(29 October 1969)
Rogers, William. “The Rogers Plan.” Washington, DC. 29 Oct. 1969. Rpt. in The Search for Peace in the Middle East, Documents and Statements 1967-1979. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1979. 292. Print.
In 1969, two high ranking State Department officials, Joseph Sisco and Roy Atherton suggested to Secretary of State Rogers that the United States go public with the outline of an agreement to the conflict based on private discussions the US had with Egyptians, Jordanians, and Israelis. Those discussions, however, were not with the leaders of the countries, but rather with lower ranking representatives. Sisco told an audience of his peers, meeting in April 1991in Washington, that at the time in late 1969, “the US was getting beaten over the head by the Soviets,” claiming that the US was dragging its feet in trying to initiate Arab-Israeli negotiations. The details of the plan that Sisco and Atherton drafted for eight hours at the State Department, became the Rogers Plan; it was delivered as a speech, and notably was not vetted by Israeli or Arab leaders prior to its public presentation.
The speech called for a “fair solution” to the refugee problem, but did not call for a political solution for the Palestinians, using terms like self-determination or state creation. It offered the establishment of an agreement between Jordan and Israel, but did not mention Syria. The plan did not call for a peace treaty as the outcome of negotiations or a timeframe or stages, or benchmarks in achieving a negotiated outcome. Further, it did not mention by name the West Bank, Jerusalem, or the Golan Heights. It was a US proposal aimed at securing first and foremost an Egyptian-Israeli agreement “following procedures used at Rhodes in 1949,” which in themselves had not been direct talks between the parties, but rather talks through a mediator shuttling between the negotiating sides. It was a plan put forth without pre-negotiations between the parties; it contained no means for either side to test the commitment or intentions of the other.
With no imminent crisis or a peace treaty as the outcome, the Israeli government of Golda Meir rejected the plan almost as fast as it was proposed. With disagreeable content – total withdrawal –and announced without prior consultation, the Israelis had additional reason to reject the Rogers Plan. In 1991, Sisco and Atherton said about the Roger’s Plan, “we consulted with [Israel’s Ambassador to Washington) Yitzhak Rabin, but we did not give them the text in advance; the Israelis as you know are very textural; they wanted the precise language, not paraphrases.”
Remarking in 1991 on how the Roger’s Plan evolved, Atherton recalled that, “the attempt to lay out a blueprint for settlement without detailed engagement of the parties,” was a mistake. And yet, this would not be the last time that the US, without consulting the respective sides or engaging in substantive preliminary or preparatory talks for narrowing differences announced its own outline for a negotiated settlement. Presidents Carter, Reagan, Bush 41, and Obama would each do so in September 1977, September 1982, October 1991, and May 2011 respectively; each time the US encountered resistance from Arab and Israeli leaders who did not want an agreement about content or process imposed upon them.
–Ken Stein, September 2016
The United Arab Republic (U.A.R.) and Israel will agree on a timetable for withdrawal of Israeli forces from U.A.R. territory occupied during the war.