Annotated Hamas Bibliography: In-Depth Assessments, Analyses, Objectives and Regional Implications

This curated and expansive bibliography on Hamas-Israel relations goes back to the late 1980s, with multiple additions found since the eruption of the Hamas-Israel War on October 7, 2023, Hezbollah’s joining of the war against Israel the next day, and the Iranian-Israeli military encounters, hostage negotiations, cease-fires, and ancillary impacts upon the domestic politics of Israel and her contiguous neighbors. Multiple events locally, regionally and internationally are covered. 

Of particular note are 18 CIE short videos compiled by CIE interns of remarks made by analysts and scholars who graciously participated in our weekly Hamas-Israel war webinars. The videos cover Hezbollah, Hamas, Iranian engagement, and the pernicious outpouring of antisemitism in response to the war. The entire bibliography covers the decade-long struggle with the PLO/PA for leadership among Palestinians, the formation and ideology of Hamas found in multiple languages, statements by Hamas leaders, and more. We have included reputable surveys of Palestinian public opinion and Israeli opinions from the Israel Democracy Institute and American Jewish Committee. All entries are logged by date, beginning with the most recent. CIE-produced materials are included as well as reference to  CIE’s 35 webinars on the war are listed at the end of the compilation and on the website here; each of those webinars runs roughly 45 minutes, with both audio and visual versions. Some 80 experts, scholars, writers and analysts were interviewed on the webinars; each provides an insightful assessment about Israel and the war from regional and international perspectives. Learners, researchers, clergy, teachers and others could use the webinars as starting points for discussions, a lecture series or a full course on the war.

We are certain we have listed only a small fraction of the excellent analytical prose or digital materials that have appeared.  Before we annotated two or three excellent articles published monthly we have curated a list of some of the best materials and curated by our staff, we have listed several dozen. A review of CIE’s monthly curated contemporary readings, using Control F in word, and searching for Hamas, will certainly call up dozens of articles of merit. 

Below the first series of listings of what we consider the best readings, we have for each month curated two articles to annotate with in-depth summaries. The bibliography is long with most of the entries in front of a pay wall. When we posted these items the links were all live. A major shortcoming of the bibliography is the absence of entries in multiple foreign languages. 

— Ken Stein, April 4, 2025

Ghaith al-Omari, “Hamas Has Fractured the Arab World,” Foreign Affairs, October 13, 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/israel/hamas-has-fractured-arab-world

Meir Litvak, “The Islamization of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict: the Case of Hamas,” Middle Eastern Studies, January 1998 (with permission), https://ciestaging.wpengine.com/meir-litvak-the-islamization-of-the-palestinian-israeli-conflict-the-case-of-hamas

Michael Milshtein, “ Why Is It So Difficult for Israel to Decipher Hamas?” The Jerusalem Strategic Tribune, December 2023, https://jstribune.com/milsthein-why-is-it-so-difficult-for-israel-to-decipher-Hamas/

Asher Susser, “The Rise of Hamas in Palestine and the Crisis of Secularism in the Arab World,” Brandeis, 2006 (79pp). (with permission)

Aaron Zeilin, “Hamas Diplomacy: From Haniyeh to Sinwar,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, PolicyWatch 3921 August 28, 2024, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/hamas-diplomacy-haniyeh-sinwar

Neomi Neumann, “What if Gaza’s ‘Day After’ Converges With the Day After Abbas?” PolicyWatch 3894, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, July 1, 2024, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/what-if-gazas-day-after-converges-day-after-abbas

“US Policy in the Post-October 7 Middle East, Looking Back and Looking Forward,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Dana Stroul, Dennis Ross, David Schenker, Robert Satloff, October 2, 2024.

“A Short History of Hamas,” (Español), (Portuguese), Center for Israel Education, October 28, 2023.

“Hamas Charter Totally Rejects Israel and Zionism — 1988,” (Español), Center for Israel Education, October 23, 2023.

“Jimmy Carter’s Hamas Decade of Embrace,” Center for Israel Education, October 29, 2023.

“International Voices Urging the Recognition of Hamas as a Legitimate Political Actor,” Center for Israel Education, October 30, 2023.

“Quotations From Hamas Sources Expressing Hatred for Zionism, Israel, and Jews, 1988-Present,” (Español) (Portuguese), Center for Israel Education, June 4, 2024.

Timeline Hamas-Israel Relations with events, statements, and previous clashers, 1988-Present, Center for Israel Education, June 2024.

Annotated Hamas Bibliography –in-depth assessments, organization, operations, objectives, and regional relations, May 2025

Pitfalls for the Trump administration to avoid in its talks with Tehran; Qatari money and antisemitism on campus Frannie Block and Maya Sulkin, “Qatar and China Are Pouring Billions Into Elite American Universities,” The Free Press, April 27, 2025, https://www.thefp.com/p/explosion-in-foreign-funding-for-american-universities?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email
Amid President Trump’s push for universities to disclose their foreign funding sources, the role of Qatari money in American higher education has come under renewed scrutiny. In this open-access article for the largely paywall-protected Free Press, two reporters follow the money trail of foreign contributions to American universities, tracing it to its Qatari and Chinese sources in particular. The reporters discovered that foreign contributions to American universities have surged in recent years, amounting to nearly $29 billion between 2021 and 2024. Qatar and China have been two of the of the main donor countries. Now, considering Qatar is the Arab country closest to Hamas, its generosity to the American academy carries far-reaching implications for Israel and American Jews. In fact, no country has donated more to American universities–$6.3 billion–since the federal government started tracking foreign largesse to American universities forty years ago. Nearly a third of this Qatar money was spent from 2021 to 2024. The reporters note that’s likely more than coincidental that the universities that have been the main beneficiaries of foreign donations have also been “the universities exploding with anti-Israel protests.” Citing a 2024 study in Frontiers of Social Psychology, they note “a strong correlation between universities that receive foreign funding from authoritarian countries and a rise in antisemitic incidents.”

Matthew Levitt, “Ending Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Program Is Not Enough,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 25, 2025, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/ending-irans-nuclear-weapons-program-not-enough
In this op-ed for the Boston Globe, Matthew Levitt, director of the Reinhard Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence at The Washington Institute.for Near East Policy, argues that the talks underway between Iran and the Trump administrations must not be limited to the nuclear portfolio. Iran’s regional subversion must also be addressed, all the more given Iranian backing for the October 7 attack and ongoing Iranian support for Houthi efforts to disrupt maritime commerce. Levitt observes that, despite Tehran’s eagerness for sanctions relief, Iran’s regional posture has been no more conciliatory. On the contrary. He quotes the US intelligence community’s latest annual threat assessment report, stating, “Tehran will continue its efforts to counter Israel and press the United States to leave the region by aiding and arming its loose connection of like-minded terrorist and militant actors.” The U.S., Levitt continues, should make every effort to leverage Iranian weakness and demand Iran cease its support for terrorism and its human rights abuses. Otherwise, the U.S. risks a resurrection of Obama’s JCPOA, which dealt exclusively with the nuclear portfolio. “Unless the president plans to capitulate to Iranian terrorism and unilaterally terminate all Iran sanctions, even without an Iranian commitment to cease sponsoring terrorism or engaging in other malign activities, then the same problem will face these new negotiations.”

Yaakov Lappin, “Israel Applying Lessons Learned from October 7,” The Jerusalem Strategic Tribune, March 2025, https://jstribune.com/lappin-israel-applying-lessons-learned-from-october-7/

In this essay in the Jerusalem Strategic Tribune, veteran military analyst Yaakov Lappin surveys corrective measures taken by the IDF since October 7. But before he engages with this, the article’s focal subject, he discusses Hamas’ conception of the October 7 attack, reconstructing it from documents seized in Gaza. Then, Lappin reviews the Jewish state’s operational and intelligence failures that allowed the attack to happen. Proceeding to the crux of his essay, Lappin details “significant changes in IDF doctrine, particularly regarding rapid response capabilities and preemptive action.” At the practical level, a new air force command structure has been established with a view to real-time coordination between units on the ground and in the air. A “Participation and Borders Air Group” has likewise been set up to undertake aerial surveillance of vulnerable borderland, a force that works hand and hand with ground troops. Specifically to counter Hamas’s guerilla tactics (tunnel warfare and urban entrenchment), “special forces units and frontline combat teams have undergone extensive training.” These and other reforms have found useful application as war has worn on. The change in the IDF’s strategic doctrine has also been observable in recent months. As has been seen in Syria and Lebanon in the past four months, the IDF’s post-October 7 commitment to preemption (forestalling aggression instead of responding to it) stands in stark contrast to Israel’s prewar passivity. 

Majid Rafizadeh, “Iran’s Nuclear Programme and the Possibility of Military Action,” Al Majalla, March 29, 2025, https://en.majalla.com/node/324938/politics/irans-nuclear-programme-and-possibility-military-action​

Iranian-American political scientist Majid Rafizadeh, whose sympathy for Israel and antipathy to the Islamic Republic are no secret, is a columnist for the Saudi-owned English-language magazine al-Majalla. In light of President Trump’s recent ultimatum to Iran to halt nuclear enrichment and ballistic missile production or face possible military action, Rafizadeh casts an eye toward the future, exploring Tehran’s likely response as well as Israel’s and America’s possible rejoinder. He notes that Trump’s conditions are non-starters for Tehran. Iran, after all, regards its nuclear capability as the regime’s lifeline: “Full nuclear disarmament is simply not an option for a country whose national security heavily relies on its nuclear capability.” For its part, Iran would prefer to a return to an Obama-style nuclear accord. Rafizadeh then looks at America’s and Israel’s possible courses of action. Washington and Jerusalem seem to be in agreement about the urgency of a reckoning with Tehran over its nuclear program, Iran being closer than ever to achieving nuclear breakout capability. Rafizadeh observes, “If Israel were to take military action, it is almost certain that the US would provide logistical and intelligence support and possibly even direct military assistance.” Finally, Rafizadeh points out that in the event of an Israeli attack, Iran’s options for retaliation have narrowed such that Tehran could only attempt a small and face-saving, if operationally meaningless, counterattack. 

Annotated Hamas Bibliography –in-depth assessments, organization, operations,

objectives, and regional relations, February 2025

The findings of the IDF’s probes into the failures of October 7 and striking Iran while the iron is hot https://www.timesofisrael.com/767-troops-faced-5000-terrorists-gaza-division-was-overrun-for-hours-idf-oct-7-probe/?utm_campaign=most_popular&utm_source=website&utm_medium=article_end&utm_content=2

In this article in The Times of Israel, military affairs correspondent Emanuel Fabian synthesizes the findings of the IDF’s reports on its failures on October 7. The recently completed reports are the products of monthslong probes by various branches of the IDF–namely, the Southern Command, Operations Division, Israeli Air Force, and Israeli Navy. Fabian summarizes the reports’ account of the Hamas onslaught itself, noting that the invasion on October 7 proceeded in three main waves, the first between 6:30 and 7 a.m., the second between 7 and 9 a.m., and the third between 9 a.m. and 4 p.m. All told, as many as 5,600 terrorists crossed into Israel on October 7, the number of infiltrators dropping off with each of the three successive waves. Fabian then turns his attention to the IDF’s most costly failures that day. He observes that the Gaza Envelope was so woefully undermanned that dawn on October 7 found just 767 soldiers deployed in the Gaza perimeter. Then Fabian, on the reports’ authority, explains the IDF’s inability to reinforce the already thin military presence on the border. He notes that the principal problem that hindered the IDF from coming to the aid of the embattled western Negev was the general staff’s lack of situational awareness. With the Gaza Division’s headquarters overrun by terrorists, the Southern Command and Operations Directorate could not gain a clear picture of what was unfolding. This opacity was made all the worse by a breakdown in command and control. Many company and platoon commanders were killed that morning, the Gaza Division’s Southern Brigade commander among them. Access was another obstacle to the dispatch of support for the Gaza Division. With roads blocked and terrorists lying in wait alongside them, thoroughfares and service streets became practically impassable. Intervening from the air 

presented certain difficulties of its own too. Distinguishing between terrorists and civilians was particularly challenging for the pilots. Also, with situational awareness so limited, the IAF faced many of the same problems as the ground forces, target prioritization especially. For instance, the IAF, on the mistaken assumption that tunnels were being used for cross-border infiltration, concentrated its firepower on destroying these passageways. Nor was the Israeli Navy prepared for Hamas’s seven speedboats when they attempted an amphibious landing. Israeli naval patrols did manage to take out five of the speedboats, but the terrorists on the two that avoided interdiction made it ashore, killing 17 Israelis on Zikim Beach. 

Michael Makovsky and John Hannah, “No More Talk: It’s Time to Destroy Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Program,” Newsweek, February 3, 2025, https://www.newsweek.com/no-more-talk-its-time-destroy-irans-nuclear-weapons-program-opinion-2024468

In this article in Newsweek, scholars Michael Makovsky, president and CEO of the Jewish Institute for National Security of America, and John Hannah, a lawyer and a senior fellow at several eminent think thanks, make the case that the time is ripe for Israel to do what it’s been considering for almost 15 years: strike Iran’s nuclear facilities. Makovsky and Hannah contend that Iran has shown time and again that diplomacy is ineffective and Iranian good faith unthinkable. This makes military action the only option if Iran is to be stopped from becoming the tenth country in the world to possess a nuclear arsenal. Makovsky and Hannah stress the urgency of an attack for several reasons. First, Iranian skies are more vulnerable than ever. Israel neutralized Iranian air defenses in its two attacks last year, leaving Iranian nuclear installations exposed to Israeli strikes. It’s only a matter of time before Moscow helps Iran restore its air defenses. Second, given the erosion of Iranian deterrence and the crippling of its proxies and clients–none more so than Hezbollah–Iran’s longstanding bid for nuclear weapons has gathered more momentum. Meanwhile, if Iran’s willingness to obtain nuclear weapons has deepened, its ability to develop them has improved. “In a month, it [Iran] could have 10-bombs’ worth of highly enriched uranium,” Makovsky and Hannah estimate. Another time-sensitive factor is the expiration on October 18 of the provision of the 2015 nuclear deal that empowers Britain and France (signatories to the agreement) to institute “snapback” sanctions on Tehran. Makovsky and Hannah further argue that the United States should carry out the attack with Israel, given the greater earth-penetrating capabilities of American bunker busters. Failing that, Washington could provide Jerusalem with precision-guided weapons and aerial refueling tankers. 

Annotated Hamas Bibliography –in-depth assessments, organization, operations,

objectives, and regional relations, January 2025

The reasons a cease-fire agreement was finally concluded and Iran’s quest for nuclear weapons and the Trump administration’s preventative options 

David Makovsky, “What the Israel-Hamas Ceasefire in Gaza Means for the Middle East,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 17, 2025, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/what-israel-hamas-ceasefire-gaza-means-middle-east

In this article, David Makovsky, veteran Middle East analyst and director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy Project on the Middle East Peace Process, analyzes the reasons that, after fifteen months of fighting, the cease-fire deal was finally struck. He begins by detailing all the recent blows sustained by Iran’s “Axis of Resistance,” Tehran’s regional network of anti-Israel clients and proxies: Hamas and Hezbollah have been decimated, the latter having withdrawn from the war in November; the Assad dynasty has fallen in Syria, replaced by a regime hostile to Iran; Tehran’s air defenses have been neutralized and its ballistic missile production degraded. Makovsky then looks at the impact of President Trump’s imminent return to office in leading to the cease-fire. Seeing as President Trump was intent on a cease-fire, Netanyahu was determined not to defy the incoming president and alienate him on the eve of his return to office. Though less important, the same consideration likely influenced the two American allies that brokered the agreement, Egypt and Qatar. For its part, Hamas, of course, was not concerned about Trump’s goodwill, but the terrorist organization does fear Trump more than it did Biden. This, together with Hamas’s recognition that it “would not get a better deal under President-elect Donald Trump” softened its position. As for the Trump presidency itself, Netanyahu probably acceded to the agreement with an eye to the future. The specter of a nuclear Iran looms, and the prospect of a peace agreement with Saudi Arabia beckons, two things with which Netanyahu must be able to count on President Trump’s help. 

Michael Singh, “Policy Steps to Prevent a Nuclear Iran,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy Notes 154, January 28, 2025, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/policy-steps-prevent-nuclear-iran

In this study on Iran at the outset of the second Trump presidency, Washington Institute scholar Michael Singh combines analytical insights and policy prescriptions. As his point of departure, Singh calls attention to a striking paradox: While Iran has never been weaker, it has also never been closer to nuclear weaponization. The two premises of this paradox, though seemingly contradictory, are in fact complementary, as it is Iran’s weakness that is accelerating its pursuit of nuclear weaponry. Iran’s nuclear “breakout time” is now a week or less, down from the 3.5 months it stood at four years ago. Meanwhile, as Iran has made strides toward the militarization of its nuclear program, its cooperation with the IAEA has dropped off. So has the regime’s messaging about the legitimacy of nuclear weapons. After years of declaring nuclear weapons contrary to Islam, the regime has retreated from this position, vowing that acquiring such munitions would be a natural response to the threat Iran faces. Singh looks at Iran’s revised calculus as regards nuclear weapons. By obtaining these munitions, Iran would not only restore the potency it lost in 2024, but it would also heighten it: “The possession of nuclear weapons would dramatically enhance Iran’s deterrence. Any country confronting Iran directly would be risking not just regional war, but a nuclear exchange.” Amid Tehran’s march toward becoming the tenth country to possess nuclear weapons, the Trump administration, Singh observes, would “be remiss not to consider, and indeed prepare seriously for, military strikes against Iran’s nuclear program.” Singh observes that preventing a nuclear Iran by diplomacy would be “less costly,” but the pitfalls of such a course, given the nature of the Iranian regime, would be considerable. That said, Singh writes that, where Iran is concerned, diplomacy and coercion are not mutually exclusive, but synergistic: “Rather than choosing between diplomacy and military action, the Trump administration should think of these options as mutually supporting.” 

Annotated Hamas Bibliography — in-depth assessments, organization, operations, objectives, and regional assessments, December 2024

Assad’s fall is an unprecedented setback for Iran’s regional ambitions; one devout Egyptian Arab nationalist, Abdel Moneim Said, bemoans the state of the Arab state and acknowledges for too long, Arabs themselves have blamed others for their own failure.

