

501.BB Palestine/11-1748: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State, at Paris

TOP SECRET

LONDON, November 17, 1948—7 p. m.

887. I have had lengthy conversations since returning from Paris with Sir Orme Sargent, Christopher Mayhew (Foreign Office Parliamentary Secretary), Michael Wright and Bernard Burrows. Lewis Jones has also had extensive talks and I feel we are now in a position to give fairly clear picture of reaction of Foreign Office officials to "principles applicable to US position on Palestine question before UNGA" set forth in Paris telegram 1269, November 15 to London.¹ Please note that views reported below without my comments are those held personally by Foreign Office experts named: They do not constitute official UK policy although latter will obviously be influenced by expert thinking.

2. Consensus opinion among officials is that Arabs would acquiesce to UN decision along lines Bernadotte plan provided UN would assume responsibility for drawing up a definite settlement including fairly definite indication regarding frontiers. This, officials feel, would give Arab leaders some reasonable explanation vis-à-vis their own people and, according British information on such a basis (i.e. original Bernadotte plan acquiescence principle) Arab acquiescence is just around the corner. British believe their efforts to persuade Arabs regarding merits Bernadotte plan are beginning to bear fruit.

3. British officials whom I have seen believe that prospects for Israeli-Arab negotiations have grown much worse following recent Israeli military successes because at outset such negotiations (either directly or under aegis conciliation commission) Jews will have behind them such military capability that it will amount to Arabs being called upon by UNGA to negotiate under duress. Expressing his personal view, Sir Orme Sargent said that in present circumstances to enjoin negotiations, however convenient this might be, would be tantamount to piously holding the ring and telling two contestants, between whom military equilibrium has been destroyed by preponderance Israeli arms, to thrash out their problems in their own way. He expressed belief that such an action would amount to cowardly avoidance of responsibility. Sir Orme fears that on the horizon lies another Munich which would be repeated if, after Arabs and Jews fail to negotiate an agreement, the powers were to come to the UK and ask UK to tell Abdullah that if he should refuse to settle with Israel, the UK-Transjordan treaty would no longer be operative. To sell Abdullah down the river for the sake of spurious peace, easy consciences, and

¹ This was a repeat of Delga 762, p. 1595.

"the greater good" would, in Sir Orme's view, be a reenactment of the Czech tragedy.

4. Sir Orme and other officials concede that once the broad lines of settlement are established by UNGA (preferably having been marked out in advance by US and UK) and after these lines have been acquiesced in by both sides it would be possible for details to be negotiated between parties.

5. Other thoughts Foreign Office officials are dwarfed by those in preceding paragraphs. However, Foreign Office officials believe, as do I, that a factor which deserves an important place in Paragraph One, Paris reference telegram, is mutual importance, not only regarding Palestine settlement but also regarding future of UN, of US-UK policy working in concert on this problem particularly since without such cooperation no settlement seems likely.

6. The internationalization of Jerusalem (Paragraph Five Paris reference telegram) continues to be matter of greatest concern to Foreign Office officials who have been perturbed by Shertok's statement that PGI, which no longer feels bound by November 29, will now accept only internationalization old city.

7. When US views regarding settlement by peaceful means (Paris reference telegram) were outlined to Foreign Office officials they found entire substance this paragraph admirable not only regarding UNGA settlement but also in connection with armistice. They noted, however, with great interest that implied in this paragraph is a willingness to take steps to stop recalcitrant party, i.e. sanctions.

Sent Paris for Gadel 887, repeated Department.²

DOUGLAS

² This telegram is printed from the copy received in the Department as Embassy London's 4908.

501.BB Palestine/11-1748: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NIACT

PARIS, November 17, 1948—midnight.

Delga 797. Next preceding telegram¹ gives text resolution which UK, with possibly China and other delegations but not US as co-sponsors, may introduce Committee One tomorrow² in event parliamentary situation in view UK requires action to prevent situation in committee getting out of hand and in event it is not possible reconcile divergent US-UK views as indicated below. UK representatives telegraphing text London for final clearance. This text results from series

¹ Delga 796, November 17, not printed.

² The United Kingdom introduced its draft resolution in Committee 1 on November 18; for text, see GA, 3rd sess., Pt. I, First Committee, Annexes, 1948, p. 55.

intensive consultations UK representatives in which they have accepted our views substantially all parts draft with exception numbered paragraphs 2, 3 and 5. We strongly urged acceptance following alternative drafts for these particular paragraphs:

Substitute for paragraph 2:³

"Calls upon the governments and authorities concerned to extend the scope of the negotiations provided for in the SC's resolution of 16 November, 1948, to bring about a final settlement of all other questions outstanding between them."

Substitute for paragraph 3:⁴

"Establishes a conciliation commission consisting of (three states members of the UN) which shall have the following functions:

"(a) To assume the functions given to the UN Mediator in Palestine by the resolution of the GA of 16 [14] May, 1948;

"(b) To carry out the specific functions and directives given to it by this resolution and such additional functions and directives as may be given to it by the GA or by the SC;

"(c) To assist the governments and authorities concerned in reaching a final settlement of all questions outstanding between the parties, including any questions which may be raised by the parties concerning matters dealt with in the GA resolution of November 29, 1947 and in Part One, Section VIII, paragraph 4 of the progress report of the UN mediator in Palestine;

"(d) To undertake, upon the request of the SC, any of the functions now assigned to the UN Mediator in Palestine or to the UN Truce Commission by resolutions of the SC; upon such request by the SC with respect to all the functions of the UN Mediator in Palestine under SC resolutions, that office shall be terminated."

Substitute for paragraph 5:⁵

"Instructs the Conciliation Commission to assist the governments and authorities concerned to delimit frontiers in Palestine, taking into

³ British paragraph 2 read: "Notes with satisfaction part one of the progress report of the United Nations Mediator and *endorses* the specific conclusions contained in part one of that report as a basis for a peaceful settlement of the Palestine question;"

⁴ British paragraph 3 read: "*Establishes* a Conciliation Commission . . . to carry out the functions assigned to it by this resolution in accordance with the specific conclusions of part one of the progress report of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine and by such instructions as the General Assembly or the Security Council may issue;"

⁵ British paragraph 5 read: "*Instructs* the Conciliation Commission in pursuance of paragraph 3 above to appoint a technical boundaries commission to assist the Governments and authorities concerned in delimiting the frontiers in Palestine based on the specific conclusions of the United Nations Mediator (paragraph 4 (b) of the conclusions to part one of the Mediator's report), subject to such adjustments as may promote agreement between the Governments and authorities concerned without altering the general equilibrium of the Mediator's conclusions, and taking into account the nature of the terrain and the unity of village areas;"

account the following general considerations, without excluding any territorial settlement mutually acceptable to the parties:

“(a) That there are important elements common to both the resolution of the GA of 29 November, 1947, and the progress report of the UN Mediator in Palestine;

“(b) That certain adjustments in the territorial arrangements of the GA resolution of 29 November 1947, should be considered through negotiations directly or through the UN Conciliation Commission; an adjustment of the disposition of Jaffa, all or part of western Galilee and all or part of the Negev.”

Department should compare above substitute paragraph with paragraph 3 delegation position paper contained Delga 762, November 16. Difference represents effort to simplify position paper for purposes of resolution since position paper is somewhat complicated and would be difficult to explain clearly to other delegations.

In explaining their objection to our suggested language, UK representatives on advice Foreign Office made following points:

1. UK is deeply and irrevocably committed to support Bernadotte Plan.

2. They undertook commitment to this effect to Bernadotte before his death.

3. Full British Cabinet approved Bevin's statement in Commons in support of Bernadotte Plan, in other words, they have supported this plan with “greatest formality”.

4. They have carried on very intensive campaign with Arab leaders as result of which those leaders have agreed that if Bernadotte Plan is accepted by Assembly those leaders will do their utmost to secure acquiescence Arab governments and peoples.

5. UK is therefore not able to accept any resolution which omits a specific endorsement of Bernadotte Plan or which does not aim at carrying out this plan integrally.

In response to requests for clarification our policy we read to UK representatives appropriate portions Telmar 148 indicating in response their inquiry that this must be taken as policy US Government. British reaction was this means practically (a) that Israel gets all of Negev because Negev is given to them by November 29 resolution, and (b) that Israel gets all of western Galilee because it is in their possession and no one will force them out. We indicated our interpretation US policy as meaning Israel should not have both Negev under November 29 plus Galilee under Bernadotte Plan. We feel there is no misunderstanding between us on this point.

British indicated view that November 29 plan as stated by Bernadotte, is wholly impractical and that Bernadotte Plan is practical. They indicated further that they have no particular UK interest in Negev. Their primary interest is in stability in Palestine and they feel most strongly that November 29 resolution does not provide such stability.

Moreover, British object strongly to leaving settlement of Palestine question to negotiation between parties. Their view is that Arabs cannot negotiate because negotiation involves recognition of partition (and existence of Jewish State) which they cannot do. Arabs, according to British, will never agree directly or indirectly as result of negotiations to partition. They could, however, acquiesce in a decision of GA because they could say such decision was forced on them. Endorsement by GA of Bernadotte conclusions would be taken by them as such a decision.

British also feel failure to endorse Bernadotte Plan would be widely interpreted by public opinion as a retreat by both British and American Governments from statements already made by President, Secretary of State, and British Foreign Secretary.

Following concerns tactics in current situation in Committee One. If British find necessary to put in draft along lines text sent Department preceding telegram they would expect US to speak to this draft reasonably early (within 24 hours), expressing general sympathy but reserving right to move amendments to specific paragraphs. This would give us time to get as close as possible together on amendments in hope that any amendments we might propose UK representative would be able to accept.

Without undertaking any commitments British feel our aim should be that both our governments could accept will of majority and vote for resolution as a whole, although specific paragraphs or amendments we were supporting individually might not pass. We agreed with foregoing, making clear, however, that we could not agree to any resolution which permitted any alteration in November 29 frontiers of Israel without consent of Israel.

Sent Department Delga 797; repeated London 1282.

MARSHALL

501.BB Palestine/11-1748: Telegram

*The Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald)
to the Acting Secretary of State*

SECRET US URGENT

TEL AVIV, November 17, 1948—9 a. m.

260. Personal Attention President and Acting Secretary. On eve my departure for Paris President Weizmann invited me personal conference at luncheon his residence and requested I transmit his views on Bunche Negev resolution:

"I am, as you know," said Weizmann "moderate, conciliatory and friend Britain, but I know Israel will never surrender Negev; instead every Jew there will resist to death." He stated that "Britain's policy since President Truman proposed large scale Jewish refugee immigration into Palestine in 1945 has successively been based on series of

gross miscalculations: First, that Israel could not finance war with Arabs; second, that Israel could not resist Arabs who would drive the Jews into sea; third, and currently, that Israel is in the hands of Russians."

Weizmann declared: Last accusation is as groundless as were earlier British misjudgments; that Israel is oriented towards the West, desires to retain closest possible US contacts because Israeli democratic and western-minded and realize that only with cooperation of US can this nation develop and remain free. It welcomes Russian support in UN but dreads Russian embrace. Russian influence can become dangerous here only if UN with US support humiliates and sacrifices Israel to British imperial interests. "I plead", concluded Weizmann, "with President Truman whose prestige among us is incomparably higher than that of any other foreign statesman, to save us from desperation."

Weizmann's consistent reputation for moderation lends special significance to above views.¹

MCDONALD

¹ Shertok had expressed similar views to McDonald at a luncheon on November 14. (Telegram 256, November 15, 4 p. m. from Tel Aviv, 501.BB Palestine/11-548)

501.BB Palestine/11-1748: Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET URGENT
NIACT

PARIS, November 17, 1948—11 p. m.

Delga 803. Eyes alone Lovett from Rusk. In separate telegrams are found text British resolution on Palestine and amendments which we would have to propose to conform to delegation opinion here. At this moment it appears improbable that US and UK can harmonize their positions sufficiently to present joint draft resolution or to permit us to support theirs without amendment. British feel compelled to speak soon and to submit resolution, and apparently consider that formal nature their public and unequivocal support Bernadotte plan and their commitments to Arab states leave them no alternative but to proceed that basis.

Text of possible US amendments suggested by us appear to be minimum we would have to make in light of attitude senior members delegation. However, you should bear in mind that our discussions within delegation may not have reflected real attitude of President on precise relationship between November 29 resolution and Bernadotte plan. If it is necessary to seek reaffirmation of November 29 resolution, or if we can modify our proposed language to bring it closer to British draft, delegation should receive specific instructions on those points. My estimate is that we and British recognize that in practice future events will be about the same under their draft or ours. Difficulty is what to get the assembly to say.

We have in Paris problem not only of reconciling President's and Secretary's statements reference November 29 and Bernadotte Plan, but also that of reconciling widely divergent views within delegation. If possible, instructions which would contain precise wording on any amendment we should seek in British draft or extent to which we could agree British draft would be most helpful.

All members of delegation have made serious and bonafide effort to reach common policy based on understanding President's wishes. Believe, however, results our discussions here need to be carefully checked to confirm that they in fact represent US policy.

British will probably speak in Committee One Thursday morning, but will not introduce resolution until later. We now plan not to speak until after British resolution is circulated, but would speak not later than Friday. Proposed text US opening speech will be forwarded Thursday.

Disadvantages of British proceeding to introduce resolution is that their position becomes more rigid and we lose in part, at least, advantages of joint action. Advantage is that British can make their case for Arab sympathy while we, by amendment, would make move more favorable to Israel and would avoid charge that we are tail to British kite.

We have not given up hope of possible joint resolution with British but much depends upon extent to which Department thinks British draft acceptable or unacceptable and whether delegation view accurately reflects what is wanted by President. [Rusk.]

MARSHALL

501.BB Palestine/11-1848: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Delegation at Paris

TOP SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, November 18, 1948—5 p. m.
NIACT

Gadel 522. We have given immediate consideration to UK draft resolution whose text is set forth in Delga 796, Nov. 17,¹ and to proposed amendments to that resolution suggested in Delga 797, Nov. 17. It is of paramount importance that Delegation's action on any draft Palestine resolution in Com. I conform absolutely to basic policy considerations established by Telmar 148, Nov. 10.

Taking commentary in Delga 797 first, we have following four comments:

(1) We confirm your interpretation of US policy to British as meaning that Israel should not have both Negev under Nov. 29 resolution plus Galilee under Bernadotte plan.

¹ Not printed.

(2) On British objection to leaving Palestine settlement to negotiation between parties, we feel that their own insistence on "compulsion" can be used as an argument in favor of GA "compelling" parties to negotiate. Your substitute for paragraph 2, UK draft, would afford such compulsion.

(3) As for British apprehension lest failure to endorse would be interpreted by public opinion as retreat by UK and US govts from positions formerly adopted, we are impressed by statement of Acting Mediator Bunche Oct 15² that Bernadotte himself did not regard his recommendations as hard and fast, take-it-or-leave-it plan, but as a basis for negotiating a settlement and conciliation of differences between the two parties.

(4) Without "expressing general sympathy" or approval British draft, we concur that you should vote for resolution as a whole (refer last para Delga 797), provided our amendments are carried. We assume however first vote after amendments will be paragraph by paragraph, and that final draft will conform to policy in Telmar 148. Otherwise you should abstain from voting on such final draft. We concur with your statement to British that we cannot agree to any resolution which permits any alteration in Nov 29 frontiers of Israel without consent of Israel.

Following are Dept's comments on Delegation's proposed amendments to UK draft in Delga 796:

Paragraph 2: We accept your suggested amendment.

Paragraph 3: We accept your suggested amendment.

Paragraph 5: We accept initial paragraph and paragraph (a), however paragraph (b) should read as follows:

"That certain adjustments in the territorial arrangements of the GA resolution of 29 Nov. *should* be considered through negotiations directly or through the UN Conciliation Commission; *should the Jewish State desire to remain in occupancy of Jaffa and Western Galilee, compensatory arrangements should be made in the Southern Negev, which should then form a portion of the Arab territory of Palestine.*"³

Other drafting changes in British text contained in Delga 796 seem unobjectionable and an improvement over draft contained in Delga 351, Oct. 16. However, it would seem useful to include Paragraph 10 of draft contained in Delga 351 immediately preceding Paragraph 10 of Delga 796.

Although Dept has not seen text of Delegation's proposed speech it desires to emphasize that Telmar 148, Nov. 10, is a basic policy state-

² Before the First Committee of the General Assembly; see GA, 3rd sess., Pt. I, First Committee, Summary Records, 1948, p. 160.

³ The Department, on November 19, altered a portion of the wording of paragraph 5 (b) on the recommendation of the United States Delegation at Paris in a telephone conversation the night before. It directed that the seven words immediately following the semicolon, from "should" to "remain" be changed to "if as a result of such negotiations the Jewish State remains" (telegram Gadel 533, 501.BB Palestine/11-1948).

ment of the President and that any speech of Delegation must be in precise conformity with that policy.⁴

Repeated to London—eyes only for Ambassador.

LOVETT

⁴ Marginal notation by Mr. Lovett: "Read to Key West 4 PM." At 11 p. m. the same evening, the Department notified the United States Delegation at Paris that although it had been impossible to clear Gadel 522 with President Truman, the Delegation was to treat the communication as a binding instruction (Gadel 527, 501.BB Palestine/11-1848).

501.BB Palestine/11-1848: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State, at Paris

TOP SECRET US URGENT LONDON, November 18, 1948—7 p. m.
 NIACT

892. 1. I talked with Prime Minister Attlee at length yesterday regarding the Palestine situation which at its present stage is the most serious problem in US-UK relations which has arisen during my mission here.

2. As a matter of reporting only—it is clear to me that the Prime Minister and the Cabinet feel that the US, by adopting inflexibly the criteria set forth in Telmar 148, November 11 [10] to Paris, and in particular the October 24 statement to the effect that modifications defined by resolution of November 29, 1947 "should be made only if fully acceptable to the State of Israel," has in substance undermined the common ground worked out by US and UK so laboriously in connection with Palestinian question and especially re Bernadotte's proposals.

3. The Prime Minister told me yesterday that because UK considers the Bernadotte proposals weighted against the Arabs the UK only accepted these proposals in first instance in order that it might stand shoulder to shoulder with US and thus through joint cooperation obtain a two-thirds vote in UNGA for a workable Palestine settlement. The British Government feels that US has, in effect, put situation back to November 29, 1947, and that UK is so formally committed to the Bernadotte proposals, having urged Arab acquiescence to them so strongly, that it cannot now abandon or greatly modify British support for these proposals. Paris 1282, November 17 gives a very clear picture of British attitude.¹

4. Committed as UK is to Bernadotte proposals, Prime Minister reaffirmed to me the sincere desire of the UK to maintain US-UK cooperation in achieving a settlement in Palestine.

¹ This was a repeat of telegram Delga 797, p. 1603.

5. I take it that our general objective in the light of "recent developments" (paragraph 4 Telmar 148) is that Israel should receive everything granted it under the Bernadotte proposals plus the most useful part of the Negev. If there is any bargain to be struck with the British it will be with regard to what if any part of the Negev should go to Israel. Such bargaining, which perhaps could be carried out most usefully in Paris although I am ready to do my share here, cannot, of course, begin or receive UK support until we are prepared to take a firm and unvacillating position in regard to any US-UK mutually agreed upon demarcation of frontiers. Assurance that once we reach agreement with UK we will not thereafter shift our position is almost the kernel of the nut.

6. To obtain British agreement to making the southern frontier of Israel either alternatives, (a) or (b) in paragraph 4 Telmar 148 will be no easy task. It would involve overcoming deep-rooted British objections on the following grounds:

(a) Negev north of 31 degrees includes virtually all arable land in Negev and would leave to Palestine Arabs only the desert waste and the limestone hills and terraces which form the spine of Palestine. Some criticism would apply to alternative (a) in paragraph 4 Telmar 148 to lesser degree. . . .

(b) Before flight of Arabs in fear of Jews Negev was largely Arab populated excepting portion north of Gaza-Beersheba road and lying between these two points. Even here Jewish population was in clear minority.

(c) To give so large a portion of Negev to Israel would rob Arab leaders and particularly Abdullah of any concessions which they could present to their home populations. This, in British view, would probably result in downfall of Arab governments with consequent confusion and disorder and intrusion of Soviet into Arab states.

(d) Giving part Negev to Israel would recreate hourglass frontier and destroy the integrated homogeneity of Bernadotte Plan frontiers.

(e) Negev (see map) is like a dagger blade dividing Arab world. British feel strongly that it would be great mistake for this to be in Jewish hands because:

(1) Arabs are . . . in no position to protect their interests without UK assistance which could be afforded if Negev went to Transjordan or Egypt.

(2) While British JCS hopes PGI will be friendly it has concluded that it would be unsafe to rely upon PGI to give British air installations in Negev with free access thereto.

(3) Arabs and Transjordan should have undisputed access to Mediterranean and to Gulf of Aqaba with sufficient territory to secure this access from hostile attack.

(4) UK difficulties with Egypt re treaty expiring 1956 and UK uncertainties re Cyrenaica trusteeship (2 just above) make Negev especially important at this time, although even with Cyrenaica importance of Negev territorial sovereignty resting with a British ally or allies is vital to British and US strategic plans.

7. Notwithstanding above British objections, it is my tentative view that the UK might be persuaded to use their influence on the Arabs to accept through the Frontier Commission a southern line of Israel which would fall more or less at Gaza-Beersheba road at the same time leaving Israel all or most of Western Galilee provided that:

(a) Location this southern frontier should not be left to parties to negotiate for reasons paragraph 3 Embassy's 4908, November 17 (repeated Paris as 887), and

(b) US without possibility of deviation is prepared to support without qualification these proposals in conjunction UK.

8. At this juncture I believe we are faced with a major crisis in US-UK relations. I am fully cognizant of the President's commitments in regard to PGI. I am inclined to believe, however, that since the statement on October 24, events have occurred in Palestine which justify in all good conscience and without infidelity to campaign utterances a re-evaluation by the President of the statement he then made. A commitment which may have been appropriate under one set of circumstances does not, it seems to me, require the same faithful observance under a different set of circumstances. I doubt that the President intended to give Israel carte blanche to take military action in defiance of UN and its servants, to go beyond the November 29 frontiers as in Galilee and then to cite the President's October 24 statement as a bargaining counter against the Arabs for the best of two worlds and the best of two plans.

9. Now that Committee One is considering Palestine we have reached the parliamentary stage and perhaps through dexterity of maneuver by US and UK delegations it may be possible to obscure for a time the essential divergence of US-UK thinking re a Palestine settlement. It would, however, be a mistake to imagine that the British Government will easily forget their impression that US has "let them down" in connection with the Bernadotte proposals. Moreover, I believe personally that time will show that it is a delusion to believe that Arab-Jewish negotiations, unless conducted within fairly precise limits of a plan endorsed by UNGA, will bring peace to the Holy Land. Alternatively US and UK should have firm agreement between themselves as to boundary demarcation which they would be prepared to recommend to Conciliation Commission and to stand on. The latter is far less likely to produce peace than the former.²

Sent Paris for GADel for Secretary 892; repeated Department for Lovett 4922.³

DOUGLAS

² Filed with this telegram is an information copy bearing an undated marginal notation by Mr. McClintock: "Sent to Key West for President".

³ This telegram is printed from the copy sent to the Department as Embassy London's 4922.

501.BB Palestine/11-1848: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State, at Paris

TOP SECRET URGENT
NIACT

LONDON, November 18, 1948—8 p. m.

893. Personal for the Secretary (eyes only) no circulation.

1. Have seen the Prime Minister and have discussed Palestine at length with him. I have also seen other officials at the FonOff. Reports on these conversations, together with my (Embtel 4908, repeated Paris 887, November 17 and Embtel 4922, repeated Paris 892, November 18) comments, have been sent Paris and Washington. This cable is a supplement for your information only, to be used according to your judgment. Because of the very personal and confidential nature of this information, I suggest that it be distributed only to your most intimate advisers. You will observe that I am not even sending it to Washington, for I think you can protect its circulation in Washington better than I can.

2. I spent two hours with Eden¹ today discussing Palestine. His attitude is far more flexible than is that of the present Government. He believes that the Jews should have more of the Negev. He agrees with me that the problem is one of arriving at a settlement of frontiers which will, on the one hand, give the Israeli reasonable satisfaction and, on the other hand, allow us to hold the Arab world intact on our side. He thinks it of vital importance that the US-UK stand together in such a way as to eliminate the danger of Israeli attack upon Transjordan. This, in Eden's opinion, might be a shattering blow to both of us.

3. Eden is seeing his old friends in the FonOff for the purpose of trying to make them take a more flexible attitude in regard to frontiers.

4. In view of the above, I hope that we will keep our position in the light of Telmar 148 and my cables to Paris 887, Nov 17, and 892, Nov 18, sufficiently flexible and sufficiently conciliatory vis-à-vis the British to give us a little time to try to bring this matter to rest on some solid foundation of US-UK accord. If both the US and UK can keep the doors open toward each other in their speeches on the matter in Committee One, I do not yet despair of bringing the British more toward our side. We possess enough ingenuity and persuasiveness to resolve what I think is one of the most, if not the most critical issue we now face with the United Kingdom.

DOUGLAS

¹ Anthony Eden, former British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

501.BB Palestine/11-1948: Circular telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices*¹

WASHINGTON, November 19, 1948—6 p. m.

GA plenary session today approved resolution originally submitted by US, UK, Belgium, Netherlands for 32 million dollar program relief Palestinian refugees of all communities covering period ending Aug 31, 1949. Resolution as approved includes 5 million dollar advance from UN working capital fund.² Details will follow.

LOVETT

¹ At Arab capitals, Jerusalem, and Tel Aviv.

² For text of resolution 212(III), see GA, *3rd sess., Pt. I, Resolutions, 1948*, p. 66.

501.BB Palestine/11-1948: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

RESTRICTED

US URGENT

PARIS, November 19, 1948—8 p. m.

Delga 839. Following is text of Israeli reply to Bunche and SC on November 4 and November 16 resolutions of SC, with particular reference to Negev and armistice. This has been communicated formally to Bunche and SC this morning. Comment based on discussion with Israeli and British representatives follows:

"Text of observations of the PGI on the resolutions adopted by the SC on the 4th and 16th of November 1948.

1. The PGI has given most careful consideration to the resolutions of the SC of the 4th and 16th November, and to the Mediator's communication transmitted on November 14.

2. The government reaffirms its policy of adherence to the principles of the UN. It welcomes the SC's decision that, 'in order to eliminate the threat to the peace in Palestine and to facilitate the transition from the present truce to permanent peace in Palestine, an armistice shall be established in all sectors of Palestine.' The government notes with satisfaction that the SC 'calls upon the parties as a further provisional measure under Article 40 of the Charter, to seek agreement forthwith, by negotiations conducted either directly or through the Acting Mediator on Palestine, with a view to the immediate establishment of an armistice.' The Government of Israel is much encouraged by the reiterated call for direct negotiations made in the SC's resolution of the 4th and 16th of November.

3. It is the consistent policy and practice of the Government of Israel to seek negotiations with the Arab states, whose armies invaded Palestine in wanton defiance of the Charter, with a view to arriving at a permanent peace as envisaged in the resolution of November 16th. The Government of Israel is most anxious to see these negotiations brought to a speedy and successful conclusion and requests that it be

notified without delay of the time and place at which its accredited representatives may meet accredited representatives of the Arab states.

