Hafez Ismail as a valued adviser to Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. He served as National Security Adviser and was given that title just prior to the Ismail -Kissinger secret meetings with Kissinger in February 1973, and later in the spring 1973. There Ismail told Kissinger that Egypt was prepared for a negotiated agreement with Israel, but Kissinger did not operationalize an effort to test Sadat’s intentions, and the Israeli government under Golda Meir was not willing to test Sadat’s intentions privately.
Mohamed Hafez Ismail rose through Egyptian military ranks, ultimately interacting with other countries. After his 1960 retirement, he was made deputy of the foreign ministry, and then held various ambassadorships from 1963-1970. He then became the director of the General Intelligence Directorate, followed by roles as President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s national security advisor and President Anwar Sadat’s chief of staff, before rejoining the foreign ministry.
In this interview, Ismail shares his perception of Sadat — whether it was trying to amass power in order to singlehandedly make decisions regarding war and peace or how Sadat envisioned United States’ and Russia’s roles, “one could give you equipment and arms and the one would be responsible for making peace.” Ismail’s observation — that Sadat used his own initiatives to always keep his options open — is why Ismail calls very bold. We learn from many other interviews from Egyptian diplomats at the time, that Sadat’s potential policy options were always travelling down several parallel pathways simultaneously.
Ismail reveals that Sadat’s decision to go to cross the Suez during the 1973 Yom Kippur War was calculated to achieve limited objectives— and one that Henry Kissinger did not understand. Sadat thought it would open up diplomacy and allow him to regain the initiative. While Ismail saw Kissinger raise the stakes regarding nuclear war at the end of October 1973 facing off the USSR, Sadat himself believed that he could maneuver the highly tense situation at the time so that the superpowers would not have a confrontation of their own. Sadat did not want any political or military outcome that would brought Russian troops back to Egypt, after he had expelled most of them in July 1972. Ismail observes that like Sadat, Kissinger “wanted all the reins in his hands” while Sadat “did not want to be considered by history as one who submitted to pressure.” From other sources we learn that Sadat, Kissinger, and Meir pre-planned the December 1973 Middle East Peace conference that sideline Moscow and indirectly Syria and the PLO as well.
Ken Stein, December 2024
KWS: Obviously, I’m interested in the period —before the 1973 war and afterwards
HI: [Unintelligible.]
KWS: Obviously, I’m interested in the period prior to the ’73 War —
HI: Hmm.
KWS: — and immediately thereafter. You became President [Anwar] Sadat’s —
HI: — [U.S. Secretary of State Henry] Kissinger.
KWS: — Kissinger, if you will, in what year? What year did you —
HI: ’71. End of ’71, September ’71.
KWS: And you served in that capacity until when?
HI: Until April ’74, after the first disengagement.
KWS: Until April of ’74. And then you were posted —
HI: I went to Russia, to, to Moscow.
KWS: What was the title of the position here, national security advisor?
HI: Yes.
KWS: That was the same title we used in the states?
HI: Mmm, it was.
KWS: Okay.
HI: He was probably, umm, thinking about raising the level of contacts from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs — from the state department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to presidential level.
KWS: Sadat was?
HI: Mmm.
KWS: In ’71.
HI: Probably. He didn’t tell me.
KWS: Mmm.
HI: And therefore he wanted to have a similar, a similar, parallel —
KWS: — relationship.
HI: — organization, so that both, both counsels can speak together. And then, probably, as he did during the war, he will be sending messages to [U.S. President Richard] Nixon.
KWS: Of course, you didn’t have relations with us, so a national security advisor was a perfect way —
HI: Mmm.
KWS: — to create a link.
HI: Yes.
KWS: This was April, you say, April of ’71.
HI: No. September ’71 until April ’74.
KWS: So, September of ’71, okay. Now, [Egyptian] General [Mohamed al-] Gamasy and [General] Ahmed Fakhr have both told me that the decision to go to war was made about March or April —
HI: Mmm.
KWS: — of 1972.
HI: Mmm, ’72.
KWS: ’72. Gamasy told me that’s when they — when he received from Sadat the first instructions to begin making preparations.
HI: Mmm.
KWS: And General Fakhr, at, at lunch —
HI: Yes.
KWS: — told me, just two days ago — he said he was in Moscow, in April, and they were — he was charged with purchasing materials that could be used to, umm, break down the, the sand walls.
HI: Mmm, yes.
KWS: Now, umm, when did you first — when was, when did President Sadat first indicate to you that you should go see Kissinger?
HI: When Kissinger invited us. That was the end of July, after, after he made his, uh, his decision to uh, uh, liquidate the presence, the military presence, of the, of the Soviets in Egypt. That was — that was —
KWS: [Unintelligible.]
HI: — July seventh-eighth of July.
KWS: Kissinger — the initiative came from Kissinger?
HI: Of course.
KWS: And it came through?
HI: — through the, umm, umm, our CIA, Mukhabarat [the Egyptian General Intelligence Service].
KWS: Mmm.
HI: Ahmed Ismail Ali was at that time —
KWS: Yes.
HI: — was head of the Mukhabarat, intelligence — CIA intelligence — and he informed the president.
KWS: And when did you meet Kissinger for the first time?
HI: February ’73.
KWS: Why did it take so long between July of ’72 and February of ’73 for there, for there to be a meeting?
HI: Well, we had to, eh, normalize the situation. First, we had — the, the, the Soviets should, should go away, and we should normalize our relations with them. Secondly, we have to think about, um, why did Kissinger make this, umm, this initiative. Although, he made a similar initiative in October ’71 with [Egyptian Foreign Minister] Mahmoud Riad.
KWS: Yeah.
HI: But, but [unintelligible]. At that time, the Vietnam question was, was, uh approaching an end.
KWS: Mm-hmm.
HI: Uh, I had to go to the Soviet Union to see [Leonid] Brezhnev and tell him about what the Arab want to do.
KWS: With, with [unintelligible]?
HI: Yes. So, I went there, first week of February, the seventh, eighth of February. It took a long, long time: August, September, October, November [laughs], December.
KWS: Six months! Six — six months.
HI: Mmm.
KWS: Didn’t that frustrate Sadat?
HI: Mmm, no, no. Probably, he had, he had, uh, he had private channels through a third party.
KWS: Mm-hmm. When did Sadat come to the realization that Bill Rogers was not the right address in Washington? Didn’t — he began to understand —
HI: You see, you see, probably he, he, he thought that important questions will only be solved by the president and his counselor, that the role of the state department was to keep, keep the Middle East, eh, um, just, without, without any nuisance.
KWS: Keep the lid on.
HI: Yeah, but to keep it warm, until they finish Viet— Vietnam, until they finish with Vietnam.
KWS: But did Sadat get an indication from Kissinger that that’s what Kissinger wanted to do? He was going to, he said — Did you ever get the notion that the U.S. had communicated to Sadat, saying, “Yes, yes, we’ll get to you as soon as I finish this?” I mean, you speak as if you knew that’s what —
HI: Mm-mmm.
KWS: — was American reason.
HI: No, no. But maybe, maybe [Joe] Sisco, through the, uh, the third party —
KWS: Mm-hmm.
HI: — informed Sadat that the, uh, umm, Russians could not do anything. “You have to be — to have — you have to have confidence in us. We can help you.”
KWS: And what kind — when you knew that you were going to go see Kissinger, what were the objectives of the meeting, as far as you were concerned?
HI: To conduct discu— Umm, he said, “to conduct discussions to see where we stand before we can start, uh, important negotiations.” But we started negotiations right, right from the beginning. Umm, you see, we had, we had — we had two initiatives in the beginning of ’71: the four— the fourth of February initiative —
KWS: Correct. I remember that.
HI: — which the President did. And the 8th — Yadin initiative, where he said the Israelis will withdraw to the international border. So, we joined both together. And in June, I think, in June you had, you had, you, you had the summit meeting between, between Brezhnev —
KWS: May, May of ’72.
HI: May, or June?
KWS: May.
HI: May. So, we called upon the [UN] Security Council to start discussion of the situation in the Middle East. And with respect to the summit meeting, we had it in two, eh, two periods: first period then became to plan and push things, right, during the summit. And then second period where we had — we wanted a resolution of the Security Council. We got the resolution, which was a respect of, the respect of the 8th of February ’71 initiative.
KWS: Right.
HI: By 14 members of the Security Council, and the veto of the — the American veto.
KWS: Did the fact that the, umm, the Brezhnev-Nixon summit of May of ’72 — it said very little about the Middle East —
HI: Yes.
KWS: Did that irritate Sadat?
HI: That is what irritated him.
KWS: It did irritate him.
HI: Mmm.
KWS: He felt that the superpowers were not paying attention —
HI: Not [unintelligible], that the Russians were probably incapable of, of pushing things in the Middle East.
KWS: Is that why he asked them to leave here?
HI: Mmm.
KWS: Is that why he expelled them in July?
HI: Because — because in the, in the, in the —
KWS: Is there a direct connection?
HI: — in the statement, the statement which was published after the, after the meeting, he said, “relaxation of” Relaxation? Yeah — “relaxation of the situation in the Middle East.”
KWS: Okay. Okay, let’s get back to the Kissinger visit. You met him where?
HI: Outside New York.
KWS: Armonk.
HI: Armonk.
KWS: Armonk. And how long did that meeting last?
HI: How long?
KWS: A couple hours?
HI: [Unintelligible.] No, no, no. Two days.
KWS: Two days.
HI: Mmm. One and a half days, something like that. Morning, evening, the next morning.
KWS: How broad was the discussion?
HI: As broad as you can measure. I mean, we, we — I was speaking for Egypt, but I had the Arabs in my conscience. And I would not — I was not asking for a, a separate dealing.