Majid Rafizadeh, “Biggest Blow to Iranian Power Since 1979: The Fall of al-Assad and Loss of Strategic Ally,” al-Arabiya, December 12, 2024, https://english.alarabiya.net/views/2024/12/12/biggest-blow-to-iranian-power-since-1979-the-fall-of-syria-and-loss-of-strategic-ally

Writing in al-Arabiya, Iranian-born Middle East scholar Majid Rafizadeh analyzes the implications, for Iran, of the fall of the Assad regime. Assad’s ouster is indeed a crushing blow to Iran, Syria having been Iran’s oldest and closest Arab ally as well as the central node in its so-called “Axis of Resistance.” By way of Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, Iran had boasted a continuous arc of territory between the Caspian to the Mediterranean Seas. For decades, this land bridge had been a crucial highway for the transit of Iranian weapons and personnel throughout the Fertile Crescent. It was through this corridor, moreover, that Iran had been able to press its 45-year offensive, through its proxies–Hezbollah most especially–against the Jewish state. The loss of Syria, in effect, severs this land bridge, depriving Iran of its resupply route to Hezbollah, its positions in Syria not far from the Israeli border, and its Syrian munitions factories and military installations. Besides its operational, logistical, and military consequences, the end of the Assad dynasty spells a strategic defeat for Iran, representing as it does “the unraveling of Iran’s regional strategy.” Although the factions that ousted Assad are no friends of the Jewish state, the chief benefit of Assad’s ouster, as far as Israel is concerned, is that Iran has ceased to be–as al-Julani, post-Assad Syria’s foremost figure put it–“a “playground for Iranian ambitions.” Rafizadeh doesn’t exaggerate when he proclaims the major setback for Iran “the most significant blow to Iranian power in the region since the 1979 revolution.”

Abdel Moneim Said, “The Syrian Tragedy,” December 10, 2024, Al-Ahram On-Line

“Syria is not alone in experiencing the recurring cycle of misery. We see it in other Arab countries whose national experiments failed to establish a cohesive state based on a common national identity, national culture, and geopolitical and economic interests. Arab intellectuals and thinkers still typically argue that all this disunity and fragmentation is the product of colonial era arrangements and territorial partitions, such as the Sykes-Picot Agreement. It is as though more than a century is not enough for that argument to have lost its efficacy. To some extent, the tendency to fall back on colonial machinations and the implantation of Israel in the region stems from the inclination to deny responsibility for the failure to build a nation state able to sustain the cohesion of the polity and flourish. For some time, the preferred alternative to that effort was to leap into the unknown by expanding the political realm to establish a single pan-Arab state or, for some, to resurrect the Islamic caliphate after the Turks renounced it. Perhaps people’s vision was too blurred to see a successful, sustainable, and undivided Arab national state with citizens who were not constantly at each other’s throats and without being overrun by jihadist groups or rapid support forces. The tragedy experienced by Syria and other Arab countries is, sadly, all too familiar. What we see unfolding today in our geographic proximity is heartrending, all the more so in the light of its historical precedents and the failure to remedy its underlying causes. There is always a scapegoat on which to lay the blame, whether Western colonialism in the past or Zionist settler colonialism in the present, so as to avoid facing up to responsibility for the root cause that has left Arab countries open to such constant attrition. This root cause is the absence of a modern nation state due to the inability to develop a shared national identity and a bedrock of common economic and strategic interests.”

Annotated Hamas Bibliography — in-depth assessments, organization, operations, objectives, and regional relations, November 2024

Reforming UNRWA’s and UNIFIL’s mandates and an infographic with commentary on Iran’s uranium stockpiling and enrichment.

Seth J. Frantzman, “If We Want Peace, UNRWA and UNIFIL Must Both Be Completely Reformed,” The Jewish Chronicle, November 27, 2024, https://www.thejc.com/lets-talk/analysis/if-we-want-peace-unrwa-and-unifil-must-both-be-completely-reformed-sca3vfa3

Since October 7, United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) have increasingly come under fire for their complicity or, worse, their participation in attacks against Israel. Criticism of the two UN apparatuses is nothing new, but the flagrancy over their hostile acts against Israel since October 7 has raised a louder-than-ever outcry against them. In this piece for Britain’s flagship Jewish newspaper, The Jewish Chronicle, Israeli-American analyst Seth Frantzman considers measures that could be taken to overhaul UNRWA and UNIFIL. Frantzman argues that serious reform must begin with changing the organizations’ mandates. UNRWA “needs to be mandated to report on Hamas’ criminal activities” while UNIFIL “needs to fulfil its mandate and stop having its 10,000 soldiers sit behind walls and pretend Hezbollah doesn’t exist.” Frantzman notes that, far from reporting candidly on Hamas’s interdiction of humanitarian aid, UNRWA has repeatedly covered for the terrorist group. In its reports, it signally fails to identify the “unnamed looters” from Hamas who requisition aid. Not to be outdone, UNIFIL runs interference for Hezbollah by referring to Hezbollah terrorists who impede their work as “non-state actors.” This practice of anonymizing Hamas and Hezbollah terrorists must end, Frantzman insists, and their organizational affiliations must be recorded in official reports. Frantzman concludes, “It’s time for the international community to ensure the UN mandates in Gaza and Lebanon change. The UN needs to focus on preventing Hamas and Hezbollah rule. Only then can civilians live in peace in Israel, Gaza and Lebanon.”

“Will Iran Eventually Have a Nuclear Weapon?” Al Majalla, November 26, 2024, https://en.majalla.com/node/323214/infographics/will-iran-eventually-have-nuclear-weapon

The English-language, Saudi-owned weekly Al Majalla presents a useful annotated infographic charting the increase of Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium from 2015 to the present. The infographic tracks two increases in particular: the quantity of Iran’s total stockpile of enriched uranium and the grade of its enrichment. (For reference, twenty-five kilograms enriched to weapons grade–90% purity–is needed for one nuclear weapon.) The infographic shows that while Iran was a party to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)–the accord that President Obama considered his foremost foreign policy achievement–its known stockpile of enriched uranium was not refined beyond 3.67%, the threshold stipulated under the agreement. The infographic shows, however, that even after President Trump withdrew from the agreement in 2018, Iran only enriched its stockpile modestly. It wasn’t until President Biden took office that things changed. At the end of President Trump’s first term, Iranian enrichment of its uranium stockpile stood at 4.5%. By the end of Biden’s first year in office, however, it had soared to 60%.

Annotated Hamas Bibliography –in-depth assessments, organization, operations,

objectives, and regional relations, October 2024

A native Gazan describes Hamas’s efforts to prevent the evacuation of civilians, new revelations about UNRWA, and Israel’s first direct attack against Iran

Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib, “An Uncomfortable Fact That Many Don’t Want to Acknowledge,” X, 

October 23, 2024, https://twitter.com/afalkhatib/status/1849134429467222383

Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib, senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, is no ordinary analyst. If being a native Gazan who comments in English on Palestinian affairs makes him unusual, being one who champions non-violence and a two-state solution makes him unique. In this 700-word op-ed on X, Alkhatib details attempt by Hamas, from the beginning of the war, to hinder Palestinian civilians from fleeing northern Gaza. Not only were Gazans barred access to the tunnels into which Hamas fighters disappeared, their evacuation out of harm’s way was foiled. He quotes a Hamas spokesman who, early in the war, openly declared, “We cannot tolerate civilians leaving us alone to the Israelis.” Although it is well known that Hamas’s strategy is “to delegitimize Israel and high casualties which generate high pressure on the Israeli government to ultimately stop the war,” testimony to this effect from an insider like Alkhatib is no common occurrence. Alkhatib further describes how Hamas “wanted to hide behind the civilian population, which was told not to leave and to ‘hold the land.’”

Benny Morris, “The Shifting Sands of War,” Quillette, October 28, 2024, https://quillette.com/2024/10/28/war-comes-to-iran-israel-gaza-nuclear-weapons/

In this essay on Jerusalem’s first-ever direct attack against Iran, Israel’s best-known living historian, Benny Morris, analyzes the operation itself and its consequences. Morris opens with a detailed description of the aerial assault. The strike was executed by a 140-strong armada of F-15s, F-16s, and F-35s. In three sorties spanning two hours in total, the Israeli aircraft fired on some 20 sites from the Persian Gulf in the south to Tehran in the north. The targets were of three main types: air defense batteries, military-industrial plants, and the Revolutionary Guard’s missile bases and depots. Seeing that the targets were all military, it would seem that Prime Minister Netanyahu acceded to President Biden’s pressure that Israel spare Iran’s oil infrastructure and nuclear installations. Morris then surveys the war, since October 2023, on the northern front. When Hezbollah began rocketing Israel on October 8, it began what Morris calls the Third Lebanon War. He notes that until September 2024, both sides showed restraint, limiting their war-making. Hezbollah didn’t lob rockets at Haifa or Gush Dan (the Tel Aviv metropolitan area), and Israel restricted its strikes to southernmost of Hezbollah’s three main concentrations in Lebanon. Until September 2024, Lebanon was a sideshow to the war underway in the main theater of conflict, Gaza. But this has changed in the past two months. Morris devotes the second half of this long-form piece to contextualizing the war in Israeli history. 

Asaf Romirowsky, “History Shows Congress Made the Correct Choice in Cutting Off UNRWA Funding,” The Hill, October 23, 2024, https://thehill.com/opinion/4947340-unrwa-hamas-leader-sinwar/

In this op-ed, Israeli scholar Asaf Romirowsky, a leading authority on UNRWA, considers recent developments in the ongoing scandal about the relief organization. Controversial since its founding in 1949, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency ostensibly sees after the welfare of Palestinian refugees scattered throughout the Middle East. The organization has long been faulted for doing much to aggravate the Israeli-Palestinian  conflict, and never more so since October 7. Since January, when it emerged that many UNRWA employees, most notably 

Hamas’s finance minister, participated in the October 7 massacre and abductions, the organization has been rocked by scandal. In this op-ed, Romirowsky presents an update on UNRWA’s woes days after an UNRWA employee’s passport was found on Yahya Sinwar’s person. Romirowsky observes that Israeli documents recently made public identify at least 440 employees in Gaza are Hamas fighters and 2,000 more are registered members of the organization. More than half of UNRWA’s 13,000 employees in Gaza have immediate family members in Hamas. Romirowsky then looks at the American government’s inconsistent response to the recent exposure of UNRWA’s dubious deeds. While Congress passed an “unprecedented appropriations bill earlier this year that bans all funding for UNRWA,” the Biden administration has been less firm. President Biden not only supports restoring funding for UNRWA, but when the relatives of Israelis slain on October 7 sued UNRWA in federal court in New York for its complicity, the Department of Justice intervened on UNRWA’s behalf. The Justice Department filed a brief stating, “The United Nations is absolutely immune from suit and legal process absent an express waiver of immunity.”

Annotated Hamas Bibliography — in-depth assessments, organization, operations, objectives, and regional relations, September 2024

The intelligence behind Israel’s many recent successes in its campaign against Hezbollah; American support for Israel that’s qualified and conditional.

Mehul Srivastava, James Shotter, Charles Clover, and Raya Jalabi, “How Israeli Spies Penetrated Hizbollah,” Financial Times, September 29, 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/6638813e-e246-4409-9a38-95bf60a220a8

This detailed article was published in the Financial Times in the immediate aftermath of Hassan Nasrallah’s assassination. Written by four authors with insider knowledge and with access to well-placed sources, the article traces the improvement of Israel’s intelligence-gathering related to Hezbollah. The article makes plain that Israel’s highly effective campaign of targeted assassinations against Hezbollah brass didn’t begin in July, when it took out Fuad Shukr, a senior commander; it was years in the making. It began after the 2006 Second Lebanon War, in which Israel fell far short of its declared objective to destroy Hezbollah. After Israel’s poor showing in the 2006 war, Israeli intelligence underwent a conceptual change vis-a-vis Hezbollah. No longer would Jerusalem look upon Hezbollah as merely a band of well-armed guerilla fighters; it would view the organization holistically, as a political party with, in many respects, a conventional army.

But for Hezbollah as an organization and for Hezbollah watchers in Israeli intelligence it was the terrorist group’s entry into the Syrian Civil War on the side of the government that proved to be the crucial turning point. When Hezbollah deployed to Syria in 2012, it exposed itself to infiltration by Israel and afforded Israel a more complete picture of the organization’s operation: e.g., “who was in charge of Hezbollah’s operations, who was getting promoted, who was corrupt, and who had just returned from an unexplained trip.” Amid its participation in the Syrian conflict, Hezbollah needed more manpower, so it accelerated recruitment and brought into the organization recruits who would otherwise not have passed muster. At the same time, Hezbollah’s coordination with the Syrian army, long penetrated by Israel, meant that Israel’s intelligence pipeline to the Syrian military now extended to Hezbollah. Together with this “human intelligence,” Israel reaped a harvest of publicly available data because of Hezbollah’s participation in the Syrian Civil War. Of particular value were “martyr posters” and social media posts reporting biographical details of dead terrorists and surveillance of mourners at fighters’ funerals. Technology was also enlisted by Israeli intelligence: “spy satellites, sophisticated drones and cyber-hacking capabilities that turn mobile phones into listening devices.” With all these facilities, Israel could zero in on Hezbollah members and create the vast target bank that allowed Israel to kill eight of the organization’s nine most senior military commanders.

Michael Oren, “Israel Must Battle the ‘But,’” Clarity with Michael Oren, September 23, 2024, https://substack.com/@michaeloren/p-149277369

In this op-ed, Michael Oren, the eminent historian and former Israeli ambassador to America, probes a newish trend in American discourse about Israel: the tendency of many on the left side of the political spectrum to qualify declarations of support for Israel. Oren observes that this support for Israel is not merely conditional, it’s impossibly conditional: “In many sectors of America—indeed, throughout the West—recognition of Israel’s right to self-defense and sovereignty is now subject to a number of conditions. Few, if any, can be met.” The irony here is that the American officials who stipulate these conditions will, often in the same breath, refer to the very obstacles that make fulfilling these conditions impossible. For instance, the Biden administration made clear its resolute opposition to an Israel offensive in Rafah while at the same time declaring American support for the eradication of Hamas. The snag, of course, was that these two things are irreconcilable. Similarly, the Biden administration has upheld Israel’s right to defend itself while deploring all the casualties inflicted in the process. How exactly Israel is to defend itself without collateral damage is, of course, not specified. Oren closes this brief op-ed with an appeal: “Israel must strive to eliminate those conditions and remove the asterisks above our rights to national liberty and life. While battling both Hamas and Hezbollah, Israel must wage war against the ‘but.’”

Annotated Hamas Bibliography — in-depth assessments, organization, operations, objectives, and regional relations, August 2024

Hamas’ diplomacy since October 7, the importance of the Philadelphi Corridor 

Yossi Kuperwasser, “Israeli Presence on the Philadelphi Corridor Is Vital,” Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, August 22, 2024, https://jcpa.org/article/israeli-presence-on-the-philadelphi-corridor-is-vital/

Throughout the 17 years of Hamas supremacy over Gaza, the Philadelphi Corridor, a narrow tract of borderland between Gaza and Egypt, had been the terrorist group’s lifeline. After each of the wars Hamas provoked with Israel between 2008 and 2021, Hamas needed to be resupplied; the dozens of cross-border tunnels traversing the corridor were its supply lines. On May 7, Israel seized this narrow belt of borderland, and the Israeli government, it would seem, has no intention of relinquishing it. In this astute analysis, Yossi Kuperwasser, former head of the Research Division of IDF Military Intelligence, stresses the strategic imperative of retaining control of the Philadelphi Corridor. In his judgment, not only ought Israel to field a detachment to secure the corridor, it also ought to erect a barrier “similar to the one it built along the Gaza-Israel border. The IDF will have to be deployed along the corridor to ensure that the underground barrier, the aboveground wall, the monitoring of the Rafah crossing, and the other elements of the systems designed to prevent smuggling are functioning so that any infiltration attempt will be thwarted immediately.” Israel must learn from its past mistakes and not withdraw from the corridor, trust a third party to secure the border, and build an ineffective barrier. This means, more than anything else, using Israel manpower to secure the corridor and prevent smuggling. As Kuperwasser notes, there is “no substitute for a physical Israeli presence” in the corridor.

Aaron Zeilin, “Hamas Diplomacy: From Haniyeh to Sinwar,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Watch 3921 August 28, 2024, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/hamas-diplomacy-haniyeh-sinwar

In this rigorous analysis, Aaron Zeilin, a scholar of Islamism and a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, looks at the war Hamas has been waging on another front since the October 7 massacre: the diplomatic front. Zeilin notes that in the past eleven months, Hamas leaders have participated, online or in person, in 128 meetings with “foreign officials, political parties, [and] local NGOs,” among others. The representatives of 23 countries number among Hamas’ diplomatic interlocutors since October 7. Talks with these and other interlocutors

represent a significant increase in the terrorist organization’s diplomatic engagements since it committed the world’s deadliest terrorist attack since 9/11. While Hamas usually publicizes its diplomacy, it has, on occasion, kept certain parleys quiet so as not to cause political problems for its interlocutors. Such was the case, Zeilin notes, when Hamas opened a political office in Iraq in June. Iran, naturally, has been Hamas’ most frequent interlocutor since October 7. Next in line are two other Islamist regimes, those of Qatar and Turkey. Nor have Hamas’ diplomatic engagements been limited to Muslim countries. Zeilin notes that Hamas has been feted in South Africa–and by no less a personage than Nelson Mandela’s grandson, a Muslim convert. Part of Hamas’ rationale for its diplomatic outreach is “to situate itself as the sole voice on Palestine.” Zeilin notes that, with the assassination of Haniyeh and Sinwar’s succession as politburo chairman, Hamas’ diplomatic efforts will slacken, given Sinwar’s confinement in Gaza and his preoccupation with the war.

Annotated Hamas Bibliography — in-depth assessments, organization, operations, objectives, and regional relations, July 2024

The Washington Post’s journalistic malpractice in its Israel coverage; preparing for long wars and reducing military dependence on the United States

Robert Satloff, “Anonymous Sources in Gaza War Reporting: The Washington Post vs. Its Peers,” Policy Notes 151, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, July 29, 2024, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/anonymous-sources-gaza-war-reporting-washington-post-vs-its-peers

Media bias is an old and familiar problem in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, but the coverage of the conflict since October 7 has thrown this bias into sharper relief. Yet, of all the papers of record in the United States, none has been as slanted and even mendacious as the Washington Post. The crimes against journalism on the part of the Post, a newspaper whose Global Opinions editor endorsed the October 7 pogrom, have been numerous: denying Hamas’ use of Gaza’s al-Shifa Hospital, criticizing the family of a hostage for not condemning the death toll among Gazans, reproducing Hamas’s casualty figures uncritically, falsely claiming Israel has a policy of separating families. The list goes on. In this study, Robert Satloff of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy establishes that the Washington Post’s reportage has relied inordinately on anonymous sources. The Washington Institute assembled a database of 436 stories about the war in different outlets, and of these, “the Washington Post was responsible for 72 percent of all the citations of Gaza-related unofficial anonymous sources—more than five times as many as both the New York Times (8) and all the other major U.S. media platforms combined (8).” This is a major breach of journalistic ethics, which hold that anonymous sourcing is to be used only as a last resort, when there is no alternative for reporting essential information. Satloff finds that the Post compounded the problem of undue reliance on these sources by presenting their informants’ testimonies in a biased manner: “A detailed review of the Post’s Gaza coverage shows that more than 80 percent of the total were secondary subjects often providing a confirming quotation or color to complement observations from named sources.”

