

501.BB Palestine/3-1748 : Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to  
the Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET URGENT

NEW YORK, March 17, 1948—3:21 p. m.

305. Eyes only for McClintock from Rusk. Ambassador Austin met today at 11:15 a. m. with Cadogan, Parodi and Tsiang (Tsiang was accompanied by one adviser) to discuss Palestine matter. Cadogan was present as an observer only.

The first item discussed was a draft set of conclusions which might be furnished jointly to the Security Council as a result of the recent consultations among the permanent members. The text of such conclusions follows:

[Here follow draft conclusions; for the draft as subsequently amplified, see telegram 953, March 18, to London, page 739.]

Following brief discussion of the above points, Austin referred to Tsiang's statement yesterday that a truce would be possible only if the truce applied both in the military and the political field. Tsiang had spoken of a "moratorium". Austin also referred to Tsiang's report that each of the six Arab states had told him that they would cooperate in every way with a truce if the implementation of partition is suspended.

Austin then said that the United States was primarily interested in maintaining the peace in the Palestine situation and in finding a peaceful solution within the framework of the United Nations. This was based not only upon our regard for the United Nations but also upon very serious humanitarian interests which are now at stake. He said that we therefore wished to do everything we could to meet the views of others, particularly of the permanent members, because he felt that those present could, by agreement, find a peaceful result.

Austin continued that we were concerned with the implications of a political moratorium in view of the situation which could be expected on May 15 upon termination of the mandate. He stated that he would like to propose to those present some additions to the conclusions already discussed, which, if accepted by them as a joint approach, might meet the situation on a realistic basis. He then read parts of a draft statement which he was considering making to the Security Council at an early date:

[Here follows draft statement, which in somewhat altered form was used by Ambassador Austin before the Security Council on March 19; see page 742.]

Austin underlined that we looked upon a trusteeship as a temporary arrangement designed primarily to maintain the peace and would be

entirely without prejudice to the nature of an eventual political settlement.

[Here follows further discussion by Ambassador Austin with the representatives of the United Kingdom, France, and China.]

It is most urgent that the Department communicate immediately with London, Paris and Nanking calling this new approach to their attention and strongly urge upon those governments to cooperate in an effort to maintain governmental authority in Palestine in such a way as to preserve the peace. It was clear from the nature of the discussion this morning that Tsiang and Parodi were both personally very favorably inclined to the idea. A joint approach by those represented at today's meeting would make a great impression on world opinion, would substantially strengthen the hand of the United Nations in dealing with this question, and would probably be supported by nine of the members of the Security Council.

Senator Austin impressed upon those present the great need for the utmost secrecy in dealing with this matter before the presentation of the joint views to the Security Council. Hence, any communications to London, Paris and Nanking should emphasize the implications which would be caused by premature leaks. [Rusk.]

AUSTIN

---

*Editorial Note*

On March 18 Dr. Chaim Weizmann, the Zionist leader who until December 1946 had been President of the World Zionist Congress, discussed the Palestine problem with President Truman. The editors have been unable to find an official record of this conversation. For the President's later report, see Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs by Harry S. Truman* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, 1956) volume II, page 161.

---

501.BB Palestine/3-1848: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom*

TOP SECRET      NIACT

WASHINGTON, March 18, 1948—2 p. m.

952. Our next top secret telegram<sup>1</sup> contains text of draft working paper prepared by UN delegations of US, France and China with Trafford Smith of UK, technically present as an observer only, although he took an active part in discussion and drafting of the paper. This document sets forth conclusions drawn by US, France and China

---

<sup>1</sup> *Infra.*

(and also, we hope, the UK) as result of Big Five consultation on situation in Palestine pursuant to SC resolution of March 5.

Please immediately call on Foreign Minister (repeated for action also to Paris as 856, Nanking as 414) and leave with him a copy of this working paper, pointing out that it is yet a draft but that its main points have support of this govt.

You should orally add that, as was made clear in Amb. Austin's statement to SC, Feb. 24, US makes strong distinction between wide powers and obligation of SC under Charter to maintain international peace and security and its lack of any Charter authorization to use force to carry out a political recommendation or decision. We believe it should be made clear at this time that plan recommended by GA for partition of Palestine with economic union is an integral plan which cannot succeed unless each of its parts can be carried out. Palestine Commission, Mandatory Power, Jewish Agency, and Arab Higher Committee have indicated that partition plan cannot be implemented by peaceful means under present conditions. This being so, the SC is not in a position to go ahead with efforts to implement the plan. In particular, SC has no constitutional authority to enforce partition.

US believes that simultaneously with such SC action as may be necessary to bring about an effective truce in Palestine at earliest practicable moment special session of GA should immediately convene to establish a temporary trusteeship for Palestine without prejudice to eventual settlement of problem of independence for that country. We have not come to a decision as to what authority should administer this trusteeship and invite views of FonMin whether a direct UN trusteeship, or one administered by a single Power or several Powers jointly, would be preferable.

Please suggest to FonMin that if he concurs with this Govt's position immediate instructions be telegraphed to his Govt's representatives on SC which next meets to consider this problem Friday morning, Mar. 19.<sup>2</sup>

Repeated to USUN as 143.

THORP

<sup>2</sup> Michael R. Wright, Superintending Under-Secretary of State in the British Foreign Office informed an Embassy officer on March 19 of instructions sent to Sir Alexander Cadogan authorizing him to "inform suitable delegations that while it would not be in accord with consistent policy HMG to offer comments on details working paper, HMG has always made it clear HMG would welcome any effort to arrive at a settlement by an agreement with Arabs and Jews, and therefore HMG views with sympathy the present move towards this end." Regarding a possible British role in drafting a trusteeship agreement, Mr. Wright stated that the British Government would "place its knowledge and experience re Palestine at disposal UN . . . but HMG itself would neither draft agreement nor assume responsibility for it." (Telegram 1138, March 19, 3 p. m., from London, 501.BB Palestine/3-1948)

501.BB Palestine/3-1848 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom*

TOP SECRET      US URGENT  
NIACT

WASHINGTON, March 18, 1948—2 p. m.