4. The Government of Israel notes that the resolution of November 4th calls upon the governments concerned without prejudice to their rights, claims and position regarding a peaceful adjustment of future situation, to withdraw those forces which have advanced beyond positions held on the 14th October. The government understands that it is not the intention of the SC to require the withdrawal of forces from positions held before the 14th October; and it notes the Mediator's statement that the withdrawal of military forces north of the delined [*defined?*] line is inapplicable to those maintained in the Negev settlements for defence prior to the 14th October. The government recalls that since the 15th May it has uninterruptedly maintained regular mobile forces in the Negev which moved freely throughout the area, in addition to static settlement defence in the narrower sense of the term. It notes with satisfaction that the SC is not demanding the withdrawal from the Negev of forces maintained there before the 14th October in order to safeguard the security and independence of Israel and to protect its inhabitants. The withdrawal of such forces from inland areas, including Beersheba, would invite predatory activities by irregulars, a constant menace to the safety of all who dwell in this area. If Beersheba is deprived of defence, the way would again be thrown open to Jerusalem whose protection against aggression from the south could not be guaranteed.

5. The Government of Israel states that forces which entered the Negev on and after the 14th October for the purpose of reestablishing communications obstructed by the Egyptian army in deliberate defiance of the truce and the UN Chief of Staff's decision, have since been withdrawn to positions north of the line indicated in the Mediator's memorandum.

6. Regarding the coastal area, the government is prepared, after consultation with the UN staff, to order the withdrawal of its regular forces to the north of Deir Suneid, subject to local security arrangements to be agreed upon with the UN Chief of Staff.

7. The Government of Israel sees a contradiction between the Mediator's plan for the establishment of neutral or demilitarized zones, and his decision that the Egyptians may remain in the Bir Asluj area, and that Egyptian control of the Bir Asluj-Rafah road shall be recognized and maintained. The government reserves the right to make representations on this point when the matter arises for practical settlement with the UN staff.

8. The Government of Israel desires, in conclusion, to reaffirm its regard for the decision and recommendations of the SC, and its readiness to do everything possible to facilitate a peaceful settlement in the conflict which has arisen in Palestine, as a result of Arab aggression. It has nominated Col. Yigal Yadin and Mr. Reuven Shiloah as officers whom the UN Chief of Staff may consult in connection with further arrangements. The government reiterates its urgent request to the Acting Mediator that it be informed without delay of the place and time of the meeting with the accredited representatives of the Arab Governments. The Government of Israel expresses its sincere hope that this meeting may open direct negotiations establishing peace

and good neighborliness—an objective which Israel has pursued since the very beginning of this unhappy conflict.”

Sent Department Delga 839, repeated London as 1297.

MARSHALL

501.BB Palestine/11-1948: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET URGENT

PARIS, November 19, 1948—midnight.

Delga 848. Following are comments Eban and Comay¹ to Ross this morning on PGI response to SC resolutions of 4 and 16 November (texts sent Department Delga 839, November 19). Eban stressed the following five points:

1. Principal emphasis should be that there is no desire on part PGI to challenge authority of SC, but on contrary, emphasis should be placed on cooperation with the Council.
2. Main element of Israeli forces which have entered the Negev since October 14 are to be withdrawn.
3. Insofar as forces are not withdrawn from the coastal area the PGI is prepared to withdraw its forces north of Deir Suneid so that the Egyptians can advance to the line set by the mediator.
4. The appointment of officers in response to Bunche's request indicates the willingness of the PGI to cooperate in working out any outstanding matters.
5. With reference to the November 16 resolution, Eban stressed acceptance by the PGI of principles contained this resolution.

Both Israeli representatives stressed that action taken required great deal of courage on part of PGI in view domestic situation Israel. They were encouraged in taking this step by fact that SC found it possible pass armistice resolution November 16 and by assurances compliance with Bunche program in Negev would not prejudice eventual territorial settlement.

Eban quoted Bunche as being very satisfied and stating he felt PGI action “most statesmanlike.” Bunche confirmed this view later in the day.

Beeley's view (which he expressed at press conference today) was somewhat more cautious and marked by understatement. He told us he felt PGI's action “a step in right direction.”

Jessup shares view that this action by PGI gets us over this difficult hurdle.

Sent Dept Delga 848; repeated London 1301.

MARSHALL

¹ Michael Saul Comay, Member of the Israeli Delegation to the General Assembly.

Editorial Note

Mr. Jessup, before the First Committee on November 20, announced the general agreement of the United States with the basic premises of Count Bernadotte's report. He stated that peace must return to Palestine; that a Jewish state called Israel existed in Palestine as a recognized entity; that the boundaries of Israel should be determined by agreement of the parties, aided by the Conciliation Commission, that Israel was entitled to the boundaries set forth in the resolution of November 29, 1947, that any modifications of these boundaries be made only if acceptable to Israel, but that if Israel desired additional territory, it must offer an appropriate exchange through negotiations; that the Palestinian refugees be permitted to return to their homes, with adequate compensation to those who chose not to return; that Jerusalem be accorded special treatment; and that the question of international responsibility for guaranteeing boundaries and maintenance of human rights required careful consideration; for text of Mr. Jessup's statement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, November 28, 1948, page 657.

British reaction to Mr. Jessup's statement was "very unfavorable." Sir Orme Sargent, Permanent Under Secretary of State, said that the statement was worse than the Foreign Office had expected, particularly regarding "(a) abandonment of principle of acquiescence and (b) position that changes can be made in November 29 frontier only with consent PGI." (Telegram 4961, November 23, 7 p. m., from London, 501.BB Palestine/11-2348)

867N.01/11-2048: Telegram

Mr. Wells Stabler to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

AMMAN, November 20, 1948—4 p. m.

124. Recent reports indicate that Abdel Ghani Bey Karmi¹ (mytel 114, November 11²) has held talks with Israelis in Paris and has discussed possible terms of settlement including disposition of Negev, Abdullah's attitude regarding Jaffa and other points. Prime Minister, on learning such conversations proceeding, objected to King on basis he unable countenance any form "negotiation". King has agreed and telegram has allegedly been sent to Abdel Majid Haidar instructing him to restrain Karmi.

Also understood that Prime Minister has received another telegram

¹ Private Secretary to King Abdullah.

² Not printed.

from Sassoon. Efforts being made confirm this and ascertain subject.³
Department pass to Gadel 19.

STABLER

³ Amman, on November 21, reported that Mr. Sassoon's second telegram to the Transjordanian Prime Minister, friendly in tone, dealt with the protection of the Rutenberg Works by the Arab Legion during the flood period of the Yarmuk River (telegram 125, 867N.01/11-2148). The Prime Minister replied that the area of the Rutenberg Works was the responsibility of the Iraqi Army and that the Transjordanian authorities could not offer much assistance (telegram 127, November 23, 3 p. m., from Amman, 867N.01/11-2348). The latter message also stated that the Prime Minister had received a fourth message from Mr. Sassoon on November 22 "stating that Israeli authorities had heard that Arab Legion was planning mount offensive in Jerusalem and expressing hope that such report not true. Prime Minister has replied that Arab Legion has no [such] intentions and referred to previous message re Mount Scopus in which he indicated desire to cease fire in all Jerusalem."

501.BB Palestine/11-2048 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET US URGENT

PARIS, November 20, 1948—9 p. m.

Delga 862. We have given further consideration Paragraph 5(b) (Gadel 522, November 18 and Gadel 535 [533¹], November 19) and suggest it be reworded as follows:

"That certain adjustments in the territorial arrangements of the GA resolution of 29 November 1947 should be considered through negotiations directly or through the UN Conciliation Commission; if as a result of such negotiations, the Jewish state remains in occupancy of Jaffa and all or part of Western Galilee, compensatory arrangements should be made in the Negev."

Reference Delga 859, November 20,² we are inclined to believe changed wording may make this paragraph more acceptable to British. We believe in any event that reference to "Southern Negev[?]" might be open to misinterpretation and that it would be preferable to refer to this area as "Negev" as hitherto. If you concur, it naturally follows that last clause as given Gadel 533, November 19 would have to be dropped.

At this stage, it would be difficult to comment in detail on Paragraph 4 of Gadel 522, November 18. After we have had reactions to US statement Committee 1, November 20, we will have more balanced perspective of possible course developments Committee 1.

¹ Latter not printed; but see footnote 3, p. 1609.

² Not printed; it gave British comments on Gadel 522, November 18, p. 1608, and particularly, Ambassador Douglas' report that "Beeley took rather strong exception to Department's suggested redraft of Paragraph 5(b) of the United Kingdom resolution. He said Department's redraft appeared to be in contradiction and wholly inconsistent with Paragraph 1, Gadel 522. Paragraph 1 appeared to establish Galilee and Negev on an equal basis. Department's redraft, however, seemed to be a very important retrogression since it in effect gave Galilee and northern Negev to Jews leaving only southern Negev as offsetting factor." (501.BB Palestine/11-2048)

Reference Paragraph 10, Delga 351, Beeley indicates British would have no objection to inclusion, but failed to see necessity therefor in view Paragraph 10, Delga 796.

Sent Department 862, repeated London as 1310.

MARSHALL

867N.01/11-2148 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Acting Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

JERUSALEM, November 21, 1948—3 p. m.

1491. On own initiative Colonel Dayan, Commanding Officer Jewish forces Jerusalem, last night suggested to Consul General meeting with Abdullah Tel, Arab Military Governor, to establish effective cease-fire Jerusalem. Stated given full powers by Israeli chief staff Tel Aviv negotiate agreement binding all Jewish forces under his command including units opposite Bethlehem. Felt cease-fire should extend for about 15 miles either side city Jerusalem. Asserted could guarantee compliance his troops since no longer bothered by IZL or Stern units. Expressed opinion both Arabs and Jews would abide by agreement voluntarily reached as opposed to one ineffectually imposed by United Nations. Wishes discuss with Abdullah Tel question Mount Scopus convoys and use Hadassah and Hebrew unit but will attach no conditions to cease-fire. After consulting Neuville and senior United Nations observers Jerusalem intend proceed Old City tomorrow discuss with Abdullah Tel.

Approach may indicate PGI wishes permanent end fighting Jerusalem and feels possible make effective agreement with Arab Legion.

Sent Department 7491; Department pass Gadel 9, Cairo 139, Amman; repeated Beirut 97; Baghdad 28; Damascus 47.

BURDETT

501.BB Palestine/11-2248 : Telegram

The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation at Paris (Dulles) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET URGENT

PARIS, November 22, 1948—2 p. m.

Delga 885. At Shertok's invitation Jessup called on him last evening. Eban only other person present. Shertok stated US statement in first committee¹ read "with appreciation." He singled out for primary emphasis our tribute to the way in which Israel is fulfilling its mission in receiving and providing for immigrants. Secondly, he appreciated references to Israeli membership. He indicated their doubts concern-

¹ For a summary of Mr. Jessup's statement of November 20, see editorial note, p. 1617.

ing our views on boundary matters, suggesting that while they could not give up claim to Negeb, the question was whether their traditional claim to Galilee should not also be recognized. Jessup did not engage in discussion on this point. Shertok wondered why we considered British resolution even basis for discussion though Eban admitted preliminary paragraphs not bad. Jessup stated fundamental difference was that British resolution contemplated Assembly would proceed to some decision on boundaries while US statement indicated this is matter for negotiation.

Shertok touched on relations with US and Soviet Union. He said that permanent good relations with the west and especially with the US were primary considerations in their policy. He then emphasized that they faced necessity of arranging for bringing immigrants from Poland, Roumania, Bulgaria, et cetera, and that these arrangements required friendly relations with Soviet Union, which they must preserve. With something of a plea for support of him and his group in PGI, he stressed necessity of avoiding giving people of Israel picture of the west blocking Israel's future, particularly UN membership. He emphasized importance of membership in connection with inequality otherwise existing between Jews and Arabs before a conciliation commission.

On refugees, he registered doubt as to ability to readmit them and cited self-contradictory statements of Mufti which added up to an indication that Arab refugees should not return to Israel.

[Here follows Mr. Shertok's estimate of the attitude of various members of the Security Council toward Israeli membership in the United Nations.]

Jessup stated frankly that it would be very difficult for the US in promoting Israeli membership if military activities should suddenly commence. Shertok quickly said that assurances on this point can be given, not formally and publicly but to US. Eban added that formal application for membership would contain pledge to observe Charter. Jessup agreed desirability working in close contact in regard to timing on this matter. Jessup inquired whether they knew avoiding [*how to avoid?*] Soviet views [*veto?*] concerning simultaneous admission Transjordan. Shertok reported conversations with Soviet and Ukraine representatives SC had but had no definite statement from them. Shertok agreed that it would be helpful to PGI if Transjordan were admitted. He raised question of Soviet desire for general agreement to admit all applicants. Jessup replied this consideration would complicate Palestine problem and much better from Israeli point of view to help to separate the two cases of Israel and Transjordan.

Regarding Jerusalem, Jessup asked whether they would press for actual incorporation into state of Israel. Shertok stated emphatically that Israel would resist incorporation of all of Jerusalem under Arab

trusteeship, hastily adding that he referred only to verbal battles. He amplified at length his plan for Israeli trusteeship for part of the New City, Arab trusteeship for other part of New City, Old City being under direct UN trusteeship with Christian governor. Old City under such plan would be delimited not by the walls but would also take in such Holy places as Garden of Gethsemane. He stressed that their willingness to accept such a plan was held very secretly and known to very few in Israeli Government. It was not known to Israeli public and premature leak would be very harmful. He said that under previous regime New City had borne major part financial burden administering Old City and under his plan such financial support would continue.

Regarding Beersheba, Shertok said they had not talked recently with Bunche but hoped the representative they had appointed could adjust the matter with Bunche's representatives on the spot. Shertok was cautious in responding to Jessup's suggestion that if any military forces had to be used from now on, they should be considered as police forces in conjunction with Acting Mediator. Shertok excluded possibility of joint Jewish and Arab police teams, e.g., in Negeb.

On Jaffa and Lydda, Shertok inquired whether US statement meant acceptance of proposals in his speech on these subjects. Jessup replied we have not committed ourselves to any particular plan but had merely indicated we interpreted Shertok's speech as revealing fact that these were subjects which might be settled by negotiation.

DULLES

501.BB Palestine/11-2248: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Delegation at Paris

TOP SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, November 22, 1948—5 p. m.

Gadel 551. We approve language suggested for para. 5(b) as contained in Delga 862, Nov. 20.

We have given careful study to Delga 859, Nov. 20, as well as Delgas 848, 849 and 857,¹ providing recent Israeli comment on UK draft resolution and Israeli idea of a "simplified resolution" which might serve to meet immediate requirements in this GA.² We do not feel receptive to Israeli suggestion for such a resolution at this time. We are now on record as supporting the general principles contained in Bernadotte's seven basic premises with amendments. Careful reading

¹ None printed; telegrams 848 and 849 are dated November 19 and 857, the following day.

² The Israelis opposed the British view that the General Assembly determine territorial lines and favored their demarcation through negotiation between the parties. Their "simple resolution" called for extending the Security Council's armistice efforts and the appointment of a conciliation commission which would assist the parties in reaching agreement (Delga 849, 501.BB Palestine/11-1948).

by Israeli representatives of Jessup's statement Nov. 20³ will show that attitude of US is favorable to them but that this govt is publicly on record as feeling that Bernadotte Plan is a basis for negotiating a settlement and conciliation of differences between the two parties.

On the other hand we feel that British position is unduly rigid and in fact somewhat unreal. Conditions which prevailed last Sept. and which prompted Secretary's statement of Sept. 21 in support of Bernadotte Plan have materially changed as result of military operations and political conditions in countries concerned. In consequence we feel that British will defeat their own purpose, which is a prompt and definitive territorial settlement, by clinging stubbornly to every dotted I and crossed T in Bernadotte Plan.

On question of negotiations mentioned para. 1, Delga 859, Nov. 20, we feel it would be useful to tell McNeil and Beeley that neither of our govts. should "freeze" to fixed positions. We favor at least recognizing desirability of direct negotiations (your suggested new para. 2) because one party to conflict—Israel—has consistently expressed willingness to negotiate and because two of other parties—Transjordan and Egypt—have apparently undertaken clandestine conversations with Israel.

We have no thought of either UK or US putting pressure on Transjordan as victim of a Near-Eastern Munich. However, we fail to see why our two govts should not in a friendly way counsel with the parties in an endeavor to work out a meeting of the minds. If there were such an agreement arrived at secretly and soon, it would then be possible to join with British in securing passage of a GA resolution which would give international confirmation by UN to agreement privately reached, thus saving face of Arab leaders. If this should not prove possible, appointment of proposed Conciliation Commission would establish machinery for a continued effort to reach final settlement.

In fact it seems to us that present time is propitious for a settlement. There are two recent significant indications of Israeli statesmanship and moderation which serve to substantiate this opinion. One is Israeli deference to Mediator's order for withdrawal from Negev to Oct. 14 positions. The other is important initiative taken by Jewish Commanding Officer, Jerusalem, as reported Jerusalem's 7491 [1491], Nov. 21, to Dept, repeated Gadel 9. From Arab point of view (providing Bevin does not encourage them to wishful thinking by veiled promises of Brit. aid in form of rearmament) it should be obvious that in light of their own military weakness relative to Israel present moment offers opportunity of reaching a quick settlement which in view of present GA interest in problem need not be on terms disadvantageous to them.

We for our part would be prepared to give most urgent advice to

³ See editorial note, p. 1617.

PGI to continue counsels of moderation which it exhibited in accepting Acting Mediator's request for a withdrawal in the Negev. US stands willing to be of service to parties if they feel that a go-between is necessary or would be willing to see any other friendly govt perform such service. All concerned would welcome a definitive settlement now rather than prospect of dragging out this acrimonious interchange for another year under auspices of a committee optimistically named "conciliation." Furthermore, an agreed settlement now would be hailed with acclamation by other members of UN and would stand out as principal achievement of third session UNGA.

As concluding paragraphs of Delga 859 aptly point out, Israelis want negotiations and no Bernadotte Plan, British want Bernadotte Plan and no negotiations. US position is to bridge gap between these two extremes. We regret however that it is not possible to accept British endorsement paragraphs as suggested final para. Delga 859.

Repeated to London as 4397 for Ambassador.⁴

LOVETT

⁴ Filed with this telegram is an information copy bearing the following marginal notation in Mr. McClintock's handwriting: "Cleared with Clark Clifford, 6:30 pm Nov. 22."

Editorial Note

Mr. Jessup addressed the First Committee on November 23 concerning the British draft resolution of November 18, broadening the scope of the amendments proposed on November 17 by Secretary Marshall in Delga 797, page 1603; for the full text of his statement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, December 5, 1948, page 687. The official text of the United States amendments to the British draft resolution is printed in GA, *3rd sess., Pt. I, First Committee, Annexes*, page 66. The United States amendments were revised on November 25; for text, see *ibid.*, page 67.

501.BB Palestine/11-2348: Telegram

Mr. Wells Stabler to the Secretary of State

SECRET URGENT

AMMAN, November 23, 1948—noon.

126. Re Jerusalem's 491 [1491], November 21 to Department, it appears that on November 12 Sassoon at Paris sent message to Prime Minister in reply latter's message of October 31 concerning Mount Scopus (mytel 102, November 1¹) and suggested that Jewish and Arab military commanders Jerusalem meet to discuss end hostilities entire Jerusalem area. Sassoon indicated that instructions were being

¹ Not printed; but see footnote 2, p. 1548.

sent Colonel Dayan, CO Jewish forces Jerusalem to arrange meeting. It is understood here that Dayan's absence from Jerusalem has been responsible for delay in meeting but relative quiet in Jerusalem during past ten days has been attributed to receipt of instructions from Israelis at Paris.

In view previous attitude Transjordan authorities and Arab Legion re Jerusalem, it is felt that no difficulty will be encountered from Transjordan side in reaching effective cease-fire agreement.

Department pass Jerusalem, Gadel 21, Beirut, Cairo, and Damascus.

STABLER

501.BB Palestine/11-2448: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

SECRET

WASHINGTON, November 24, 1948—6 p. m.

4422. Hoyer Millar¹ presented Lovett last evening with personal message from Bevin for Secy with verbal request it be passed on to President also. Message reads: "Bevin was much concerned at views on Palestine expressed by US Rep at meeting of Political Comm of GA on Nov 20.² He is convinced that frank and close cooperation between US and UK both as regards Middle East and many other important fields is essential to preservation world peace. He is glad know that US and UK Delegations in Paris are in touch with each other with view to seeking some way of overcoming differences between two govts, but he fears that unless US Delegation is authorised make considerable advance from its present position there will inevitably be open disagreement between two Delegations in Assembly on certain vital points, and that they will probably find themselves obliged vote on different sides. Bevin would very deeply regret any such development, but he feels bound maintain principles which both Govts have publicly endorsed. After long discussion and cooperation between our two govts, it was possible for them both find common ground in shape of support for Bernadotte proposals. It was only after US had announced its support these proposals that HMG likewise gave them their support and HMG have been basing their policy on assumption that this common stand would be maintained. While Bevin would, of course, not exclude possibility of Bernadotte proposals being amended, he regards as essential factors which must be maintained general substance of territorial provisions and principle of solution recommended by Assembly of UN in which both sides are asked acquiesce.

"Bevin earnestly hopes that in light this expression his views, US Govt may feel able instruct US Delegation Paris modify their present

¹ Sir Frederick Robert Hoyer Millar, British Minister.

² See editorial note, p. 1617.

attitude and withdraw their opposition to vital points in UK resolution, to which they are at present taking exception—namely that general substance of territorial provisions of Bernadotte Report should be approved and that Conciliation Comm should be given adequate power put them into effect, relying on acquiescence of two parties in this action but not depending on their prior agreement.”

Brit Min stated he realized events had overtaken message since press despatches from Paris indicated US amendments to UK resolution had already been presented. Emb had therefore hesitated whether [send?] present message at all but decided in favor doing so. Lovett replied that notwithstanding these developments he would pass message on to both Secy and President.

Lovett in commenting on Bevin's message first mentioned Douglas report on Sargent's³ reaction to US position (London's 4961 Nov 23⁴) with specific reference to question territorial provisions Bernadotte report and question acquiescence. He said that US finally has firm position re boundaries namely that Israel must either adhere to those fixed by Nov 29 resolution or if it desires retain Western Galilee and Jaffa must make compensatory exchanges. We believe solution by negotiation essential since our delegation considers it impossible obtain GA approval for boundaries fixed by Bernadotte report. Our two delegations in Paris are in close touch with each other and there is really only small difference between their two positions.

Lovett emphasized point that while it may be impossible persuade Arab states either agree or acquiesce in UK resolution with US amendments this might not be case if Arabs were convinced UK would not supply them with arms. He sincerely hoped therefore that our two delegations could reach common agreement on differences now separating them.⁵

MARSHALL

³ Sir Orme G. Sargent, British Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

⁴ Not printed; but see editorial note, p. 1617.

⁵ This telegram was repeated to Paris as Gadel 572.

501.BB Palestine/11-2448: Telegram

*The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation at Paris
(Dulles) to the Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET US URGENT PARIS, November 24, 1948—midnight.

Delga 920. For Lovett from Kopper. Fawzi Bey (Egypt) called on Jessup today. Conversations resulted from approach by Fawzi to Bunche saying he wished to see Jessup and Ross prior to Arab delegates meeting this afternoon. Fawzi had discussed with Bunche yesterday much of what he discussed with Jessup.

Discussion commenced with Fawzi stating UK resolution and US amendments did not appear to be so bad after opportunity had been given to study them. He felt them sufficiently strong but not too rigid. Opportunity for some flexibility apparent in drafting of terms. Jessup pointed out that we thought it would be mistake for GA to attempt to make definitive delineation of boundaries. Fawzi agreed that it was wiser to leave this more general in resolution.

Fawzi then made following points:

(a) Israeli should abide by SC resolutions.
 (b) While November 16 SC resolution was distasteful to Arabs in that it implied a degree of recognition by Arab States of existence Israeli state, Arabs should be able to conduct negotiations with Mediator in such way as to carry out spirit of resolution.

(c) While official Arab position continued favor unitary state, it was obvious certain practical matter had to be considered. Fawzi favored geographic continuity.

(d) Arabs could not agree to any diminution Negeb as envisaged in Bernadotte [report?]. Egypt could not be separated from other Arab states by Jewish state. Jewish colonies forming bulge in Negeb must be given up in return for transfer of Arab portions of northern Palestine to Israel.

(e) In response to question by Jessup whether any real issue existed between Egypt and Transjordan regarding territorial disposition, Fawzi replied there was not. These matters could be settled if viewed realistically. He then made clear he thought Egypt should have portion of Negeb south of line drawn through Majdal and Hebron. Transjordan should have portion up to Bethlehem and presumably to south. He did not define this specifically.

(f) Re Transjordan access to sea, Fawzi said that if absolutely necessary Transjordan could have strip north of Majdal-Hebron line. Egypt must have Beersheba. (Subsequently Fawzi told Kopper reasons for Egyptian desire to have portion of Negeb were several. Among them were desire to have something to show to their people. We believe apprehension of extension of Transjordan sphere and UK relation thereto also a factor.)

(g) Fawzi felt continuity between Egypt and Arab states should be west of Jordan and Dead Sea.

(h) Arabs do not feel November 29 resolution still stands but thought it would be undesirable to become involved in protracted legal arguments this point. Adverted to his conversation with Secretary last summer when he had emphasized necessity to recognize practicalities of situation.

(i) Most significant point made by Fawzi was at conclusion of conversation when he stated it most important that preliminary understanding should be reached in next few days regarding general form boundaries would take. Thought US, UK, Arab states and Jews should have such understanding on overall boundaries. Re Negeb, thought US, UK, Transjordan and Egypt should have understanding.

(j) When asked whether other Arab states would hold similar views, Fawzi said they were not in position to do anything in present situation so would have to acquiesce.

Later in day Fawzi told Kopper he had informed Khashaba Pasha¹ of his conversation. Said latter would probably talk to British tonight, particularly on matter set forth in paragraph *i* above. Said he had hoped to hear more from Jessup in near future as to our views. Said he hoped we would talk to British.

Our feeling here on Egyptian boundaries position vis-à-vis Israel and Transjordan is that it constitutes first bargaining position.²

Sent Department; repeated London for the Ambassador as 1351. [Kopper.]

DULLES

¹ Ahmed Mohammed Khashaba, Egyptian Foreign Minister.

² Fawzi Bey, on November 26, had a conversation with Messrs. Kopper, Bunche, and Beeley, at which he elaborated on Egyptian views of Negeb boundaries. He stated that the "Eastern boundary of Egypt would be line drawn from point east of Hebron to junction 35 east longitude and 31 north latitude, then south along 35 east longitude to Transjordan border and then along present border to Gulf of Aqaba." The Egyptian spokesman noted that these boundaries were subject to modification in negotiations with Transjordan (telegram Delga 953, November 26, 9 p. m., from Paris, 501.BB Palestine/11-2648).

