Presidents Carter and Sadat, Prime Minister Begin at Camp David – September 1978
The Prime Minister Reports on his conversation with President Carter –
File Source: Israel State Archives/Box/A4314/1
Reporting to the members of the Israeli Delegation, Camp David
September 5, 1978, at 11 PM
The Prime Minister, Menachem Begin, reported to the members of the delegation on his two and a half hour conversation this evening with President Carter.
Begin: President Carter opened the conversation by saying that Israel made a huge effort for peace and he knows how to appreciate it, though until now, he would not have properly valued it. After those nice and praising words, the President said that he will meet with Sadat at 10 AM and will conduct a meeting in the afternoon with the participation of Sadat and myself. The President quickly inquired if I have any ideas.
I said that we want to reach an understanding with the Americans and an agreement with the Egyptians; first about the Sinai, where there are security problems, and I suggest that you tell Sadat that he has to conduct the negotiations with us with patience, since we have issues of demilitarization, free navigation in international waterways, settlements (that present an utmost security concern) and that we have in this regard national consensus (Peres said that his Party insists that the settlements in Al-Arish-Gaza will remain intact).
President Carter has to understand, I said, that for us it is a security problem, since a direct tie between Egypt and Gaza will turn Gaza into a ‘loaded pistol’ against the centers of our population in the South and none in Israel, with the exception of the Communists, are ready to dismantle the settlements. Carter replied that he spoke to Sadat about the settlements in the Sinai and tried to persuade him that this area will be demilitarized and that the settlements should remain, but Sadat did not agree. He regards the settlements as an encroachment and he is very adamant about his demands for dismantling them. Tomorrow Carter will raise this subject again in his meeting with Sadat, though so far, he was unsuccessful in convincing him to change his mind about the settlements.
After Carter’s response, I continued and said that it is desirable to reach an agreement on the Sinai, even if it is signed as a preliminary one and we shall continue onward to discuss the remaining substantial issues. I suggested that Carter should talk to Sadat about the issues concerning Judea, Samaria and Gaza.
As it is well known, we proposed to Carter that the question of sovereignty will remain open. We shall not agree on sovereignty, but we agree to let this issue remain open-ended. I submitted to Carter the numbers and he burst out laughing – 22,000 square miles is the size of the Sinai and 2,300 square miles constitute Judea, Samaria and Gaza; on the one hand, he implied, we concede the 22,000 and nothing, not even a square mile, in the other. Carter made gestures of understanding, as if it was a new ‘discovery’ for him. But as I mentioned, we have put a great effort into formulating our plan. He said that it is necessary to define the issues and arrive at an agreement.
Later, the President raised few problems that reflected Sadat’s demands. Accordingly, Sadat expects that in Camp David we shall comply with, and I quote: “the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force.” I told President Carter that this is not mentioned in Resolution 242.
The Security Council Resolution emphasizes “by war” and the Arabs have to decide if they mean “by aggressive war”. If such is the case we may agree, but then it is necessary to change the map of Europe, and they cannot hold the rope on both ends. Egypt itself was in the Gaza Strip following an invasion and aggressive war. It did not annex Gaza. On the other hand Abdulla executed an act of annexation and this is an acquisition of territory by war. So how can we be told and be held accountable for an opposing interpretation? These are simply nonsensical. Carter actually accepted my argument, not in words but by gesture. He remarked ‘very interesting’ as if he affirmed what I said, but not in full manner. He reiterated that this is what Sadat demands to achieve in Camp David.
Then the President made a list of things that by his estimate Egypt agrees upon. They were as follows: First: No Palestinian State.
Dinitz: Did he say “independent”?
Begin: No, “Palestinian State”.
Second: The IDF remains in Judea and Samaria beyond five years (so he said quoting Sadat).
Third: You retreat to the international border in the Sinai. There are some issues concerning airfields that need to be negotiated upon and the fate of the settlements; as I mentioned, Sadat does not agree that they should stay. Open borders; comprehensive peace, these are the issues that are agreed upon. Maybe the negotiations should be conducted in the way the Americans and Chinese did. Namely, each side states his position and then proceeds to what has been agreed upon and discusses the issues that remained in dispute. There are those issues that have been resolved and those that have not been yet. And the wording should be positive. (This we actually did in Ismailia with regards to the Palestinian issue when we followed the American-Chinese model). As Dayan said, Sadat will not agree to conduct negotiations after Camp David, on such issues that have not been agreed upon.