953. Following is text of draft working paper on Palestine<sup>1</sup> to which Deptel 952 today refers:

“I

The consultations among the permanent members of the SC and informal communication with the Palestine Commission, the mandatory power, the JA and the AHC held since March 5, 1948 have developed the following facts regarding the situation with respect to Palestine:

1. The JA accepts the partition plan, considers it to be the irreducible minimum acceptable to the Jews, and insists upon the implementation of the plan without substantial modification.

2. The AHC rejects any solution based on partition in any form and considers that the only solution acceptable to the Arabs of Palestine is the formation of one independent state for the whole of Palestine whose constitution would be based on democratic principles and which would include adequate safeguards for minorities and the safety of the holy places.

3. No modifications in the essentials of the partition plan are acceptable to the JA and no modifications would make the plan acceptable to the AHC.

4. The Palestine Commission, the mandatory power, the JA and the AHC have indicated that the partition plan cannot be implemented by peaceful means under present conditions.

5. The plan proposed by the GA is an integral plan which cannot succeed unless each of its parts can be carried out. There seems to be general agreement that the plan cannot now be implemented by peaceful means. This being so, the SC is not in a position to go ahead with efforts to implement this plan [in the existing situation.<sup>2</sup>]

6. The mandatory power has confirmed that a considerable number of illegal arms and hostile elements have entered Palestine both by land and by sea since November 29, 1947.

---

<sup>1</sup> Sent to the Department by New York in telegram 309, March 17, 11:30 p. m. (501.BB Palestine/3-1748). The Department made minor language changes and divided the twelve numbered paragraphs into two sections, before sending telegram 953.

<sup>2</sup> Bracketed portion in the source text.

7. The gradual withdrawal of the military forces of the mandatory power will, in the absence of agreement, result in increasing violence and disorder in Palestine. Warfare of a guerrilla type grows more violent constantly.

8. If the mandate is terminated prior to a peaceful solution of the problem, large-scale fighting between the two communities can be expected.

## II

1. As a result of their consultations regarding the situation with respect to Palestine, the permanent members find and report that a continuation of the infiltration into Palestine by land and by sea of groups and persons with the purpose of taking part in violence would aggravate still further the situation, and recommend:

(a) That the SC should make it clear to the parties and governments concerned that the SC is determined not to permit the situation in Palestine to threaten international peace, and

(b) That the SC should take further action by all means available to it to bring about the immediate cessation of violence and the restoration of peace and order in Palestine.

3[2]. Under the charter the SC has both an inescapable responsibility as well as full authority to take the steps necessary to bring about a cease fire in Palestine and a halt to the incursions being made into that country. The powers of Articles 39, 40, 41 and 42 are very great and the council should not hesitate to use them if necessary to stop the fighting.

4[3]. In addition, we believe that further steps must be taken immediately not only to maintain the peace but also to afford a further opportunity to reach an agreement between the interested parties regarding the future government of Palestine. To this end we believe that a temporary trusteeship for Palestine should be established under the TC of the UN. Such a UN trusteeship would be without prejudice to the rights, claims or position of the parties concerned or to the character of the eventual political settlement, which we hope can be achieved without long delay. In our opinion, the SC should recommend the establishment of such a trusteeship to the GA and to the mandatory power. This would require an immediate special session of the GA, which the SC should request the SYG to convoke under Article 20 of the charter.

5[4]. Pending the meeting of the proposed special session of the GA, we believe that the SC should instruct the Palestine Commission to suspend its efforts to implement the proposed partition plan."<sup>3</sup>

Repeated Paris as 857, Nanking as 415.

THORP

---

<sup>3</sup> Ambassador Austin made a statement before the Security Council on March 19 on the results of the consultations among the permanent members of the Council. The substantive portion of his statement, which had the agreement of China and France, followed closely telegram 953, except for the omission of paragraph 5 of Section I and all of Section II except for paragraph 1. Ambassador Gromyko then gave his report to the Council on the consultations. He noted at one point that he had agreed to the decisions made in sub-paragraphs *a* and *b* of Section II of Ambassador Austin's statement, although the United States Representative had not pointed out this fact. For the texts of the statements by Ambassador Austin and Ambassador Gromyko, see SC, *3rd yr.*, Nos. 36-51, pp. 141-143 and 143-148, respectively.

---

501.BB Palestine/3-1748: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative  
at the United Nations (Austin)*

TOP SECRET      US URGENT      WASHINGTON, March 18, 1948—3 p. m.  
NIACT

144. Dept approves text of draft working paper submitted in your 309, March 17.<sup>1</sup>

In view of possibility that UK may be inclined to support these general conclusions and that there is even stronger possibility that French and Chinese representatives will associate themselves therewith, proposed statement authorized in Dept's 108, March 5, may be considerably truncated in order that emphasis shall be on main problems confronting SC and not on legal theory as to what happens after termination of Palestine mandate by UK. This legal argument might more appropriately be reserved for use when effort is made to persuade UK to retain its responsibility for Palestine until Special Session of GA has succeeded in setting up UN trusteeship.

While Dept approves your draft paragraph 9(a) and (b)<sup>2</sup> you should not permit this important aspect of the problem to be concentrated on to exclusion of equally important decision confronting UN to call special session and get on with problem of administering Palestine as a trusteeship. In all probability Soviet Representative with active support of Jewish Agency will seek to confuse issue by stressing need to

---

<sup>1</sup> Not printed; but see footnote 1, p. 739.

<sup>2</sup> The same as paragraph II, 1, (a) and (b) in telegram 953, *supra*, except that the words after "bring about" in paragraph 9(b) of telegram 309 read "an effective truce in that country at the earliest practicable moment."

enforce peace to exclusion of need to establish a framework within which peaceful solution of Palestine problem can be found.

This Govt is not prepared to join in enforcement measures in Palestine for maintenance of international peace and security until UN trusteeship is established and then only to maintain the integrity of the trusteeship as a bulwark of international peace and security.<sup>3</sup>

Foregoing for your info only but should govern your course of action in forthcoming SC debate.<sup>4</sup>

THORP

<sup>3</sup> Mr. Bohlen, in a marginal notation, stated that this paragraph had been cleared by phone with Secretary of Defense Forrestal.

<sup>4</sup> A meeting in Mr. Bohlen's office, attended by Messrs. Bohlen, Armour, and Henderson and representatives of the Offices of United Nations Affairs and of European Affairs, during the afternoon of March 18, considered and approved telegram 144.