867N.01/11-2548: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, November 25, 1948—1 p. m.
NIACT

4429. Following is text message for Lovett left by Hoyer Millar yesterday under FonOff instructions (see Deptel 4422 Nov 24 to London, London's 4995 Nov 24 and Delga 911 Nov 24¹):

"Minister should see Mr. Lovett again today and point out it by no means too late for further efforts to bridge gap between US and UK over Bernadotte proposals. A number of amendments and counter-amendments will be under active discussion in Paris during the next few days, and we in FonOff are constantly making fresh suggestions to the UK Delegation, as you will see from the most recent telegrams. There might even be a drafting subcommittee in Paris to try and reconcile conflicting suggestions.

"Minister should therefore again urge that instructions should be sent to Dr. Jessup, authorizing him to go as far as he possibly can to meet the UK views. Even if the USG maintain their view that they cannot support the whole Brit resolution, could they not even at this stage agree to counter-amendments which would depart less widely from their previous attitude and diminish the most regrettable public divergence between the two Govts?"

Please inform FonOff we are equally anxious there should be no public divergence between two countries and will be glad study pro-

¹ Delga 911 not printed.

posed Brit counter-amendments with view to seeing extent to which they can be accepted within limits present GADel instructions.

GADel should keep Dept promptly informed of such amendments with its recommendations concerning them.²

MARSHALL

² This telegram was repeated to Paris as Gadel 581. The United States Delegation, on November 25, transmitted a revised version of the British draft resolution (Delga 925, 501.BB Palestine/11-2548); for text, see GA, 3rd sess., Pt. I, First Committee, Annexes, 1948, p. 58. The Delegation noted, later the same day, that the revised draft incorporated some but not all the United States amendments of the original draft (Delga 939, 501.BB Summaries/11-2548). For the statement by the British Representative explaining the revisions, see GA, 3rd sess., Pt. I, First Committee, Summary Records, 1948, p. 759.

Editorial Note

The Soviet Representative, on November 25, submitted a draft resolution to the First Committee calling for withdrawal of all foreign troops and military personnel from Palestine; for text, see GA, 3rd sess., Pt. I, First Committee, Annexes, 1948, page 75. The following day, the Syrian Representative submitted a draft resolution calling for creation of a commission "to prepare proposals for the establishment of a single State of the whole of Palestine on a cantonization or federal basis"; for text, see *ibid.*

Several additional resolutions were proposed during the meetings of the First Committee. Inasmuch as many of the provisions of the drafts overlapped, the Committee, on November 26, adopted an oral proposal by the Canadian Representative to appoint a working group to prepare a consolidated tabulation of the various texts and amendments (GA, 3rd sess., Pt. I, First Committee, Summary Records, 1948, pages 788, 789). The Working Group completed such a tabulation the following day; for text, see GA, 3rd sess., Pt. I, First Committee, Annexes, page 76.

867N.01/11-2648: Telegram

The Special Representative of the United States in Israel, Temporarily at Paris (McDonald) to the President's Special Counsel (Clifford)

TOP SECRET

PARIS, November 26, 1948—2 p. m.

6044. Urgent for White House only. Personal attention Clifford. Despite absolute loyalty and able leadership Dulles and other delegates, I am convinced Bevin still hopes undo Assembly resolution November 29 and to secure from this UN resolution which Israel would have to reject and thus place itself in position of "flouting" authority UN. President would thus be checkmated and Britain

would then be freed—even if sanctions were not imposed—to rearm the Arab States and enable and encourage them continue war against Israel.

Unless and until British show Arabs that UK acknowledges Israel to be an inescapable and enduring fact; and until Bevin permits Abdullah to make peace with Israel, British protestations of peaceful intent are mere words to trap the unwary.

Would be most helpful if President would personally telephone Dulles assuring latter of full confidence and appreciation and urging him to:

- (1) Resist firmly any further whittling down US program; and
- (2) Press vigorously President's suggestion that Israel be admitted to UN this session. Such admission depends on enthusiastic American support. (President might thus forestall threatening crisis and help secure Assembly support essential his program.)

Should you wish supporting data above analysis I could supply it if you would telephone me Hotel Crillon, Room 211.

Your advice Wednesday when I telephoned you re remaining Paris was sound. At request Dulles, Dept has granted extension time. Signed James G. McDonald.

501.BB Palestine/11-2648 : Telegram

*The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation at Paris
(Dulles) to the Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET NIACT

PARIS, November 26, 1948—3 p. m.

6047. Eyes only for Lovett from Rusk—no distribution. Now understand that McDonald has sent message¹ direct to President through State Department channels without knowledge of Dulles which comments adversely upon delegation attitude Palestine. Since delegation is acting strictly under instructions and no principal delegate is objecting to our line of action, this may create intolerable situation. Apparently one point of concern is question of UN membership for Israel. Israel has not even applied for membership. Israel knows proper procedure is to file application with Security Council. Israel also knows US will give them as much help as possible when matter comes to SC. We are already taking matter up with other SC delegations.

We thought we had convinced Eban and Comay that negative or marginal vote in GA Committee One on this question prior to SC action would be fatal to their chances. Many delegations would abstain on basis it is undignified for Assembly to solicit membership of

¹ Presumably telegram 6044, *supra*.

state which has not even applied. We have urged Israel to apply but they insist on playing hard to get.

One possibility would be to ask McDonald to hasten back to Tel Aviv with personal message from President to Ben Gurion stating, among other things, (a) US believes now is time to move definitely to final solution Palestine and we are doing everything possible to bring other parties to attitude of negotiation and settlement (b) we are anxious to accomplish Israel membership in UN at this session; we believe prospects are fair but know that attitude of other members SC turns on assurance that Israel has no more military objectives in mind and will cooperate with SC in maintaining peace (c) we believe application to SC by Israel for UN membership in conjunction with conciliatory attitude toward SC effort to establish armistice would be an appropriate step, (d) et cetera, et cetera.

Perhaps no trouble will develop this end, but if we begin to get sudden telephone calls which cut across our instructions, reserve a wing at St. Elizabeth's.² [Rusk.]

DULLES

² Mental hospital in Washington, D.C.

501.BB Palestine/11-2648 : Telegram

*The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation at Paris
(Dulles) to the Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET

URGENT

PARIS, November 26, 1948—5 p. m.

Delga 946. During past week, Bunche has expressed increasing concern to us privately regarding difficulties General Riley was having in getting Israeli acceptance of plan for withdrawal from northern Negeb pursuant to November 4 resolution. Three days ago, Bunche told Shertok he took most serious view of situation and would have to call meeting of Security Council committee within 24 hours if outstanding differences between Riley and Israeli military representatives were not settled. Bunche extended this first 24-hour period by an additional 24 hours which expired yesterday afternoon. He therefore requested a meeting of the committee for this afternoon.

According to Bunche, Shertok has been visibly concerned and had promised to cable Tel Aviv. Ross discussed matter with Eban yesterday morning who informed us that Shertok had urged Tel Aviv to find some way out of the difficulty. According to Eban, the Israeli delegation here is concerned regarding the possible effect this situation might have on the development of Assembly action. He implied that there might be differences of view between Israeli military and political leaders.

According to Bunche, one of his difficulties has been that Tel Aviv

has told Riley they must consult Paris, while the Israeli delegation here has told Bunche that they must consult Tel Aviv.

A major hazard to our efforts to secure effective Assembly action with regard to the political settlement and in turn Security Council and Assembly action looking to the admission of Israel to the United Nations, would be failure to settle the northern Negeb situation pursuant to the November 4 resolution. Accordingly, at our suggestion, Shertok and Eban called on Jessup this morning on their way to Committee One meeting to discuss this matter. Ross was also present.

Jessup initiated the conversation by indicating our grave concern based on the facts as they had been reported to us here that failure to settle this situation promptly would impair our efforts in the Assembly.

Shertok said that with regard to the procedural aspects of the matter, the decision had to be made in Tel Aviv and that while he did not want to remain in any way aloof from the matter, he preferred that the decision remain in Tel Aviv particularly since it was primarily a military matter.

Shertok went on to say that on the substance, Israel had complied with two of the major requirements of the withdrawal plan. First, they had withdrawn their forces from the coastal area allotted to the Arabs under the November 29 resolution, thus permitting the advance of Egyptian forces to the lines laid down for them. Second, Israel had withdrawn all surplus troops which had entered the Negeb since October 14.

As he understood the remaining differences, Shertok went on, there were three, which he then outlined as follows:

1. They could not possibly withdraw from certain areas in the Negeb where their troops were stationed, because to do so would leave dangerous vacuums in which Arab or Jewish irregulars might operate freely. The United Nations did not have any force at its disposal and it was impossible for the United Nations to fill such dangerous vacuums. Until the armistice lines were established, they could not possibly comply with such requests.

2. They could not comply with the request that mobile PGI forces which had been in the Negeb before May 14 should withdraw. These forces should be distinguished from mobile forces which had entered the area after May 14 as well as from static defense forces left in the settlements. The PGI considered it essential that the PGI forces which had been in an area, namely the Negeb, which they considered politically and militarily theirs since May 14 should be allowed to remain there and have freedom of movement.

3. They could not agree to allow the Egyptian brigade now in the Faluja pocket to be evacuated or supplied with food. No military commander could possibly allow a fully armed brigade to escape and remain available to the enemy for offensive operations. This would be

a suicidal move. The Egyptians at Faluja were prisoners of war in every sense of the term except the technical one. So far as feeding these Egyptians is concerned, for three months the Egyptians would not let food go through to peaceful Israeli settlements.

Shertok then made the general comment that they viewed the November 4 and November 16 resolutions of the Security Council as an organic hold [*whole?*]. They had indicated their desire to comply fully with the November 16 resolution and they were trying to comply with the November 4 resolution to the best of their ability.

Jessup commented very frankly along the following lines. Public opinion widely would believe that the Israeli attitude was very much like that of a lion which having caught a mouse in a trap would not let the mouse out because it would be suicidal for the lion to do so. It would be very hard to make people believe that it would be suicidal for Israel to let these Egyptians evacuate the Faluja pocket and withdraw to the lines, that is, Gaza, established for them under the November 4 resolution.

The general atmosphere in the Council and the General Assembly, Jessup went on, is that we are moving forward to peace through an armistice. If we are held up in our work now, because of the situation in the Negeb, this whole atmosphere will evaporate. And as Jessup had told Shertok on Sunday, it would be very difficult for us to help Israel in the Security Council and in the Assembly if a new unfavorable atmosphere should develop.

Jessup went on to say that the question might be reduced to a very simple formula. Israel had to balance a political risk against a military risk. The political risk of an atmosphere unfavorable to Israel developing was great while the military risk seemed to be insignificant in comparison. Shertok said that Israel had "an extreme anxiety to end the war and have peace". But, he went on to say, there was no sign that the other side felt the same way about the situation.

Our discussion concluded for lack of time with assurances by Shertok that they would give careful consideration to the views Jessup had expressed.¹

Sent Department Delga 946 repeated London 1364.

DULLES

¹ During the afternoon of November 26, Mr. Eban advised the United States Delegation that Mr. Shertok had cabled Tel Aviv immediately following the morning conference and had received a reply indicating that the "PGI had agreed (a) to let food convoys go through to beleaguered Egyptians at Faluja and (b) to discuss release of Egyptians in connection with armistice discussions contemplated 16 November resolution." (Delga 952, November 26, 9 p. m., from Paris, 501.BB Palestine/11-2648)

Truman Papers, President's Secretary's File

*President Truman to the President of the Provisional Government
of Israel (Weizmann)*

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] November 29, 1948.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Today—the first anniversary of the Partition Resolution—is a most appropriate time for me to answer your last letter, dated November 5th.

As I read your letter, I was struck by the common experience you and I have recently shared. We had both been abandoned by the so-called realistic experts to our supposedly forlorn lost causes. Yet we both kept pressing for what we were sure was right—and we were both proved to be right. My feeling of elation on the morning of November 3rd must have approximated your own feelings one year ago today, and on May 14th, and on several occasions since then.

However, it does not take long for bitter and resourceful opponents to regroup their forces after they have been shattered. You in Israel have already been confronted with that situation; and I expect to be all too soon. So I understand very well your concern to prevent the undermining of your well-earned victories.

I remember well our conversation about the Negev, to which you referred in your letter. I agree fully with your estimate of the importance of that area to Israel, and I deplore any attempt to take it away from Israel. I had thought that my position would have been clear to all the world, particularly in the light of the specific wording of the Democratic Party Platform. But there were those who did not take this seriously, regarding it as “just another campaign promise” to be forgotten after the election. I believe they have recently realized their error. I have interpreted my re-election as a mandate from the American people to carry out the Democratic Platform—including, of course, the plank on Israel. I intend to do so.

Since your letter was written, we have announced in the General Assembly our firm intention to oppose any territorial changes in the November 29th Resolution which are not acceptable to the State of Israel. I am confident that the General Assembly will support us in this basic position.

We have already expressed our willingness to help develop the new State through financial and economic measures. As you know, the Export-Import Bank is actively considering a substantial long-term loan to Israel on a project basis. I understand that your Government is now in process of preparing the details of such projects for submission to the Bank. Personally, I would like to go even further, by expanding

such financial and economic assistance on a large scale to the entire Middle East, contingent upon effective mutual cooperation.

Thank you so much for your warm congratulations and good wishes on my re-election. I was pleased to learn that the first Israeli elections have been scheduled for January 25th. That enables us to set a definite target date for extending *de jure* recognition.

In closing, I want to tell you how happy and impressed I have been at the remarkable progress made by the new State of Israel. What you have received at the hands of the world has been far less than was your due. But you have more than made the most of what you have received, and I admire you for it. I trust that the present uncertainty, with its terribly burdensome consequences, will soon be eliminated. We will do all we can to help by encouraging direct negotiations between the parties looking toward a prompt peace settlement.

Very sincerely yours,

[HARRY S. TRUMAN]

501.BB Palestine/11-2948: Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

JERUSALEM, November 29, 1948—1 p. m.

1503. Meeting held yesterday at Government House between Colonel Dayan, CO Israeli forces Jerusalem, and Colonel Abdullah Tel of Arab Legion in presence of United Nations observers and Truce Commission. Tentative agreement reached on establishment "complete and sincere" cease-fire for Jerusalem area extending from Beit Jala and Bethlehem in south to Ramallah in north and Latrun on west. Freedom of movement to be permitted within present lines but no movement in no man's land. Proposed concluding statement expresses intention holding additional talks to put into effect other provisions truce and ameliorate conditions in area. Next meeting scheduled for 30th after observers complete delineation no man's land.

Appendix to July 7 Mount Scopus agreement also prepared providing for relief 50% Jewish personnel each fortnight and food convoy each fortnight. Intention expressed to negotiate new comprehensive accord on Mount Scopus. This appendix should eliminate one cause-friction Jerusalem considered by Dayan prerequisite any real cease-fire.

Consul General feels atmosphere during meeting indicative definite desire on part both parties terminate fighting Jerusalem. Both commanders advanced practical suggestions for achieving objective. Statements by Dayan re broadening accord and reaching agreement on basis Jerusalem problems particularly significant since apparently acting on instructions from PGI. Contrary to previous meetings questions approached as first step to lasting peace instead effort obtain tactical advantage prior resumption fighting.

Sent Department 1503, Department pass Cairo 140, Gadel 11, London 35. Pouched Tel Aviv 11, Amman, Jidda, repeated Damascus 48, Baghdad 29, Beirut 100.

BURDETT

501.BB Palestine/11-2948 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation at Paris

SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, November 29, 1948—7 p. m.
 NIACT

Gadel 611. 1. Re Griffis' appointment,¹ confirm (McClintock-Rusk telephone conversation this afternoon) that President highly gratified at word SYG will appoint Griffis as Director Palestine relief (Delga 961, Nov. 27²). Griffis will serve without pay in this post and will be on leave of absence from his Emb at Cairo.

2. Re Delga 986, Nov. 29,² Undersecretary has informally discussed question Congressional appropriation of \$16 million for Palestine-refugee relief with Vandenberg, Eaton, Connally, Bloom, Barkley, Lucas and Biffle. Reaction, although not enthusiastic, on whole favorable.

You are authorized officially state that President, following passage by GA of Palestine refugee resolution, will seek \$16 million appropriation from Congress as this Govt's share of \$32 million total in earnest hope other govts will meet remainder this contribution. However, it is of utmost importance your statement make absolutely clear that this is not commitment by US Govt to do more than ask for Congressional appropriation. Final decision must rest with Congress.

MARSHALL

¹ As Director of the United Nations Relief for Palestinian Refugees. The Ambassador's appointment was made public at Paris on December 4 (Department of State *Bulletin*, December 12, 1948, p. 730).

² Not printed.

501.BB Palestine/11-2948 : Telegram

The Acting Chairman of United States Delegation at Paris (Dulles) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, November 29, 1948—8 p. m.

Delga 1001. 1. Initial Arab reactions to Israeli application for UN membership¹ reflect considerable anger, disappointment and further disillusionment in US and UN in spite of counter-arguments advanced by us.

¹ For Mr. Shertok's letter of November 29 to the Secretary-General of the United Nations making such application, see SC, 3rd yr., *Supplement for December 1948*, p. 118.

2. In general Arab representatives here believe that Israeli application now is most untimely and will have undesirable effect on effort moderates to achieve or go along with solution of Palestine question. They feel US bears a responsibility because of our strong espousal in spite of our pointing out that Israel made own decision to apply.

[Here follow specific comments by members of Arab Delegations.]

4. Virtually all Arabs unable understand how state with undefined boundaries whose government is recognized by only 17 nations can apply for admission with reasonable prospect of favorable action on its application. No Arab has, however, today alluded to possibility of Arab withdrawal from UN in event Israel elected.

5. Difficult at moment to appraise what effect admission Israel this session will have on efforts to secure peaceful settlement Palestine question. Arabs have injured feelings, probably due to fact they have cooperated pretty well with us on questions major political importance in contrast to their abstention policy last year. How far US can go in support Israel's aspirations in and out UN in forthcoming years while not taking into account numerous legitimate arguments advanced by Near Eastern countries serious question. If policy of cooperation with US on major political questions espoused by certain Arab leaders, some of whom are here, bears no fruit where their specific interests are concerned, position of those leaders likely to become increasingly untenable.

6. Have discussed this with Rusk who believes we must strongly support Israel membership, but hopes Department can find ways and means of seizing this opportunity to demonstrate our interest in Arab world on other matters. He specifically referred to interest expressed by President last spring in getting on with Tigris-Euphrates Valley development and other similar projects in other Arab countries. Rusk stated he was convinced Arab world is ripe now for major effort our part to re-establish friendly relations despite existence of one question on which they feel most bitter.

Department may desire to repeat to Arab capitals.

Sent Department Delga 1001; repeated London 1392 for Saturday from Kopper—limited distribution.

DULLES

501.BB Palestine/11-3048: Telegram

*The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation at Paris
(Dulles) to the Secretary of State*

SECRET NIACT

PARIS, November 30, 1948—1 p. m.

Delga 996. US and UK delegates have agreed, as result conversations between Ambassador Douglas and British Foreign Office

(Delga 905, November 24 and Delga 925 November 25¹) on following changes in revised text UK draft resolution on Palestine in Committee One:

1. Deletion of paragraph two of UK revised text.
2. Inclusion of paragraph two of US amendment reworded as follows: "Calls upon the governments and authorities concerned to extend the scope of the negotiation provided for in the SC resolution of 16 November and to seek agreement by negotiation conducted either thru the conciliation commission or directly with a view to a final settlement of all questions outstanding between them".
3. Transposition of new paragraph two of British text with paragraph three of British text.
4. Rewording of paragraph four of UK draft as follows:

"Four. Instructs the conciliation commission in pursuance of paragraph 2(c) above to enter into consultations with the governments and authorities concerned with a view to delimiting the frontiers in Palestine, taking into account the following general considerations, without excluding any territorial settlement mutually acceptable to the parties:

a. That there are important elements common to both the resolution of the GA of 29 November 1947 and the progress report of the UN mediator on Palestine;

b. That certain modifications in the territorial arrangements of the GA resolution of 29 November 1947 should be considered taking into account part I, section VIII, paragraph 4(b) of the progress report of the UN Mediator as a contribution to a peaceful adjustment, based on reciprocity and mutual interest, of differences between the parties;"

Comment: It is expected that US delegate in explaining the added words in Committee One would make clear that the idea is that no party can have merely the most advantageous features of both November 29 resolution and Bernadotte report; but that additions to November 29 territory would presumably, by way of reciprocity, call for some reciprocal offset.

5. Addition of new paragraph reading as follows: "Instructs the conciliation commission to seek arrangements among the governments and authorities concerned which will facilitate the economic development of the area, including arrangements for access to ports and airfields and the use of transportation and communications facilities; in this connection, the conclusions contained in part I, section VIII, paragraphs 4(e) and (f) of the progress report of the UN Mediator should be taken into account."

Comment: The addition of foregoing paragraph was condition of British agreement to deletion of their paragraph numbered 2 and is

¹ Neither printed; the former gave the text of the United States amendments to the British draft resolution of November 18 (see editorial note, p. 1623 and footnote 2 to telegram Delga 797, p. 1603); the latter gave the revised text of the British draft resolution of November 24 (see GA, 3rd sess., Pt. I, First Committee, Annexes, 1948, p. 58).

intended to cover reference to Haifa and Lydda which were not formerly covered by specific paragraphs in British revised draft but were held to be taken care of by endorsement of Bernadotte's specific conclusions under British paragraph numbered 2.

6. Discussions now taking place regarding revised wording paragraph ten on Arab refugees, with regard to which agreement expected this morning.²

7. UKDel plans submit new revised text Palestine draft resolution this afternoon including all foregoing changes.

8. USDel plans, thereafter, withdraw its amendments to former UK revised draft.³

Sent Department Delga 996, repeated London 1390.

DULLES

² The agreed wording appeared as paragraph 11 in the second revised British draft resolution; for text of this draft resolution, dated November 30, see GA, 3rd sess., Pt. I, First Committee, Annexes, 1948, p. 61.

³ Mr. Rusk, in a statement before the First Committee on December 1, said that the new British draft resolution took full account of suggestions made by the United States Delegation and others and that the United States supported the new British draft (GA, 3rd sess., Pt. I, Summary Records, 1948, p. 835). The new draft eliminated the paragraph endorsing the specific conclusions of the Bernadotte report and made attendance changes.

Editorial Note

The Arab and Israeli Military Commanders in the Jerusalem area, Lieutenant Colonel Abdullah el-Tel and Moshe Dayan, signed an agreement at Jerusalem on November 30 calling for a "complete and sincere ceasefire" in that area.

The same day a second agreement was signed at Jerusalem in the nature of an annex to the agreement of July 7, 1948, concerning Mount Scopus (see editorial note, page 1195).¹

The agreements were signed in the presence of the United Nations observers and of the Security Council Truce Commission. Their texts were transmitted by Jerusalem the same day in telegram 1507 (867N.01/11-3048).

¹ Jerusalem, on December 1, reported that the "Meeting yesterday between Dayan and Abdullah Tel conducted in atmosphere extreme cordiality" and that "Scope present talks and large area included is such [as] may lead to *de facto* armistice between Transjordan and PGI and informal demilitarization Jerusalem. Conduct talks under guise implementing truce, on present level and between Arab and Jewish spokesmen, ready compromise, and who trust each other possesses many advantages. Minimizes opportunity for criticism King Abdullah by other Arab states on grounds accepting partition and entering direct negotiations with Jews. Permits conclusion practical functional arrangements with minimum regard to final political settlement." (Telegram 1511, 867N.01/12-148)

501.BB Palestine/11-2748: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, December 1, 1948—6 p. m.

4485. US attitude re territorial settlement Palestine (ur 4996 Nov 24 rptd Gadel 928, Delga 971 Nov 27¹ rptd London 1376) based on view matter is one for settlement by negotiation, either directly bet parties or through Conciliation Commission, and upon premise that modifications of Nov 29 boundaries of Israel should be made only if fully acceptable to Israel. If Israel desires addition to territory allotted her under Nov 29 resolution, i.e., Western Galilee and Jaffa, US position is that Israel should relinquish part of Negev to Arab States.

If Israel should relinquish Western Galilee and Jaffa, desiring retain all of Negev, US would support Israel in this position. If Israel should desire additions to Nov 29 territory, and should through direct negotiations or through Conciliation Commission reach agreement with Arab States as to portion of Negev to be exchanged for such additions, US would support such agreement, regardless of what boundaries of Israel thus agreed upon would be.

Present view US Govt is that in event Israel should retain Western Galilee and Jaffa, it would be desirable that southern Israeli border be extended to thirty-first parallel within that portion of Negev allotted to Israel under Nov 29 resolution. Portion of Negev thereby made available to Arab States might be divided between Transjordan and Egypt, giving Transjordan access to sea and assuring land communications between Egypt and Transjordan.

If Brit FonOff still attaches considerable importance to access to sea for Transjordan (ur 5031 Nov 28²) Dept gathers there is little likelihood FonOff will approve UKDel's suggested Auja-Beersheba line.³

LOVETT

¹ Neither printed; the former reported information from the Foreign Office that the British Delegation at Paris had recently raised with the United States Delegation the question of the precise territorial objectives the United States and the United Kingdom were aiming for in Palestine and that the Foreign Office was extremely interested in the suggestion (501.BB Palestine/11-2448).

² Not printed.

³ Telegram 4485 was repeated to Paris as Gadel 640.

501.BB Palestine/12-148: Telegram

The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation at Paris (Dulles) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET URGENT

PARIS, December 1, 1948—6 p. m.

Delga 1013. Last night I explained our position on Palestine to delegates of Panama, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Venezuela, Peru, Uruguay, Nicaragua, Bolivia, and Ecuador.

Briefly, I said that

(1) We had at least reached a common position with the British and were entirely in accord with the revised British resolution which was presented in Committee One yesterday. We had only reached this position after considerable discussion and compromise on both sides.

(2) By reaching this common position, we felt that we had removed the belief, which had undoubtedly been held up to present, that Arabs could count on British support and Israelis on the support of US, enabling them thus to play one against other. We also felt that present resolution gave as much consideration as possible to conflicting views of parties concerned.

(3) We felt that there was considerable chance of adoption of this resolution *in toto*, but that if there was continued lengthy debate and amendments were introduced, situation would become more confused and the matter might drag on in Committee One indefinitely; however, if there were sufficient support for this resolution, we felt that matter would be removed from GA, an objective which we all desired.

(4) The difficult position in which Arabs find themselves is well known. From this they can probably only extract themselves through pressure brought to bear by UN. We have reason to believe they would acquiesce in such action.

(5) The delegates present discussed problem at length and I gathered impression that majority of them at least intended abstaining when matter came to final vote. They said, however, that what we all wanted was a solution to this long-standing problem and that if joint British-American resolution gave that, they were inclined support it, although instructions to abstain and other commitments already bound them to different course. Most of them indicated they would communicate immediately with their governments, requesting new instructions. As this cannot be counted upon, would urge Department immediately to instruct our missions in the other American Republics to communicate urgently with respective governments, urging support Anglo-American resolution by Latin American delegates here. Instructions to delegates here should be sent immediately as vote on Palestine may be reached today.