Then the President said that Sadat demands a commitment to a total withdrawal from Judea, Samaria and Gaza. He mentioned it towards the end of our conversation. Carter said that he tried to convince Sadat on the issue of the Jewish settlements in the Sinai, but did not succeed.
The President said that he recollects that we have made some changes in the peace plan that will grant Israel veto power. Do I remember correctly, he asked? I replied that I don’t have the document in front of me, and in order not to be misquoted I’ll mention one thing that I remember and it may be defined as unanimous or a veto – and this had to do with immigration of Arabs to Judea and Samaria from Lebanon. The Committee’s decision should consist of representatives of Jordan, the Administrative Council and Israel, and should be unanimous. I said that I will check the rest – Carter said that the Egyptians are disturbed by the veto provision. I replied: I’ll check the rest and find out where there were more demands for unanimous decisions.
Carter asked: ‘What’s with the settlements? I suggest that there will not be additional ones’. I responded firmly. I said that this is an old discussion, but it does not represent a barrier to peace. Our previous government built scores of settlements and we have decided not to confiscate lands. What injustice was made and to whom? We hold the position of confiscating lands that are not cultivated. Carter nodded his head, somewhat impressed, but I do not think that he will say that the U.S. agrees on the question of the settlements.
As for the authority of the Administrative Council he said: ‘You mentioned that the military governor will be the source of authority and this worried us. I replied that I based it upon the opinion of Barak, our legal counsel to the government, and replied – indeed, we are ready to consider the division into two periods: In the first one there will be a Military Administration, and in the second one we will be ready to cancel it and the final agreement will become the source of authority. Carter expressed his approval.
Carter said: ‘Resolution 242 has to apply to the West Bank and excuse me for naming it as such. I don’t intend to hurt your feelings. I know that you call it Judea and Samaria, but out of habit I called it the West Bank.’ I said that we have our own interpretation about the Administration, and this is not just mere proposal, but we insist on the “abolishment and withdrawal” of the Military Administration and this is the interpretation of 242. Indeed, it may be a different interpretation, but it is legitimate. He was silent and did not express an objection. But later he said that Sadat demands a commitment to a total withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza.
Dayan: He said both things, but only as a token expression.
Poran: He said: Beyond five years, but not forever.
Begin: By his own initiative Carter raised the issue of American military bases in the Sinai. He did not mention Haifa. He said that the U.S. is not eager to construct them, but if there will be an agreement between Israel and Sadat and all sides will consent, ‘our Chiefs of Staff propose” (and I quote), “that it will be a training base.’
Weizman: They had such camps in Libya and Morocco.
Begin: He did not mention Haifa and I did not take the initiative to mention it either. Under no circumstances is it acceptable to send American soldiers to Judea and Samaria and Gaza, and despite some hints in the press we will not consider it. With regards to defense, he made a distinction between NATO where an attack on one member state is considered an attack on the U.S., or such case as Korea which it is not automatic and congress has to deliberate on it. He did not suggest that they are offering us a defense treaty, but rather explained the distinctions. I did not raise this matter on my own initiative.
As far as a partial-permanent agreement, I explained the matter as reflected on the status of Al-Arish and Santa Katharina and that we are ready to give them back before reaching an agreement and wish to have in return a permanent agreement for our settlements that will be defended by Israeli forces and will not be removed.
Weizman: Is that what Carter is going to tell Sadat?
Begin: Yes, but Sadat did not agree to let the settlements stay. The spread of Communism was mentioned and that it is our mutual interest to prevent its outreach. Carter said that the U.S. would like to have good ties with us, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. He is worried about the situation in Teheran. He mentioned the heir to the Crown and said that he is an enlightened young man. Both of us praised the Shah, but the situation there is very precarious. The U.S. supports the Shah.