*Statement Made by the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) Before the Security Council on March 19, 1948*<sup>1</sup>

[Extract]

The Security Council now has before it clear evidence that the Jews and Arabs of Palestine and the Mandatory Power cannot agree to implement the General Assembly plan of partition through peaceful means. The announced determination of the Mandatory Power to terminate the Mandate on 15 May 1948, if carried out by the United Kingdom, would result, in the light of information now available, in chaos, heavy fighting and much loss of life in Palestine. The United Nations cannot permit such a result. The loss of life in the Holy Land must be brought to an immediate end. The maintenance of international peace is at stake.

The United States fully subscribes to the conclusion reached by the four permanent members that the Security Council should make it clear to the parties and Governments concerned that the Security Council is determined not to permit the situation in Palestine to threaten international peace and, further, that the Security Council should take further action by all means available to it to bring about the immediate cessation of violence and the restoration of peace and order in Palestine.

Under the Charter, the Security Council has both an inescapable responsibility and full authority to take the steps necessary to bring about a cease-fire in Palestine, and a halt to the incursions being made into that country. The powers of Articles 39, 40, 41, and 42 are very

<sup>1</sup> Reprinted from SC, 3rd yr., Nos. 36-51, pp. 157, 167.

great, and the Security Council should not hesitate to use them—all of them—if necessary to bring about peace.

In addition, my Government believes that a temporary trusteeship for Palestine should be established under the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations to maintain the peace and to afford the Jews and Arabs of Palestine, who must live together, further opportunity to reach an agreement regarding the future government of that country. Such a United Nations trusteeship would, of course, be without prejudice to the character of the eventual political settlement, which we hope can be achieved without long delay. In our opinion, the Security Council should recommend the establishment of such a trusteeship to the General Assembly and to the Mandatory Power. This would require an immediate special session of the General Assembly, which the Security Council might call under the terms of the Charter. Pending the convening of the special session of the General Assembly, we believe that the Security Council should instruct the Palestine Commission to suspend its efforts to implement the proposed partition plan.

I shall now read three propositions which are being submitted by the United States. I am not making any representation for any other one of the permanent members. The United States propositions are contained in a paper entitled "Additional conclusions and recommendations concerning Palestine", which has been circulated to the members. It reads as follows:

"1. The plan proposed by the General Assembly is an integral plan which cannot succeed unless each of its parts can be carried out. There seems to be general agreement that the plan cannot now be implemented by peaceful means.

"2. We believe that further steps must be taken immediately not only to maintain the peace but also to afford a further opportunity to reach an agreement between the interested parties regarding the future government of Palestine. To this end we believe that a temporary trusteeship for Palestine should be established under the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations. Such a United Nations trusteeship would be without prejudice to the rights, claims or position of the parties concerned or to the character of the eventual political settlement, which we hope can be achieved without long delay. In our opinion, the Security Council should recommend the establishment of such a trusteeship to the General Assembly and to the Mandatory Power. This would require an immediate special session of the General Assembly, which the Security Council should request the Secretary-General to convoke under Article 20 of the Charter.

"3. Pending the meeting of the proposed special session of the General Assembly, we believe that the Security Council should instruct the Palestine Commission to suspend its efforts to implement the proposed partition plan."



Draft resolutions which would give effect to the above suggestions will be circulated shortly for the consideration of the Security Council.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> At 3 p. m., shortly before Ambassador Austin delivered the above statement, Mr. Kopper met with Faris el-Khouri, Camille Chamoun, and Mahmoud Fawzi, representatives of Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt at the United Nations, and Isa Nakleh. He informed them of the position the United States had decided to take on the Palestine question and read the three conclusions in the Ambassador's statement. Although the Arab representatives were guarded in their comments, Mr. Kopper gained the impression that "they were pleased with this latest turn of events, but they did not gloat." (Memorandum of conversation, March 19, by Mr. Kopper, 501.BB Palestine/3-1948)

Mr. Henderson discussed Ambassador Austin's statement with representatives of the British Embassy on March 20. For the substance of their conversation, see Mr. Henderson's memorandum of March 27 to Mr. Lovett, p. 767.

According to Trygve Lie's memoir, *In the Cause of Peace* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1954), the Secretary-General felt that the new United States position was a rebuff to the United Nations and to him personally. He recalls (p. 171) his suggestion to Ambassador Austin on March 20 that the two resign as a measure of protest against the Ambassador's instructions. The Ambassador was said to have replied that he would not resign and to have advised the Secretary-General not to do so either. Shortly after, Soviet Ambassador Gromyko expressed to the Secretary-General his hope and that of his Government that he would not resign.

---

#### *Editorial Note*

Ambassador Austin's statement of March 19 has been the center of a controversy concerning the extent of President Truman's knowledge and approval of the Ambassador's public advocacy of an international trusteeship for Palestine.

Margaret Truman, in *Harry S. Truman* (New York, William Morrow & Company, 1973) asserts that her father never formally committed himself to the trusteeship plan (page 387). She quotes on page 388 from her father's calendar for March 19 to the effect that the Austin statement represented the State Department pulling the rug from under him, that the State Department had reversed his Palestine policy and that with the Secretary and Under Secretary away, the third and fourth levels of the Department had succeeded in cutting his throat. Miss Truman notes on page 389 that not even in his memoirs did the President feel free to tell the whole story, although he hinted at it.

Indeed, in volume II of his *Memoirs*, President Truman on page 163 states that the March 19 statement was not a rejection of partition but an effort to postpone its effective date until conditions were more propitious. He averred that his policy on Palestine did not mean commitment to any set of dates or circumstances but was rather a dedication to international obligations and relief of human misery. In this sense, he said, the trusteeship proposal was not contrary to his policy. He expressed his certainty, however, that some State De-

partment officials anticipated that the Jews and Arabs would interpret the trusteeship proposal as an abandonment of the partition plan. In this sense, he stated, trusteeship was at odds with his attitude and policy.

