

will enable the United Nations Palestine Commission to discharge its functions and responsibilities in due course, without the use of force;

“(b) To examine the advisability of requesting the Secretary-General to call an extraordinary session of the General Assembly for the purpose of reconsidering its resolution of 29 November 1947, as a whole or in part, and discussing such other matters relating thereto as the committee may find necessary for the pacific settlement of the situation in Palestine.”

Finally, the resolution requested the United Kingdom “to postpone the date fixed for the termination of its Mandate until 15 July 1948, and, accordingly, its arrangements for the evacuation of its troops from Palestine.” (SC, *3rd yr.*, Nos. 16-35, pages 292, 293.)

The proposal was withdrawn by the Colombian Representative at the Security Council meeting of February 27 (*ibid.*, page 365).

PPS Files, Lot 64D563

*Report by the Policy Planning Staff*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] February 24, 1948.

PPS/23

[Extracts]

REVIEW OF CURRENT TRENDS
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

V. PALESTINE AND THE MIDDLE EAST

The Staff views on Palestine have been made known in a separate paper. I do not intend to recapitulate them here. But there are two background considerations of determining importance, both for the Palestine question and for our whole position in the Middle East, which I should like to emphasize at this time.

1. *The British Strategic Position in the Middle East*

We have decided in this Government that the security of the Middle East is vital to our own security. We have also decided that it would not be desirable or advantageous for us to attempt to duplicate or to take over the strategic facilities now held by the British in that area. We have recognized that these facilities would be at our effective disposal anyway, in the event of war, and that to attempt to get them transferred, in the formal sense, from the British to ourselves would

¹This report was an annex to a memorandum of February 24 by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan), addressed to the Secretary and Under Secretary of State. For the full text of both documents, see vol. I, Part 2, pp. 509 and 510.

only raise a host of new and unnecessary problems, and would probably be generally unsuccessful.

This means that we must do what we can to support the maintenance of the British of their strategic position in that area. This does *not mean* that we must support them in every individual instance. It does *not mean* that we must back them up in cases where they have got themselves into a false position or where we would thereby be undertaking extravagant political commitments. It *does mean* that any policy on our part which tends to strain British relations with the Arab world and to whittle down the British position in the Arab countries is only a policy directed against ourselves and against the immediate strategic interests of our country.

2. *The Direction of Our Own Policy*

The pressures to which this Government is now subjected are ones which impel us toward a position where we would shoulder major responsibility for the maintenance, and even the expansion, of a Jewish state in Palestine. To the extent that we move in this direction, we will be operating directly counter to our major security interests in that area. For this reason, our policy in the Palestine issue should be dominated by the determination to avoid being impelled along this path.

We are now heavily and unfortunately involved in this Palestine question. We will apparently have to make certain further concessions to our past commitments and to domestic pressures.

These concessions will be dangerous ones; but they will not necessarily be catastrophic if we are thoroughly conscious of what we are doing, and if we lay our general course toward the avoidance of the possibility of the responsibility I have referred to. If we do not lay our course in that direction but drift along the lines of least resistance in the existing vortex of cross currents, our entire policy in the Middle Eastern area will unquestionably be carried in the direction of confusion, ineffectiveness, and grievous involvement in a situation to which there cannot be—from our standpoint—any happy ending.

I think it should be stated that if this Government is carried to a point in the Palestine controversy where it is required to send U.S. forces to Palestine in any manner whatsoever, or to agree either to the international recruitment of volunteers or the sending of small nation forces which would include those of Soviet satellites, then in my opinion, the whole structure of strategic and political planning which we have been building up for the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern areas would have to be reexamined and probably modified or replaced by something else. For this would then mean that we had consented to be guided, in a highly important question affecting those areas, not by national interest but by other considerations. If we tried, in the

face of this fact, to continue with policy in adjacent areas motivated solely by national interest, we would be faced with a duality of purpose which would surely lead in the end to a dissipation and confusion of effort. We cannot operate with one objective in one area, and with a conflicting one next door.

If, therefore, we decide that we are obliged by past commitments or U.N. decision or any other consideration to take a leading part in the enforcement in Palestine of any arrangement opposed by the great majority of the inhabitants of the Middle Eastern area, we must be prepared to face the implications of this act by revising our general policy in that part of the world. And since the Middle East is vital to the present security concepts on which this Government is basing itself in its worldwide military and political planning, this would further mean a review of our entire military and political policy.

X. CONCLUSIONS

In the Mediterranean and Middle East, we have a situation where a vigorous and collective national effort, utilizing both our political and military resources, could probably prevent the area from falling under Soviet influence and preserve it as a highly important factor in our world strategic position. But we are deeply involved, in that same area, in a situation which has no direct relation to our national security, and where the motives of our involvement lie solely in past commitments of dubious wisdom and in our attachment to the U.N. itself. If we do not effect a fairly radical reversal of the trend of our policy to date, we will end up either in the position of being ourselves militarily responsible for the protection of the Jewish population in Palestine against the declared hostility of the Arab world, or of sharing that responsibility with the Russians and thus assisting at their installation as one of the military powers of the area. In either case, the clarity and efficiency of a sound national policy for that area will be shattered.

*Statement Made by the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) Before the Security Council on February 25, 1948*¹

I propose a draft resolution on the Palestine question which reads as follows:

"The Security Council,
"Having received General Assembly resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947, on Palestine, and having received from the United

¹ Reprinted from SC, 3rd yr., Nos. 16-35, pp. 294, 295.

Nations Palestine Commission its first monthly report and its first special report on the problem of security in Palestine;

“Resolves:

“1. To accept, subject to the authority of the Security Council under the Charter, the requests addressed by the General Assembly to it in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of section A of the General Assembly resolution of 29 November 1947;

“2. To establish a committee of the Security Council, comprising the five permanent members of the Security Council, the functions [of] which will be:

“(a) To inform the Security Council regarding the situation with respect to Palestine and to make recommendations to it regarding the guidance and instructions which the Security Council might usefully give to the Palestine Commission;

“(b) To consider whether the situation with respect to Palestine constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and to report its conclusions as a matter of urgency to the Security Council, together with any recommendations for action by the Security Council which it considers appropriate;

“(c) To consult with the Palestine Commission, the Mandatory Power, and representatives of the principal communities of Palestine concerning the implementation of the General Assembly recommendation of 29 November 1947.

“Appeals to all Governments and peoples, particularly in and around Palestine, to take all possible action to prevent or reduce such disorders as are now occurring in Palestine.”

I think it would be premature for me to undertake to debate this draft resolution, because it follows a draft resolution which is already before the Security Council, but this draft resolution clearly shows that the attitude of the United States is such that it cannot support the proposal made yesterday by the representative of Colombia, and that its opposition is not without reason, because the position as stated yesterday is exactly the position that is represented in this draft resolution.

I wanted to submit this draft resolution to the Security Council early enough—indeed I think this is the earliest possible moment I could submit it—so that in considering the draft resolution presented by Colombia and any other situation that may arise here, the Security Council may know that the position of the United States, represented in the address which I made before the Security Council yesterday, is carried into a definite, concrete proposal, and so that the members of the Security Council may have the earliest possible notice of the United States position.

IO Files : US/A/AC.21/45

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Samuel K. C. Kopper

SECRET

[NEW YORK,] February 25, 1948.

I. PALESTINE

Mr. Chamoun told me this afternoon that he was somewhat concerned about the possibility of the Security Council finding a threat to the peace existing in Palestine and while taking action with respect to such a threat implementing the partition plan as a by-product. I replied that in so far as the United States position was concerned, Ambassador Austin's statement yesterday clearly indicated that the United States did not believe the Security Council had the power to enforce a recommendation. On the other hand, however, we did feel that the Charter very definitely granted power to the Security Council to deal with threats to the peace. In so far as the Palestine situation was concerned, the Council could take action with respect to any threat which it determined existed there. The maintenance of peace, however, was not the same as the enforcement of partition. Mr. Chamoun did not seem to be convinced. I tried to point out that it was rather difficult to make it clear to him, since the Council action would depend on existing facts but would be limited within the powers granted to the Council by the Charter.

Mr. Chamoun said he did not like the resolution introduced by the United States this afternoon. I said it followed the speech made by Ambassador Austin yesterday. He again reiterated his concern about whether the Council would implement partition while seeking to maintain peace. I said the question of maintenance of international peace was very important. I said that it was of deep concern to the United States Government that there be no aggression from without Palestine because it was incumbent upon the Council to take action with respect to breaches of the peace and acts of aggression.

[Here follows Section II dealing with another subject.]

501.BB Palestine/2-2648

Memorandum to the Files by Mr. Robert M. McClintock

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] February 26, 1948.

Pursuant to Mr. Rusk's request by telephone this morning I spoke to Mr. Lovett at 12:25 p.m. and said that Mr. Rusk had some doubts as to the treatment which the US resolution on Palestine, introduced yesterday before the Security Council, would receive at the hands of

the Council. Particularly, Mr. Rusk wondered what course of action should be taken if the Council decided to consider this resolution paragraph by paragraph and in so doing to delete paragraph 2(a), which charges the Big Five Committee to "inform the Security Council regarding the situation with respect to Palestine and to make recommendations to it regarding the guidance and instructions which the Council might usefully give to the Palestine Commission."

Mr. Lovett said it was difficult to answer a tactical question of that sort in absence of knowledge of the parliamentary situation attending the debate. He was clear in his mind, however, that the basic question confronting the Council was whether or not to accept the responsibilities which the Assembly sought to impose on it by the resolution of November 29, 1947. Now that we had introduced the resolution we should, of course, stick to it but should not be unduly concerned if our language was not adopted. Should the Council not accept our draft it was not incumbent, in Mr. Lovett's opinion, on the US Delegation to continue to "carry the ball."

The essential thing was for the Council to decide what it would do under the Assembly's resolution. If it decided not to accept the responsibilities imposed upon it by the Assembly, then clearly there was justification to call a special session to consider what to do next. If the Council did accept all or part of the Assembly's requests it could then examine to what degree it could carry them out and, after the results of this inquiry, would be in a position to decide whether the plan were workable or whether a special session should be convened.

Editorial Note

Messrs. Henderson and McClintock, on February 26, drafted a telegram on the Palestine question to be sent to Damascus and repeated to other Arab capitals and Jerusalem. In an attached note, dated the following day, Mr. McClintock stated: "Mr. Lovett decided not to send this telegram at present. He said, 'This is a good time for everyone to sit tight.'" The proposed telegram, as originally drafted, reads as follows:

"In furtherance of your representations to Govt to which you are accredited under instructions in Deptel 34, Feb. 23 (211 to Cairo, 83 to Beirut, 60 to Bagdad, 55 to Jidda and 130 to Jerusalem) the following salient points of Ambassador Austin's speech sent you in Deptel 35 should be stressed:

"(1) While we are discussing problem of Palestine it is of first importance to future of UN that precedent to be established by

action taken in this case be in full accord with terms of Charter. (2) The recommendations of General Assembly have great moral force and every Member should make a serious effort to comply with them. (3) Security Council should attempt to get agreement on basis of GA recommendation with respect to Palestine. (4) UN Charter does not empower SC to enforce a political settlement, whether pursuant to a recommendation of GA or of Council itself. (5) If SC finds that international peace is threatened from any source, it is required by Charter to act. All Members of UN are under an obligation to assist Council in maintaining peace.

"You should point out to responsible officials that in line with Austin's statement to SC US feels that SC must do what it can within framework of Charter to effect peaceably settlement of Palestine problem along lines of recommendations of GA resolution of Nov 29, 1947. In endeavoring to effect such settlement SC can use its wide powers of recommendation and conciliation. US earnestly hopes that while honest endeavors are being made to effect such settlement situation will not develop in Palestine which will compel SC to find there is threat to international peace and to consider dispatch of armed forces to that country to remove such threat. Much depends upon policies pursued by Arab countries at this juncture. If they persist in sending troops and arms, in making threats to intervene by force in Palestine or engaging in other activities which can be construed only as aggression or threats of aggression re Palestine SC will have no choice other than to decide that situation referred to above exists.

"As indicated in Austin's statement, US policy on Palestine will not be unilateral but will conform to and be in support of UN decisions. It is because this Govt is a sincere friend of the Arab world and is with equal sincerity determined to maintain international peace and security as a steadfast supporter of UN that this present counsel is given.

"Repeated to Cairo as ———, Beirut as ———, Bagdad as ———, Jidda as ———, Jerusalem as ——— with request that CG informally communicate contents to Govt of Transjordan. Repeated London and USUN." (501.BB Palestine/2-2648)

Regarding telegram 35, see footnote 1, page 650.

501.BB Palestine/2-2648: Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)
to the Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET

NEW YORK, February 26, 1948—6:30 p. m.

214. For Lovett from Rusk. In private meeting this afternoon among Austin, Parodi [France], McNaughton [Canada], Pearson [Canada], Nisot (Belgium), Ignatieff (Canada) and Rusk, Parodi and Nisot raised a number of objections to the proposed US resolution on Palestine. The substance of their objections was (a) that SC should

not accept the partition plan of the GA resolution prior to the investigations to be carried out by the committee of the permanent members, since without such investigations SC could not know the effect of the recommendation upon the maintenance of international peace and security; (b) that the SC should not accept in advance the standard as to what constitutes a threat to the peace set forth in request (c) of the GA resolution. It was clear from Nisot's remarks that Belgium does not wish to approve partition again at this point in the light of the changed conditions which have arisen since November 29. Both Parodi and Nisot hinted that they might not be able to support the US resolution unless their amendments were accepted.

Austin informed them that we considered it important for the SC to establish a frame of reference for the work of the proposed committee, based on the GA recommendation; that we were confident that our phrase "subject to the authority of the SC under the charter" took care of any inference that the SC would be exceeding its powers by accepting the request of the GA.

Austin stated that he felt certain that we were after the same objectives and that he hoped agreeable language could be found to meet their views. He added however, that he could not say whether the US could agree to any such amendments since the matter was one which would have to be referred to the Department for further instructions. [Rusk.]

AUSTIN

501.BB Palestine/2-2648: Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)
to the Secretary of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

NEW YORK, February 26, 1948—6:40 p. m.

215. According to present information, following amendments to US resolution¹ on Palestine will be offered by Belgian and French delegations:

1. Delete paragraph 1.
2. Insert after the word "establish" in paragraph 2 of US resolution the following "in the light of the said resolution of the GA."
3. Add to subparagraph 2 (a) the following: "Should circumstances permit."
4. Add a new subparagraph 2 (d) as follows: "to give advice to the SC as to the action to be taken by the latter in the matter."

AUSTIN

¹ See *ante*, p. 657.

501.BB Palestine/2-2748

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Mr. Robert M. McClintock

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] February 27, 1948.

Participants: U—Mr. Lovett
USUN—Mr. Rusk¹

Mr. Rusk telephoned Mr. Lovett at 9:30 a. m. to inquire the Department's reaction to USUN's top secret 214, Feb. 26, and its confidential telegram 215 of the same date, which set forth the proposed Belgian and French amendments to the US resolution on Palestine of February 25. Mr. Lovett said that he desired to discuss these telegrams further with Messrs. Henderson and McClintock and that he would shortly call Mr. Rusk.

After some discussion Mr. Lovett then telephoned Mr. Rusk² and established the following position:

1. The US Delegate should vote against the first Belgian-French amendment, which calls for deletion of paragraph 1 of the US resolution. It was agreed that in all probability this Belgian-French amendment would fail to receive the necessary seven affirmative votes in the Council.

2. When the US resolution came to vote paragraph by paragraph, Ambassador Austin should vote for paragraph 1, but should not make any impassioned speeches in its defense. His remarks should be confined to restating quietly and clearly what had already been said in his address of February 24. Mr. Rusk interjected that the Delegation was under strong pressure from sideline advisers to become apoplectic in its approach but clearly understood the instructions from the Under Secretary.

3. In Mr. Rusk's opinion paragraph 1 of the US resolution would fail to pass the Council and attention would then center on the second paragraph of our resolution on which the French and Belgian delegations wished to submit other amendments. These were discussed:

a. It was agreed to accept the second Belgian-French amendment to insert after the word "establish" in paragraph 2 of the US resolution the words "in the light of the said resolution of the General Assembly."

b. It was agreed to accept the additional words "should circumstances permit" at the termination of sub-paragraph 2(*a*) of the US resolution, provided that the semi-colon were deleted precedent to this clause, as otherwise the clause would modify sub-para. 2(*b*) of the US resolution.

c. No objection was raised to the Belgian-French proposal to add a new sub-paragraph 2(*d*): "to give advice to the Security

¹ At New York.² At 9:50 a. m. (Marginal notation by Mr. McClintock on telegram 214 from New York.)

Council as to the action to be taken by the latter in the matter."³

Mr. Lovett inquired of Mr. Rusk what the position should be on the Colombian draft resolution of February 24 which would call for a special session of the General Assembly to reconsider the resolution of November 29, 1947. Mr. Rusk said that the US should not be in a position of vetoing this resolution, and therefore he proposed that the Delegation abstain. Mr. Lovett agreed to this procedure but later requested Mr. McClintock to telephone Mr. Rusk and make clear that our attitude should be plainly set forth in the Council that we were opposed at this stage to the Colombian resolution.⁴ If it were possible to vote against that resolution without our negative vote being construed as a veto we should do so. This information was imparted to Mr. Rusk by phone at 10:50 a. m.

³ The proposed resolution was introduced by Belgian Representative Nisot on February 27; for text, see United Nations, *Official Records of the Security Council, Third Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1948*, p. 30. The resolution was virtually identical with that of the United States proposal of February 25, except for the deletion of paragraph numbered one and the addition of a clause to paragraph (c), which read "to report thereon to the Security Council together with any recommendation as to the action to be taken by the Council in the matter." Mr. Nisot, in introducing his resolution, noted that Paragraph 1 of the United States proposal would require the Council to take a position before knowing the results of the work of the Committee of the five Great Powers, which it was instructing to investigate the situation (SC, *3rd yr.*, Nos. 16-35, p. 357).

⁴ The Colombian Representative withdrew his resolution on February 27 (*ibid.*, p. 365).

501.BB Palestine/2-2748

Mr. Robert M. McClintock to the Director of the Office of United Nations Affairs (Rusk), Temporarily at New York

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] February 27, 1948.

DEAR DEAN: Enclosed is memo of your conversation this morning with Mr. Lovett,¹ as seen from this end of the line.

I thought you might be interested to know for background purposes that Mr. Lovett set Loy Henderson straight on the future alternatives which confront the UN in the Palestine case.

Mr. Lovett said there was one possibility, which was that the SC would find that it could do nothing constructive on the Palestine problem; would call a special session on the GA to consider the matter anew; and that the Assembly would make a new recommendation for a solution along the lines of possibly a trusteeship. In this case the British might or might not be amenable to pressure designed to have them maintain law and order in Palestine for a while longer.

¹ *Supra.*

However, we could not formulate policy on the assumption that the British would be thus amenable.

Another possibility, said Mr. Lovett, was that the SC would find (and indeed there seemed to be ample evidence on hand already) that the situation in Palestine constituted a threat to the maintenance of international peace and security. In this case and with the British pulling out between May 15 and August 1, the UN might find it necessary to send forces to Palestine to maintain international peace. If, in the meantime, nothing had occurred to change the Assembly's recommendation of last November 29, we might find that the Palestine Commission would go to Palestine under the terms of that resolution and seek by negotiation to carry out the plan of partition with economic union. In that case it should be clear, however, that UN forces in Palestine were there to maintain international peace and not to enforce partition.

Mr. Lovett seemed to envisage clearly the possibility that some type of international force would have to be made available in Palestine by the UN, although he did not say as much in so many words.

[ROBERT M.] M[CCLINTOCK]

501.BB Palestine/2-2748 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

SECRET

US URGENT

WASHINGTON, February 27, 1948—6 p. m.