KWS: I understand.
HI: Umm —
KWS: What did Kissinger want to know from you?
HI: He wanted me to educate him, that’s what he said [laughs].
KWS: Really? Really?
HI: Of course, he knew more about the Middle East than I, than, than me.
KWS: Do you think he — you think you educated him? Did you educate him?
HI: Eh, maybe.
KWS: On what points, do you think?
HI: The process. Reaching peace.
KWS: And how did you describe Sadat’s view of the process?
HI: Not that he had an idea before I left about the process, but his initiative would be a first step to a second step which would be a withdrawal to the international borders.
KWS: In other words, partial withdrawal.
HI: Eh [exhales], partial withdrawal [pronounced each syllable distinctly].
KWS: Partial withdrawal.
HI: Mmm. One and then, the second.
KWS: In other words, a partial withdrawal. Similar to the February ’71 initiative, there would be an Israeli withdrawal, you’d put Egyptian policeman on the other side of the canal —
HI: Uh, well, we didn’t, we didn’t like that. He said, I remember — he was, eh, he had sarcasm.
KWS: He had —
HI: He said, “You can put anybody in any type of uniform, like a guard or something like that.” Well, in, in ’71, the, the Israelis got the idea of the British, when they left the canal, leaving military people in civilian clothes [laughs] in, in, in the base. So, they, they, they wanted to have their, their people, some people, in civilian clothes inside the, uh, [unintelligible] parts, which they established on the eastern part.
KWS: What do you think you accomplished by the visit with Kissinger?
HI: To go to war.
KWS: To go to war because why? Because he was not responding?
HI: Because he was asking for, for concessions.
KWS: What kind?
HI: He said — I cannot, cannot, cannot — after twenty years [unintelligible] exactly what he said. He said that he wanted to convince the Congress and Jewish lobby and in Israel, and therefore he should be in a position to provide s— to, to offer them something.
KWS: Uh-huh, uh-huh. And what was the something?
HI: You see, he, he give me — before I left, he give me a, a copy of a, a magazine called the Globus?
KWS: Globus, yeah.
HI: Globus. It had in it, uh, an article written by some, some Israeli, someone, I don’t remember his name. And he put in, he put in it his idea of — he put in it an avant [French for before, followed by an unintelligible French term] of a — of a settlement between Egypt and, and in that — that’s why Kissinger wanted us to accept. He wanted an Egyptian, he want— umm, uh, Nixon said we have to, umm, we have to adjust sovereignty with security. In, in, in Sinai. That meant that an Egyptian government would be sitting in [unintelligible] and a commander of, of, of Israeli forces would be, eh, would be across the border, on the other side of the border, inside Sinai. And they would be visiting each other, eh, eh, in turn. This time, the governor goes to the [unintelligible], the second time, the commander. He called it to mix, to mix them together. And that is probably what Rabin is asking in the Golan, to have, to have some kind of — Oh, of course, he cannot, uh, he cannot say, “I’ll, I’ll leave the Golan right away.” Anyhow, umm, so, eh, em, eh, Kissinger said. “Arrangements during withdrawal which” — and a part of them would continue even after withdrawal — He meant that overlap between, between sovereignty and, and, and, and security.
KWS: In other words, he was saying that the Israelis would retain a presence in partial —
HI: Mmm.
KWS: — in parts of Egyptian Sinai —
HI: Mmm.
KWS: — which for you, and for Sadat, that was unacceptable.
HI: Mmm. Mm-hmm.
KWS: So that’s why you say that the conclusion of the discussion was to go to war.
HI: Yes. I think, I think that — that’s why I, I was rather astonished about Gamasy and Fakr, because when I went to see Sadat in Alexandria, [unintelligible]. And he, I had Hafez [unintelligible] — he was a politician from the party — and I intended — he was with me to see Nixon, and Brezhnev before, and, and, and I insisted that he should be with me so that I would not forget any part. And Sadat was leaning like that, and I was sitting there, and [unintelligible], and at one point, he went back. And I thought at that moment he probably got a message, maybe the, the that question of concessions, further concessions, and that he was not prepared to accept that. On the 7th of — 7th or 8th of March —
KWS: ’73.
HI: ’73. That, that was on the 2nd or 3rd of March ’73.
KWS: When you saw him in Alexandria.
HI: I saw him in Alexandria, yes. I came, I came from New York. I saw [West German Chancellor] Willy Brandt in Bonn, before coming, upon instructions from [unintelligible]. On the 7th or 8th of March, he asked me to start thinking about a new, a new, a new, a new government.
KWS: Mm-hmm.
HI: That I would be head of a, of a, a new government.
KWS: Here in Egypt?
HI: Yeah, yeah.
KWS: He asked you to start it?
HI: Yes, yes. He had Ahmed Ismail. Ahmed Ismail, by that time, was, was head of the — in other words, a minister of defense, mmm? When I went back and — he told me, “Next week you come to me and you tell me what you have thought about.”
KWS: He wanted you to figure out who would be ministers, or —?
HI: Yes, mmm. When I went back —
KWS: Mm-hmm.
HI: — he said, “I think that would be too much for you.” Because I told him, I told him I had been working abroad, “I don’t know people here, I don’t know whom to choose for that or this [unintelligible].” But he insisted. And Ahmed Ismail insisted also. He wanted a military government, sort of a military government. When I went back on the 15th, he said, “No, no, no. I, I’ll form the government.” He —
KWS: Sadat.
HI: Sadat. And he — in April, he actually formed a government. He was head — he was Prime Minister. But he had [Dr. Mohamed] Abdel Kader Hatem [unintelligible] as a, a deputy prime minister [sic: deputy premier] who would look after —
KWS: — everything.
HI: Yes.
KWS: Sadat had not been prime minister as well as president, up until that point. He had only been president, right?
HI: No. That, that was the first time.
KWS: That was the first time, in April?
HI: Mmm.
KWS: Umm, when did you see Kissinger again?
HI: In May ’73.
KWS: In Paris.
HI: In Paris. Outside Paris.
KWS: And whose initiative was that? Was it —
HI: It was, it was, uh. an understanding between us in the first session, in the first meeting, that we would meet again. And it was — uh, we, we thought about the 20th of April. So, when I told Sadat that I was going again on the 20th of April —
KWS: — to?
HI: — to, to see Kissinger, when he told me about, about the — he said, “No, push it. Push that, that meeting for some time —”
KWS: — into the future.
HI: Into the future. And then he told me about the premiership.
KWS: Were you surprised that he took the position of premiership as well?
HI: He wanted to have all the reins in his hand. He would be the one who took the decision, this issue, to go to war, he would be the one who execute everything and he was the one who made peace.
KWS: Umm, what was Sadat’s impression of Nixon? Was he impressed by Nixon? Did he have any —
HI: I don’t remember.
KWS: Umm, when Kissinger saw you the second time in Paris, umm, discussion was not as long, the meeting was not as long as the first time.
HI: Yes, it was not.
KWS: Were there specific agenda items —
HI: Umm —
KWS: — that you spoke about?
HI: He said, “How about continuing?” I said, “I see no reason for continuing discussion.” I said, “Kissing—, umm, Nixon said, ‘sovereignty and security.’ Will you, the United States, issue a declaration saying that you respect Egyptian sovereignty over its —”
KWS: — territory.
HI: “— territory?” And he said, “No.”
KWS: He said no?
HI: Yeah.
KWS: Really?
HI: “We may be able to make a declaration on the lines of [U.N. Resolution] 242,” something —
KWS: — general.
HI: “And we may be able to have the Israelis to accept that. We may be able to convince them to accept that declaration.” And I think that, that was in the garden outside the house, outside the villa. And I think, in his book, there is a —
KWS: Kissinger?
HI: Kissinger [unintelligible].
KWS: There is a picture of the two of you.
HI: — walking, mmm. And when he refused, I saw no reason to continue discussions.
KWS: You came back and reported to Sadat.
HI: Mmm.
KWS: And told him that —
HI: Sadat, uh, Sadat was going to war in April, but then Ahmed Ismail — when I was, in February, in Washington and New York, Ahmed Ismail was in Moscow. And that can give you an idea of how Sadat visualized the role of the two superpowers: one could give you equipment and arms and one would be responsible for —
KWS: — making the peace.
HI: Making peace. So, emm, Ahmed Ismail convinced him that we should wait for the equipment that he, eh, that he, that he demanded from the Soviets, for some time. And therefore, he had to postpone the date. Of course, the date was tied up with the question of swell of the —
KWS: — the tides.
HI: — the tides.
KWS: Gamasy said he, they gave Sadat three, three days.
HI: Mmm.
KWS: One in May, one in August, and one in October.
HI: October. Of course. That is correct. Uh, but in May, it would have been a question of a, uh, a war of attrition and Ahmed Ismail, Ahmed Ismail did not like that. Maybe the August one was not liked by the Syrians. Maybe, I don’t know. So, he accepted —
KWS: Why did Ahmed Ismail not want another war? He didn’t want another war of attrition because he didn’t want to repeat it; he wanted to take back territory.
HI: Mmm, but not all territory. That is the difference between him and Muhamed Sadek [Egyptian defense minister before Ahmed Ismail replaced him]. Maybe Muhamed Sadek was too ambitious, and did not consider the political issues, that we would not be allowed to reach the international border with our troops, because nobody could stop us then. We would not say, “Oh, that’s, that is the line that separates us from, from, from Palestine.” And America would not like that.
KWS: So, the plan from the very beginning was something limited.
HI: Eh, yes, yes.
KWS: Uh, did it include going to the passes?