Ian J. Bickerton, in an article entitled "President Truman's Recognition of Israel" in the December 1968 issue of the *American Jewish Historical Quarterly*, states flatly that President Truman agreed to the suggestion of Secretary Marshall that Palestine be placed under a temporary United Nations trusteeship (page 213 and again on pages 215-216). Then, on page 218, the author states that although the President had approved Secretary Marshall's suggestion for a trusteeship, he had given no directive for its implementation. Greatly disturbed by the Austin statement, the President learned through Clark Clifford that the Secretary of State had forwarded to him a memorandum (presumably the message received by the President on February 21, page 637) outlining the procedure for introducing to the General Assembly proposals for trusteeship over Palestine. The State Department had acted on the proposals in the belief that the President had given his formal approval. Apparently the President felt otherwise and regarded the timing of the release of the proposals as an attempt to force his hand.

A somewhat similar point of view is advanced in a memorandum of March 22, 1948, in the Files of Charles S. Murphy. The memorandum, presumably prepared by Mr. Murphy, who was Administrative Assistant to President Truman, reads as follows:

"The President had instructed the State Department to continue to support partition in the United Nations. He had authorized the trusteeship proposal to be advanced if, but only if, the Security Council finally voted down the implementation of partition notwithstanding its support by the United States.

"These instructions were garbled by the State Department, and when it became apparent that the Security Council would vote down partition in spite of its support by the United States, the trusteeship proposal was put forward without pressing for a final vote in the Security Council.

"This was done without the President's knowledge or approval.

"The end result might have been the same if the President's instructions had been followed, because partition could not have been implemented within the framework of the United Nations without a favorable vote of the Security Council. And the expressed attitude of the Council members seemed to make it clear that not more than five votes would be cast in favor of implementing partition.

"Nevertheless, the procedure which was followed failed to make the record clear and the failure to inform the President of the procedure left him in an insufferable position."

John Snetsinger's *Truman, the Jewish Vote, and the Creation of Israel* (Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, 1974), page 88, states

bluntly that President Truman "directly and knowingly" approved the change in American policy on Palestine.

Evidence of this point is included in several pages of penciled notes, dated May 4, 1948, in the handwriting of Mr. Clifford, which are among his papers in the Harry S. Truman Library at Independence, Missouri. Some of these notes outline the background of Ambassador Austin's speech of March 19. They read in part as follows:

"1. Marshall to Austin March 8[5] President has approved draft statement.

"2. President

"A. Summary of consultation.

"B. Question of responsibility after May 15.

"C. Proposals for further action by Security Council

"President has approved Point B and Point C. Had not approved actual language in C and probably not B.

"3. Marshall to Austin March 16—directs Austin to make speech. Marshall says Austin is to make speech as soon as possible as Austin believes appropriate.

"4. Austin and Rusk were not instructed to delay speech until final vote in Security Council.

"5. Marshall and Lovett left no word that President was to be informed when Austin was to speak.

"6. Text of Austin's speech was not submitted to President for his approval.

"A) It was the same substance as the draft previously submitted to President."

Mr. Clifford, on June 20, 1974, informed William M. Franklin, Director of the Department of State Historical Office, that his penciled notes of May 4, 1948, were prepared by him for use in the conference that was to be held eight days later at the White House to discuss the question of recognizing the Jewish State (memorandum of conversation by Mr. Franklin, June 20, 1974; 501-BB Palestine/3-2248). Regarding the conference of May 12, see the Secretary's memorandum of that date, page 972.

The text of other notes of May 4 by Mr. Clifford is presented in the editorial note on page 906.

Mr. Lovett's firm views that President Truman did approve a policy of international trusteeship for Palestine are set forth in Mr. Humelsine's memorandum of March 22, page 749.

---

501.BB Palestine/3-1948

*Memorandum by Mr. Robert M. McClintock to the Counselor (Bohlen)*

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] March 19, 1948.

Since I shall not be in the Department this afternoon I thought it would be well to inform you that Paris and Nanking have instructed

their representatives at Lake Success to go along with us on the draft working paper submitted in USUN's 309 yesterday.<sup>1</sup> Mr. Rusk believes that with French and Chinese support it will be possible for Ambassador Austin to give our entire twelve-point program, rather than, as was suggested last night, to stop half way with the stress on the Security Council's responsibility for maintaining international peace and security.

I reaffirmed to Mr. Rusk this morning our strong view that our program was an integral one and that the suggestion for calling a special session to establish a trusteeship for Palestine was as important as any other aspect of the proposed statement.

I communicated the substance of the foregoing to Mr. Lovett on Carl Humelsine's phone this morning and summarized briefly the meeting in your office yesterday. Mr. Lovett thought that that portion of the Department's telegram 144 of March 18 to New York which you cleared with Mr. Forrestal should also be checked with the President.

For your convenience I attach a copy of the policy paper on Palestine which was approved by President Truman on February 21, 1948.<sup>2</sup> The policy regarding possible use of force to maintain international peace and security is set forth in Paragraph 8, while the position on calling a special session to establish a trusteeship is found in Paragraph 12.

<sup>1</sup> Dated March 17, not printed; but see footnote 1, p. 739.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, see p. 637.

L Files

*Memorandum by the Legal Adviser (Gross) to the Director of the Office of United Nations Affairs (Rusk)*

[WASHINGTON,] March 19, 1948.

The attached memorandum,<sup>1</sup> dealing with questions concerning the legal status of Palestine, reaches the following general conclusions:

(1) The Principal Allied and Associated Powers held and exercised the legal power to dispose of Palestine following World War I.

(2) Under the mandate which Great Britain accepted, Great Britain was empowered, and accepted responsibility, to complete the tutelage of Palestine in order to bring the people of that country to attainment of full independence, which had been provisionally recognized in the Covenant of the League of Nations.

(3) When it considered the Palestine problem at the request of the Mandatory, the United Nations General Assembly recommended a particular plan to be adopted in bringing to a conclusion tutelage by the Mandatory. This plan was to be put in effect by action of the Mandatory, of United Nations organs, and of groups in Palestine.

<sup>1</sup> Dated March 19, by Leonard C. Meeker of the Office of the Legal Adviser, not printed.

(4) The Security Council is not empowered to alter the November 29, 1947 resolution of the General Assembly. While that resolution stands, groups in Palestine are authorized, and the Palestine Commission is required, unless the Security Council has taken action pursuant to Chapter VI or Chapter VII of the Charter recommending a political settlement other than that recommended by the General Assembly, to take the steps contemplated in the resolution for implementing the partition plan, Great Britain having stated its acceptance of the plan and acquiescing in its implementation.

