Udi Dekel, INSS, February 6, 2020
With permission, read full article at INSS.
The INSS 13th Annual International Conference (January 28-30, 2020) hosted senior political and military figures, experts, and decision makers from Israeli and abroad. Discussions centered on four areas: the international power system; the regional environment; Israel’s political and security challenges; and Israel’s internal arena – all with a view toward the coming decade. Particular attention was paid to “the deal of the century,” Iran after Soleimani, and Israel’s northern front. This article presents the main insights from the conference sessions.The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) 13th Annual International Conference (January 28-30, 2020) hosted experts and decision makers from the political and military echelons, both Israeli and foreign, and examined four subject areas: the international power system, the regional environment, Israel’s political and security challenges, and Israel’s internal arena – all with a view toward the coming decade. This article presents the main initial insights from the conference sessions.
General Overview
The risks Israel faces are growing, given a weakened and fragile surrounding Middle East where combat arenas and interconnected zones of instability abound. It is particularly difficult to assess the unintended consequences of military and political action, and there is an ongoing process of learning and improvement underway among Israel’s adversaries, who take advantage of advanced technologies that are cheap and readily available. There is increased difficulty in attaining a proper grasp on reality in a world of clashing narratives and questioned truth, which compromises decision making.
Several meta-shapers can generate significant pivots. Maj. Gen. Tamir Hayman, chief of IDF Military Intelligence, presented three: 1. Iran’s amassment of nuclear capabilities by; 2. fissures within the Shiite axis after the targeted killing of Quds Force Commander Qasem Soleimani, given that he “has a successor, but it is doubtful he can be replaced.” Soleimani transformed the Shiite axis from a network of organizations into a network of armies that requires a command and control mechanism and a management infrastructure. His successor will find it hard to maintain and advance this complex initiative; 3. US President Donald Trump’s “deal of the century” for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has the potential to shake current balances within the Israeli-Palestinian arena and upset Israel’s relations with countries with which it has signed peace treaties (Jordan and Egypt), mainly if Israel sees in the Trump plan legitimacy for a unilateral application of law (annexation) over settlement areas in the West Bank and the Jordan Valley.
The Balance of Power among the Superpowers
A Contest for Global Hegemony: Former US National Security Adviser Gen. (ret.) H. R. McMaster assessed that China will continue combining economic belligerence with international espionage, mainly technological, in order to achieve dominance over the international economy. Within this framework, it will try to take over strategic assets, for example, ports in Israel. In the absence of counter-competition by the United States and Europe, China will grow more aggressive. As action the West should take given this threat, McMaster said, “What the Chinese Communist Party perceives as our weaknesses [should be turned] into strengths: democracy, rule of law, the free press, and international investment standards.” If the United States does not confront China on a range of issues, nothing will curb a broadening of its global activities and influence.
The United States remains the dominant economic and military power, but President Trump’s “America First” approach distances the US from international coalitions and cooperation arrangements. According to former Bank of Israel Governor Stanley Fischer, this approach also weakens the global trade structure and raises a risk of global recession in the coming decade. In addition, the end of the US hegemonic role could lead to a loss of oversight mechanisms against the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
US interests in the Middle East are changing. According to Gen. (ret.) Joseph Votel, former commander of the US CENTCOM, the United States is less dependent on the region’s resources than in the past. That said, US involvement in the Middle East is still necessary, given the contest with Russia and China for regional influence and the challenge posed by Salafi-jihadists seeking local opportunities to emerge anew. In the wake of the Soleimani killing there has been a rise in US motivation to continue economic and military pressure against the Iranian regime.
It is difficult to forge a Middle East coalition against the Shiite axis, and Washington sees few regional partners that can be trusted. Israel remains the only ally that can be relied upon, such that heavy responsibility will shift to Israel if and when the administration decides to withdraw US forces from Syria and Iraq – at which point Israel is likely to be fighting for American interests, as well as its own.
“The Deal of the Century”
After the Trump plan on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was made public (which coincided with the opening of the conference), three main scenarios were analyzed:
As part of the conference, the implications of the “deal of the century” were analyzed and several insights emerged:
The Northern Front
A wargame was held as part of the conference, simulating escalation on the northern front. As it unfolded, what became clear is that all actors were interested in avoiding war. The scenarios emerged from an Israeli operation within the framework of the “campaign between wars” against Iranian military entrenchment in Syria and against the precision-guided missile project, in parallel with a strike against US forces in Iraq by local militias serving as Iran’s proxies. It was further demonstrated that due to restraining forces – the aversion to war evinced by all actors was joined by the influential presence of Russia and the United States in the region – a window of opportunity was left for the campaign between wars, with the goal of arresting and preventing the construction of the Iranian war machine.