Yaakov Lapin, “A New Era of Long Wars,” Jerusalem Strategic Tribune, July 2024, https://jstribune.com/lappin-a-new-era-of-long-wars/

In this article, veteran military analyst Yaakov Lappin considers the effects of Operation Swords on Israeli strategy and military doctrine. The era of lightning assaults on conventional armies is long over, and Israeli warfare needs to be revised accordingly. The solution, writes Lappin, is “balancing operational resilience and resource management while maintaining strategic agility.” In the matter of weaponry, Israel must enlarge its stockpile of munitions, boost domestic production, and diversify its sources of ammunition imports. The Israeli Defense Ministry has already taken a step in this direction, formulating a plan called “Independence,” under which Israel has already increased its production of air-to-ground munitions and shells. Lappin opines that “domestic production will not be able to keep up with the rate of wartime usage. The key is to ensure that Israel can amass a substantial stockpile swiftly before the next lengthy war begins.” Lappin further observes that “the scenario of a drawn-out conflict with Hezbollah means Israel must also stockpile food, medicine, and fuel, and ensure that every sector of the economy can function, meaning that government planners must look beyond military affairs.”

Neomi Neumann, “What If Gaza’s ‘Day After’ Converges With the Day After Abbas?” PolicyWatch 3894, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, July 1, 2024, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/what -if-gazas-day-after-converges-day-after-abbas

Neomi Neumann, former head of the Shin Bet’s research unit, considers the effects of October 7 and the ensuing war on the Palestinian Authority (PA). She observes that Hamas’s successes have reinvigorated a flagging commitment to the “resistance agenda” among some Palestinians. The triumph of the PA’s rival has forced it to acknowledge that, if it wants to remain relevant, it will have to “continue taking confrontational steps toward Israel.” This is not to say that Abbas will call for a third intifada. Rather, he will pursue other “potential avenues for provocation, including diplomatic moves abroad (e.g., promoting international recognition of a Palestinian state) and internal actions (e.g., reconciling with Hamas, calling for elections, and raising the possibility of integrating more Palestinian factions into the institutions of the Palestine Liberation Organization).” Since Hamas has shown that “resistance pays,” Abbas or his successor will have to reconcile with Hamas and reach a modus vivendi of some kind. Meanwhile, the aggression of Palestinians in the West Bank, the PA’s fiefdom, is mounting, the violence in the territory reaching its highest level since 2002.

Annotated Hamas Bibliography — in-depth assessments, organization, operations, objectives, and regional relations, June 2024

Ben-Dror Yemeni, “Khamenei Is Leading Israel Like a Lamb to Geopolitical Slaughter,” Ynet, June 04, 2024, https://www.ynetnews.com/article/byicgnhvc

Ben-Dror Yemeni, one of Israel’s most esteemed journalists, analyzes a recent speech by Iranian supreme leader Ali Khamenei. Yemeni laments Israel’s historical tendency to discount the hawkish declarations of its enemies. Instead of taking a sober look at this bellicosity, Israelis have tended to dismiss it as saber-rattling bluster. He reminds his readers of Yasser Arafat’s notorious remark, at the height of the Oslo peace process, that the agreement was no more than a tactical ceasefire, not a peace treaty. He then adduces the more recent–not to mention, more relevant–example of Yahya Sinwar’s 2018 vow to “rip the hearts of Israelis out of their bodies.” “It’s high time we truly listen,” advises Yemeni, and in that spirit, he unpacks Khamenei’s warmongering speech. Khamenei declared that “al-Aqsa Flood” (Hamas’s name for the October 7 onslaught) “came at the right moment to halt the regional power shift.” By this, the supreme leader means, in Yemeni’s interpretation, that the massacre arrested Israel’s regional normalization, undermined Jerusalem’s relations with its Arab partners, and “invigorated” Iran’s so-called resistance axis. Khamenei further declared that Iran seeks the “perpetual harassment” of Israel, the gradual erosion of Israel’s defenses, its morale, and its international standing. Yemeni concludes by affirming that “Khamenei’s recent words underscore his intent to thwart this alliance [the Israel-Sunni Arab bloc], isolate Israel, and fortify the resistance axis bombarding Israel from every direction. He meant every word.”

Annotated Hamas Bibliography — in-depth assessments, organization, operations, objectives, and regional relations, May 2024

Israel’s conceptual and operational mistakes leading up to October 7; the evolution of American Jewry’s response to the Hamas massacre and the war; the folly of expecting Hezbollah to agree to disarm 

Amir Oren, “Gaza-lighting: How Israel’s Weakest Foe Became its Worst Enemy,” Jerusalem Strategic Tribune, May 2024, https://jstribune.com/oren-gaza-lighting/

This essay by Amir Oren, a celebrated Israeli journalist who writes on security and intelligence affairs, is an extended response to a question he asks at the outset: “How could it happen that Israel’s weakest enemy turned out to be its most lethal?” His short answer: “a grave failure of imagination.” Oren details what he calls Israeli “self-deception,” the complacent view that Hamas was a mere “nuisance” and a deterred one at that. This miscalculation relaxed Israeli vigilance, leaving the Gaza Envelope poorly defended. With Israel’s underbelly exposed, Hamas was able to succeed “beyond Sinwar’s wildest dreams” by “go[ing] al-out.” Moving from a conceptual to an operational analysis, Oren then observes that once the era of conventional warfare between states had ended, Israel allowed itself to go from being the formidable “air-and-armor lightning military machine of 1967” to becoming a glorified police force–”a constabulary, an occupying force fighting terror and guarding settlements and roads.” A military focused on guard duty and counterinsurgency, in other words, is not one prepared for confrontations like the Second Lebanon War, let alone Swords of Iron.

David Schenker, “An Israel-Lebanon Agreement May Not Be Worth the Costs,” PolicyWatch 3868, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 14, 2024, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/israel-lebanon-agreement-may-not-be-worth-costs

Veteran Middle East watcher and former Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, David Schenker turns our attention to the northern front in the current war, as he examines the prospects and the wisdom of an Israel-Lebanon agreement. Such an agreement, which the Biden administration has been pressing for, would theoretically end the hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah. Whether such an agreement is possible, however, is another matter. Schenker, for his part, elaborates his view that an Israel-Hezbollah agreement is neither possible nor desirable, as Hezbollah would not accept non-belligerency with Israel. The agreement under discussion is based on UN Security Council Resolution 1701, the UN resolution that ended the 2006 Second Lebanon War but did not end, as it quixotically attempted to, the Israel-Hezbollah conflict. Intended to correct the defects of Resolution 1701, the proposed agreement would “redeploy Hezbollah’s Radwan special forces seven to ten kilometers north of the border, close to but not necessarily beyond the Litani River” and station “15,000 troops from the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) along the frontier.” There are several other provisions of the proposed agreement, but the foregoing are, arguably, its two most ambitious clauses. As expected, the draft agreement did not find a favorable reception on the Lebanese side. The obvious reason that Hezbollah is averse to such an agreement is that it contradicts its “articulated raison d’etre [of] fighting the Israeli ‘occupation’ of Lebanon.” Schenker speculates that Hezbollah will try to take advantage of the American push for an agreement by extracting concessions, most notably the installation of a Hezbollah ally as Lebanon’s next president. Thus, Hezbollah will win concessions without making any itself: “Hezbollah will not adhere to any deal Beirut reaches with Washington and Paris. The lesson from 2008 is that the group will pocket whichever provisions benefit its position at home and the interests of its sponsors in Iran while ultimately disregarding the rest.”

Steven Windmueller, “In the Wake of October 7: Reflections on the American Jewish Community,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, May 20, 2024, https://jcpa.org/in-the-wake-of-october-7-reflections-on-the-american-jewish-community/

In this study, Steven Windmueller, an expert on “Jewish communal studies,” analyzes the response of American Jews to October 7 and the war Hamas launched. He begins by asserting that history will remember October 7 as a turning point in Jewish-American experience, “a new moment in time for Jews in this country.” The Hamas massacre, he explains, has brought about “seismic shifts” in the world’s second-largest Jewish community, shifts that have transformed American Jews’ “relationship to Israel,” their “political alliances,” and “their way of being Jewish in a world that feels scarier, lonelier, and, in some surprising ways, more Jewish than ever.”

He then offers a periodization of American Jewry’s response, discerning four distinct phases, each defined by an emotional state or a collective action: 1) Trauma and shock (the first several weeks following October 7); 2) Mobilization and unity (culminating with the demonstration in Washington on November 14); 3) questions and challenges (since the Ceasefire, November 23-30); 4) uncertainty and concern (some of the glue of unity is now coming undone as the possibility of a wider war may be on the horizon). While Windmueller identifies many challenges facing American Jewry (e.g., the surge of antisemitism, campus protests, DEI demonization of Jews), he also sees opportunities for American Jews to strengthen their community. He notes that October 7 has prompted “significant numbers of non-affiliated and disaffected Jews [to] seek to reconnect with the Jewish people.” He asks, rhetorically, “Are we prepared to embrace these individuals?”

Annotated Hamas Bibliography — in-depth assessments, analyses, objectives, regional and international implications, April 2024

Deterring Iran, the false equivalence between today’s campus protests and those in 1968, and Israeli public opinion on whether officials responsible for failures related to October 7 should resign

Michael Eisenstadt, “Denial or Punishment? The U.S.-Israel Debate About How Best to Deter Iran,” PolicyWatch 3863, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 26, 2024, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/denial-or-punishment-us-israel-debate-about-how-best-deter-iran

In this analysis, the eminent military analyst Michael Eisenstadt considers the best means of deterring Iran. He proposes a combination of “denial” and “punishment,” defining the two concepts as follows: “Denial works by convincing the adversary that it will be thwarted, punishment by convincing the adversary that it will incur unacceptable costs.” Marshaling a number of precedents dating as far back as 1987, Eisenstadt persuasively shows that Iranian aggression is halted only when it meets with forceful retaliation or a credible threat thereof. He observes that “U.S. attempts to deter by denial have often yielded to deterrence by punishment, as restraint frequently emboldened Tehran; by practicing both denial and punishment, Washington might more effectively deter and contain Iran.” He further notes–again citing history–that American concerns of escalation are misplaced: “The United States and Israel have sparred with Iran for decades without sparking an “all-out regional war.” The dual deterrent strategy he advocates should be jointly pursued by the U.S., Israel, and the coalition of Iran’s Arab adversaries: “U.S. policymakers will need to overcome their debilitating caution and avoid disclosing Israeli activities that the latter has not acknowledged; Arab policymakers should be strongly encouraged to stay the course regarding their participation in the regional air and missile defense architecture created by CENTCOM; and Israeli policymakers will need to act with greater prudence to avoid provocative moves that could stoke U.S. fears of escalation and undermine its support for a more risk-acceptant deterrence strategy.”

Michael Oren, “A Page From the 1968 Playbook?” Clarity, April 28, 2024, https://claritywithmichaeloren.substack.com/p/a-page-from-the-1968-playbook?utm_source=profile&utm_medium=reader2

Michael Oren, the celebrated Middle East historian and former Israeli ambassador to the United States, tests the accuracy of the oft-heard comparison of today’s campus protests with their antecedents in 1968. Oren contends that the comparison is facile, observing, “In multiple ways, the current unrest differs fundamentally from that of the 1960s. In fact, they could not be more different.” In the first place, the demonstrators in 1968 were anti-war, opposed to the tragic American misadventure in Vietnam, whereas the demonstrators of today are bloodthirsty militarists, as their sloganeering makes clear: “Globalize the intifada” and “Burn Tel Aviv to the Ground.” The 1968 and 2023-24 demonstrators’ orientation toward racism is another salient difference. If the 1968 demonstrations were “about tolerance and love, today’s demonstrations are about racism and hatred.” The taunts directed at Jews by today’s demonstrators–”Go back to Poland,” for instance–cannot be understood other than as racist. Moving from the message to the messengers, Oren observes that in 1968, a great many of the demonstrators, not least the leaders themselves, were Jewish. In today’s demonstrations, in contrast, Jews are notably few. Oren does discern one signal similarity between the demonstrations of these two different eras: “The primary objective of both was, and remains, the radical alteration of American policy. Fifty-six years ago, they largely succeeded.” Whether today’s demonstrators will also succeed remains to be determined.

Tamar Hermann, Lior Yohanani, and Yaron Kaplan, “Israelis Say the Time Has Come for Those Responsible for October 7 to Step Down,” Israel Democracy Institute, April 21, 2024, https://en.idi.org.il/articles/53666

In a recent survey, the Israel Democracy Institute probed Israeli public opinion on government responsibility for the failure to avert the October 7 massacre. The telephonic survey sounded out 514 respondents and found that a majority of Israelis believe that “those responsible for the failure of October 7” should resign without further delay: 58% of Jews and 81% of Arabs. Not nearly as many Israelis, however, regard the holding early elections as a matter of similar urgency. Fifty-one percent of Israelis “agree that elections should be held before the end of 2024”: 68% of Arabs, 47% of Jews. Unsurprisingly, the Israeli right is not nearly as impatient for early elections as the political center and left.

Annotated Hamas Bibliography — in-depth assessments, organization, operations, objectives, and regional relations, March 2024

Hamas falsifies casualty figures, Israel sets a new standard in urban warfare, and Hezbollah uses increasingly advanced weaponry, suggesting an uptick toward a larger Israel-Hezbollah conflict pending.

Gabriel Epstein, “Gaza Fatality Data Has Become Completely Unreliable,” PolicyWatch 3851, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 26, 2024, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/gaza-fatality-data-has-become-completely-unreliable

In this study of Hamas’s casualty figures, Gabriel Epstein, an analyst at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, astutely unpacks the methodology behind Hamas’s tally of war dead. He notes that in the first month of the war, Hamas relied on its usual collection system for casualty figures, aggregating the fatalities from hospitals, morgues, and Red Crescent ambulances. But in early November, the exigencies of war forced Hamas to consult another and much less authoritative source: local news reports. The change came about after the Israeli ground invasion, when hospitals in northern Gaza ceased to operate. The Hamas-run Gaza Ministry of Health announced its new methodology on November 10, and since then, most of the fatalities have been tallied according to gleanings from news reports. The shortcomings of this approach are many. Not only is the numerical total less reliable when so calculated, but the demographic breakdown (e.g., men, women, children, combatant, non-combatant) is similarly flawed: “The repeated claim that 72% of the dead are women and children is very likely incorrect.” It is more than probable, Epstein observes, that the “media reports methodology significantly understates the number of men killed and may overstate the number of children killed.”

John Spencer, “Israel Has Created a New Standard for Urban Warfare. Why Will No One Admit It?” Newsweek, March 25, 2024, https://www.newsweek.com/israel-has-created-new-standard-urban-warfare-why-will-no-one-admit-it-opinion-1883286

In this article, John Spencer, urban warfare expert and co-director of West Point’s Urban Warfare Project, lauds Israel for setting “a remarkable, historic new standard Israel” in balancing military objectives with humanitarian considerations in urban combat. Spencer singles out Israel for doing more than “any military in history—above and beyond what international law requires and more than the U.S. did in its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.” In fact, so attentive is the IDF to civilian welfare that its humanitarian precautions have often come at the expense of operational success. One such precaution is the IDF’s practice of announcing attacks in advance. While the IDF’s warnings allow civilians to move out of harm’s way, they also deny their attacks the crucial element of surprise. What is more, the warnings enable Hamas commanders, in preparation for an IDF assault, either to reposition themselves or to disappear into the tunnels beneath Gaza. These operational warnings only add to Israel’s inherent disadvantage of fighting an enemy that embeds itself among the civilian population, both in its fighting positions and its civilian mode of dress. Israeli appeals to civilians to evacuate combat zones have been variously transmitted–whether in 70,000 direct phone calls, 13 million text messages, 15 million pre-recorded voice messages, or by drones outfitted with loudspeakers, and parachute-borne amplifiers. A few weeks after Swords of Iron began, the IDF also instituted a complex map system, accessible by cell phone, which directs evacuees to safe zones.

Abraham Wyner, “How the Gaza Ministry of Health Fakes Casualty Numbers,” Tablet, March 6, 2024, https://www.tabletmag.com/sections/news/articles/how-gaza-health-ministry-fakes-casualty-numbers

News outlets the world over have generally accepted without question the casualty figures of the Hamas-directed Gaza Ministry of Health. Sometimes references to the death toll are caveated with the explanation that the Gaza Ministry of Health is a part of the Hamas government, but the figures themselves are mostly accepted at face value. In this article, the eminent statistician Abraham Wyner casts doubt on the veracity of Hamas’s data, concluding that “the casualties are not overwhelmingly women and children, and the majority may be Hamas fighters.” Wyner observes several irregularities in the data. First, from October 26 until November 10, 2023, the death toll “increas[es] with almost metronomical linearity.” The gradual, almost perfect, cresting of the tally from this period “show[s] strikingly little variation. There should be days with twice the average or more and others with half or less.” Similarly suspect is the constancy with which the number of women and children dead rises during this period. What is more, women and child casualties should correlate, showing similar spikes and dips, but they don’t: “Consequently, on the days with many women casualties there should be large numbers of children casualties, and on the days when just a few women are reported to have been killed, just a few children should be reported.” How, then, have casualties been reckoned? “Most likely, the Hamas ministry settled on a daily total arbitrarily. We know this because the daily totals increase too consistently to be real. Then they assigned about 70% of the total to be women and children, splitting that amount randomly from day to day. Then they in-filled the number of men as set by the predetermined total. This explains all the data observed.”

“Five Months of Hostilities on the Israel-Lebanon Border,” The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, March 17, 2024, https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/five-months-of-hostilities-on-the-israel-lebanon-border/

Analysts at the Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, a think tank close to Israel’s defense establishment, have noted a gradual escalation in the lethality and the range of the armaments used by Hezbollah throughout the war. In the war’s first three weeks, Hezbollah’s barrages consisted of “sniper fire, artillery and mortar shell fire, anti-tank guided missiles and rockets.” In November, Hezbollah began fielding drones, short-range ballistic missiles, and double-barreled launchers to fire anti-tank guided missiles. January brought another escalation, and since then Hezbollah has deployed an array of advanced weapons. Hezbollah’s belligerent rhetoric and the reach of its salvos have increased correspondingly. Hezbollah has so far “carried out 959 attacks on Israel, using anti-tank guided missiles (266 attacks), Burkan heavy rockets (73), Falaq rockets (40), suicide drones (31) and surface-to-air missiles (6).” Despite these tactical and operational changes, the analysts maintain that Hezbollah’s strategy has been constant, and their “objective is to exhaust the IDF and force it to divert resources from the Gaza Strip to the northern border, part of Hezbollah’s aid to Hamas and showing its commitment to the ‘resistance axis,’ the ‘unity of the arenas’ and to preserve the organization’s balance of deterrence vis-à-vis Israel.” The analysts also give their assessment of the prospects that Hezbollah will withdraw to north of the Litani River, as required by UN Resolution 1701: “Hezbollah has no intention of giving up its control of the border when the war ends.” As for whether the ongoing exchange of fire could escalate into full-scale war, the analysts argue that Hezbollah is prepared to risk war with Israel even though Lebanese opinion opposes it. Accordingly, Hezbollah secretary general Hassan Nasrallah has belabored “the claim that they do not want a war with Israel, but they are prepared for one, and if Israel starts a war, Hezbollah will retaliate without reservation.”

