Source: https://unsco.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/s_res_17012006.pdf
The Lebanese Israeli border and the Litani River
Source: CIA
By the end of September 2024, Israel was seeking a least partial disarmament of Lebanon, south to the Litani River, ten miles from Israel’s northern border. Israel could not continue to have 65,000 of its citizens out of their homes in the Israeli center, fearing for their daily lives from regular in discriminant Hezbollah terrorist attacks on population centers, schools, hospitals, and general life. In September Israel ratcheted up its conflict with Hezbollah by killing dozens of its leaders, thousands of fighters, and destroying only a small fraction of Hezbollah’s military depots. For more than fourth years, Israel had been harassed, shot at, bombed, with its civilians kidnapped and killed in what was a multiple decade war of episodic fighting, between Israel and Hezbollah. Having taken control of the Lebanese south from a weak Lebanese central government in the 1980s Hezbollah’s organized itself politically and militarily, funded by Iran, aimed a perhaps making Lebanon another Shia autocracy, focuses all the while on assisting local Lebanese, while killing, Jews, degrading Israeli morale, and ultimately seeking Israel’s destruction. Similar philosophies and militant actions vilifying Israel were taken by Iran, the Houtis, Hamas, and Iranian shia proxies through the Middle East.
For Hezbollah to engage in a full scale war against Israel, it would open up most of Lebanon to full scale war against Israel’s superior military forces. Israel would likewise in a major war suffer tens of thousands of casualties, with the infrastructure of both countries severely damaged. Would Hezbollah risk going to war and possibly lose a significant handle on Lebanese politics, truly not a priority for its allies in Tehran? In the interim, would Hezbollah quietly back off and withdraw beyond the Litani River? Can Israel tolerate anything less, if it wants its citizens to return to their homes some 5-15 miles from the Israeli and Lebanese-Syrian borders?
Eighteen years earlier, on July 12, 2006, Hezbollah staged a cross-border raid on Israel, abducting two Israeli patrolmen before retreating. So began what Israelis call the Second Lebanon War. The 34-day confrontation between Israel and its Iranian-sponsored Lebanese enemy concluded when the combatants accepted a ceasefire proposed by a U.N. resolution. Adopted unanimously on August 11, 2006, UN Resolution 1701 indeed brought the Israel-Hezbollah war to an end, but it conspicuously failed to bring the Israel-Hezbollah conflict to an end, despite its ambitious intention to do just this. With this unrealistic objective in view, the resolution made several distinct appeals, calling for Hezbollah’s disarmament and withdrawal to north of the Litani River, the demarcation of the disputed Israeli Lebanese border, the deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces in southern Lebanon, and the enlargement of the UN peacekeeping force (UNIFIL) fielded in southern Lebanon since 1978.
Resolution 1701 was doomed to failure from the start because its central provision called on Hezbollah’s disarmament. By law, the Lebanese constitution required disarmament; and the Israeli military unsuccessfully had attempted Hezbollah’s disarmament by force. To disarm, Hezbollah would undermine its existential purpose to make war on Israel, end armed struggle against Israel, and renounce its intent to eliminate Israel. Hence, a day after the resolution passed, Hezbollah announced that it would not accept–and the Lebanese government announced that it could not enforce–the resolution’s foremost provision. For the same reason, Hezbollah, rejected Resolution 1701’s demand that it pulls back beyond the Litani River, some ten miles north of the Israeli border. Hezbollah, after all, would cease to be Hezbollah if it allowed southern Lebanon–the movement’s heartland and its staging ground for attacking Israel–to be declared a no-go zone.
Relative quiet that reigned for a short time after the Israeli Lebanese border war. Israel had visited devastation on Hezbollah’s positions south of Beirut and near the Israeli border, leaving Hezbollah with no desire to renew hostilities. Thus, it was Israeli deterrence, not UN deliberations, which brought the residents of Israel’s Upper Galilee a measure of postwar peace.