The Situation in Syria: Contrary to common perceptions, the war has not ended. The weakening of the Syrian state continues, and there is no central power element capable of imposing law and order, internal security, and stability. The Assad regime has apparently restored its control over some 70 percent of Syrian territory, but throughout the country basic services like electricity and gas are lacking. The national economy has collapsed and there is no reconstruction agent. The rebels’ agreement of surrender and the arrangement drafted by Russia have been wiped out, and jihadist elements are regrouping and resuming terrorist attacks. Russia aspires to institute a central governance model, while by contrast, Iran is building and operating regional and local militias that are stronger and enjoy better conditions than the Syrian military.
Iran will pursue an aggressive policy in order to preserve the regional influence that it achieved, mainly over the last five years, and in response to the “maximum pressure” applied by the United States, which is perceived in Tehran as designed to topple the regime. The Soleimani killing left Iran with a score to settle with the United States, and retaliation can be expected to focus on an effort to make life difficult for US forces stationed in Iraq and bring about their withdrawal – which, as it happens, has at this stage prompted President Trump to postpone their departure.
The question of the sanctions mechanism as an effective strategic tool: When the “maximum pressure” doctrine on Iran is reviewed, specifically the efficacy of US sanctions against Iran in staving off its attainment of nuclear weapons, it appears that the opposite is happening. The sanctions indeed generate an economic crisis and public despair in Iran, but these are not enough to compel it to act like a “normal country.” David Peyman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Counter Threat Finance and Sanctions, made clear that the US is now conducting a maximum pressure campaign against Iran, and in 2020 will shift to “super-maximum pressure.” He stated, “Our sanctions are intended to deprive this regime of revenue it uses to engage in malign activities across the region.” The pressure is intended to present Iran’s leaders with a choice: either cease the belligerent actions or watch its economy collapse. Peyman added that the sanctions are very effective: Iran is isolated and its economy has shrunk by more than 9 percent. Consequently, the budget for Shiite militias in Iraq has been cut, there was a been a significant decline in the cash flow to terrorist groups all over the world, and groups like Hezbollah are forced to seek other sources of income. As for the future, Peyman said the United States will not yield on the sanctions until Iran behaves like a normal country within the international system.
The discourse in the Arab world: The conference presented the ongoing discourse that INSS holds with Arabs in the region through the publication of research studies over social media. These are viewed by around a million people and prompt hundreds of thousands of responses. These figures point to the Arab public in the region being open to information and findings, eager to hear opinions from Israel and to be exposed to different viewpoints. Young people in the Arab world are especially keen on alternative information to what regime media in their countries provide. Among findings of an opinion poll of the Arab world that INSS conducted using social media is that in the eyes of the Arab public, the most negative force in the Middle East is Iran – double the negative view of Israel. Most respondents see a low probability of war between Israel and Iran, but in the event such were to erupt, a third of respondents said they would side with Israel, and less than a third said they would side with Iran. The primary issues that preoccupy the public in the Arab world are corruption, unemployment, and lack of governance.
In conclusion, Israel’s strategic position has improved, and stands in marked comparison to the weakness and fragility prevalent in the regional environment. Israel’s adversaries, chiefly Iran and its proxies, are not interested in a confrontation that would bring about a war with Israel, and they fear United States intervention in fighting alongside Israel. The operational zone for Israel in waging the campaign between wars – below the war threshold – has not shut. Thus, it would be right for Israel to keep up its efforts to delay and disrupt the consolidation and the buildup of Iranian war machine in the northern arena. At the same time, Israel must take into account its adversaries’ weakness and avoid exploiting operational opportunities without weighing the strategic consequences. From a political standpoint, exploiting what looks like an opportunity to reap immediate gains, specifically by annexing territory in the West Bank, would make it difficult in the future to achieve a political, demographic, and geographic separation from the Palestinians, and this would also open a door for Palestinian and regional weakness to seep into Israel, thereby undermining Israel’s strength.