98. Secretary Marshall made the following statement on Palestine at his press conference Feb. 26:

"I tell you now I will not answer detailed questions on Palestine because there must be no confusion between Ambassador Austin and myself as to what is being stated and any statement will be made from there rather than from here."

Following for Ambassador Austin's confidential information only. Secretary Marshall then made the following statement completely *Off the record*: "I will tell you this: That so far as I am concerned and the State Dept. is concerned, but particularly so far as I am concerned, that in this highly emotional period of extreme bitterness and violent attacks, my intention is to see that nothing is done by the State Dept. in guidance for the action of its delegates to the United Nations, in response to either military threats or political threats, one or the other, nothing whatever. My intention is to see that the action of the US Govt. is to be on a plane of integrity that will bear inspection and a common review and that there will be no bending to

any military threat or to any political threat so long as I am Secretary of State. *End of off the record.*"¹

MARSHALL

¹ At this point, in the official memorandum of the press and radio news conference appears the following: "Asked why this comment could not be made public, Mr. Marshall said that we had enough troubles already. He said such a statement would have to be cleared with the President. Asked if he was speaking of international political threats, the Secretary replied that he meant exactly what he said. . . . Citing the fact that Mr. Austin's statement on Palestine had been subjected to many interpretations, a correspondent asked if the Department planned to interpret the statement either before Congress or through a further statement. The Secretary replied that the Department intended to leave matters almost entirely to Mr. Austin so that there would be no confusion in expressions and sentences used."

The Secretary concluded his observations on Palestine with a denial that the Arab League nations had sent a note to the State Department stating that Arab countries would withdraw oil concessions if the United States pushed partition (News Division Files).

CIA Files

*Report by the Central Intelligence Agency*¹

SECRET
ORE 7-48

[WASHINGTON,] 28 February 1948.

POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS IN PALESTINE

SUMMARY

It is apparent that the partition of Palestine into separate Arab and Jewish states (and an international zone), with economic union between the two states, as recommended by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on 29 November 1947, cannot be implemented. The Arab reaction to the recommendation has been violent, and the Arab refusal to cooperate in any way with the five-nation United Nations Commission will prevent the formation of an Arab state and the organization of economic union. The Arabs will use force to oppose the establishment of a Jewish state and to this end are training troops in Palestine and other Arab states. Moreover, the United Kingdom has stated repeatedly that it will take no part in implementing a UN decision not acceptable to both Jews and Arabs. The British have also declared that when the mandate terminates on 15 May, they will not transfer authority to the UN Commission but will merely relinquish that authority, which would then be assumed by the UN. Thus, without Arab and British cooperation, the Commission will be unable to carry out the task assigned to it.

¹According to a note in the source text: "The information in this report is as of 18 February 1948, at which time the report was submitted to the member agencies of the Interdepartmental Advisory Council for coordination. This paper was concurred in by the Intelligence Agencies of the Department of State, Army, Navy, and Air Force on 19 February. On 20 February CIA disseminated an Advance Copy of the coordinated report."

Even among the Jews there is dissatisfaction over the partition plan. Irgun Zvai Leumi and the Stern Gang, the two extremist groups, have refused to accept the plan and continue to claim all of Palestine (and even Transjordan) for the Jewish state. The Jewish Agency, official representative of the Jewish community, had hoped to obtain a larger portion of Palestine for the new state but has decided to cooperate with the UN Commission. Recruiting and training for Hagana, the Agency's military arm, have been increased, and the terrorist groups will join Hagana in the Arab fight despite their opposition to partition. The Jewish effort, however, will not be sufficient to enable the UN Commission to carry out partition as envisaged by the UNGA.

Since the complete partition plan cannot be implemented, the possible developments in Palestine resolve themselves into three main groups:

(1) *UN attempts to set up a Jewish state by force.*

Again, the UN would be balked by lack of Arab and British cooperation. While the UN might attempt to set up an international police force (which would have to be large and remain in Palestine indefinitely), the US and UK would have to consider the danger of permitting Soviet and/or Satellite troops to enter Palestine, and the USSR would undoubtedly object to any force not including these troops. It is possible that the SC might consider authorizing unilateral aid to the Jews by the member states of the UN, but such a course would be extremely dangerous to world peace. Since the USSR would take advantage of the opportunity to increase its influence in Palestine by supporting the Jews, the UK and the US would have good cause not to sanction such action in the SC.

(2) *No action by the UN.*

The UN would suffer a serious loss of prestige if it should wash its hands of the Palestine issue. Moreover, the Jewish-Arab conflict would increase and spread, and the USSR would be free to send troops into Palestine as it saw fit.

(3) *UN reconsideration of the whole issue.*

Reconsideration of the issue could be initiated in several ways. The SC might seek an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on the legality of the UNGA recommendations and simultaneously arrange an Arab-Jewish truce. The Arabs would welcome such a step and the Jews would probably have to agree (though reluctantly) since the entire Jewish position is based on UN action. Jewish violence, however, would undoubtedly continue.

Should the issue be returned to the General Assembly, partition could be considered abandoned. Subsequent developments cannot be predicted, but it is reasonable to assume that any new solution would have to be acceptable to the Arabs, who would probably be willing to

make some concessions on the basis of the Minority Report of the UN Special Committee on Palestine.

1. *Aims in Palestine After the Partition Recommendation.*

a. Planned UN Course of Action.

When the UNGA voted on 29 November 1947 recommending the partition of Palestine into separate Arab and Jewish states, the course of action to be followed was clearly defined. A five-man commission with representatives from Denmark, Czechoslovakia, Bolivia, Panama, and the Philippines was to be organized in New York, together with a sizable secretariat of administrative officials and technical experts. After consultations with the mandatory power, the commission and its secretariat were to proceed to Palestine in the latter part of December 1947. When in Palestine, the UN Commission was to take over administrative responsibility from the UK in those areas from which the latter would progressively withdraw its troops. This withdrawal and the termination of the mandate were to take place not later than 1 August. (The mandatory subsequently announced that the mandate would terminate not later than 15 May.) During this period of transference of authority from the mandatory to the UN Commission, the latter was to cooperate with the Jewish Agency and the Arab Higher Committee in the formation of provisional councils of government of the prospective Jewish and Arab states and a Joint Economic Board. The provisional councils in both states were to be established by 1 April. Administrative authority was to be progressively turned over by the UN Commission to these two bodies, which would become the provisional governments of the two new states whose independence would be established not later than 1 October 1948. The UN Commission would also delimit the frontiers of the Arab and Jewish states. All these recommendations of the UNGA were to be carried out by the UN Commission with the guidance of the Security Council.

b. Planned UK Course of Action.

UK plans after the partition recommendation were exactly what they had been throughout the UNGA session. The British stated repeatedly that they would refuse to assist in implementing a UN decision not acceptable to both the Jews and the Arabs. They based their stand on the thesis that until the mandate was terminated they were bound by its provisions. On this basis, the UK was determined to retain undivided responsibility for the administration and internal security of Palestine until the mandate was terminated. Thereafter, the UK would retain responsibility in any areas occupied by its military forces until those forces were withdrawn. Finally, the UK stated unequivocally that it would not transfer administrative authority to the UN Commission but would simply relinquish that authority, which would be immediately assumed by the UN. The UK would not

obstruct the efforts of the UN Commission; nor would it participate in the work of the Commission.

c. Planned Arab Course of Action.

The UNGA recommendation on Palestine put the Arabs on the defensive, and consequently their plans were largely undeveloped. The very multiplicity of Arab states and of the groups within those states resulted in a spate of different proposals. In spite of these differences, however, the Arabs agreed that a Zionist state could not be tolerated in the Arab world. To prevent the formation of this state, the following general course of action was envisaged :

(1) To make military preparations, both in Palestine and the Arab states, to prevent by military action the formation and functioning of a Jewish state.

(2) To refuse to cooperate with the UN Commission in any way.

(3) To establish an independent unitary state embracing all of Palestine.

(4) To prevent further Jewish immigration until an immigration policy could be formulated by the unitary state.

Various Arab groups contemplated two additional lines of action. The most responsible and moderate groups considered further action in the UN, while the most extreme and nationalistic groups urged the cancellation of all diplomatic and economic relations with those states that had supported partition. While neither of these proposals was generally agreed to, the Arab states sent strong notes of protest to the respective US chiefs of missions.

d. Jewish Course of Action.

The Jewish plan of action after the UNGA recommendation was perfectly clearcut. While the Jewish Agency, the official representative of the Jewish community, had hoped to obtain a larger portion of Palestine, it decided to cooperate with the UN Commission in the establishment of the proposed Jewish state. In the meantime, it planned to build up its internal security forces, train an administrative corps, and propagandize the rest of the world for financial and military assistance against any Arab attempts to prevent the implementation of the UNGA recommendation. The aims, however, of the Revisionists, including Irgun Zvai Leumi and the Stern Gang, were more extreme: to fight both the British and the Arabs and to set up a Jewish state in all of Palestine and Transjordan.

2. Development of the Situation Since the Partition Recommendation.

a. UN Activity.

From the very beginning, the UN had difficulty in carrying out its intended course of action. In spite of repeated urgent appeals by Secretary General Trygve Lie, the members of the UN Commission were

not appointed by their respective governments until late in December and did not all reach New York for their first meeting until 9 January. Since then the UN Commission has made little progress, for its success was predicated on the assumption that it would receive the cooperation of the Jews, the Arabs, and the UK. Of these, only the Jews have fully cooperated. The Arabs have flatly refused to have anything to do with the Commission, and the UK's cooperation was considerably restricted by its interpretation of its responsibilities as mandatory power. UK refusal to allow the Commission to enter Palestine before 1 May (two weeks before the termination of the mandate) will make it impossible for the Commission to establish the provisional Arab and Jewish governments by the required date of 1 April. The UK refusal to relinquish any administrative authority in Palestine until after the termination of the mandate has prevented the progressive transfer of authority to the UN Commission. The Commission has also been compelled to recognize the deplorable security situation in Palestine and realizes that it cannot attempt to carry out the recommendations of the UNGA without an adequate international police force.

b. UK Activity.

UK activity since the partition vote has been twofold. In Palestine the mandatory administration, its police, and the UK forces have been attempting to maintain internal security. They have been hampered by two main factors: (1) evacuation plans have considerably obstructed UK security measures; and (2) the UK desire not to antagonize the Arab states has prevented the implementation of full-scale security measures to repress Arab-Jewish hostilities. In spite of these reservations, UK forces have been impartial in attempting to curb Arab-Jewish hostilities. The major aims seem to have been to prevent general anarchy and full-scale war—at least until the forces themselves have withdrawn.

In the UN, the UK delegates have taken pains to acquaint the UN Commission with the difficulties of the Palestine situation. They have advised the UN Commission on administrative matters, on the question of the projected Jerusalem Trusteeship, and on the setting up of provisional governments. They have refused, however, to assume joint responsibility with the Commission for the establishment of the new states in Palestine or to permit any development which might be interpreted as UK support of one side against the other. On this ground, the UK has refused to open a port on 1 February to unlimited Jewish immigration, as recommended by the UNGA resolution.

c. Arab Activity.

Arab reaction to the UNGA partition plan was prompt and violent. Strikes and demonstrations led to scattered riots within Palestine, and Arab League action was instituted by the Arab states. The sporadic violence in Palestine had developed by the middle of January

into more highly organized hostilities. By the beginning of February disciplined Arab bands were operating in different parts of the country, and the Arab Higher Committee claimed to be directing their activities. The nature of Arab activities indicated that until the British withdrawal Arab objectives were limited to: (1) avoiding, if possible, hostilities with the British forces; (2) purchasing and capturing essential supplies such as food, weapons, ammunition, and clothing; (3) disrupting Jewish commerce, transportation, and communications without launching full-scale attacks; (4) recruiting volunteer forces, within and without Palestine, and training them in guerrilla tactics; (5) setting up a unified military command; (6) establishing contact with Arab League channels of assistance. The entire emphasis has been on preparation for the British withdrawal, and the Arab leaders have apparently attempted to hold back their surging followers.

During a series of meetings at Sofar, Aley, and Cairo, Arab League representatives, despite differences of opinion, eventually evolved a program of action. The program, which in several particulars merely approved activities already under way, was immediately implemented and provided that: (1) the partisan movement in Palestine be supported with funds, arms, and men; (2) troops of the Arab states be stationed on the frontier of Palestine as a border watch; and (3) these armies not be sent into Palestine until after the British withdrawal. Funds were immediately raised in all the Arab states. Volunteers from Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Transjordan foregathered at Qatana in Syria for training; and by the middle of February over 8,000 were known to have slipped, uniformed and armed, into Palestine. Syrian, Egyptian, and Transjordan troops had been moved to the Palestine border; and Iraqi contingents were reported to be moving into Transjordan. Determined efforts were made to obtain arms and ammunition. Syria signed a contract with Skoda, and a first delivery is known to have been made.

While the Arab chain of command has not been announced, the forces will be commanded by former Syrian and Iraqi army officers and experienced guerrilla leaders.

d. Jewish Activity.

Having won the initial victory in the acceptance by the UNGA of the partition plan, the Jews concentrated (with some exceptions) on preparing for the new state. In the face of violent Arab opposition, the Jewish Agency immediately undertook: (1) to strengthen the internal defense forces of the prospective Jewish state; (2) to organize and train an administrative corps; and (3) to cooperate with the UN in implementing the UNGA decision. Recruiting and training for Hagana were increased; and, in spite of the fact that the mandatory refused to recognize its legality, it attempted to protect the Jewish

community from Arab attacks and also acted as a local police force. In time, Hagana adopted a policy of "active" defense and carried out terrorist raids against the Arabs similar in tactics to those of the Irgun Zvai Leumi and the Stern Gang against the UK forces. These two extremist groups continued their war against the British; and although they agreed to fight the Arabs together with Hagana, they refused to accept the partition recommendation and continued to claim all of Palestine (and even Transjordan) for the Jewish state.

3. *Possible Developments.*

a. *General Considerations.*

Partition as envisaged by the UNGA involves not only the creation of two states (and an international zone) but also economic union between the states. Such a plan cannot be implemented without Arab cooperation, and it is inconceivable that the Arabs will abandon their present violent opposition to partition. To the masses, the fight has become almost a religious tenet; to the governing classes, it has become a political creed which they dare not forsake. The Arabs can never be forced to acquiesce in a Western-sponsored movement which they believe is threatening the twentieth century renaissance of their indigenous civilization. With implementation of the complete partition plan hopeless, the possible developments in Palestine resolve themselves into three main groups: (1) UN attempts to set up a Jewish state by force; (2) no action by the UN; and (3) UN reconsideration of the whole issue.

b. *UN Attempts to Set Up a Jewish State.*

(1) *Possible British Assistance.*

An attempt might be made to persuade the UK to alter its current Palestine policy and to permit the formation of a Jewish militia, to agree to the "progressive transfer" of authority, to allow the UN Commission to come to Palestine earlier than 1 May, to open immediately a "port and hinterland" for Jewish immigration, and to suppress Arab guerrilla activities. However, in view of the UK's serious economic difficulties, its disinclination to antagonize the Arab world, and its consistently "neutral" policy since it turned the whole problem over to the UN last year, the British cannot be expected to change their stand between now and 1 August. Therefore, a Jewish state can be established only in the event that the UN Commission is given a police force sufficiently strong to withstand Arab aggression or that the Jews in Palestine are provided with enough military support from outside to overcome Arab opposition.

(2) *Great Powers Police Force.*

An international police force established by the Security Council may be of various types. Obviously, the most effective force would be one composed of units from the armed forces of the five great powers. The USSR can be expected to welcome an opportunity to send its

troops to Palestine; France, also, would probably be pleased to set foot once again in the Near East; China, for reasons of prestige, would want to be represented on an international police force but could scarcely afford to spare any troops from the civil war in China. The UK will almost certainly refuse to contribute. US troops, according to President Truman, will not be sent to Palestine. The dispatch of a force composed only of contingents from the USSR, France, and possibly China would present the UK and the US with the alternatives of exercising the veto or of opening Palestine to Soviet infiltration.

(3) *Medium Powers Police Force.*

A second possibility would be a force made up of contingents from the medium powers, but here again the UK and the US would have to consider the danger of permitting Soviet Satellite troops to enter Palestine. The USSR would probably veto the formation of any force that did not include Satellite representatives. Even if the great powers could agree on a force composed of contingents from the medium powers, it is unlikely that a sufficient number of nations would be willing to contribute adequate forces.

The formation of an international police force will depend, in the last analysis, not on a mere decision of the Security Council but on the willingness of nations to contribute to such a force. It is extremely unlikely that any nation would do so solely to maintain the prestige of the UN. In the present state of international security, probably no nation will send its troops to fight the Arabs in Palestine for the purpose of establishing a Jewish state unless its national interests are threatened by the failure of partition or unless it can hope to enlarge its sphere of influence. The USSR is the only nation that would gain from sending troops into Palestine. Since both the UK and the US have strong strategic reasons for refusing to allow Soviet or Soviet-controlled troops to enter Palestine, it is highly improbable that an international police force will ever be formed.

(4) *Assistance to the Jews.*

The only alternative method, therefore, is for military aid to be sent to the Jews in such quantities that they will be able to suppress all Arab opposition, both internal and external, and set up and maintain an independent state. Such aid might take the form of a volunteer "international" force, or the Security Council could presumably recommend to the other member nations of the UN that the Arab states be boycotted as deliberately resisting a decision of the SC and that the Jewish state be supported with shipments of funds, arms, and ammunition. The UN Commission might be retained as a liaison body between the Security Council and the new Jewish state. It could not delineate the frontiers recommended by the UNGA nor could it have any contacts with the Arabs, or establish a special administration in

Jerusalem. Thus the entire purpose of the UNGA partition resolution would be distorted from the creation of *two* independent states in Palestine to the organization and defense of *one* state—the Jewish state.

By sponsoring the formation of an “international” volunteer force, or by relinquishing the initiative and authorizing unilateral action by member states of the UN, the Security Council would recommend a course of action extremely dangerous to world peace. Since the USSR would be quick to take advantage of openings related to an SC decision to support the Jews, and thereby extend Soviet strategic influence into Palestine and the Near East, the UK and the US would have good cause not to sanction such action in the Security Council.

b. [sic] No Action by the UN.

If the UN were unable to agree on any action whatsoever, the consequences would be disastrous and appreciably decrease the prestige of the UN. The Jews and Arabs in Palestine would be completely free to solicit aid from and make alliances with individual nations. It would be practically impossible to localize the conflict; any nation with vital interests in the Arab world would inevitably be embroiled. Since the struggling Jews and Arabs would accept aid from whatever quarter offered, it is difficult to imagine how, under such circumstances, the USSR could be prevented from sending troops into Palestine.

c. Reconsideration by the UN.

(1) General Considerations.

Since the failure of partition is already evident, and in view of the dangers attendant on the establishment of a Jewish state, it appears that the only course open to the UN is to reconsider the whole issue. For the UN to admit error and to undertake reconsideration would be a momentous step necessitating considerable moral courage, but such procedure would be quite in line with the general practice of tribunals in permitting reargument where doubt is entertained as to the correctness of the original decision. To comprehend the overriding necessity for such a step, two factors must be understood: (1) that Arab opposition automatically invalidates the UNGA partition recommendations, whose basic assumption is Arab-Jewish cooperation; (2) that even if a Jewish state could be established and defended by force of arms, it would have to defend itself continuously not only against its hostile neighbors but against the resistance of 450,000 Arabs within its own borders until such time as Arab nationalism no longer existed; and (3) that full recourse to all judicial procedures before action is taken would help to establish world confidence in the fairness and justice of the UN as an instrument for world peace.

(2) Security Council Action.