Do not consider advisable communicate with the following—
Nicaragua, Argentina, Brazil, Guatemala.

View urgency suggest Department repeat this message immediately other Latin American missions.¹

DULLES

¹ The Department, by circular telegram on December 1, transmitted the text of Delga 1013 to American Ambassadors in Panama, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, Nicaragua, Bolivia, and Ecuador. The Department directed that Mr. Dulles' views be communicated informally to the respective foreign offices and authorized the Ambassadors to add that the United States Government was giving full support to the revised United Kingdom resolution on Palestine (501.BB Palestine/12-148).

867N.01/12-248: Telegram

Mr. Wells Stabler to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

AMMAN, December 2, 1948—noon.

138. During talk with Prime Minister this morning following points discussed:

1. Jerusalem cease-fire. Talks had originated on political level with Transjordan Government and Jews having given instructions to military commanders to hold meetings. While at present talks only concern questions relating to truce, it is envisaged they might be extended into political matters. However, Prime Minister said he must proceed with great caution in this connection having regard for attitude other Arab states and depending on general circumstances. Consequently at this stage it will not be possible for Transjordan and Jews meet as governments to consider political points at issue.

Jews appear to show sincere desire reach accord with Transjordan, although it is understood that they have only their interests in mind. Jews have always felt "safe" as regards King but they now see Transjordan Government also responsible. King has maintained contacts with Jews through personal emissaries. While Prime Minister does not approve such contacts, he does not oppose them in belief that they may prove useful channels should time arrive for more direct negotiations. If, however, they become known, they can be repudiated as not approved by government. Publicity re Jerusalem talks is not harmful as truce matters only dealt with. Prime Minister stated he cannot undertake negotiations but would not oppose King's wishes. Latter's policy is definitive and if he chooses negotiate, Prime Minister will resign to open way for government of negotiation.

2. Conciliation Commission. Arab League Political Committee meeting will probably be called as soon as UN makes decision re Palestine. If Conciliation Commission resolution is adopted, believe Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, because of public opinion, will reject it. Egypt's position still unclear but there are signs pointing to more reasonable attitude. If Egypt and Transjordan can agree, probable other Arab states will follow. Prime Minister plans attend League Political Committee meeting himself in order endeavor persuade others to accept UN decisions.

Prime Minister said that in his opinion evidence does exist that other Arab leaders in general are developing more realistic outlook on Palestine situation, particularly in private talks. He was surprised at Iraqi Prime Minister's recent declaration as latter had in recent meetings with Abdullah, Prime Minister and even Palestine Arabs shown himself more in touch with facts.

Speculating on different possibilities Prime Minister said that if

Arab League rejected Conciliation Commission, Transjordan might decide to treat with Commission alone. It would explain publicly that attempts to persuade others to be reasonable had failed and that in deciding to follow this course it had taken into consideration expressed desires of Palestine Arabs. Prime Minister emphasized that such view entirely tentative and that in general it would be preferable to have concurrence of Arab states.

3. Second Palestine conference. (Mytel 136, November 30.¹) Meeting of significance in that it proposed to King that he settle Palestine question either by fighting or by peace. Leaders were not "brave enough" to request peace settlement outright but in any event their resolution gives a definite choice. Believed persons at meeting plus those sharing views far more representative of Palestine Arabs than Gaza Government.

Sent Jerusalem by pouch; repeated Gadel 26 and Arab capitals.

STABLER

¹ Not printed.

501.BB Palestine/12-248: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the
Acting Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET

LONDON, December 2, 1948—7 p. m.

5079. 1. Believe you will agree that in light Department's 4485, December 1; repeated Paris for GADel as 640, no useful purpose would be served at this time by my pursuing with UK question territorial objectives (my 4996, November 24 and Delga 971, November 27 to Department¹). Because of further strain possibly imposed thereby on US-UK relations I am most reluctant to mention this question unless instructed by Department to do so. Moreover, I feel that at this stage of UNGA proceedings to work out such a side understanding with UK might be made subject of criticism on grounds of moral impropriety.

2. If and when Department undertakes to draft such instructions I hope it will be borne in mind that any chance of success with UK will depend upon convincing UK that there is a southern frontier somewhere in Negev beyond which US will not support Israeli claims.

3. After all excuse for US and UK reaching an understanding re territorial objectives would disappear if parties can negotiate an agreed boundary either directly or through the Conciliation Commission. I sincerely trust that our hopes in this connection will be realized,

¹ Neither printed; regarding the former, see footnote 1, p. 1639.

but I foresee the possibility that we may have to face the problems of an intervening stage prior to a final settlement.

4. Do you agree with my analysis above? ²

Sent Paris 960 GADel for Dulles; repeated Department 5079.

DOUGLAS

²The Department, on December 3, expressed its concurrence that no useful purpose would be served by pursuing the question of territorial objectives with the British (telegram 4518 to London, 501.BB Palestine/12-248).

501.BB Palestine/12-348: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, December 3, 1948—6 p. m.

Gadel 672. For Amb Griffis. On basis verbatim reports Committee III debate on refugee resolution, following countries expressed general willingness contribute to program: Denmark, Lebanon, Netherlands, Sweden, Brazil, Dominican Republic. Egypt stated it had decided lend 10,000 tons wheat. Argentina will contribute but unable give dols or gold. Venezuela prepared contribute "considerable sum of money". Uruguay ready make contribution but must obtain parliamentary approval. Norway prepared make immediate contribution in kind, unable make cash payment before July. India will make symbolic contribution. Australia unable make contribution in dols over and above its contribution in other currencies and in kind. USSR "fully disposed" give all possible aid to Palestinian people. Belgium as co-sponsor resolution presumably prepared contribute. UK contributing one million pounds sterling. France 500,000,000 francs.

In conjunction USDel and Secretariat, you may wish firm up these commitments and any others known to USDel, prior adjournment GA.

LOVETT

Editorial Note

The First Committee, on December 4, adopted the second revised British draft by 25 votes to 21, with 9 abstentions (GA, *3rd sess., Pt. I, First Committee, Summary Records, 1948*, pages 923-924; for text, see GA, *3rd sess., Pt. I, Annexes, 1948*, page 532).

Later the same day, the Committee rejected the Soviet and Syrian draft resolution (see editorial note, page 1628), as well as a second Syrian draft resolution calling on the International Court of Justice to furnish a legal opinion as to the power of the General Assembly to partition Palestine and as to the international status of Palestine upon the termination of the British Mandate (for text, see GA, *3rd sess., Pt.*

I, First Committee, Annexes, 1948, page 88). For the votes on the three draft resolutions, see GA, *3rd sess., Pt. I, Summary Records, 1948*, pages 930-933.

501.BB Palestine/12-448: Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

JERUSALEM, December 4, 1948—11 a. m.

1517. No distribution. Colonel Carlson, senior United Nations observer Jerusalem, apparently acting on orders from General Riley in Haifa now making efforts exclude Truce Commission from participation in future Arab-Jewish meetings. Alleges both parties questioned presence Truce Commission and desired reduce number persons attending. On contrary Consul[ate] General believes both welcomed presence Truce Commission and Truce Commission made considerable contribution towards success meetings. Consul[ate] General is strongly resisting efforts exclude Truce Commission.

As talks progress and scope broadens political considerations will enter to increasing degree and Truce Commission better qualified than observers handle such questions. United Nations should be considered as third interested party in discussions and Truce Commission could influence talks in direction of proposed United Nations decision re city. United States member could likewise be effective instrument for advancing United States policy for Jerusalem. Additional consideration is necessity holding talks through United Nations and under guise implementing truce. Gradual exclusion United Nations representatives while in accord with Jewish desire for direct negotiations could arouse strong criticism of Transjordan from other Arab states (rioters in Damascus attacked cease-fire agreement) forcing King Abdullah suspend talks. Brigadier Lash, CO Arab Legion division in Palestine, yesterday stated to Consul[ate] General political considerations rather than military would determine success talks and emphasized importance continuing meetings under direction United Nations as [apparent omission] implementation truce.

Department's comments would be appreciated.¹

BURDETT

¹The Department replied, on December 9, noting its agreement that "as long as both sides Jerusalem willing continue talks under auspices UN, Truce Commission should have primary responsibility conduct talks. However, Dept believes that should both parties state their desire continue talks directly between themselves without presence UN reps latter should not insist participation meetings, inasmuch as important UN objective of bringing parties together would have been accomplished." (Telegram 1051 to Jerusalem, 501.BB Palestine/12-448)

501.BB Palestine/12-448: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Delegation at Paris*SECRET US URGENT
NIACT

WASHINGTON, December 4, 1948—1 p. m.

Gadel 683. According to PW 128 from Garnish and Knapp,¹ Dec. 3, Committee 1 approved by a vote of forty-two to one with twelve abstentions, US suggested language for terms of reference of Palestine Conciliation Commission.² According to this language Commission would be instructed to "assist Governments and authorities concerned to achieve final settlement of all questions outstanding between them". We realize that your alternative phraseology was all that could be achieved in order to win approval of Committee for some form of a resolution dealing with Palestine problem. Dept approves position taken by Del.

We presume Del has considered position which US might find itself in if appointed member of Conciliation Commission under these terms of reference which are so generalized and vague. Although previously Dept was prepared for US to serve as member of Conciliation Commission together with France and Belgium we now wonder, since Commission lacks directives which had been established in par 4 of revised UK draft resolution, whether we might not find ourselves in position of whipping boy if we served on this body.

Pls let us have your views urgently.

LOVETT

¹ John H. Garnish and John P. Knapp of the International Broadcasting Division, apparently attached to the United States Delegation at Paris; the editors have been unable to identify PW 128.

² The Department's position on the terms of reference for the Conciliation Commission had been set forth initially in Gadel 522, November 18, and in footnote 2 to that document. The position had been spelled out further in the United States amendments of November 23 and 25 to the British draft resolution; see editorial note, p. 1623. The vote by Committee One on the United States amendments embodied two negative ballots, rather than one, as erroneously given in the text above; see GA, 3rd sess., Pt. I, First Committee, Summary Records, 1948, p. 887.

867N.01/12-448: Telegram

Mr. Wells Stabler to the Acting Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

AMMAN, December 4, 1948.

140. Second Palestine Arab conference held at Jericho December 1 (mytel 136 November 30¹) and attended by numerous delegations including mayors of Hebron, Bethlehem, Ramallah, Arab Legion Military Governor General and military governors all districts, and other notables. It is understood that organizers of meeting arranged

¹ Not printed

transportation service to ensure attendance by many delegates. Audience estimated at several thousand.

While 6 resolutions were originally proposed, only 4 were adopted. According to Secretary of Conference, Ajaj Nuweihid, drafting committee still in process of completing final text of resolutions which "will go down in history". Nuweihid said that after preamble which referred to resolutions adopted at meeting of October 1, four new resolutions contained following:

1. Palestine Arabs desire unity between Transjordan and Arab Palestine and therefore make known their wish that Arab Palestine be annexed immediately to Transjordan. They also recognize Abdullah as their King and request him proclaim himself King of new territory.
2. Palestine Arabs express gratitude to Arab states for their efforts in behalf of liberation of Palestine (Nuweihid indicated object of this was hint to Arab states that their job was done).
3. Expression of thanks to Arab states for their generous assistance and support to Palestine Arab refugees.
4. Resolve that purport of first resolution be conveyed to King at once.

Following meeting large delegation proceeded to King's winter quarters at Shuneh to present resolution to King and request his acceptance. King replied that matter must be referred to his government and that he must also ascertain views other Arab states.

Although usual jealousies and frictions were apparent during meeting, it is believed of significance, particularly in light recent developments in UN political committee, as King may regard resolution as his mandate from Palestine Arabs.

Sent Jerusalem by pouch repeated GADel Paris as 27.

STABLER

501.BB Palestine/12-648: Telegram

Mr. Wells Stabler to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

AMMAN, December 6, 1948—4 p. m.

143. Acting Mediator Bunche accompanied by Chief of Staff arrived Amman morning December 5 and proceeded immediately to Shuneh for conferences with King and Prime Minister.

During talks with Bunche that evening he made following comments:

1. Prime Minister had handed him letter accepting on behalf Transjordan SC resolution of November 16.
2. After giving Prime Minister full and frank review of present situation, latter had indicated Transjordan readiness to cooperate with United Nations and Conciliation Commission in arriving at settlement.
3. Believed other Arab states would also cooperate with Conciliation Commission notwithstanding their attitude as expressed at G.A.

4. King seemed encouraged that political committee's rejection of part of British resolution re disposition Arab Palestine does not necessarily preclude such development as result Conciliation Commission recommendation.

5. Believed that annexation of Arab Palestine to Transjordan at present time would be "actual help" in reaching final settlement. Arab Palestine is now vacuum which must be filled and Transjordan in best position to do it.

6. Basically Palestine settlement rests with Egypt, Transjordan and Israel. If Egypt and Transjordan could get together on matter they could overcome any opposition other Arab states. Emir Abdel Majid Haidar, Transjordan observer at UNGA, held talks with Egyptians at Paris but without result.

While Bunche expected King make some mention of his intentions after result vote in political commission (paragraph 4 above), latter made no mention of scheme outlined in mytel 141, December 4.¹ However Bunche apparently hinted to His Majesty that annexation Arab Palestine Transjordan would probably be accepted as *fait accompli* in view Transjordan's present position in Arab Palestine.

Bunche departed for Tel Aviv morning December 6.²

Sent Jerusalem by pouch. Repeated Gadel 29 and Jidda, Damascus, Beirut, Baghdad and Cairo.

STABLER

¹ Not printed; it advised that King Abdullah, on December 4, had informed Mr. Stabler that when the Jericho resolutions were formally presented to him, "he would announce his acceptance request contained in resolutions and proclaim annexation Arab Palestine to Transjordan." The King indicated further that "he would also announce his readiness to negotiate settlement of Palestine question with anyone, even Jews." (867N.01/12-448)

² Amman, on December 9, reported information from British Minister Kirkbride that after a meeting with his Cabinet, King Abdullah had approved a statement to the "effect that Transjordan Government looks with favor on unification Arab Palestine and Transjordan . . . and promised that as soon as necessary measures regarding international and constitutional changes had been taken resolutions would be executed." The Minister predicted that after Parliamentary approval of the statement, no further action would be taken (telegram 146, 867N.01/12-948).

867N.01/12-648: Telegram

Mr. Wells Stabler to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

AMMAN, December 6, 1948—6 p. m.

144. Kirkbride said this morning:

1. Prime Minister received another message from Sassoon following signature cease-fire agreement in Jerusalem in which he expressed satisfaction and hope that it would lead to permanent peace settlement. Prime Minister felt that no reply required.

2. Re annexation Arab Palestine to Transjordan, British Govt being "coy". He felt that Transjordan would take no such step without full approval His Majesty's Government as treaty obligations

could not be extended to cover Arab Palestine without consent His Majesty's Government. Moreover believed that present time not propitious and has taken line with Prime Minister that since annexation will eventually take place, not desirable to push it.

3. Prime Minister apparently changing view re his participation in negotiations and settlement. Previously Prime Minister held view that he could not have anything to do with negotiations as his policy based on unity Arab states. However he now beginning to feel wishes to remain in office.

4. Re Transjordan talks with Egyptians in Paris British delegation had approached Egyptian delegation which had replied that it could take no step which would prejudice position it has adopted with other Arab states re Palestine.

Sent Jerusalem by pouch. Passed Gadel 30.

STABLER

501.BB Palestine/12-648: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Delegation at Paris

US URGENT NIACT WASHINGTON, December 6, 1948—7 p. m.

Gadel 688. Following is text of statement to press for simultaneous release at White House and By United States Delegation to General Assembly at Paris, 10:30 a. m. EST., December 7, 1948:

"President Truman, following adoption by the United Nations General Assembly on November 19 of a resolution for assistance to Palestine refugees, will recommend to Congress that the United States contribute fifty percent of the amount provided for in this resolution but in no case more than a total of sixteen million dollars as the share of the United States. The resolution of the General Assembly, adopted at its 163rd Plenary Meeting on November 19, 1948, considered that a sum of approximately \$29,500,000 will be required to provide relief for 500,000 refugees for a period of nine months from 1 December 1948 to 31 August 1949, and that an additional amount of approximately \$2,500,000 will be required for administrative and local operational expenses.

The recommendation of the President to Congress for an amount not to exceed \$16,000,000 will be made in the earnest hope that other countries will meet the remainder of the total required.

The American Delegation to the United Nations Assembly has emphasized that in accordance with constitutional requirements the President's recommendation for an appropriation of \$16,000,000 for Palestinian refugee relief must be accepted by the Congress before any funds become available. The final decision rests with it. The recommendation will be transmitted to the Congress after it convenes in January."¹

LOVETT

¹This telegram was repeated to London, Arab capitals, Jerusalem, and Tel Aviv.

501.BB Palestine/12-648 : Telegram

*The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation at Paris
(Dulles) to the Acting Secretary of State*

SECRET URGENT

PARIS, December 6, 1948—9 p. m.

Delga 1081. USDel has long considered (Gadel 683¹) advantages and disadvantages of willingness to serve on Conciliation Commission. We believe it correct to state that our willingness to serve was based on three principal factors:

(1) Existing truce commission formula which, if disregarded, might open up whole question and thus increase possibility of Slav membership;

(2) Presence on commission would give us greater opportunity of protecting interest of US in NE;

(3) Presence on commission would give us greater opportunity of assuring security of NE.

We believe these three principal factors are still valid even though present Palestine draft resolution is more broadly worded than original UK draft. In some respects we consider it more important now than before to indicate our willingness to serve. We believe, however, that Slav and Latino (Guatemala, for example) objections to paragraph 3 of present draft providing for selection of members by a committee of permanent members might be one factor prejudicing passage of resolution as a whole. In that circumstance we believe new formula which might not include US should be considered.

One suggestion is that Israel and Arab States might informally indicate a selection such as Australia and Turkey respectively and that these two might select a third. We do not believe commission should be increased to five to include, as has been informally suggested, US, France, Poland, Norway and Australia or Costa Rica because commission of this size would probably become a quarrelsome investigative body rather than a true Conciliation Commission; might impede necessarily delicate negotiations between Israel and Transjordan, Israel and Egypt and between Transjordan and Egypt; and would formally provide a symbol through UN commission of Slav presence in Palestine.

We also believe consideration should be given to desirability of returning to new Mediator under present resolution rather than commission if Slav states insist on five-power formula or if membership of three-power commission were to devolve upon three small, relatively weak powers. Our experience with UN and Palestine commission (under November 29) should be conclusive in this respect.

Sent Delga 1081, repeated London as 1433.

DULLES

¹ Dated December 4, p. 1645.

501.BB Palestine/12-748: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, December 7, 1948—7 p. m.

5137. Following obtained today from Burrows re Palestine. Department may wish repeat substance paragraph 1 below to Cairo, Beirut, Baghdad, Damascus, Jidda, Karachi.

1. UK has decided to take at UNGA no further initiative re Palestine, believing time has come for UK to "sit back". UK efforts behalf Arabs have brought it no thanks and Foreign Office sees no reason why it should court further blame for probably bad consequences either UK resolution as it now stands or for much simpler alternative resolution by lobbying actively for either resolution. Burrows said that following instructions were sent to UKDel Paris repeated for similar action with home governments to British ME Missions:

"You should not join in any lobbying on either resolution but you should explain situation frankly to Arab delegates. You should make it clear that you regard their opposition to stronger parts of our original draft resolution as highly irresponsible and as seriously prejudicing best interest of Arabs. Such action on their part makes it practically impossible for us to attempt to cooperate with them any more. Arabs have clearly shown that they do not wish for our advice on this question and we are not giving them any further advice. We merely wish to inform them that we shall vote for either of two resolutions now under consideration since we consider them even in their emasculated state as being rather better than nothing at all."

[Here follow paragraphs numbered 2 and 3.]

Sent Department 5137, repeated Paris for Gadel 994.

DOUGLAS

867N.01/12-848

The First Secretary of Embassy in the United Kingdom (Jones) to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Satterthwaite)

TOP SECRET

LONDON, December 8, 1948.

No. 8

DEAR JOE: I write to you at another one of the periodic low water marks of Palestine. The boys in Paris from Jack Ross down feel completely sunk and I must say I share their feeling because we were on a good bicycle until somebody let the air out of the tires.

At present I am living the role of "whipping-boy." My friends in the Foreign Office must have someone with whom they can "speak

frankly," and I hear a great many things which I would blush to report.

One thing is certain; the boys in GADel fought the good fight step by step and even though hamstrung did better than we had reason to hope.

I sent you a telegram December 7 saying that the UK does not propose to take any further initiative on Palestine in the General Assembly but I doubt very much, considering the stake the UK has in the matter, that this self denial will extend much beyond the end of the General Assembly. Already I can foresee thoughts shaping up in the Foreign Office to the following effect:

UNGA has made hash of our fine theory of acquiescence and the resolution (if we get one) will be only a little better than no resolution at all. A kind of chaos will ensue in Palestine: the Jews will expand their holdings in Palestine in a relatively ordered fashion and the Arabs, without any formal basis, will shape themselves into new lines of occupation. Open negotiations between Arabs and Jews are most unlikely for the next few months, either with or without the Conciliation Commission. Moreover, UK cannot advise the Arabs to negotiate unless UK is convinced that Arabs have a sporting chance of gaining something from such negotiations. Unreserved US support for Israel's territorial claims makes such negotiations difficult. If the UK and the US could reach an understanding regarding the location of the southern frontier of Israel a behind-the-scenes play could begin between Arabs and Jews which in a few months' time might lead to a negotiated settlement. However, the US does not seem disposed to talk Israeli frontiers with the UK. This US must be persuaded to do because only a US-UK understanding of this kind backed firmly by the US offers any hope for settlement in Palestine.

I have carefully noted the Department's view that no useful purpose would be served at this time by discussing with the UK territorial objectives (Department's 4578[4518], December 3, 1948¹). However, I would like you (and Rob McClintock, to whom I am sending a copy of this letter) to be on notice that the idea of working out territorial objectives is likely to be reborn in the British Foreign Office in the relatively near future and it will be pushed pretty hard. I think that if there is any informal thinking on this score which can be sent here, it would be useful to me.

I think you will be interested in the attached editorial from the *Spectator* for November 26,² captioned, "Towards a Palestine Settlement." This makes a point which I consider valid.

With best wishes,

[G.] LEWIS [JONES, JR.]

P.S. Some day I will show you with pride my extensive collection of draft telegrams which were never sent because their principal value was to relieve my feelings.

¹ Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 1643.

² Not printed.

867N.01/12-848: Telegram

The Chargé in Czechoslovakia (Penfield) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

PRAHA, DECEMBER 8, 1948—9 p. m.

1812. Information received subsequent to Embtel 1683, November 4 and reported in Embassy's A-828 Nov. 12, A-838, November 17 and A-905, December 7,¹ provides convincing confirmation that Czechoslovakia is for time being at least radically restricting its aid to Israel (Deptel 1557, December 2²) and that Czech policy toward Israel has recently become deliberately and markedly less friendly. Although Embassy does not have information to permit evaluation Soviet and other satellite policy toward Israel, we would assume on general grounds that this change is at Moscow orders and reflects new turn in over-all Soviet policy.

On other hand following plausible case can be made that change is based on much more limited considerations. Ministry Interior is reliably reported to have taken lead in opposing continuation of program and character of trainees indicates it has good reason to regard them as poor political and security risks. Embassy's informants state that attempt was made to educate trainees in Communism and recent inspection of pilots by Red Army officers consisted principally of political examinations but that program has completely failed to create indoctrinated cadre for Israel Army. Assuming that this was one of basic purposes of program, it is not unreasonable further to assume that Soviets have decided to give up attempt at least for time being on theory that far from creating fifth column they may actually be training an army of potential enemies.

Pouched Warsaw, Bratislava.

PENFIELD

¹ None printed.

² Not printed.

501.BB Palestine/12-848: Telegram

The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation at Paris (Dulles) to the Acting Secretary of State

RESTRICTED

PARIS, DECEMBER 8, 1948—7 p. m.

Delga 1113. Following is memorandum dated December 7 from Acting Mediator concerning the position of Ben-Gurion on the Egyptian force encircled at Al Faluja and Israeli occupation of Beersheba:

1. In the course of my extended conversations with Mr. Ben-Gurion at Hakiryia, Israel on 6 December, I took up the position of the Egyptian force encircled at Al Faluja and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the town of Beersheba, under the plan of 13

November for the implementation of the SC resolution of 4 November (Doc. [S/] 1070).¹

2. As regards Al Faluja, I pointed out that the plan of 13 November, which had been accepted by the PGI in its letter of 18 November, required the withdrawal of this Egyptian force and that the Jewish forces encircling it were preventing Egyptian compliance with the 4 November resolution. Moreover, I urged that the refusal to accept the principle that food and medical convoys under UN escort were entitled, under the truce, to go through to this beleaguered force was contrary to both the letter and spirit of the truce, since the truce could not be exploited by either side as a means of laying siege. I also expressed the view that Israeli intransigence on this issue was not only preventing the implementation of the 4 November resolution but constituted a severe obstruction to the fulfillment of the 16 November resolution on the armistice.

3. Concerning Beersheba, I explained fully that no question had been raised as to the right of Israeli forces to be in the area, since there are two Jewish settlements in the vicinity of Beersheba which were garrisoned by Israeli forces prior to 14 October. The point at issue, I emphasized, is Israeli insistence on maintaining military occupation of the town of Beersheba, from which Israeli forces were required to withdraw by the resolution of 4 November and the plan of 13 November.

4. Mr. Ben-Gurion stated that the encircled Egyptian force at Al Faluja would not be released and that his government would make no commitment to permit convoys to go through to them regularly, unless and until the Egyptian Government was prepared to undertake armistice or peace negotiations. He added that the release of the Egyptian forces could be given a high priority on the list of subjects to be discussed once such negotiations would be undertaken. A similar position was taken as regards the Israeli military occupation of Beersheba. Mr. Ben-Gurion explained that the basis for the Israeli policy in this regard was the security of his country, since a state of war still existed.

5. At the conclusion of the conference with Mr. Ben-Gurion, which was satisfactory on all other matters, I requested that his position on Al Faluja be summarized in writing. This was done in the following communication addressed to me by Mr. Eytan:

[Here follows the text of Mr. Eytan's communication of December 6 to Dr. Bunche which served to confirm in writing Mr. Ben Gurion's position on al-Faluja, as set forth in paragraph numbered 4.]

6. In my two long conferences with Nokrashy Pasha, Prime Minister of Egypt at Cairo on 4 December, I was informed that no Egyptian reply had been made to my letter on the 16 November resolution since to date neither I nor the SC had been able to obtain Israeli compliance with the 4 November resolution. The Prime Minister emphasized particularly the situation at Al Faluja which he regarded with utmost seriousness. He assured me of Egyptian willingness to comply fully with the 4 November resolution and stated that he would authorize the Egyptian commander-in-chief to enter into negotiations through the UN, envisaged in paragraph 5 (2) of the resolution of 4 November.

¹ See p. 1546.

As regards the 16 November resolution, the Prime Minister stated that his government could regard it favorably providing the 4 November resolution were first carried out.