He then voluntarily offered the following assessment: Israel is capable of defeating any combination of its enemies. It has a strong and well-trained army and is highly motivated. Though the other side has more tanks and fighter planes, Israel can still defeat all of them. The President asked: ‘’Why don’t you accept the term – in all its aspects?’ I responded that he has to understand that for all others this is a foreign policy problem, including Egypt, which risks nothing. For us it is a question of life and death and it might lead to a Palestinian State. This is not just a refugee problem. But for us, this is a political and national matter and we must be cautious – because for us it is a survival issue – resulting from definitions that may be interpreted as leading to the establishment of a Palestinian State. Carter diligently wrote down the word issues relating to the subject like total withdrawal and settlements. He wrote it down in seeming neutrality and objectivity.
Tomorrow at 10 in the morning he will meet with Sadat and will raise these issues. He respects him, but he is impulsive and Carter is concerned that if they do not reach an agreement, he may decide in October to let the UN forces go; and then Sadat not only will be defeated in war (and he knows that) but he might have no other option but starting one. This might be the consequence if he decides to expel the UN from the Sinai. In the afternoon Carter wants to hold a meeting of three. There is a room there with a round table with three seats for the heads of each delegation. He is aware of the fact that Sadat is impetuous and may resort to a military action in order to push the negotiations forward. The atmosphere of the meeting was comfortable. The Americans are aware of Israel’s strength and tenacity. On this issue he offered no proposals and neither did I.
We talked about Lebanon only at the end. I told him about our assistance and the consideration of transferring tanks that the U.S. exerts pressured us not to give them to the Lebanese. We think there is a danger that there will be an appeal to the (UN) Security Council and we cannot allow that to happen. He said that he will consider together with Vance to send a letter to Damascus. I told Carter about our assistance – which consisted of artillery, but not tanks, because of the U.S. objection. Kamil Sham’un, who is an interesting old man, visited me at my home. They expect that we will not let them be defeated and told Carter about the shooting at our airplanes by the Syrians.
Carter asked and I replied that until now nothing happened, but we could not stay quiet in the face of such aggression. In the afternoon, I suggest, that we hear it from the “horse’s mouth”.
The meeting was pleasant and it was conducted only between the two of us. Carter went out of his way to demonstrate his understanding. He is a very gracious person and good hearted but when he said that ‘there should be no more settlements’ his facial expression demonstrated that he meant it. Later, when this subject was raised again, he was smiling.
Sadat probably wishes that our announcement of withdrawal to the previous lines will be applied to all fronts with regards to ‘acquisition of territories in war.’ Carter is not certain that he will be able to convince Sadat to change his opinion and principles in their meeting tomorrow, but he will try. At the moment, if we are to assess the situation seriously, there is no “ganging up” between Egypt and the American Administration.
With regards to sovereignty, Carter said that the Egyptians were not satisfied after our first meeting because it was too wide-ranging in their opinion. I explained that if someone will demand sovereignty over Judea, Samaria and Gaza we shall also present our demands and it should be without doubt that he did not speak of self-determination.
Tamir: An announcement about retreat appeared also in Saltsburg – the issue of withdrawal in the declaration of intents and the actual presence.
Begin: Total withdrawal.
Weizman: We, Dinitz and I, had a conversation with Vance and this subject was also raised.
Dinitz: Vance told Ezer (Weizman) that there will be matters that Sadat will agree on in public and sign, and others that he will sign, but only discreetly.
Weizman: So that we will be able to keep the signature with us as was done with Syria in 1973. Vance said that he would like to meet with the Israeli delegation tomorrow at 11:30. We should determine who will participate.
Begin: The collective meetings will be with the three of us and the members of the delegation. In the afternoon only the three of us will convene. Later there will be meetings only between me and Sadat, without Carter. And then the three delegations will convene. Carter is in no rush. He is ready to meet next week too. Carter read a message that he received from Ford who telephoned him and said that this is a rare opportunity and he wishes him success. From observing Carter’s demeanor he is in good spirit. He has not yet failed in his mission.
Dayan: If I understand it correctly, Sadat’s definition about the ‘non-acquisition of territories at war’ is comprehensive and principled, and should be applied to the Golan Heights as well. More specifically he talks about the Sinai and Judea and Samaria. It is there where he wants a withdrawal, no settlements, and in Judea and Samaria he is willing to have a military presence. These are Egyptian demands. The U.S. demands of us to stop the continuation of the settlements. As for the Sinai – we do not continue to settle there in any case. So the demands relate specifically to Judea and Samaria.