Resolution 1701 showed is core ineffectiveness because UN forces could not prevent Hezbollah fighters from infiltrating to Israel’s border, way south of the Litani River. Far from ending the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict, the resolution neither restored Lebanese sovereignty nor Israeli security; on the contrary, Hezbollah rearmed busily, replenishing its rocket arsenal many times over and emerging as the world’s best-equipped non-state actor, with an estimated 130,000 rockets and missiles of all varieties.
If any good came from Resolution 1701, it came from broadening UNIFIL’s mandate. The resolution created a cooperative forum, the “Liaison and Coordination Arrangement,” that opened a channel of direct communication between Israel and the Lebanese Armed Forces and between Israel and Hezbollah indirectly. This channel has, at times, prevented escalation when tensions on the Israeli Lebanese border have flared. Yet, after the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, the resolution continued to prove unenforceable, with the United States and France trying frantically to generate a cease fire and keep the cross boarder wars from expanding into a massive conflict.
Ken Stein, September 27, 2024
UN Security Council Resolution 1701 on the War in Lebanon
(11 August 2006)
Source: https://unsco.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/s_res_17012006.pdf
The Security Council,
Recalling all its previous resolutions on Lebanon, in particular Resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978), 520 (1982), 1559 (2004), 1655 (2006) 1680 (2006) and 1697 (2006), as well as the statements of its President on the situation in Lebanon, in particular the statements of 18 June 2000 (S/PRST/2000/21), of 19 October 2004 (S/PRST/2004/36), of 4 May 2005 (S/PRST/2005/17), of 23 January 2006 (S/PRST/2006/3) and of 30 July 2006 (S/PRST/2006/35),
Expressing its utmost concern at the continuing escalation of hostilities in Lebanon and in Israel since Hezbollah’s attack on Israel on 12 July 2006, which has already caused hundreds of deaths and injuries on both sides, extensive damage to civilian infrastructure and hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons,
Emphasizing the need for an end of violence, but at the same time emphasizing the need to address urgently the causes that have given rise to the current crisis, including by the unconditional release of the abducted Israeli soldiers,
Mindful of the sensitivity of the issue of prisoners and encouraging the efforts aimed at urgently settling the issue of the Lebanese prisoners detained in Israel,
Welcoming the efforts of the Lebanese Prime Minister and the commitment of the Government of Lebanon, in its seven-point plan, to extend its authority over its territory, through its own legitimate armed forces, such that there will be no weapons without the consent of the Government of Lebanon and no authority other than that of the Government of Lebanon, welcoming also its commitment to a United Nations force that is supplemented and enhanced in numbers, equipment, mandate and scope of operation, and bearing in mind its request in this plan for an immediate withdrawal of the Israeli forces from southern Lebanon,
Determined to act for this withdrawal to happen at the earliest,
Taking due note of the proposals made in the seven-point plan regarding the Shebaa farms area,
Welcoming the unanimous decision by the Government of Lebanon on 7 August 2006 to deploy a Lebanese armed force of 15,000 troops in South Lebanon as the Israeli army withdraws behind the Blue Line and to request the assistance of additional forces from the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) as needed, to facilitate the entry of the Lebanese armed forces into the region and to restate its intention to strengthen the Lebanese armed forces with material as needed to enable it to perform its duties,
Aware of its responsibilities to help secure a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution to the conflict,
Determining that the situation in Lebanon constitutes a threat to international peace and security,
– full respect for the Blue Line by both parties;
– security arrangements to prevent the resumption of hostilities, including the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani river of an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL as authorized in paragraph 11, deployed in this area;
– full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, and of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), that require the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon, so that, pursuant to the Lebanese cabinet decision of 27 July 2006, there will be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than that of the Lebanese State;
– no foreign forces in Lebanon without the consent of its Government;
– no sales or supply of arms and related materiel to Lebanon except as authorized by its Government;
– provision to the United Nations of all remaining maps of landmines in Lebanon in Israel’s possession;
Adopted by the Security Council at its 5511th meeting.