HI: Ahmed Ismail told me that the immediate objective, the immediate objective, would be 11, 12 kilometers east of the canal. But, final objective would be the passes, but, but that, that would not — the troops would not be asked to go as far as there. We have to, to tell them that they still have got to go to the passes, but we would not, but we would not —
KWS: — actually ask them to do so.
HI: Mmm. He wanted to, emm — the line between Port Said and Alexandria, eh, eh, Port Said and Suez to be transferred east of the canal. And to start, em, engaging, eh —
KWS: How much, how much of this plan of his did he share with his Arab brethren — did Sadat share?
HI: I don’t know.
KWS: When the war broke —
HI: I only heard that they expected us to go as far as the passes.
KWS: But he never consulted with the Jordanians about his plans.
HI: No.
KWS: And, and the Syrians were brought in when? Into the plan?
HI: You see, before — even before Nasser died, at the end of ’69, there was, eh, there was an agreement between Egypt and — between Egypt and Syria about the combined political [unintelligible] which would control the commander-in-chief of the two [unintelligible].
KWS: Who handled the relations, then, between Egypt and Syria? Primarily Sadat?
HI: Well, Sadat was everywhere.
KWS: No foreign minister, I guess he had to be.
HI: He had Mahmoud Riad.
KWS: I mean no — I’m sorry, yes of course, foreign minister, sure. I’m sorry. I was thinking about relations —
HI: But Mahmoud Riad left the government in, uh, December ’71 and [Mohammed] Murad Ghaleb was appointed minister.
KWS: But he was not the same caliber of Mahmoud Riad.
HI: Well, he, he was our, he was our ambassador to Moscow. He was the dean of ambassadors. He spent there ten years.
KWS: You really paint a picture of Sadat who divided in his mind the abilities of both superpowers —
HI: Mmm.
KWS: — and the relationships that he was creating amongst his advisors on who would be designated to handle —
HI: Mmm.
KWS: — which portfolios.
HI: Mmm. He, he, he always had his options open. That is my, my, my conclusion. He always had these, umm, initiatives. He would not close any —
KWS: — door.
HI: — any door. Even after the war, he had discussions in [Kilometer] 101, discussions with the Russians, he sent Ismail Fahmy to Washington so that he would see where, how to go along.
KWS: In a certain sense, he pursued a similar, similar policy that Nasser did. Not as, not as, not as overt, but he sent very subtle messages both to Moscow and to Washington that he was always talking to the other side.
HI: Umm, no. Nasser was more precise in his, in his relationship with the, with the Russians.
KWS: Was Sadat, was Sadat bold?
HI: Very bold.
KWS: Was he more bold than Nasser?
HI: I don’t know.
KWS: Who was more courageous?
HI: They are two different political figures. I don’t know about their courage, physical courage — even Nasser was courageous. But Sadat was a man of seek and hide.
KWS: Hide and seek.
HI: Hide and seeks. But Nasser would go different [unintelligible].
KWS: Where were you when the war started? Physically, where were you when the October War started?
HI: In Heliopolis.
KWS: And what were you doing?
HI: I had my staff in a villa there, close to — do you know the [unintelligible]?
KWS: I know Heliopolis.
HI: You know Heliopolis. You know, there is, uh, the palace, the Quba Palace —
KWS: Yeah.
HI: — and [unintelligible]. In between, there was a villa which was owned by Prince Abdul [unintelligible], mmm, and there was also a small, a small palace, al Tahra.
KWS: Mm-hmm.
HI: So, Sadat was in the al Tahra, I was in [unintelligible] with my staff. He had his operations in al Tahra. General, general headquarters was in [unintelligible] It was very [unintelligible]? at that time. Communications were dealt with by Ashraf Marwan, the son-in-law of Nasser, and he was in his original bureau in a couple of, uh — about a kilometer or a kilometer-and-a-half from, from my, my headquarters. In my headquarters, I had both military intelligence and, umm, umm, and diplomats.
KWS: The war broke. How soon did Sadat contact Kissinger after the war started?
HI: Kissinger started to contact Hassan El-Zayyat, in New York, our minister of foreign affairs; he was at that time in New York. Probably he was brought out of his bed by the Israelis telling him that something fishy is going on, that there may be war. So, he contacted Zayyat and, and asked him, “Please don’t go to war. I have, I have the confirmation of, of the Israelis that they will not, uh, not carry out any offensive —”
KWS: — preemptive attack —
HI: “— any preemptive strike. And if they do, I’ll stand against them.”
KWS: Mm-hmm.
HI: And Sadat — And, and Zayyat spoke with me, I talked to — I told him — at that time it was 1 o’clock, it was 2 o’clock —
KWS: Here.
HI: Mmm. Six — it was 8 o’clock.
KWS: In the morning.
HI: Mm-hmm.
KWS: [Unintelligible.]
HI: I told him, the first, uh, the first statement was already made, that the Israelis were attacking an area across, across the gulf, the Suez Gulf, and that we — that Sadat has issued orders to clear them out of that, and to attack all along the line.
KWS: Alright, so it really wasn’t the truth, but it didn’t matter.
HI: Mmm. Sadat, umm — Kissinger wanted first to prevent war. When war broke out, he wanted us to confine ourselves to the area of the attack, of the, of the Israeli attack. Then — and he said that a committee, or a delegation, would be sent which would carry out through some investigation of, umm, how, how war broke out. When things started to look like a war, he started to contact Saudi Arabia — probably Jordan, I don’t know —
KWS: Kissinger.
HI: Mmm — so that war will not swallow the whole area, especially the gulf area, where oil was there — Because Sadat, in May, the 1st of May ’73 — was it ’73? Mmm, ’74? — Anyhow, the question of oil was always in our minds, that umm — and I think [Saudi Arabia] King Faisal went along nicely.
KWS: Did Sadat talk to Faisal before the war about —
HI: Oh yes, he must have. And during the war — after the war broke out, he sent ibn— Said [unintelligible], you know the name?
KWS: Yes.
HI: Mmm. Said [unintelligible], to Riyadh.
KWS: If Sadat wanted to be in touch with Kissinger during the war, how did he, how did he — was he in touch with him? Or, how did he stay in touch with him?
HI: No, Kissinger — at one time, uh, at a certain time on the 7th of October, Sadat decided that we should have direct contact with Kissinger. Not through Zayyat. And Zayyat was — So, we started to have direct contact through a representative of the CIA. Iton?
KWS: Trun?
HI: He was a [unintelligible] New York. Anyhow, it was someone, certain —
KWS: But in any case, you stayed in touch — Kissinger stayed in touch with Sadat even as the war progressed?
HI: Yes, yes, yes. Once we started contact, our telegrams came through me to Kissinger, and from Kissinger to me.
KWS: What were the nature of the, of the telegrams, early on? What was, what was Sadat saying to Kissinger? What was Kissinger saying to Sadat? I mean, he must have been angry that the Egyptians had gone to war. He probably thought that Egyptians want to get killed.
HI: Mmm.
KWS: He probably thought that they were going to be defeated rapidly, soundly.
HI: Mmm.
KWS: He probably had this notion that Sadat was a buffoon for doing this.
HI: Mmm.
KWS: You know, you interview — I interviewed Peter Rodman, and I interviewed Roy Atherton, and I interviewed [Hal] Saunders, I interviewed [William] Quandt. And they all come to the same opinion, that Kissinger’s view of Sadat during the first week was, “Who is this? Why is he doing this? Doesn’t he know he’s going to get beaten?”
HI: Mmm, uh —
KWS: So, I mean —
HI: Maybe, maybe, that’s what he said there. But what he was trying to achieve was a cease-fire. And a return to original positions. When that came —
KWS: To the original positions?
HI: Yes. When that —
KWS: You mean before, the status quo ante?
HI: Yes. When that, when that did not materialize, he accepted, through the British, a cease-fire on location.
KWS: In situ.
HI: Yes. That was the 13th, that was about —
KWS: But after the war started, Sadat was not about to bring the Egyptian troops back across the canal.
HI: No, no, no. Or even after it started — or even after —
KWS: Okay I just want to be clear, I just want to be —
HI: No, no, no.
KWS: I want to be sure about it. Okay. Umm, was Sadat convinced that this war would open up diplomacy?
HI: Yes.
KWS: Why? What convinced him of it? What convinced him —
HI: He always told us, “Oh, the Americans coming from the States there, they always talk to us about — as a dead horse. We are not a dead horse. We should prove to them that we are not a dead horse.” After the summit meeting, the American-Russian summit meeting, umm, he said, “Now, I regain the initiative. I can assume, assume now initiative and open up venues for my, my going further on.” He was not tied by the — Well, they did not tie us, but of course, they give us advice, the Russians. Even, even, even the Yugoslav, even [leader Josip Broz] Tito was rather anxious, he — Sadat was —
[END OF SIDE ONE, TAPE ONE]
HI: — about — one has to swallow something.
KWS: Umm, where did this idea for an international conference come from? On the 16th of October Sadat makes a speech before parliament —
HI: Mmm.
KWS: — and in the middle of the speech, he said, “Well, we can go to an international conference and discuss this.”
HI: Mmm.
KWS: Where did this idea come from? Do you have any idea? Had you heard it before? Or, do you recollect having heard it before?
HI: I cannot say yes or no.
KWS: Because no American that I have spoken to knows the origins of it except it comes out of Sadat’s speech.
HI: Mmm. Maybe the Russians gave him the impression that an international, that — he wanted always to stick with the United Nations. Because, even at that time, he did not have enough confidence in, in America. He wanted to, to be sure.
KWS: He wanted the UN as a balance.
HI: Mmm.
KWS: Uh huh. I think, if I’m not mistaken —
HI: [Unintelligible], he put it — well, [unintelligible] came from the UN. Was it his initiative? No, no. He said [unintelligible] opening the canal, and then, there was a program for final withdrawal to —
KWS: Right.