Reconsideration by the UN of the Palestine issue could be initiated in several ways. The Security Council, after failing to agree on meas-

ures to implement partition, may ask the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion on the legality of the UNGA recommendations. At the same time, it might urge a truce between the Arabs and Jews and designate either the present Palestine Commission or some newly formed Security Council agent to arrange and supervise the truce. Since this step would constitute a completely new development, and one long urged by the Arabs, the Arabs would almost certainly agree to such a truce. Since the entire Jewish position is based on UN action, the Jews would have no alternative but to agree although Jewish violence would probably continue. The Security Council might, on the other hand, refer the question to the Little Assembly or take no action. The proposal for a UN Conciliation Board, if carried through, would furnish an opportunity for reconsideration without damage to UN prestige.

(3) *General Assembly Action.*

Should the Security Council fail to agree on any action whatsoever, the UN Commission, even if it agrees to go to Palestine to help the Jews set up their state, would probably report to the Secretary General that the UNGA recommendations could be implemented to only a limited extent. The Secretary General could then refer the issue to the Little Assembly or even summon a special session of the General Assembly to reconsider the whole question. (The Little Assembly itself has the authority to summon a special session of the General Assembly.) Once the issue had been returned to the General Assembly, partition could be considered abandoned. It is impossible to predict what new developments would take place, but it is reasonable to assume that any new solution would have to be acceptable to the Arabs, who would probably be willing to make some concessions on the basis of the UNSCOP Minority Report.

Editorial Note

In a statement before the Security Council on March 2, Ambassador Austin made known that the United States would not support the Belgian amendment. At one point, in discussing the United States draft resolution, he noted that "a vote for paragraph 1 would be a vote for partition as a solution of the Palestine question. The General Assembly voted for partition as a solution of the Palestine question. The United States voted for that solution, and still supports it. As we have stated before, the United States supports the General Assembly plan of partition as the framework of implementation by pacific means." He concluded his remarks by stating that "Taken altogether, paragraph 1 of the United States draft resolution means that the Security Council will do everything it can under the Charter to give effect

to the recommendation of the General Assembly." The full text of Ambassador Austin's statement is printed in SC, *3rd yr.*, Nos. 16-35, pages 398-401.

The British spokesman, Mr. Creech Jones, announced that his Government would not take part in the committee proposed by the two draft resolutions, would not vote for either and would not enter into any new or extended commitment in regard to Palestine. He concluded by stating that "the date of termination of our responsibility is irrevocably fixed." (*Ibid.*, pages 402-405)

Soviet Representative Gromyko concluded the discussion on March 2 by announcing his agreement in principle that the five permanent members of the Security Council should consult on the Palestine situation. His position, however, was that they hold direct consultations rather than through a committee, which he said, would only complicate and delay settlement of the question. He noted also that he had no objection to paragraph 1 of the United States draft resolution (*ibid.*, pages 405-407).

501:BB Palestine/3-448 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

NEW YORK, March 4, 1948—5:20 p.m.

242. For Lovett from Austin. I concur with contents of amended statement on UN responsibility for Palestine on May 15, 1948, contained in text authenticated by Rusk and McClintock.¹ Any confusion on the point should be clarified to avoid informal or accidental commitments by member governments on matter of that importance.

Timing of such statement is of great importance. If it should be made immediately after vote on Belgian amendment and US resolution, it might be misinterpreted as a negative attitude on our part merely presented to offer still further obstacles to UN action on Palestine. Whatever the voting in Security Council on Belgian amendment and US resolution, it now seems reasonably certain that some consultation by a committee or group of council with mandatory power, Palestine Commission, and Jews and Arabs of Palestine will take place concerning peaceful implementation of partition plan. US should insist by resolution that these consultations be held and, in absence of promising results, be wound up as rapidly as possible.

Unless there is a major statement by UK, Secretary-General Lie, or others directed to UN responsibility on May 15 prior to a report on the attempted conciliation, it appears US should make the proposed state-

¹ Not found in Department of State files; but for statement as finally approved, see telegram 108, March 5, to New York, p. 682.

ment at time of Security Council consideration of results of conciliation effort. In that event, statement should lead directly into positive proposals for further handling of Palestine matter by UN. Our legal analysis of question of responsibility on May 15 would strongly support necessity for prompt action along new lines and would make it clear to our own people why such proposals are essential.

Consequently, I recommend Department consider addition of following to present text of proposed statement:

[Here follow additions recommended by Ambassador Austin.²]

AUSTIN

² These suggested additions as redrafted in the Department appear in telegram 107, March 5, to New York, p. 679.

501.BB Palestine/3-448: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Tuck) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

CAIRO, March 4, 1948—9 p. m.

225. For Loy Henderson. I called on Minister Foreign Affairs yesterday to see his reaction to Austin's speech before the SC, text of which I had sent him.

Khashaba Pasha said he had read the speech with great interest and with "considerable relief" he stated that he feared that American official attitude toward partition might have been much closer to "four-point plan" advocated by certain prominent Americans, including Mrs. Roosevelt and Sumner Welles,¹ and which had been given considerable publicity in the local press.

Minister Foreign Affairs added that Austin's speech, while to him slightly ambiguous, appeared more acceptable and that while reaction in Egyptian official circles was guarded, it had been on the whole favorable. He was personally interested and gratified that Austin's speech had received support of President Truman. He told me that if Arab States could receive assurance that plan for establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine would be abandoned once and for all and that Jewish immigration would not be permitted on scale which would result in creation of a majority which would facilitate the forming of a Jewish state, then Arab countries would be prepared to discuss any form of compromise such as federalization or cantonization in Palestine.

I seized occasion to acquaint him with the purport of paragraphs 2 and 3 of Deptel 211 of February 23, 6 p. m.,² emphasizing the importance which our government attaches to prevention infiltration of

¹ Under Secretary of State, 1937-1943.

² This was a repeat of No. 34 to Damascus, p. 649.

fighting men and arms into Palestine. I told him that I felt that Egypt played a leading role in the Arab League and that an example of moderation in this respect might have its effect on other Arab Govts. Khashaba Pasha replied that while he had admitted the wisdom of such a policy it was indeed difficult, if not impossible, to convince the other members of the Arab League to this effect.³

TUCK

³The reactions of leaders in other Arab lands to Senator Austin's statement were cautiously favorable (telegrams 121, February 26, from Damascus; 73, February 27, from Beirut; 195, March 2, from Baghdad; and 107, March 4, from Jidda). The Soviet reaction was given in a headline in *Trud*, which stated "USA Sabotages UN Decision on Palestine", and in the accompanying article which stated that "USA trying to delay still more and possibly even prevent fulfillment GA resolution on partition." (Telegram 388, March 1, from Moscow, 501.BB Palestine/3-148)

840.50 Recovery/3-548

*Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Truman and to the Cabinet*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] March 5, 1948.

[Here follow six numbered paragraphs on matters other than the Palestine question.]

VII. PALESTINE

Following Ambassador Austin's statement to the Security Council on Palestine on February 24, the United States introduced a resolution the first paragraph of which would accept, subject to the authority of the Security Council under the Charter, the requests made to the Council by the Assembly in its resolution of November 29, 1947 calling for implementation of the partition of Palestine. The second paragraph of the United States resolution would establish a committee of the Council to inform the Council regarding the situation in Palestine, to consider whether there was a threat to international peace and security in that situation, and to consult with the Palestine Commission, the United Kingdom and representatives of the principal communities of Palestine on how to carry out the General Assembly recommendation of November 29, 1947.

On February 27 the Belgian Delegation introduced an amendment to the United States resolution which retained the idea of a subcommittee but would delete the first paragraph of the United States resolution which calls on the Council in effect to agree to carry out so far as the Charter permits the partition of Palestine. Ambassador

¹Drafted by William J. McWilliams, Assistant Director of the Executive Secretariat. A marginal notation states that the memorandum was "taken by hand by the Secretary to Cabinet meeting."

Austin, on March 2, made it clear to the Council that a vote on paragraph one would be a vote for or against partition by peaceful means.

It seems apparent that in the vote which is expected this afternoon the Belgian resolution deleting our first paragraph may carry by the necessary seven votes. It is almost absolutely certain that there are not seven votes in favor of the United States resolution with its first paragraph. The result will be that the Council will set up a subcommittee on Palestine and will ask the committee to use every effort of conciliation to see if there is some measure of agreement between the Arabs, Jews and the Mandatory Power to effect the partition of Palestine by means short of the use of force.

It seems certain that such efforts at conciliation will prove fruitless and at this time the Council must reach a decision in light of the facts whether or not still to attempt to carry out the partition. Without endeavoring to prophesy, the future trend seems to be that the Council will find itself unable to proceed with partition and that it will refer the Palestine problem to an immediate special session of the General Assembly for fresh consideration.

G. C. MARSHALL

501.BB Palestine/3-548: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

TOP SECRET

US URGENT

WASHINGTON, March 5, 1948—3 p. m.

NIACT

107. Careful review has been made of draft statement on United Nations responsibility for Palestine as of May 15, 1948 and of your 242, March 4.

It is our opinion that the essential factor in Security Council's consideration of Palestine problem is whether or not Council will accept plan of partition with economic union recommended by General Assembly last Nov. 29. This question is posed specifically to Council in Par. 1 of US Res. of Feb. 25. You again laid stress on this essential question in your remarks to Council on March 2.

We had thought it preferable to bring this issue to sharp focus in the vote today on US Res. of Feb. 25 and Belgian amendment seeking to delete Para. 1 of that res., dated Feb. 27.

However, following telephone conversations with USUN we defer to your judgment that it is essential for Council's conciliatory machinery to be used before final decision is taken. We shall be guided by your opinion that issue will mature more naturally in a week or ten days' time and that the conciliatory machinery of the Council will result in

showing beyond any doubt whatsoever that the differing attitudes of the Jews for partition, Arabs against partition, and the Mandatory Power for leaving Palestine, are at present irreconcilable.

Should the conciliatory process reach what seems to be this inevitable conclusion there is still need of a clear-cut decision by the Council on whether or not to accept the requests made of it by the General Assembly. We do not feel it incumbent on the United States to draw its own conclusions after the results of conciliation are known and then to suggest the specific program outlined in your 242. Rather, we feel that the matter should be brought to a vote, not at the instance of the United States but on the motion of some colleague such as Colombia or China. This could be done, for example, in a resolution pointing to the negative results of conciliation as confirming the Council's previous negative vote on paragraph 1 of the United States resolution of February 25.

On such a resolution the United States would abstain on the ground that it did not wish to cast a veto. This would indicate that we were impressed by the facts reported by the Conciliation Committee but would not force us to go on record as voting against partition.

As for the debate in the Council today, on the United States and Belgian Resolutions, you have already been instructed by telephone to indicate our strong opposition to the essential aim of the Belgian Resolution which is to delete Paragraph 1 of the United States Resolution. You will point out that a bare ten weeks intervene between now and May 15, the announced date of termination of UK responsibility for Palestine. You will stress that the Council cannot evade a decision on whether or not to accept the requests of the General Assembly's Resolution of November 29.

The approved text of the proposed statement on United Nations responsibility for Palestine after May 15 follows by separate telegram, with certain minor textual changes. You should add the following conclusion:

"Now that these conclusions have been made clear, what is the next task of this Council?

By the vote on March —— it is evident that the Security Council has rejected the requests made of it by the General Assembly in its resolution of November 29, 1947. It is evident that the Security Council has rejected the partition of Palestine.

As I pointed out a few moments ago, my Government believes that the plan proposed by the General Assembly was an integral plan and, as the Chairman of the Palestine Commission clearly indicated, it would not succeed unless each of its parts were carried out.

The decision of the Security Council has been taken. This decision is contrary to the position which the United States Delegation has

taken but as a loyal member of this Council we defer to the will of the majority.

The Security Council now has before it clear evidence that the Jews and Arabs of Palestine and the Mandatory Power are not prepared to implement the General Assembly plan of partition through peaceful means. The announced determination of the Mandatory Power to terminate the Mandate on May 15, 1948, if carried out by the UK, would clearly result, in light of information now available, in chaos and heavy fighting in Palestine. We cannot believe that the UN, the Mandatory Power, or the inhabitants of Palestine could permit such a result. We believe that every possible effort should be made by all concerned to find a peaceful settlement prior to departure of British forces from that country.

The United States believes that the Security Council should take immediate steps for the maintenance of international peace and security and for finding of a settlement of the Palestine problem. The United States believes that the Security Council should now:

(a) Take all measures under the Charter to ensure that the situation in Palestine shall not become a threat to international peace and security.

(b) Request the Secretary-General to convoke immediately a special session of the General Assembly to consider further the question of Palestine.

(c) Continue its efforts, in consultation with Representatives of the principal committees of Palestine and the Mandatory Power, to ascertain whether there is any basis for agreement on a future government of Palestine which would permit the early attainment of independence by that country.

(d) In the event that the consultation foreseen in (c) above proves without affirmative result, to consider recommendation to the Special Session of the General Assembly that until the people of Palestine are ready for self-government they should be placed under the trusteeship system of the United Nations.

(e) Request the UK to reconsider its decision to terminate the mandate on May 15, 1948, pending further consideration of the problem by the General Assembly and in order that the United Nations may make further efforts to find a peaceful solution.

(f) Instruct the Palestine Commission to suspend its activities pending further recommendations by the General Assembly.

The United States makes these suggestions to the Council because of our deep concern over the prospective course of events in Palestine. As I stated in my remarks to Council on February 24, the United States seeks a solution for Palestine within the framework of the United Nations. That means, of course, that we would be glad to consider any other proposals from any source which might provide an answer for this complicated question. We are convinced, however, that whatever is to be done must be done promptly, and that further delay may become synonymous with disaster."

501.BB Palestine/3-548: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

TOP SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, March 5, 1948—4 p. m.

108. Following is approved text of proposed statement by Ambassador Austin on situation in Palestine after British withdrawal May 15, 1948:

“In his statement to the Security Council on February 24, 1948, the Representative of the United Kingdom said, ‘My Government are bringing to an end the discharge of their responsibilities towards Palestine under the Mandate and are leaving the future of that country to international authority.’

On March 2, 1948, the Representative of the United Kingdom referred, in his statement to the Council, to ‘whatever procedure the United Nations may decide to adopt with a view to assuming responsibility for the Government of Palestine on May 15th’, and concluded with the statement, ‘finally, I must repeat that the United Kingdom cannot enter into any new or extended commitment in regard to Palestine. Our contribution has already been made over the years and the date of termination of our responsibility is irrevocably fixed.’

The status of Palestine will be equivocal because the United Kingdom seeks to give up the Mandate. Article 5 of the Mandate in respect of Palestine provides:

‘The Mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that no Palestine territory shall be ceded or leased to, or in any way placed under the control of, the Government of any foreign Power.’

In the premises there is the urgent need for a prompt decision by the Security Council on the General Assembly recommendation as well as an early clarification of United Nations responsibility toward Palestine.

The General Assembly and the Security Council have broad responsibilities in fidelity to the principles of justice and the aims of the Charter to assist in bringing about a pacific settlement of situations and disputes placed before them. The Security Council has specific obligations and powers where it finds a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression. I have already dealt, in my statement to the Security Council on February 24 and March 2, with these responsibilities.

The assumption of administrative or governmental responsibility by the United Nations is another matter. If the United Nations is to act as a government, a large administrative task is involved. The Organization itself becomes directly responsible for all phases of the life of the people over whom such powers are exercised. It is a formidable responsibility and a heavy financial commitment is incurred by all 57 Members of the Organization.

The United Nations does not automatically fall heir to the responsibilities either of the League of Nations or of the Mandatory Power in respect of the Palestine Mandate. The record seems to us entirely clear

that the United Nations did not take over the League of Nations mandate system.

The League of Nations Assembly on April 18, 1946, at its final session, passed a resolution which included the following two paragraphs:

‘THE ASSEMBLY

‘3. Recognizes that, on the termination of the League’s existence, its functions with respect to the mandated territories will come to an end, but notes that Chapters XI, XII, and XIII of the Charter of the United Nations embody principles corresponding to those declared in Article 22 of the Covenant of the League;

‘4. Takes note of the expressed intentions of the Members of the League now administering territories under mandate to continue to administer them for the well-being and development of the peoples concerned in accordance with the obligations contained in the respective Mandates; *until other arrangements have been agreed between the United Nations and the respective Mandatory Powers.*’

At the first part of the first session of the United Nations General Assembly, on February 12, 1946, the Assembly passed a Resolution regarding the transfer of certain functions, activities, and assets of the League of Nations to the United Nations. No transfer of functions concerning Mandates was mentioned. The Resolution included the statement that:

‘The General Assembly will itself examine, or will submit to the appropriate organ of the United Nations, any request from the parties that the United Nations should assume the exercise of functions or powers entrusted to the League of Nations by treaties, international conventions, agreements, and other instruments having a political character.’

Provision was made in the United Nations Charter for the voluntary placing of mandates under a trusteeship system by means of trusteeship agreements between the General Assembly or the Security Council and the states directly concerned, including the Mandatory Power. By such an agreement, the United Nations itself under article 81 of the Charter could become the administering authority for a trust territory. No such proposal has been made by the Mandatory Power with respect to Palestine and no action has been taken by the United Nations itself which would have that result.

We think it clear that the United Nations does not succeed to administrative responsibility for Palestine merely because the latter is a Mandate. Signing the Charter did not commit the signatories to a contingent liability for mandates, to become operative by unilateral decisions of Mandatory Powers to abandon their mandates.

Does the General Assembly recommendation of November 29, 1947 constitute an acceptance by the United Nations of governmental responsibility for Palestine?

On April 2, 1947 the United Kingdom directed the following request to the Secretary General of the United Nations:

‘His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to place the question of

Palestine on the agenda of the General Assembly at its next regular Annual Session. *They will submit to the Assembly an account of their administration of the League of Nations Mandate and will ask the Assembly to make recommendations, under Article 10 of the Charter, concerning the future government of Palestine.*

'In making this request, His Majesty's Government drew the attention of the Secretary-General to the desirability of an early settlement in Palestine and to the risk that the General Assembly might not be able to decide upon its recommendations at its next regular annual session unless some preliminary study of the question had previously been made under the auspices of the United Nations. They therefore request the Secretary-General to summon, as soon as possible, a special session of the General Assembly for the purpose of constituting and instructing a special committee to prepare for the consideration, at the regular session of the Assembly, of the question referred to in the preceding paragraph.'

From this it is clear that the question of Palestine came before the General Assembly as a request for a recommendation. No proposal was made by the United Kingdom to the General Assembly that the United Nations itself undertake responsibility for the government of Palestine.

Following consideration of the question of Palestine in a special session, in a special committee (UNSCOP), and by an *Ad Hoc* Committee of the General Assembly at its Second Regular Session, the General Assembly passed a Resolution which recommended 'to the United Kingdom, as the Mandatory Power for Palestine, and to all other Members of the United Nations, the adoption and implementation, with regard to the future government of Palestine, of the plan of partition with economic union' set forth in the Resolution. Under the plan, the United Nations agreed, as a part of the recommended general settlement, to undertake administrative responsibilities for the City of Jerusalem. Further, the General Assembly agreed that a commission elected by it would perform certain functions to effect the transfer of responsibility from the Mandatory Power to the successor governments in Palestine. The limited responsibilities of the United Nations set forth in the plan are inseparable from the plan as a whole and are dependent upon the adoption and implementation of the entire plan. This essential unity of the General Assembly recommendation was emphasized by the Chairman of the Palestine Commission in his statement to the Security Council on February 24:

'I have put some stress upon the words "Plan of Partition as it has been envisaged by the General Assembly," since it is with the implementation of such Plan that our Commission has been entrusted. It is quite natural—and legitimate—for interested parties to concentrate their efforts preponderantly—if not exclusively—on such parts of the Plan as are intended more especially for their sake. The Commission is not in such a position; its duty, according to its terms of reference, is to provide for the implementation

of the whole Plan which has been conceived by the General Assembly as a whole . . .

