Oslo Accords (Declaration of Principles on Interim Self- Government Agreements)

August 24, 2024

(13 September 1993)

“Oslo Accords .” Israel’s Foreign Relations: Selected Documents. 1992-1994. Editor Meron Medzini. Jerusalem: Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

1995. 310-328. Print.

Through the offices of the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Israel and the PLO exchanged documents of recognition on September 9, 1993. The PLO letter to Israel renounced terrorism and recognized Israel’s right to live as a sovereign state in the Middle East; Israel’s letter was limited to recognizing the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people. Four days later on the White House lawn, PLO leader Yasir Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin signed a four hundred page agreement known as the Oslo Accords. Its objective was to establish Palestinian self-rule over portions of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, lands which Israel had administered and occupied since the June 1967 war. The Oslo Accords were another ‘disengagement agreement,’ whereby Israel transferred territory and powers to an Arab side, this time to the PLO, and in return received a promise of non-violence. In the 1970s Israel reached agreements with Egypt (January 1974 and September 1975) and Syria (May 1974), in which Israel withdrew from territories taken in the June 1967 war in exchange for a commitment to end violence against the Jewish state. The ultimate agreement on disengagement was the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, which resulted in Israel’s return of all of Sinai to Egyptian sovereignty.

The Oslo Accords was the first signed Palestinian-Israeli agreement. No such understanding or agreement had been ever been tried, let alone negotiated and signed, between Israel and the Palestinians since Israel’s creation in 1948. For many who considered the Palestinian issue to be the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Oslo Accords offered hope that Israelis and Palestinians would march together toward a new era of compromise and cooperation.

Thirty years after Israel’s establishment, the 1978 Camp David Accords called for the establishment of a self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza areas, but the Arab world and the PLO, representing Palestinian interests, rejected that agreement. Fifteen years later, with Israel having developed a large network of settlements in the West Bank and Gaza, the PLO accepted the notion of a self-governing authority through the establishment of a newly formed entity, the Palestinian Authority (PA). It was clear that the PLO would shape and staff the development of the PA as it saw fit. Thus, the Accords focused on Israel’s intention to transfer land and the responsibilities of governance to Palestinian control. The changes stipulated in the 1993 Oslo Accords were gradually applied, in a limited fashion, over a specified area in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, with Israel retaining control over the borders and access to the Palestinian areas. The 1978 Camp David Accords had not specifically stated where or when Palestinian self rule would take place. The 1993 Oslo Accords specifically mentioned Jericho and Gaza and suggested that there would be fast transfer of authority to Palestinian control. The ultimate status of all the territories was left to future negotiations, as were matters and details surrounding, among other issues, the future disposition of Jerusalem and that of Israeli settlements.

For Israel, the Accords were a ‘future’s option.’ This was a plan to provide the Palestinian people with an opportunity to rule themselves, while testing the Palestinian commitment to stop all violence and no longer engage in terrorism against Israel or Israelis. Israel had entered earlier disengagement agreements with Egypt and Syria, testing their intentions and commitments to live together without violence. Israel controlled land that the Palestinians wanted and was similarly testing the intentions of the Palestinians, and specifically those of Arafat. Israelis hoped that a negotiating dynamic established with the PLO could be carried forward under the auspices of the international community, and particularly the United States, to a point where there might be a turning point in the conflict. The Oslo Accords were another step in a step by step process of Israel seeking normalized relations with its Arab neighbors— in this case with the Palestinians, who felt most aggrieved over Israel’s establishment. Much as the Zionists had done in earlier decades, the PLO chose to speak on behalf of the Palestinian people, taking charge of their own destiny instead of having either a great power, another Arab state like Egypt or Jordan, or a group of Arab states like the Arab League speak on its behalf or promote its interests.