HI: [Unintelligible.]
KWS: In the middle of the war —
HI: You didn’t like an international conference?
KWS: No, I, I —
HI: [Unintelligible.]
KWS: I’m just trying to find the origins of it.
HI: Mmm, mmm.
KWS: The idea.
HI: Mmm.
KWS: Because it’s the first time it enters into Middle East diplomacy —
HI: Mmm.
KWS: — in an official way.
HI: But, but, uh, but Kissinger killed it. Later —
KWS: Well, I mean, two months later it was very much alive.
HI: Well, December ’73, yes. But, as a tool.
KWS: Of course.
HI: For a military delegation to sit and to work out the details of a disengagement or something like that.
KWS: During the war, the Soviet foreign minister visited you —
HI: No, [Soviet Premier Alexei] Kosygin.
KWS: Kosygin visited you — Kosygin.
HI: He came on the 16th.
KWS: And he stayed for three or four days.
HI: He stayed until the 19th. Then he flew back.
KWS: What was the purpose of his visit?
HI: To try, to work out a paper, for a settlement, that he could present to the Americans.
KWS: A paper that deals, would deal with what?
HI: With a settlement.
KWS: A settlement or a cease-fire?
HI: Well, they started the cease-fire on the 6th [laughs]. They came to us and they said, “The Syrians want a cease-fire.” So that was a surprise. He said, he said, “Who told you that?” He said to Hafez al-Assad, he said, “Go on, fight. Don’t withdraw.” And Hafez al-Assad sent to him a request for a cease-fire. So, the, the Russians were — the Russians and the Americans had just started in ‘72 the first summit meeting [May 22-30 in Moscow]. Then, they wanted to keep it — they didn’t want to, to break it up.
KWS: So, what you’re saying is, you think the respective superpowers did not want this war to destroy detente.
HI: Yes, of course.
KWS: And that’s how Sadat viewed it —
HI: And Sadat worked for it also, later, and during the war. He said, “I don’t want a confrontation between you and — between the Americans and the Russians.” When he asked for troops from the two superpowers to come to, uh, uh —
KWS: — monitor the cease-fire.
HI: — to push back the Israelis to the line of the 22nd.
KWS: I see. Were there actually — did Soviet troops actually come here, Soviet observers?
HI: Yes.
KWS: Ismail Fahmy, in his book, said there were about four dozen who actually arrived —
HI: Four dozen?
KWS: — and then they had, and then they went back home. They were here for two or three days and went back home.
HI: I didn’t see them, but I heard about them.
KWS: Kissinger said that he would not tolerate Soviet troops versus U.S. troops here, because he thought that the clash would —
HI: Mmm.
KWS: — create a spark, and —
HI: Well, well, military people from your side were on the Israeli line. That’s why Sadat got the idea of having observers, or troops, and then later, umm, eh, international observers.
KWS: Monitors.
HI: No, no, troops.
KWS: He had evidence that Americans were fighting for the Israelis?
HI: No, no, but that there were observers there.
KWS: I see, I see. Umm, when did you learn about the cease-fire resolution, the, the — [UN Resolution] 338? Because Sadat was never contacted by either Moscow or by the United States with a resolution that was concocted in Moscow. It was drafted in Moscow.
HI: It was drafted in Moscow; it was sent to New York, eh —
KWS: — and immediately ratified.
HI: Not immediately.
KWS: Well, it was sent to New York, it was sent to New York.
HI: It was 12 hours, six — 6:52 in the evening. 6:52 in the morning the resolution was passed. I think, I think the Security Council spent all the night working on that.
KWS: But nothing was changed from the draft that was made in Moscow.
HI: No. We, we, we didn’t get the draft to, uh, to, uh —
KWS: — comment.
HI: — to comment.
KWS: Either did the Israelis.
HI: Did he —
KWS: The Israelis didn’t either.
HI: No, no.
KWS: And they were very angry.
HI: Were they?
KWS: Very angry.
HI: Well, he give them some time to fight on. When he visited —
KWS: — Israel.
HI: Kissinger came, on his way back home, he came to, uh, to Damascus — to Jerusalem.
KWS: That’s correct.
HI: He met Golda Meir.
KWS: Correct.
HI: And he got the impression — maybe he didn’t say so —
KWS: — so many words —
HI: — in so many words, but he got the impression that while he was on his way, he can do something.
KWS: You mean, expand their presence.
HI: And they did.
KWS: Yes. Of course, they did.
HI: The 23rd.
KWS: How did the confrontation evolve between the Soviet Union and the United States, the nuclear thing?
HI: Oh.
KWS: From your point of view — how did you see that evolve?
HI: Uh, when, when Sadat asked for troops to come down, the Russians said, Yes, we accept that.” But he got a message from, okay, from Nixon saying that, umm, that this might — “We don’t want your territory to be the objective of nuclear war. And, umm, and we don’t want — We, we, we refuse to send troops to Egypt.” And I, I think he promised that he would do whatever is necessary to stop the war.
KWS: How did we get to the point —
HI: So, so, the, the, the, umm — Probably Kissinger, or CIA, noticed that the flights, the flights between, between the Soviet Union and, and Egypt started to decline. And they started to — thinking that maybe there is something fishy. Probably the Russians were preparing some airborne troops to be brought in, or preparing some — it was a division [unintelligible]?
KWS: Do you know that they were preparing?
HI: No.
KWS: I mean, you don’t have any evidence that they were preparing to send troops.
HI: No. So, on the 24th — the cease-fire was broken on the 22nd, a few, a few hours later.
KWS: Correct.
HI: And then, another cease-fire was, eh, on the 23rd.
KWS: [UN Resolution] 339.
HI: 339. Probably that would take, would be effective on the 24th. On the 24th, things started to become, umm, hot. Very hot. The Israelis were driving toward Suez. They were cutting lines of communication between Suez, but they could not enter — they entered Suez, but they had to withdraw. I think that on, on, on — Simultaneously, the question of . umm, alert, American alert, of troops. Troops were alerted, but I think that the question of using nuclear weapons was just to, to bring fear into us, that it was not — I mean, I mean, the Russians and the, the Russians and the, uh —
KWS: U.S.
HI: — and the U.S., would not have used nuclear weapons. But anyhow —
KWS: But did, you see — I don’t want to put words in your mouth, but you think Kissinger wanted to raise the stakes to such a level —
HI: So that on the 25th —
KWS: — that everyone would go “Ah!”
HI: On the 25th, he, he even leaked information that American troops in Europe and somewhere else —
KWS: Were on DEFCON 3.
HI: — were alerted.
KWS: Mm-hmm. Do you think he did that intentionally?
HI: He must have been, eh, he must have been very cautious that his bluff might be — if he was bluffing — that he, he, uh, uh —
KWS: You don’t think that there was a conspiracy between him and the Soviets? Where did the, umm, where did the idea come for this, for the negotiations to take place at Kilometer 101, this, this disengagement of —
HI: 101?
KWS: Yes, where did this — how did that come about?
HI: I think. I think, uh Kissinger sent to Golda Meir, and she — about breaking the cease-fire, and she answered, “Well, we can’t have —” Probably she answered in this way, “We can have a military meeting between —”
KWS: — the sides —
HI: “— people of two sides under the UN, with UN presence,” and he, he, he said, “I assure you.” They would ask, “They would accept that?” and he said, “We’ll try.” And he said to us on the 27th at 3 o’clock in the morning, 2 o’clock, actually, and we accepted, to send Gamasy.
KWS: On the 28th in the evening.
HI: No, uh, let’s see, when would it be?
KWS: He left at 5 o’clock for a meeting that didn’t take place.
HI: [Unintelligible.]
KWS: He came back —
HI: — he came back —
KWS: —and then —
HI: — and then he went right back again.
KWS: — at 1 o’clock in the morning they started.
HI: Mmm. Uh, the Israelis carried out the last offensive against Suez, and they failed in the morning — at noon, 28th, and thus, they, they accepted to sit and to talk.
KWS: Do you think, did you think it was — I mean, you’re national security advisor, how much did you see of Sadat during the war?
HI: Varied.
KWS: Mm-hmm?
HI: Mmm.
KWS: And talk about the status or — what was the nature of the conversation? I mean, he knew what he wanted to accomplish. He knew he wanted to get to discussions.
HI: Mmm. Probably, he, uh, he was exhausted towards the end, especially when the Israelis broke out of the [unintelligible] bar.
KWS: The 17th, 18th, 19th —
HI: No, twenty— 22, after the cease-fire.
KWS: Ah right. Right, right, right, right.
HI: You see, he got, he got the first information about the Israelis crossing the canal on the 16th, and for a couple of days, we had the impression that, that maybe it was a company of, a company of, uh, tanks that crossed. But Sharon was more [laughs] —
KWS: — aggressive.
HI: — more aggressive than that.
KWS: He certainly was.
HI: Mmm. And he had a couple of divisions, but a couple of companies. And Sadat said, “I’ll ask for cease-fire to keep my — what I have gained.” He refused to, to withdraw troops from the east side to the west, according to [Egyptian General Saad] Shazly. The canal represented to us — if you are, if you move eastwards, you are gaining; if you move westwards, you are losing — it was a psychological —
KWS: Of course. Besides, the canal meant something to Egypt nationally, in terms of its history.
HI: But unfortunately, we did not, umm, we have, we had already used the bulk of our reserves, and west of the canal, there was not any fighting troops.
KWS: Did that create a sense of worry, concern, for Sadat, for you: now the Israelis are 60 miles from Cairo? At what point did you — you know, this guy is across the canal, he’s got tanks, he just broke out, he tried to go into Suez — was there any apprehension that they might just head on this way?