Annotated Hamas Bibliography — in-depth assessments, organization, operations, objectives, and regional relations, February 2024

Observations from a delegation’s recent tour of the Middle East, the essentials of reforming Palestinian Authority, the Palestinian co-opting of social justice advocacy in the United States. 

Cory Gardner, Howard Berman, Dana Stroul, Ghaith al-Omari, Michael Singh, “From War to Peace? Trip Report From a Middle East Study Tour,” Policy Watch 3839, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Feb. 27, 2024, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/war-peace-trip-report-middle-east-study-tour

This rapporteur’s summary (minutes of a meeting taken by a recording secretary) recaps the remarks of three scholars and two former members of Congress in the Washington Institute’s virtual Policy Forum on February 22. The five participants, fresh off a tour of the Middle East “to assess the prospects for security and peace in the current environment,” were former U.S. senator Cory Gardner (R-CO), former U.S. congressman Howard Berman (D-CA), and Washington Institute senior fellows Ghaith al-Omari, Michael Singh, and Dana Stroul.

Both Gardner and Berman agree that, for the time being, Israel has no further care than to achieve its war aims. The two-state solution or diplomacy in pursuit of this objective is, as Berman noted, “out of sight for now.” Israelis, Berman further observed, “have no appetite to even consider the idea of Palestinian statehood.” The Israelis are similarly blasé about the idea of a reformed Palestinian authority, Ghaith al-Omari remarked, and “there is no appetite for the idea now.”

Dana Stroul, until recently the most senior civilian Middle East hand in the Department of Defense, analyzed the Biden administration’s response to the 180 attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria by Iranian proxies. She described the administration’s strategy of retaliating with “strikes against Iran-linked facilities in Iraq and Syria, followed by operations targeting Iraqi militia leaders.” The results, she suggests, are zero-sum: a success in preventing full-scale regional war but a failure by not deterring Iran. The discussants did not detect much willingness on the part of the Arab states to make meaningful contributions to stabilize the region. Al-Omari noted that “no Arab state appeared willing to put in the hard work necessary for real PA reform” while Gardner commented that “although the Saudis are eager for the U.S. security umbrella that a treaty would provide, we heard very little about what they will provide in return.” Nevertheless, Michael Singh noted that the Saudis “still view normalization with Israel as the price they must pay to reach a deal with Washington.”

Ghaith al-Omari, “Real PA Reform Requires More Than Just a New Prime Minister,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Feb. 27, 2024, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/real-pa-reform-requires-more-just-new-prime-minister

In the wake of the recent resignation of the Palestinian Authority’s prime minister and cabinet, Ghaith al-Omari, a former P.A. advisor and a fellow at the Washington Institute, considers the prospects for reforming the P.A. Since October 7, the U.S., E.U., and Arab states have all called for the ineffective, corrupt, and unpopular Palestinian Authority to be reformed so that “Ramallah [can] play a role in humanitarian, reconstruction, and governance efforts in postwar Gaza and, ultimately, reassume control over the Strip.” Such reform is necessary not just for the administrative health of the Palestinian territories, but also because a better-functioning PA will recover some of the legitimacy it has lost and restore the willingness of donors to contribute to the regeneration of postwar Gaza. “International actors will be reluctant to get involved in transitional arrangements,” notes Omari, “unless they are sure the PA is serious about building the necessary security capabilities.” To gauge P.A. reform’s prospects for success, al-Omari presents two allied questions to be asked while the reform is underway: “First, will the new prime minister be empowered to undertake the necessary reforms?” For the answer to be affirmative, al-Omari argues that the new prime minister must command enough independence of action so that reforms can be undertaken without being sabotaged by those invested in the old, corrupt order. The true test of the prime minister’s independence will be answered by al-Omari’s second question: “Who will control the cabinet formation process?” If the president (Abbas) and the Fatah Central Committee continue to exercise veto power over the prime minister’s appointments, then true reform will remain elusive. Omar also wonders if the next government will be technocratic (i.e., manned by competent technical experts) or a “national consensus government” in which the appointees are chosen by different factions, Hamas among them. If Hamas is included, reform will be impossible, and if the next cabinet is uniformly elderly, made up of veteran Fatah hands instead of the young guard, reform will be improbable.

Gil Troy, “How Palestine Hijacked the U.S. Civil Rights Movement,” Tablet, January 31, 2024, https://www.tabletmag.com/sections/news/articles/how-palestine-hijacked-us-civil-rights-movement

Harnessing the insight that has made him one of Israel’s ablest historians of our era, Gil Troy analyzes the success of the Palestinian movement’s “gain[ing] a seat in the progressive sectarian tent by piggybacking off the historical experience of American Blacks.”

Troy traces the origins of the Palestinian cause’s appeal to the American left and Black activists to the Soviet Union’s campaign in the 1960s to internationalize the Palestinian cause. The Soviets, Troy observes, sought to weaponize the Palestinian cause, deploying it in their propaganda campaign to hurt the West and court the Third World. The Palestinians are finishing what the Soviets started, in other words. Since, in the United States, no cause commands as much sympathy as that of Black Americans, “other identity groups keep trying to graft their victimhood onto the story of the Black civil rights movement to cement their legitimacy.” But only the Palestinians have succeeded to this end because “the Palestinian cause gets a free pass other movements somehow don’t merit.” Troy notes that “when the Black Lives Matter movement emerged, its activists policed any attempts to broaden their slogan to include other identity groups. Yet pro-Palestinian activists were allowed to appropriate the slogan ‘Palestinian Lives Matter’ and to embed themselves in an internationalized framework against ‘oppression’ that extends ‘from Ferguson to Gaza.’” Troy further notes that the vogue of the “grievance-based politics” in today’s America draws its roots from the “rise of identity politics in the 1960s and 1970s,” around the same time the Soviets’ anti-Zionist campaign got underway. Since around 2010, he maintains, the support for the Palestinian cause has become one of the orthodoxies in the creed of the progressive left: “Since 2010 or so, when progressive Third World sectarianism became quasi-official ideology among all right-thinking people, the Palestinian cause has become increasingly central in left doctrine, bounding to the top of the American left’s “anti-racist” agenda.”

Annotated Hamas Bibliography — in-depth assessments, organization, operations, objectives, and regional relations, January 2024

A prescient analysis of UNRWA’s institutional flaws, different scenarios for the postwar administration of Gaza, recommendations for preventing Hamas from regenerating after the war, and a sober look at Hamas’s priorities. 

Alexander H. Joffe and Asaf Romirowsky, “Stop Giving Money to the U.N.’s Relief Agency for Palestinians,” The New Republic, August 18, 2014, https://newrepublic.com/article/119128/unrwa-must-be-defunded-palestinian-authority-have-viable-state

Reading this 10-year-old analysis in light of recent revelations about UNRWA, one cannot fail to be impressed by the foresight of the authors’ analysis of UNRWA’s defects and the wisdom of their suggestions for its reform. Joffe and Romirowsky begin by exposing Hamas’s connections to UNRWA laid bare in the 2014 Israel-Hamas War–namely, the repurposing of UNRWA schools into weapons depots and the firing rockets from their premises. They go on to say that, although the war brought the UNRWA-Hamas connection into sharper relief, the organization itself is fundamentally compromised, so much so that “UNRWA is effectively a branch of Hamas.” Indeed, most of UNRWA’s staffers in Gaza are members of the Hamas-linked trade union and some are even fighters in Hamas’s ranks. Moreover, UNRWA schools are accessible to and used by Hamas and their curriculum shaped by Hamas. These and other abuses, Joffe and Romirowsky maintain, call for the top-down institutional form of UNRWA. First, UNRWA should be denied any role in the postwar arrangement for Gaza’s reconstruction. Second, since the UN General Assembly wouldn’t support the overhaul, much less the dismantlement, of UNRWA, Western donor countries ought to use their leverage to better advantage. Western diplomatic and financial pressure could “reprogram their funds, first by demanding that the PA take over UNRWA’s employees and responsibilities.” Although this would bolster the more pragmatic PA and weaken Hamas, Joffe and Romirowsky acknowledge that this plan is not without its flaws, foremost among which is that “the PA is monumentally corrupt.”

Jeremy Sharp and Jim Zanotti, “Israel and Hamas Conflict In Brief: Overview, U.S. Policy, and Options for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, January 11, 2024, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/mideast/R47828.pdf

This report by two scholars in the Congressional Research Service considers the Israel-Hamas war from the American perspective. After a summary review of the war up to the date of publication (January 11), the report looks at American involvement from a number of angles: e.g., expedited arms deliveries to Israel, humanitarian assistance to the Palestinians, supplemental appropriations legislation, the oversight of American security assistance, and the American response to the aggression of Iranian proxies. Of particular interest is the report’s commentary on different scenarios for Gaza’s postwar governance and security. It relates that if the differences between the U.S., Israel, and the P.A. can be resolved, a plan such as Israeli Defense Minister Gallant proposed in early January could be carried into effect. This plan for civil administration in Gaza rests on three pillars: maintaining “Palestinian administrative mechanisms, with officials and local clans unaffiliated with Hamas,” affording “Israel broad responsibility to prevent security threats against Israel, including via coordination with Egypt at its border with Gaza,” and forming a multinational task force (with the U.S. and some European and Arab states) to regulate Gaza’s civil affairs and economic recovery. Gallant’s proposal could be carried out in tandem with a plan already discussed by the U.S. and the P.A. under which the P.A. and the U.S. Security Coordinator for Israel could re-train 1,000 of the PA’s onetime Gaza security officers. To assist this initial tranche of security personnel reinstated in Gaza, 3,000-5,000 P.A. security forces could be redeployed from the West Bank to Gaza. Meanwhile, on the diplomatic front, negotiations between Israel and the PA could be renewed so as to smooth the obstacles to regional Arab participation.

Matthew Levitt, “How to Keep Hamas From Bouncing Back,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 9, 2024, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/how-keep-hamas-bouncing-back

In a crushing blow to the terrorist organization, Israel assassinated Hamas’s most senior official based in Lebanon, Saleh al-Arouri, on January 2. Al-Arouri was the deputy chairman of Hamas’s Politburo, but his responsibilities were hardly limited to political affairs. He was also Hamas’s principal liaison with its foremost foreign sponsor, Iran, and with Iran’s Lebanese surrogate, Hezbollah. What’s more, al-Arouri, a co-founder of Hamas’s armed wing, was in charge of Hamas’s operational activity in the West Bank, in which capacity he helped orchestrate the casus belli of the 2014 Israel-Hamas War: the abduction and murder of three Israeli teenagers.

In this analysis, Levitt, with characteristic acuity, considers the impact of the assassination on Hamas and the means by which Hamas can be kept from “bouncing back” from this and from the decimation of its forces in Gaza. Levitt draws on lessons from history to explain “the key to preventing Hamas from fully bouncing back after the loss of Arouri: namely, concerted action against the group’s support networks abroad.” He points out that it was this external support that allowed Hamas to recover from Israel’s 1989 arrest of 200 Hamas and Islamic Jihad operatives and its 1992 deportation of 415 members of the two groups. Yet, whereas “in 1992, Hamas had just a few core supporters within the Palestinian diaspora, today it enjoys various degrees of support from Iran, Qatar, and Turkey, as well as diaspora donors around the world, including in the West.” This is all the more reason for “the international community to work collectively to disrupt Hamas’ external channels of support.”

Levitt cites several encouraging examples of American and Western attempts to crack down on foreign support for Hamas since October 7. For instance, the FBI has opened investigations into Hamas-affiliated individuals in the U.S. suspected of “raising funds or providing other material support to this designated foreign terrorist organization.” The Virginia Attorney General’s Office has also initiated an inquest into American Muslims for Palestine, an NGO that may have violated the law by soliciting charitable contributions for Hamas. Another effort since October 7 that promises to hobble Hamas abroad is the formation of the Counter Terrorist Financing Taskforce-Israel, a collaborative body of European and Australian financial intelligence units aimed at disrupting “the flow of funds to Hamas and other terrorist groups.” These actions are “already yielding dividends,” Levitt observes.

Matthew Levitt, “For All That Changed, Hamas Is Still Hamas,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 22, 2024, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/all-changed-hamas-still-hamas

Levitt persuasively shows that in the 18 years since he published his landmark study of Hamas, the group has consistently defied expectations that it would moderate; nothing has dramatized the falsity of this idea more vividly than the October 7 massacre. Levitt observes that since his book was published, “Hamas experienced two transformational events”: its landslide victory in the Palestinian national elections of 2006 and its assault on Israel on October 7. These two events form the bookends of the moderation delusion, from its emergence in January 2006 to its discrediting in October 2023. After its 2006 electoral victory, Hamas, “faced with the choice of focusing on governance or militancy…chose the latter.” But this was a choice Hamas made discreetly, not avowedly, so as to encourage the impression that it was open to an accommodation of some kind with Israel. Thanks to its deception campaign, “Hamas duped Israeli and Western officials into thinking it would not put its governance project at risk and therefore could be deterred.” But October 7 made nonsense of this idea and, “in fact, October 7 was the war Hamas always wanted.” As was belatedly realized, an Islamist terrorist organization will not renounce its raison d’etre for the sake of better governance. In other words, the leopard, as the Book of Jeremiah advises, doesn’t change its spots.

Annotated Hamas Bibliography — in-depth assessments, organization, operations, objectives, and regional relations, December 2023

The surge of attacks against Jews in Europe, the miscalculations behind Israel’s pre-October 7 assessment failure, the reasons for quiet in the West Bank, and Hamas’s cynical use of civilian infrastructure in its war against Israel, support for a two-state solution plummets.

Matthew Levitt, “Addressing the Scourge of Anti-Semitism in Europe,” Congressional Testimony and House Foreign Affairs Committee, December 12, 2023, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/addressing-scourge-anti-semitism-europe

Setting the contemporary context of European Anti-Semitism, Levitt, summarizes the number of Anti-Semitic incidents in Europe since the October 7 slaughter of 1200 Jews and others in southern Israel. He includes incidents across Europe and acts of Islamophobia-he recounts the rise in hate speech, use of symbols, threats, intimidation, and violence. He cites Right-Wing extremist posts and calls for violence. He notes that Islamist groups “are by far not the only terrorist organizations to take advantage of October 7 to advocate for violence, hatred, and racism. Far-right neo-Nazi groups began creating anti-Semitic propaganda within hours of Hamas’s incursion into Israel, drawing positive comparisons between Hamas and the Nazis and even creating a hybrid Palestinian-Nazi flag.” The spike in anti-Semitism in Europe has been dramatic, requiring vigilance and excellent intelligence gathering; European officials have said Levitt, acknowledge the intersection of anti-Semitism and terrorism in Europe, with more incidents anticipated to come.

Michael Milshtein, “ Why Is It So Difficult for Israel to Decipher Hamas?” The Jerusalem Strategic Tribune, December 2023, https://jstribune.com/milsthein-why-is-it-so-difficult-for-israel-to-decipher-Hamas/

In one of the best clearly stated and insightful summaries of the Hamas attack and Israel’s dramatic failures to understand Hamas’s intentions and ideology, Milshtein delves into the inability of Israeli and other analysts to understand Hamas ideological fervor. Milshtein suggests that Israelis grossly erred in wanting to believe that Hamas was and could be tamed. He cites the increasing willingness of analysts to subscribe to group- think, and fewer specialists who read Arabic and are familiar with Middle Eastern political and religious cultures. This is an article that should be read, and suggestions ingested if mistakes like October 7 are to be avoided in the future.

Neomi Neumann, “Why a West Bank Front Has Not Opened So Far,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, December 13, 2023, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/why-west-bank-front-has-not-opened-so-far

In this analysis, Neomi Neumann, a visiting fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, probes the reasons that West Bank Palestinians have not opened a second Palestinian front despite Hamas’s repeated calls for them to join the fray. Citing statistics from Israel’s internal security service, Shin Bet, Neumann notes that Palestinians in the West Bank have committed some 150 terrorist attacks (“acts of violence that result in Israeli casualties”) since October 7. Yet, although the West Bank is seething with discontent, it has not yet blazed into rebellion and, as Neumann argues, there is little prospect that it will. These attacks, far from increasing, have declined significantly since early November, a drop-off Neymann attributes to “the killing of senior terrorists, the seizure of arms caches, the introduction of new combat patterns (e.g., aerial fire).” Moreover, some 2,150 Palestinians in the West Bank have been arrested, more than at any time since the Second Intifada. Israelis, however, are not the only ones maintaining order; the PA security forces, Neumann goes on to say, have prevented large-scale protests, justifying these interventions “by telling the public that it is protecting them from “trigger-happy” Israel.” Neumann also mentions a restraining force that is not military or coercive but psychological; the “relative quiet” in the West Bank has been enforced by the memory of Israel’s subdual of the Second Intifada and of the high casualties it inflicted.

“Hamas Exploitation of Hospitals for Military-Terrorist Purposes: Shifa Hospital as a Test Case,” Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, December 12, 2023, https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/hamas-exploitation-of-hospitals-for-military-terrorist-purposes-shifa-hospital-as-a-test-case/

The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, a think tank close to Israel’s defense establishment, is well known for its exposure of Hamas’s and Hezbollah’s cynical use of human shields and civilian infrastructure in combat. This study draws on this expertise to analyze Hamas’s conversion of Gaza’s largest hospital, al-Shifa in Gaza City, into a command and control center. It details the specific ways in which al-Shifa, a government hospital administered by Hamas’s Ministry of Health, serves Hamas’s war effort. Complete with photographs and satellite imagery, the exposé documents weapons stockpiles and ammunition depots in al-Shifa’s MRI suite. It also describes the tunnel network and tunnel shafts that enabled Hamas to circulate, underground, between buildings, escaping the notice of prying eyes. These tunnels, it notes, were maintained with fuel and electricity diverted from the medical facility. The article broadens its focus beyond al-Shifa and the ongoing war, citing other hospitals in which Hamas is operating and other wars in which it has used the same modus operandi.

“Popularity for a Two-State Solution at All Time Low,” Public Opinion Poll no. 90, Palestine Center for Policy and Survey Research, December 13, 2023, https://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/928

Wide public support for Hamas’ offensive on October the 7th, but the vast majority denies that Hamas has committed atrocities against Israeli civilians. The war increases Hamas’ popularity and greatly weakens the standing of the PA and its leadership; nonetheless, the majority of the Palestinians remains unsupportive of Hamas. Support for armed struggle rises, particularly in the West Bank and in response to settlers’ violence. The overwhelming majority condemns the positions taken by the US and the main European powers during the war and express the belief that they have lost their moral compass. Support for a two-state solution among Palestinians and Israelis declines to just one-third on each side.