Not surprisingly, Israeli-PLO mutual recognition had ramifications locally, regionally, and internationally. Jordan’s King Hussein was angry that the PLO-Israeli talks had taken place in secrecy and that he was not informed. Nonetheless, Hussein understood that the PLO’s recognition of Israel would make it relatively easy for Jordan to follow suit, if an agreement could be achieved that would not compromise Jordanian national interests. Israel and Jordan wasted no time. Fourteen months after the signing of the Oslo Accords, Israel and Jordan signed their October 1994 peace treaty. Syria and other Arab states were angered by the PLO recognition of Israel. Syria was particularly vexed by three points: the PLO’s recognition of Israel; the PLO’s willingness to sign an agreement but not insist on a pre-condition of full Israeli withdrawal from all the territories taken in the June 1967 War (which would have applied to Israel’s continuing presence in the Golan Heights); and the PLO allowing Israel to determine how much and on what schedule land should be returned, and accepting the exercise of only limited privileges for the area that Israel would potentially evacuate. Beyond the region, because Israel recognized the PLO, Israel was able to broaden its relations with other Moslem, Arab and non-Arab and non-Moslem states that had traditionally supported the PLO in its quest for self-determination. Countries such as India, China, and others in North Africa and in the Persian Gulf quietly or openly developed various levels of diplomatic and economic relations with Israel, further reducing Israel’s international isolation. European countries warmly endorsed the Oslo Accords, delighted that European venues were used to negotiate the agreement, and ready to commit funds to help the newly evolving Palestinian Authority establish and succeed at self-rule.

The signing of the Accords raised hopes that the hatred, bad feelings, and mistrust between Israelis and Palestinians would subside. Palestinians, too, saw the Oslo Accords/DOP as a phase in the eventual removal of Israeli presence from their lives. The Palestinian uprising of 1987 through 1992 demonstrated Palestinian frustration with Israeli occupation, presence and control. The Oslo Accords initially offered hope that Israel would remove itself from governing the lives of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. While praised by the international community (Arafat, Rabin, and Israeli Foreign Minister Peres received the Nobel Peace Prize for their actions and intentions), the signing of the Oslo Accords also caused enormous distress among Palestinians, Arab leaders, and Israelis who were opposed to any understanding between the two sides. Explicit in the Oslo Accords was the political kernel of Israelis and Palestinians sharing the land west of the Jordan River. That idea greatly offended many Israelis and Palestinians who did not want to give up their respective dreams to have sovereign control over all the land that once comprised the Palestine Mandate— all the land that was west of the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea. Passion reached the highest pitch within Israel, when Rabin was assassinated in November 1995. His assassin felt that Rabin, a secular leader, was wrong to make a territorial compromise with the Palestinians. While Arafat was not killed, he was vilified for “selling out” the Palestinian cause by doing the unthinkable, recognizing Israel and renouncing terrorism. Violence and terrorism against Israel and Israelis, rather than dissipating in the 1990s, continued, emanating from militant groups that wanted to derail the implementation of the accords, and to have the Oslo Accords ultimately destroyed. As long as Palestinian violence continued to plague Israeli citizens, Israeli leaders delayed additional withdrawals from territories. In addition, Israel imposed economic sanctions on the Palestinians for not fulfilling their stated objective of ending violence. As long as Palestinian violence against Israelis continued, Israel insisted that ending it was a necessary precondition for any additional Israeli provision of rights or land to the Palestinian Authority.

By September 2000, with the Clinton administration’s unsuccessful effort to cajole Israeli and Palestinian leaders to reach agreement on outstanding issues between them, the outbreak of the second Palestinian intifadah that month virtually doomed the hopeful intentions of the 1993 Oslo Accords. The Accords failed because Arafat lacked the will to contain those Palestinians who did not want to drop ‘armed struggle’ as a political tool against Israelis; they failed because Israel had no incentive to give additional land to PA control, because violence was still part of the Palestinian agenda vis-a-vis Israel. Though the Oslo Accords did not constrain the building of new Jewish settlements or expansion of older ones in the territories, Israeli leaders knew that the settlement growth after the accords were signed meant grabbing lands that otherwise would have been owned and governed by Palestinians. Israel’s settlement growth poked a finger in the eye of Palestinian aspirations and increasingly limited the reality of an independent and contiguous Palestinian state ever emerging in the West Bank and Gaza areas. The 1993 mutual recognition proved that merely having an agreement did not diminish ideological hostility, and nor did it increase trust between the parties. When Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza elected a Hamas-led government in January 2006, those leaders who had been openly opposed to Arafat’s actions in 1993 and afterward, but were only a limited opposition, were now in political control of a significant part of the Palestinian Arab national movement. Hamas made the point clear that it would not recognize previous agreements signed with Israel (the Oslo Accords), recognize Israel, or accept the legitimacy of the Jewish state. At least by the end of 2006, the contents and intentions of the Oslo Accords were all but moribund.