HI: Well, it was — the road was, was clear. Not apprehension, but a possibility. But it would have been, umm, would have been very courageous of them to leave, to leave the area of the canal and to start coming to Cairo.
KWS: It would have been very what of them? What was the word that you used?
HI: It would have been very courageous.
KWS: Courageous of them?
HI: Mmm.
KWS: Of the Israelis?
HI: Mmm.
KWS: Why courageous?
HI: Umm, dispersing their troops, I think, in that way.
KWS: Ahh, I see what you’re saying.
HI: And, and coming inside —
KWS: — an Arab capital.
HI: — the capital here. And the people, they would have been beaten. We are not [unintelligible].
KWS: No, no, I understand what you are saying. I understand. But the Third Army was now surrounded, was it not?
HI: It was, on the east side.
KWS: What impact did the condition of the Third Army have upon the pace of the, the Kilometer 101 talks? Did it affect Sadat at all? Did it affect his thinking? Did the condition of the Third Army —
HI: No, I think that, eh, I think that Kissinger told the Israelis, “If you don’t, if you don’t respond, we may have the Russians dropping parachute troops, parachute [unintelligible].”
KWS: Paratroopers.
HI: No, no, no. Equipment and food and this and that, by parachute, over the other side. So, you have to accept opening the line to Suez and to the Third Army. And to exchange — to have posts of, of, of the UN troops instead of posts of —
KWS: — Israeli troops.
HI: — Israeli troops on the road. But you, you had the right to inspect the lorries going east.
KWS: Why did Sadat send Fahmy to Washington?
HI: To open the thread — the belief that, that, that America was responsible, was — not responsible, but was, would be able to reach a settlement. That is why he sent him. He sent him with a, with a, with a plan for the withdrawal of the troops east of the canal, Israeli troops east of the canal, and the —
KWS: What was the plan?
HI: They would first go back to the 22nd line, which Kissinger said made him laugh [laughs].
KWS: That’s diplomatic, very nice.
HI: He said, “This is very, uh, very ambitious,” at that time. The Egyptian plan for a withdrawal of the Israeli troops east of the, east of the canal, while keeping our troops, uh, in their positions which they have occupied, umm, and to start the, uh, uh, start the international —
KWS: But were you —
HI: — conference.
KWS: But were you ever worried that the Israelis would just cut off the Third Army, deny them blood, deny them food, deny them water, deny them blankets? What I’m trying to figure out in my mind —
HI: [Unintelligible.]
KWS: I’m trying to figure out what impact the condition of the Third Army had upon Sadat’s thinking —
HI: Mmm.
KWS: — vis-a-vis diplomacy.
HI: Mmm. That’s why he accepted right away the discussions at Kilometer 101, military discussions, or so he said [unintelligible].
KWS: But it — you see, there are two things in mind: There is this long-term strategy of Sadat, who wants to go to war in order to go to diplomacy —
HI: Mmm.
KWS: — and then there is the immediacy of the Third Army —
HI: Mmm.
KWS: — his own personal exhaustion.
HI: Mmm.
KWS: That comes together with this long-term strategy, this immediate need, along with this long-term strategy, of “let’s get talks going.”
HI: Mmm.
KWS: But Sadat never had any notion at Kilometer 101 that they’d talk politics.
HI: Later, much later. When, when, when Kissinger, in, in, uh, Washington said, “This is a very ambitious plan which you brought to me —”
KWS: To Fahmy, said [unintelligible] —
HI: — to Fahmy —
KWS: Mmm.
HI: — so Sadat sent the plan to Gamasy to present it to the, uh — [Israel’s special assistant to chief of staff, present at Kilometer 101 talks; Aharon] Yariv — Yariv, I think.
KWS: Including the international conference idea?
HI: The withdrawal, the first, the first —
KWS: Just the first?
HI: — the first stage of withdrawal. Ismail Fahmy was — of course, the Israelis told Kissinger and he, he, Kissinger said to Ismail Fahmy, “That is what I think. What are you doing?” [Laughs.] “Why did you present this plan to the Israelis?” Anyhow, it went on there. But Yariv, Yariv had several options concerning withdrawal of both. They withdraw from the west of the canal and we withdraw from east of the canal.
KWS: Of course, the Egyptians wouldn’t, wouldn’t hear that.
HI: So, he presented another. Third Army and [laughs] their troops in Suez —
KWS: Exchange.
HI: Exchange. He had two or three options.
KWS: Yariv?
HI: Yariv, yes.
KWS: Did you have any idea about how these talks were going, on a regular basis? Did you, did you understand what Yariv and Gamasy were talking about?
HI: When Gamasy came back.
KWS: On a daily basis?
HI: No, no. He would not come on a daily basis.
KWS: Because every day Omar [Sirry] and Fawzi al-Ibrashi came home —
HI: He had a couple of questions to deal with, to start with, arrangements for a, umm, a cease-fire, extended cease-fire, and the passage of, of column, of, uh —
KWS: — supplies.
HI: — supplies to, to Suez and the Third Army. That, the question of — a [unintelligible] question, came later when, when, when Ismail Fahmy sent from Washington that the Americans think that this is a very ambitious plan, so Sadat said when we give it to Gamasy who will discuss it with Yariv.
KWS: Do you think that this was Sadat’s way of keeping pressure on Kissinger?
HI: No, it was trying to find out, umm —
KWS: Because the effect was, that Gamasy and Yariv started talking about political things —
HI: Yeah.
KWS: — and that actually angered Kissinger.
HI: Yes, he wanted all the reins in his hands.
KWS: Was Sadat, was Sadat clever enough to think about that?
HI: Maybe.
KWS: I mean, in hindsight, it sounds like a guy who, as you said, he played hide and seek —
HI: Mmm.
KWS: — and he was pulling this string, and this string, and this string.
HI: Mmm. Mmm.
KWS: You know, it, it sounds too good to be true
HI: [Laughs.]
KWS: — that a person could be that smart. You understand what I am saying?
HI: Oh, but right back from 1940, ’40, ’42, ’41, he was — Even as an officer, he was in the streets. He was carrying his gun, revolver in his pocket; he was shooting at people —
KWS: Amazing.
HI: Mm-hmm.
KWS: Umm, what role did he want for the UN to play?
HI: For the UN?
KWS: After Kilometer 101 started. I mean, did he ever say anything —
HI: Uh, just that they will, will act as an umbrella, like the Rhodes, Rhodes discussions [1949 armistice agreements].
KWS: Like with [unintelligible]
HI: Mmm.
KWS: Did — after, after the negotiations had started at Kilometer 101 for this disengagement, or separation of forces, or the supply column with blood —
HI: Mmm.
KWS: — did Sadat stay in touch with Jordan at all? Or the Palestinians, do you know? Does anything come to mind? And, and the Syrians?
HI: Yes. When he, when he asked for a cease-fire, he sent to Hafez al— Hafez al-Assad telling him that, that, uh, that he was asking for a cease-fire.
KWS: Did, did Syria ever indicate that it wanted a disengagement talks at that same time? Did you ever get any indication that the Syrians were angry that you were doing this by yourself, that there weren’t talks, similar talks, going on, on a parallel basis on the Golan Heights?
HI: Mmm —
KWS: No indication?
HI: Umm, I remember Sadat saying, “Well, I, I brought them, eh, I brought them the acceptance of the Israelis to withdraw from Quneitra. Why do they have to do it again?” or something like that. Some, some, umm, hard feelings started to —
KWS: — develop.
HI: — to develop, especially with second, second, uh, disengagement in ’75.
KWS: Why? Why did the hard feelings develop after —
HI: They thought that we did together to war.
KWS: Right.
HI: So, we should contact each other, coordinate our movements. Of course, Sadat was, was, was in a hurry. He wanted to do things quickly.
KWS: Mm-hmm.
HI: He would not let things, uh, cool down, because he [laughs], he, he, he would, he would — he wanted the heat of the battle to be a force behind political decisions [unintelligible]. But he would not, he would not leave Hafez al-Assad. He would not have left him.
KWS: Would not have left him?
HI: Mmm.
[PHONE RINGS.]
KWS: Hello. Yes. Yes. Yes. Umm, sure. I, I’ll come down within the hour. Don’t worry, I’m not leaving it at that. All right. Bye. [To Hafez Ismail:] The, umm, the interesting part about my discussions with Israelis and Omar, Omar Sirry and Fawzi al-Ibrashi is that this was also — they remind me that this was also at the exact time that Kissinger invited [Hermann] Eilts to come out here. And Eilts arrived here around November 4th, November 5th, November 6th — in fact, I think he came with Kissinger, or met Kissinger on the way to the very first meeting that Kissinger had with Sadat, if I’m not mistaken. And we didn’t start diplomatic relations until February —
HI: Mm-hmm.
KWS: — officially, until February ’74, but the discussions began between Eilts and, and Fahmy —
HI: Mmm. Oh, discussions had started from ’67 on. Not discussions, but the demand that — American demand that we should have political [unintelligible] —
KWS: No, I understand, but this was an opportunity —
HI: Yeah, yeah.
KWS: — to reestablish diplomatic —
HI: Yes, of course.
KWS: Where did that decision come from, did it come from Kissinger, or Sadat?
HI: I don’t know.
KWS: And what did you think about this notion of Geneva? I mean, did you, were you in favor of it, not in favor of it, or did you —
HI: I was in favor of it, in favor of having a, umm, a conference, an international conference, like that. But at that time, we felt that, umm, we were not, we were not in control of all the reins [unintelligible] and that we have to coordinate with the Americans, and through them, with the Israelis, to reach, to reach a settlement, whether through an international conference or without it.