Annotated Hamas Bibliography — in-depth assessments, organization, operations, objectives, and regional relations, November 2023

Hamas’ long-term ambitions, anti-Israel indoctrination in academia.

Devorah Margolin and Matthew Levitt, “The Road to October 7: Hamas’ Long Game, Clarified,” Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-road-to-october-7-Hamas-long-game-clarified/

When Hamas took over the Gaza Strip by force of arms in 2007, it faced an ideological crisis. It could focus on governing Gaza and addressing the needs of the Palestinian people, or it could use the Gaza Strip as a springboard from which to attack Israel. Even then, Hamas understood these two goals were mutually exclusive. And while some anticipated Hamas would moderate, or at least be co-opted by the demands of governing, it did not. Instead, Hamas invested in efforts to radicalize society and build the militant infrastructure necessary to someday launch the kind of attack that in its view could contribute to the destruction of Israel. This article explores the road from Hamas’ 2007 takeover of Gaza to the October 2023 massacre.

Kenneth Stein, “Anti-Israel Activism in American Universities, Parts I and Part II,” https://ciestaging.wpengine.com/anti-israeli-teaching-on-american-campuses-origins-extent-and-remedies/

The two-part essay identifies multiple reasons for the growth of anti-Israeli sentiment on American campuses. It asserts that 1) both the Hamas massacres and the anti-Israel demonstrations reflect delegitimizing of Jews as a people, undercutting the legitimacy of Jews to constitute a state. Embedded in modern Arab and Muslim attitudes toward Zionism and Israel are a century of denigration, boycott, and belittlement interrupted with significant, yet transactional Arab acceptances of the Jewish state; 2) the public and scholarly realms have become increasingly abusive of Israel, acerbic toward her policies, and vengeful toward her political leaders; 3) campus teaching of the Middle East and Israel in the US since 1967 has disfavored students broad learning about Israel except for studying Hebrew; 4) college professors and campus organizations have increasingly preached anti-Israeli views to unsophisticated, apathetic, and unknowing students; 5) pre-collegiate learning about Zionism and Israel, for Jewish and non-Jewish students alike, is sporadic, often lacking in content and concept, and self-limited to less than half of American Jewish students between the ages of 5 and 18. The major takeaway is that the Jewish students going to American campuses today, have minimal Zionist and Israeli education and learning when they arrive as freshman and few opportunities to learn about Israel in the classroom where bias and prejudice do not dominate the discourse.

Annotated Hamas Bibliography — in-depth assessments, organization, operations, objectives, and regional relations, October 2023

The background to and progression of the Israel-Hamas war.

Jim Zanotti, Luisa Blanchfield, Jeremy Sharp, Cory Gill, Christopher Blanchard, John Rollins, Clayton Thomas, Rebecca Nelson, Matthew Weed, Liana Rosen and Rhoda Margesson, “Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs),” Congressional Research Service, updated October 20, 2023, 77 pages, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47754 

Describing reaction to Hamas’ s October 7 attack on Israel, the report notes there are analysts who have described the PA as “wanting to see Hamas fail but unable to openly cheer for Israel.” A number of factors may impact how this conflict proceeds: (1) “Hamas’s motivation and timing;” (2) Hezbollah’s role;” and (3) “Israeli leadership and domestic concerns,” and under the first facto quotes an unnamed senior official, “Hamas’s intention is to get Israel to retaliate massively and have the conflict escalate: a West Bank uprising, Hezbollah attacks, a revolt in Jerusalem.” Categorized as an FAQ, this report’s sections focus on questions, e.g., “What is Hamas and who supports it?” and “Did Iran play a role in planning, directing, or otherwise enabling Hamas attacks?” Its scope covers not only Hamas and thoughts about Israel’s possible steps, but also the possibility of regional actors attacking, the scope of international responses and the factors U.S. congress ought to take into consideration.

Readings on Hamas-Israel war, October 2023

Scott Abramson, “Maps of the Middle East and the Gaza Strip,” Center for Israel Education, October 14, 2023.

Gwen Ackerman and Marissa Newman, “Israel Taps Blacklisted Pegasus Maker to Track Hostages in Gaza,” Bloomberg, October 26, 2023, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-10-26/israel-taps-blacklisted-pegasus-maker-nso-to-track-gaza-hostages-and-hamas

Nidal Al-Mughrabi, “Israel drops leaflets in Gaza offering reward for hostage information,” Reuters, October 24, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-drops-leaflets-gaza-offering-reward-hostage-information-2023-10-24/

Hadeel Al Sayegh, John O’Donnell and Elizabeth Howcroft, “Analysis-Hamas’ cash-to-crypto global finance maze in Israel’s sights,” AOL/Reuters, October 13, 2023, https://www.aol.com/analysis-hamas-cash-crypto-global-192759193.html

Rafiah Al Talei, Nathan J. Brown, Yasmine Farouk, Mohanad Hage Ali, Amr Hamzawy, Zaha Hassan, Marwan Muasher, Sinan Ülgen, Maha Yahya, Sarah Yerkes, “Arab Perspectives on the Middle East Crisis,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 13, 2023, https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/10/13/arab-perspectives-on-middle-east-crisis-pub-90774

Jon Alterman, “Hamas and Israel: The Current Situation and Looking Ahead,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 11, 2023, https://www.csis.org/analysis/hamas-and-israel-current-situation-and-looking-ahead

Yara Asi, Imad Harb, Khalil Jahshan, Tamara Kharroub, Laurie King, Jonathan Kuttab and Yousef Munayyer, “The Hamas Attack on Israel: Context, Analysis, and Potential Repercussions,” Arab Center Washington DC, October 10, 2023, https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/the-hamas-attack-on-israel-context-analysis-and-potential-repercussions/

Yaron Ayalon, Jonathan Rynhold, Kenneth Stein, “Webinar: Israel’s 9/11: The October 2023 Hamas Attack on Israel” (52:29), Center for Israel Education, October 11, 2023, https://ciestaging.wpengine.com/israels-9-11-the-october-2023-hamas-attack-on-israel/

Avner Barnea, “Analysis: How Israeli Intelligence Failed to Anticipate the Hamas Attack,” IntelNews, October 16, 2023, https://intelnews.org/2023/10/16/01-3312/

Gil Bashe, “In the Face of Horror, Hope is a Vital Mental Health Resource,” Medika Life, October 8, 2023, https://medika.life/in-the-face-of-horror-hope-is-a-vital-mental-health-resource/

Justin Bassi, “Israeli’s Intelligence Failure Could Be Worse Than in 1973,” National Interest, October 13, 2023, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/israeli%E2%80%99s-intelligence-failure-could-be-worse-1973-206935

Stephen Battaglio, “Horrific images from Israel-Hamas war pose challenges for TV news,” Los Angeles Times, October 12, 2023, https://www.latimes.com/entertainment-arts/business/story/2023-10-12/horrific-images-from-hamas-attack-on-israel-poses-challenges-for-tv-news

BBC Video Formats team, “Land, air and sea: Video analysis shows how Hamas coordinated huge attack,” BBC, October 12, 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-middle-east-67096316

Peter Beaumont, “Israel attack is Hamas imposing itself on wider Middle East diplomacy,” The Guardian, October 8, 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/08/israel-attack-is-hamas-imposing-itself-on-wider-middle-east-diplomacy

Jordyn Beazley, “‘Israel declares war’: What the papers say about the surprise Hamas attack and its aftermath,” The Guardian, October 7, 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/08/israel-declares-war-what-the-papers-say-about-the-surprise-hamas-attack-and-its-aftermath

Ronen Bergman, Mark Mazzetti and Maria Abi-Habib, “How Years of Israeli Failures on Hamas Led to a Devastating Attack,” New York Times, October 29, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/29/world/middleeast/israel-intelligence-hamas-attack.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share

Ari Blaff, “UNWRA Deletes Social-Media Post Accusing Hamas of Stealing Humanitarian Supplies,” National Review, October 16, 2023, https://www.nationalreview.com/news/unwra-deletes-social-media-post-accusing-hamas-of-stealing-humanitarian-supplies/

Yonah Jeremy Bob, “Ups and downs of northern Gaza security zone strategy – analysis,” Jerusalem Post, October 24, 2023, https://www.jpost.com/arab-israeli-conflict/gaza-news/article-769968

Anna Borshchevskaya, “Russian Policy and Hamas’ Assault: Putin Benefits From Chaos,” Jerusalem Strategic Tribune, October 2023, https://jstribune.com/borshchevskaya-russian-policy-and-hamas-assault/

Elliot Cosgrove, Bret Stephens and Rachel Fish, “American Jewry and the War in Israel: What Do We Do Now?” (1:23 :45 video), SAPIR Journal and Park Avenue Synagogue, October 20, 2023, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8U–jMqw_tI

Ben Caspit, Daoud Kuttab and Andrew Parasiliti, “Webinar: Inside the Israel-Hamas War” (47:43), Al-Monitor, October 14, 2023, https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/10/israeli-palestinian-journalists-preview-gaza-war-al-monitor-event

Center for Preventive Action staff, “Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” Global Conflict Tracker, Updated October 16, 2023, https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/israeli-palestinian-conflict

Andrew Chuter, “Britain sends spy planes, ships to Mediterranean amid Israel-Hamas war,” DefenseNews, October 13, 2023, https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2023/10/13/britain-sends-spy-planes-ships-to-mediterranean-amid-israel-hamas-war/

Amichai Cohen, “Operation Swords of Iron: The Decision to Go to War, in Theory and Practice in Israel,” Israel Democracy Institute, October 11, 2023, https://en.idi.org.il/articles/51077

Amichai Cohen, “The Case for a Lean, Unified Wartime Cabinet,” Israel Democracy Institute, October 11, 2023, https://en.idi.org.il/articles/51080

Amichai Cohen, “The Hamas Abductions and International Law,” Israel Democracy Institute, October 24, 2023, https://en.idi.org.il/articles/51162

Roger Cohen, “A Shaken Israel Is Forced Back to Its Eternal Dilemma,” New York Times, October 8, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/08/world/middleeast/israel-hamas-gaza-analysis.html

Stephen Collinson, “Israel’s war with Hamas will cause deep and wide political shockwaves,” CNN, October 10, 2023, https://www.cnn.com/2023/10/10/politics/political-shockwaves-israel-hamas-war/index.html

Tara Copp, “Here’s a look at the military firepower the US is providing to Israel,” DefenseNews/AP, October 12, 2023, https://www.defensenews.com/battlefield-tech/2023/10/12/heres-a-look-at-the-military-firepower-the-us-is-providing-to-israel/

Isabel Debre, “What you need to know about Hamas, air, land and sea attack on Israel,” DefenseNews/AP, October 7, 2023, https://www.defensenews.com/intel-geoint/isr/2023/10/07/what-you-need-to-know-about-hamas-air-land-and-sea-attack-on-israel/

Ami Tojkes Dombe, “If Hamas Was Indeed Aided by Iran — the Mossad Had No Clue | Analysis,” Israel Defense, October 10, 2023, https://www.israeldefense.co.il/en/node/59841

Holly Ellyatt, “Bloodshed, destruction and a far-off peace? There are several possible outcomes of the Israel-Hamas war,” CNBC, October 12, 2023, https://www.cnbc.com/2023/10/12/how-will-the-israel-hamas-war-end-here-are-several-possible-outcomes.html

Steven Erlanger, “Attack Ends Israel’s Hope That Hamas Might Come to Embrace Stability,” New York Times, October 9, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/09/world/middleeast/hamas-gaza-israel.html

Farnaz Fassihi and Ronen Bergman, “Hamas Attack on Israel Brings New Scrutiny of Group’s Ties to Iran,” New York Times, October 13, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/13/world/middleeast/hamas-iran-israel-attack.html

Jeffrey Feltman, Sharan Grewal, Patricia M. Kim, Tanvi Madan, Suzanne Maloney, Amy J. Nelson, Michael E. O’Hanlon, Bruce Riedel, Natan Sachs, Natalie Sambhi, Jaganath Sankaran, Caitlin Talmadge, and Andrew Yeo, “The Israel-Gaza Crisis,” Brookings Institute, October 13, 2023, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-israel-gaza-crisis/

Foreign Affairs staff, “Why Hamas Attacked — and Why Israel Was Taken by Surprise: A Conversation With Martin Indyk,” Foreign Affairs, October 7, 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/middle-east/martin-indyk-why-hamas-attacked-and-why-israel-was-taken-surprise

Seth Frantzman, “Israel’s Russia and China policy in spotlight after Hamas attack — analysis,” Jerusalem Post, October 14, 2023, https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/politics-and-diplomacy/article-768328

Manisha Ganguly and Hibaq Farah, “How Israel-Hamas war disinformation is being spread online,” The Guardian, October 11, 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/media/2023/oct/11/how-israel-hamas-war-disinformation-is-being-spread-online

Judah Grunstein, “Hamas’ Most Damaging Blow Was to Israel’s Psyche,” World Politics Review, October 9, 2023, https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/israel-palestinian-conflict-gaza-hamas [Register for free to access.]

Haviv Rettig Gur, “A wounded, weakened Israel is a fiercer one,” Times of Israel, October 8, 2023, https://www.timesofisrael.com/a-wounded-weakened-israel-is-a-fiercer-one/

Bruce Hoffman, “Israel’s War on Hamas: What to Know,” Council on Foreign Relations, October 9, 2023, https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/israels-war-hamas-what-know

Bill Hutchinson, “Death came from sea, air and ground: A timeline of surprise attack by Hamas on Israel,” ABC News, October 12, 2023, https://abcnews.go.com/International/timeline-surprise-rocket-attack-hamas-israel/story?id=103816006

Philip Ingram, “Analysis: Is Hamas a more sophisticated force than Israel imagined?,” Al Jazeera, October 10, 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/10/10/analysis-is-hamas-a-more-sophisticated-force-than-israel-imagined

INSS Data Analytics Desk, “Real time Updates: Swords of Iron: An Overview,” Institute for National Security Studies, most recent update October 24, 2023, https://www.inss.org.il/publication/war-data/

Michael Jacobs, Ken Stein, Scott Abramson, “Hamas-Israel Relations with events, statements and previous clashes, 1988-present,” Center for Israel Education, October 14, 2023.

Stanly Johny, “What is Hamas, the Palestinian militant group?,” The Hindu, October 10, 2023, https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/what-is-hamas-the-palestinian-militant-group/article67402621.ece

Stanly Johny, “What are Israel’s options after the Hamas attack? | Analysis,” The Hindu, October 12, 2023, https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/analysis-what-are-israels-options-after-the-hamas-attack/article67410957.ece

Yossi Klein Halevi, “The Reckoning,” The Atlantic, October 10, 2023, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2023/10/israel-gaza-netanyahu/675597/ and also published by the author on Facebook for those without access, https://m.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=pfbid02MzAUHzaT5oGHAEaAauM72rbkhcu3SMMBufQBTFgzMP9AafBqgff4Wyx6nZNBjdeMl&id=100047099322963&mibextid=Nif5oz

Michael Knights, “Gaza’s Urban Warfare Challenge: Lessons from Mosul and Raqqa,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 13, 2023, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/gazas-urban-warfare-challenge-lessons-mosul-and-raqqa

Zoran Kusovac, “Analysis: Why did it take Israel three days to return to Gaza’s boundary?” Al Jazeera, October 11, 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/11/analysis-why-did-it-take-israel-three-days-to-return-to-gazas-boundary

Zachary Laub and Kali Robinson, “What is Hamas?” Council on Foreign Relations, October 9, 2023, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hamas

Tovah Lazaroff, “Is this Israel’s moment to re-occupy Gaza? – analysis,” Jerusalem Post, October 10, 2023, https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-767546

Brad Lendon, “How does Hamas get its weapons? A mix of improvisation, resourcefulness and a key overseas benefactor,” CNN, October 12, 2023, https://www.cnn.com/2023/10/11/middleeast/hamas-weaponry-gaza-israel-palestine-unrest-intl-hnk-ml/index.html

Matthew Levitt, “The War Hamas Always Wanted,” Foreign Affairs, October 11, 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/israel/war-hamas-always-wanted

Natasha Li and Jean-Luc Mounier, “From 1947 to 2023: Retracing the complex, tragic Israeli-Palestinian conflict,” France 24, October 11, 2023, https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20231011-from-1947-to-2023-retracing-the-complex-and-tragic-israeli-palestinian-conflict

Joe Macaron, “Analysis: Why did Hamas attack now and what is next?” Al Jazeera, October 11, 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/10/11/analysis-why-did-hamas-attack-now-and-what-is-next

Aaron Maclean, “Israel’s Outside-the-Box Options,” Mosaic Magazine, October 13, 2023, https://mosaicmagazine.com/response/israel-zionism/2023/10/israels-outside-the-box-options/ [Register for free access]

David Makovsky, “The Trust Biden Built With Israelis Doesn’t Come With a Blank Check,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 13, 2023, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/trust-biden-built-israelis-doesnt-come-blank-check

Kenneth Marcus, Alyza Lewin, Denise Katz-Prober and Mark Goldfeder, “Webinar: The Hamas Atrocities and the American Campus” (57:45), Louis D. Brandeis Center for Human Rights Under Law, October 12, 2023, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wRwL5WvESF0&ab_channel=LouisD.BrandeisCenterForHumanRightsUnderLaw

Chris McGreal, “What are the roots of the Israel-Palestine conflict?” The Guardian, October 13, 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/13/why-israel-palestine-conflict-history

Bryan Mena, “Israel-Hamas war risks further deglobalization and inflation,” CNN Business, October 15, 2023, https://www.cnn.com/2023/10/15/economy/stocks-week-ahead-deglobalization/index.html

Middle East Media Research Institute staff, “Special Announcement — The Hamas Atrocities Documentation Center (HADC),” Middle East Media Research Institute, October 15, 2023, https://www.memri.org/reports/special-announcement-hamas-atrocities-documentation-center-hadc

Yasmine Mohammed, “Opinion: Many Palestinians in Gaza hate Hamas. My father certainly did,” CNN, October 19, 2023, https://www.cnn.com/2023/10/16/opinions/israel-hamas-gaza-palestinians-oppose-terror-mohammed

Katie Nadworny, “How Businesses Are Affected in Israel,” SHRM, October 23, 2023, https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/hr-topics/global-hr/pages/israel-businesses-affected.aspx

Moscow Times staff, “Israel-Hamas War Pulls Russians’ Attention Away From Ukraine — Analysis,” The Moscow Times, October 10, 2023, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/10/10/israel-hamas-war-pulls-russians-attention-away-from-ukraine-analysis-a82707

Samia Nakhoul, Nidal Al-Mughrabi, Matt Spetalnick and Laila Bassam, “Analysis: In striking Israel, Hamas also took aim at Middle East security realignment,” Reuters, October 8, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/striking-israel-hamas-also-took-aim-middle-east-security-realignment-2023-10-08/