It is often asked, “Were the Accords successful?” The answer of course is determined by your viewpoint. By the end of 2014, the Accords did not evolve into an Israeli-Palestinian treaty. The Accords did not end Palestinian incitement or violence against Israel, and nor did they end armed conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. What the Accords did do was give operational substance to promises for Palestinian autonomy that were first agreed to in the 1978 Camp David Accords; the Oslo Accords drove Palestinian national aspirations to consider and eventually establish a self-governing organization for the West Bank and Gaza Strip defined as the Palestinian Authority. The accords allowed for Palestinian elections that took place twice, 1996 and 2006 for a Legislative Council, but both Presidents’ Arafat and Abbas severely limited the Councils’ influence to shape policy. Initially the Accords gave some Israelis hope that at two state solution might evolve, where the Palestinian state would be demilitarized. However, by the end 2022, the Palestinian Authority had become politically weak, almost dysfunctional in the words of Palestinian Arab analysts. And Israel’s political system at the end of 2002, had drifted significantly away from favoring two states for two peoples, to a point in early 2023, s upport for a two-state solution among Palestinians and Israelis had declined to just one-third on each side, along with growing opposition to a permanent peace agreement for implementing a two-state solution.

Ken Stein, February 2023

The Government of the State of Israel and the Palestinian team (in the Jordanian-Palestinian Delegation to the Middle East Peace Conference) (the “Palestinian Delegation”), representing the Palestinian people, agree that it is time to put an end to decades of confrontation and conflict, recognize their mutual legitimate and political rights, and strive to live in peaceful coexistence and mutual dignity and security and achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement and historic reconciliation through the agreed political process. Accordingly, the two sides agree to the following principles:

Article I: Aim of the Negotiations

The aim of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations within the current Middle East peace process is, among other things, to establish a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, the elected Council, (the “Council”) for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

It is understood that the interim arrangements are an integral part of the whole peace process and that the negotiations on the permanent status will lead to the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

Article II: Framework for the Interim Period

The agreed framework for the interim period is set forth in this Declaration of Principles.

Article III: Elections

In order that the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip may govern themselves according to democratic principles, direct, free and general political elections will be held for the Council under agreed supervision and international observation, while the Palestinian police will ensure public order.
An agreement will be concluded on the exact mode and conditions of the elections in accordance with the protocol attached as Annex I, with the goal of holding the elections not later than nine months after the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles.
These elections will constitute a significant interim preparatory step toward the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements.

Article IV: Jurisdiction

Jurisdiction of the Council will cover the West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations. The two sides view the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, whose integrity will be preserved during the interim period.

Article V: Transitional Period and Permanent Status Negotiations

The five-year transitional period will begin upon the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area.
Permanent status negotiations will commence as soon as possible, but not later than the beginning of the third year of the interim period, between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian people’s representatives.
It is understood that these negotiations shall cover remaining issues, including: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbors, and other issues of common interest.
The two parties agree that the outcome of the permanent status negotiations should not be prejudiced or preempted by agreements reached for the interim period.

Article VI: Prepatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities

Upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles and the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area, a transfer of authority from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the authorized Palestinians for this task, as detailed herein, will commence. This transfer of authority will be of preparatory nature until the inauguration of the Council.
Immediately after the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles and the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, with the view to promoting economic development in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, authority will be transferred to the Palestinians on the following spheres: education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, and tourism.

The Palestinian side will commence in building the Palestinian police force, as agreed upon. Pending the inauguration of the Council, the two parties may negotiate the transfer of additional powers and responsibilities, as agreed upon.

Article VII: Interim Agreement

The Israeli and Palestinian delegations will negotiate an agreement on the interim period (the “Interim Agreement”).
The Interim Agreement shall specify, among other things, the structure of the Council, the number of its members, and the transfer of powers and responsibilities from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the Council. The Interim Agreement shall also specify the Council’s executive authority, legislative authority in accordance with Article IX below, and the independent Palestinian judicial organs.
The Interim Agreement shall include arrangements, to be implemented upon the inauguration of the Council, for the assumption by the Council of all of the powers and responsibilities transferred previously in accordance with Article VI above.
In order to enable the Council to promote economic growth, upon its inauguration, the Council will establish, among other things, a Palestinian Electricity Authority, a Gaza Sea Port Authority, a Palestinian Development Bank, a Palestinian Export Promotion Board, a Palestinian Environmental Authority, a Palestinian Land Authority and a Palestinian Water Administration Authority, and any other Authorities agreed upon, in accordance with the Interim Agreement that will specify their powers and responsibilities.
After the inauguration of the Council, the Civil Administration will be dissolved, and the Israeli military government will be withdrawn.