KWS: In other words, even though you had gone to war, and even though there were discussions going on, you still didn’t feel that you were in total control of —
HI: Mmm.
KWS: — the op—, the options or the outcome.
HI: Ahh yes, of course.
KWS: Is that why Sadat chose to say to Henry, “You’re my friend, Henry. You do it for me.” He essentially, you see —
HI: “You’re one of the family.” [Laughs.]
KWS: You see, he did the same thing to [U.S. President Jimmy] Carter.
HI: Mmm.
KWS: He used the exact same method. He said, “Here, you represent Egypt.”
HI: Mmm.
KWS: “Do whichever you decide is okay with me.” We knew it wouldn’t be.
HI: Mmm.
KWS: It essentially gave the Americans the responsibility —
HI: Mm-hmm.
KWS: — to negotiate for them with the Israelis. I mean, he did it twice!
HI: He would give more — more than you, than the Israelis ask for, or the Americans. So, that he would not be. Eh, eh, he would not be, eh, considered as betraying. He would say to Ezer Weizman, “Why are you asking for three battalions? You can have four.” And [laughs] the delegation was giving him only two, our delegation was accepting only two on the land in between Rafah and Eilat. And Weizman wanted to [unintelligible], “You can have four.” He would open the Suez Canal, he would do this, he would do that. He would not be cons— he would not be — he did not want to be considered by, by history as one who submitted to pressure.
KWS: Sadat.
HI: Mmm. That is my impression.
KWS: And yet, he never wanted to abandon the Arabs.
HI: No, he felt a moral, umm, a moral attachment to them, especially to King Faisal. And to Hafez el-Assad, of course. Those two personalities affected him very much.
KWS: How did Faisal affect him?
HI: By the, the, umm, the oil, uh —
KWS: — embargo.
HI: — embargo. The oil countries reduced by five percent, Saudi Arabia by ten, and Saudi Arabia said it would not export to the States. And it went on like this. And, umm, and I think Kissinger wanted — he said I cannot do, I cannot do anything right, do anything for Syria as long as you have that embargo. I cannot go to Congress and tell them that, that in spite of the, in spite of the embargo I would, eh, eh, would deliver Israel to Hafez el-Assad. So, they had to work out some, some compromise.
KWS: So, that the release — the end of the embargo was directly related to the progress on the Syrian-Israeli front.
HI: Yes, but it took, took, it took place before.
KWS: What do you mean, it took place before?
HI: Before the, uh, the, before the, uh —
KWS: Yes, the embargo. The embargo —
HI: The embargo finished — because Europe also started — countries like, uh, like France, like Italy, started to talk to to our people and say, “We are meeting,” and therefore, the Arabs, the Gulf countries — at one time, I think they thought of canceling the reduction of, of, of —
KWS: Oil production.
HI: — oil production. Anyhow, the two were — the military and the economic pressures were put — although the, uh, the oil question started on the 16th, 17th. I think 16th, that is, one week after —
KWS: — the war.
HI: — the war. Maybe, maybe Faisal wanted to know that we are fighting, Before he could, before he would —
KWS: — actually do it.
HI: — actually do something.
KWS: But Sadat knew before the war started that there would be an embargo.
HI: He expected that. That’s why he sent [unintelligible] two or three days after the — on the ninth to Riyadh to, to, to press people there.
KWS: Do you remember Kissinger’s visit here in November?
HI: Yes.
KWS: What do you remember about it?
HI: He wasn’t by — when he, when he — he told us about his visit to Israel, after Moscow. So, Sadat sent to him and said, “Would you come?” And he replied, “Well, not, not this time, but later I will come.” When Ismail Fahmy went to Washington and he was told that the Egyptian plan was too ambitious for the present time — it was good, it was — but it was ambitious, umm, I think that at that time the step-by-step settlement was— strategy — was implemented, was thought about and implemented. So —
KWS: It wasn’t implemented yet.
HI: You’re right. Would be implemented. So, he came on the 6th of November.
KWS: Yes.
HI: Was it the 6th?
KWS: Yes.
HI: And he made the agreement, the six-point agreement —
KWS: — which had already been funneled to Gamasy and Yariv for discussion.
HI: No, for, for, emm, to, to put on paper. The idea was, was fixed. It was, was accepted. I mean, eh, Kissinger, Sadat and Golda Meir, they accepted the general idea, and then, that idea was given to the 101 —
KWS: — which they signed on the 12th.
HI: So, they, they, umm, they, they prepared an agreement which was signed on —
KWS: 11th or 12th of November.
HI: Maybe.
KWS: But when Kissinger was here, he spent three or four hours alone with Sadat.
HI: Mmm. You ask, you should ask [Egyptian journalist Mohamed] Hassanin Heikal about that. [Laughs.]
KWS: Why?
HI: He was angry — I mean, Hassanin Heikal says that he said, “Don’t, don’t meet at my [unintelligible].”
KWS: Why?
HI: Well —
KWS: I mean, was Heikal angry that Sadat was turning toward the United States?
HI: Not angry, but, umm, suspicious.
KWS: Why? Heikal had been a real supporter of Nasser —
HI: Mmm.
KWS: — and Sadat and the Soviet connection.
HI: Mmm. He was.
KWS: And now Sadat was embracing the other side.
HI: He was, he was leaving that track, and going along that idea.
KWS: And wasn’t it early in ’74 that Heikal fell out of favor with Sadat?
HI: Yes.
KWS: Very early on in ’74.
HI: Yes. Everybody fell out of favor with Sadat.
KWS: Because of?
HI: For different reasons.
KWS: Well, like — Who else besides Heikal? How did you feel about it?
HI: Zayyat, for example. When Zayyat came from New York on the 29th, he was told that he would be a counselor to the president, and that is why Fahmy would take over [as foreign minister]. Ismail Fahmy was, uh, uh, I think, I think, was a choice of Heikal. Heikal wanted himself to be always in the —
KWS: — inner circle.
HI: Mmm.
KWS: And it didn’t look like he was now going to be in the inner circle.
HI: Mm-hmm.
KWS: Were you in favor of the first disengagement agreement? Did you think that had obtained enough for Egypt, personally? I mean, did you think it was sufficient, or insufficient?
HI: Well, it was not bad. It was, it was an implementation of the, of the first part of the, of the Sadat [laughs] initiative of seventy, of ’71. I mean, that the Israelis would go back — putting UN troops between the two forces, having limited force areas, was natural.
KWS: Umm, did you continue your discussions? I mean, as national security advisor, in October, November, December, did you continue to have your discussions through the CIA, or was that replaced between Eilts and Fahmy?
[END OF SIDE TWO, TAPE ONE]
HI: [Unintelligible] complications from Washington [unintelligible].
KWS: Kissinger apparently continued to use the CIA as a channel of communication, and Hermann told me it upset him, because he wasn’t going through the state department channels.
HI: Mmm.
KWS: And he actually told Henry, he said, “If this is what you’re going to do, then you don’t need me here.” And he got very angry at Henry, apparently, during the very first couple of days he was here, and Henry apologized and said out lou — uh, “I’ll do it this way.”
HI: Mmm.
KWS: Why was Fahmy chosen as foreign minister? It’s a very curious appointment. I mean, he had an ability — I mean, he’s a good drafter, he could draft memo after memo and do it very quickly, umm, but I’ve always — there was no long-term relationship between Fahmy and, and Sadat, and most people were expecting that Ashraf would be prime — foreign minister.
HI: [Unintelligible.]
KWS: Or, a lot of people thinking that Ashraf was a candidate.
HI: Mmm.
KWS: Let me put it to you that way. At least, here in Egypt.
HI: Mmm, mmm.
KWS: And umm, again, the only explanation is it’s the, it’s Sadat and doing the unexpected.
HI: Mmm.
KWS: I haven’t yet —
HI: Ashraf became ambassador —
KWS: But he was completely locked out of everything as long as Fahmy was foreign minister.
HI: [Laughs.]
KWS: Totally blocked.
HI: Mmm.
KWS: I mean, Ashraf told me, he said, “It was like being in Washington without any ears.” He said, “I never knew, I never had access to the president because Fahmy denied it to me.” I mean, Ashraf was quite blunt with me.
HI: Mmm.
KWS: He said, you know, until he resigned in the end of 1977, Ashraf said it was, you know, he said, “I was barely invited to the meeting in, with Ford, in Salzburg.” He said it was only at the very last minute, he said, that he was invited. Ashraf is a little bit bitter about that. I mean, uh —
HI: He was always on the list of becoming, umm, minister of foreign affairs.
KWS: I mean, you know, he had headed the interest section since ’67, so I never — it just didn’t make sense to me. Umm, I, I, maybe I don’t understand Egyptian politics. I don’t understand Sadat. Umm —
HI: Maybe Ismail Fahmy is more like Sadat’s manner. [Laughs.] Ashraf is a, is a man of principle.
KWS: — a man of principle [Arabic].
HI: Mmm.
KWS: Yeah.
HI: When you have an appointment, [unintelligible]?
KWS: No, they, us, they forgot to take my imprint of my card
HI: Uh-huh.
KWS: Very big deal.
HI: [Laughs.] But they must have had it to — it was [unintelligible]—
KWS: Yes, but who said they went back to use it again?
HI: Mmm.
KWS: When you look back on this period, do you think it was a turning point — the war, and Kilometer 101, and Geneva —
HI: Mmm.
KWS: — and the disengagement, of course — Were you surprised that it took all of that, when you look at it, to get back to February of ’71? [Laughs.] I mean, it’s really what happened, isn’t it?
HI: February ’73. ’71?
KWS: Yes. And in essence what happened was —
HI: Mmm.
KWS: — you went to war, you had disengagement talks —
HI: Mmm.