'Since the Plan has been envisaged as a whole, the realization and sound functioning of one part of the Plan has been made, in a substantial degree, dependent upon the establishment and functioning of its other parts.'

The limited functions which the General Assembly offered to undertake in connection with its Palestine recommendation stand or fall with that resolution.

If it proves impossible to give effect to that Resolution, the United Nations will have, on May 15, 1948, no administrative and governmental responsibilities for Palestine, unless further action is taken by the General Assembly.

We conclude that a unilateral decision by the United Kingdom to terminate the Palestine Mandate cannot automatically commit the United Nations to responsibility for governing that country."

Conclusion of this statement will be as set forth in Dept's immediately preceding niact telegram.¹

MARSHALL

¹ *Supra.*

Editorial Note

Ambassador Austin, on March 5, reiterated to the Security Council the strong opposition of the United States to the Belgian amendment but announced that the United States would abstain from voting on the amendment to avoid raising any question of a veto (SC, 3rd yr., Nos. 36-51, page 25). Later in the discussion, he expressed his willingness, in the interests of harmony, to meet Ambassador Gromyko's wishes regarding direct consultation (*ibid.*, page 31).

The Council, the same day, moved to vote on the Belgian amendment, paragraph by paragraph. None of the paragraphs secured the necessary seven affirmative votes and the President of the Council ruled the Belgian amendment defeated (*ibid.*, pages 35-40, *passim*). The Council then proceeded to vote on the amended draft resolution of the United States, adopting the preamble, paragraph 2(a) and the final paragraph. The key first paragraph, however, received but five affirmative votes, those of the United States, the Soviet Union, Belgium, France, and the Ukraine, with six abstentions, and therefore failed of adoption. Paragraphs 2(b) and 2(c) fell one vote short of the required seven votes and also failed of adoption (*ibid.*, pages 40-43). For the text of the approved portions of the draft resolution, see telegram 164 to Jerusalem, *infra*.

501.BB Palestine/3-648 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Jerusalem*SECRET US URGENT
NIACT

WASHINGTON, March 6, 1948—6 p. m.

164. Security Council adopted resolution¹ on March 5 reading as follows:

"The Security Council

Having received the resolution of the General Assembly of 29 November 1947, on Palestine, and having received from the United Nations Palestine Commission its first monthly report and its first special report on the problem of security in Palestine:

Resolves:

To call on the permanent members of the Council to consult and to inform the Security Council regarding the situation with respect to Palestine and to make as the result of such consultations recommendations to it regarding the guidance and instructions which the Council might usefully give to the Palestine Commission with a view of implementing the resolution of the General Assembly. The Security Council requests the permanent members to report to it on the results of their consultations within ten days.

Appeals to all governments and peoples, particularly in and around Palestine, to take all possible action to prevent or reduce such disorders as are now occurring in Palestine."

Prior to adoption this resolution members USDel discussed question AHC participation in current UN discussions on Palestine with Arab reps at UN. Nakkleh, AHC rep New York, indicated AHC, on his recommendation, had decided not to take part in such discussions. Members USDel pointed out that *a*) failure to cooperate in UN efforts was creating unfavorable impression in UN circles and on world opinion; *b*) it was essential, for example, that SC have official AHC views as well as those of JA and mandatory power on which to base such conclusions as SC might reach; and *c*) AHC participation affords means through which AHC views come to world attention. Reps of important Arab states are believed to concur in latter views and have indicated they will endeavor to persuade AHC officials in Jerusalem to reconsider its decision not to participate in UN discussions. Nakkleh indicated he would reconsider question and might consult his superiors in Jerusalem.

US as one of permanent members SC is required under March 5 to consult on situation with respect Palestine and as longstanding friend of Arab world would particularly regret if reps of Arabs of Palestine refused to present their views in connection with these consultations.

Dept attaches great importance this matter and requests you discuss with AHC participation in SC discussions and in such consulta-

¹ Numbered 42 (1948).

tions as may be necessary under March 5 resolution. You might point out that such consultation would involve no commitments on part of AHC.²

Sent to Jerusalem for action; Repeated to Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Jidda and Cairo for information and for immediate informal discussion with ForOff.

MARSHALL₆

² Jerusalem, on March 8 sent the text of a communication from the Arab Higher Committee refusing to participate in discussions with the permanent members of the Security Council. Consul General Macatee concluded, after subsequent discussion with Hussein Khalidi, Secretary of the Committee, that the answer would probably have been in the affirmative if the reference to implementing the resolution of the General Assembly had not appeared in the Security Council resolution. (Telegram 271, 867N.01/3-848)

Cairo, on March 16, reported information from Azzam Pasha that the Arab Higher Committee had authorized its New York representatives to give information to the Security Council on an informal basis but had forbidden him to discuss partition in any form. (Telegram 263, 501.BB Palestine/3-1648)

Clifford Papers

*Memorandum by the President's Special Counsel (Clifford)*¹

[WASHINGTON ?,] March 6, 1948.

PROPOSED PROGRAM ON THE PALESTINE PROBLEM

Unless immediate action is taken to preserve peace in Palestine, chaos and war will follow Great Britain's withdrawal on May 15th. Such a situation will seriously damage United States prestige and United States interests. It will surely be exploited by the Russians.

The policy of the United States must be to support the United Nations settlement of the Palestine issue. This Government urged partition upon the United Nations in the first place and it is unthinkable that it should fail to back up that decision in every possible way. To do so, the United States Government should adopt the following program of immediate action:

A. *Preservation of Peace*

1. During the period of Five-Power discussions, provided for by the Security Council Resolution of March 5th, the United States should exert every pressure it can bring to bear upon the Arab States to accept partition. Strong pressures may already have been applied, but it does not look that way to the American people. Rather, there have been numerous examples of what appear to be acts of appeasement toward the Arabs. It is inconceivable to most Americans and to

¹ Although the source text contains no indication of authorship, Mr. Clifford has stated that he was the drafter. (Memorandum of conversation by William M. Franklin, June 20, 1974, 501.BB Palestine/3-2248)

many other countries that we cannot—if we really wish to do so—exert effective pressure both on the Arabs and on the British.

2. At the conclusion of the ten-day period provided for under the Resolution of the Security Council, the United States should take the initiative in branding the Arab States as aggressors and should move in the Security Council that Arab action constitutes a threat to the peace.

3. The United States should further call upon the Security Council to require Great Britain to comply with the General Assembly's resolution to refrain from taking "any action to prevent, obstruct or delay the implementation by the (Palestine) Commission of the measures recommended by the General Assembly."

In particular, Great Britain should be required to:

a) permit immediate entry of the UN Commission into Palestine as directed by the General Assembly resolution;

b) set aside Tel Aviv and its vicinity as a port, in compliance with the General Assembly resolution.

B. *Arab and Jewish Militias*

1. The United States should call upon the Security Council immediately to create the Arab and Jewish armed militias provided for in the General Assembly's resolution, and to provide means for and supervise the procurement of the necessary arms.

2. The United States should immediately lift its unilateral embargo on arms to the Middle East. Shipments of arms should be freely allowed subject to limitations set by the UN Palestine Commission or the Security Council. This will give the Jewish militia and Hagana, which are striving to implement the UN decision, equal opportunity with the Arabs to arm for self-defense.

3. The United States should withdraw its instructions to the American Consulate General in Jerusalem which requires recalling the passports of all Americans serving in Arab or Jewish militia created by the UN.

4. The United States should cooperate fully with any programs set up by the UN Palestine Commission to carry out its functions in respect of Arab and Jewish militias.

C. *International Security Force*

1. The United States should cooperate to the fullest with the UN Palestine Commission in plans for establishing an international security force in Palestine.

2. The United States position on the composition of this force should continue as it was prior to the General Assembly's action: recruitment

from volunteers and not by calls on member states for national contingents. Thus, no American troops would be involved. But the United States should assume its part of the cost of recruiting, arming, and maintaining this international security force.

Further protections are wise :

a) the pattern should be the one followed in setting up the UN Palestine Commission: no recruitment from nationals of permanent members of the Security Council or from nations directly involved in the Middle East. This means a volunteer force from the smaller nations and excludes United States, Russia, and Great Britain.

b) Service should not be in national uniform. The international security force should be under UN control and supervision, and serve as a UN force.

3. If Russia vetoes the exclusion of volunteers from the great powers, the United States should concede that point, subject to the following conditions :

a) the total number of volunteers from the 5 great powers shall not exceed $\frac{1}{2}$ of the total authorized force; and

b) the number of volunteers who are nationals of any one great power shall not exceed $\frac{1}{5}$ of the quota reserved for the 5 great powers.

This would mean, for example, that Russian volunteers would not be more than $\frac{1}{10}$ of the total authorized international security force.

In the event such program be adopted, the United States should remove any limitations penalizing Americans for serving in such force. American citizens were not barred from joining the British Air Force or the Chinese Flying Tigers in the last war.

4. If competent military authorities determine that a force composed of individual volunteers cannot be made ready soon enough to meet the needs of the situation, then the United States should agree to proposals for the Security Council to exercise its authority under the UN Charter to call on member nations to provide troops.

But here too, the composition should be as above indicated; first, if possible, by troops supplied voluntarily by member nations; secondly, if that should prove to be impossible, by call on all nations. In either event, this force should be subject to the quota limitations above outlined.

5. Special attention should be paid to the needs of the City of Jerusalem, in order that on the withdrawal of Great Britain on May 15, Christian holy places and religious buildings and sites sacred to the entire Christian world would not be left at the mercy of fanatical Moslems.

Clifford Papers

*Memorandum by the President's Special Counsel (Clifford)
to President Truman*¹

[WASHINGTON?,] March 8, 1948.

It seems to me that much of the discussion about our foreign policy—and specifically the Palestine issue—does not touch the fundamentals of the problem. I am, therefore, taking the liberty of presenting to you my own views.

At the outset, let me say that the Palestine problem should not be approached as a Jewish question, or an Arab question, or a United Nations question. The sole question is what is best for the United States of America. Furthermore, one's judgment in advising as to what is best for America must in no sense be influenced by the election this fall. I know only too well that you would not hesitate to follow a course of action that makes certain the defeat of the Democratic Party if you thought such action were best for America. What I say is, therefore, completely uninfluenced by election considerations.

I

There are some who criticize your actions last fall in actively supporting partition in Palestine. They argue that this embarked the United States on a new policy; that this new policy involves military commitments which we are unable to perform; and that, therefore, we should seek some other solution. This argument is completely fallacious.

Your action in supporting partition is in complete conformity with the settled policy of the United States. Palestine was Turkish territory prior to World War I. It was captured by the Allies. The Balfour Declaration favoring "the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people", was made November 2, 1917. Its text had been submitted to President Wilson and approved by him before its publication. It was publicly endorsed by the French and Italian Governments in April 1920. The principal Allied powers decided that the mandate for the government of Palestine should be entrusted to Great Britain and that the mandatory power was to be responsible for putting the Balfour Declaration into effect. The substance of the Balfour Declaration has been restated by Presidents Harding, Coolidge, Hoover, Franklin D. Roosevelt and yourself. The Balfour Declaration was approved by joint resolution of Congress June 30, 1922. It was reaffirmed in the American-British Palestine Mandate

¹ Although the source text contains no indication of authorship, Mr. Clifford has stated that he was the drafter. (Memorandum of conversation by William M. Franklin, June 20, 1974, 501.BB Palestine/3-2248)

Convention of December 3, 1924. The Balfour policy was again approved in a declaration by members of the Senate and the House of the 77th Congress, which was submitted to the President November 2, 1942, signed by 68 Senators and 193 members of the House.

In 1944 both the Democratic and the Republican National Conventions adopted resolutions favoring the establishment in Palestine of "a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth".

Under date of July 2, 1945, a letter was addressed to you signed by a majority of both Houses of Congress, stating "that the time for action is now" and urged "all interested governments to join with the United States toward the end of establishing Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth at the earliest possible time." A letter to the same effect dated July 2, 1945 was addressed to you and signed by the governors of forty of the forty-eight states of the United States. On December 19, 1945, a concurrent resolution was adopted by Congress which resolved that the United States use its good offices towards the establishment of a democratic commonwealth in Palestine.

There are numerous other declarations of policy by the United States Government to the same effect. Your active support of partition was in complete harmony with the policy of the United States. Seldom has any policy of this government been so clearly and definitely established. Had you failed to support partition, you would have been departing from an established American policy and justifiably subject to criticism.

Partition unquestionably offers the best hope of a permanent solution of the Palestine problem that may avoid war. The policy of drift and delay urged by opponents of partition makes *absolutely certain* the very military involvements that they profess they want to avoid. Your action on partition in no wise extended the military commitments of the United States. It was a high-minded, statesmanlike adoption of *the one* course of action that may avoid military involvement.

II

Not only is partition in conformity with established American policy, not only is partition the only hope of avoiding military involvement of the United States in the Near East, but, in addition, partition is the only course of action with respect to Palestine that will strengthen our position vis-à-vis Russia.

One of the most fundamental objectives of American foreign policy is that no aggressive military power shall establish itself on the shores of Western Europe. Germany became a real threat to the United States when she moved to establish herself in Channel ports. Twice we went to war to throw her back from these.

Britain likewise has no desire to see an aggressive military power establish itself in Western Europe. But Britain also has primary inter-

ests all over southern Asia and Africa. Britain, therefore, must consider her military position on those continents. Economic exhaustion has necessitated the limitation of her military forces. To compensate for curtailment of her military forces in Asia and the Near East, Britain is deliberately building up an alliance with the Moslem world. Such an alliance, she undoubtedly feels, will give her friendly populations from Pakistan west across Asia Minor and all along the shores of North Africa.

While the British-Moslem alliance is undoubtedly extremely important to Britain, a similar alliance between the United States and the Moslem world is much less important to the United States. Our primary interests demand alliances with the nations to the south of us and along the shores of Western Europe.

III

Events have proved that, for the present at least, "one world" is impossible of attainment—either within the United Nations or otherwise. Normally, the cohesive force that holds an organization together is opposition from the outside. The absence of such opposition from the outside tends to cause the organization to break into factions. The existence of the Axis military was the cohesive force that held the Allied Nations together during the war. With the military collapse of the Axis, unity among the Allied powers ceased. When all the nations of the world unite in a peace organization, there is no outside opposition. We are in no danger from attack from Mars. Therefore, a world organization tends to break into factions. This is what happened to the League of Nations. It is also happening in the United Nations. The United Nations is now dividing between the Soviet faction and the United States faction.

IV

The development of factions within the United Nations compels the United States to determine its course of action vis-à-vis the United Nations.

We must admit that the possibility of the United Nations affording adequate military protection to us becomes more and more remote. One course of action that the United States might follow would be to make less and less use of the United Nations machinery. This would inevitably lead ultimately to the collapse of the United Nations. Such a policy, in my opinion, would be tragic.

In the first place, the United Nations is a God-given vehicle through which the United States can build up a community of powers in Western Europe and elsewhere to resist Soviet aggression and maintain our historic interests. It is the best conceivable mechanism to capitalize on the Marshall plan politically. We can cement alliances

immediately through the United Nations mechanisms which could not be brought about by fifty years of diplomacy.

Secondly, a jettisoning of the United Nations would be calamitous to American morale. The American people want peace. They fervently believe that the United Nations offers the best hope for peace. They would go to war to sustain the United Nations as an instrumentality for peace. The cruel fact is that American morale is collapsing right around us today because the American people feel that their government is aiding and abetting in the disintegration of the United Nations—the one great hope of the American people for peace. Nothing has contributed so much to this feeling as Senator Austin's recent statement. In large part, it seemed to be the sophistries of a lawyer attempting to tell what we *could not* do to support the United Nations—in direct contradiction to your numerous statements that we mean to do everything possible *to support* the United Nations.

Not only do the American people see their government failing to back up the United Nation's position on Palestine but now they hear talk of our entering into military alliances with the powers of Western Europe with no reference to such action coming within the framework of the United Nations. The American people grasped at the United Nations, believing it would save them from being engulfed in World War III. Suddenly, they see what they thought was dry land begin to sink—sink because of what they regard as supineness of their own government.

All of this is causing a complete lack of confidence in our foreign policy from one end of this country to the other and among all classes of our population. This lack of confidence is shared by Democrats, Republicans, young people and old people. There is a definite feeling that we have no foreign policy, that we do not know where we are going, that the President and the State Department are bewildered, that the United States, instead of furnishing leadership in world affairs, is drifting helplessly.

I believe all of this can be changed.

V

PROPOSED UNITED STATES POLICY

1. While recognizing that the United Nations will not afford us adequate military protection, we should nevertheless support it to the limit as an instrumentality for consolidating the anti-Soviet forces of the world. Here is an instrumentality already in existence which is well-nigh a perfect mechanism for such purpose.

Any military arrangement with Western European powers must be pictured as coming completely within the framework of the United Nations. If this is done, it will receive the support of the American people. If this is not done, we will see an isolationism develop in America that will make any military alliances or intelligent foreign policy well-nigh impossible within the foreseeable future.

2. In order to save the United Nations for our own selfish interests, the United States must promptly and vigorously support the United Nations actions regarding Palestine. We "crossed the Rubicon" on this matter when the partition resolution was adopted by the Assembly—largely at your insistence. A retreat now will be a body-blow to the United Nations. We cannot hope to cement alliances in South America and Western Europe if we back out now. Those countries would justifiably discount the value of any commitments we might propose to make in the face of our repudiation of a commitment we only made last November.

3. The British have announced that they intend to withdraw from Palestine by May 15th. Unless affirmative action is taken immediately by both the United States and the Security Council to preserve peace in Palestine, the withdrawal of Britain's military forces on May 15th will be followed by chaos and bloody war.

4. There is no more certain way of having Russia move into the Arabian Peninsula than for us to permit war to develop between the Jews and the Arabs—and this is as certain as the rising of tomorrow's sun, less we move promptly to prevent it. Furthermore, when this happens, Russia can move in unilaterally as the defender of world peace and champion of the United Nations. To permit this to happen would be disastrous.

5. It is argued that our Arabian oil supplies will be imperilled if we support the Assembly's resolution for partition of Palestine. The United States and Western Europe can only get oil from Arabia if there is peace in Arabia. Peace in Arabia can only be maintained by backing up the Arabs or by backing up the United Nations. The time for new solutions or compromises ended when the Assembly adopted the partition resolution. It is utterly unthinkable for the United States now to back the Arabs and openly oppose a decision of the United Nations Assembly, arrived at at your own insistence. The only alternative is, therefore, to back up the United Nations so that there will be peace in Palestine.

6. There are those who say that such a course of action will not get us oil, that the Arabs will not sell us oil if we back up the United Nations partition plan. The fact of the matter is that the Arab states must have oil royalties or go broke. For example, 90% of Saudi

Arabia's revenues come from American oil royalties. The Arab states have no customer for their oil other than the United States:

a) they must have dollars and can get dollars only from the United States;

b) their social and economic structure would be irreparably harmed by adopting a Soviet orientation, and it would be suicide for their ruling classes to come within the Soviet sphere of influence;

c) Saudi Arabia possesses the greatest oil deposits in this area. King Ibn Saud has publicly and repeatedly refused even to threaten the United States with cancellation of oil leases, despite his dislike for our partition position.

7. America's security and its oil interests in the Middle East depend upon effective enforcement of the United Nations decision on Palestine. In terms of military necessity, political and economic self-preservation will compel the Arabs to sell their oil to the United States. Their need of the United States is greater than our need of them.