Begin: He does not want additional settlements. But I left no doubt in his hearts on this issue. And then he confided that I never deceived him and he is sure of it. All in all he will have a tough cookie to deal with, whose name is Sadat.
Dinitz: There are few issues that he sided with us on and others that he is closer to Sadat.
Weizman: Vance told me that he thinks that Sadat made a cardinal error in the way that he cursed you for half a year. Vance said that he expressed his opinion on that issue to Sadat as well.
Begin: Carter cannot afford to fail, that is why he is adopting the American-Chinese way where you agree on some issues and move forward. He asked for my consent to have a common prayer by him, Sadat and mine for the success of the meetings. I said that I’m willing to do so but that it should be in neutral terms and that he should not mention the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit.
Dayan: What were the issues that he mentioned that are accepted by the Egyptians?
Begin: No Palestinian State; the extended stay of the IDF beyond five years (I think); our withdrawal to the international borders in the Sinai. As for sovereignty, he wants to receive our agreement to discuss it prior to the end of the five-year period. I replied that this is reasonable. I spoke here in somewhat of a dramatic tone and said that I believe in all my heart that this land belongs to the Jewish People. Not to the Jordanians, or the Egyptians, but to us. There are those who are mocking the Bible, but neither you, nor I. This is our life’s story (he nodded his head) but it is not only a matter of historical right, but the security of our lives. I’m convinced that this is our land and it belongs to our People.
The other side also presents a demand for sovereignty, and we asked ourselves how is it possible to settle those demands and we said – let us leave this as an open question. He nodded his head repeatedly in agreement. We agree to that but not to a foreign sovereignty. He did not react to my comment. As for Jerusalem he said among others that ‘there must be some kind of an arrangement’, but he was not specific. He mentioned Saudi Arabia and that Europe is dependent on oil.
Dayan: Did he say anything about the entry of Jordan to the negotiations?
Begin: Yes. If there will be some kind of a concrete proposal, he hopes that it will join. But he did not give it much attention. He did not relate to Syria at all.
Weizman: This was my assessment in Salzburg. That is why Sadat wanted Al-Arish and Santa Katharina. But that was spilled milk.
Begin: He also wants to be in Judea and Samaria. I proposed that we shall conduct a discussion after I hear from Carter about his conversation with Sadat. However, we may not be able to do it before the meeting of the three of us in the afternoon.
Weizman: Carter invited Vance and Brzezinski for a 7 o’clock meeting in the morning. They’ll have breakfast with him.
Begin: They issued a communiqué to the press that the three of us are praying for success.
Dayan: You’ll have to take your hat off for the Christians, then your shoes for the Muslims and then wear a yarmulke.
Begin: Tuhami wrote in a draft about the divine visit of Sadat. In the meantime Carter is happy that the world is watching the conference, but he is worried about the agreement. He wants to succeed.
Dinitz: Because the whole world is watching.
Begin: Carter said that no agreement will be forced. Maybe there will be some ideas. We’ll talk to Sadat. I hope that he’ll talk like a friend. I deserve this right.
Dayan: Did he talk about refugees?
Begin: That we have the right for a veto.
Barak: The second subject is legislation.
Begin: He noted the changes that we made with regards to lands, namely, that the Arabs who purchase lands must be citizens. I said that it is subjected to Government’s decision and this change was initiated by the Foreign Minister. The fact is that Switzerland decided to enact a law that forbids selling of land to Germans. There is nothing wrong with it. It’s symmetric justice.
He said that it is not very symmetrical; you wrote something else before that. I said that Yigal Alon criticized us ceaselessly about it and argued that thousands of Arabs will seek citizenship so that they can buy land in Israel. However, such is not the case.
Rosenne: On the matter of ‘non-acquisition of territories’ we accepted it at the time because there was no annexation. The word “occupation” is allowed, except for Jerusalem.
Begin: It’s permitted to use occupation, as you’ve tried to explain in Ismailia. However, because the way this word sounds it’s not quite good.