KWS: — you had a conference —
HI: Mmm.
KWS: — you had a disengagement agreement, and it all could have happened in February of ’71.
HI: Yes, but probably at that time, Sadat was faced, umm, by the, was faced with the second line of Nasser, like [unintelligible], like others, like [unintelligible].
KWS: But that — what you’re saying to me is that he wasn’t sincere about his proposal, because he was fearful of — what you are telling me is he had to have the Corrective Revolution, he had to have May ’71 —
HI: Yes, hem he, he —
KWS: — before he could actually reach out to the Israelis.
HI: Mmm.
KWS: Is that accurate?
HI: He did not inform Mahmoud Riad of his, of his initiative.
KWS: Of February ’71.
HI: Mm-hmm. And Mahmoud Riad expresses, in his book, expressed surprise at that, at that initiative. Probably he got, umm, got the idea from Dayan, Moshe Dayan. Moshe Dayan said that he would have preferred as a minister of forei— minister of defense to have his line, not only canal, but on the passes. So, Sadat probably picked up that idea when he formed his initiative.
KWS: After the signing of the first disengagement agreement in January of ’74, you stayed on in the position of national security cou— national security advisor until April. Correct?
HI: Yes.
KWS: In those three months what did you primarily focus on? I mean, what was your, your agenda? Getting the Syrians involved, umm, the Arab world? I mean, what was your brief? What was, what did you do on a day-to-day basis? The focus, was it the U.S., American relationship? Fahmy was involved now as foreign minister.
HI: Mmm.
KWS: Syria and Israel are carrying on an artillery duel almost on a daily basis.
HI: Fahmy wanted more taken away from the presidency, from the presidency to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
KWS: In other words, the prerogatives of the national security advisor.
HI: Mm-hmm.
KWS: Was anyone appointed after you?
HI: No.
KWS: Is it fair to say that — now I’m guessing, don’t answer this if you don’t want to — but is it fair to say that Fahmy was responsible, in part, for moving you out of the position as national security advisor?
HI: No.
KWS: But Sadat certainly listened to Fahmy —
HI: Mmm.
KWS: — and concentrated the authority and the power in one person. And after, in April of ’74, you went where?
HI: [Unintelligible.] Moscow.
KWS: As —
HI: Messenger.
KWS: ’74 through —
HI: ’76, April ’76.
KWS: How would you characterize Egyptian-Soviet relations then? You know, it’s a very interesting time —
HI: Mmm. You see, you see, I was the man responsible, in 1955, for the discussions and the negotiations concerning the armaments, the armaments for the Egyptian Army.
KWS: The Czech arms deal.
HI: The Czech arms deal.
KWS: When was the — by the way, when was that first discussion? When were those first discussions?
HI: ’55.
KWS: Not ’54.
HI: No. Maybe. Maybe they started after ’54, but I started to know about them in ’55.
KWS: Because in January of ’54, already, there was a, a Soviet, a Soviet agricultural delegation that was here. And there was some —
HI: I think it was, it was after Bandung (Asian-African conference of May 1955).
KWS: It was after Bandung. So, you negotiated —
HI: [Premier of People’s Republic of China] Chou En-Lai met Nasser in —
KWS: Right —
HI: [Unintelligible.] I tell you why, because the end of ’52 Ali Sabri went to the States. I was there as assistant military attaché. And he wanted to draw the Americans, and to get equipment and arms and this and that. And he said, “Well, this is for the British, we can only arm the police.” And then, the French started. When we were helping the revolution in Algeria, the French started supplying Israel. We sent — umm, we, we, asked the, the British, but the British were — they gave us some Centurions, tanks, umm, 20 pieces. So, we sent our QMG, Quartermaster General, to France to buy AMX-30. And they sold us each for about 35,000 pounds. So, after that, we said, “Well, they were providing Israel with one, and the French army with one, and we with one, and the three cost 35.” So, we paid for, for Israel, some [unintelligible] and Israel [laughs] for France. Usually, the ton cost 1,000 pounds so, 13, 15, thousand would [unintelligible].
KWS: Mmm.
HI: So, we were frustrated from the British and the French. And the Americans. So, we sent to — to talk to the Russians.
KWS: And they suggested to deal with the Czechs —
HI: They sug— We suggested. I think, I think it was on our demand that we went to, umm, Czechoslovakia, to Prague. But they had a mixed delegation. We didn’t know —
KWS: — who was who.
HI: — who was who, until they started to — they, they felt maybe, maybe those Egyptians are [unintelligible], are playing a game or something, trying to influence the other side. But then they, they felt that things are rather serious. I saw an elderly gentleman was sitting at the end of the table, coming and sitting in the center, in front of me. He was Russian.
KWS: You remember who it was though?
HI: He was the head of the department for — [unintelligible]. I met him when I went back, in ’74 —
KWS: Really?
HI: Mmm. In ’74 [unintelligible]. I saw him again.
KWS: Is this all by way of telling me that by the time July of ’56 comes, it really didn’t matter what we decided to do about the Aswan Dam, Nasser had made up his mind, that he was going to turn to the Soviets for arms?
HI: No, no. We turned to the Soviets in ’58.
KWS: No, but the beginning?
HI: It was after the refusal of the, uh, monetary —
KWS: — assistance.
HI: — assistance, and the withdrawal of participation of, umm, British and each of them, together that he made his speech in Alexandria.
KWS: But you must have understood that when you reached out to the Czechs that you were going to anger the Americans more.
HI: I didn’t care. I was, I was, uh —
KWS: — an arms buyer.
HI: [Laughs.] I was head of the cabinet of [Abdel] Hakim Amer at that time. I had returned from the States in early ’53.
KWS: So, you were chef de cabinet?
HI: I was chef of — chef de cabinet for Muhammed Naguib first, and then for Amer. And I stayed for about seven and a half years at that post.
KWS: Wow.
HI: It was the longest I had. Longest this period I had in one, in one post. Amer used to say, “Hell with Hafez is better than, eh, Eden with someone else.”
KWS: [Laughs.] “Hell with Hafez —” Well, what about the period from ’74 to ’76 in Moscow?
HI: [Unintelligible.] I told, uh, I told [unintelligible] — you know the name?
KWS: Yes.
HI: Mmm. I told him in October ’75, after the second. [Pause.] I told him I go, go back to, to Moscow. I have nothing here to do. I was, I was, I was in Cairo in ’75 [unintelligible] ’75 —
KWS: Of ’75?
HI: Of ’75.
KWS: For what purpose?
HI: No, no, I was here in April, April ’75 —
KWS: Yes?
HI: — and I saw the president. And I said, “What do you want from the Russians?” He said, “Nothing.”
KWS: Nothing?
HI: Mmm. So, in October or November — I had lost two, two of my brothers — so I said to [unintelligible], “Tell the President that I would like to leave Moscow, that I have nothing here, nothing to do.”
KWS: Wasn’t there an effort made, though, on several occasions in ’74 and ’75, to — or at least a discussion about a reconvened Geneva Conference?
HI: No. Probably the Russians felt that Ismail Fahmy was not so serious.
KWS: Really? Why not?
HI: I have, I have to meet back, to leave again [unintelligible; laughs] before I speak, answer that. But you see, he, he, he made it as if it was — the first time he went to Moscow was late in ’74, October ’71, I think it was ’74. And he came in a special aircraft. He had with him about 50 people, including, eh, including press representatives, and he wanted, he wanted spare parts.
KWS: You said October ’74?
HI: ’74.
KWS: Right after Rabat, the Rabat Resolution?
HI: Rabat —
KWS: — was October ’74.
HI: November?
KWS: Well, I’m looking at a chronology here, but go ahead —
HI: It was, it was at that time, maybe, maybe, when he was told by Brezhnev that he would come to the area, he would come to the Middle East.
KWS: Yes, that was November.
HI: November.
KWS: Yes, November-December, yes, okay. And he showed up in Moscow with this large number of —
HI: — large number of representatives of different, uh, different ministries and different papers, uh —
KWS: November ’74 was the Vladivostok Summit.
HI: Mmm.
KWS: — between Ford an, and Brezhnev. [Reading from something:] “They issued a communique calling for lasting peace, and the sides believed that the Geneva Conference should play an important part in the establishment of a just and lasting peace.”
HI: Who said so?
KWS: That was at the Vladivostok Summit.
HI: Vladivostok —
KWS: November of ’74. Arafat met in Moscow with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko on the 28th.
HI: Mm-hmm.
KWS: And Egyptian — umm, here — “December 9th, Egyptian Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmy said Egypt needed Soviet friendship as well as U.S., and he expected that, he expected the visit of Brezhnev to Egypt in January to result in new Soviet military assistance —” This is December 9th, of ’74 —
HI: Mmm, new military —
KWS: “— assistance, under the Friendship Treaty of ’71.” And —
HI: Mmm. He always mentioned the treaty, and the obligations of the, and the obligations of the Soviets.
KWS: “On December 30th USSR announced that Party Leader Brezhnev’s January visit to Egypt was canceled.”
HI: Mmm. They, they asked, they asked Ismail Fahmy and Gamasy to come over.
KWS: Instead?
HI: To tell them that Brezhnev would not go —
KWS: Mm-hmm.
HI: — to Cairo.
KWS: Why wouldn’t Brezhnev come to Cairo? That’s what I don’t understand.
HI: He was sick.
KWS: Was he really sick?
HI: Well, they went to see him in, umm, in a clinic outside Moscow. But I think that, I think that, eh, it would have, uh, compromised things. Because at that time, probably there was some talk about a second disengagement.
KWS: There certainly was.
HI: Mmm.
KWS: Kissinger was about to embark on it, and he, he came down to March of ’75 —
HI: March, mmm.