7. In the circumstances, I must report that I have been unable to achieve full implementation of the 4 November resolution, and that this has obstructed progress toward implementing the 16 November resolution.

DULLES

IO Files

Summary Record of the Seventh Meeting of the Committee of the Security Council on the Palestinian Question Held at Paris on December 8, 1948

[Extract]

Mr. Ross (United States) stated that he found more encouragement than discouragement in the statements of the Acting Mediator.¹ He called attention to the cease-fire which had been obtained in Jerusalem in the past few days, and mentioned the indications of a favourable attitude on the part of Egypt and Transjordan towards the 16 November resolution.

He did not wish, however, to overlook Dr. Bunche's report concerning the difficulties of compliance with the 13 November plan.² The Committee was well aware of the importance attached by Egypt to the release of its forces from Al Faluja. It seemed feasible that a practicable solution could be worked out by the same methods which had been employed in the Jerusalem area, i.e., discussions among the military commanders of both sides and Dr. Bunche's staff. There was no reason to believe that such an approach would not have similar good results in the case of Faluja.

In the opinion of Mr. Ross, it was possible to proceed simultaneously to implement both resolutions and to take steps leading to a prompt conclusion of the armistice called for in the 16 November resolution. Apparently both the Arab and Jewish Governments were prepared to accede and negotiate on the 16 November resolution.

Moreover, Mr. Eytan's letter³ could not be interpreted as a categorical refusal to release Egyptian forces.

Mr. Ross believed that the opposing views, one based on the 4 November resolution, and the other on the 16 November resolution, had been drawing closer together, though the process had been slow and

¹ Mr. Bunche addressed the Committee earlier the same day, advising of his consultations at Cairo, Amman, Tel Aviv, and Haifa and giving his "definite impression that there is a marked change in the attitude of the parties, and that there is a moderate, but nevertheless definite, readiness to take constructive steps toward a solution of the problem."

² See editorial note, p. 1580.

³ See Delga 1113, *supra*.

painful. It ought to be possible with Dr. Bunche's assistance to bridge the remaining gap, and thus advance the problem towards an armistice and a peaceful settlement.

A certain amount of time, perhaps only a few days, might be necessary to enable the Acting Mediator to bring about the implementation of the 4 November resolution. If this were successful, there would be no need for this Committee or the Security Council to consider the matter further. If this proved to be too optimistic a view, Mr. Ross said, he would support the United Kingdom representative with regard to referring the situation back to the Security Council to deal with the request contained in the Egyptian letter.⁴

The Acting Mediator had made a specific suggestion as to the manner in which the impasse might be broken. The representative of Israel had taken note of that suggestion and also of the information in the Egyptian reply concerning the 16 November resolution. Mr. Eban had promised to communicate with this Government and with the Acting Mediator in regard to the matter. The Committee might therefore let the matter rest and leave the next meeting to the call of the Chair in consultation with the Acting Mediator.

⁴ Presumably the letter dated December 1, sent to the President of the Security Council by the Egyptian Representative at the United Nations. The letter requested that the Council include on its agenda for the following day the question of the implementation of its resolution of November 4; it concluded as follows: "The continued Zionist refusal to abide by this decision seriously affects the situation in Palestine as envisaged by the Security Council's decisions in relation to the truce which has been repeatedly violated by the Zionists, and gravely hampers the possibilities of any progress towards a peaceful settlement of the Palestine question." (SC, 3rd yr., No. 128, p. 1)

501.BB Palestine/12-848 : Telegram

*The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation at Paris
(Dulles) to the Acting Secretary of State*

SECRET URGENT

PARIS, December 8, 1948—midnight.

Delga 1120. Bunche who has just returned to Paris from Cairo, Amman, Tel Aviv and Haifa reports comment in Transjordan principally by Abdullah and Prime Minister that US is withholding recognition Transjordan in order give Israel opportunity at later date to make claim to additional area in Transjordan (which was part of Palestine mandate until 1922). Bunche says Transjordan officials do not understand our continued refusal to recognize Transjordan and are extremely apprehensive as a result. Bunche says that Abdullah would feel more free, if the US had recognized Transjordan, to commence political discussions with Israel. Abdullah apparently feels it

would be difficult for him to take such action without having been recognized, as he would in effect be out in front of the other members of the Arab League. Bunche believes that Transjordan's apprehensions and attitude toward recognition is now a real factor in Palestine situation. Bunche said he realized why US had not yet extended recognition although we had supported Transjordan's application for UN membership since 1946, but wondered whether US extension *de facto* recognition at this time might not have desirable stabilizing effect.

Sent Department Delga 1120; repeated London as 1448, Amman as 4.

DULLES

501.BB Palestine/12-948: Telegram

*The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation at Paris
(Dulles) to the Acting Secretary of State*

SECRET URGENT
NIACT

PARIS, December 9, 1948—1 a. m.

Delga 1122. Following is situation regarding plenary GA action on Palestine resolution:

1. A group of members including Australia, New Zealand, Canada, China and possibly others will introduce certain amendments in plenary session to Committee I Palestine resolution to make it possible to obtain broadest possible support for such resolution. These amendments, which will be supported by US and UK, are as follows:

(a) Delete all of the preamble of the present Committee I resolution and substitute therefor the following: "Having considered further the situation in Palestine"

(b) Delete sub-paragraph 2(c) which contains a specific reference to the State of Israel.

(c) Delete paragraph 3 containing an unpopular formula for selection of conciliation commission.

(d) Delete last clause of paragraph 10 beginning "in this connection"; Arabs insist upon this deletion because of its reference to Bernadotte report despite fact content is in Arab interest.

(e) Delete first clause paragraph 11 for same reason.

(f) Arabs are expected to insist that reference to November 29 resolution contained in paragraph 8 be deleted and boundaries be indicated by reference to geographical localities.

2. Our best available information is that these amendments will make it possible for Arab States to abstain rather than vote against and that Middle East and Far East friends of Arabs will vote affirma-

tively for resulting resolution. These changes are also believed to be acceptable to Israel.

3. Department's attention is invited to fact that course of discussions on Palestine resolution has clearly indicated that both Arabs and Jews seek straightforward conciliation effort and object to any effort by present assembly to be specific about the details of final settlement. Although Jews and Arabs differ widely in their ultimate objectives, they now appear to agree upon conciliation as method of settling such difficulties.

4. We do not expect strong Jewish reaction in Paris against deletion of sub-paragraph 2 (c) containing specific reference to State of Israel, but some ill-informed press sources in US may give such deletion wrong interpretation. USGADel has told Committee I that we do not seek an Assembly resolution which represents in every respect US policy on Palestine but rather a resolution which we believe will contribute most to a peaceful settlement of outstanding differences. In this sense, we have specifically discouraged introduction into resolution of question of recognition of Israel or of approval of Israel membership, while at same time reaffirming US policy these points both in GA and SC.

5. Deletion of present provision for election of conciliation commission by Big Five is necessary to overcome objections on part of middle and small powers against "undemocratic" procedure. Commission will probably be selected by ordinary election by Assembly (simple majority) following adoption Palestine resolution. Since US is being treated as a candidate, USGADel is not taking active part in selection of commission but we have indicated that commission consisting of Australia, Turkey, and US, or alternatively France, Turkey and US, would be acceptable to us. There appears to be overwhelming sentiment in Assembly, shared both by Jews and Arabs, that US must be member of conciliation commission.

DULLES

501.BB Palestine/12-948: Telegram

*The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation at Paris
(Dulles) to the Secretary of State*

SECRET URGENT
NIACT

PARIS, December 9, 1948—8 p. m.

Delga 1139. For Satterthwaite and Hare from Kopper.

1. Last evening it appeared to us Arab states would abstain on amended Palestine resolution and would inform friends, Asians and

otherwise, that they would have no objection to their casting votes in favor of resolution (Delga 1122, December 9). This Arab position confirmed by Riad Solh and Ammoun (Lebanon) and Fawzi Bey (Egypt). Only major question remaining to be settled was composition of commission upon which Arab states had themselves been unable to agree and still have not.

2. Announcement today that SC would hold meeting Friday morning December 10 to take up application of Israel for admission UN has had major effect on Arab attitude. At noon today both Riad Solh and Fawzi flatly declared favorable SC action on Israeli application would cause Arabs to reverse stand of last evening. Arabs would vote against GA resolution and strongly urge friends to do so. Riad Solh went so far as to say Lebanon's whole approach to future questions would have to be reviewed if Israel's application were now approved by SC. He urged strongly that action be postponed, reiterating that SC approval now would be complete defeat position Arab leaders here.

3. Arguments that (a) SC action on admission and GA resolution on settlement are separate questions and (b) there is little likelihood GA will approve admission application even though SC might do so are unavailing in discussions with Arabs. Reasons why Arabs are unconvinced seem to be that (a) SC membership committee indicated in its report that questions of admission and GA resolution on settlement were linked by several members, and (b) favorable SC action on Israeli application would be more than a confirmation of November 29, 1947 resolution.

Sent Department Delga 1139, repeated London 1460. [Kopper.]

DULLES

501.BB Palestine/12-1048: Telegram

The Special Representative of the United States in Israel, Temporarily at Paris (McDonald) to the President's Special Counsel (Clifford)

SECRET

PARIS, December 10, 1948—4 p. m.

6246. From McDonald. For White House only. Personal attention Clifford. Before returning Tel Aviv tonight feel impelled repeat my previous high praise of efforts made by our delegates to advance President's Palestine policy but also my earlier warnings lest United States unintentionally through technical moves become involved in threat of sanctions against Israel. Despite optimistic report re prospects peace negotiations made by Bunche, just back from Middle East, Brit-

ish demanded December 8 emergency Security Council meeting to force Israel withdrawals to October 14 line Negev. This was dangerous maneuver to embarrass United States and other countries urging favorable action Israel admission United Nations this Assembly. United States response made in Security Council sub-committee by Ross without opportunity consultation Dulles or Jessup gave partial United States moral support British latest maneuver to indict Israel as aggressor.¹ United States technical cooperation with such United Kingdom tactics could destroy President's peace hopes Middle East. If United Kingdom were told unequivocally that United States will not be party sanctions or moves that direction, I believe United Kingdom might finally accept in good faith viable Israel as reality and encourage instead of discourage Abdullah, Farouk, and others make peace. Central fact remains United Kingdom must desire peace and convince Arab states of such desire before any peace becomes possible. [McDonald.]

¹ For summary record of Mr. Ross' statement of December 8, see p. 1654.

501.BB Palestine/12-1048 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the
Acting Secretary of State*

SECRET

LONDON, December 10, 1948—6 p. m.

5197. Delga 1120, December 8 to Department. While Embassy has not considered it appropriate to discuss with Foreign Office pros and cons US recognition Transjordan as suggested by Bunche and will not do so even informally unless Foreign Office raises matter, Embassy is of opinion that UK now more than ever would welcome this gesture towards Transjordan by US as definite contribution to Middle East stability at difficult juncture. Factor in this connection which had to be considered hitherto was effect of US recognition Transjordan on neighboring Arab states where there is strong likelihood that US action would be interpreted as bribe for Transjordan coming to some arrangement with PGI (Provisional Government of Israel). However British disillusionment with other Arab states now runs deep (Embassy's 5137, December 7) and present British hope is that stature Abdullah will be increased by all means. Foreign Office feeling is that since other Arab states burned their bridges in Paris their reactions to aggrandizement Transjordan become much less important than previously. Consequently, Embassy is fairly confident that US recognition Transjordan, particularly if accorded very soon thus setting PGI

and Transjordan on more equal footing prior inevitable negotiations, would be welcomed warmly by UK.¹

2. Department's guidance requested.²

Sent Department 5197, repeated Paris for Gadel 1022.

DOUGLAS

¹ Mr. Stabler, on December 10, suggested the desirability of *de facto* recognition of Transjordan at this time, noting that "Transjordan has now reached virtual armistice agreement with Israel as result recent cease fire talks in Jerusalem and appears willing continue these conversations on military level, although at same time envisaging their extension at suitable moment to political level (paragraph 1 mytel 138, December 2). There is, however, some reluctance to go further at this stage but believe such could be overcome if Transjordan felt it had support of United States as well as British Governments which would give it equal footing with Israel and Egypt, the other prime factors in reaching solution in Palestine." (Telegram 149 from Amman, 501.BB Palestine/12-1048)

² The Department, in reply on December 14, stated it was advisable "not deviate from present plan, which calls for extension full recognition Transjordan and Israel Govts as soon as permanent Govt elected in Israel." (Telegram 4655, 501.BB Palestine/12-1048)

501.BB Palestine/12-1348

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Chairman of the
United States Delegation at Paris (Dulles)*

SECRET

[PARIS,] December 13, 1948.

Participants: Mr. Riad Bey Solh, Prime Minister of Lebanon
Dr. Malik
Mr. Dulles
Mr. Kopper

With Mr. Kopper, I called on Mr. Riad Bey Solh, Prime Minister of Lebanon, and Dr. Malik, Ambassador to Washington, at the Hotel Bristol on December 10 at 9:00 p. m. I said that I came to talk in relation to the pending resolution to establish a Conciliation Commission to settle the points of difference between Israel and the Arab States. I hoped very much that that resolution would be adopted by the necessary two-thirds vote because if it were not adopted the future in that area might be one of very great difficulty. I wanted to make clear that in my opinion the attitude of the American people and the Government with reference to Israel did not reflect a pro-Jewish, anti-Arab sentiment. The American people and the Government were, however, convinced that the establishment of the State of Israel under livable conditions was a historical necessity and the United States was determined to go through with it. We realized that doing so involved certain injustices to the Arab States. The situation was not one where there was any solution that was totally just to all concerned. The situation was so mixed with so many cross-interests that any solution would involve some injustices. Nevertheless, there had to be a solution, and, we believed, a peaceful solution. We believed that the pending

Resolution with the seven-power amendments would pave the way to that kind of a solution, and it could mean the beginning of closer and happier relations with the Arab States than ever before because the American people would feel that the Arabs in accepting the establishment of the State of Israel had made a sacrifice for the cause of peace. Therefore, our present action could be looked upon not as inaugurating a continuing policy of supporting a Jewish State as against the Arabs, but rather as completing one phase of a historical development which, when completed, would permit of better relations than ever before with the Arab States.

I did not, of course, have in mind any concrete proposals for the future. I knew that if I came offering a certain number of dollars in the way of economic aid in exchange for votes my proposal would be, and should be, indignantly rejected. My purpose was merely to indicate that a certain course of action on the part of the Arab States could, in my opinion, open the door to better relations with the United States than ever before. The United States was, after all, the most powerful nation in the world and it was better to have the United States feel that the Arab States had made a sacrifice and accepted, to them, a painful result in the interest of peace, and to an extent at the behest of the United States, rather than to have a reverse situation.

The Prime Minister said that he greatly appreciated my call and the lofty spirit in which I had presented the situation. I had presented the matter in a form which would appeal most effectively to the Arab States. He would consider carefully what I had said and would communicate with his associates in the Arab League.

Editorial Note

The General Assembly, on December 11, undertook discussion of the resolution of the First Committee. Australia proposed amendments jointly sponsored by seven nations, which "eliminated all references in the resolution to both the original partition plan and the Bernadotte proposals as the basis for a boundary agreement." (Department of State *Bulletin*, December 19, 1948, page 763) The Assembly had released the text of the joint amendments in document A/789. Mr. Dulles extended United States support to the resolution of the First Committee and to the joint amendments; for the full text of his statement, see *ibid.*, page 793.

The Assembly voted on the amended measure the same day, adopting it by a vote of 35 to 15, with eight abstentions. The adverse votes were cast chiefly by the Arab States and the Soviet bloc (GA, *3rd sess., Pt. I, Plenary, 1948*, pages 995, 996). The resolution established

a Conciliation Commission of three members "(a) To assume, in so far as it considers necessary in existing circumstances, the functions given to the United Nations Mediator on Palestine by resolution 186 (S-2) of the General Assembly of 14 May 1948; (b) To carry out the specific functions and directives given to it by the present resolution and such additional functions and directives as may be given to it by the General Assembly or by the Security Council; [and] (c) To undertake, upon the request of the Security Council, any of the functions now assigned to the United Nations Mediator on Palestine or to the United Nations Truce Commission by resolutions of the Security Council; upon such request to the Conciliation Commission by the Security Council with respect to all the remaining functions of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine under Security Council resolutions, the office of the Mediator shall be terminated".

The resolution also provided that Jerusalem and the surrounding area "be accorded special and separate treatment from the rest of Palestine", under effective United Nations control; and that "the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible". For the full text of the resolution, numbered 194 (III), see GA, *3rd sess., Pt. I, Resolutions, 1948*, page 21.

867N.01/12-1148 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

JERUSALEM, December 11, 1948—11 a. m.

1528. In conversation last night Colonel Dayan stated: PGI considers present psychological moment open direct armistice talks with Transjordan and Egypt.¹ Should be conducted directly as between any sovereign states and not through UN. In Jerusalem UN is third interested party and should participate.

PGI considers November 16 armistice resolution supersedes SC resolution imposing truce in Palestine. Israel anxious negotiate armistice but if Arabs refuse will consider itself free take any action it wishes.

¹ Mr. Burdett reported, on December 12 that at the meeting that day between Colonel Dayan and Colonel el-Tel, the former announced that the "PGI ready to negotiate armistice and peace with Transjordan but not willing discuss major questions on basis implementing present truce" according to Burdett, the "Jews appear to think now is propitious moment force Transjordan into open peace talks. Perhaps also intend embarrass relations Transjordan with other Arab League states." (Telegram 1529 from Jerusalem, 867N.01/12-1248)

Described Israel as in fortunate position being willing and able engage in both war or peace talks.

Sent Department 1528, Department pass Gadel 17, Amman 7, Cairo 145.

BURDETT

501.BB Palestine/12-1248 : Telegram

*The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation at Paris
(Dulles) to the Acting Secretary of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

PARIS, December 12, 1948—3 a. m.

Delga 1166. For Lovett from Rusk. In view of hostile attitude Israel is taking publicly toward membership Conciliation Commission, following information furnished confidential basis.

In GA committee of Big Five asked to nominate 3 members of commission; UK, France and China immediately supported US, France and Turkey. Their theory was US was moderately pro-Israel, Turkey moderately pro-Arab and France generally neutral, slightly pro-Israel. US representative (Rusk) stated we had no serious objection to such slate, emphasized necessity for unity of action, and objected to concept that any one member of such committee be expected to act as special advocate for any party. Rusk then stated Big Five should have before them names of other members who had taken active interest in matter or had been suggested by one or more of the parties and indicated names of Colombia, Australia and Norway as deserving consideration. Vishinsky proposed Poland as member commission of small powers and insisted that if US were on commission USSR must also be included.

After further discussion, during which UK, France and China remained firm, and during which Rusk ascertained privately that these three would insist on their slate to point of casting ballots, Rusk stated he would support majority slate in interest of unity and hoped USSR would do same. Vishinsky refused, and committee reported 4-1 to GA recommending US, France, Turkey.

Background this meeting was week's effort on part USGADel to find slate agreeable to parties. No one nominated by Israel such as Guatemala or Australia received support because of general feeling US was pro-Israel and that another strongly pro-Israel member would seriously upset balance of commission.

When Granados of Guatemala attempted to substitute Colombia for Turkey, Colombia promptly declined and slate was voted by 41-7-4. Some reason to think Israel's real objection to commission is to France, because of latter's known views on holy places and internationalization of Jerusalem.

Both Dulles and Cohen were on floor of Assembly for final vote and

appeared satisfied that commission is fair and workable. In any event, fact that US, with its strong support of Israel, is on commission leaves US in poor position to object. Of other 2 members are France, who supported partition, and Turkey, who has been most moderate of all friends of Arabs and who in fact voted in favor Palestine resolution.

We believe commission to be a good one and in any event it was constituted by majority vote in both nominating committee and Plenary Session without any pressure from US. Great contrast between calm attending this action compared with violent feeling of November 29 and May 14 constitutes good omen for peaceful settlement Palestine question. [Rusk.]

DULLES

501.BB Palestine/12-1348

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Chairman of the
Delegation at Paris (Dulles)*

SECRET

[PARIS,] December 13, 1948.

Participants: Mr. Riad Bey Solh, Prime Minister of Lebanon
Dr. Malik
Mr. Dulles

On Monday, December 13th, the Prime Minister of Lebanon and Dr. Malik came to call upon me at the Hotel Crillon. I expressed to him my satisfaction that the Palestine Resolution had been adopted. I said I realized that the Arab States could, if they had wanted, have prevented the adoption of the Resolution by the necessary two-thirds. Of course, the Arab States themselves had voted against the Resolution, but I knew that states friendly to the Arabs had voted for the Resolution. I interpreted this as indicative of a spirit of conciliation on the part of the Arab States, which I thought augured well for the future. I did not, however, ask that the Prime Minister should comment on this aspect of the matter unless he so desired.

The Prime Minister said that he was quite glad to discuss this aspect of the matter. It was true that the Arab States could have defeated the Palestine Resolution at any time up to five minutes before the vote. They had decided not to do so and their decision had in considerable part been influenced by the talk which I had with him and by the hope I had held out that if once the Israel matter could be settled, that would mean an era of good relations, rather than increasingly bad relations, with the Arab States.

I said that the result of the vote had made me feel under a greater obligation than ever to try to assure the result that I had forecast as possible and that I would, upon my return, report our conversation to the President.

The Prime Minister said that he hoped that the matter of Palestine would be disposed of first and the question of relations between the United States and Arab States dealt with only subsequently, not combining the two ideas.

There followed an exchange of courtesies.

501.BB Palestine/12-1348 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

JERUSALEM, December 13, 1948—3 p. m.

1530. Consulate General has consistently maintained strong international police force first requisite for Jerusalem "under effective United Nations control". This would necessitate agreement (Deptel 1047, December 2¹) among big powers on method selecting force and require heavy outlay United Nations funds for indefinite period. Large and costly administrative staff would also be needed. Now appears impossible obtain either force or necessary funds, assumption confirmed by conversation with Bunche. Unwillingness United Nations take effective action force either Jews or Arabs to accept its proposals for Jerusalem must also be assumed. Problem thus become to devise settlement for Jerusalem and assure protection and free access to Holy places without international force and necessitating only minimum United Nations staff. At same time maximum agreement from two parties must be obtained particularly from PGI which at present from military point view capable imposing own solution on Arabs. Question Jerusalem, corridor to coast and Holy places through all Palestine part same problem.

Based on above considerations Consulate General believes practical solution now might take following form:

1. Division city Jerusalem proper into permanent Arab and Jewish areas former becoming part of Transjordan and latter part Israel. Movement between areas would be temporarily prohibited and restriction relaxed gradually. Demarcation line could run along Ramallah road to Damascus gate, Suleimyn way to Jaffa road, Jaffa road to Jaffa gate, Hebron road past railroad yard and then over to railroad, railroad to water pipeline, straight south to municipal boundary line, east along municipal boundary line to Hebron road, south along Hebron road to present truce lines. Division based generally on results fighting Jerusalem with modifications southern sectors to give Arabs vital south north communications along Nablus Hebron route and to eliminate Jewish and Arab pockets. Jews would be required relinquish strong military positions on Mount Zion and Deir Abu Tor but proposed demilitarization of entire Jerusalem area would diminish their importance. Jews would also have to give up Jewish settlements of Italpiot and Ramat Rahel and claim to Jewish quarter Old City. Changes

¹ Not printed.

would return lower and upper Bakaa where Arabs remaining in New City now quartered to Arabs but Jews would retain Arab sections of Qatamon, German colony and Greek colony now occupied by new Jewish immigrants or Jews displaced by fighting. Railroad would remain within Jewish control thus furnishing east west communication for Jews but Arabs should receive definite right free use railroad for shipments from coast. Hebrew University-Hadassah hospital enclave would have to remain Jewish perhaps joined to Jewish Jerusalem by new road from Nahal at Shimon sector skirting Arab built up area and protected by Arab Legion.

2. Demilitarization Jerusalem area as defined in GA resolution of November 29, 1947 with specific provision that adequate number Arab Jewish police allowed. This could be started by gradually widening stretches from which military forces withdrawn and where military installations destroyed. Proposed retention Jewish corridor should meet Jewish objection to demilitarization on grounds would leave Jews in Jerusalem cut off in Arab sea. Arabs have expressed readiness demilitarize city.

3. Jewish controlled corridor to coastal area including railroad, main Jerusalem Tel Aviv highway and new Jewish "Malaya" road. This would constitute great concession on part Arabs since corridor would run in part through territory normally inhabited by Arabs and would prejudice survival Jaffa even if city returned to Arabs. But Consulate General convinced Jews after experience this summer will refuse relinquish control their lines of communication. Jews currently establishing new settlements along route to assure its protection. North south road through Jerusalem in part compensates Arabs for separation by corridor of southern and northern Arab areas. If Jaffa again becomes Arab city provision should be made for free use by Arab civilian traffic of roads and railways. Arabs should also be entitled free use port Haifa, Lydda airfield and communication routes inland. To accomplish above present truce lines for Jerusalem-Latron area could remain in force with minor rectifications to permit exclusion from corridor of Arab villages on border. Exception would be Latrun salient from which Arab Legion would withdraw to approximately Beit Nuba relinquishing commanding positions including Deir Aiyub along Jerusalem Tel Aviv highway. This would open main east west route to Jews and allow Jews repair and operate main water pipeline to Jerusalem. Arab Legion has indicated willingness withdraw from salient as no longer of special military significance. Southern limits of Jewish corridor would be determined by final Palestine boundary settlement.

4. Establishment United Nations Commission with seat in Jerusalem to perform among others following functions:

[Here follow subparagraphs *a* through *f* setting forth the proposed functions.]

5. SC resolution calling for immediate economic and if necessary military sanctions against any party violating above provisions. Effective SC action to support United Nations Commission within its comparatively narrow sphere of activity and in carrying out projects on which general agreement exists even between Arabs and Jews much more likely than on broader issues where considerable disagreement

prevails. Also need for SC action correspondingly reduced. Provided Arabs sections central Palestine go to Transjordan extension UK-Transjordan treaty to Arab areas would serve greatly to strengthen SC guarantee and allay very real Arab fears future Jewish expansion.

Consul General feels that taking into account realities present situation above points form basis for settlement Jerusalem section Palestine question which Jews will accept and to which Arab (Transjordan) will acquiesce. Arabs have in fact no power to oppose settlement and refusal could lead to further Jewish successes and ultimate solution depriving Arabs additional territory. United Nations Commission would protect rights of Christians third main religious group interested in Jerusalem which has shown very little activity on own behalf. Same results would be achieved as by paragraph 7, 8 and 9 of UK resolution and would avoid international regime which could easily degenerate into mere shadow regime contributing further to loss United Nations prestige.

Sent Department, repeated Baghdad 35, Beirut 107, Damascus 54. Pouched Amman 9, Cairo 147, Jidda 16, Tel Aviv 15.

BURDETT

867N.01/12-1348 : Telegram

Mr. Wells Stabler to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

AMMAN, December 13, 1948—4 p. m.