Ed Nawotka and Nicholas Clee, “Frankfurt, Sharjah Book Fairs Impacted by Israel-Hamas War,” Publishers Weekly, October 15, 2023, https://www.publishersweekly.com/pw/by-topic/international/trade-shows/article/93431-frankfurt-sharjah-book-fairs-impacted-by-israel-hamas-war.html

Nimrod Novik, “Nimrod Novik on the false premises and failure of vision that led to the Hamas attacks,” The Economist, October 12, 2023, https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2023/10/12/nimrod-novik-on-the-false-premises-and-failure-of-vision-that-led-to-the-hamas-attacks [create free account for access]

David Patrikarakos, “ANALYSIS: Hamas cannot defeat Israel. Israel cannot lose to Hamas. So why all the blood?” Jewish News, October 16, 2023, https://www.jewishnews.co.uk/opinion-hamas-cannot-defeat-israel-israel-cannot-lose-to-hamas-so-why-all-the-blood/

PBS Staff, “What is Hamas? What to know about its origins, leaders and funding,” PBS, October 10, 2023, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/what-is-hamas-what-to-know-about-its-origins-leaders-and-funding

Paul Pillar, “The Hamas Attack and the Failure to Understand ‘Intelligence Failures,’” National Interest, October 12, 2023, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/paul-pillar/hamas-attack-and-failure-understand-%E2%80%9Cintelligence-failures%E2%80%9D-206921

Kenneth Pollack, “A Big War That Won’t Inevitably Get Bigger,” Foreign Affairs, October 12, 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/israel/big-war-wont-inevitably-get-bigger

John Raine, Emile Hokayem, Rym Monmtaz, Hazan AlHasan, Tom Beckett, “Webinar: The geopolitics of the Hamas–Israel war” (1:60:46), International Institute for Strategic Studies, October 13, 2023, https://www.iiss.org/events/2023/10/the-geopolitics-of-the-hamas-israel-war/

Barak Ravid, “Scoop: Israel says it found Hamas files with instructions for making cyanide-based weapon,” Axios, October 21, 2023, https://www.axios.com/2023/10/21/israel-hamas-cyanide-weapon-instructions

Dennis Ross, “What Israel Must Do,” Foreign Affairs, October 11, 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/israel/hamas-what-israel-must-do

Grant Rumley, “U.S. Wartime Support to Israel: First Steps and Future Considerations,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 12, 2023, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/us-wartime-support-israel-first-steps-and-future-considerations

Robert Satloff, Dennis Ross, Michael Singh, Patrick Clawson, “Hamas Attacks: A Turning Point for U.S. Policy — A Statement of Washington Institute Experts,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 13, 2023, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/hamas-attacks-turning-point-us-policy-statement-washington-institute-experts

Robert Satloff, Ehud Yaari, Matthew Levitt, Neomi Neumann, Ghaith al-Omari, “Webinar: The New Middle East: Hamas Attack, Israel at War, and U.S. Policy” (1:19:37), Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 13, 2023, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/new-middle-east-hamas-attack-israel-war-and-us-policy

Robert Satloff, Dennis Ross, David Makovsky, “Israel’s War Aims and the Principles of a Post-Hamas Administration in Gaza,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 17, 2023, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/israels-war-aims-and-principles-post-hamas-administration-gaza

Jonathan Schanzer, “The War After the War Between the Wars,” Commentary, October 12, 2023, https://www.commentary.org/articles/jonathan-schanzer/hamas-israel-war-after-war-between-wars/

Assaf Shapira, “As The War With Hamas Continues, An Emergency Unity Government is Formed,” Israel Democracy Institute, October 10, 2023, https://en.idi.org.il/articles/51060

Aditya Sinha, “The mirage of stability: How Hamas attack has changed Middle East geopolitics,” Firstpost, October 10, 2023, https://www.firstpost.com/opinion/the-mirage-of-stability-how-hamas-attack-has-changed-middle-east-geopolitics-13228202.html

Matt Spetalnick, Humeyra Pamuk and Simon Lewis, “Israel-Hamas war upends Biden’s two-pronged Mideast strategy,” Reuters, October 10, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/israel-hamas-war-upends-bidens-two-pronged-mideast-strategy-2023-10-10/

Kenneth Stein, “Hamas Charter Totally Rejects Israel and Zionism, 1988,” (espanol), Center for Israel Education, October 23, 2023.

Kenneth Stein, “Jimmy Carter’s Hamas Decade of Embrace,” Center for Israel Education, October 29, 2023.

Kenneth Stein, “International Voices Urging the Recognition of Hamas as a Legitimate Political Actor,” Center for Israel Education, October 30, 2023.

Kenneth Stein, “Quotations From Hamas Sources Expressing Hatred for Zionism, Israel, and Jews, 1988-2014,” Center for Israel Education, October 24, 2023, https://ciestaging.wpengine.com/quotations-from-hamas-sources-expressing-hatred-for-zionism-israel-and-jews-1988-2014/

Kenneth Stein, “A Short History of Hamas” (espanol), Center for Israel Education, October 28, 2023.

Bret Stephens, “‘We Are Alone’: Reflections on the Jewish-American Response to October 7,” Sapir Journal, October 2023, https://sapirjournal.org/war-in-israel/2023/10/we-are-alone-reflections-on-the-jewish-american-response-to-october-7/

Laura Strickler, “‘It’s like being underwater’: What Israeli soldiers will face inside the labyrinth of Hamas tunnels,” NBC News, October 23, 2023, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/israeli-soldiers-will-face-labyrinth-hamas-tunnels-rcna121459

Zhiyuan Sun, “Binance freezes Hamas-linked accounts after Israeli request,” Cointelegraph, October 10, 2023, https://cointelegraph.com/news/binance-freezes-hamas-linked-accounts-israeli-request

Fatma Tanis, “Why Hamas and Israel reached this moment now — and what comes next,” NPR, October 11, 2023, https://www.npr.org/2023/10/11/1204923717/israel-gaza-hamas-palestinian-war

Daniel Thomas, Jim Pickard and Heba Saleh, “Six BBC reporters taken off air as probe launched over pro-Palestine tweets,” Financial Times, October 16, 2023, https://www.ft.com/content/c998bfa4-ad8e-4c61-9117-61a57aa9a92a

Times of Israel staff, “Document drafted by defense minister Liberman in 2016 predicted Hamas onslaught,” Times of Israel, October 30, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/29/world/middleeast/israel-intelligence-hamas-attack.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share

Times of Israel staff, “Ministry proposes moving Gaza’s civilians to north Sinai, a likely non-starter,” Times of Israel, October 30, 2023, https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/ministry-proposes-moving-gazas-civilians-to-north-sinai-a-likely-non-starter/

Times of Israel staff and Jacob Magid, “US said concerned that Israel lacks achievable goals for Gaza op and IDF isn’t ready,” Times of Israel, October 24, 2023, https://www.timesofisrael.com/us-said-concerned-israel-lacks-achievable-goals-for-gaza-op-and-that-idf-not-ready/

Karl Vick, “A Former Israeli Intelligence Chief on Atrocities, the Coming Invasion of Gaza, and the Fate of Hostages,” TIME, October 13, 2023, https://time.com/6323051/israeli-intelligence-chief-hamas-gaza-interview/#tbl-em-lnov3qbr8e384t4y7em

Pierre Vimont, “Europe’s Moment of Powerlessness in the Middle East,” Carnegie Europe, October 10, 2023, https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/90746

Cleary Waldo, Gabriel Epstein, Sydney Hilbush, “International Reactions to the Hamas Attack on Israel,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 11, 2023, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/international-reactions-hamas-attack-israel

Selina Wang, “Israel-Hamas conflict tests Biden’s foreign policy message ahead of 2024: ANALYSIS,” ABC News, October 9, 2023, https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/israeli-hamas-conflict-tests-bidens-foreign-policy-message/story?id=103836878

Robin Wright, “Israel May Decimate Hamas, but Can It ‘Win’ This War?” New Yorker, October 9, 2023, https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/israel-may-decimate-hamas-but-can-it-win-this-war

Michael Young, “Will Gaza Set the Middle East Alight?” Carnegie Middle East Center, October 13, 2023, https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/90769

Amy Zegart, “Israel’s Intelligence Disaster,” Foreign Affairs, October 11, 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/middle-east/israels-intelligence-disaster

Neri Zilber, Shira Efron, Nimrod Novik and Michael Koplow, “Israel under attack (Emergency Briefing” (57:02), Israel Policy Forum, October 9, 2023. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NOW9EqKjkJQ&ab_channel=IsraelPolicyForum

CIE-Curated Hamas reading list of articles, 1987-August 2023

This 1987-2023 compilation covers important English articles, analyses and videos, providing valuable context and recent history of the Hamas-Israel conflicts.

We recommend these authors: Mathew Levitt, Meir Litvak, Devorah Margolin, Michael Milshtein, Gaith al-Omari, Jonathan Schanzer, Rob Satloff, Kenneth Stein, Khalil Shikaki and Jim Zanotti.

Gianluca Pacchiani, “Protests against Hamas reemerge in the streets of Gaza, but will they persist?,” Times of Israel, August 8, 2023, https://www.timesofisrael.com/protests-against-hamas-reemerge-in-the-streets-of-gaza-but-will-they-persist/

TOI Staff, “Iranian, Hamas officials discuss response to upheaval in Israel — report,” Times of Israel, July 26, 2023, https://www.timesofisrael.com/iranian-hamas-officials-secretly-discuss-response-to-upheaval-in-israel-report

Michael Oren, “When Israel gave Hamas something worth not fighting for,” Times of Israel, May 15, 2023, https://blogs.timesofisrael.com/when-israel-gave-hamas-something-worth-not-fighting-for/

Nidal Al-Mughrabi, “Analysis: Hamas sees West Bank as battleground with new Israel gov’t,” Reuters, January 18, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hamas-sees-west-bank-battleground-with-new-israel-govt-2023-01-18/

Center for Peace Communications and TOI Staff, “What’s life like under Hamas? ‘Whispered in Gaza’ offers unique, courageous testimony,” Times of Israel, January 16, 2023, https://www.timesofisrael.com/whats-life-like-under-hamas-whispered-in-gaza-offers-unique-courageous-testimony

2022

Ido Zelkovitz, “Game of Thrones: The Struggle between Fatah and Hamas for Political Hegemony in the Palestinian Authority, 2011-2022.” INSS, July 2022, https://www.inss.org.il/publication/game-of-thrones-the-struggle-between-fatah-and-hamas-for-political-hegemony-in-the-palestinian-authority-2011-2022/

The Syrian Observer Staff, “Syrian Islamic Council: Mufti’s Meeting with Haniyeh to Discourage Hamas from Normalizing with Regime,” The Syrian Observer, July 6, 2022, https://syrianobserver.com/news/77268/syrian-islamic-council-muftis-meeting-with-haniyeh-to-discourage-hamas-from-normalizing-with-regime.html

Khaled Abu Toameh, “Hamas wins Birzeit University student council elections,” Jerusalem Post, May 19, 2022, https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-707081

Ramy Aziz, “Egypt, Israel, and Hamas: Opportunities for Progress in Gaza,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 19, 2022, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/egypt-israel-and-hamas-opportunities-progress-gaza

Yaakov Katz, “Hamas Doesn’t Need Sheikh Jarrah or Jerusalem to Start a War,” The Jerusalem Post, February 17, 2022, https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-696874

Khaled Abu Toameh, “Palestinian online campaign blames Hamas for Gaza misery,” The Jerusalem Post, January 29, 2022, https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-694921

2021

Hillel Frisch, “Hamas takeover of Gaza killed the two-state solution,” Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security, December 23, 2021, https://jiss.org.il/en/frisch-hamas-takeover-of-gaza-killed-the-two-state-solution/

Kobi Michael, “Israel’s Moment of Truth in Dealing with Hamas?” INSS, December 23, 2021, https://www.inss.org.il/publication/hamas-israel/

Makram Rabah, “The Palestinian refugee camp explosion shows that Hamas is in the pocket of Iran,” Al-Arabiya, December 19, 2021, https://english.alarabiya.net/views/2021/12/19/The-Palestinian-refugee-camp-explosion-shows-that-Hamas-is-in-the-pocket-of-Iran

Khaled Abu Toameh, “Hamas, PA responsible for crises, say Gazans — poll,” Jerusalem Post, December 24, 2021, https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-689610

Jonathan Schanzer, “The May 2021 Israel-Hamas war was a stress test for normalization,” Al-Arabiya, November 12, 2021, https://english.alarabiya.net/views/2021/11/12/The-May-2021-Israel-Hamas-war-was-a-stress-test-for-normalization

Khaled Abu Toameh, “PA steps up crackdown on Hamas, Islamic Jihad members,” Jerusalem Post, November 27, 2021, https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/pa-steps-up-crackdown-on-hamas-islamic-jihad-members-687136

Udi Dekel, “Hamas has its Own Logic. What is Israel’s Logic?” INSS, September 4, 2021, https://www.inss.org.il/publication/hamas-reason/

Khaled Abu Toameh, “Fatah-Hamas rift deepens as Abbas moves closer to US, Israel,” Jerusalem Post, August 31, 2021, https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/fatah-hamas-rift-deepens-as-abbas-moves-closer-to-us-israel-678264

David Wurmser, “The Hamas War Against Israel,” Jewish Policy Center, Summer 2021, https://www.jewishpolicycenter.org/2021/07/07/the-hamas-war-against-israel/

Amb. Alan Baker, “The Legal War: Hamas’ War Crimes and Israel’s Right to Self-Defense,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, June 3, 2021, https://jcpa.org/article/the-legal-war-hamas-war-crimes-and-israels-right-to-self-defense/

Alex Grinberg, “Hamas After the Latest Round: A Total Failure or an Advantageous Opportunity,” Reut Group, June 17, 2021, https://www.reutgroup.org/Publications/The-Axis-of-Resistance-After-the-Last-Bout-of-Fighting

Ido Levy, “How Iran Fuels Hamas Terrorism,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, June 1, 2021, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/how-iran-fuels-hamas-terrorism

Sarah Feuer, “The Real Impact of the War Between Hamas and Israel,” The National Interest, May 21, 2021, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/real-impact-war-between-hamas-and-israel-185917?page=0%2C1

Dore Gold, “Hamas is Acting as an Arm of Iranian Power,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, May 18, 2021, https://jcpa.org/hamas-is-acting-as-an-arm-of-iranian-power/

David May and Jonathan Schanzer, “The truth about Hamas,” The Washington Examiner, May 20, 2021, https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/politics/the-truth-about-hamas

Gaith al-Omari, “Israel-Gaza Violence Means Biden Must Avoid Emboldening Hamas in Any Cease-Fire Deal,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 18, 2021, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/israel-gaza-violence-means-biden-must-avoid-emboldening-hamas-any-cease-fire-deal

Yohanan Plesner, “Israel must differentiate between Hamas, Arab riots — opinion,” Jerusalem Post, May 20, 2021, https://www.jpost.com/opinion/israel-must-differentiate-between-hamas-arab-riots-opinion-668686

Grant Rumley and Neri Zilber, “A Military Assessment of the Israel-Hamas Conflict,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 25, 202, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/military-assessment-israel-hamas-conflict

Shoshana Solomon, “Israel’s political stalemate impacts economy more than Hamas rockets — Moody’s,” Times of Israel, May 20, 2021, https://www.timesofisrael.com/israels-political-stalemate-impacts-economy-more-than-hamas-rockets-moodys/

Kenneth Stein, “Hamas Charter totally rejects Israel and Zionism,” Center for Israel Education, May 27, 2021, https://ciestaging.wpengine.com/hamas-charter-totally-rejects-israel-and-zionism/

Ben-Dror Yemini, “The truth about the Hamas terrorist organization,” Ynet News, May 18, 2021, https://www.ynetnews.com/article/ryFgHO11Yu

Katherine Bauer and Matthew Levitt, “Hamas Fields a Militant Electoral List: Implications for U.S.-Palestinian Ties,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 21, 2021, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/hamas-fields-militant-electoral-list-implications-us-palestinian-ties

Oded Eran and Yohanon Tzoreff, “Possible Rapprochement between Fatah and Hamas: Is Israel Ready?” INSS, April 5, 2021, https://www.inss.org.il/publication/fatah-hamas/?offset=10&posts=1461&type=399

Gaith Al-Omari, “If Palestinian Elections Proceed, Hamas May Have the Upper Hand,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 25, 2021, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/if-palestinian-elections-proceed-hamas-may-have-upper-hand

Haviv Rettig Gur, “In rocket war ‘for Al-Aqsa,’ Hamas has already won the Palestinian leadership,” Times of Israel, May 13, 2021, https://www.timesofisrael.com/in-rocket-war-for-al-aqsa-hamas-has-already-won-the-palestinian-leadership

2020

Gadi Eisenkot, “Israel’s greatest threat is not Hamas or Iran, but political infighting,” Ynet News, December 31, 2020, https://www.ynetnews.com/article/HyXx2foTw

Yohana Tzoreff, Kobi Michael, “A Discussion at INSS on Hamas Fatah Reconciliation Efforts,” INSS, October 15, 2020, https://www.inss.org.il/publication/hamas-fatah-reconciliation/

Jehab Harb, “Phased Policy Alternatives Between Reunification and Separation [Hamas and PA],” Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, July 2020, http://pcpsr.org/en/node/815

2019

Adnan Abu Amer, “How to read Hamas’ visit to Iran,” Al-Monitor, July 26, 2019, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/07/palestine-hamas-iran-relations-visit-delegation-war-us-syria.html

Hillel Frisch, “Ahead of the Bahrain Conference, Hamas Casts Its Lot with Iran,” BESA Center, June 18, 2019, https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/ahead-of-the-bahrain-conference-hamas-casts-its-lot-with-iran/

Ehud Yairi, “Israel’s Armistice with Hamas, Growing Tensions with Abbas,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 24, 2019, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/israels-armistice-with-hamas-growing-tensions-with-abbas

Yaakov Lappin, “Hamas Is Willing to Risk War to Avoid Economic Collapse,” BESA Center, March 10, 2019, https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/hamas-is-willing-to-risk-war-to-avoid-economic-collapse/

Michael Barak, “Civil War? The rift between Fatah and Hamas, as seen on social media,” Moshe Dayan Center, February 7, 2019, https://dayan.org/content/civil-war-rift-between-fatah-and-hamas-seen-social-media

Yaakov Lapid, “Can Israel Defeat Hamas Without Toppling It?” BESA Center, February 21, 2019, https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/israel-defeat-hamas/

2018

Seth J. Frantzman, “How Hamas Brought Israel to the Brink of Election Chaos,” The National Interest, November 16, 2018, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/middle-east-watch/how-hamas-brought-israel-brink-election-chaos-36272

David Pollock, “New Polls Show Most Gazans Want Israeli Jobs, Not Hamas Mobs,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 29, 2018, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/fikraforum/view/new-polls-show-most-gazans-want-jobs-not-mobs

Hillel Frisch, “What Is the Right Strategy with Hamas: Make Concessions or Fight?” BESA Center, September 27, 2018, https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/hamas-concessions-fight/