Article VIII: Public Order and Security

In order to guarantee public order and internal security for the Palestinians of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the Council will establish a strong police force, while Israel will continue to carry the responsibility for defending against external threats, as well as the responsibility for overall security of Israelis for the purpose of safeguarding their internal security and public order.

Article IX: Laws and Military Orders

The Council will be empowered to legislate, in accordance with the Interim Agreement, within all authorities transferred to it.
Both parties will review jointly laws and military orders presently in force in remaining spheres.

Article X: Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee

In order to provide for a smooth implementation of this Declaration of Principles and any subsequent agreements pertaining to the interim period, upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, a Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee will be established in order to deal with issues requiring coordination, other issues of common interest, and disputes.

Article XI: Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation in Economic Fields

Recognizing the mutual benefit of cooperation in promoting the development of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and Israel, upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, an Israeli-Palestinian Economic Cooperation Committee will be established in order to develop and implement in a cooperative manner the programs identified in the protocols attached as Annex III and Annex IV.

Article XII: Liaison and Cooperation with Jordan and Egypt

The two parties will invite the Governments of Jordan and Egypt to participate in establishing further liaison and cooperation arrangements between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian representatives, on one hand, and the Governments of Jordan and Egypt, on the other hand, to promote cooperation between them. These arrangements will include the constitution of a Continuing Committee that will decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder. Other matters of common concern will be dealt with by this Committee.

Article XIII: Redeployment of Israeli Forces

After the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, and not later than the eve of elections for the Council, a redeployment of Israeli military forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will take place, in addition to withdrawal of Israeli forces carried out in accordance with Article XIV.
In redeploying its military forces, Israel will be guided by the principle that its military forces should be redeployed outside populated areas.
Further redeployments to specified locations will be gradually implemented commensurate with the assumption of responsibility for public order and internal security by the Palestinian police force pursuant to Article VIII above.

Article XIV: Israeli Withdrawal from Gaza Strip and Jericho Area

Israel will withdraw from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, as detailed in the protocol attached as Annex II.

Article XV: Resolution of Disputes

Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this Declaration of Principles, or any subsequent agreements pertaining to the interim period, shall be resolved by negotiations through the Joint Liaison Committee to be established pursuant to Article X above.
Disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations may be resolved by a mechanism of conciliation to be agreed upon by the parties.
The parties may agree to submit to arbitration disputes relating to the interim period, which cannot be settled through conciliation. To this end, upon the agreement of both parties, the parties will establish an Arbitration Committee.

Article XVI: Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation Concerning Regional Programs

Both parties view the multilateral working groups as an appropriate instrument for promoting a “Marshall Plan,” the regional programs and other programs, including special programs for the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as indicated in the protocol attached as Annex IV.

Article XVII: Miscellaneous Provisions

This Declaration of Principles will enter into force one month after its signing.
All protocols annexed to this Declaration of Principles and Agreed Minutes pertaining thereto shall be regarded as an integral part hereof.

Done at Washington, D.C., this 13th day of September, 1993.

For the Government of Israel For the Palestinian Delegation

Witnessed By:

The United States of America The Russian Federation

Annex I

Protocol on the Mode and Conditions of Elections

Palestinians of Jerusalem who live there will have the right to participate in the election process, according to an agreement between the two sides.
In addition, the election agreement should cover, among other things, the following issues:
1. The system of elections;
2. The mode of the agreed supervision and international observation and their personal composition; and
3. Rules and regulations regarding election campaign, including agreed arrangements for the organizing of mass media, and the possibility of licensing a broadcasting and TV station.
The future status of displaced Palestinians who were registered on 4 June 1967 will not be prejudiced because they are unable to participate in the election process due to practical reasons.