155. 1. It is understood that about December 7 King sent message to Nokrashy Pasha by Transjordan Minister to Egypt informing him of Jericho Conference resolutions and requesting Egypt's support. Nokrashy replied to Prime Minister end last week to effect that Egypt considered it unfortunate that Transjordan had decided to pursue independent policy re Palestine when Arab states had agreed that there should be unanimity.¹ Apparently message has annoyed Prime Minister who is sending reply to Nokrashy stating that Transjordan must consider present situation on basis facts and that next meeting Arab League Political Committee he proposes point out realities of situation to other Arab states, which realities may not be pleasing. It appears that "ostrich-like" policy of Arab states is causing resentment here almost to point of determination take independent line.

2. It is reported that Sassoon of Israeli Foreign Office is now in

¹ On December 14, Mr. Stabler reported understanding that Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen had followed Egypt's lead in protesting to King Abdullah regarding the resolutions of the Jericho Conference (telegram 157, 867N.01/12-1448). The Arab League, on December 14, also made a protest in a note to the Transjordanian Legation in Egypt. Cairo, the same day, transmitted to the Department the text of the note, as well as the Legation's note of the previous day to the Arab League (despatch 1009, 867N.01/12-1448).

Jerusalem and has been placed in contact with Abdullah Bey el Tel, Arab Legion Military Governor of Jerusalem, through Colonel Dayan of Israeli forces.

Repeated Jerusalem 74; Cairo 5.

STABLER

867N.01/12-448 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to Mr. Wells Stabler, at Amman

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, December 13, 1948—7 p. m.

52. Dept requested Brit Emb ascertain views FonOff re Abdullah's stated intention proclaim annexation Arab Palestine (ur 142 Dec 4¹). Emb today stated FonOff "not enthusiastic" and believes this not right time for such a move. FonOff opinion, however, is that best solution problem disposition Arab Palestine is eventual incorporation Transjordan.

Dept believes that view probability Abdullah will not at present carry out his plan announce annexation, US approach to King to make known US views this subject not desirable.²

LOVETT

¹ Not printed.

² This telegram was repeated to London as No. 4637.

501.BB Palestine/12-1448

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Stuart W. Rockwell of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] December 14, 1948.

Participants: Mr. Eliahu Epstein, Israeli Mission
 Mr. Uriel Heyd, Israeli Mission
 Colonel Efraim Ben-Arzi, Israeli Mission
 NEA—Mr. Satterthwaite
 NE—Mr. Colquitt
 Mr. Rockwell

Messrs. Epstein and Heyd came in to present to the appropriate officers of NEA Colonel Ben-Arzi, who has arrived in the United States to assume his duties as Military Attaché at the Israeli Mission.

[Here follow four paragraphs giving Mr. Epstein's views on the question of Israeli membership in the United Nations, the composition of the Conciliation Commission and related matters.]

Mr. Satterthwaite then declared that he had a matter to discuss with Messrs. Epstein and Heyd. He said that the Department had received reports that certain Israeli patrols had penetrated the Transjordan frontier. He said that he realized how indefinite were the

territorial boundaries in that part of the world and how difficult it was to restrain the enthusiasm of young soldiers on patrol, but that such incidents could have serious consequences in view of the British determination to live up to the terms of the Anglo-Transjordan treaty. He wished to bring this matter to the attention of Messrs. Epstein and Heyd in the most friendly fashion, since it had caused the Department some concern. Mr. Epstein and Colonel Ben-Arzi referred to the difficulty of knowing exactly where the border lay and said that they had had no confirmation of the reports, which they believed to have been spread by British sources. They added, however, that if any such incursion into Transjordan had taken place, it was certainly unintentional.

Mr. Epstein then went on to say that the Israelis were going to reply to the renewed British references to the arms received by Israel from Czechoslovakia in violation of the terms of the truce, and that the Provisional Government of Israel, according to a message from Tel Aviv, had proof that the British themselves had been continuing to supply arms to the Arabs. While admitting that the Israelis had received arms from Czechoslovakia, Mr. Epstein felt that the British were in a poor moral position to accuse the Israelis of violating the truce, since, he said, they themselves were sending arms to the Arabs.

501.BB Palestine/12-1348 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, December 14, 1948—7 p. m.

4654. Brit Emb today informed Dept FonOff hoped US Govt would, if suitable opportunities presented themselves, urge upon interested parties in Palestine dispute incorporation in Transjordan of all or greater part of Arab Palestine as best solution problem disposition that area. Dept took occasion inform Brit Emb US position territorial-settlement Palestine set forth first two paras Deptel 4485 Dec 1 (ur 5225 Dec 13¹).

In specific reply Brit Emb's query, Dept stated that in view US attitude territorial question is one for settlement by negotiation, either directly between parties or through Conciliation Commission, and that US would support such territorial arrangement agreeable to Arab States and Israel as might be reached through either of above methods. Dept considered it advisable await outcome such direct negotiations as might take place or result experience Conciliation Commission before considering possible positive steps to assist in achieving territorial settlement.

LOVETT

¹ Not printed.

501.BB Palestine/12-1448: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET US URGENT

LONDON, December 14, 1948—9 p. m.

5244. For Lovett. See mytel 5225, December 13.¹ As anticipated Bevin asked me to call today to discuss future moves with respect Palestine. Expressly concerned over whole problem Middle East considering that internal situation Egypt constitutes grave danger as trouble there would be exploited by Communists and situation might develop similar to that China imperilling western powers Middle East. He urged strategic considerations be taken to account in determining limitation Palestine boundaries. I replied I had doubts expressed in Embtel about too early extra-lateral understanding re frontiers; Bevin answered that at some time he would have to give advice Arabs and wanted this advice be consonant with US views though did not now want necessarily US-UK agreement. He invited me to lunch with him and British Chiefs of staff Monday next in order to convey their views, particularly on strategic considerations, prior to my departure for US. In view I shall express no US opinions but seek only British views, see no objection here.

Bevin hopes that US member Conciliation Commission will be man of high standing and character who would work energetically for an early settlement Palestine boundaries. If US makes first appointment pattern will be set for French and Turkish appointments.

Shall report more fully after Monday's meeting by cable or orally on arrival Washington.

DOUGLAS

¹ Not printed.

867N.2390E/12-1648: Telegram

The Minister in Lebanon (Pinkerton) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

BEIRUT, December 16, 1948—10 a. m.

620. Remytel 614, December 8.¹ At his request I again visited President Khouri and he talked at length with regard to Jewish occupation of Lebanese territory. He is worried. While he favors and will support Arab cooperation with newly created conciliation commission, he said other members Arab League will consider his support as strange so long as Jews continue occupy Lebanon. Any Lebanese attempt forcibly remove Jews would result in reopening of hostilities generally which Lebanon does not desire and is not in position to pursue. President

¹ Not printed.

desires US Government take initiative in pressing for Jewish withdrawal as evidence US friendship for Lebanon. This would eliminate any resentment of our Palestine policy held in Lebanon. He pointed out traditional Lebanese friendship for US and emphasized position of Lebanese as moderating influence among Arab states which should be strengthened. As latest evidence of Lebanon's desire to prevent discord in Middle East President pointed out his government has refused take stand for either Abdullah or Egypt in coming controversy over Arab Palestine and has limited its action to counselling Abdullah to avoid precipitate steps which might lead to controversy among Arab states.

On question of treaty of alliance which would safeguard Lebanese frontiers he said he cannot alone sign treaty with single country because he would have to accord privileges to that country which should not be accorded. He would like to sign with group of countries or be one of group which would sign with one country. It was clear he was speaking of UK because he has often mentioned impossibility of signing any such treaty with France. President is now trying to veer away from pro-Arab policy Lebanon has been following, and is in desperate need of friendly counsel which he cannot get from France or UK because they would inject too many of their own interests in such advice.

I believe maintenance of *status quo* in Lebanon and strengthening its political and economic situation would prove stabilizing influence in area, and would at same time continue reservoir of good will US has in Lebanon more than any other Middle Eastern country. President said there is some sentiment for reduction of Lebanon to its early boundaries of Mount Lebanon and he believes such state would not be viable and would become mere troublesome pawn in Middle East political group. He is therefore seeking moral support as opposed to military which he is convinced will not be necessary and he points out security of Saudi Arabia maintained simply by knowledge that US gives its friendship.

President would appreciate any comments Department may be able to make on his present situation.²

PINKERTON

² In a memorandum of December 21 to Mr. Lovett, Mr. Satterthwaite stated that "NEA concurs in Minister Pinkerton's conclusions and recommends that, when Mr. Eliahu Epstein, Israeli Special Representative, calls on you this afternoon, you inform him of our concern over the continued military occupation of Lebanese territory, and that we consider that the voluntary withdrawal by his Government of its military units from Lebanon would serve to improve the atmosphere in which the Conciliation Commission will shortly undertake its work." (501.BB Palestine/12-2148)

Mr. Lovett's marginal notation read as follows: "(a) We should not act as 'good offices.' Our record is too bad on this score. b) will sound out Epstein on their plans." Regarding point b, see Mr. Lovett's memorandum of conversation, December 21, p. 1676.

867N.01/12-1748

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] December 17, 1948.

Participants: Mr. Lovett, Acting Secretary
Mohamed Kamil Abdul Rahim, Egyptian Ambassador
Mr. Raymond A. Hare, Deputy Director, NEA

The Ambassador opened the conversation by saying that the last time that he had talked with me was on the occasion of his courtesy call on his arrival, and he felt that time had come when it would be helpful for him to discuss certain problems of current importance. First of all, he said he wished to emphasize his very sincere personal interest in the maintenance of friendly relations between Egypt and the United States. Such had been his long-standing persuasion and, in fact, it was essentially for that reason that his Government had chosen him as its representative in Washington. I thanked the Ambassador and told him that he could be assured that we entirely reciprocated his sentiments and I felt that we could go forward on that basis.

The Ambassador then spoke of the friendship which had traditionally characterized relations between the United States and Egypt but which had recently been clouded by the Palestine situation. He said that sentiment on the Palestine situation ran deep in the minds of the Arab people, who were convinced that they were gravely endangered by the introduction into their midst of an alien group with aggressive intent.

I interrupted at this point to observe that it would, of course, be fruitless to enter into discussion of the development of this situation, but I did want to emphasize the realities of the case with which we are now faced. The fact is that there is a very considerable group of Jews who are physically in Palestine and who could not be removed from the scene except by a force of arms which cannot be mobilized against them. Consequently, it is necessary to regularize the situation as soon as possible so that this new group can be enabled to take its place as a responsible entity in the society of nations and so that present uncertainties, such as the lack of clearly defined boundaries, may be eliminated. This objective and dispassionate viewpoint is the basis of United States policy, and it seemed to me that the interests of the Arab States, and especially of Egypt, might well be served by a similar unemotional recognition of fact. What we need above all is peace. As the Ambassador was probably aware, the American Government had in the recent past been giving serious consideration to certain economic projects in the Middle East, and American private interests, particularly the oil companies, were prepared to make vast expenditures in the area which would redound to the benefit of the local population

¹ Drafted by Mr. Hare.

But nothing could be done without peace and that was the reason why we must emphasize that aspect of the situation.

The Ambassador said that he appreciated this expression of the American viewpoint and that he also had been grateful to note what had been done at American instigation for the benefit of the unhappy Arab refugees. He felt, however, that there was one aspect of this situation which merited emphasis and that was the attitude of the Arab peoples themselves, irrespective of what the policies of their governments might be. The reaction to the Palestine situation by the ordinary man on the street in the Arab countries was one of fear: fear of Jewish territorial encroachment, fear of cut-throat Jewish economic competition, and fear that Israel is a center from which Communism will spread its tentacles to the Arab countries. The result of these very deep seated and strongly held fears was that, regardless of what policies the Arab Governments themselves might follow, the Arab people felt that they would be endangered by a Jewish State and would not consent to negotiations premised on the recognition of Israel. Furthermore, it was not true, as the Israelis were seditiously [*sedulously?*] asserting, that the Arab armies had been defeated. Actually, Arab casualties had not exceeded one percent and no real test of strength had ever taken place.

Referring to the Ambassador's assertion of the danger of Communism in Israel, I observed that the group from which the present Government in Israel has largely been drawn professes to be strongly anti-Communist, and it was my belief that such was actually the case. Moreover, the stronger opposition elements professed similarly anti-Communist sentiments, and the Communist Party itself was of negligible importance. I said that if the counsels of these more moderate elements were to prevail, it was essential that the solution of the Palestine problem should be by peaceful means. Continuing strife would only benefit the extremists.

Returning to the Ambassador's remark regarding the military side of the question, I said that, speaking as one who had had some slight acquaintance with military matters, I would suggest that it would be unwise of the Arabs to discount Jewish military strength. The Israeli Army is sizeable, well-equipped and has high morale. Furthermore, facilities for production of war materials in Israel have been developed. But the really important point was to get away from any idea of a military settlement and to stress peaceful negotiation. Any attempt to force the issue by a trial of arms would only result in chaos, formidable expenditure and the creation of an opening for bringing in reinforcements from behind the iron curtain. Under such circumstances, Communist influences would indeed have a field day.

To summarize and to emphasize, I said, our policy is to recognize the accomplished fact of Israel's existence and to seek to regularize the

situation by peaceful means. The United States has a real interest in the Middle East and values the friendship of the Arab countries, but the only way in which cooperation can be renewed effectively is by the return to normal conditions through peaceful negotiation.

The Ambassador said that this exchange of views had been very helpful, but he wished to leave with me the idea that it should still not be too late to rethink this whole problem in order to endeavor to find a more satisfactory solution. Time was no longer pressing and he hoped that the United States Government would think again before taking any further action, such as *de jure* recognition or a loan. I replied that I doubted if we really had much time at our disposal. Time might indeed be running quite short if a peaceful solution were to be effected.

[Here follow two paragraphs dealing with the question of Italian colonies.]

L[OVETT]

501.BB Palestine/12-1748 : Telegram

Mr. Wells Stabler to the Acting Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

AMMAN, December 17, 1948—5 p. m.

162. It is understood that Prime Minister informed United Nations representative in Amman on December 16 that since Transjordan has accepted SC resolution of November 16 it is willing consider armistice plan. Suggested that Jews submit armistice plan in writing for consideration of Transjordan Government.¹

Repeated Jerusalem, 76, Damascus, Baghdad, Beirut, Jidda, Cairo.

STABLER

¹ Stabler reported on December 23 that the "King and Prime Minister have decided to consider any plan in writing proposed by Israelis but any negotiations concerning it must await until Conciliation Commission arrives. Theory is that commission will lend its support to action in this regard taken by Transjordan." (Telegram 168, 890i.002/12-2348)

867N.01/12-2048 : Telegram

*The Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald)
to the Secretary of State*

SECRET

TEL AVIV, December 20, 1948—4 p. m.

323. Remistel 317, December 17.¹ While not aware Department thinking re publicized Export-Import Bank loan Israel or exact timing *de jure* recognition, mission deems it most important take into account following considerations:

1. While domestically there are party differences as to future socio-

¹ Not printed.

economic and religious pattern, any appraisal Israel international political problems must proceed from fundamental premise that thinking is conditioned by ardent desire to achieve "kibbutz galuyot" ("ingathering of exiles") to save persecuted Jews abroad.

2. Political struggle coming elections essentially between MAPAI and MAPAM. MAPAI orientated West in belief Western system political freedom and socio-economic justice is closest to objectives Israel people; is aware dangers Soviet, its historic antipathy Zionism and present persecution Zionists USSR; is willing cautiously risk Soviet ire, both nationally and with respect Jews in USSR and satellites to form working liaison with West. MAPAM, which is itself coalition, contains substantial elements who, although not Communists in party-line sense, are nevertheless pro-Soviet in sympathy these elements against any overt move tying Israel irrevocably with West owing desire remain "neutral" and fear Israel will be a pawn for Western powers with consequent disaster hostage Jews abroad; they are impressed by Soviet UN aid and stress US "alliance" with British whom vast majority population now considers Israel arch-enemy. Extended conversations with MAPAM leaders indicate naive and wishful thinking re USSR with great ignorance of USA; they believe that by being "nice" to Soviets and above all avoiding antagonize USSR Soviets will continue give Israel firm support UN and ultimately let 3 to 4 million Jews in Soviet orbit go Israel without any specific *quid pro quo*.

3. As previously reported Mission unable to date obtain evidence any *quid pro* asked or offered other than cash payment for arms purchased satellite countries. However, gratitude population to USSR is strong and if composition Israel Government should be one of amenable type Soviets will press for favors. Incipient pressures this direction may be implicit in action Czechoslovakia, Rumania, etc., re emigration and training recently reported by Missions here. True Soviets failure so far capitalize underlying widespread gratitude, but there is strongest reason believe MAPAI leaders more disturbed than they admit at possibility USSR pressure.

4. In coming election general belief is MAPAI will probably get 30 to 35 percent seats Assembly, MAPAM 18 to 20 percent, and balance will go center and extreme right. Thus MAPAI would have control by margin of coalition with center and right. However, such margin not sufficient insure stability of all probable international contingencies, nor to resist more radical domestic policies of MAPAM. Moreover, Soviets may plan some campaign tricks, possibly using MAPAM front to influence January 25 election Assembly or February elections Hista-drut Council.

5. In view above, Mission hopes Department will immediately consider political advisability some action unambiguously demonstrating

USA determination strengthen those elements here who stand clearly for Western system political freedom and socio-economic justice. In so doing US should avoid forcing those elements make specific declaration they are openly antagonistic to USSR. Since Department is expected ultimately announce *de jure* recognition or recommend loans, it would be advantageous make announcement immediately of recognition, or at least of loan, utilizable by MAPAI as clear evidence reliability US. Regarding loan, MAPAM position is that it is needed but MAPAM will resist imposition political conditions and hence announcement should make clear no political conditions while, of course, reserving free action re credit risk and applicable bank regulations.

6. Mission of opinion that firm declaration by Department on loan to Israel would accomplish much. *De jure* recognition statement would show US not lagging behind USSR and not tied British policies. Mission recommends any announcement action simultaneously Washington and Tel Aviv to obtain maximum effect. Department requested also keep Mission continuously informed, for its comment.²

McDONALD

² Mr. McDonald, on December 21, suggested that telegram 323 be sent to the White House (telegram 325, 867N.01/12-2148). A marginal notation on the latter message by Mr. Rockwell stated that Mr. Humelsine would send No. 323 to the White House. The next day, Mr. McDonald sent a telegram for the "Personal attention Clifford and info Department," which stated in part: "Anxious you study personally recommendations ourtel 323. . . . President's timely action loan and *de jure* recognition could checkmate Russian attempts weaken predominant moderate pro-Western forces during present electoral campaign." (No. 333, 867N.01/12-2248)

501.BB Palestine/12-2148

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] December 21, 1948.

Participants: The Acting Secretary

Mr. Eliahu Epstein, Special Representative of the
Provisional Government of Israel

Mr. Wilkins—NE

Mr. Epstein called on me this afternoon at his request for the express purpose of thanking the United States Government, on behalf of his government, for the continued support and assistance which the United States Delegation had given the Israeli Delegation at the recent meetings of the General Assembly and the Secretary Council in Paris.

Mr. Epstein said Israel particularly appreciated Dr. Jessup's remarks in the Security Council on December 2² with regard to Israel's application for membership in the United Nations and regretted that,

¹ Drafted by Mr. Wilkins.

² For text, see SC, *3rd yr.*, No. 128, p. 8.

thereafter, France and Canada had been unable to vote in favor. Mr. Epstein was of the opinion the Cairo news release with regard to the El Faluja pocket in the Negev appearing at that moment—possibly deliberately—had prevented favorable action by the Security Council.³ Nevertheless, Israel appreciated to the full our support and hoped developments in Palestine would soon permit favorable reconsideration by the Security Council and the admission of Israel into the United Nations during the April session of the General Assembly.

I told Mr. Epstein that prior to the recent Security Council meeting we had discussed the question of admission with both France and Canada and, in the case of France, understood they were prepared to vote in favor. We had not, however, been so certain of Canadian support. I agreed with Mr. Epstein the Cairo news release had undoubtedly been a determining factor in the Security Council's failure to take action.

I pointed out in this connection that we had recently again been approached with regard to the Israeli troops on Lebanese territory and asked Mr. Epstein if he could tell me anything about it. I said that if Israel troops were in the Lebanon it would undoubtedly serve as a basis for further Arab charges in the Security Council which might, as in the case of El Faluja, have a continuing adverse effect on Israel's application for admission. It seemed to me that it would be helpful if these troops could be withdrawn. Mr. Epstein said he had no recent information and was not informed on the subject but understood Israeli troops were on Lebanese territory because Syrian troops were in occupation of Israeli territory. Mr. Epstein said he realized this was not an answer to my question but that it was the best he could give me at this time.⁴

Mr. Epstein went on to describe in some detail two major problems which now confronted the Provisional Government of Israel. The first of these problems was their relations with the various Arab states. Mr. Epstein hoped the United States Government would shortly be able to take constructive economic steps in assisting the countries of the Near East to raise their social and economic standards. Israel would genuinely support such action. Mr. Epstein said his govern-

³ The Security Council voted on the Israeli application for membership in the United Nations on December 17. Five affirmative votes were recorded, including those by the United States and the Soviet Union. Syria opposed and Belgium, Canada, China, France, and the United Kingdom abstained. The application was rejected as it failed to obtain the necessary seven affirmative votes (SC, *3rd yr.*, No. 130, p. 37). For Department comment, see Department of State *Bulletin*, December 19, 1948, p. 763.

⁴ The Department, on December 23, informed Beirut of Mr. Lovett's suggestion to Mr. Epstein regarding the desirability of withdrawing Israeli troops from Lebanon and authorized the Legation to so inform the Lebanese President. The Department requested that no publicity be given to its action (telegram 789, 867N.2390E/12-2348). The telegram was in reply to No. 620 from Beirut, December 16, p. 1670.

ment was firmly convinced that Israel could not exist as a flourishing oasis in a Near Eastern desert in which political, social and economic conditions were deteriorating. Israel feared demagogues and extreme groups in the Arab countries might take advantage of present conditions to further their own limited objectives. Governments might fall and foreign elements such as Russia might exploit the resulting situation. Mr. Epstein concluded that American aid to the Arab countries would prevent developments of this character and would in the long run benefit the Arab states, the United States and Israel.

Mr. Epstein said the second major problem confronting Israel was their relations with the British. The British had always been a realistic and pragmatic people and were at long last beginning to realize that Israel was established and would continue to exist. Mr. Epstein hoped, on behalf of his Government, that the United States would take every feasible step to assist in the establishment of improved relations between Israel and the British Government. Mr. Epstein considered such improvement as essential because it would assist Israel in improving its own relations with the United States and with the Arab states.

I interjected that my previous experience as a banker before entering the Department clearly showed the British were realistic and pragmatic but preferred to let matters develop slowly and gradually. It occasionally required a considerable period to convince them of a basic change in the situation. I pointed out the Department had exerted strenuous efforts for the past 8 or 9 months to persuade the British Government of our views with regard to the change in the situation in Palestine. I said I believed that we had been successful in this effort.

I then asked Mr. Epstein if he had any news with regard to the proposed elections in Israel. Mr. Epstein said elections were scheduled to be held on January 25, 1949 and expressed the hope that the United States Government would be able to take some action before that date which would strengthen the hands of the moderates in Israel and thus assure control of the government by MAPAI, the central groups and the religious groups. Mr. Epstein did not suggest what type of action the United States Government might take but hoped that we would be able to devise some action. Mr. Epstein added, in response to my query, that Israeli discussions with Export-Import Bank were progressing favorably and did not believe the Department should approach the Bank on the subject at this time.

Mr. Epstein pointed out that as two of the members of the new Palestine Conciliation Commission—France and Turkey—were considered to be pro-Arab, it would be extremely helpful if a "good" American were appointed. Such appointment would give the Israelis increased confidence in the Commission and would be greeted with

favor in Tel Aviv. I said that the Department had sent a list of 10 or 15 names to the White House but that a Commissioner had not yet been selected. I said I felt sure a sound, substantial man with profound legal knowledge would be appointed, one who would study the situation and take a direct line.

Mr. Epstein asked me if I thought *de jure* recognition were feasible at this time. I said I thought not. Mr. Epstein agreed with me.

Mr. Epstein again urged we give thought to some action which would strengthen the hands of the moderates during the proposed elections. I said we would give further thought to the matter. Mr. Wilkins added that, in his opinion, the solution of outstanding military problems in the Negev, particularly El Faluja, and of the question of Israeli troops in Lebanon—in other words constructive steps under the Security Council resolution of November 16—would create a favorable impression upon such members of the Security Council as France and Canada. It might subsequently result [that] the Security Council would be able to take favorable action on the Israeli application for admission prior to the January elections. Such action might strengthen the hands of the moderates and the United States would, therefore, be in a much stronger position to support Israeli admission. Mr. Epstein at first thought such discussions should be solely within the province of the Conciliation Commission but agreed, following further reference to the November 16 resolution, the military commanders could conclude such arrangements immediately. I pointed out excellent progress had already been made in Jerusalem in this respect. Mr. Epstein seemed impressed.⁵

⁵ In a memorandum of December 21 to brief Mr. Lovett for his conversation with Mr. Epstein, Mr. Satterthwaite informed him that Israel had submitted separate loan applications to cover specific projects, as suggested by the Export-Import Bank. The Bank was said to be studying the applications with "a sincere and genuine interest" and proceeding as rapidly as possible. The memorandum concluded with the observation that "The Department is in constant contact with the Bank on this matter." (811.516 Export-Import Bank/12-2148)

867N.01/12-2148; Telegram

*The Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald)
to the Acting Secretary of State*

SECRET PRIORITY

TEL AVIV, December 21, 1948—11 a. m.

324. In confidential and strictly informal talk Shiloah with Knox, former stated Egyptian and Iraqi refusals talk armistice causing increasing concern PGI. Shiloah stated Egyptian offer tendered through Riley was that if Israel would free half of trapped Egyptian Faluja forces, Egypt would negotiate with Israel through Riley but not direct; Egyptian Field Commander reported stated he would never

negotiate with Israel Chief Staff but would designate subordinate talk with ICS. These proposals unacceptable to PGI as being subterfuges insure further delays solution while Egyptian Army reforms and rearms. Iraqi have apparently made no proposals for armistice.

It is not known what extent Shiloah's remarks reflect official thinking but there is some sentiment in military circles, supported in part by press reflecting public disappointment over failure achieve UN membership, that UN may not arrive at any satisfactory solution owing Arab intransigence and that a further indefinite and difficult truce may drag victor into what might be tantamount partial defeat owing economic and financial strain. Such opinions based on "realistic" argument that no one disposed help Israel but herself and that in this "realistic" world Israel had best think about clearing up situation definitively.

Mission presupposes that Department and Military authorities Washington fully aware by now Israel has stronger military force than any Arab state plus organization and *esprit* that makes for victory.

Estimate situation is even stronger now than Mistel 179, October 14. Israel fully able defeat either Egyptian forces in Negev or Iraqi in triangle alternately while holding on other Arab fronts. If Transjordan maintains neutrality as indicated present truce mission estimates Israel could drive Iraqi over Jordan and Egyptians from Negev simultaneously, although Iraqi operation might be very costly owing adverse terrain.