(5) If, for any reason, in particular because of developments not anticipated when the General Assembly made its recommendation—such as violent opposition in Palestine, frustration by the Mandatory, inaction of the Security Council—the recommended plan appears unworkable, the General Assembly may repeal or alter its recommendation.

(6) Under articles 73 and 80 of the Charter of the United Nations, Great Britain has responsibilities with respect to Palestine which Great Britain must observe. Great Britain cannot discharge its obligation by disclaiming its trust. Great Britain's responsibilities continue until its tutelage of Palestine is completed as, for example, by the orderly working out of the General Assembly recommendation, or by a trusteeship for Palestine under the United Nations Charter.

(7) If the Mandatory should disclaim its trust by prematurely abandoning the mandate, questions might be raised as to the existence of legal continuity for the governing of Palestine, if at that time the General Assembly had repealed its recommendation. United Nations organs would, nevertheless, have their customary prerogatives and duties under the Charter.

(8) If the state or states having authority to provide a government for Palestine took no action, and the organs of the United Nations likewise remained paralyzed, there would be an absence of constituted authority in Palestine, which would leave the way open for the growth of one or more local agencies of administration. These might assume a governmental character and secure international recognition, thus achieving status as members of the family of nations, with corresponding rights and duties.

ERNEST A. GROSS

---

*Editorial Note*

According to Dan Kurzman, *Genesis 1948*, page 99. President Truman telephoned to Secretary Marshall at San Francisco on March 20 and instructed him to issue a statement making it clear that trusteeship had not been proposed as a substitute for partition but had simply been suggested as a temporary measure to fill the political vacuum in Palestine until partition could be effected.

Secretary Marshall held a press conference at Los Angeles on March 20 at which he stated that "The course of action with respect to the Palestine question which was proposed on March 19 by Ambassador Austin appeared to me, after the most careful consideration, to be the wisest course to follow. I recommended it to the President,

and he approved my recommendation. . . . The United States suggestion is that a temporary trusteeship should be established in order to maintain the peace and to open up the way to an agreed settlement. This trusteeship could be ended as soon as a peaceful solution can be found. The trusteeship itself would be established without prejudice in any way to the eventual political settlement which might be reached for Palestine." The full text of the Secretary's statement is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, March 28, 1948, page 408.

501.BB Palestine/3-2248

*Memorandum by the Director of the Executive Secretariat  
(Humelsine) to the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] March 22, 1948.

MR. SECRETARY: Mr. Lovett gave me the following statement on Palestine this morning. He asked that a copy of it be passed along to you for your information.

When Clifford called me he took the line that the President said he had never approved the so-called "Mandate Speech" of Austin's,<sup>1</sup> which was submitted to the President and which carried at the end the recommendation for the trusteeship. Actually that document was taken over to Clifford (to be given to the President) by McClintock on March 6, the day after the President returned from his trip. That same day the President called me to come over around noon, and I asked him at that time if he had received the document which we had sent over earlier that morning. He said he had the document and would read it.

Then, as I recall, on Monday the 8th the Secretary took me to the White House to report on two things, ERP and Palestine. At that time I outlined the situation as follows: That on the 5th the Security Council had considered our no. 1 proposal (which was to accept the plan and implement it) and had voted that down. The Security Council then had moved to the remainder of our motion to take up paragraphs 2 and 3 (the consultation part of the thing), but although paragraph 1 had been voted down, that I (Lovett) would not consider this vote-down as a complete rejection. At that time the President asked me what the outlook was, and I said it was bad because we had only gotten 5 votes for implementation of the GA proposal, and our people in New York thought we could not get the 7 votes to pass it. I said that we would have to have an alternative and that was the trusteeship proposal contained in the latter part of the draft statement. The President said we were to go though and attempt to get approval of implementation of the GA resolution but if we did not get it we could take the alternative step. That was perfectly clear.<sup>2</sup> He said it to General Marshall and to me. I came back to the office, and then went to lunch.

<sup>1</sup> Ambassador Austin's statement before the Security Council on March 19; see p. 742.

<sup>2</sup> Underscoring here and in the two places later in this memorandum appear in the original.

When I got back from lunch I told McClintock the President had approved the mandate speech as a second step after we had gotten licked on the other. There is absolutely no question but what the President approved it.

There was a definite clearance there. I stress it because Clifford told me the President said he did not know anything about it.<sup>3</sup>

C[ARLISLE] HUMELSINE

<sup>3</sup> In a memorandum of March 22 to Mr. Bohlen, the Secretary of State wrote:

"In my discussion of Palestine with the President today, he said that the reason he was so much exercised in the matter was the fact that Austin made his statement without the President having been advised that he was going to make it at that particular time. He had agreed to the statement but said that if he had known when it was going to be made he could have taken certain measures to have avoided the political blast of the press." (501.BB Palestine/3-2248)

501.BB Palestine/3-2248

*Memorandum by the Director of the Office of United Nations Affairs  
(Rusk) to the Secretary of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] March 22, 1948.

In dealing with questions on Palestine, the following points are fundamental:

1. The United Nations itself reached a complete impasse on Palestine.

a. *The Security Council*

On March 5, 1948, the Security Council refused to pass an American resolution which would have accepted the General Assembly resolution as a basis for Security Council action. Our resolution got only 5 of the necessary 7 votes. During Big Five consultations over the past two weeks, no agreement was reached on a basis for further Security Council action on Palestine. In addition, informal consultations among the non-permanent members of the Security Council indicated very clearly that partition could never get 7 votes in the Security Council.

b. *The Trusteeship Council*

On March 16, 1948, there were only 4 affirmative votes for the Draft Statute for the City of Jerusalem, an essential part of the partition plan. There were 5 votes in opposition. The only way in which partition was saved this defeat was by postponing action in the Trusteeship Council until April.

c. *The Palestine Commission*

The Palestine Commission will not be able to proceed to Palestine without armed forces to support it, will not be able to establish an

Arab Government in the proposed Arab state, will not be able to establish an economic union, and will not be able to place in operation the international territory of the City of Jerusalem. Thus it is clear that the only part of the plan which the Palestine Commission might possibly carry out would be the announcement of a provisional council of government for the Jewish state itself.