Annex II

Protocol on Withdrawal of Israeli Forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area

The two sides will conclude and sign within two months from the date of entry into force this Declaration of Principles, an agreement on the withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area. This agreement will include comprehensive arrangements to apply in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area subsequent to the Israeli withdrawal.
Israel will implement an accelerated and scheduled withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, beginning immediately with the signing of the agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho area and to be completed within a period not exceeding four months after the signing of this agreement.
The above agreement will include, among other things:
1. Arrangements for a smooth and peaceful transfer of authority from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the Palestinian representatives.
2. Structure, powers, and responsibilities of the Palestinian Authority in these areas, except: external security, settlements, Israelis, foreign relations, and other mutually agreed matters.
3. Arrangements for the assumption of internal security and public order by the Palestinian police force consisting of police officers recruited locally and from abroad (holding Jordanian passports and Palestinian documents issued by Egypt). Those who will participate in the Palestinian police force coming from abroad should be trained as police and police officers.
4. A temporary international or foreign presence, as agreed upon.
5. Establishment of a joint Palestinian-Israeli Coordination and Cooperation Committee for mutual security purposes.
6. An economic development and stabilization program, including the establishment of an Emergency Fund, to encourage foreign investment, and financial and economic support. Both sides will coordinate and cooperate jointly and unilaterally with regional and international parties to support these aims.
7. Arrangements for a safe passage for persons and transportation between the Gaza Strip and Jericho area.
The above agreement will include arrangements for coordination between both parties regarding passages:
1. Gaza – Egypt; and
2. Jericho – Jordan.
The offices responsible for carrying out the powers and responsibilities of the Palestinian Authority under this Annex II and Article VI of the Declaration of Principles will be located in the Gaza Strip and in the Jericho area pending the inauguration of the Council.
Other than these agreed arrangements, the status of the Gaza Strip and Jericho area will continue to be an integral part of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and will not be changed in the interim period.

Annex III

Protocol on Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation in Economic and Development Programs

The two sides agree to establish an Israeli-Palestinian Continuing Committee for Economic Cooperation, focusing, among other things, on the following:

Cooperation in the field of water, including a Water Development Program prepared by experts from both sides, which will also specify the mode of cooperation in the management of water resources in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and will include proposals for studies and plans on water rights of each party, as well as on the equitable utilization of joint water resources for implementation in and beyond the interim period.
Cooperation in the field of electricity, including an Electricity Development Program, which will also specify the mode of cooperation for the production, maintenance, purchase and sale of electricity resources.
Cooperation in the field of energy, including an Energy Development Program, which will provide for the exploitation of oil and gas for industrial purposes, particularly in the Gaza Strip and in the Negev, and will encourage further joint exploitation of other energy resources. This Program may also provide for the construction of a Petrochemical industrial complex in the Gaza Strip and the construction of oil and gas pipelines.
Cooperation in the field of finance, including a Financial Development and Action Program for the encouragement of international investment in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and in Israel, as well as the establishment of a Palestinian Development Bank.
Cooperation in the field of transport and communications, including a Program, which will define guidelines for the establishment of a Gaza Sea Port Area, and will provide for the establishing of transport and communications lines to and from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to Israel and to other countries. In addition, this Program will provide for carrying out the necessary construction of roads, railways, communications lines, etc.
Cooperation in the field of trade, including studies, and Trade Promotion Programs, which will encourage local, regional and inter-regional trade, as well as a feasibility study of creating free trade zones in the Gaza Strip and in Israel, mutual access to these zones, and cooperation in other areas related to trade and commerce.
Cooperation in the field of industry, including Industrial Development Programs, which will provide for the establishment of joint Israeli-Palestinian Industrial Research and Development Centers, will promote Palestinian-Israeli joint ventures, and provide guidelines for cooperation in the textile, food, pharmaceutical, electronics, diamonds, computer and science-based industries.
A program for cooperation in, and regulation of, labor relations and cooperation in social welfare issues.
A Human Resources Development and Cooperation Plan, providing for joint Israeli-Palestinian workshops and seminars, and for the establishment of joint vocational training centers, research institutes and data banks.
An Environmental Protection Plan, providing for joint and/or coordinated measures in this sphere.
A program for developing coordination and cooperation in the field of communication and media.
Any other programs of mutual interest.