Mission has no reason believe that PGI is not fully disposed give Conciliation Commission chance to relieve situation but it is important Commission get under way without delay. Transjordan negotiations armistice rumored stalled. Shertok arrives on 23d and expectation is he will actively push direct negotiations with Arabs.

MCDONALD

501.BB Palestine/12-2248: Airgram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Acting
Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET

LONDON, December 22, 1948.

Subject: Appeal of British Government for US-UK understanding with regard to forthcoming Arab-Jewish negotiations re frontiers in Palestine.

A-2377. For Lovett and Satterthwaite (NEA).

Bevin held his "Palestine" luncheon mentioned my 5244 December 14 at his residence December 20. He had invited among others A. V. Alexander (Minister of Defence), Lord Tedder, General Slim

(Chief, Imperial General Staff), Hector McNeil, Sir Orme Sargent, General Hollis, Michael Wright, Admiral Lord Frazer (First Sea Lord), William Hayter and Frank Roberts as well as Holmes and Jones of this Embassy.¹ Post-prandial conversation led by Bevin took place in atmosphere perhaps even more serious and charged with anxiety than at earlier meetings of same character (Embtel 2267, May 25 and Martel 134, Nov. 15 to Dept) and Defence Minister Alexander, when he spoke of Arab loss of faith in US and UK as result of Palestine and British observance of Arms Embargo, seemed particularly disturbed.

2. Bevin began by saying that he thought US and UK had "done well" in Europe: it remained for them to work out a Middle East policy and to "stay put on it". World was in a difficult position: no one can forecast outcome in China and SE Asia although Bevin had been working hard on Indo China and had suggested to French that they should take "bolder line" there with view to establishing a kind of "Western Union for Southeast Asia". Recent Dutch action had for time being spoiled Bevin's hopes this connection.

3. Bevin said Pal developments were disappointing. He had banked on Bernadotte proposals and US support therefor. He now finds that all Arab States are rapidly losing faith in US and UK and deep pessimism re attitude of West is growing in addition to divisions between individual Arab States. Bevin said Pal settlement at the earliest possible date is essential. UK does not intend to "hold out" against recognition PGI and at proper time when UK knows location Israeli frontiers, UK will extend promptly full recognition to Israel. However, UK believes prospects for UK obtaining its strategic requirements from Israel in the foreseeable future are poor and possibility must be faced that "within five years" Israel may be Communist state. Bevin infers this from fact that new Jewish immigrants come largely from countries behind Iron Curtain where they have been exposed to Communist philosophy. There was no great exodus to Israel from the US and UK where democratic philosophy could have been absorbed. To have communist Israel lying athwart vital strategic roads in ME such as Auja-Beersheba, Gaza-Beersheba and El Kuntilla-Aqaba, would be serious blow to UK strategic plans for area. Bevin said provided these roads and airfield area in Gaza coastal strip (see Embs TopSec Despatch No. 2497 of December 21, 1948²) were safely in Arab hands UK would not object to Israel receiving part Negev and recognized this was inevitable. (*Note*: it seemed clear that Bevin had in mind that Israeli portion Negev should be within limits Nov. 29

¹ Ambassador Douglas led the American group but left London for Washington before this airgram was ready for his signature.

² Not printed.

Resolution east and west but not south Auja-Beersheba road which, together with Beersheba itself, should be in Arab hands.)

4. Bevin reiterated (Embs 5244, Dec. 14) that he hoped US would quickly appoint high caliber representative to Conciliation Commission and that CC would deal specifically with frontiers as well as with general conciliation between parties. He thought CC should endeavor to complete its work in not more than 90 days from present. If CC were not successful, Bevin thought it likely that US and UK would be faced with "another China" in ME.

5. When the Ambassador asked Bevin to explain what he meant by "another China" he mentioned following as factors in support this idea:

- a) Kurds in Iraq offer admirable opportunity for Sov agents to work up racial feeling;
- b) economic stagnation in Iraq following closure south leg pipe line; and
- c) possibility that at any time USSR may switch its support from Israel to Egypt and Transjordan thus creating a great impression in Arab world.

Bevin thought it should not be difficult for USSR to coalesce these indigenous factors into a series of ME civil wars.

6. In contrast to above, Bevin said that once Pal is settled US and UK can quickly push ahead with economic development of Iraq along lines of scheme which he had brought to Secretary's attention in Moscow.³ Iraq, on basis present irrigation schemes, could be made capable of absorbing 150% larger population and this might go far to take care of many Arab refugees as well as Arab population increase.

7. Alexander interrupted at this point to make impassioned plea regarding importance Arab goodwill to US and UK since "only this can check subversive Soviet efforts in area".

8. Bevin said that UK took great risk in supporting Bernadotte proposals and in abiding by UK Arms Embargo. UK had been successful in persuading Arabs to accept first Truce and now Arabs hold UK responsible for Israeli successes achieved by breaking practically every phase of Truce. UK asked Arabs to accept Bernadotte proposals on understanding these were supported by US, but when time came US Del Paris urged postponement consideration Pal problem until after November 2. As it turned out, US attitude has not been in any way changed since Nov. 2 and Arabs have grown progressively weaker. Now Arabs are asking UK to supply them with arms up to the level of arms acquired illegally by Israel. Only way out of situation which

³ See Mr. Bevin's undated memorandum transmitted with a memorandum of March 20, 1947, and footnote 33, *Foreign Relations, 1947*, vol. v, p. 503.

Bevin could see was for US and UK to make certain that CC achieves a settlement within next 90 days. With this objective in mind Bevin suggested that US and UK should arrive at an understanding regarding location southern frontier of Israel in Negev.

9. Bevin then asked Tedder to explain latest Brit thinking re broad strategic aspects Pal problem. This Tedder did substantially along lines para two Embtel 2267, May 25. He commented that it was being said that UK military in supporting Arabs "had backed the wrong horse". He did not think that this was the case since all along Brit military have said Jews would win the first round in any Arab-Jewish clash. Tedder spoke forcefully of danger to defence Suez Canal of Communist infiltration in Middle East and other Moslem countries but commented that he did not think Moslems are likely to go Communist unless local governments collapse with resultant chaos. Of various grave aspects Pal situation, among the most important was its effect on stability of local Arab governments.

10. Slim at this point injected the view that it is "very wrong" to think that Moslems do not become Communists: for example, Bokhara, with its Moslem population, early fell under Soviet domination even while USSR was weak. Alexander opined that Israel will go Communist much more readily than any Moslem State.

11. The Ambassador said that if he understood the British proposition correctly, the Brit Chiefs of Staff are anxious to take out insurance against possibility that Israel, in the event of hostilities, would be either a neutral or an unfriendly state. With this in mind UK would like to see Negev boundary Israel so placed that it would not affect most pressing Brit needs in Negev (see para 3 above and Embs Top Sec Despatch No. 2497 of December 21, 1948). Those present agreed with the Ambassador's statement of the British position.

12. The Ambassador then suggested that if Brit military believe Israel possesses the strongest indigenous military force in the Middle East it would be advisable for UK to consider how Israel can be kept oriented towards the West. Bevin promptly agreed with this point and said that his greatest wish is to achieve an early settlement Pal problem provided this is not done at expense of Britain's Arab friends. Hector McNeil expressed view that if CC operates with clear understanding strategic problems involved in locating Negev frontier it should be possible for it to achieve a settlement which would neither outrage Arabs nor perpetuate Arab-Jewish friction in the Middle East. It could be argued, McNeil said, that Israel might become eventually important asset in Middle Eastern defence. However, at present

Transjordan and Egypt are certainly "better bets than Israel", and consequently their goodwill should not be destroyed to satisfy exaggerated Israeli claims upon territory in the Negev. This caused McNeil to believe it would be desirable for CC to have a "working plan" based on US-UK understanding before it sits down to work with parties.

13. Michael Wright said UK is faced with difficult diplomatic problem since it is certain that Arab States will ask UK advice before and during CC negotiations. UK does not wish to advise Arabs contrary to ideas of US. But what are ideas US? Without these UK could say very little to Arabs.

14. Bevin asked that the Ambassador should take particular pains during his brief visit Washington to discuss foregoing Brit view with Dept since in Bevin's view the sooner US and UK reach an understanding re location southern frontier of Israel which UK could recommend to Arabs and which US could recommend to PGI, the better. Vital factor in such an understanding would be unwavering US and UK support to parties of agreed line. The Ambassador promised, without commitment re prospects of success, that he would do this and would send Bevin Depts reactions. He would do this if possible before Jan 1, 1949. The Ambassador made it clear, however, that present trend Depts thinking as he understood it is to leave location Negev frontier so far as possible to CC.

15. Tedder again raised question desirability UK supplying RAF installations Amman along lines para 10 *et seq.*, Martel 134, Nov 15, to Dept. It was clear that he and Alexander regard this as matter of pressing concern but that no immediate moves to take this action are contemplated. Bevin mentioned reinforcement RAF installation Amman in connection with arranging for Brit Consul General to open office Tel Aviv and for release of Jews detained Cyprus. He said that if these two pro-Israel measures were taken, reinforcement RAF Amman would be one of things which he might do in an effort to compensate and restore confidence of Arab side.

16. To summarize foregoing, the British Government is most anxious that:

(a) US immediately appoint a high-caliber man to be US representative on the Conciliation Commission and direct him to use his influence to get the Conciliation Commission operating on the spot in Palestine at the earliest possible date;

(b) US and UK should reach a firm understanding based upon mutual strategic needs regarding the location of the southern frontier of Israel with a view to:

(i) UK recommending Arab acquiescence to this agreed frontier,

(ii) US recommending Israeli acquiescence to this agreed frontier, and

(iii) US member Conciliation Commission being appropriately briefed re US-UK strategic thinking so that in so far as possible he can use his influence to secure Arab-Israeli acquiescence to the agreed frontier.*

HOLMES

* A notation on airgram 2377 states that London placed the original and four carbons in an envelope addressed to Ambassador Douglas in care of Mr. Lovett and sent them to Washington via Navy courier. The editors presume that the Ambassador handed what became the Department's record copy of the airgram to officers of the Department during his conversations with them.

In a letter of January 18, 1949, to First Secretary Jones at the Embassy in the United Kingdom, Mr. Satterthwaite wrote in part: "Shortly after Ambassador Douglas' arrival here, a meeting was set up to discuss Palestine with him. Present were Dean Rusk, Ray Hare, Rob McClintock, Stuart Rockwell and myself. The Ambassador went over your long Top Secret airgram 2377 of December 22 with us and described in detail his meetings with Bevin on the general subject. We went into the background of the US position on Palestine, with particular reference to the basic policy set up by the President. At the end of the meeting the Ambassador said that he completely understood the situation and realized that the Department would not be able to go along with Mr. Bevin on the position which the latter wished to see adopted." (501.BB Palestine/1-1849)

867N.01/12-2248: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, December 22, 1948—7 p. m.

5337. Following obtained today from Burrows and Beeley re Palestine:

1. On telegram from British Embassy Prague in sense Department's 4592, December 8,¹ re new Czech restrictions on aid to PGI, Bevin personally scrawled, "Watch for Soviet swing towards Arabs—E. B."

2. Burrows said that although there is great activity re Palestine, Amman, and Cairo, so far nothing very definite has emerged and there is little evidence that Egypt and Transjordan have gotten very far towards reconciling their differences. Individual Egyptians have been urging UK to use its good offices to bring two countries together, but so far only UK action has been to express view to both that such reconciliation would be "good thing". Burrows said Foreign Office is reluctant to play an active role at this delicate stage and thinks Abdullah, "who has been doing very well," probably knows best (Embassy 5243, December 14² paragraph 2).

3. Foreign Office considers Abdullah is working in right direction but is wise in not moving too fast because it would be foolish for him to outpace Egypt. His action in appointing new Mufti was "courageous" and one which may help situation because new Mufti was

¹ This telegram transmitted a copy of telegram 1812, December 8, from Praha, p. 1652.

² Not printed.

regarded by former Palestine Government as best Moslem Divine Palestine and as such was appointed by it head Sharia Courts.

4. Burrows said he understood there were roughly three lines of thought re Palestine current in Egypt:

(a) That Transjordan and Egypt might keep their troops in respective areas on *de facto* basis and that this situation would gradually solidify without necessity for controversial declarations re sovereignty, negotiations with PGI etc.

(b) That while direct negotiations with Jews are impossible, Conciliation Commission will offer means and excuse for Arabs to work out realistic settlement.

(c) Extreme Arab League attitude favoring continuing hostilities (Embreftel paragraph 3).

5. Burrows said next move re establishment British Consulate General to Tel Aviv (Embreftel paragraph 1) was up to PGI, which has so far not replied to McNeil approach Paris.³

HOLMES

³ Mr. I. J. Linton, an Israeli representative at London, told an Embassy officer on December 31 that the previous day he had informed Mr. McNeil that Israel was not interested in the establishment of the office unless the British Government would publicly announce *de facto* recognition of his government when the office opened. Mr. McNeil told Mr. Linton that he would present the matter to Mr. Bevin but that he was not optimistic (telegram 5438, December 31, 5 p. m., from London, 867N.01/12-3148).

501.BB Palestine/12-2348

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense
(Forrestal)*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, December 23, 1948.

DEAR JIM: Please do not regard this as a formal communication. I thought I would send you this private word forecasting what I think may develop in Palestine, particularly with reference to the military observers which the National Defense Establishment has been kind enough to furnish in relation to the Security Council truce in that country.

As you know, the General Assembly on December 11, 1948 adopted a resolution on Palestine which, among other things, provided that the office of the United Nations Mediator could be terminated at the request of the Security Council, the new Palestine Conciliation Commission taking over his functions. I expect that early next year the Council will in fact relieve the Mediator of further responsibility for supervising the truce and of attempting to find a solution of the Palestine problem. In this case it would be natural to suppose that the military observers who are servants of the Mediator would return home.

However, the Palestine Conciliation Commission, made up of Representatives of France, Turkey, and the United States, will certainly not wish to relinquish the already functioning machinery which the Mediator has established and will probably have need of some of the military observers to assist it in its endeavors to negotiate a permanent armistice.

I should think, accordingly, that in our planning for the future we should expect to receive a call for continued service by United States military observers, although possibly not in the present numbers since a smaller contingent could, under improved conditions, fill the bill. It would seem reasonable to suppose that the Belgian Government, if discharged from its duties as a Member of the Truce Commission, or even on termination of the Office of the Mediator, would expect to withdraw its present officer personnel. However, the gap left by Belgium could be filled by Turkey.

These predictions are, of course, subject to changing developments and I would not wish you to regard them as hard and fast. However, I do think it would be helpful if General Riley were informed that his staff should not be broken up, nor should officers be given their walking papers, until the situation has become more clear, which I expect will be early in January.

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT A. LOVETT

501.BB Palestine/12-2348: Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

JERUSALEM, December 23, 1948—1 p. m.

1550. Yesterday Truce Commission called on Colonel Dayan to explore means breaking present impasse in PGI-Transjordan talks. Pointed out to Dayan its conviction both parties sincerely desire peace and present propitious moment carry out to conclusion talks successfully begun. Stated appeared Transjordan considering itself unable in view opposition from other Arab states (particularly Iraq) to engage in direct armistice talks although it recognized such approach best procedure. Suggested same objective might be achieved by secret talks or continuation meetings under guise implementing cease-fire. Agreements could be reached which both sides would recognize as permanent but without publicity.

Dayan replied PGI ready negotiate armistice and peace either publicly or secretly. Formula used made no difference. Revealed that Colonel Tel in private discussion with him at meeting December 5 suggested secret discussions on basic issues for Jerusalem area. Dayan agreed, but Tel apparently received new orders and evaded continuation talks. Only after convinced Arabs stalling did Dayan make public

offer of armistice talks. Dayan believes King Abdullah, after building up Jericho conference and reaching verge of direct talks with PGI stopped short in view adverse Arab reaction. Recalled Abdullah known as wily fox and probably thinks can stall along and await developments over next few months. Dayan accused British of discouraging Abdullah from proceeding with talks. He insisted PGI would brook no delaying tactics. Reiterated PGI opinion its offer negotiate armistice fulfilled obligations under SC resolution November 16 (Contel 1528, 11th) and left it free take whatever action felt necessary. Implied PGI would resume hostilities if stalemate continues.

TC considers Dayan and PGI sincere in desire negotiate permanent settlement with Abdullah. Dayan on previous occasion stated to Consul General PGI anxious terminate war so could devote energy to main problems of immigration and settlement. TC also feels very definite possibility PGI decision resume hostilities, quickly terminate war by pushing to Jordan (both Jews, Arab Legion and United Nations observers feel can do so with no difficulty) and thus end present drain on economy. Delay may also result in breakdown present cease-fire without deliberate intention on either side. According to Dayan, first serious breaches cease-fire occurred yesterday with one Israeli soldier killed by Egyptians south of Jerusalem and heavy fire opened on Jerusalem Tel Aviv road by Arab Legion from Beit Ikka. French Consul General pointed out present stalemate has relatively slight effect economies Arab states who may well deliberately dally along in hope some event will swing situation their favor. Fallacy this tactic should be obvious from constant deterioration Arab position versus Jews and much more unfavorable settlement they can expect now from that offered by first or second Bernadotte recommendations.

Consul General feels strongly every effort should be extended at present secure agreement between PGI and Transjordan instead risking decision by PGI resume hostilities and gradual termination cease-fire Jerusalem. Measure confidence and cooperation now established and advantage should be taken present situation to push through to armistice. From conversations with British Consul General Jerusalem appears British while perhaps not discouraging Abdullah from armistice talks certainly not urging him conclude peace. British appear believe because opposition Arab states present not right moment and armistice agreement would place Abdullah too strongly at mercy of Jews. Consul General suggests Department may wish impress on British advisability conclusion immediate settlement between Abdullah and PGI and may wish Stabler present same views informally to

King. Willingness British extend terms Transjordan defense treaty to include Arab Palestine under Transjordan control on conclusion armistice or peace would prove powerful inducement to Abdullah. At same time Iraqis might be advised to at least acquiesce in such settlement and effect agreement on their part with Jews re resumption flow oil to Haifa would have in relieving their financial situation again pointed out. Among Arabs only Iraqi forces in central Palestine could cause Transjordan difficulty.¹

Sent Department 1550, repeated Baghdad 38, Beirut 111, Damascus 58, London 38, Amman 15; pouched Cairo 153, Jidda 19.

BURDETT

¹ The Department replied on December 24, stating it was "grateful suggestion your helpful and well-reasoned tel 1550 Dec 23. Unfortunately, moves you suggest appear unfeasible view present outbreak hostilities. Dept will give careful consideration suggested course of action if favorable circumstances established." (telegram 1070, 501.BB Palestine/12-2348)

501.BB Palestine/12-2448

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of United Nations Affairs (Rusk) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] December 24, 1948.

We have spoken with Ralph Bunche, the Acting Palestine Mediator, by telephone, who says that reports from General Riley and his Deputy, Vigier, from Palestine, although of a preliminary nature, do confirm that Israel has resumed hostilities against Egypt, thus violating once more the Security Council's truce resolutions. Bunche is officially communicating these facts to the President of the Security Council, which will meet on Monday, December 27, at the request of Egypt.

In light of McDonald's recent telegrams to Mr. Clifford it would seem useful to make an immediate representation in Tel Aviv couched in fairly strong terms. To balance this it would seem useful also to make representations in Cairo, since the Egyptians have not thus far complied with the Security Council's resolution of November 16, which calls on the parties to negotiate an armistice.¹

¹ Tel Aviv, on December 24, reported that the major military engagement that began in the Negev on December 22, was due to "several factors, including (1) persistent consciousness continued threat of Egypt in south; (2) increasing great economic and financial strain of indefinite duration war; (3) knowledge of Netherlands defection in Indonesia contrary to UN orders; and (4) widening feeling that perhaps only solution is for Israel secure by its own efforts the territory in Negev allotted under partition". (Telegram 339, 867N.00(W)/12-2448)

[Annex 1]

*Draft Telegram by the Acting Secretary of State to the Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald)*²SECRET US URGENT
NIACT

WASHINGTON, [undated.]

Your 323, Dec. 20, and 333, Dec. 22,³ have been discussed with President who very much hopes that reports will yet prove untrue that Israel has resumed military operations in Palestine. However, preliminary info received by Acting Mediator is to effect that PGI has in fact resumed hostilities. Obviously renewed resort to warfare would have to be taken into consideration by Ex-Im Bank in dealing with Israeli request for loan.

This resort to open hostilities if officially confirmed, despite SC truce resolutions, including that of Nov. 16, and despite GA resolution establishing machinery for final peaceful settlement, does not seem in accord with written assurances given SC by FonMin Shertok on Nov. 29 requesting admission of Israel as member of UN in accordance with Art. 4 of the Charter and giving official declaration that Israel "unreservedly accepts the obligations of the United Nations Charter and undertakes to honour them from the day when it becomes a member of the United Nations".

Please officially communicate these views to Ben Gurion and Shertok. You should add that this Govt would much regret if action by Israel in resorting to open warfare in violation of SC truce resolution should indicate that it is not a peace-loving state. Under such circumstances this Govt would be forced to review its position as a supporter of Israel's application for membership in UN. This Govt profoundly hopes that such a contingency will not arise and trusts that statesmanship of Israeli leaders will again be evidenced in a prompt decision to cease hostilities and to utilize facilities afforded by SC, and GA resolution of Dec. 11, to reach a lasting peaceful settlement. This Govt stands ready to assist Israel in every appropriate way, both as a friendly Power and as a member of Palestine Conciliation Commission, to achieve this end.

Foregoing representation must be made within next twelve hours. Telegraph report of your interview.

Repeated to Paris as ———, eyes only for Jessup.

Repeated to London for info only as ———.

² This draft message and the one below were not sent. The Department of State files do not indicate why they were not sent.

³ Latter not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 1676.

[Annex 2]

*Draft Telegram by the Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt*SECRET US URGENT
NIACT

WASHINGTON, [undated.]

Please seek immediate audience with King Farouk and say that your Govt, motivated by its long-standing friendship with Egypt, desires to suggest that Egypt would be in a better position in bringing present alleged Palestine truce violation before SC if Egyptian Govt did in fact now fulfill its obligation under SC resolution of Nov. 16, which called upon parties directly involved in conflict in Palestine to seek agreement forthwith by negotiations conducted directly or through Acting Mediator with view to immediate establishment of armistice. You should add that we hope Egypt will take no action which would contribute to continuation of hostilities.

This representation should be made within next twelve hours.

Repeated for info to London as ———, Paris as ——— for Jessup.

LOVETT

501.BB Palestine/12-2648: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Delegation at Paris*SECRET US URGENT
NIACT

WASHINGTON, December 26, 1948—1 p. m.

4928. For Jessup.

1. Brit Emb on instructions of FonOff today informed Dept that if facts of recent fighting in Negeb were confirmed by reports of UN Palestine Mediator, they would instruct their representative on SC to introduce a resolution reaffirming SC resolutions of Nov 4 and 16, calling on Council to consider possible action under Chapter 7, and fixing a time limit within which parties in Palestine fighting should comply with resolutions of Nov 4 and 16. Brit info thus far is based exclusively on representations made to Brit Amb Cairo by Haidar Pasha Egyptian Min of War.

2. According to Haidar Pasha, he informed Gen Riley on Dec 20 that Egypt was prepared to negotiate armistice under Nov 16 Resolution on condition that Israel would fulfill requirements of Nov 4 Resolution. Egyptians tell Brit Amb that this position still holds good but insist on prompt compliance by Israel with Nov 4 requirement for troop withdrawal from Negeb to positions of Oct 14.

3. Brit have requested Dept's support of their proposed resolution as outlined in Para 1. We made following observations:

(a) It seems futile to propose a resolution which seeks merely to

reaffirm resolutions already violated. SC has already reached point of diminishing returns in this respect.

(b) We thought that Nov 4 and 16th resolutions provide sufficient machinery to deal with present situation, particularly Subcommittee established under Nov 4 SC order.

(c) Most important of all, we felt that US position as member of Conciliation Commission would be gravely jeopardized if we should take line in support of proposed Brit action in SC. We pointed out that rightly or wrongly PGI believes that two members of Conciliation Com are not disposed to be friendly to Israel, since Turkey is a Mohammedan country and France did not vote for Israeli admission to UN in recent SC session. We think chances of US accomplishment as member of Conciliation Commission would be impaired if we played too prominent a role in Council at this juncture.

(d) In consequence we will instruct you to abstain if Brit put down resolution described in Para 1, and to make no statement in Council meeting called to consider present alleged truce violations. After report of Mediator's representatives has been studied we shall determine what course of action to follow.

Repeated to London for info as 4757.

LOVETT

501.BB Palestine/12-2748

*Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Mr. Robert M.
McClintock*

RESTRICTED

[WASHINGTON,] December 27, 1948.

Mr. Bromley¹ phoned at 11:10 this morning to say that a telegram had just been received from the Foreign Office in response to the British Embassy's report of its conversation yesterday with Mr. Satterthwaite and myself, the results of which were summarized in the Department's telegram No. 4928,² for Jessup in Paris. The Foreign Office telegram said that a report had been received by the Security Council from Dr. Bunche³ which made clear that there had been "unprovoked aggression from the Jewish side". In view of this, the Foreign Office was disappointed that the Department had not taken a more responsive attitude yesterday but was persuaded by our suggestion that it would not be useful to introduce a new resolution seeking to reaffirm the resolutions of November 4 and 16. The Foreign Office was hopeful that the problem could be dealt with in substance by existing machinery but did very much wish that the State Department would be able to join it in taking appropriate measures, if warranted by the facts.

I told Mr. Bromley that we were yet in ignorance of Dr. Bunche's report and did not know what the facts might be. When we were in

¹ T. E. Bromley, First Secretary of the British Embassy.

² *Supra*.

³ For the texts of Mr. Bunche's report of December 25, as well as his supplemental report of two days later, see SC, 3rd yr., *Supplement for December 1948*, pp. 300, 304.

possession of the facts we would determine our attitude in the Council and elsewhere. I said once more, however, that we were most concerned to maintain our position as a useful member of the Conciliation Commission and that, accordingly, the British should not look to us to make dramatic speeches in the Security Council. I added further that the situation seemed very complex according to the newspaper reports and that in my own mind it was by no means clear as to who was aggressing whom. I concluded by remarking that according to today's press, Mr. Eban of the Jewish Foreign Office had indicated that his government still wanted peace by negotiation but would resort to all-out warfare if no negotiations were possible. I suggested that we might take this statement as our text for the morning sermon and see what might be done to help the parties negotiate a peaceful settlement. I suggested that this need not be done on a completely broad front but could be accomplished piecemeal as, for example, by negotiations between Abdullah and the PGI. I added, however, that Mr. Bromley's Arab clients had an infinite capacity for political blunder and that I was not sanguine as to the auspices.

Editorial Note

Acting Secretary of State Lovett, in a memorandum of December 27, 1948, to President Truman recommended the appointment of Joseph B. Keenan as United States Representative on the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (501.BB Palestine/12-2748).

Mr. Keenan was appointed to the position the following day. Claude Bréart de Boisanger and Hüseyin Yalçın were designated the French and Turkish Representatives, respectively, on the Commission (Department of State *Bulletin*, January 9, 1949, page 41).