KWS: And he didn’t succeed —
HI: Mmm.
KWS: — Ford’s reassessment, and then you get to September.
HI: Mmm, September.
KWS: Did the Soviets feel left out of this Kissinger — I mean, Kissinger —
HI: Ahh, yes, yes, yes. Gromyko said, “This is a very serious thing.”
KWS: Meaning?
HI: That they, they are left out of what’s going on.
KWS: But, you can say something’s serious, but, how serious was it? They never did anything about it.
HI: They never — Oh, they, they, they prevented spare parts, for example, for the —
KWS: — for you.
HI: Yeah.
KWS: So, in a certain sense, the fact that they were kept out of the negotiations kept Egypt from receiving — worsened, worsened Egyptian-
HI: Yeah.
KWS: Soviet relations.
HI: But in ’76, when they had, emm, the party, the party —
KWS: — Congress.
HI: — Congress, the 25th, I think. Congress. And Brezhnev said, said something about Egypt, we don’t, that we didn’t like. So, Sadat canceled the facilities and, and, and I think, I think he canceled the treaty. —
KWS: So, then it was really this — almost this continuous slope, of sliding down —
HI: Yes, yes.
KWS: — away —
HI: Yes.
KWS: — from Moscow.
HI: Yes, yes.
KWS: So, going to Moscow was almost overseeing a relationship that was becoming increasingly —
HI: Mmm. Mmm.
KWS: — less active —
HI: Mmm.
KWS: — less vigorous —
HI: Yes.
KWS: But every once in a while, they talk about an international conference, but —
HI: They didn’t, they didn’t think that Fahmy was very serious.
KWS: Did they view Fahmy as being close to Kissinger?
HI: Maybe.
KWS: Because Fahmy and Kissinger never got along.
HI: Oh, close to America.
KWS: Close to America. That’s probably better said. Yes, I think that’s probably accurate. They had two very big egos, I mean, the Americans have told me that Fahmy and Kissinger —
HI: [Unintelligible.]
KWS: Ismail Fahmy —
HI: Mmm.
KWS: — and Kissinger
HI: Mmm.
KWS: — two huge egos that were constantly battling against one another.
HI: Were they?
KWS: Saunders and Atherton and [unintelligible] — you know, they, they —
HI: Kissinger as, as, as state secretary?
KWS: Secretary of state.
HI: Secretary of state.
KWS: Because Fahmy — Kissinger always had a leg up on Fahmy. Because whenever Kissinger saw Sadat, Fahmy never was there in the room.
HI: Mmm.
KWS: And it, it, it irritated the hell out of Fahmy.
HI: [Laughs.]
KWS: Omar Sirry told me, he said, it just destroyed him.
HI: Mmm.
KWS: It hurt him to see that his foreign minister —
HI: Well, in, uh, in, in Aswan, in January ’74, Kissinger was there with Sadat and Fahmy was sitting [laughs] by the, by the sink [unintelligible], by the swimming pool [laughs; unintelligible].
KWS: Were you in Aswan?
HI: I was.
KWS: Were you at the signing of the — no, signing was at Kilometer 101. But you, were you in that meeting with the American delegation and the Sovie—, the Egyptian delegation?
HI: Well, things started becoming rather hectic at that time.
KWS: Gamasy told me, that’s when he had tears in his eyes, because Sadat had made this concession about the tanks — Gamasy —
HI: I started, I started breaking away.
KWS: What do you mean, breaking away? You’re very reserved about the term. What do you mean by breaking away?
HI: Well, uh —
KWS: Be candid with me.
HI: I want to be, but I don’t know, I don’t [unintelligible] — I, I, I thought that my term of, uh, my term of my position has come to a close. Because, before Kissinger came, Sadat invited me and Kissi— Gamasy, and he went into the garden, and he brought in the photographer, and he took, eh, he took some photos with the, with the [unintelligible; laughs] map in front of us, and I thought that it was [unintelligible].
KWS: This was in Aswan?
HI: Mmm.
KWS: I guess, you have personal pride too.
HI: Maybe.
KWS: No, it’s not maybe, people have personal pride.
HI: Mmm, mmm.
KWS: I mean, I’ve been in meetings in Damascus where President Carter has had meetings with President Assad, and Farouk al-Sharaa was not in the meeting — because I was sitting with him outside.
HI: [Laughs.] Well, you have to give the —
KWS: And I know the next day, in a public speech, Sharaa made reference to being at the meeting.
HI: Oh. You, you have — we, we, we did not learn yet that the two heads of state can have a personal meeting together, even, even, even the head of state visiting, coming from [unintelligible].
KWS: [Laughs.]
HI: He would sit with the president for 15 minutes together, so that he can arrange what they, what they want, how things would go and all, and then invite the rest of the delegation, the two delegations. That is what Rabin is asking from Hafez al-Assad, or from, from, from King Hussain, to sit with them like Nixon sitting with Brezhnev, or [unintelligible] sitting with I don’t know who was — Or going to Vladivostok where they had the agreed upon — so many missiles for each . They would give that to the delegation. It’s not — The men sitting on bilateral meetings here cannot give each other the withdrawal of the Israelis and the [laughs] sovereignty of Syria over this or that and —
KWS: Sure, I understand. I understand.
HI: They are technical.
KWS: Sure.
HI: They are legal people who, who put the directives on paper and start writing down the, the, the directive of the two heads of state who are there.
KWS: Sure, I understand. Okay. Umm, what can I — I mean, where can I help you — Oh, I know what I wanted to ask you.
HI: [Laughs.] I should have, I should have counted how many, how many questions —
KWS: Well, there are — there are 20 pages which I didn’t ask.
HI: Oh.
KWS: Umm, it’s possible that in October of this year, this October, that in Atlanta, at Emory, at my country, my university, we will have a conference — 20 years after the October War. What I would like to do, we would like to divide it up into three parts. First of all, I would like you to come, be our guest. We have to confirm the financial arrangements, but I’m pretty sure we’re going to do it. We would like to have a segment that deals with —
HI: In Washington?
KWS: No, in Atlanta, Georgia.
HI: Atlanta, Georgia, oh.
KWS: We would like to have a segment that deals with the period leading up to the war, the war itself, and then Kilometer 101 through the first disengagement. Would you feel more comfortable dealing with which one of those three periods? The earlier period —
HI: You ask others —
KWS: Yes, well, I’ve asked Gamasy
HI: And, and —?
KWS: — Gamasy will come. I’ve asked —
HI: And what period is he interested —
KWS: He’s I — Primarily the war.
HI: — the war.
KWS: Either the war or Kilometer 101. Maybe both.
HI: Mmm.
KWS: Because obviously, you know. Yariv will come.
HI: Yariv.
KWS: He will definitely come. Have you ever met him?
HI: No.
KWS: Umm, Mordechai Gazit, who was Golda Meir’s director general —
HI: mmm.
KWS: — of the foreign ministry; Epi Evron, who was the number two in the Israeli foreign ministry; Omar Sirry —
HI: Omar Sirry?
KWS: — said he would come.
HI: Why?
KWS: He was the chef de cabinet of Fahmy.
HI: Fahmy.
KWS: Fahmy won’t come.
HI: Mmm.
KWS: I asked him, and he absolutely refuses to come. He will not do it.
HI: He has withdrawn —
KWS: — yes —
HI: — from, from general life.
KWS: Ashraf has said he’ll come.
HI: Ashraf Ghorbal, yes, I see.
KWS: Yes. And so has Tahsin Bashir.
HI: Ahh, Tahsin will go any —
KWS: — anywhere and everywhere.
HI: [Laughs.]
KWS: So, there’s a good Egyptian group coming, I mean, so far, that I have verbally invited. I haven’t sent out invitations —
HI: Mmm.
KWS: — but verbally.
HI: Mmm.
KWS: And there’s a good group of, of Israelis who were involved at the time. Dayan, of course, has passed away, Golda Meir isn’t there, umm, but we have that next level of people, just like we do here.
HI: Yes.
KWS: And in the States: Atherton, Quandt, Saunders —
HI: Dah dah dah dah dah.
KWS: — Sisco. And they all know that this is in the planning stage.
HI: Ah, yes.
KWS: And I’m probably, next month, going to send out letters to everyone, asking them to keep, to set aside the last three or four, two or three days of October —
HI: Mmm.
KWS: — and —
HI: End or —
KWS: End.
HI: End of October?
KWS: Like the 26th to the 28th or something like that.
HI: You know that my, my birthday is the 28th —
KWS: — of October —
HI: — of October.
KWS: And you’ll be 39 years old.
HI: [Laughs.] You make me laugh.
KWS: But anyway, would you be interested in coming?
HI: If I’m still alive.
KWS: You’ll be alive. Come on.
HI: I’m 73 now.
KWS: My father’s 85.
HI: Well —
KWS: My mother’s 79 —
HI: Well, my brother died at 59. When he [unintelligible] 75 [unintelligible].
KWS: But we’d love to have you come.
HI: Mmm. The first part would be — that is a part that has not been, that nobody, that no one in the ministry [unintelligible].
KWS: Well, Sisco knows.
HI: American yes, but Egyptian —
KWS: No, not the Egyptians. Maybe that would be the ideal part, because you were the national security advisor, you had singular, I mean, you talked at time with Kissinger, you know —
HI: Mmm. But, let me confirm this. You must have somebody confirm this, that I was to —
KWS: Well first I’ve got to send out the invitations.
HI: Mmm.
KWS: Do you have a — I have to get your, umm, address.
HI: Yes.
KWS: And don’t forget your book.
HI: Ahh. Too many —
KWS: Here. Here, here, here. Okay, put it down.
[END OF INTERVIEW]