8. There are those who say that partition will not work and that another solution must be found. This comes from those who never wanted partition to succeed and who have been determined to sabotage it. If anything has been omitted that could help kill partition, I do not know what it would be. First, Britain, the Mandatory Power, not only publicly declared she would have no part of it, but she has done everything possible to prevent effective action by the Palestine Commission. Next, we have placed an embargo on arms to Palestine, while Britain fulfills her "contract obligations" to supply arms to the Arabs. Thirdly, our State Department has made no attempt to conceal their dislike for partition. Fourthly, the United States appears in the ridiculous role of trembling before threats of a few nomadic desert tribes. This has done us irreparable damage. Why should Russia or Yugoslavia, or any other nation treat us with anything but contempt in light of our shilly-shallying appeasement of the Arabs. After all, the only successful opposition to the Russian advance has been in Greece and Turkey. You proclaimed a bold policy and stood your ground. The Truman Doctrine, so far, has been the one outstanding success in a disintegrating situation.

In case you are interested, I am sending you herewith a separate memorandum detailing suggestions for action in the Palestine situation.

[Annex]

SUMMARY OF PROPOSALS FOR AMERICAN POLICY IN PALESTINE²

Vigorous American support of UN's Palestine decision is the only policy which is in American interests in the Middle East.

² Attached to the summary of proposals is an undated nine-page paper entitled "Palestine", not printed. It is divided into four major sections: the legal status of the partition plan, the present situation in Palestine, a program of action for the United States, and American Foreign Policy in Palestine.

1. *American Security and Peace in Palestine*: American security and our vital interests in the Middle East's oil depend upon peace in Palestine. UN's failure to enforce its Palestine plan will bring bitter warfare between Arabs and Jews. Peace in Palestine depends on firm UN action, which is impossible without American leadership.

2. *American Security and Russian Penetration into Middle East*: UN abdication in Palestine leaves a military vacuum there after May 15 when Great Britain withdraws. Unless UN implements its Palestine decision, Russia may intervene unilaterally in the guise of preserving world peace and defending the UN Charter.

3. *American Security and Middle East Oil*: The Arab States will continue to sell oil to the United States. The Arabs need us more than we need them. They must have oil royalties or go bankrupt. 90% of Saudi Arabia's governmental revenues derive from American oil royalties, and King Ibn Saud has publicly refused even to threaten cancellation of United States oil leases despite his dislike of our partition position.

The Arab States must have dollars, and can get dollars only from the United States. The Arab leaders would be committing suicide to accept Russian orientation.

4. *American Security and Jewish Palestine*: Jewish Palestine is strongly oriented to the United States, and away from Russia, and will remain so unless a military vacuum in Palestine caused by collapse of UN authority brings Russian unilateral intervention into Palestine.

5. *American Security and UN's Palestine Decision*: Collapse of a UN decision taken at the insistence of the United States would cause serious loss of American prestige and moral leadership all over the world. Arab league negation of partition is not only open defiance of UN, but also deliberate and insolent defiance of the United States which vigorously espoused partition.

American self-interest, American military security, American interests in Middle East oil, and American prestige in international affairs all demand effective implementation of the UN Palestine decision. The most effective way to prevent Russian penetration into the Middle East and to protect vital American oil interests there is for the United States to take the immediate initiative in the Security Council to implement the General Assembly's Palestine resolution.

[Here follows a section entitled "Program of Action for the U.S.", which deals with the preservation of peace, Arab and Jewish militias, cooperation by Great Britain with the United Nations, and an international security force. This section, in the form of an outline, parallels in content the lengthier exposition set forth in the memorandum of March 6, *supra*.]

501.BB Palestine/3-848 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, March 8, 1948-noon.

116. The President has approved draft statement on situation in Palestine after May 15, 1948, with concluding remarks as set forth in Deptel 107, March 5, for use if and when necessary.

MARSHALL

501.BB Palestine/3-848

*Memorandum by Mr. Robert M. McClintock to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] March 8, 1948.

Subject: Check list on future Palestine developments.

If the trend in the Security Council continues to the point envisaged in the Department's telegram to Ambassador Austin, No. 107 of March 5 (which position has been approved by the President), we shall presently find ourselves involved in a special session of the General Assembly, whose probable outcome will be the establishment of a United Nations trusteeship for Palestine. In such event the emphasis will be shifted, so far as the maintenance of international peace and security is concerned, from the threat of Arab aggression to a new threat of Jewish attempts by violence to establish a *de facto* State in Palestine. The following check list is submitted as a matter of urgency to highlight certain of the problems for which this Government must find answers in the very near future.

1. *Trusteeship.*

Detailed draft trusteeship agreements² have been worked out by DA and NE calling for either a direct United Nations trusteeship over Palestine or a trusteeship of the three residuary legatees of World War I—United States, United Kingdom, and France. These draft agreements both stress the paramount powers of a strong governor.

¹ Addressed also to Mr. Henderson and John D. Hickerson, Director of the Office of European Affairs. Mr. McClintock transmitted a copy to Charles E. Bohlen, Counselor of the Department, with his memorandum of March 18.

² The first draft of a trusteeship agreement for Palestine found in the Department files by the editors was prepared on February 11, 1948, by officers of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs and of the Office of United Nations Affairs. The draft called for a Three-Power trusteeship by France, the United Kingdom and the United States as the remaining Principal Allied and Associated Powers. A second draft prepared by the same group and dated the following day, designated the United Nations as the Administering Authority. The drafts are presumably the documents referred to here; they are filed under 501.BB Palestine/2-1148.

2. *United States control over efforts of American Jews to send arms or emigrants to Palestine.*

The present arms embargo should suffice as a legal barrier to the efforts of American Jews to run guns and other implements of war into Palestine. However, our legal machinery seems somewhat defective in preventing Jewish corporations from purchasing American vessels for foreign registry with the eventual aim of using these ships for bringing clandestine emigrants to Palestine. The withdrawal of the British from Palestine and their replacement by a United Nations administration would presumably not alter our responsibilities to prevent the United States being used as a base for illegal immigration activity.

3. *Immigration.*

If the trusteeship were established the United States should strongly support measures for an orderly and increased immigration of Jews to Palestine. We should advocate that this migration should be controlled from the source by the IRO and at the destination by the new United Nations government of Palestine.

4. *Security Forces.*

If a United Nations trusteeship is established some form of force must be provided to maintain the integrity of the trusteeship. Such a force would include naval patrol vessels to prevent gun-running and illegal immigration, and land and air security forces to maintain the integrity of the land frontiers of Palestine, as well as internal order and security pending the development by the governor of Palestine of local security forces. Under either of the types of trusteeship envisaged by the Department, the United States would be a participant, and prompt study should be made on the basis of the experience of the British Government in Palestine of minimum security needs with a view to supplying the United States portion of those requirements by a May 15 deadline.

5. *Representations to the United Kingdom.*

The problems raised in this check list would be brought measurably closer to satisfactory solution if the United Kingdom could be prevailed upon to carry the major immediate burden for possibly six or eight months longer than the British Government now intends. If the United Kingdom could find it possible to maintain its existing naval patrol and to second officers and local security forces of the present government of Palestine to the trusteeship administration, the task of transition from one regime to the other would be greatly simplified. It would be politically impossible, no doubt, for the British Government to agree to shoulder the whole burden of the security problem, but the members of the United Nations have reasonable warrant to

look to the United Kingdom to cease its precipitate withdrawal from Palestine and to assume responsibility, even on a diminishing scale, until the new trusteeship government is squarely on its feet. Once the Security Council has reached a decision to call a special session of the General Assembly immediate representations would be in order to the British Government suggesting that the period of transition be extended beyond May 15 to the end of this year, with assurances that the United States will be willing to do its part in the joint UN effort.³

³ Marginal notation by Mr. Lovett: "We should attempt, I think, to supply naval & air support as our contribution at the outset."

501.BB Palestine/3-848

*Memorandum by Mr. Robert M. McClintock to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] March 8, 1948.

Subject: Big Five Consultation on Palestine Situation—First Meeting.

I telephoned Mr. Rusk at 3:20 p. m., to inquire the outcome of this morning's Big Five consultation in the office of Mr. Gromyko on the situation in Palestine, responsive to the Security Council's resolution of March 5.

Mr. Rusk said that the results had not been fruitful. Mr. Gromyko had been completely negative to the idea of setting up a working group or of taking testimony, in effect, from the interested parties such as the Palestine Commission, the Jewish Agency, the Arab Higher Committee, and the Mandatory Power. While he did not object to individual members of the Big Five consulting with the parties at interest, he was adamant in his insistence that the Big Five should not consult as a group with the parties. Mr. Gromyko contended that the consultation contemplated by the Council's resolution was limited to direct consultation between the USSR, US, UK, France and China.

Mr. Rusk plans to consult with the French and Chinese Representatives this afternoon and will report later on these conversations. In a preliminary way, however, he raised the question, "What should the Department advise if the Russians persisted in their present attitude?" Would it be better to terminate Big Five consultation quickly, report back promptly to the Security Council, and then give our speech on the situation after May 15?

I told Mr. Rusk that it seemed perfectly obvious that the Russians would persist in their attitude and that I would report the results of the morning meeting to Mr. Lovett.

¹ Addressed also to Mr. Henderson.

It seems to me that it would be unfortunate for the Big Five to go through perfunctory motions of consultation and then pitch the ball back at the Security Council. It seems to me that the following line of action could be tried:

1. The United States, France and China should ask questions of the United Kingdom as Mandatory Power. This would, in effect, constitute Big Four consultation and leave the Russians standing out as intransigents by their own choice.
2. The United States, France and China, collectively if possible, and severally if not, should query the Palestine Commission, the Jewish Agency, and the Arab Higher Committee on the situation in Palestine within the terms of the Assembly's resolution of March 5.
3. Following this "taking of testimony" we will be in a much better position to come back to Big Five consultation. We can then freely ask questions of the USSR and other permanent Members of the Security Council. More important, if the Soviet Union asks the United States leading questions such as whether we are still in favor of partition, we could, on the basis of the testimony previously gathered, express valid doubts.
4. Following this Big Five consultation a report could be made to the Security Council by March 15, after which the ground would be better prepared for Senator Austin's proposed statement.²

² Ambassador Austin furnished a detailed summary of the First Meeting of the permanent members of the Security Council on the Palestine question in telegram 256, March 8, 3:25 p. m., from New York, not printed. At one point in the meeting, he "stressed that we proposed to proceed with partition plan as the basis and find out whether there are any modifications in detail which would be acceptable both to the Jews and Arabs and therefore make it possible to implement plan by peaceful means." (501.BB Palestine/3-848)

501.BB Palestine/3-948

Memorandum by Mr. Robert M. McClintock to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] March 9, 1948.

Three telegrams¹ are attached for your signature pursuant to our conversation this morning.

I talked to Mr. Rusk at 11:25 a. m. by telephone. Fortunately USUN had arrived at the same conclusions as we, and Mr. Rusk has already had conversations with Mr. Tsiang of China and M. de Rose of France in which general agreement was reached on the need for interrogating the parties. The French and Chinese were pleased with our proposed questions and Tsiang expressed the opinion that they went to the core of the problem.

I suggested to Mr. Rusk that for the record an effort should be made again to invite Gromyko to participate and that we hoped that the

¹ Presumably telegrams 122, 125, and 172, immediately following.

interrogatories would be conducted by the Big Three as a group and not separately.

I drew to Mr. Rusk's attention the article on Page 3 of this morning's *New York Times*, in which the legal experts of the UN Secretariat are quoted as affirming the legal authority of the Security Council to partition Palestine by force, as well as establishing the opinion that the UN Palestine Commission "will become the legally constituted government of Palestine after Britain surrenders the mandate on May 15." Mr. Rusk said that this was a working paper which had been asked for by the Palestine Commission and that it was dated February 3. Secretary-General Lie had, however, submitted it informally to members of the Security Council yesterday.

I commented that it was most unfortunate for the public impression to get around that the UN Secretariat had prepared a refutation of Senator Austin's statement of February 24, to say nothing of rendering an opinion on the question of who had responsibility for Palestine after May 15. I suggested that Mr. Lie had better set the record straight as to the date and origin of this paper and that we might wish to inform Mr. Lie, since he had communicated to us as a member of the Council, that we did not concur in his legal opinion.

Mr. Rusk said we should not be surprised to see press accounts quoting "a Russian spokesman" to the effect that the Soviet Union will advocate that the Security Council implement by force, if necessary, the partition plan. The "Russian spokesman" is Mr. Gromyko.

501.BB Palestine/3-848: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

TOP SECRET

US URGENT

WASHINGTON, March 9, 1948—6 p. m.

NIACT

122. For Austin from Lovett. Despite negative Soviet attitude reported in your 256, March 8,¹ we feel it is essential for those permanent members of SC which are willing to cooperate to develop clearly the attitude of Jews, Arabs and the Mandatory Power with respect to the situation in Palestine. In particular it is necessary to show their opinion on whether the plan of partition with economic union can be implemented by peaceful means without agreement between the Jews and Arabs of Palestine. We suggest the following procedure:

The Soviet Union should today formally be invited to participate with the US, China and France in questioning the Jewish Agency, the Arab Higher Committee, the Mandatory Power, and the Palestine

¹ Not printed; but see footnote 2, p. 700.

Commission. Following anticipated Soviet refusal to participate in such questioning, the US, France, and China should collectively interrogate the parties. Approved questions for your use in this connection are listed in next telegram.² It would seem preferable to commence the interrogatory with the UK, since this would in effect constitute consultation among four of the five Permanent Members.

After testimony has been taken from the Jews, Arabs, the Mandatory Power, and the Palestine Commission, consultation should proceed among the Big Five according to the terms of the resolution of March 5. Since the attitudes of the parties in Palestine are known in advance it seems obvious that their replies to Big Three questioning will have served once more to show the utter irreconcilability of the attitudes of Jews, Arabs and the UK on the plan for partition with economic union.

In light of this testimony therefore, the question, directed severally to the Big Five, "Do you believe that the plan of partition with economic union can be implemented by peaceful means without agreement between the Jews and Arabs of Palestine?" can scarcely receive an affirmative answer.

If the Soviet Representative says "No" to this question he can later scarcely fail to object to the logic of our position as developed in Deptel 107, March 5. If the Soviet Representative says "Yes", the burden of proof will be on the USSR to show how partition can be carried out by peaceful means in the absence of agreement. If the Soviet Representative advocates the use of SC force to carry out partition he must refute the constitutional argument established in your statement of Feb. 24.

In view of scant time at your disposal it is hoped that immediate agreement can be found between US, France and China for procedure outlined above. You should apprise your British colleague of our intentions and of our expectation that UK cooperation will be informed, immediate, and imbued with realization of that responsibility which the British still hold for Palestine. [Lovett.]

MARSHALL

² *Infra*.

501.BB Palestine/3-948: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

SECRET US URGENT

WASHINGTON, March 9, 1948—6 p. m.

125. Following are approved questions for your use in ascertaining attitude of Jewish Agency, Arab Higher Committee, the Mandatory

Power, and the Palestine Commission, on the present situation in Palestine with respect to the Assembly's recommended plan of partition with economic union. You will note that the questions to be directed to the Jewish Agency and the Arab Higher Committee are, *mutatis mutandis*, identical. We feel in general that the questions should be limited in number and directed to the main issue which is whether the plan of partition with economic union is workable if carried out by peaceful means.

You should not be led into questions on whether or not the present situation in Palestine is a threat to international peace and security. This is a question which can only be directed to and answered by the Security Council and not by the Jews or Arabs of Palestine.

The questions follow seriatim :

To the Jewish Agency

1. Do the Jews of Palestine accept the Plan of Partition with Economic Union recommended by the General Assembly?

2. Do you believe that the Partition Plan can be implemented by peaceful means without agreement between the Jews and Arabs of Palestine?

3. Are the Jews prepared to accept responsibility for governmental administration and for the maintenance of law and order within the proposed Jewish State?

4. What is the attitude of the Arabs who would be within the proposed Jewish State toward the Partition Plan? Has any effort been made by Jewish leaders to obtain the agreement of Arab leaders to the plan of partition with economic union?

5. Which elements in the proposed Partition Plan are considered by the Jews of Palestine as absolutely essential?

6. What modifications do the Jews of Palestine consider might be made in the proposed Partition Plan to make agreement between the Jews and Arabs more possible of attainment?

7. Is the proposed Economic Union essential to the viability of the proposed Jewish State?

To the Arab Higher Committee

1. Do the Arabs of Palestine accept the Plan of Partition with Economic Union recommended by the General Assembly?

2. Do you believe that the Partition Plan can be implemented by peaceful means without agreement between the Jews and Arabs of Palestine?

3. Are the Arabs prepared by [to] accept responsibility for governmental administration and for the maintenance of law and order within the proposed Arab State?

4. What is the attitude of the Arabs who would be within the proposed Jewish State toward the Partition Plan? Has any effort been made by Arab leaders to obtain the agreement of Jewish leaders to the Plan of Partition with Economic Union?

5. Which elements in the proposed Partition Plan are considered by the Arabs as absolutely unacceptable?

6. What modifications do the Arabs of Palestine consider might be made in the proposed Partition Plan to make agreement between the Jews and Arabs more possible of attainment?

7. Is the proposed Economic Union essential to the viability of the proposed Arab State?

To the Mandatory Power

1. Does the Mandatory Power accept the Plan of Partition with Economic Union recommended by the General Assembly? Does the Mandatory Power include in its acceptance the "adoption and implementation" by it and other Members of the Plan?

2. Does the Mandatory Power consider that the Partition Plan can be implemented by peaceful means without agreement between the Jews and Arabs of Palestine?

3. Does the Mandatory Power believe that the proposed plan of economic union is essential to the viability of the proposed Jewish and Arab States?

4. Does the Mandatory Power consider that modifications of detail might be made in the proposed Partition Plan which would make it acceptable to both the Jews and Arabs of Palestine?

5. Does the Mandatory Power have any suggestion to make in connection with the statement by Sir Arthur Creech Jones, March 2, that "we shall welcome any effort to find a bridge, even at this late hour, across the gulf which now separates the two communities in Palestine."?

To the Palestine Commission

1. Has the Palestine Commission found sufficient acceptance of the Partition Plan on the part of (a) the Jews of Palestine (b) the Arabs of Palestine and (c) the Mandatory Power to afford a basis for its peaceful implementation?

2. Has the Palestine Commission discovered possible modifications in either the substance or the procedures of the Partition Plan which might offer a basis for agreement among the people of Palestine?

3. If no agreement has thus far been obtained on the Partition Plan between the Jews and Arabs of Palestine, what are the specific points at issue in such disagreement?

4. To what extent does the Palestine Commission consider it possible to implement a substantial part of the plan by peaceful means?

5. What would be the effect upon the proposed Economic Union of a failure to obtain the agreement of both the Arabs and Jews of Palestine?

MARSHALL

501.BB Palestine/3-948: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Jerusalem

SECRET US URGENT
NIACT

WASHINGTON, March 9, 1948—6 p. m.

172. Please explain to Khalidi the following points and urge him to reconsider decision mentioned in urtel 271, March 8:¹

(1) The US Govt's interpretation of the SC resolution is that it refers to peaceful implementation;

(2) Under SC resolution consultations envisaged are informal and between the Big 5, who may wish to inquire attitudes of people of Palestine on situation there. Therefore, AHC should not be unduly concerned with reference to implementing resolution of GA.

Understand Nakhleh telephoning Cairo to request permission to participate in informal consultations and hope your representations to AHC will convince them of great desirability in Arabs' own interest in these consultations.

Sent to Jerusalem as 172; repeated to Cairo as 279; Baghdad as 74; Jidda as 70; Beirut as 99; and Damascus as 52. USUN as 128.

MARSHALL

¹ Not printed; but see footnote 2, p. 687.

501.BB Palestine/3-1048: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW YORK, March 10, 1948—1; 50 p. m.