Giora Eiland, “What do the three players [Israel, Egypt, & Hamas] stand to gain from the Gaza ceasefire deal?” Ynet News, August 19, 2018, https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-5331489,00.html

Maj. Gen. (res.) Gershon Hacohen, “The Israel-Hamas Deal: Escape from Oslo,” BESA Center, August 28, 2018, https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/israel-hamas-oslo/

Yaakov Lappin, “A Failure at State-Building, Hamas Sticks to Military Buildup in Gaza,” Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, July 23, 2018, https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/failure-state-building-hamas-sticks-to-military-buildup-in-gaza/

Gershon Hacohen, “Hamas’s Kite Terrorism: A Threat that Requires a Decisive Response,” Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, June 20, 2018, https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/hamas-kite-terrorism/

Amos Yadlin, “Hamas incites violence to hide its own shortcomings,” Ynet News, May 14, 2018, https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-5260612,00.html

Haim Ramon, “It’s Time to end policy of coexistence with Hamas,” Ynet News, April 13, 2018, https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-5225030,00.html

Daniel L. Byman, “Why Israel is stuck with Hamas,” Brookings Institute, March 19, 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/03/19/why-israel-is-stuck-with-hamas

2017

Maj. Gen. (res.) Gershon Hacohen, “Fatah-Hamas Reconciliation: Resistance as an Expression of Faith,” BESA Center, December 5, 2017, https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/fatah-hamas-reconciliation/

Muriel Asseburg, “The Fatah-Hamas Reconciliation Agreement of October 2017,” Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik Berlin, November 2017, https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2017C44_ass.pdf

Ami Ayalon, Gilad Sher, Orni Petruschka, “Fatah-Hamas reconciliation: Both challenge and opportunity,” Ynet, October 19, 2017, https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-5030871,00.html

Yoni Ben Menachem, “A Fatah-Hamas Reconciliation. Has Anything Changed?” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, October 3, 2017, https://jcpa.org/article/fatah-hamas-reconciliation-anything-changed/

Yaron Schneider, “The Limits of Restraint: Hamas in Gaza and a Confrontation with Israel,” INSS, October 30, 2017, http://www.inss.org.il/publication/limits-restraint-hamas-gaza-confrontation-israel/?offset=0&posts=986&type=399

Avi Issacharoff, “Sick of running Gaza, Hamas may be aiming to switch to a Hezbollah-style role,” Times of Israel, October 1, 2017, https://www.timesofisrael.com/sick-of-running-gaza-hamas-may-be-aiming-to-switch-to-a-hezbollah-style-role/

Kobi Michael, Liran Ofek and Gilead Sher, “Hamas: Toward Palestinian Reconciliation, or Abdication of Government Responsibility?” INSS, September 24, 2017, http://www.inss.org.il/publication/hamas-toward-palestinian-reconciliation-abdication-governmental-responsibility/?offset=4&posts=976&type=399

Michael Segall, “Iran and Hamas Reconnect,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, September 25, 2017, http://jcpa.org/article/iran-hamas-reconnect/

David Pollock, “The Palestinian Public’s Tough Choices: On Violence, Instability, Hamas, “Jewish State,” Washington Institute for Near East Studies, June 2017, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/fikraforum/view/the-palestinian-publics-tough-choices-on-violence-instability-hamas-jewish

Raz Zimmer, “No More Palestinian than the Palestinians: Iranians React to the Hamas Revised Charter,” Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies — Beehive Middle East Social Media, June 7, 2017, http://dayan.org/content/no-more-palestinian-palestinians-iranians-react-hamas-revised-charter

Rasha Abou Jalal, “What’s behind Abbas’ recent threats to Hamas? Al-Monitor, May 15, 2017, www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/05/palestine-abbas-threats-hamas-gaza-trump-visit.html

Udi Dekel, “Hamas’s New Statement of Principles: A Political Opportunity for Israel?,” INSS, May 14, 2017, www.inss.org.il/publication/hamass-new-statement-principles-political-opportunity-israel/?offset=6&posts=932&type=399

Shlomo Brom and Ofir Winter, “Israel and the New Leaf in Egypt-Hamas Relations,” INSS, February 16, 2017, https://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/898.pdf

Raphael S. Cohen, David E. Johnson, David E. Thaler, Brenna Allen, Elizabeth M. Bartels, James Cahill, Shira Efron, “Lessons from Israel’s Wars in Gaza,” RAND Corp., January 2017, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9975.html

2016

Hani Al-Masri, “Hamas faces bitter options,” Middle East Monitor, March 29, 2016, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20160329-hamas-faces-bitter-options/

Shlomi Eldar, “The morning after: What happens to Gaza if Hamas is toppled?,” Al-Monitor, August 2016, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/08/avigdor-liberman-plan-hamas-ngo-humanitarian-aid-gaza-strip.html

Khaled Abu Toameh, “Hamas, Palestinian Authority Target Journalists Ahead of Election,” Gatestone Institute, August 23, 2016, https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/8738/hamas-palestinian-journalists

Grant Rumley, “Hamas Vows to Join Municipal Elections, but Obstacles Remain,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, July 19, 2016, http://www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/grant-rumley-hamas-vows-to-join-municipal-elections-but-obstacles-remain/

Efraim Inbar, “No One-Shot Solution to the Hamas Challenge,” BESA, June 30, 2016, http://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/no-one-shot-solution-hamas-challenge/

Nadav Pollak, “Hamas Is Testing Israel Once Again,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 22, 2016, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/hamas-is-testing-israel-once-again

Amos Yadlin, “Past Lessons and Future Objectives: A Preemptive Strike on Hamas Tunnels,” INSS Insight, February 15, 2016, https://www.inss.org.il/publication/past-lessons-and-future-objectives-a-preemptive-strike-on-hamas-tunnels/

2015

Ehud Yaari, “Hamas and the Islamic State: Growing Cooperation in the Sinai,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, December 15, 2015, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/hamas-and-the-islamic-state-growing-cooperation-in-the-sinai

Uri Savir, “Israel, Hamas negotiate, but truce still far off.” Al-Monitor, June 30, 2015, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/06/israel-hamas-truce-negotiations-egypt-netanyahu.html

Benedetta Berti, “Hamas’s Islamic State Woes,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 28, 2015, https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/60238

Yoram Schweitzer, “Hamas and the Islamic State Organization: Toward a Head-On Collision in the Gaza Strip?” INSS Insight, May 17, 2015, https://www.inss.org.il/publication/hamas-and-the-islamic-state-organization-toward-a-head-on-collision-in-the-gaza-strip/

Gabi Siboni and A. G., “Military Lessons for Hamas from Operation Protective Edge.” INSS Insight, May 21, 2015, https://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/systemfiles/No.%20700%20-%20Gabi%20and%20A.G.%20for%20web156732601.pdf

Grant Rumley, “Hamas Triumphs in Election at Flagship West Bank University.” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, April 23, 2015, http://www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/grant-rumley-hamas-triumphs-in-election-at-flagship-west-bank-university/

Avi Issacharoff, “Hamas digs new terror tunnels up to, but not across, border.” Times of Israel, March 25, 2015, http://www.timesofisrael.com/hamas-rebuilding-tunnels-near-but-not-across-border-sources/

Ahmed Melhelm, “The deepening rift between Fatah and Hamas,” al-Monitor, March 20, 2015, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/03/palestine-hamas-fatah-plo-accusations.html

Orit Perlov, “Israel, Hamas and Hizbollah on a Collision Course: Undesirable yet Inevitable.” Institute for National Security Studies, March 16, 2015, https://www.inss.org.il/publication/israel-hamas-and-hizbollah-on-a-collision-course-undesirable-yet-inevitable/

Khalil Shikaki, “Can Hamas Moderate? Insights from Palestinian Politics during 2005-2011,” Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, January 2015, https://www.pcpsr.org/sites/default/files/Can%20Hamas%20moderateJan2015.pdf

2014

Pinhas Inbari, “Hamas and Muslim Brotherhood Have Their Sights on the West Bank and Jordan,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, December 23, 2014, http://jcpa.org/article/hamas-sights-on-west-bank/

Lt. Col. (ret.) Jonathan D. Halevi, “Hamas Embraces the Path of the Islamic State (ISIS),” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, November 30, 2014, http://jcpa.org/pdf/Hamas-Embraces-the-Path-of-the-Islamic-State-ISIS-Jonathan-Halevi-Vol14No38.pdf

Burak Bekdil, “Turkey’s Love Affair with Hamas,” Middle East Forum, October 19, 2014, http://www.meforum.org/4866/turkey-love-affair-with-hamas

Grant Rumley, “Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood Seeks Help from Hamas,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, October 21, 2014, http://www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/grant-rumley-jordans-muslim-brotherhood-seeks-help-from-hamas/

Yaacov Amidror, “We Have to Be Prepared (with Hamas),” BESA Center, September 15, 2014, http://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/prepared/

Lt. Col. (ret.) Jonathan D. Halevi, “Hamas Policy after Operation Protective Edge,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, September 28, 2014, http://jcpa.org/article/hamas-policy/

Rami G. Khoury, “Shameful Hamas-Fatah Behavior Must Stop,” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, September 20, 2014, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/shameful-hamas-fateh-behavior-must-stop

Robert Satloff and Ehud Yaari. “Gaza and Beyond: The Arab-Israeli Arena in the Wake of the Hamas War,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 11, 2014, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/gaza-and-beyond-the-arab-israeli-arena-in-the-wake-of-the-hamas-war

Amos Yadlin, “Dealing with Hamas? Military Force Reconstruction,” INSS Insight. September 11, 2014, https://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/systemfiles/No.%20606%20-%20Amos%20for%20web.pdf

Ofra Bengio, “Meet the Kurds, a Historically Oppressed People Who Will Get Their Own State While Hamas Fires Rockets, and ISIS Beheads Unbelievers, the Kurds Build the Second Non-Arab State in the Middle East,” Tablet Magazine, August 14, 2014, http://www.tabletmag.com/jewish-news-and-politics/182042/kurdish-independence

Udi Dekel, “Is Israel Facing a War of Attrition against Hamas?” INSS Insight, August 13, 2014, https://www.inss.org.il/publication/is-israel-facing-a-war-of-attrition-against-hamas/

Jeffrey Herf, “Why They Fight: Hamas’ Too-Little-Known Facist Charter,” The American Interest, August 1, 2014, http://www.the-american-interest.com/articles/2014/08/01/why-they-fight-hamas-too-little-known-fascist-charter/

Irwin J. Mansdorf, “Unseen Scars of War: Psychological Consequences of the Hamas Attacks on the Israeli Civilian Population,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, July 20, 2014, http://jcpa.org/article/unseen-scars-of-war-psychological-consequences/#sthash.4p9hbG2C.dpuf

Abdel Moneim Said, “Let’s Be Frank About Hamas and Gaza,” Ahram Weekly, August 7, 2014, https://english.ahram.org.eg/News/6895/21/Let%E2%80%99s-be-frank-about-Hamas-and-Gaza—–.aspx

Yoram Schweitzer, “After Operation Protective Edge: Hamas’ Sense of What It Achieved,” INSS Insight, August 7, 2014, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/182765/No.%20586%20-%20Yoram%20for%20web.pdf

Ken Stein, “Hamas Doctrine: Detest Israel — Part I Hamas Doctrine: Detest Israel – Part I ‘On Opposing Agreements, Negotiations, or Recognition of Israel,” Times of Israel, August 3, 2014, http://blogs.timesofisrael.com/315204/

Ken Stein, “Hamas Doctrine: Detest Israel — Part II ‘On Israel and Israel’s Illegitimacy,’” The Times of Israel, August 4, 2014, http://blogs.timesofisrael.com/hamas-doctrine-detest-israel-part-ii/

Ken Stein, “Hamas Doctrine: Detest Israel — Part III ‘Hamas-principles for the Liberation of Palestine and Jihad against Zionism,’” The Times of Israel, August 6, 2014, http://blogs.timesofisrael.com/hamas-doctrine-detest-israel-part-iii/

Eyal Zisser, “Hamas Lost Big,” Israel Hayom, August 3, 2014, https://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_opinion.php?id=9435

Elliot Abrams, “Why Did Hamas Provoke a War?” Center for Foreign Relations, July 9, 2014, https://www.cfr.org/blog/why-did-hamas-provoke-war

Yaacov Amidor, “The War with Hamas: Decision Time Approaching,” BESA Center, July 24, 2014, https://besacenter.org/war-hamas-decision-time-approaching

Harel Chorev, “Hamas–Charting a New Strategic Course of Action,” Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, July 10, 2014, https://dayan.org/content/tel-aviv-notes-hamas-charting-new-strategic-course-action

Udi Dekel. “Israel-Hamas: Conditions for a Stable Ceasefire,” INSS Insight, July 17, 2014, https://www.inss.org.il/publication/israel-hamas-conditions-for-a-stable-ceasefire/

Shai Feldman, “Five Early Lessons from the Israel-Hamas War,” Crown Center for Middle East Studies, Brandeis University, July 14, 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/five-early-lessons-the-israel-hamas-war-10871

Professor Hillel Frisch, “Hit Hamas Hard to Create a Different Balance Against Islamic Terrorism,” BESA Center, July 19, 2014, http://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/hit-hamas-hard-create-different-strategic-balance-islamic-terrorism/

Jeffrey Goldberg, “What Exactly Is Hamas Trying to Prove?” The Atlantic, July 13, 2014, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/07/what-exactly-is-hamas-trying-to-prove/374342/

Aaron David Miller, “Stay Home and Stay out of This Fight,” Foreign Policy, July 8, 2014, https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/07/08/stay-home-and-stay-out-of-this-fight/

Lt. (ret.) Dr. Jacque Neriah, “Egypt, Israel and Hamas — the Impossible Equation,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, July 27, 2014, http://jcpa.org/egypt-israel-hamas-impossible-equation/

Michael Oren, “Israel Must Be Permitted to Crush Hamas,” Washington Post, July 24, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/michael-oren-israel-must-be-permitted-to-crush-hamas/2014/07/24/bd9967fc-1350-11e4-9285-4243a40ddc97_story.html

David D. Patrick, “Arab Leaders Viewing Hamas as Worse than Israel, Stay Silent,” New York Times, July 30, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/31/world/middleeast/fighting-political-islam-arab-states-find-themselves-allied-with-israel.html?_r=0

Pew Research Global Attitudes Project, “Concerns About Islamic Extremism on the Rise in the Middle East — Negative Opinions of Al-Qaeda, Hamas and Hezbollah,” Pew Global, July 1, 2014, http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/07/01/concerns-about-islamic-extremism-on-the-rise-in-middle-east/

David Pollock, “Gaza Public Rejects Hamas, Wants Ceasefire,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, July 15, 2014, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/gaza-public-rejects-hamas-wants-ceasefire

Daniel Mandel, “Obama’s Outrageous Decision to Fund Hamas-Aligned Palestinian Regime,” The Algemeiner, June 8, 2014, http://www.algemeiner.com/2014/06/08/obamas-outrageous-decision-to-fund-hamas-aligned-palestinian-regime/

Pnina Sharvit Baruch, “The Fight Against Hamas: The Legal Angle,” INSS Insight, June 27, 2014, https://www.inss.org.il/publication/the-fight-against-hamas-the-legal-angle/

Ehud Yaari, “Hamas Opts for the Hezbollah Model,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, June 3, 2014, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/hamas-opts-for-the-hezbollah-model

Neri Zilber, “Hamas on the Ropes,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, June 26, 2014, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/hamas-ropes

Adnan Abu Amer, “Hamas’ Abu Marzouk Says Recognizing Israel a ‘Red Line,’” Al-Monitor. May 13, 2014, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/05/interview-abu-marzouk-hamas-israel-fatah-reconciliation.html

Shoshana Bryen, “Hamas Tells Israel, ‘No Hope,’” American Thinker, May 8, 2014, http://www.americanthinker.com/2014/05/hamas_tells_israel_no_hope.html

Lt. Col. (ret.) Jonathan D. Halevi, “Palestinian Reconciliation and the Rising Power of Hamas and Islamic Jihad: An Iranian Windfall,” JCPA, May 14, 2014, http://jcpa.org/article/palestinian-reconciliation-and-the-rising-power-of-hamas/#sthash.wjXZzVAO.dpuf

Jonathan Schanzer, “Hamas Participation In Palestinian Government Likely Won’t Trigger Cut-Off,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, June 2, 2014, https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2014/06/01/hamas-participation-in-palestinian-government-likely-wont-trigger-cut-off/

Benedetta Berti and Shlomo Brom, “The Erosion of the Israel-Hamas Ceasefire in Gaza,” INSS Insight, April 6, 2014, https://www.inss.org.il/publication/the-erosion-of-the-israel-hamas-ceasefire-in-gaza/

Adan Abu Amer, “Hamas, Jordan Probe Possibility of Better Ties,” Al-Monitor, March 31, 2014, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/03/jordan-hamas-palestine-relations-amman.html

Ehud Yaari, “The New Triangle of Egypt, Israel, and Hamas,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, N.p., 17 Jan. 2014. Web. 4 Feb. 2014. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-new-triangle-of-egypt-israel-and-hamas

2013

Ehud Yaari, “The Call for Rebellion against Hamas in Gaza,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, November 8, 2013, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-call-for-rebellion-against-hamas-in-gaza

Hanin Ghaddar, “The Marriage and Divorce of Hamas and Hezbollah,” Wilson Center, August 26, 2013, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/the-marriage-and-divorce-hamas-and-hezbollah

Jonathan Schanzer, “How Hamas Lost the Arab Spring After drifting away from Syria and Iran, the movement faces an uncertain future,” The Atlantic, June 21, 2013, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/06/how-hamas-lost-the-arab-spring/277102/

Julio de la Guardia, “The emergence of Hamas as a regional political actor,” El Cano Royal Institute, February 27, 2013, https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/en/analyses/the-emergence-of-hamas-as-a-regional-political-actor/

2012

Whitney Eulich, “With Hamas’s confidence waxing, Khaled Meshaal arrives in Gaza,” Christian Science Monitor, December 7, 2012, https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/terrorism-security/2012/1207/With-Hamas-s-confidence-waxing-Khaled-Meshaal-arrives-in-Gaza

Assaf David, “How Well Do We Know Hamas,” Molad, December 11, 2012, http://www.molad.org/en/articles/how-well-do-we-know-hamas

Naomi Westland and Lia Tarachansky, “Israeli army, Hamas military tap power of social media,” USA Today, November 21, 2012, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2012/11/21/israel-gaza-social-media/1719981/

Ulrike Putz, “Hamas Can Replenish Arsenal — If Egypt Lets It,” Spiegel International, November 20, 2012, https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/analysis-of-hamas-military-capability-after-six-day-conflict-with-israel-a-868353.html

Nidal al-Mughrabi, “Analysis: Hamas finds cause to smile under Israeli assault,” Reuters, November 18, 2012, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-palestinians-israel-hamas-analysis/analysis-hamas-finds-cause-to-smile-under-israeli-assault-idUSBRE8AH0G720121118