2. Unless emergency action is taken, large-scale fighting will break out in Palestine on May 16.

The United Kingdom seems determined to terminate the mandate on May 15. There is no prospect that the partition scheme can now be made effective by that date. Any effort to establish a Jewish state by self-help on the part of the Jews would inevitably result in large-scale fighting between the Jews and the Arabs. The Arabs will insist that the termination of the mandate leaves Palestine as a single independent country, of course under Arab control.

3. The United States proposal for a temporary trusteeship is emergency action directed solely to the maintenance of peace pending a political settlement.

In discussing the nature of the proposed trusteeship, it is important to emphasize that it is a means for obtaining a truce. The military truce must be accompanied by a political truce, but the political truce requires governmental machinery to take over when the British leave. The proposal is without prejudice to the eventual political settlement. It is a conservatory effort.

4. In the trusteeship field, the United Nations is empowered to act as a *government* and is not making recommendations. There is therefore no Charter problem about enforcing law and order in Palestine in connection with trusteeship.

---

501.BB Palestine/3-2248

*Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Mr. Robert M. McClintock*

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] March 22, 1948.

Mr. Clifford telephoned me this morning to say that the President had requested him to prepare "a little study" of recent chronology on the handling of the Palestine case in the Security Council. He said that he had heard that on Friday I had talked to Mr. Lovett about a certain matter which had been cleared with Secretary Forrestal and which Mr. Lovett had requested be cleared with the President. I told Mr. Clifford that I had spoken to Mr. Lovett on the telephone Friday morning and had informed him of a certain security aspect of the Palestine problem which had been cleared by Mr. Bohlen with the Secretary of National Defense, and that Mr. Lovett had sug-



gested that this be checked with the President. I said that I had immediately sought to get in touch with Mr. Bohlen; that the latter was then at the Capitol; and that I wrote Mr. Bohlen a memorandum of the Under Secretary's instructions.

Mr. Clifford asked if anyone in the State Department had sought to gain White House clearance pursuant to Mr. Lovett's request. I said that so far as I was aware no one had unless it was Mr. Bohlen himself. However, I had been absent from Washington since Friday afternoon and was not personally aware what had gone on since my departure. I added that, since Mr. Bohlen had secured clearance from Mr. Forrestal, I thought that the White House clearance suggested by Mr. Lovett should go through Mr. Bohlen.

Mr. Clifford concluded the interview by asking me "Did you, yourself, try to clear this point with the White House?" I said I had not.

---

501.BB Palestine/3-2248

*Memorandum by the Counselor (Bohlen) to Mr. Robert M. McClintock*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] March 22, 1948.

With reference to the attached memorandum from Mr. McClintock:<sup>2</sup>

As I was on the Hill that morning I did not receive the memorandum until late in the morning upon my return. Since Mr. Lovett's suggestion with regard to that portion of the telegram<sup>3</sup> already cleared with Mr. Forrestal referred *not* to any question calling for any action by Senator Austin in the Palestine question, but was merely for his information only—in order to safeguard against being committed indirectly to a course of action not in accordance with the President's program; and in view of the fact that the Security Council meeting at which the agreed program was to go forward was already in session, I did not consider it necessary to check this point with the President in the afternoon.

I would like to emphasize again that this point did not bear on the statement that Senator Austin was then making before the Security Council but was merely for his information concerning our eventual participation in a trusteeship agreement as set forth in the program—which would not arise even for consideration until the proposed meeting of the General Assembly to consider the principle of UN trusteeship.

CHARLES E. BOHLEN

---

<sup>1</sup> Addressed also to Mr. Humelsine.

<sup>2</sup> Presumably, the memorandum, *supra*.

<sup>3</sup> Presumably, telegram 144, March 18, to New York, p. 741.

501.BB Palestine/3-2248: Telegram

*The Consul General at Jerusalem (Macatee) to the Secretary of State*

SECRET US URGENT

JERUSALEM, March 22, 1948—5 p. m.

341. Jewish reaction Austin statement Friday one of consternation, disillusion, despair and determination. Most feel United States has betrayed Jews in interests Middle Eastern oil and for fear Russian designs. Foreign correspondents see Jewish determination set up state in any event and only decision to be made is whether state to be in area given under partition scheme or in all Palestine with Jerusalem as capital and Tel Aviv as seat of govt. Jewish Agency political and security officials confirm public sentiment and bitterness against US but feel that Jewish Agency executive, if meeting probably Tuesday, will not reach immediate decision establishment state.<sup>1</sup> As JA security officer said "if we do make such decision we poor Jews will be in the wrong again". While some believe US policy reversal will throw Jews into hands of Russians most feel Jews will have to "fight it out alone".

Arabs while pleased with United States abandonment of partition regard it as only natural return of US to principles of democracy and justice and are glad Arabs and Americans can resume traditional friendship. But all determined fight against Jews must continue until Zionism eradicated. Kawukgi, commander [Yarmuk] army, told American correspondents his army in Palestine not to fight partition but to crush Zionism. Arabs more optimistic but not overconfident.

Both Arabs Jews regard trusteeship scheme undesirable and most observers feel bloodshed will now increase tremendously with Jews desperate and Arabs feeling new strength.<sup>2</sup>

MACATEE

<sup>1</sup>The Jewish Agency and the National Council of the Jews in Palestine, the Vaad Leumi, adopted a statement on the question of a trusteeship for Palestine on March 23. The statement declared their opposition to any proposal designed to prevent or postpone the establishment of a Jewish State; rejected any plan to establish a trusteeship regime in Palestine; and asserted that by May 16, a provisional Jewish Government would begin to function; for text of the statement, see SC, *3rd yr.*, Nos. 36-51, p. 244.