267. For Lovett from Austin. Following is text of letter I sent by messenger to Gromyko this noon.

"I wonder if it would not be possible for you to reconsider your views against participating in informal questioning of representatives of the Jewish and Arab communities of Palestine in connection with the resolution passed by the SC last Friday? I am asking my representatives to get in touch very informally this afternoon at Lake Success with your representatives and those of Dr. Tsiang¹ and Mr. Parodi² with a view to formulating for our consideration questions which

¹ Ting-fu Tsiang, Chinese Representative at the United Nations.

² Alexandre Parodi, French Representative at the United Nations.

might usefully be directed to representatives of the Jewish and Arab communities, as well as the mandatory power and the Palestine Commission.

Our examination of the matter leads me to the inescapable conclusion that there are many questions having a bearing on the possibility of implementing the GA partition plan by peaceful means for which there are no clear answers in the present record. I think it is of the utmost importance for us to get the answers to these questions in order to carry out effectively our responsibilities to the SC under its resolution of March 5, particularly with reference to implementation of the partition plan by peaceful means.

I earnestly hope, therefore, that you will find it possible to reconsider your views and participate with us in questioning representatives of the Jewish and Arab communities of Palestine, as well as representatives of the mandatory power and the Palestine Commission."

AUSTIN

501.BB Palestine/3-948 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Legation in Syria

SECRET US URGENT

WASHINGTON, March 11, 1948—7 p. m.

58. Attitude of Syrian officials reported in your 135, March 9,¹ is of serious concern to this Govt as a steadfast supporter of UN. Presidential Secretary's complacent remark that to remove Arab threat of force might damage an increasing favorable situation reveals utter lack of comprehension of solemn undertakings entered into by Syrian Govt when it signed Charter of UN and ratified that instrument.

Your telegrams and other info reaching Dept lead to unmistakable inference that Syrian Govt could easily be charged with complicity in threatening international peace and security with regard to Palestine. In light of Ambassador Austin's statement of Feb 24 Syrian Govt should have no illusion as to where this Govt will stand in SC or elsewhere with respect to threats to international peace and security.

Please call on President Quwatly and state that while *démarche* suggested in Deptel 49, March 6,² is evidence of friendly regard which this Govt has for Arab world, Syrian Govt should by no means underestimate sincerity and fixity of purpose of the US to support measures by SC under UN Charter to maintain international peace and security. This purpose should seem of particular significance to Syrian Govt, which relied upon our support in 1946 in SC in securing withdrawal of French and British troops from Syrian territory.³

¹ Not printed.

² This is a repeat of telegram 164 to Jerusalem, p. 686.

³ For documentation on the policy of the United States concerning this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. VII, pp. 751 ff.

It should be obvious to anyone that such arrangements as those reported in your 136, March 9,⁴ will merely serve to underscore evidence of Syria's participation in threatening the integrity of Palestine and that Defense Minister in providing facilities for this press junket to Qawukji's headquarters is merely preparing grave difficulties for his own govt.

Please repeat your reference tels to Arab capitals to which this telegram is sent for info.⁵

MARSHALL

⁴ Not printed; it reported that Syrian Defense Minister Sharabati had informed various American reporters of the arrangements made for them to visit Fawzi Kawukji's headquarters on March 11 (501.BB Palestine/3-948). Kawukji was commander of the irregular Arab bands operating in northern Palestine.

⁵ This telegram was repeated to Cairo, Jidda, Beirut, Jerusalem, and Baghdad.

501.BB Palestine/3-1148: Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)
to the Secretary of State*

SECRET

NEW YORK, March 11, 1948—8 p. m.

273. For Lovett from Austin. Following is account of meeting of permanent members held in my office from 10:30 to 12:30 this morning¹ pursuant to SC resolution of last Friday. Parodi, Tsiang, Gromyko and SYG Lie were present during the whole meeting and Cadogan came in on our invitation during last hour. Tsiang opened the meeting by asking if we should invite Cadogan to join us. I said I had been talking with Rabbi Silver² earlier in the morning and raised the question whether we should not invite him also to appear before us to answer questions.

Gromyko said he wanted to make his position perfectly plain: he cannot participate in consultations with the Jewish Agency, Arab Committee, Palestine Commission or mandatory power. In support of this position he repeated all of the arguments he used during our first meeting on Monday (mytel 256, March 8³).

Gromyko went on to say that if other delegations mentioning France, China, and the US by name, wished to invite anybody to participate they must take responsibility for doing so.

I then suggested that we review proposed questions to be directed to the Jewish Agency. Copies of these questions, as well as those proposed to be directed to the Arab Committee, mandatory power, and Palestine Commission, as revised in consultations at staff level with

¹ For an account of the meeting held on March 9, see telegram 288, March 13, from New York, p. 720.

² Abba Hillel Silver, member of the American Section of the Executive of the Jewish Agency and a spokesman for the Agency at the United Nations.

³ Not printed; but see footnote 2, p. 700.

Chinese and French representatives yesterday afternoon, had been distributed and Gromyko as well as others had read them. (Text of these questions follows in next telegram.⁴) Gromyko observed that all of these questions have been clarified many times both by Jews and Arabs. I asked him if he thought that question "do you believe that the partition plan can be implemented by peaceful means by agreement between the Jews and Arabs of Palestine?" had been answered. He replied that this question had been answered, strongly implying that on the record there was no possibility of the plan being implemented by peaceful means.

I asked him whether he thought the question "would modifications in the proposed partition plan make agreement between the Jews and Arabs more possible of attainment?" had been answered. He replied that it has been answered at least ten times. The Jews, he said, have made it clear that the partition plan is the minimum they will accept.

I asked him whether he thought the question "do you consider the principles of the proposed economic union essential to the economic life of Palestine as a whole?" had been answered. He replied in the affirmative saying that both Jews and Arabs so far as he knows consider economic union essential.

Gromyko then asked whether questions of this sort were aimed at changing the recommendations of the GA. I told him that what we were after is to find out whether there are any modifications that would make possible implementation of the partition plan by pacific means.

At this point I said that I did not think there was any sense in pursuing any further the procedural point of whether or not we were going to consult with the Jewish Agency and others.

We returned to the question of asking Cadogan to come in. Gromyko finally agreed to this on the clear understanding that Cadogan would be coming not as the beginning of consultations with the mandatory power but merely as a continuation of the questioning of Cadogan which began at our meeting on Tuesday afternoon when we put to Cadogan a number of questions concerning the security of Palestine.⁵

After some further discussion Gromyko finally agreed that we might also put to Cadogan the questions we had prepared for today concerning peaceful implementation of the partition plan. I thereupon telephoned Cadogan and asked him to join us.

During the interval before Cadogan arrived we discussed the proposed questions for the Palestine Commission and Gromyko finally agreed, although reluctantly, that these questions might be put to the Palestine Commission through SYG Lie.

⁴ No. 274, March 11, 8: 15 p. m., not printed.

⁵ See telegram 288, March 13, from New York, p. 720.

During this interval, I also served notice on Gromyko that I intended to invite Rabbi Silver to the next meeting of the group and I hoped Gromyko would stay. He merely repeated that he could not participate.

I questioned Cadogan closely along the lines of the proposed questions directed to the mandatory power and those directed to the Palestine Commission as follows.

In response to our first question, in effect requesting clarification of the meaning of "acceptance" by the mandatory power of the partition plan Cadogan said that his government wants to avoid doing anything that might be considered obstructive, but on the other hand they wanted to avoid participating in putting any plan into effect against the wishes of either party. They were trying to steer a course empirically between these two points and he could not furnish any general rule which would answer all questions. This was not very satisfactory to the rest of us perhaps but they were doing the best they could according to their lights. I asked Cadogan if in effect this meant that acceptance of the plan by the mandatory government was conditional upon its acceptance by both the Jews and Arabs. I stressed that all of us were trying to implement this plan by peaceful means. I asked if it might be assumed that failing agreement between the Jews and Arabs if there were acquiescence by both if the mandatory government would then not be inflexible.

Cadogan dodged the question of whether UK acceptance was conditional on acceptance by both parties. He said that if, of course, anyone could find a way of bringing the parties together he was sure this would be most welcome to his government. In stating his position Cadogan used additional language which helped to clarify the UK attitude. For example, he said that "we could not ourselves be instrumental in putting into effect a plan which is not accepted by the parties" and again "we cannot take an active part in implementing a plan not accepted by the parties."

In response to question number 2 concerning the possibility of implementation of the plan by peaceful means Cadogan replied that his government considered it very difficult to carry out a plan like this without the backing of force.

I asked him if he thought the plan could be implemented if the Jews could be provided with the militia contemplated in the plan and if they had the necessary arms. He replied that this was of course hypothetical. It was a matter of how much they had and how long they could hold out. He pointed out that placing arms in the hands of the Jews sufficient to permit the organization of a Jewish state would not of itself equal settlement.

It was obvious in Cadogan's responses to the first two numbered questions that he did not see any real possibility of implementation of the plan by peaceful means.

In response to question number three concerning the possibility of modification of detail which would make the plan acceptable to both parties, Cadogan said that he could not think of any modifications of detail, stressing the word detail, which would make the plan acceptable to both parties. In response to the next question concerning modification of the timetable he replied emphatically that so far as the UK is concerned no change in the timetable is contemplated. He indicated that there is no willingness on the part of the mandatory government to modify the date (May 15) of laying down the mandate. He went on to say that "in accordance with his existing instructions those dates are fixed and irrevocable." And he added that there were no modifications he knew of which would change the British view in this matter.

In response to the next question which concerned Creech Jones' statement about finding a bridge across the gulf separating the two communities, Cadogan said that his government had no suggestions to make. He said his government had made no efforts to bring the parties together since they brought the matter to the UN a year ago which action was of course in a way a confession of failure. While they would welcome the success of any such efforts they had no suggestions to make.

Cadogan had very little to offer by way of comment on the questions directed to the Palestine Commission.

He said that the mandatory had had no further conversation with the Palestine Commission regarding piecemeal relinquishment of the mandate (question 5) and he said that he has informed the Palestine Commission that his government is standing by the May 1 date for arrival of the commission in Palestine (question 6).

[Here follows an account of the views of John Fletcher-Cooke, Financial Under-Secretary in the Palestine Government, on economic and administrative matters in Palestine.]

None of the other permanent representatives had any questions to ask Cadogan today beyond those covered above.

Before this morning's meeting broke up Tsiang raised the question of our next meeting and Gromyko made some point of not wanting to meet before tomorrow afternoon. We therefore finally agreed on 2:30 tomorrow in Mr. Parodi's office. I again said that I intended to invite Rabbi Silver to meet with us. Neither Tsiang nor Parodi objected; Gromyko merely repeated that he could not participate in such consultation. However, it may not be without significance that

in response to a question from the UN press officer covering our meetings as to whether Mr. Gromyko would or would not participate in questioning of Dr. Silver, Gromyko replied that was a matter twenty-four hours away.

Before leaving Gromyko told me privately in response to the letter I sent him yesterday (mytel 267, March 10) that he had not changed his views concerning consultations.

AUSTIN

*Second Monthly Progress Report of the United Nations Palestine Commission to the Security Council*¹

[Here follows an account of the preparatory work of the Commission, which contains the texts of questions put to the Mandatory Power and the latter's replies; an analysis of the impossibility of implementing the provisions of the General Assembly's partition resolution of November 29, 1947, concerning establishment of Provisional Councils of Government and concerning the formation of militias in Palestine; and a discussion of relevant economic and financial questions.]

H. CONCLUSION

1. Negotiations with the Mandatory Power and the Jewish Agency will be continued. In view of the policy of the Mandatory Power not to co-operate in the implementation of the Plan adopted by the General Assembly, a satisfactory coordination of the plans of the Commission with those of the Mandatory Power, in many vital aspects, is precluded. This, together with the steady deterioration of conditions in Palestine, leaves little hope for the achievement of continuity in administrative services and for an orderly transfer of authority to the Commission upon the termination of the Mandate.

2. Information concerning present conditions in Palestine, received by the Commission from the Advance Party of the Secretariat in Jerusalem, fully confirms the conclusions set forth in the commission's first special report on the problems of security, and further emphasizes that unless security is restored in Palestine, implementation of the resolution of the General Assembly will not be possible.

3. The Commission, therefore, has the duty to reiterate that present indications point to the inescapable conclusion that when the Mandate is terminated Palestine is likely to suffer severely from administrative chaos and widespread strife and bloodshed.

¹ Reprinted from SC, 3rd yr., *Special Suppl. No. 2*, pp. 20, 27. The report, dated March 12, 1948, was transmitted by Chairman Lisicky to the President of the Security Council on March 15.

501.BB Palestine/3-1348:Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET US URGENT

NEW YORK, March 13, 1948—1:30 a. m.

284. For Lovett from Austin. Following is account of meeting of permanent members today at Parodi's offices between 2:30 and 5:30 p. m. [, March 12?].

Despite his position concerning "consultations", Gromyko stayed throughout the meeting. Silver and Shertok represented the JA and the greater part of the meeting was taken up with their response to questions reported to Department yesterday. We had supplied JA with copy of these questions yesterday afternoon to assist their preparation.

Tsiang opened the meeting by saying he was under obligation as President of the SC to call a meeting for Monday, March 15, at 2:30, in conformity with the 10-day limit established in the SC resolution of last Friday.

Gromyko made a statement at the outset saying he wished to confirm his previous statements concerning the whole question of consultation, and to repeat that each word in his statement stands.

I countered by asking him what suggestions he would have for peaceful implementation of the plan of partition. He replied that my question does not relate to the subject, and I observed I thought the whole purpose of our meeting was to study the implementation of partition. I then asked the President whether he contemplated having a meeting to determine what we were going to report to the SC.

Tsiang in reply made clear that he was not present in his capacity as President of the SC. He said we had no chairman in our group and no *rapporteur* and he confirmed a brief statement by Gromyko to the effect that each of us would make his own individual statement in the SC, that is, his own evaluation of the situation.

(Tsiang's observations on this point indicated clearly that there was no hope of getting any joint report by him as we had hoped, reporting the consensus of the views of at least three of us.)

I then asked Tsiang if his observations meant that our consultations were to be, therefore, wholly without any effect. Gromyko observed that I was attempting to confuse two things, and he asked me if the US proposal for consultation which I had made at our first meeting still stands. He apparently had in mind the general idea of consultation with the various groups. I told him that his question was no question at all and said I thought our mandate was clear under the resolution of the Council. I asked whether we were going to have an opportunity

among ourselves before returning to the SC to discuss what each of us felt about this whole matter. Tsiang said he thought we might have a further meeting on Monday morning for the purpose of determining how far apart the four of us were and how near together. He emphasized that this would be to facilitate the smooth proceedings of the SC. He suggested that we meet at 10:30 Monday in his office. No objection to this was expressed but Gromyko made some deprecatory comment.

Tsiang then made a statement which started off in effect by agreeing with Gromyko's position that the Council's resolution under which we were operating means consultation among the permanent members to consider the question of peaceful implementation. He would like, however, to see all four of us start with the same data, and for this reason it would be certainly useful for us to hear the principal parties. On the other hand, we must abide by the resolution but it would certainly be more fruitful if we could get at the fundamental issues and facts.

Gromyko reiterated that he could take part in no consultations; that those who wished to do so would have to take responsibility and bear the full consequences of complications and delay in dealing with this Palestine matter.

Parodi said that at least three of us had agreed yesterday to invite Rabbi Silver to attend our meeting. He was now here with us at our invitation the only purpose of which was to be helpful. Parodi's intervention gave Tsiang an opportunity to ask Rabbi Silver to go ahead.

After an expression of the usual amenities, Silver said that they were surprised at the question concerning possible modifications in the partition plan. Since this matter seemed to be in our minds, he thought it would be helpful if they were to restate their position before attempting to answer the various questions. He would like to indicate why the JA does not regard any reopening of the subject as helpful, why the present plan represented the irreducible minimum for them. He said that the proposed plan was to them the only practicable solution which had been arrived at after many other plans had been proposed and had failed of acceptance. The present plan was no easy solution but the whole question is a very difficult one.

Silver then emphasized that any solution which the UN would endorse and approve will require enforcement and this by now should be an axiom. He hoped that their position would not be interpreted as *intransigent*. Events and circumstances, however, make this plan mandatory and imperative.

He then said that he had certain suggestions concerning SC action which he would like to make later if the group so desired. He at this

point turned the floor over to Dr. Shertok who answered seriatim the questions directed to the JA as follows :

Question No. 1:

Shertok emphasized that the partition plan is acceptable to the Jews. This was repeatedly stated during the GA and there had not seemed to be any occasion for a formal statement to this effect during the present phase of the matter. He said that world Jewish public opinion overwhelmingly supports this plan. Any views to the contrary are relatively insignificant.

There could be no more effective form of ratification of the plan for the Jews than the setting up of the provisional council of government which the Jews were only too eager to begin doing. Shertok then criticized the mandatory power as being responsible for delays in setting up the PCG.

Question No. 2:

Shertok said this really involved two closely interrelated questions: (a) Can the plan be implemented by peaceful means and (b) can it be implemented by agreement between the Jews and Arabs of Palestine? In respect to (a) he gave a flat no, if by agreement is meant formal public agreement in advance of implementation.

Implementation by peaceful means on the other hand could not be answered so simply. The Jews had always reckoned on a measure of physical opposition, but on the other hand, a large measure of acquiescence by the Arabs of Palestine. If they were left alone to go ahead, they felt that considerable sections of the Palestinian Arab population would be willing to acquiesce and cooperate. The factor which has completely changed the picture is the armed intervention of neighboring states which constitutes the most blatant form of aggression under the resolution and the charter. This aggression involved not only the neighboring states but also the Arab League which has a separate interest of its own.

Question No. 3:

The JA endorsed the answer clearly implied in the first part of this question. Their readiness to form the PCG includes putting in working order and carrying out such tasks as might be put upon it under the resolution. They were constantly and actively working out the taking over of various administrative services, etc.

Here again the problem of transfer from the mandatory government was of great importance and lack of cooperation from the mandatory amounted to a request that the Jews give birth without a pregnancy.

The Jews could not predict a smooth process in establishing the PCG, and unless Arab aggression is checked, they would be faced with a more difficult situation after May 15. Even assuming however, that they are facing a turbulent period, they are confident they will be in a position to assert the authority of the Jewish state and maintain essential services. This presupposes the establishment and equipment of the militia contemplated in the plan. It also contemplates that restrictions on the importance [*importation?*] of arms would be lifted. If given what they have asked for, they believe they would be able to defend the Jewish population and territory.

This does not mean that they have abandoned the idea of an international force. They still believe this is necessary but it is a question for the SC to decide, particularly the permanent members.

If no international force is provided, this would mean much more serious losses both to Arabs and Jews.

Question No. 4:

Shertok said that they had had a great many conversations with Arabs, not only in Palestine but also outside.

Within Palestine they had not had any conversations with the AHC but with a number of Arab notables, many of whom had come to the Jews.

Soon after the UNSCOP report was made public, they had approached the SYG of the Arab League who rejected categorically, without reservation, any attempts to confer. The JA has the minutes of this conversation which they will make available in confidence, reserving the authority over its publication. Shertok also said that months ago a letter was sent to the SYG of the Arab League, to which no reply had been received. This letter would also be made available, if desired.

Shertok described at some length the tremendous potential opposition to the AHC among Arabs in Palestine, who did not, however, have sufficient courage in their convictions to be willing to fight for them.

Question No. 5:

Shertok said that all essential elements of the plan are essential. The combination of essential elements make up the irreducible minimum acceptable to the JA. This includes statehood, sovereignty, territory, control of immigration, a seat in the UN.

He said the JA would "view with alarm any attempt to tamper with any element of the plan". It was like tampering with a single block of a wall. In the process of tampering, the whole structure might collapse. The JA could not be party to any such attempt.

Question No. 6:

There are no modifications in the present plan which would commend themselves to the Jews. There were a number of modifications in favor of the Jews which would be, of course, acceptable, but they did not imagine we had such modifications in mind. They might be willing to give up territory here and take on more territory there, so long as the result did not amount to less territory.