2011

Lucy Kurtzer-Ellenbogen, “Palestinian Reconciliation [between Fatah and Hamas],” United States Institute of Peace, May 3, 2011, https://www.usip.org/publications/2011/05/palestinian-reconciliation

Katherine Faley and Gisue Mehdi, “Iran-Hamas Relationship Tracker 2011,” Critical Threats, January 13, 2011, https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-hamas-relationship-tracker-2011

2010

Congressional Research Service staff, “Hamas: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, December 2, 2010. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R41514

Are Hovdenak, “Hamas in Gaza: Preparing for Long-term Control?” Peace Research Institute Oslo, November 2010, https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/867b40b8-1304-4704-9e96-0ced96621ec4/Hovednak%202010%20Hamas%20in%20Gaza%20PRIO%20Policy%20Brief%2011-2010.pdf?inline=true

Mahmoud Jaraba, “Hamas and the Peace Process: Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 10, 2010, https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/41916

Dag Tuastad, “The Hudna: Hamas’s Concept of a Long-Term Ceasefire,” Peace Research Institute Oslo, September 2010, https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/cf1699b6-9e6e-4cff-9c68-467c58d0968f/The%20Hudna%20-%20PRIO%20Policy%20Brief%2009-2010.pdf?inline=true

Daniel Byman, “How to Handle Hamas,” Brookings Institute (originally in Foreign Affairs), August 25, 2010, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/how-to-handle-hamas/

Kerry Harris, Michael Adkins, Cody Curran, Katherine Faley, Laura Fish, James Gallagher, Patrick Knapp, Michal Toiba and Katherine Zimmerman, “Iran-Hamas Relationship Tracker 2010,” Critical Threat, June 16, 2010, https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-hamas-relationship-tracker-2010

Are Hovdenak, “The Public Services under Hamas in Gaza: Islamic Revolution or Crisis Management?” Peace Research Institute Oslo, March 2010, https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/1ab44969-bc0b-48f6-b730-7a8e01eb0e08/The_Public_Services_under_Hamas_in_Gaza.pdf?inline=true

Pew Research Center staff, “Mixed Views of Hamas and Hezbollah in Largely Muslim Nations,” Pew Research Center, February 4, 2010, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2010/02/04/mixed-views-of-hamas-and-hezbollah-in-largely-muslim-nations/

2009

NBC News staff, “What about Hamas? Question snarls peace bid,” NBC News, October 7, 2009, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna33204281

Carl Brown, “Book review of ‘Kill Khalid: The Failed Mossad Assassination of Khalid Mishal and the Rise of Hamas,’” Foreign Affairs, September 1, 2009, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsule-review/2009-09-01/kill-khalid-failed-mossad-assassination-khalid-mishal-and-rise

Paul Scham and Osama Abu-Irshaid, “Hamas: Ideological Rigidity and Political Flexibility,” United States Institute of Peace, June 2009, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/Special%20Report%20224_Hamas.pdf

Kristen Chick, “Briefing: The motives and aims of Hamas,” Christian Science Monitor, May 13, 2009, https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2009/0513/p06s19-wome.html

Charlie Szrom, “Iran-Hamas Relationship in 2008,” Critical Threats, February 18, 2009, https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-hamas-relationship-in-2008

Jonathan Fighel, “Hamas, Al-Qaeda and the Islamisation of the Palestinian Cause,” Elcano Royal Institute, January 30, 2009, https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/en/analyses/hamas-al-qaeda-and-the-islamisation-of-the-palestinian-cause-ari/

Andrew Tabler and Simon Henderson, “Tough Choice on Hamas Prompt Arab Disarray,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 27, 2009, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/tough-choices-hamas-prompt-arab-disarray

Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs staff, “The Hamas War Against Israel: Statements by Israeli leaders,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 18, 2009 (updated August 8, 2021), https://www.gov.il/en/Departments/General/the-hamas-war-against-israel-statements-by-israeli-leaders

Robert Ehrenfeld, “Where Hamas Gets Its Money,” Forbes, January 16, 2009, https://www.forbes.com/2009/01/16/gaza-hamas-funding-oped-cx_re_0116ehrenfeld.html?sh=4a7c6af87afb

Bernard Gwertzman, “Iran Supports Hamas, but Hamas Is No Iranian ’Puppet,’” Council on Foreign Relations, January 7, 2009, https://www.cfr.org/interview/iran-supports-hamas-hamas-no-iranian-puppet

Alex Altman, “Hamas Leader Khaled Mashaal,” TIME, January 4, 2009, https://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1869481,00.html

Floor Janssen, “Hamas and its Positions Towards Israel,” Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael (academic paper), January 2009, https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2016-02/20090200_cscp_security_paper_jansen.pdf

2008

Matthew Levitt, “Holding Hamas Accountable,” The Forward, December 31, 2008, https://forward.com/opinion/14845/holding-hamas-accountable-03079/

Anav Silverman, “Hamas’s Winning Media Strategy,” Sderot Media, December 30, 2008, https://sderotmedia.com/hamass-winning-media-strategy/2137/

Jeffrey White, “Operation Cast Lead: Israel’s Assault on Hamas,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, December 29, 2008, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/operation-cast-lead-israels-assault-hamas

Jeffrey White, “West Bank Hardball: Fatah’s Offensive Against Hamas,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, December 9, 2008, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/west-bank-hardball-fatahs-offensive-against-hamas

Mohammad Yaghi, “Reconciling with Hamas?: Abbas’s Hedge Against a Failed Peace Process,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy/Los Angeles Times, June 18, 2008, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/reconciling-hamas-abbass-hedge-against-failed-peace-process

Associated Press staff, “Hamas offers truce in return for 1967 borders,” NBC News, April 21, 2008, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna24235665

Robert Satloff, “The False Hope of Embracing Hamas,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy/Los Angeles Times, April 21, 2008, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/false-hope-embracing-hamas

Matthew Levitt, “Carter’s Role in Legitimizing Hamas,” CBS News/Weekly Standard, April 16, 2008, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/carters-role-in-legitimizing-hamas/

Robert Satloff, “The Hamas Dilemma: A Debate on Alternative Strategies,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 26, 2008, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/hamas-dilemma-debate-alternative-strategies

Nidal al-Mughrabi, “Inspired by God, Hamas fighters battle on,” Reuters, March 4, 2008, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-palestinians-israel-fighter/inspired-by-god-hamas-fighters-battle-on-idUSL0312451520080304

Matthew Levitt, “Hamas in the Spotlight,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 28, 2008, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/hamas-spotlight

2007

Haim Malka, “Hamas: Resistance and the Transformation of Palestinian Society” (chapter from book), Center for Strategic a& International Studies, December 28, 2007, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/071228_haimmalka.pdf

Mohammad Yaghi, “Hamas’s Authoritarian Regime in Gaza,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 13, 2007, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/hamass-authoritarian-regime-gaza

Nick Francona, “Hamas’s Military Capabilities after the Gaza Takeover,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy/Los Angeles Times, August 27, 2007, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/hamass-military-capabilities-after-gaza-takeover

Matthew Levitt, “Undercutting a Culture of Militancy: Designating Hamas Charities,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy/Los Angeles Times, August 8, 2007, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/undercutting-culture-militancy-designating-hamas-charities

Matthew Levitt, “Hamas’s Hidden Economy,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy/Los Angeles Times, July 3, 2007, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/hamass-hidden-economy

Associated Press staff, “Abbas vows to protect West Bank from Hamas,” NBC News, June 20, 2007, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna19335843

Mohammad Yaghi and Ben Fishman, “Hamas’s Coup and the Challenges Ahead for Fatah,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, June 19, 2007, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/hamass-coup-and-challenges-ahead-fatah

Robert Satloff, “Hamas and the Second Six Day War: Implications, Challenges, and Opportunities,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, June 18, 2007, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/hamas-and-second-six-day-war-implications-challenges-and-opportunities

Dennis Ross, “The Specter of ‘Hamastan’: More Must Be Done to Counter Islamist Gains in Gaza,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, June 4, 2007, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/specter-hamastan-more-must-be-done-counter-islamist-gains-gaza

Khalil Shikaki, “With Hamas in Power: Impact of Palestinian Domestic Developments on Options for the Peace Process,” working paper, Brandeis University, February 2007, https://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/working-papers/pdfs/wp1.pdf

Mohammad Yaghi, “Hamas’s Victory: From Gaza to Mecca,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 16, 2007, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/hamass-victory-gaza-mecca

Matthew Levitt, “Teaching Terror: How Hamas Radicalizes Palestinian Society,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 12, 2007,. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/teaching-terror-how-hamas-radicalizes-palestinian-society

Mohammad Yaghi, “Palestinian Public Opinion a Year after Hamas’s Victory,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 30, 2007, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/palestinian-public-opinion-year-after-hamass-victory

Ghaith al-Omari, Mohammad Yaghi, Dennis Ross, “Hamas vs. Fatah: Is Confrontation Inevitable?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 22, 2007, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/hamas-vs-fatah-confrontation-inevitable

2006

Adam Davidson, “Hamas: Government or Terrorist Organization?” NPR, December 6, 2006. https://www.npr.org/2006/12/06/6583080/hamas-government-or-terrorist-organization

Shimon Peres, “Israel’s War against Hizballah and Its Battle against Hamas,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, August 2, 2006, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/israels-war-against-hizballah-and-its-battle-against-hamas

Moshe Yaalon, David Makovsky and Dennis Ross, “Hamas and Israel: From Isolation to Confrontation,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, July 20, 2006, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/hamas-and-israel-isolation-confrontation

David Schenker, “Syria, Hamas, and the Gaza Crisis,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, July 10, 2006, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/syria-hamas-and-gaza-crisis

David Makovsky, “How to Deali with the challenge from Hamas,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 12, 2006, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/how-deal-challenge-hamas

Ben Fishman, “Funding Alternatives to Hamas,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 2, 2006, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/funding-alternatives-hamas

Robert Satloff, “Hobbling Hamas: Moving Beyond the U.S. Policy of Three No’s,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 3, 2006, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/hobbling-hamas-moving-beyond-us-policy-three-nos

Matthew Levitt, “Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 1, 2006, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/hamas-politics-charity-and-terrorism-service-jihad

Martin Kramer, “Power Will Not Moderate Hamas,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 27, 2006, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/power-will-not-moderate-hamas

Michael Herzog, “Target Aid to Help Hamas Fail,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 8, 2006, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/target-aid-help-hamas-fail

Patrick Clawson and David Makovsky, “Responding to Hamas’s Triumph,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 3, 2006, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/responding-hamass-triumph-0

Michael Herzog, “Can Hamas Be Tamed?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 1, 200, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/can-hamas-be-tamed

Robert Satloff, “Hamas Triumphant: Implications for Security, Politics, Economy, and Strategy,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 17, 2006, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/hamas-triumphant-implications-security-politics-economy-and-strategy

Moshe Yaalon, “The Security Implications of a Hamas-Led Palestinian Authority,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 16, 2006, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/security-implications-hamas-led-palestinian-authority

Dennis Ross, “United States Must Focus on Getting Hamas to ‘Transform Itself’ and Accept Israel’s Right to Exist,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 15, 2006, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/united-states-must-focus-getting-hamas-transform-itself-and-accept-israels-right

Alexandra Silver, “Hamas’ Leaders,” Council on Foreign Relations, February 8, 2006, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/hamas-leaders

Paul Owen and agencies, “Hamas Sets Out Conditions for Peace,” The Guardian, February 8, 2006, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/feb/08/israel1

Dennis Ross, “Give Hamas Nothing for Free,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 5, 2006, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/give-hamas-nothing-free

David Makovsky, “Keep Up the Pressure on Hamas,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 3, 2006, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/keep-pressure-hamas

Christopher Hitchens, “Suicide Voters: How Hamas dooms Palestine,” Slate, January 30, 2006, https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2006/01/how-hamas-dooms-palestine.html

Aljazeera staff, “Hamas: The New Political Force,” Al Jazeera, January 26, 2006, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2006/1/26/hamas-the-new-political-force

Robert Satloff, “Hamas’s Rise and Israel’s Choice,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 26, 2006, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/hamass-rise-and-israels-choice

David Makovsky, “Don’t Make Exceptions for Hamas,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 24, 2006, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/dont-make-exceptions-hamas

2005

Meir Litvak, “The Anti-Semitism of Hamas,” Palestine-Israel Journal of Politics, Economics and Culture, December 2005, https://pij.org/articles/345/the-antisemitism-of-hamas

Jamie Chosak and Julie Sawyer, “Hamas’s Tactics: Lessons from Recent Attacks,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 19, 2005, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/hamass-tactics-lessons-recent-attacks

Metthew Levitt, “A Hamas Headquarters in Saudi Arabia?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 28, 2005, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/hamas-headquarters-saudi-arabia

Michael Herzog, “A Wind in Hamas’s Sails: Palestinian Militants Gather Post-Disengagement Momentum,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 13, 2005, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/wind-hamass-sails-palestinian-militants-gather-post-disengagement-momentum

David Makovsky, “Toward a Quartet Position on Hamas: European Rules on Banning Political Parties,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 12, 2005, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/toward-quartet-position-hamas-european-rules-banning-political-parties

Matthew Levitt, “Undermining Hamas and Empowering Moderates by Filling the Humanitarian Void,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 7, 2005, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/undermining-hamas-and-empowering-moderates-filling-humanitarian-void

Ben Fishman and Mohammad Yaghi, “To Stay in the Game, Hamas Has To Play by the Rules,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, August 10, 2005, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/stay-game-hamas-has-play-rules

Michael Herzog, “Encouraging a Tougher PA Response to the Hamas Challenge,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, July 28, 2005, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/encouraging-tougher-pa-response-hamas-challenge

Matthew Levitt, “Palestinian Authority Minister of Economy Tied to Hamas?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 4, 2005, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/palestinian-authority-minister-economy-tied-hamas

David Makovsky, “A Multi-Pronged Strategy to Defeat Hamas,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 1, 2005, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/multi-pronged-strategy-defeat-hamas

Matthew Levitt, “Hamas and Islamic Jihad Clash over ‘Media Jihad,’” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 1, 2005, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/hamas-and-islamic-jihad-clash-over-media-jihad

2004

Matthew Levitt, “Terror [i.e., Hamas operatives] on the UN Payroll?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 13, 2004, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/terror-un-payroll

Matthew Levitt, “Indicting Hamas: By Disrupting Its Operations, Does the West Become a Target?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, August 26, 2004, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/indicting-hamas-disrupting-its-operations-does-west-become-target

Matthew Levitt, “Shaykh Yassin and Hamas Terror,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 23, 2004, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/shaykh-yassin-and-hamas-terror

Jeff Cary, “Hamas Ceasefire Proposal: Peace or Pause?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 16, 2004, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/hamas-ceasefire-proposal-peace-or-pause

Matthew Levitt, “Shut Down Hamas,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 22, 2004, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/shut-down-hamas

Zohar Palti, “Advancing Palestinian Society by Weakening Hamas,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 21, 2004, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/advancing-palestinian-society-weakening-hamas

Matthew Levitt, “Hamas’s Political Wing: Terror by Other Means,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 6, 2004, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/hamass-political-wing-terror-other-means

Matthew Levitt, “Hamas from Cradle to Grave,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 1, 2004, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/hamas-cradle-grave

2003

Matthew Levitt, “Turning a Blind Eye to Hamas in London,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy/Los Angeles Times, October 20, 2003, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/turning-blind-eye-hamas-london

Max Abrahms, “Terrorism Casts Pall on ‘Road Map,’” Washington Institute for Near East Policy/Los Angeles Times, August 14, 2003, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/terrorism-casts-pall-road-map

Shoshanah Haberman, “Between Hudna and Crackdown: Assessing the Record of Hamas Ceasefires,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, June 2, 2003, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/between-hudna-and-crackdown-assessing-record-hamas-ceasefires

Matthew Levitt, “Hamas Blood Money: Mixing Good Works and Terror is No Formula for Peace,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 5, 2003, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/hamas-blood-money-mixing-good-works-and-terror-no-formula-peace

Jonathan Schanzer, “The Challenge of Hamas to Fatah,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 1, 2003, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/challenge-hamas-fatah

2002

Jonathan Schanzer, “Fatah-Hamas Relations: Rapprochement or Ready to Rumble?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, December 19, 2002, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/fatah-hamas-relations-rapprochement-or-ready-rumble

Richard Sale, “Analysis: Hamas history tied to Israel,” UPI, June 18, 2002, https://www.upi.com/Defense-News/2002/06/18/Analysis-Hamas-history-tied-to-Israel/82721024445587/

Matthew Levitt, “Hamas: Toward a Lebanese-Style War of Attrition?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 26, 2002, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/hamas-toward-lebanese-style-war-attrition

Seth Wikas, “The Hamas Ceasefire: Historical Background, Future Foretold?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 3, 2002, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/hamas-ceasefire-historical-background-future-foretold

2001

David Schenker, “Jordan and the Islamists [i.e., Hamas]: Unfinished Business,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, July 27, 2001, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/jordan-and-islamists-unfinished-business

Jacqueline Kaufman, “Islamic Palestine or Liberated Palestine? The Relationship between the Palestinian Authority and Hamas,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, July 19, 2001, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/islamic-palestine-or-liberated-palestine-relationship-between-palestinian-authority

2000

Reuven Paz, “Hamas’s Lessons from Lebanon,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 25, 2000, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/hamass-lessons-lebanon

Reuven Paz, “Palestinian [Hamas] Holocaust Denial,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 21, 2000, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/palestinian-holocaust-denial

1999

Nicole Brackman, “Clampdown on Hamas: King Abdullah Strikes Out on His Own,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 6, 1999, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/clampdown-hamas-king-abdullah-strikes-out-his-own

Meir Litvak, “The Islamization of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict: the Case of Hamas,” Middle Eastern Studies, January 1998, with permission of the author.

1997

Rachel Ingber and Jonathan Lincoln, “A ‘Kinder, Gentler’ Hamas?: Hamas Leaders on the Record,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 27, 1997, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/kinder-gentler-hamas-hamas-leaders-record

Robert Satloff, “From Hebron to Har Homa to Hamas: The Chimera of ‘Reciprocity,’” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 4, 1997, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/hebron-har-homa-hamas-chimera-reciprocity

Jonathan Torop, “The Arafat-Hamas Rapprochement,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 21, 1997, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/arafat-hamas-rapprochement

1993

Congressional Research Service staff, “Hamas: The Organizations, Goals and Tactics of a Militant Palestinian Organization,” Federation of American Scientists, October 14, 1993, https://irp.fas.org/crs/931014-hamas.htm

1992

Clinton Bailey, “Policy Focus: Hamas: The Fundamentalist Challenge to the PLO,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 1992, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/media/3643

1989

Lisa Taraki, “The Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) in the Palestinian Uprising,” Middle East Research and Information Project, January-February 1989, https://merip.org/1989/01/the-islamic-resistance-movement-in-the-palestinian-uprising