<sup>2</sup>The reaction of the Arab States to Ambassador Austin's statement was favorable, although accompanied in some instances by a note of caution. The Syrian Government expressed its "gratitude for America's reversion to common sense and fairness in rejecting Palestine's partition as unworkable." (Telegram 153, March 20, 11 p. m., from Damascus, 867N.01/3-2048) The Saudi Arabian Government was "pleased." (Telegram 157, March 22, 1 p. m., from Jidda, 867N.01/3-2248) The Iraqi reaction was "good" and "hopeful", but satisfaction "must be tempered by uncertainty how matter will develop in SC and special session GA." (Telegram 252, March 22, 2 p. m., from Baghdad, 501.BB Palestine/3-2248) The Lebanese welcomed wholeheartedly the suggestion of the United States but emphasized "that our difficulties are far from solved." (Airgram 136, March 23, from Beirut, 501.BB Palestine/3-2348) The Egyptians "universally welcomed" the United States action. An important section of public opinion, however, was "inclined to await with reserve next US step. General agreement that even temporary trusteeship will be unacceptable if it permits continued immigration or assists otherwise in establishment Jewish state or if it blocks achievement ultimate Arab objective of independent, democratic Palestine state." (Telegram 289, March 24, 4 p. m., from Cairo, 501.BB Palestine/3-2448)

*Editorial Note*

Offices of the Department prepared two further draft trusteeship agreements for Palestine on March 22 and 23; regarding the earlier drafts of February 11 and 12, see footnote 2, page 697. The draft of March 22 proposed that France, the United Kingdom, and the United States serve as administering authority; the draft of the following day designated the United Nations for this role. Both drafts are filed under 501.BB Palestine/3-2248; the authors are not identified.

---

501.BB Palestine/3-2448

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Armour)*

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] March 24, 1948.

Mr. Clifford telephoned, said that last night about 7 o'clock General Carter of Secretary Marshall's office telephoned him and said that in the ordinary course of events the U.S. Delegate to the United Nations would introduce a resolution asking for a special call of the General Assembly. General Carter had said that in view of the fact that the President was having a meeting today with Secretary Marshall, he wondered what Mr. Clifford's reaction was as to Mr. Austin introducing the resolution. Mr. Clifford said he told General Carter that it would be unwise to introduce the resolution in view of the important conference the President was calling for today, and he thought it better be held in *status quo* until certain matters had been discussed. Mr. Clifford said he had tried to reach General Carter, and that he had also tried to reach Mr. Bohlen and Mr. Rusk without success, and that he wanted to be sure that the President's reaction on the matter had been clearly understood. He said that the President wanted absolutely nothing done until the President had discussed the matter with Secretary Marshall and others; that if such a resolution were introduced in all probability it would be accompanied by remarks, and that the President does not want anything said at present.

I said I would check into it immediately and would see that his instructions were carried out.

I checked into the matter and then telephoned Mr. Clifford that the telegram to Austin did not go out; that it had been cancelled and that it was distinctly understood at the UN that there were to be no remarks made, and that everything will be held in abeyance until after the President's conference today.

NORMAN ARMOUR

Clifford Papers

*Memorandum of Conference on Palestine, March 24, 1948, Prepared  
by the President's Special Counsel (Clifford)*

Conference was held in the Cabinet Room and was attended by the President; Secretary of State Marshall, Loy Henderson, Chip Bohlen and Dean Rusk of the State Department; Howard McGrath, Oscar Ewing; Matt Connelly; Charles Ross; Dave Niles;<sup>1</sup> and Clark Clifford.

Lengthy discussion was held about various solutions for solving the problem of Palestine. One of the main subjects discussed was the lifting of the embargo on arms to the Middle East.

Those present at the conference, outside of the State Department representatives, were in favor of lifting the arms embargo as soon as possible. General Marshall stated that they were working on plans for a truce and that it was felt that there was a good possibility that a truce could be effectuated. Oscar Ewing thought it was important that it be ascertained as soon as possible if a truce could be obtained and if not that the embargo should be lifted. General Marshall was asked if the decision regarding a truce could be made by Thursday, April 1, which was the President's next Press Conference. A State Department representative stated that this was too soon but that they should know definitely within two weeks of the date of the meeting. This meant that they would have a definite answer on the question of a truce by April 7.

The general understanding was that, if they could not report that they had been successful in obtaining a truce by April 7, steps would be taken to release the embargo.<sup>2</sup>

CLARK M. CLIFFORD

---

<sup>1</sup> J. Howard McGrath, United States Senator from Rhode Island; Oscar R. Ewing, Administrator of the Federal Security Agency; Matthew J. Connelly, Appointments Secretary to President Truman; Charles G. Ross, Press Secretary to the President; and David K. Niles, Administrative Assistant to the President.

<sup>2</sup> Secretary Marshall testified in Executive Session on the Palestine problem before the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate on March 24. A staff member of the Committee, in a letter of May 23, 1974, has informed the editors that the Committee prepared no stenographic record of his testimony. The session began at 10 a. m., and for one hour and fifty minutes heard Secretary Marshall discuss the entire range of American foreign policy. The *New York Times* of March 25, 1948, p. 1, has printed an account of the Secretary's testimony on the Palestine problem as received from "informants of the utmost reliability."

The letter of May 23, 1974 is filed under Department of State Accession No. P740059-1789.

501.BB Palestine/3-2448

*Memorandum Prepared in the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON, undated.]

Certain observations regarding the present status of the Palestine problem:

(1) Our present policy with regard to Palestine, that is, support of a temporary trusteeship, is leading us in the direction of taking certain heavy responsibilities which may be of almost indefinite duration. These responsibilities not only may be of a financial character but may eventually require the presence of American troops in Palestine and even the shedding of American blood in Palestine.

This policy is being inaugurated in the belief that (1) American public sentiment would insist on American armed intervention if necessary in order to prevent the slaughter of the Jews in Palestine; (2) such slaughter would take place following British withdrawal unless either American or Soviet troops intervene; and (3) if American troops are introduced into Palestine it would be preferable for them to go under the terms of a neutral trusteeship rather than in order to maintain law and order while partition is being carried out. It is likely that an attempt to carry out partition accompanied by the use of foreign force would eventually require the conquest by force and a continued military occupation of much of the Arab world.

(2) There are certain dangers and pitfalls inherent in our present policy. They would be inherent in any kind of a policy with regard to Palestine. A development which would render our policy a failure would be the lack of full cooperation on the part of Great Britain. Unless there is full British-American cooperation in the future with regard to Palestine, no Palestine policy can be successful; fighting will continue in that country and chaos will probably develop in the whole Middle East to an extent which will be injurious to our national interests and will adversely affect our national security.