Shertok saw no possibility of any modifications which would make the plan acceptable to the Arabs. He said that nothing less than complete subversion of the plan would satisfy them.

Question No. 7:

Shertok gave a flat no to this question as it is put. The particular form of economic union, as presented is not considered essential by the JA. It amounts to a substantial curtailment of sovereignty. It was finally reluctantly accepted as (a) part of the whole scheme and (b) because it has some appealing aspects. They accepted economic union, but did not ask for it. Economic union is not an obstacle to the creation of the Jewish state, nor is it a valid reason for failing to set up the Jewish state.

The UNSCOP report provided for economic union as a condition of establishment of the proposed state. As Shertok recalled it, it was proposed by the US in Committee 1 that a mere undertaking to cooperate in economic union, if and when established, was sufficient.

Question No. 8:

The answer is definitely yes. The Jews would cooperate in the administration of Jerusalem by the UN, considered, however, as a part of the plan. It was a hypothetical question, but if it were contemplated that Jerusalem might be administered by the UN quite apart from the plan, this would create a serious obstacle to cooperation. He reserved the position of the JA with regard to a change which the TC has made in the provisions of the GA resolution concerning proportional representation in the municipal council for Jerusalem. The TC had changed the fixed quotas, resulting in 18 Jewish members and 19 non-Jewish members.

Question No. 9:

The question of guarantees for the Arabs in the Jewish state has not been raised by them. Shertok made a rather lengthy statement to the effect that the Jews were ready for any paper guarantee that can be formulated, but they preferred trust in their good faith and self interest. It was obviously a basic principle in the self interest of the Jews to treat the Arabs fairly. There were too many Jewish hostages throughout the world. They would be living in a glass house in Palestine under the severe light of world public opinion.

I asked Rabbi Silver about his suggestions for SC action, and he read them to the group. The text of these recommendations follows in next telegram.¹

Parodi then asked if the SC should address a solemn appeal for a truce between all parties until the termination of the mandate, what would be the reception of this appeal by the JA. Would the Jews be able to control their own people and what would be the reception by the Arab community?

Shertok replied that the Jews would wait a certain number of hours to see the effect of this appeal on the Arabs. If the Arabs complied, there would be no violence. If the Arabs did not comply, the Jews would resist. While waiting, they would make preparations for defensive, protective measures against possible attack. There would be no attacks on the British if steps were not taken to prolong the mandate. His personal interpretation of the Arab attitude would be they would ask whether the UN intended to abandon the partition scheme or implement it. In the latter case, a simple appeal would have no effect.

I asked what the effect would be of an order by the SC under Article 40 of the charter. What would be the Arab states' attitude as members of the UN. Shertok replied that such an order, if it were specifically addressed to the Arab states, would be likely to be more effective than a general appeal without direction at all. Shertok went on to say that a pernicious doctrine was being spread in the Middle East that UN will not follow through. Therefore, the Arabs have nothing to worry about. An appeal or order would have to be backed by a show of force and great willingness to use force if necessary.

In respect to a question by Tsiang, Shertok said that the whole question of territorial modifications had been gone through in great detail time and time again. The Jews had already made very great sacrifices and he could not conceive of any territorial modifications which would make for acceptance by the Arabs.

In respect to a further question by Tsiang, Shertok said that the Jews insisted on control of immigration because this was a question of sovereignty. He went on to say that it is the most essential part of the whole scheme. The most fundamental root is that the Jews must have the keys to their own homeland in their own hands. There must be a place for Jewish persecutees in need of a home which would be solely in the control of Jews. And exclusive control of immigration was the most powerful argument in persuading the Jews to accept the partition plan.

On the other hand, the Jews recognized the necessity for sound planning. They had in mind a rate of immigration of 80,000 to 100,000

¹ No. 285, March 13, 2 a. m., not printed.

a year, subject to variation depending on the economic situation of the existing population, Arab as well as Jewish.

In respect to a question from me concerning the absorptive capacity of the Jewish state, Shertok replied that they contemplated about one million in the next decade.

Silver interjected to indicate that there was time when there was a great reservoir of Jewish immigration, especially in eastern and central Europe, amounting to 7 or 8 million Jews. This reservoir had given rise to Arab fears that Palestine would be inundated. Six million of these Jews had perished during the Nazi regime. They would expect, perhaps, as many as 700,000 or 800,000 Jews from Europe and perhaps 200,000 or 300,000 from other areas, principally the peripheral Arab states. There was no cause for any fear of inundation.

In response to my question concerning the emigration of Jews from Palestine, Shertok said that under the Turks, emigration had about equalled immigration. In the late 20's and early 30's, there had been a small backwash of emigration which had virtually ceased in 1932 and there was no emigration thereafter until after the war. The volume of emigration at this time is insignificant. In respect to a question by Tsiang, Shertok and Silver indicated that the ratio of Arabs to Jews in all of Palestine would be roughly half and half with two million Jews and two million Arabs. Tsiang asked whether there had been a rise in anti-Jewish feeling in the Arab states. Shertok replied that the Jews had at best been tolerated by the Arabs through the ages. They were second or third class citizens subject to all sorts of formal disabilities, the classic example being in the Yemen.

There were no more questions and Rabbi Silver and Shertok left the meeting.

Gromyko then attacked Lie for the press coverage of yesterday's meeting, in particular, Gromyko insisted that he had never said he would not attend a meeting at which the JA was represented. He had simply made clear that he would not participate in consultations with representatives of the JA or the AHC, etc.

After some discussion, it was then agreed that a new attempt should be made to have representatives of the AHC appear and answer the questions proposed to be directed to them. It was agreed also that Lie would present these questions to Nakkleh, the only AHC representative in NY, informing him of the meeting Monday morning. It was apparent that Gromyko would attend this meeting, making clear, however, that he was not participating in consultations with the AHC.

Following meeting, members of my staff took Lie to our offices, as a matter of convenience, where Lie met Nakkleh and handed him the questions explaining briefly that he had been asked to do so by the group of 4 permanent members and explaining the circumstances.

Nakkleh received the questions and said he would cable or telephone them to Jerusalem. In doing so, however, he wanted to make his own personal position clear, namely, that he was not participating in any consultations in so doing.

During this brief interview, there was a very unpleasant interchange between Nakkleh and Lie. Nakkleh charged Lie and the secretariat with a prejudiced position in favor of the Jews and Lie retorted he had not come here to be insulted. After Lie left, Nakkleh stayed behind and staff officers repeated to him once more our position re consultations with the AHC.

As Lie left, he told us privately that he was convinced of our sincerity in our efforts to find a way, if there is any way, of implementing the partition plan by peaceful means. He was therefore doing everything in his power to support this effort by us. He was afraid we would find, however, that it would be impossible to implement the plan by peaceful means. Therefore, it would have to be enforced. Otherwise the UN would go downhill rapidly to nothing.

AUSTIN

501.BB Palestine/3-1348: Telegram

The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Childs) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

JIDDA, March 13, 1948—2 p. m.

129. ReLegtel 107, March 4.¹ Azzam Pasha informed me today that after conferring with King Abdullah it had been agreed that he, Azzam, should send a circular telegram to Arab states cautioning them against making any statements or committing any acts which might be interpreted by SC as threat international peace. He had pointed out Palestinian conflict was civil one and it was most important from Arab states' own interest not do anything which would give SC occasion use force in Palestine. Azzam indicated he understood and was in thorough accord viewpoint expressed by Department.

I acquainted him confidentially with situation reported Department's 76, March 11.² He immediately drafted telegram to Syrian Prime Minister referring Azzam's previous telegram of caution (sent about March 8) and repeating necessity Arab states do nothing which might imperil international peace and security Middle East. Azzam indicated he sympathized most heartily position Department as set forth its telegram 58 to Damascus.

Sent Department 129; repeated Baghdad 11, Cairo 37, Damascus 3. Cairo please pouch to Jerusalem, Beirut.

CHILDs

¹ Not printed.² This was a repeat of telegram 58 to Damascus, p. 706.

501.BB Palestine/3-1348: Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to
the Secretary of State*

SECRET

NEW YORK, March 13, 1948—4:02 p. m.

288. The following is a running account of discussions held between Austin, Gromyko, Tsiang and Parodi on the one hand and Sir Alexander Cadogan on the other on Tuesday afternoon, March 9, concerning the security situation in Palestine. The UK had agreed to be present as mandatory power in order to furnish such information to the permanent members as they might need during their present consultations. Gromyko stated his willingness to discuss the matter with the UK in the latter's capacity as a permanent member but not as mandatory power. Gromyko made it clear that he did not thereby agree to consultations by the permanent members with the Palestine Commission or with the Jews or Arabs of Palestine.

The first question (US) was: have incursions by armed elements from outside Palestine occurred in addition to those already reported to the Palestine Commission by the mandatory power? Sir Alexander replied that all information at the disposal of the UK had been made available to the Palestine Commission; that a number of reports on security matters had come in since the Commission furnished its first special report to the SC; that the UK suggested that the Palestine Commission be asked to make available the large amount of material already furnished to the Commission by the UK on this subject.

The second question (US) was: has the mandatory power been able to identify personnel involved in such incursions? Sir Alexander replied that they had, of course, been able to determine that particular parts of the borders of Palestine had been infringed from particular adjacent countries but that the actual identification of individual persons involved was difficult. He referred again to the material already furnished the Commission and pointed out that such material would show that the UK considered that Iraqi, Syrians and Egyptians had been involved.

The third question (US) was: are these incursions privately organized by individuals or unofficial groups or are they supported and encouraged by governments outside Palestine? Sir Alexander said that he could not furnish a specific answer for lack of proof. He stated that the UK had made certain representations to neighboring governments regarding incursions into Palestine and that he would look into the matter and give us any further information which was available to him.

The fourth question (US) was: are arms now flowing into Palestine from outside sources to individuals or groups unauthorized by the mandatory power to possess arms? Sir Alexander replied that the

mandatory power would of course do everything it could to stop arms going in to unauthorized personnel. He stated that no arms are going to such personnel with the knowledge of the UK but that, of course, the interception of arms, particularly small arms, is a very difficult task under conditions now existing in Palestine. When asked further whether the UK knew of arsenals or stores of arms in other countries adjacent to the Palestine border, Sir Alexander stated that he had no such information.

The fifth question (US) was: what measures by the mandatory power are now in effect to prevent the movement of hostile elements into Palestine from outside Palestine? Sir Alexander replied that he must get this information for the permanent members because it involves the question of border patrols and he does not have the latest information. The difficulty was that the UK is now engaged in certain troop withdrawals and the answer to the question would of course involve such withdrawals. In general, however, the British security forces were doing what they could to protect Palestine from incursions and to maintain law and order inside the country.

The sixth question (US) was: to what extent are disorders inside Palestine due to participation by armed elements from outside Palestine? Sir Alexander replied that he would have to furnish such information later.

The seventh question (US) was: to what extent are disorders inside Palestine due to incitement to violence from outside Palestine? Sir Alexander replied that he would have to ask about that and report later.

The eighth question (US) was: does the mandatory power consider that there is a threat of force against Palestine which now constitutes a threat to international peace? Sir Alexander replied that the UK will be happy to furnish the permanent members all of the facts available to the UK but not an appreciation of what those facts meant; the question of what constitutes a threat to the peace is for the SC to decide. The members of the SC will have before them all of the information which is available to the UK. Austin pressed Cadogan further by reminding him that the UK is responsible for the government and the protection of Palestine and therefore could be expected to know more about the situation than anyone else. In that respect the UK is in a peculiar position to advise the Council on whether a threat to the peace exists. Austin asked how can the UN itself make such a finding if the UK has no reason to fear any such threat? Sir Alexander continued to decline to answer and indicated that he would refer the question to London, holding out no hope that the question would be answered.

At this point Gromyko asked what situation does the UK think will develop when British troops are withdrawn from Palestine? Sir Alex-

ander replied that the UK is fully responsible until May 15; that after May 15 the UK will maintain order only insofar as is required for the protection of British troops. Gromyko asked what the situation would be in the areas from which British troops are withdrawn? Sir Alexander replied that he could not say. Gromyko asked if there would be real fighting between Jews and Arabs. Sir Alexander replied that we must, of course, apprehend that that would be the case. He pointed out that the first areas to be evacuated by the British will be relatively quiet; that disorders will increase as the withdrawal occurs because the more controversial areas will by then be left without military authority.

Gromyko then asked whether the existing situation is a situation which constitutes a threat to the peace. Sir Alexander replied that he could not answer but that he would give all information available to the UK.

Gromyko asked if press information was accurate regarding thousands and thousands of "more or less" regular troops in Palestine from other countries. Sir Alexander replied that the numbers ran to about 2000. (Later information raised this to approximately 7000.) Sir Alexander said that they were not regular troops although they may have come across the border with the connivance of neighboring governments; they were irregulars who showed some appearance of training and good equipment; they crossed in bands and then dispersed into the population and were therefore difficult to find or eject.

Gromyko asked how such bands could cross and not be noticed. Sir Alexander replied that the UK does not have unlimited forces in Palestine, that there is a long frontier, that it is patrolled but that patrols are limited by the necessity for using troops to prepare for the withdrawal of British forces. Further, it was very difficult to stop the movement of small groups across the frontier of such country at night.

Gromyko then asked, "do the Arabs mean what they say?" Sir Alexander replied that that is anybody's guess and that the Arabs do not confide in the UK. USSR then referred to the entry of Kawukji who was reported to have entered with several hundreds or thousands of armed men and established headquarters in Palestine.

Austin then asked whether operations at sea have resulted in the capture of arms destined for Palestine. Sir Alexander replied that some interception may have been made at sea but that the UK has fairly effective control over the ports and it was unlikely that large quantities of arms were reaching Palestine from the sea.

The USSR then asked about the availability of ports. Sir Alexander replied that Tel Aviv would probably be free after May 15 insofar as the British were concerned but that the Haifa area would probably be retained as an enclave for the withdrawal of British troops between

May 15 and August 1. Sir Alexander pointed out that Haifa was the only satisfactory port in Palestine and that the others were so small that only the smallest vessels could dock alongside.

Austin asked whether the withdrawals of Abdullah's forces have now been accomplished. Sir Alexander replied yes, that the date will be furnished (he later corrected this on the basis of a schedule of withdrawal furnished to the permanent members). Gromyko then asked if Abdullah's forces would enter Palestine upon the termination of the mandate. Sir Alexander replied that he could not say, that he did not know Abdullah's intentions.

Austin asked whether the mandatory power has any evidence of preparation by Egypt with respect to Palestine. Sir Alexander replied that the UK has no evidence of direct military intervention but that there undoubtedly was some preparation of guerillas for infiltration into Palestine. Gromyko asked who would supply such guerillas with arms. Sir Alexander replied that he would look into the particulars. Austin asked to what extent is the opposition spontaneous among the Arabs and to what extent due to extremist Arab leaders. Sir Alexander replied that the opposition was spontaneous in a very large measure and that the Arabs were motivated chiefly by a fear of being "swamped" by outsiders.

Austin asked whether any heavy armament had been captured. Sir Alexander replied that certain mortars had been found. When asked by Austin whether these might be identified, Sir Alexander said that he was not sure that any mortars had actually been captured, only that mortar fire had been reported. Replying to a further question of Austin, Sir Alexander said that violent acts by illegal aircraft had been reported but that such reports were apparently not well founded; that such aircraft as had been used were very light planes which were used for reconnaissance only. Gromyko asked whether the Arabs in Palestine were armed better than the Jews. Sir Alexander said that he did not know.

Sir Alexander has, since this discussion, turned over to the permanent members a considerable amount of information which already been furnished to the Palestine Commission. Copies of this information have been furnished the Dept.

AUSTIN

501.BB Palestine/3-1448

Memorandum by Mr. Samuel K. C. Kopper to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

TOP SECRET

[NEW YORK,] March 14, 1948.

Conversations on the Palestine Question with several of the principal Arab Delegates to the United Nations, including Faris Bey

el Khouri (Syria), Camille Chamoun (Lebanon), Charles Malik (Lebanon) and Fawzi Bey (Egypt), during the past days have revealed certain important points which indicate that insofar as the Arab states are concerned they would be willing to suggest possible solutions to the Palestine Question which in the judgment of Mr. Wilkins and myself go further than any previous position taken by the Arab states. It now appears that the Arab states, and as a result the Arab Higher Committee, might be willing to agree to one of the following solutions which incorporated the following features:

1. A unitary state with

- (a) a democratic constitution and government;
- (b) explicit guarantees regarding minority rights and privileges;
- (c) a bicameral legislature in which the Jewish population would have equal representation in a Senate;
- (d) municipal autonomy for various towns or districts;
- (e) immigration of Jews up to 100,000 over a two or three year period and a lesser number each year thereafter;
- (f) a United Nations commission to observe development of the Palestine situation.

2. A Federal or cantonized state with

- (a) a democratic constitution and government;
- (b) explicit guarantees regarding minority rights and privileges;
- (c) a bicameral legislature in which the Jewish population would have equal representation in a Senate;
- (d) states or cantons similar to the constitutional organization of the United States or Switzerland;
- (e) immigration of Jews up to 100,000 over a two or three year period and a lesser number each year thereafter;
- (f) a United Nations commission to observe development of the Palestine situation.

3. Trusteeship with

- (a) terms of reference giving more responsibility for self-government than present times;
- (b) immigration features similar to those set forth in the preceding two paragraphs.

Thus it will be noted that the Arab states would now be willing to go further than they ever have before on the subjects of

- (a) constitutional organization,
- (b) immigration, and
- (c) guarantees for minorities.

However, trusteeship would be the least favorable solution in Arab minds.

The Arab states feel that the present Partition Plan should be abandoned. A special session of the General Assembly should be called. The Mandatory Power might be asked to stay on for two or three months

until a new solution were evolved. A transitory trusteeship might be established in the event that the Mandatory Power will not remain after May 15.

There is a growing amount of evidence from our missions in the field that moderate elements in the Arab states such as King Ibn Saud, Azzam Pasha, Secretary-General of the Arab League, Nokrashi Pasha, Prime Minister of Egypt and others are anxious to obtain a moderate solution of the Palestine Question and, to shelve permanently the Mufti and the extremist Arab elements in Palestine. It was likewise evidenced that the Arab League has King Abdullah of Transjordan under control.

They believe that the refugee problem should be handled by the UN and that the inherent responsibility should be assumed by other members of the UN to assist in handling the displaced persons problem.

501.BC/3-1548: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW YORK, March 15, 1948—4:30 p. m.

295. For the Secretary from Austin. Following is account of fifth meeting of consultative group of permanent members of SC (Security Council) on Palestine in Chinese delegation offices, 10:30 to 12:30 this morning.

At outset of meeting I raised the question whether it would not be possible for the four of us to agree at least on a set of facts which could be reported to SC in response to first part of SC resolution of March 5 which called for a report on situation in Palestine.

Gromyko said that we have asked certain questions and received answers and perhaps the SYG (Secretary-General) should convey at once to all members of SC information we have received.

Tsiang said, "could we not agree on this as an established fact, that peaceful implementation of the plan of partition is out of the question?"

I said I thought we should consider this and decide what our viewpoint is and make a report on the question.

Lie asked if another question would be "is there a threat to international peace?" and I replied that we should also consider and report on this question.

Tsiang said that up to present moment, while we have had intrusion of bands into Palestine, we have no information that any state has taken part in the fighting. He said that if partition plan should be pushed forward the condition of fighting would become more serious.

I then raised question whether there is some method available to SC to quiet fighting down. Could we not proceed with a provisional order for a truce? Parodi said that as long as we have not taken the position that there is a threat to the peace we are in a good position to get both of the parties to accept a truce. A decision that there is a threat to the peace would have to be in effect against one of the parties. He thought that it would be a good first step to try to get a truce. He thought it would not be too difficult to get both parties to accept a truce. This would not only stop the fighting but increase the strength of the SC which has thus far lost strength on this matter.