Annex IV

Protocol on Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation Concerning Regional Development Programs

The two sides will cooperate in the context of the multilateral peace efforts in promoting a Development Program for the region, including the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, to be initiated by the G-7. The parties will request the G-7 to seek the participation in this program of other interested states, such as members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, regional Arab states and institutions, as well as members of the private sector.
The Development Program will consist of two elements:
1. An Economic Development Program for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The Economic Development Program for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will consist of the following elements:
  1. i. A Social Rehabilitation Program, including a Housing and Construction Program.
  2. ii. A Small and Medium Business Development Plan.
  3. iii. And Infrastructure Development Program (water, electricity, transportation and communications, etc.)
  4. iv. A Human Resources Plan.
  5. v. Other programs.
  6. A Regional Economic Development Program. The Regional Economic Development Program may consist of the following elements:
    1. i. The establishment of a Middle East Development Fund, as a first step, and a Middle East Development Bank, as a second step.
    2. ii. The development of a joint Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian Plan for coordinated exploitation of the Dead Sea area.
    3. iii. The Mediterranean Sea (Gaza) – Dead Sea Canal.
    4. iv. Regional Desalinization and other water development projects.
    5. v. A regional plan for agricultural development, including a coordinated regional effort for the prevention of desertification.
    6. vi. Interconnection of electricity grids.
    7. vii. Regional cooperation for the transfer, distribution and industrial exploitation of gas, oil and other energy resources.
    8. viii. A Regional Tourism, Transportation and Telecommunications Development Plan.
    9. ix. Regional cooperation in other spheres.
The two sides will encourage the multilateral working groups, and will coordinate towards its success. The two parties will encourage intercessional activities, as well as pre-feasibility and feasibility studies, within the various multilateral working groups.

Agreed Minutes to the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements

A. General Understandings and Agreements

Any powers and responsibilities transferred to the Palestinians pursuant to the Declaration of Principles prior to the inauguration of the Council will be subject to the same principles pertaining to Article IV, as set out in these Agreed Minutes below.

B. Specific Understandings and Agreements

Article IV

It is understood that:

Jurisdiction of the Council will cover the West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations: Jerusalem, settlements, military locations and Israelis.
The Council’s jurisdiction will apply with regard to the agreed powers, responsibilities, spheres and authorities transferred to it.

Article VI (2)

It is agreed that the transfer of authority will be as follows:

The Palestinian side will inform the Israeli side of the names of the authorized Palestinians who will assume the powers, authorities and responsibilities that will be transferred to the Palestinians according to the Declaration of Principles in the following fields: education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, tourism, and any other authorities agreed upon.
It is understood that the rights and obligations of these offices will not be affected.
Each of the spheres described above will continue to enjoy existing budgetary allocations in accordance with arrangements to be mutually agreed upon. These arrangements also will provide for the necessary adjustments required in order to take into account the taxes collected by the direct taxation office.
Upon the execution of the Declaration of Principles, the Israeli and Palestinian delegations will immediately commence negotiations on a detailed plan for the transfer of authority on the above offices in accordance with the above understandings.

Article VII (2)

The Interim Agreement will also include arrangements for coordination and cooperation.

Article VII (5)

The withdrawal of the military government will not prevent Israel from exercising the powers and responsibilities not transferred to the Council.

Article VIII

It is understood that the Interim Agreement will include arrangements for cooperation and coordination between the two parties in this regard. It is also agreed that the transfer of powers and responsibilities to the Palestinian police will be accomplished in a phased manner, as agreed in the Interim Agreement.

Article X

It is agreed that, upon the entry into force of the Declaration of Principles, the Israeli and Palestinian delegations will exchange the names of the individuals designated by them as members of the Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee.

It is further agreed that each side will have an equal number of members in the Joint Committee. The Joint Committee will reach decisions by agreement. The Joint Committee may add other technicians and experts, as necessary. The Joint Committee will decide on the frequency and place or places of its meetings.

Annex II

It is understood that, subsequent to the Israeli withdrawal, Israel will continue to be responsible for external security, and for internal security and public order of settlements and Israelis. Israeli military forces and civilians may continue to use roads freely within the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area.

Done at Washington, D.C., this 13th day of September, 1993.

For the Government of Israel For the Palestinian Delegation

Witnessed By: The United States of America The Russian Federation