Dinitz: On the issue of “war of aggression”…
Begin: Carter suggested that maybe it will be proper to write ‘non-possession of territories that were captured in war’ and I replied: Please do. Then let us say that the war in 1967 was a “war of national defense.” I said that we should abolish “withdrawal” (Carter did not pay attention and I did not want to show it to that word.)
He then said that there is another point of consent with regard to ‘the military government administration’, namely: That the military administration will be abolished. I responded by noting that not only should the “military rule” be terminated but the “administration,” which is the one that ‘will be abolished and withdrawn.’
Dayan: With regards to ‘aggression,’ it is necessary to be cautious. We went to the Golan Heights after Syria announced that it accepts the cease-fire.
Begin: This is not remembered in the world.
Dayan: When it will become necessary, it will be remembered.
Dinitz: I prefer that there will be no reference to ‘non-aggression’.
Begin: I said it and it’s not in writing, but it has to be self-explanatory, otherwise it is necessary to change the whole map of Europe.
Dayan: Resolution 242 does not demand returning to previous borders.
Begin: The Americans, why do they accept? Sisco explained to Malik that they believe in minor border corrections that should be agreed upon; hence it supersedes the wording that there is ‘no acquisition of territory by war.’
The changes derive from an agreement and they are minor, therefore there is no acquisition of territory. Sadat will not agree to write ‘by war of aggression.’
Dayan: Our position is somewhat stable in the face of Sadat’s presentation of the issues. In his demands, we retreat from all territories, including the removal of settlements. It’s much harder when it comes to the U.S.’ demands with regard to the continuation of building settlements – first because they are Americans, and second, they don’t say to remove anything.
Begin: They maintain that this is their traditional position.
Weizman: To freeze…
Begin: Yes. I made it clear that the Genève Convention does not apply here. Carter did not speak about purchasing lands from private buyers.
Weizman: Sadat said that if an Arab wants to sell and a Jew wishes to buy land – it is allowed.
Begin: With regards to this matter, I don’t think that there is an agreement between the Egyptian and the Americans.
Dinitz: Maybe they checked.
Weizman: The real problem is what will be the status of Judea and Samaria after five years.
Begin: Carter wants to know why there will be no discussion of sovereignty within the next five years. He said that he does not understand it.
Dayan: If there was a formula stating that the discussion should be within five years and a decision that it should be conducted after five years, then there is not such a big difference. They said, let’s begin the discussion after three years, but there is no decision on this matter.
Begin: If there will be a change on that issue, it is possible that we reach an agreement in the Chinese-American mode – summing-up the matters that have been agreed on and those that have not.
Dinitz: It is my personal opinion that the President’s proposal, which has been agreed upon, is finalized. However, it will not be practical as long as the gap derives from the Egyptians’ demand to retreat to the 1967 borders and uproot settlements. And then, what are the matters that we do agree on – the termination of our administration and the removal of the Israeli military force? He will say that he agrees on it as long as we are committing ourselves to withdraw.
Begin: It is not accidental that Carter spoke about it already. It comes from his advisers. I told him what we discussed it in Ismailia and related to the Chinese-American method.
Dayan: This is only good for the record and not beyond. If there are differences of opinions on major issues, the question is what will we do then?
Weizman: We will look and say that we made some progress…
Begin: It is possible that Sadat will not agree to it while there is still a wide gap on the basic issues. Such as the settlements in the Sinai that are an ‘encroachment on his territory.’
Rosenne: Did Carter relate to the renewal of the mandate for the UN forces?
Begin: He is considering the possibility that they might be expelled in October.
Weizman: Vance said that despite the fact that the condition of the Egyptian army is not good, Sadat may decide to make a military move.
Dinitz: Even if he knows that he will not succeed.
Weizman: He said that Gammasi’s predicament is better than Mubarak’s and he left him there because the army is restless.
Begin: He left him for security reasons.
Weizman: Gammasi mentioned the restlessness in the army at the meeting in Salzburg.
Begin wished to add that Carter proposed that Sadat and the Prime Minster will announce once again: “No more war.”
Notes taken by: Elyakim Rubinstein