867N.01/12-2848: Telegram

The Chargé in Egypt (Patterson) to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

CAIRO, December 28, 1948—11 a. m.

1766. For Satterthwaite from Griffis. Your 1696, December 15¹ has just reached me as I have been Paris, Geneva.

While I am interested in status possible benefits Egypt discussed

¹ Not printed; it gave the status of matters on Egypt discussed with Ambassador Griffis on November 30, including increased access to United States and world markets for Egyptian cotton, possible United States assistance in expediting construction of the Assuan Dam, technical assistance missions and the training of Egyptians in the United States by the Army and Air Force. The concluding paragraph of the telegram read: "Regret it evident from foregoing that basis for your proposed approach to King too limited and hypothetical warrant such approach now. Dept will continue pursue all favorable possibilities and will welcome further views or recommendations from you." (611.8331/12-1548)

November 30 I have hitherto expressed my opinion frequently and at length to President, Secretary, Undersecretary, your Department and all top members American Delegation UN Paris that Palestine situation cannot be solved with sanctions, mediators, mediation commissions or any other way until firm and united US-UK front with defined borders likewise acceptable to Israel are decided upon by UK and US. I believe that only by this method can problem resolve itself and until this is done any efforts this Embassy to influence King of Egypt are futile. If, however, UK and US can be brought into stated agreement on this matter I believe it can be solved rapidly and with dignity both to Israel and Arab states. My idea has always been to secure US-UK agreement before approaching King. As I am devoting my entire time to Palestine relief this wire not intended as resumption my duties as Ambassador here but this opinion deserves Department's most prompt and urgent consideration on highest levels.

[Here follows final paragraph dealing with the Cairo-Suez pipeline.]

[Griffis]
PATTERSON

867N.01/12-2848 : Telegram

Mr. Wells Stabler to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

AMMAN, December 28, 1948—noon.

173. During frequent talks with King and Prime Minister about matters of current concern, innumerable occasions arise when it would be most useful to have guidance from Department as to line which should be taken. While it is true that Transjordan seeks and welcomes advice from British it is equally true that King and Prime Minister would like to know attitude of US Government which, after all, is playing leading role in endeavors find solution of Palestine problem. As Department has pointed out, settlement in Palestine is urgently needed. Thus it would seem desirable that every opportunity be seized to influence the protagonists toward reaching an understanding. At this stage, Transjordan has gone further than other Arab States, both in theory and in practice, in achieving such understanding with Israel. Such advance, it is submitted, should be encouraged. Consequently, informal guidance to Abdullah and his government might well be a factor of considerable importance in bringing about the desired peace.

Up to this time it has been necessary to remain mute to any hints King and Prime Minister have put out to obtain United States guidance. This muteness is increasingly difficult to maintain in view United

States concern with Palestine question and it may in fact be harmful to cause of settlement and peace.

Therefore, propose that Department may wish consider preparation of policy guidance statement on Transjordan covering such points as:

- a. Negotiation of armistice with Israel;
 - b. Acceleration by Transjordan toward final peace negotiations with Israel;
 - c. Jericho resolutions;
 - d. Transjordan attitude toward Arab League and other Arab States.
- In other words, what does United States Government believe is most desirable course of action Transjordan should follow in order to achieve peace settlement which, as it is admitted, is so urgently needed.

STABLER

501.BB Palestine/12-2848: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET US URGENT

LONDON, December 28, 1948—2 p. m.

5377. According Burrows, deep concern regarding Negev fighting caused Bevin to hold series Foreign Office meetings over holiday weekend. Bevin was "disappointed" with Dept reaction to British appeal via British Ambassador Washington for US support for UK resolution SC (Dept's 4755 [4757¹] December 26). British officials believe US attitude probably decided without benefit full text Mediator's report which makes Israeli responsibility abundantly clear. (See General Riley's report to CNO Washington, December 27.) Officials imagine that study latter may cause US to take firmer attitude since US will understand dangers of appeasement, while conflict continues. Officials also draw attention to strong line by US regarding Indonesian fighting.

2. Burrows said he thought US and UK are fundamentally in agreement regards getting into action existing machinery under November 4 and November 16 resolutions, particularly sub-committee established under SC November 4 order (paragraph 3 (b) Dept's 4757 December 26 to Paris for Jessup). Bevin is worried, however, by divergence with US re methods since UK feels strongly that only way to halt PGI which seems bent on expelling Egyptians (paragraph 1 Tel Aviv's 339, December 24 to Dept²) is to place spotlight world opinion upon Israeli activities through new resolution of kind tabled by Beeley³ SC today. British view is that SC should not content itself with quietly getting existing machinery into action. PGI must have already dis-

¹ This was a repeat of telegram 4928 to Paris, December 26, p. 1691.

² Not printed, but see footnote 1 to memorandum of December 24, p. 1689.

³ For text, see p. 1699.

counted effectiveness this machinery and instead of being given pause by it would be encouraged to believe its aggressive action would bring down on it nothing more persuasive than threat of action drafted in other circumstances and out of which PGI lawyers by obstruction should be able to talk themselves.

3. Burrows said Foreign Office has no information from British sources regarding progress of fighting beyond fact that it appears other Palestine fronts are quiet.

Sent Dept 5377, repeated Paris for Jessup 1075.

HOLMES

501.BB Palestine/12-2948 : Circular airgram

*The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices*¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, December 29, 1948—8:15 a. m.

In view of the fact that the United Nations refugee relief program will terminate August 31, 1949, it is essential that the long-range aspects of the Arab refugee situation* be given careful consideration with a view to formulating policy on this important question.

The General Assembly resolution concerning Palestine, adopted December 11, 1948, deals with the refugee question as follows: "Resolves that refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which under the principles of international law or in equity should be made good by the governments or authorities responsible" and "instructs the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of refugees and payment of compensation and to maintain close relations with the Director of the UN Relief for Palestine Refugees and through him with appropriate organs and agencies of the United Nations." Al-

¹ At Arab capitals, Jerusalem, and London (for information).

*The latest estimates of refugee totals received by the Department are the following:

160,000-220,000	Northern Palestine
200,000-245,000	Southern Palestine
75,000- 80,000	Transjordan
100,000-110,000	Syria
90,000	Lebanon
5,000	Iraq
8,000	Egypt
7,000	Israel

[Footnote in the source text.]

though this Government will use its best efforts to promote the purposes envisaged in this resolution, account must be taken of the possibility that the Government of Israel will be reluctant to accept the return of all those Arabs who fled from territory under Israeli control or that many of those who fled will not wish to return to the Israeli state.

Against the background of these possibilities, any comments which you can make at this time on the following general subjects would be of considerable value to the Department:

1. Economic—To what extent would the continued presence of the refugees adversely affect the economy of the country to which you are accredited or assigned? To what extent and under what circumstances could the state in question assimilate the refugees which it is now harboring? (In the case of Egypt and Transjordan, please also take into account those refugees in Palestinian territory who are under the supervision of the Egyptian and Transjordanian military authorities respectively.) What economic projects of a limited character might be undertaken as a means of integrating these refugees into the local economy? To what extent could they be utilized in connection with oil expansion projects? As a rough indication of their occupational potential, estimate if possible what proportion of the refugees in your area came from urban centers and what proportion from rural. To what extent and under what circumstances could Iraq, which has only 5,000 refugees, and Saudi Arabia, which has none, assimilate a significant number of refugees?

2. Political—What is your estimate of the long-range effect upon the political stability of the state in question in the event that the present group of refugees remains? What is your estimate as to the number of refugees who would be willing to return to Israeli territory on a permanent basis? What is their attitude towards the country in which they are now taking refuge? Is there any evidence that the government is considering the possibility that it may have to accept a number of refugees on a permanent basis, or that it is formulating any plans with that contingency in mind?

3. In view of the manifest impracticability of continuing indefinitely an international refugee relief program, what are your provisional recommendations for the solution of the Arab refugee question? In presenting your views, special emphasis should be placed upon the long-range effects on Near Eastern security of returning the refugees to Israeli territory or, alternatively, of endeavoring to integrate them into the Arab states.

Despite the highly speculative character of these questions, it would be desirable to obtain provisional estimates at this time, subject to review as conditions warrant, for planning purposes and for the guidance of the American member of the Conciliation Commission.

While it would be inadvisable to discuss these questions with Arab officials at the present time, in your discretion you may wish to discuss them with your British colleagues and possibly with certain American nationals concerned with refugee matters. Such discussion, however, should be on an informal and personal basis and no reference to this instruction should be made.

LOVETT

501.BB Palestine/12-2948 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Delegation at Paris*SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, December 29, 1948—11 a. m.
NIACT

4957. For Jessup. Brit Emb has just informed Dept as follows. Brit FonOff has recd two cables from Brit Emb Cairo dated Dec 29. First quoted Haidar Pasha Egyptian Min War as stating Israeli forces were in vicinity El Auja and some had perhaps crossed Egyptian frontier. Message stated Egyptians were requesting UK permission for Egyptian Spitfires to operate out of Suez Canal zone.

Second and subsequent message quoted Haidar Pasha as stating Israelis were then within 10 miles of El Arish and well over Egyptian frontier.

Brit FonOff desired substance these two messages be given Dept. FonOff stated no confirmation from other sources but RAF had been instructed to verify by reconnaissance. If Israelis had in fact crossed Egyptian frontier UK obligations under terms Anglo-Egyptian treaty would of course come into play.¹

LOVETT

¹ This telegram was repeated to Cairo.

501.BB Palestine/12-2948 : Telegram

*The Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald)
to the Acting Secretary of State*

SECRET US URGENT TEL AVIV, December 29, 1948—4 p. m.

349. Acceptance by S.C. of Beeley resolution¹ would, we believe, postpone peace in Negev by encouraging Egypt's continued refusal negotiate armistice. Moreover, PGI cannot surrender military gains in Negev especially since Egypt shows no willingness recognize Israel's existence, MG [*sic*] state or to deal with PGI.

MCDONALD

¹ See resolution of December 29, *infra*.

*Resolution 66 (1948) Adopted by the Security Council on
December 29, 1948¹*

The Security Council

*Having considered the report of the Acting Mediator on the hostilities which broke out in southern Palestine on 22 December 1948,
Calls upon the Governments concerned:*

- (i) To order an immediate cease-fire;
- (ii) To implement without further delay resolution 61 (1948) of 4 November 1948 and the instructions issued by the Acting Mediator in accordance with sub-paragraph (1) of the fifth paragraph of that resolution;
- (iii) To allow and facilitate the complete supervision of the truce by the United Nations observers;

Instructs the committee of the Council appointed on 4 November to meet at Lake Success on 7 January 1949 to consider the situation in southern Palestine and to report to the Council on the extent to which the Governments concerned have by that date complied with the present resolution and with resolutions 61 (1948) and 62 (1948) of 4 and 16 November 1948;

Invites Cuba and Norway to replace as from 1 January 1949 the two retiring members of the committee (Belgium and Colombia);

Expresses the hope that the members of the Conciliation Commission appointed by the General Assembly on 11 December 1948 will nominate their representatives and establish the Commission with as little delay as possible.

¹ Reprinted from SC, *3rd yr., Resolutions, 1948*, p. 30. The Council adopted the resolution by eight votes to none, with the United States, the Soviet Union, and the Ukraine abstaining. For the official record of the voting, see SC, *3rd yr., No. 137*, pp. 23-26. The Egyptian Representative, in a letter of December 24 to the President of the Security Council, had claimed that Zionist forces had launched heavy, new attacks on Egyptian positions in the Negeb and had requested an urgent meeting of the Council to deal with the situation; for text, see SC, *3rd yr., Supplement for December 1948*. The Council began its deliberations on the matter on December 28 and considered a British draft resolution; for text, see SC, *3rd yr., No. 136*, pp. 13-14.

867N.01/12-2948 : Telegram

Mr. Wells Stabler to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

AMMAN, December 29, 1948—8 p. m.

175. Following obtained from Kirkbride this morning:

1. At meeting December 28 in Jerusalem attended by Sassoon, Dayan and Abdullah el Tel, Israelis informed Transjordan representative

that Israel was no longer interested in armistice and insisted on immediate peace negotiations. Apparently Israelis took severe line indicating it must be either peace or war. This is believed to be in nature reply to Abdullah's message Sassoon (paragraph 3 mytel 172, December 28¹).

2. King is considerably worried by this situation as, with present Jewish attack in Negev, it is obvious Israel entirely prepared continue hostilities to achieve its ends. Kirkbride thought it likely that unless Abdullah agreed to peace negotiations almost at once Jews might well attack Iraqis thereby rendering Transjordan's position hopeless.

3. King is now following own line in respect Israelis and Prime Minister uninformed. Latter has reached stage where he is no longer particularly interested in developments. Only question of time before he resigns.

4. As Egyptian troops in Bethlehem area cannot be trusted (mytel 169, December 23²), Arab Legion has moved regiment from Akaba to Bethlehem leaving Akaba unprotected. In view unsatisfactory state of affairs in Bethlehem, Transjordan authorities are reconsidering attitude toward Egyptian units keeping in mind fact that punitive action would probably result in final break with Egypt.

5. Certain evidence now points to air raid on Jericho being carried out by Jewish plane with bombs captured from Egyptians.³ Raid may have been for psychological purposes as bombs were dropped in such a manner as to cause no damage. British Royal Air Force in Egypt have reported they satisfied it not Egyptian plane.

Sent Department 175; repeated Jerusalem 82.

STABLER

¹ Not printed; paragraph 3 stated in part: "King gave account [to Mr. Stabler] of steps he is now taking on political level to reach understanding with Jews. Several weeks ago Sassoon of Israeli Foreign Office sent message to King that he would like to confer with responsible Transjordan official (mytel 155, December 13). King sent reply through Abdullah el Tel and his private physician, Shawkat Pasha, suggesting certain action Jews might follow to indicate their sincerity of intentions. Apparently main points were return of Jaffa to Arabs and permission for Arab refugees to go back to Lydda and Ramle. King remarked that if Jews did accept his proposition, his position vis-à-vis Arab League would be much stronger in that he could point to this achievement as concrete evidence of his efforts in behalf of Palestine Arabs. Expected answer from Sassoon December 27 or 28. If reply is in negative it will not change his present policy toward Israel or his belief that two countries could cooperate." (867N.01/12-2848)

² Not printed.

³ Amman, in its telegram 172, gave the King's comment that the "air raid on Jericho and Shuneh night December 24 may have been carried out by Egyptians. Bomb fragment bore words 'Farouk to Shertok' in the Arabic letters."

501.BB Palestine/12-3048

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] December 30, 1948.

Participants: The Acting Secretary, Mr. Lovett
The British Ambassador, Sir Oliver Franks
The British Minister, Mr. Hoyer Millar
Mr. Satterthwaite—NEA
Mr. McClintock—UNA

The British Ambassador called, under instructions to leave a *Note Verbale* with the Acting Secretary of State with reference to the existing hostilities in Palestine. A copy of this document is attached. Sir Oliver Franks read, from a telegram just received by his Embassy, reports from the British Ambassador in Cairo to the effect that an Israeli column had bifurcated in the vicinity of Beersheba and that attacks were being made by Israeli forces across the Egyptian frontier from the south and southeast on a line from Rafah extending fifteen kilometers in the direction of El Arish. One Egyptian airstrip on Egyptian territory had been taken by the Israeli forces. Egyptian Spitfires had landed out of gas on British airfields in the Canal zones, thus implying that advanced Egyptian airfields were no longer operable.

When asked whether, if the treaty of 1936 were invoked, it would be invoked by the British Government or by the Egyptian Government, particularly in light of the fact that the latter government had recently shown its dissatisfaction with that treaty, the British Ambassador said that he could give no straight answer. He emphasized that his information on the military situation was preliminary but that, according to the evidence now at hand, it seemed highly probable that Israeli forces had crossed the Egyptian frontier and that in consequence a most serious situation had arisen. He spoke of the strategic interests of the United States and the United Kingdom in this area and, from the broader political point of view, the troubles which could ensue to both governments if the present threatening situation were allowed to continue.

I said that we agreed that the situation, if the facts were as represented, was a serious one and that we were ready to do our best to compose it. I said the President had been informed yesterday of the most recent information and that I would discuss the Ambassador's *Note Verbale* with the President at 12:30 today.² I thought, offhand, that it might be useful for the President to instruct our Representative at Tel Aviv to make immediate representations to the Provisional Government of Israel.

¹ Drafted by Mr. McClintock.

² President Truman read this note at 12:45 p. m., December 30.

As for the final paragraph of the *Note Verbale*, I could not but say frankly that if the British Government decided to resume the shipment of arms to the Arab countries this would be regarded as a clear violation of the Security Council's arms embargo. It would inevitably result in a demand in this country for the lifting of our own arms embargo which, as the Ambassador knew, had been imposed by us unilaterally even before the Security Council took action. Such a development would, of course, be highly unfortunate.

Mr. McClintock suggested to the Ambassador that there was a seeming inconsistency between the first and final paragraphs of the *Note Verbale*. The concluding sentence of the first paragraph reads "If the Security Council is thus flouted the United Nations will cease to be an effective force", yet the final sentence of the fourth paragraph clearly indicates that the British Government intends to resume shipping arms to the Arab countries, thus itself flouting the United Nations.

Sir Oliver Franks at this point said that he had been given permission, but only in terms of "utmost discretion", to inform the Acting Secretary that a telegram had been received from the British Representative in Amman, stating that King Abdullah had received a message from the Jews (presumably the Provisional Government of Israel) that the time for negotiations for an armistice had passed. The Jews were interested now only in negotiating peace. If it was not to be peace, it would be war. Sir Oliver inferred that it was on the basis of this threatening information that his government had drafted the final paragraph of the *Note Verbale*. The British Ambassador was asked his opinion whether his Government would carry out the intended action described in Paragraph 4, if through the cooperation of the United States it proved possible to meet the suggestions made in Paragraph 3, with the result that the forces of Israel would withdraw from Egyptian territory immediately. Sir Oliver said that he was speaking only for himself but he thought it possible that his government would not proceed to arm the other Arab countries if indeed it was possible to restrain the Israelis from their present attack on Egypt and to get their forces back across the border.

Sir Oliver reverted to his telephone conversation with me³ in which he had requested an interview with the President. I said that the President was giving no outside appointments this week as he was engaged on the State of the Union Message. Sir Oliver asked if I would present his case to the President and I said I would at once give him the British *Note Verbale* and report our interview. At the Ambassador's request I promised to ask the President to accord him an interview at the earliest possible moment.

³ The editors have found no record of this conversation in the Department of State files.

[Annex]

Note Verbale by the British Embassy

All the evidence in possession of the British Government points to the fact that, notwithstanding the truce and the resolutions passed by the United Nations, Israeli forces are fighting on Egyptian territory, where they are in possession of airfields. They have declined the use of United Nations observers and officials and it seems that United Nations, upon which the United States and Britain had both pledged their action, are being deliberately and totally ignored. If the Security Council is thus flouted the United Nations will cease to be an effective force.

2. The British Government regard the situation with grave concern. Unless the Jews withdraw from Egyptian territory the British Government will be bound to take steps to fulfil their obligations under their treaty of 1936 with Egypt. There may arise out of this situation the gravest possible consequences, not only to Anglo-American strategic interests in the Near East, but also to American relations with Britain and Western Europe.

3. The British Government have no desire to get into conflict with the Jews provided the latter accept the decisions of the Security Council of the United Nations and act upon them. They still trust that wiser counsels among the Jews will prevail. They trust that it will be possible for the United States Government so to act upon the Jews as to make any military action by British forces on Egyptian territory unnecessary under our treaty with Egypt. This can only be ensured if the Jews immediately withdraw from Egyptian territory.

4. Meanwhile, the British Government feel bound to take the necessary steps to protect their own troops and installations in Transjordan. The British Government agreed not to supply any arms to the Arab countries provided the truce was observed, and they understood that the United States Government were agreeable that Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter should be applied to either party which did not observe the truce. On that basis, the British Government have carried out their obligations to the absolute letter. They have refrained from moving arms and equipment even to their own installations, thereby endangering their own troops in order to assist a settlement. In view of the very serious danger the British Government must now proceed to move equipment into Transjordan. Moreover, in view of the aggressive use to which the Jews have put arms obtained from Russian satellite countries, the British Government will find themselves in a position in which they are no longer able to refuse to carry out British contracts to the Arab countries.

WASHINGTON, 30th December, 1948.

501.BB Palestine/12-3048: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald)

TOP SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, December 30, 1948—5 p. m.
NIACT

281. President directs that you make following immediate representation to Shertok and Ben Gurion. You are authorized in your discretion to make same representation to President Weizmann. Please telegraph immediate report of your interviews.

1. This Govt is most deeply disturbed on receipt of apparently authentic reports confirming that Egyptian territory has been invaded by armed forces of Israel. Reports indicate that this is not an accidental maneuver but a deliberately planned military operation.

2. British Govt has officially notified this Govt that it regards situation with grave concern and that unless Israeli forces withdraw from Egyptian territory British Govt will be bound to take steps to fulfill their obligations under Treaty of 1936 with Egypt. However, British Govt states it has no desire to get into conflict with Govt of Israel provided latter accept decisions of Security Council of UN and act upon them.

3. As first govt to recognize PGI and as a sponsor of Israel's application for admission to UN as a "peace-loving state" this Govt, with deep concern and as evidence of its consistent friendship for Israel, desires to draw attention of Israeli Govt to grave possibility that by ill-advised action PGI may not only jeopardize peace of Middle East but would also cause reconsideration of its application for membership in UN and of necessity a reconsideration by this Govt of its relations with Israel. As PGI knows, their assurances of peaceful intent have been basis upon which our policy toward Israel has rested.

4. Immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces from Egyptian territory appears to be minimum requirement giving proof of peaceful intent of PGI, if enlarged conflict is to be avoided.

5. This Govt has received reports from its representative in Transjordan indicating that PGI has informed Govt of Transjordan that time for negotiations for an armistice has passed. PGI is represented as stating that it is interested now only in negotiating peace, but indicated that it must be either peace or war. If this threatening attitude should be confirmed, again this Govt would have no other course than to undertake a substantial review of its attitude toward Israel.

6. You may conclude by stating that temporarily your Govt is withholding press comment pending a complete statement from PGI in answer to the foregoing representation.

Repeated to Amembassy, London as 4819.

LOVETT

Forrestal Papers

*Diary Entry for December 31, 1948, by the Secretary of Defense
(Forrestal)*

Cabinet—China—Palestine

Subject this morning at Cabinet was China.

[Here follow two paragraphs concerning China.]

Palestine:

Lovett said the Israeli troops had apparently invaded Egypt. Specifically, they were reported to have attacked an air field within the Egyptian border; that it was reported the British would notify us that the failure of the Israelis to withdraw promptly would automatically bring into operation the Anglo-Egyptian mutual defense pact.

501.BB Palestine/12-3148: Telegram

*The Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald)
to the Acting Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET

URGENT

TEL AVIV, December 31, 1948—1 p. m.

NIACT

350. Redeptel 281, December 30, 5 p. m., received at 1 p. m. December 31. True copy typed at 1:45. At 2 p. m. called Shertok who came my house and I read him careful paraphrase. Knox present. Shertok informed me Ben-Gurion left Tel Aviv for Tiberias at 12 noon but would immediately attempt get in touch with him. I urged necessity my seeing BG here or Tiberias today. Owing distance Tel Aviv to Tiberias and gravity of question 10 or 12 hours may elapse before I am able send full reply.

Shertok's tentative and informal preliminary reply was as follows:

1. As for Israel incursion into Egypt he admitted such operations but stated uninformed as to details (Shertok returned Israel only last 24 hours). Shertok observed that his opinion such operations based on military logic of total operations and not any intentions seize Egyptian territory.

2. As regards Trans-Jordan Shertok was positive. He stated that our government's advices inaccurate. Israel has informed Trans-Jordan that negotiations must proceed further than present cease-fire arrangements toward an effective armistice looking toward peace. Last secret meeting of negotiators took place night December 30 in Arab part Jerusalem with Shiloah, Colonel Dayan and secretary on one side and Abdullah el-Tel on other. Next secret meeting is for January 5 in Jewish Jerusalem. Shertok stated that if any statement re-

garding "war or peace" was made at earlier meeting it was in course conversational exchange, was not an ultimatum, and used in an effort persuade Trans-Jordan proceed to definite armistice.¹

MCDONALD

¹ Mr. McDonald, later the same day, reported that he and Mr. Knox were leaving immediately for Tiberias to see the Israeli Prime Minister, who was ill. He also advised of information from Mr. Shiloah that orders had already been issued for the immediate withdrawal of small Israeli units from the Egyptian side of the frontier (telegram 351 from Tel Aviv, 501.BB Palestine/12-3148).

867N.01/12-2848: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to Mr. Wells Stabler, at Amman

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, January 3, 1949—5 p. m.

2. Dept has given careful consideration Jerusalem tel No. 1550 Dec 23 rptd Amman 15 and to ur 173 Dec 28, 172 Dec 28¹ and 176 Dec. 29.² Dept's comment on points raised as follows:

Dept anxious see peace restored to Palestine and believes should be accomplished by negotiations, either directly between parties or through Conciliation Commission. Dept would naturally welcome any concrete steps by Israelis or Arabs to bring about such negotiations. In this connection Dept has found reasonable attitude shown by TJ re negotiations with Jews extremely hopeful sign.

US, however, naturally desires avoid becoming involved in inter-Arab jealousies and intrigues and Dept regards question TJ relations with Arab League as essentially one for determination by TJ. As you point out ur 176 Dec 29, determining factor seems to be mil one. Dept believes final attitude TJ re Israelis will be decided by mil situation, particularly position of Arab Legion, and by stand taken by UK. Not essential, therefore, and certainly undesirable that US become involved in question TJ attitude re Arab League and other Arab States.

Dept believes that most satisfactory solution disposition greater part Arab Palestine would be incorporation in Transjordan. Therefore Dept approves principle underlying Jericho resolutions.

To sum up, US would like to see TJ negotiate armistice and final peace with Israelis, and believes most Arab Palestine could be incorporated in Transjordan as outcome such negotiations. However, US can not become involved in inter-Arab politics. If King and TJ officials

¹ No. 172 not printed; but see footnotes 1 and 3, p. 1700.

² Not printed; it advised that British Minister Kirkbride had cabled the Foreign Office for instructions concerning an approach to King Abdullah. The Minister commented that the policy of the Foreign Office to "hold back until Conciliation Commission arrives" no longer corresponded with the facts and that the King was fearful that the Israelis would "continue war against him or Iraqis or both unless he agrees in immediate future to peace negotiations." The King was said to be aware that the Arab Legion and the Iraqi Army would be defeated easily, the former because of its lack of ammunition (867N.01/12-2948).

seek views US on question Palestine settlement, you are authorized state US approval reasonable attitude so far shown by TJ and to express US hope that TJ, as well as other Arab States, will find way of entering armistice and peace negotiations with Israelis. You are also authorized, if queried re US views on disposition Arab Palestine, to state that US believes logical outcome negotiations between TJ and Israelis would be incorporation greater part Arab Palestine in TJ. You will know best how to do this without giving impression US supporting TJ against Arab League and without involving US in Arab politics.³

LOVETT

³ This telegram was repeated to Jerusalem and London.