I said that I had in mind the possibility of finding a threat to the peace under Article 39 and then getting a truce as a provisional measure under Article 40. As I understood it, Parodi had in mind trying to get a truce by agreement between the parties. Parodi agreed that this was the case.

He went on to say that the Arabs must have the impression that the SC is not very strong for partition. They are therefore less prepared to accept any agreement. The moral position of SC will be impossible if inaction leads to further massacre in Palestine. The SC is not strong for partition but it has no other plan. The only other plan that it seems might be suggested would be a federal state but even this assumes at least a minimum of Arab agreement and this, therefore, does not get us very far. He concluded that "very frankly the United Nations will not survive" if it fails to find a means of dealing with this situation quickly.

I said it now seemed to be clear that the Jews will take nothing but partition. The Arabs on the other hand will have nothing to do with partition. We must then ask if there is any other solution. If not, then the big remaining question is maintaining peace.

Parodi observed that even if we are not prepared to do anything, it is very important that we do not give this impression. If we do the Arabs will be hopeless. Even if we have no solution now perhaps we will have in a month or two.

Parodi went on to say that the Arabs have the impression we are drawing back; we must therefore do something, otherwise the situation will become more and more dangerous and finally very dangerous.

I said the situation has obviously been getting worse. We have information that preparations are going on in other countries such as recruiting, financing and the like. Does this mean anything? Is it just a bluff? Should we ignore it? If not, we cannot sit around hoping something will turn up. We will have to make up our minds to do something. I repeated that I still have hopes that all four of permanent members can agree at least on the facts.

Gromyko said the SC requested US for recommendations, not facts. The facts, he said, should be made available to the SC (pre-

sumably through the SYG). We had obtained some very interesting facts. The British had "admitted" that bands had crossed the frontiers, but the British are too reserved. He did not know why it was so difficult for the British to supply us with more information about these incursions.

Parodi said that he was not sure that all the information we had on these points was quite enough to indicate a real threat to the peace; that is, he said, "international peace within the meaning of the Charter." There was a threat to internal peace, of course. We really, however, needed more information from the Arab state, perhaps reports from our consuls or from the Arab states themselves.

Parodi then went on to say very clearly that he has in mind an appeal rather than an order for a truce.

I agreed that of course we must adhere to the pacific method as long as possible. It is for this reason, I said, that we are sticking to the partition plan if we can find a way of implementing it peacefully.

Gromyko asked if I had in mind a truce order directed to the neighboring states. I said yes and to the Jews and mandatory power and anybody else concerned.

Gromyko asked what the difference was between this and the last paragraph of SC resolution of March 5, and I pointed out that that was just an appeal.

Parodi then said that perhaps we could get agreement of both parties to implement the last paragraph of SC resolution. If they did not agree there probably would be a threat to the peace. It was understood that both my proposal and Parodi's proposal would be directed to all of parties concerned. Gromyko wanted to be particularly sure of this point.

I raised the question whether we should consult with Arab states and find out from them whether a truce by agreement would be possible. I emphasized it would not be enough to get a truce agreement with just the Jews, the Arab Higher Committee, and mandatory power. The Arab states have their organization, the Arab League, which has met on this subject frequently and taken votes in opposition to partition. The Arab League might also have an effect on the views of the Arab Higher Committee.

Parodi commented that he was not certain whether we should recognize formally the interests of Arab states in Palestine by discussing the truce with them since they had no right to engage in activities which such a truce would attempt to end.

Tsiang said that he thought the idea of trying to get agreement for a truce is a reasonable one. He thought, however, the chance was very small. He could not see the Arabs agreeing to a truce without at the same time declaring a sort of moratorium on the whole situation for a limited period.

(Nakkleh, representative of Arab Higher Committee here, came in at this point and we did not return to or answer Tsiang's question.)

[Here follow the discussion of the Security Council Representatives with Mr. Nakkleh of the Arab Higher Committee and the text of the communication the latter had received from the Committee "this morning" reiterating its rejection of any solution of the Palestine problem based on partition.]

Tsiang then raised the question of postponement of SC meeting which had been scheduled for this afternoon to discuss Palestine.

I raised in this connection the question of whether we should not address this question on a truce to the Arab states.

Parodi intervened that the Arab states could not be asked to agree to something affecting the internal situation in Palestine. Tsiang said that we would perhaps have to phrase the question differently.

I said that if the Arab states were not willing to agree, how could we get a truce. I added off the record that I doubted whether we can get a truce peacefully but I was willing to try. But in order to get a truce peacefully we must consult the Arab states. The time has also come to inform them that we mean business. I suggested that the President of the Council might consult the Syrian member of SC and other representatives here.

Tsiang agreed to consult the Syrian, Egyptian and Lebanese representatives. It was agreed to cancel the SC meeting today; to have a four-power meeting at 10:30 tomorrow morning in Gromyko's office; to postpone SC consideration of Kashmir dispute tomorrow afternoon and to hold tomorrow afternoon's meeting of SC on Palestine.

AUSTIN

501.BB Palestine/3-1648: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

TOP SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, March 16, 1948—10 a. m.

138. We have reviewed Security Council handling of Palestine problem since your statement of Feb 24 which established basic US thesis that under Charter Security Council must use its powers to maintain international peace and security but that it is not authorized to enforce political decision of partition on people of Palestine.

General line of tactics set forth in Deptel 107, March 5, and proposed statement on situation in Palestine after British withdrawal on May 15 as contained in Deptel 108, March 5, have been approved by the President for use when and if necessary (Deptel 116, March 8).

Following discussion today on outcome of Big Five consultation and presentation of suggested statement contained in your telegram 291,

March 14,¹ it seems to us that there will be rapid need of focusing basic issue of whether plan of partition with economic union can be successfully carried out by peaceful means in absence of agreement between Jews and Arabs of Palestine.

It is apparent that situation in Palestine grows daily more fraught with danger to international peace. Security Council must exercise its responsibilities for maintenance of international peace. However, once Council directs its inquiry to security situation in Palestine, if it has not already disposed of issue of partition with economic union, the two questions, although constitutionally separate, will become merged and we will find our efforts to maintain the peace made immensely more difficult because they will be construed by a majority of the people of Palestine as being a covert method of carrying out partition by force.

It is accordingly of the first importance that the Council dispose one way or another of the partition issue. Council has already by its action on March 5 failed to adopt first paragraph of US draft resolution of Feb 25 and thus has in effect tacitly refused to accept the three requests made of it by General Assembly in its resolution of last Nov 29. Issue presently before Council is whether Big Five consultation has or has not produced some new area of agreement which might make possible partition by peaceful means. Since statements summarized in your 291, March 14, clearly reveal that no party to Palestine problem believes partition can be carried out except by use of force it would seem that the necessary conclusions can rapidly be drawn. In this case you should make statement authorized in Deptels 107 and 108 in order that Council may proceed thereupon to consideration of security problem of Palestine divorced from political issue of partition with economic union.

The time factor is imperative and Council must act without delay.

MARSHALL

¹ Not printed; this message, sent by Mr. Rusk to Mr. McClintock, gave the draft text of proposed remarks, to be made by Ambassador Austin before the Security Council, on the consultations during the past week (501.BB Palestine/3-1448).

501.BB Palestine/3-1748

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Mr. Robert M. McClintock

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] March 17, 1948.

Mr. Rusk¹ inquired early this morning if the Department would have any objection should the approved United States tactical posi-

¹ At New York.

tion on Palestine be presented to the Security Council, possibly at its next meeting on March 19, as a joint US, Chinese, and French proposal. He wished this point checked with Mr. Bohlen. I replied that offhand the suggestion seemed to be without objection, and later received a similar reaction from Mr. Bohlen.

In a later telephone conversation with Mr. Rusk the latter said that he and Mr. Ross had succeeded in persuading Ambassador Austin that the tactics reaffirmed in the Department's top secret telegram No. 138 of yesterday should be adhered to. (At one point yesterday there seemed to have been considerable danger lest Ambassador Austin find himself in outright disagreement with his instructions and that he had been tempted at least to discuss this disagreement with the President.) Mr. Rusk went on to add that in conversation this morning with Ambassador Austin one or two modifications of the basic position, as set forth in the Department's top secret telegram No. 107 of March 5, had commended themselves to Ambassador Austin and to Mr. Rusk. These modifications were to make clear in our presentation that the calling of a special session of the General Assembly to establish a United Nations trusteeship would be a temporary measure and without prejudice to whatever future settlement were arrived at by agreement between the peoples of Palestine. In other words, Ambassador Austin did not wish to knock partition on the head at this juncture but to leave that as one of a variety of possible solutions for the Palestine problem, which might be considered when the United Nations trusteeship for Palestine were terminated.

Needless to remark, the conversation which elicited this information was by no means as explicit as the foregoing paragraph.

Mr. Rusk said that if it were agreed that the three Powers jointly present this new suggestion it could be made to seem that the suggestions stemmed directly from their consultations pursuant to the Council's resolution of March 5. I said that this was entirely in line with the basic instructions set forth in Deptel 107.

Mr. Rusk thought it would be wise if there were consultation with London, Paris, and Nanking. I agreed and suggested that USUN reduce its views to writing, for immediate transmission to the Department, which would consider them and in turn send telegrams to the three capitals mentioned.

I observed to Mr. Rusk that on the basis of John Rogers' account in this morning's *Herald Tribune*, we had come mighty close to the Gromyko line of favoring an out and out finding by the Security Council that the Arab States had been guilty of a threat to international peace and security in and around Palestine. I said that we had been exerting great efforts in the Middle East to bring the Arab Governments to a more conciliatory frame of mind. I wondered if Ambassador Austin in his speech might not in turn make some friendly reference

to Faris el-Khouri's statement yesterday to the effect that the Arab States would not interfere in subsequent fighting in Palestine so long as no other foreign force took part in it.

Mr. Rusk said that other members of the Council simply did not believe the statement of Faris el-Khouri. He said that Ambassador Austin would, as a minimum, insist on inserting a paragraph in his statement stressing the obligation of the Security Council under the Charter to maintain international peace and security, and citing the Articles of the Charter which gave it that power.

I said that I realized the Ambassador's stern devotion to the Charter but that we had worked very hard in the Arab capitals to bring forth one little green sprig of tolerance out of the mould and that I would not wish to see it shrivel up under the hot blast of righteousness. Perhaps the Ambassador could in a fatherly way admonish both the Arabs and Jews to be good.

A meeting has been set up in Mr. Bohlen's office for Thursday, March 18, at 11 a. m., to consider these proposals.

501.BB Palestine/3-1748

Memorandum by Mr. Robert M. McClinton to the Director of the Executive Secretariat (Humelsine)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] March 17, 1948.

There is little in UNA this morning for your telephone call to Mr. Lovett.¹

On Palestine Mr. Lovett should be told that any press report to the contrary there has been no agreement between the US, USSR, and France, to urge the Security Council to make a finding that international peace and security is threatened in and around Palestine. For Mr. Lovett's strictly private information it has seemed during the past few days that Ambassador Austin has been trending along the line followed by Mr. Gromyko which would place a finding of a threat to international peace and security as the prior business of the Security Council before it deals with the question of Palestine partition. However, Mr. Rusk telephoned me late last night to say that he thought it almost ninety percent sure that Ambassador Austin had been got back on the track and that the instructions which the Secretary and Mr. Lovett approved yesterday would hold.

Mr. Rusk telephoned at 9:25 this morning to inquire if the Department would have any objection if China, France, and the US jointly drew conclusions from the Big Five consultation of the past ten days

¹Mr. Lovett had departed from Washington on March 15 for a vacation in Florida; he returned to the Department by March 27.

and on the basis of these conclusions recommended the program which the Department has reaffirmed to Ambassador Austin as being our tactical position, in order to dispose of the partition issue. I told Mr. Rusk that offhand I could see no objection but that I would check with Mr. Bohlen.

501.BB Palestine/3-1748 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY

NEW YORK, March 17, 1948—4:30 p. m.

304. Following is delayed account of sixth meeting of permanent members on Palestine held in Gromyko's offices from 10:30 to 1 yesterday morning.

Lie said he had presented to Jewish Agency the question on the possibility of their agreeing to a truce. He had received that morning a reply from Shertok indicating that they felt it necessary to refer the question to Palestine and expressed the hope that they might be granted a brief delay for a reply.

Tsiang said he had individually interviewed the heads of the six Arab states delegations here to ascertain their attitude towards a truce. They had individually agreed in their replies to the effect that if partition is suspended they will agree to a truce, otherwise not.

Tsiang went on to say that he wished to repeat what he had said before, that a military truce would have no validity without a political truce which equaled in effect suspension of partition.

Gromyko suggested that we study the nine points suggested by the Jewish Agency when we met with them. He thought some of these points might be agreed upon by the conferees and adopted by the SC. In response to a question by Tsiang he said he had in mind particularly the Jewish Agency's points 3, 4 and 5 relating respectively to a threat to peace, a call on the Arab states to stop recruiting, etc., and a call on the Arab states to stop warmongering.

I then distributed copies of paper we had prepared and read to them the point[s] concerning the finding of a threat to the peace and the necessity for SC action.¹

¹ The paper, in the nature of a development of facts regarding the situation in Palestine, had been transmitted to the Department by New York in telegram 299, March 15, 9:15 p. m., not printed. Point 6 read: "A threat to international peace exists in the infiltration of hostile elements into Palestine from the outside whose purpose is to prevent by force the implementation of the General Assembly resolution."; point 10 read: "As a result of the consultations of the permanent members regarding the situation with respect to Palestine, they recommend (a) that the Security Council should make it clear to the parties and governments concerned that the Security Council is determined not to permit the situation in Palestine to continue as a threat to international peace, and (b) that the

Gromyko said he was not in a position to agree to any joint document but that it might be possible for the conferees to agree on some of the fundamental points, the first being that the situation in Palestine constitutes a threat to the peace. (This was point 5 of US paper.) The second point Gromyko suggested on which we might agree was that the SC as one (he emphasized one) of measures to be taken should order (he emphasized order) the Arab states to stop sending assistance of any kind to the Arabs in Palestine, and to take measures to withdraw elements which have crossed into Palestine. If agreement could be reached on these two points this would be a step forward. It would not exhaust the requirements of the situation but would nevertheless be a step forward. He said that the crossing of these groups into Palestine was "absolutely abnormal and dangerous."

I indicated that it would be very fortunate if the four of us could agree on strong, firm SC action to maintain the peace. With reference to the second part of the resolution passed by the SC on March 5, it would be fortunate if we could also work out something constructive regarding instructions to the Palestine Commission.

I said boiled down to the cold facts, we must find a way of getting these parties together because they must live together without force to hold them together. I did not mean to imply that we had abandoned the GA resolution. Our objective was to find a way, if possible, for peaceful implementation of the plan involving yielding on both sides so that the plan could go into effect without war.

Tsiang said he wanted to be cooperative but that with regard to finding that a threat to the peace exists, he felt that this finding must not be one-sided. It must apply to the infiltration of arms and armed forces by sea, as well as by land. He said it would be impossible to get a truce if a finding of a threat to the peace were one-sided. We must aim at the reduction of arms and armed forces by both sides. By making our action impartial we would promote prospects of an effective truce. He repeated that while he would like to see a truce be an effective truce, he did not see how we could bring this about if we had only a military truce without a political truce. He added that everyone knows the present situation is caused by the partition plan.

Gromyko said that paragraph 4 of our paper relating to the difficulty of peaceful implementation meant to him that the plan would be doomed at once automatically. Gromyko then went on to repeat in effect his arguments that there is at present a threat to peace in Palestine and that one of the steps that should be taken would be to

Security Council should take further action by all means available to it to bring about an effective truce in that country at the earliest practicable moment." (501.BB Palestine/3-1548)

For the text of the paper as subsequently revised, see telegram 953, March 18, to London, p. 739.

order that those states responsible should stop their actions at once and take measures to withdraw their forces from Palestine.

Gromyko then digressed to express at length his views to the effect that we had spent all our time this past week only discussing the question of consultation with the Jewish Agency, etc., and that we were just beginning today to discuss the substance of the matter.

I said that assuming that there is a threat to the peace now, if we directed a finding against the Arabs we would put an end forever to the possibility of getting peaceful implementation of the partition plan. I wondered whether there was no longer any hope of yielding by the Arabs on three essential points, namely, immigration, sovereignty and territory. I emphasized that we would never be able to maintain a situation permanently by a ring of bayonets.

I went on to say that of course there were a whole series of actions under Chapter VII provided for in Articles 40, 41, and 42, as well as 106, which might be taken if there were a finding of a threat to peace under Article 39. If, however, we adopted such actions now, would we not cut off the possibility of bringing the parties together?

Gromyko observed that in effect any effort to find a means of peaceful implementation by modification of the partition plan was not carrying out the partition plan and was merely causing delay. He said the undeniable facts must be taken into account, first, that the mandate terminates on May 15; there would then be bloodshed and war (maybe a small one) he said, and we must not allow such a situation. Second, the actions of those responsible (implying the Arab states) must stop.

Parodi questioned Gromyko rather closely on whether Gromyko felt that the partition plan could or could not be carried out by peaceful means.

Gromyko replied that he did not know whether it could be carried out by peaceful means or not. We must, he added, adhere to the plan as it is with no modifications.

I raised the question of whether a new vote on paragraph 1 of our original resolution relating to acceptance by the SC of the GA's request, subject to the authority of the Charter, would serve any useful purpose in order to determine how far the SC is willing to go.

Gromyko replied that the SC could take effective steps without formal approval of this paragraph 1.

Gromyko then went on to say in effect, let us get down to brass tacks. Do we agree that the situation in Palestine and its continuation constitute a threat to peace? If we agree to this, then do we agree on an SC order to the states responsible to cease their actions and withdraw forces already in Palestine?

Parodi said he wanted to make his position entirely clear. He was conscious of the great responsibility we had; he knew we were working

for implementation of the partition plan which he, incidentally, did not like very much. We also had the responsibility for the maintenance of peace. In effect, he said he was not prepared to go too far too fast. He said that at present there is a sort of threat to the peace. He is not sure that this would be the time to proclaim it. He thought we should agree today to give a warning and be prepared to go further later should this seem necessary. He thought that a clear warning to the Arabs would counteract their impression that the SC is going backwards. If we went further than this the difficulties of Arab cooperation would be increased immeasurably.

I said that if we avoided naming the Arabs or directing a finding of threat against them we would preserve the possibility of peaceful development.

At this point Gromyko weakened in his position and said that it might be okay not to name the Arab states. He said, "if we are not able to adopt a more concrete decision, maybe we could adopt a less concrete decision."

After we then spent a few moments discussing the form and details of a possible report to the SC on this point, Tsiang intervened with a strong objection that he could not approve a finding of a threat to the peace as it was being conceived and if this matter came to a vote in the SC he would have to abstain. He went on to say that we cannot under the Charter authorize any one party to implement a resolution by force. If the SC uses force that is one thing, but we cannot allow a private organization to use force. Tsiang then insisted that any finding of a threat to the peace be modified in such a way that Jewish as well as Arab elements be included.

After some further discussion of the differences in the various points of view I suggested that it would weaken the position of the conferees if an attempt were not made to report to the SC that afternoon as had been scheduled. It was agreed that at the Council meeting the president would merely say we needed a little more time for our consultations and would suggest that after hearing Chamoun's speech the SC should adjourn having in mind a further meeting of the conferees in Lie's office following the SC meeting.

Our meeting broke up at this point with Gromyko observing that he felt he would have to express at the SC meeting that afternoon his dissatisfaction with the progress of the consultations since we had spent all our time talking about the American proposal for consultations with the Jewish Agency, etc. I told him if he found it necessary to do this I would certainly reply.