(3) It will probably not be easy to obtain full British cooperation for our present policy because the British are extremely bitter at what they consider to be our lack of consideration for their difficulties with regard to Palestine in the past and because of their belief that internal political pressures and shifts in the United States will render the American Government an unreliable partner in the carrying out of any Palestine policy.

<sup>1</sup> Transmitted to the Secretary of State by Mr. Henderson with his memorandum of March 24.

(4) If we are, therefore, to obtain British cooperation we must be able to give assurances that there will not be deviations in our policy with regard to Palestine as a result of internal political pressures in the United States. It would be difficult for us to give any assurances of this kind: (a) unless the United States Government decides once for all that it will not permit itself to be influenced by Zionist pressures; (b) unless the Palestine problem is fully explained to the leaders of both great political Parties, including members of Congress and Presidential candidates, and informal undertakings are obtained from them that Zionism and Palestine will not be made an issue in the coming presidential campaign.

(5) If we are to obtain British cooperation, we must also let the British know that the Executive Branch will take all possible steps in order to see that the United States will bear its fair share of the financial and military responsibilities involved.

(6) Our present policy with regard to Palestine can not possibly be successful if we take a defensive rather than a bold clear-cut attitude with regard to it both in the international and in the domestic arena. In the international field in cooperation with Great Britain, France, China, and such other powers as are willing to participate, we should insist sternly upon the laying down of arms, the cessation of the illegal entry of either Arabs or Jews and of the cessation of all smuggling of arms into Palestine. Perpetrators of acts of violence in Palestine, once trusteeship is established, must be considered as ordinary criminals and terrorists and punished as such. Any weakness on our part in this respect would be disastrous.

Internally we should take the lead in calling upon all American citizens regardless of race, creed or political party, to refrain from taking any action which might encourage the continuance of violence in Palestine. It should be made clear that the encouragement of such violence might well lead to the shedding of American blood and would be opposed to the basic interest of the United States. It is possible that a carefully planned campaign might result in freeing many American Jews from the domination of Zionist extremists.

(7) It is important that energetic steps be taken to bring the moderate Jews and Arabs in Palestine together. Both Jews and Arabs in Palestine should be given to understand that their failure to reach an agreement can only mean loss of life and property in Palestine. In particular the Jews in Palestine should be made to understand that they will receive no United States backing in case they persist in following a course of violence.

501.BB Palestine/3-2448: Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary  
of State*

SECRET US URGENT

LONDON, March 24, 1948—7 p. m.

1218. Beeley advised Embassy today that Foreign Office has instructed Cadogan to tell US Del UN that while His Majesty's Government sympathizes with motives US Government in making further attempt to avert civil war Palestine, is not possible for His Majesty's Government to depart in SC from its neutral attitude.

2. Beeley referred to charge made Parliament March 23 to effect that State Department and Foreign Office together have been concocting settlement unfavorable Jewish state (Paragraph 7 Embtel 1207<sup>1</sup>). He thought public support His Majesty's Government in SC would lend color to this widely-circulated false story and consequently probably not be helpful to Department.

3. Beeley said he was sorry that British Government's public attitude will seem unhelpful because it is not intention His Majesty's Government to be unhelpful. For example, Foreign Office hopes to reply at an early date to Department's questions regarding Palestine put to British Embassy Washington. Beeley believes there may be further steps of same kind which can be taken. Personally, he is exploring idea of drafting interim arrangements for Jerusalem and holy places (see Paragraph 4 Embs 1191, March 23<sup>2</sup>).

4. Embassy has impression that personally British officials dealing with Palestine problem consider new attitude US Government as sound legally and can conceive no better move in present circumstances. However, British Cabinet and British politicians are deeply sensible of overwhelming popular demand in UK to get "the boys" home from Palestine and believe all sections British public would react strongly if for whatever cause under whatever aegis, an attempt were made to keep "the boys" in Palestine even for short while beyond announced period. Long experience of being shot at by both sides in Palestine and being vilified by Zionists all nations has, in view British politicians, so calloused British conscience that it is insensate on this particular subject. The British officials who are sympathetic with US Government motives and see logic US Government position are faced with problem getting a hearing from British politicians who now have a popular and firm Palestine policy which they will not abandon easily. However, these officials may be able to persuade their superiors after termination mandate (thus keeping pledge to British electorate) to venture in cooperation with US and/or UN somewhat beyond present

<sup>1</sup> Dated March 24, not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

neutral position His Majesty's Government, although in present mood British public Embassy believes it most unlikely that any British troops will be made available for use in Palestine.

GALLMAN

501.BB Palestine/3-2548: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt*

US URGENT

WASHINGTON, March 25, 1948.

337. Following statement was released by President today:

"It is vital that American people have clear understanding of position of US in UN re Palestine.

This country vigorously supported plan for Partition with Economic Union recommended by UNSCOP and by GA. We have explored every possibility consistent with basic principles of Charter for giving effect to that solution. Unfortunately, it has become clear that partition plan cannot be carried out at this time by peaceful means. We could not undertake to impose this solution on people of Palestine by use of American troops, both on Charter grounds and as matter of national policy.

UK has announced its firm intention to abandon its mandate in Palestine on May 15. Unless emergency action is taken, there will be no public authority in Palestine on that date capable of preserving law and order. Violence and bloodshed will descend upon the Holy Land. Large scale fighting among people of that country will be inevitable result. Such fighting would infect entire Middle East and could lead to consequences of gravest sort involving peace of this nation and of world.

These dangers are imminent. Responsible govts in UN cannot face this prospect without acting promptly to prevent it. US has proposed to SC a temporary UN trusteeship for Palestine to provide a govt to keep peace. Such trusteeship was proposed only after we had exhausted every effort to find way to carry out partition by peaceful means. Trusteeship is not proposed as substitute for partition plan but as effort to fill vacuum soon to be created by termination of mandate on May 15. Trusteeship does not prejudice character of final political settlement. It would establish conditions of order which are essential to peaceful solution.

If we are to avert tragedy in Palestine, immediate truce must be reached between Arabs and Jews of that country. I am instructing Ambassador Austin to urge upon SC in strongest terms that representatives of Arabs and Jews be called at once to Council table to arrange such a truce.<sup>1</sup>

US is prepared to lend every appropriate assistance to UN in preventing bloodshed and in reaching peaceful settlement. If UN agrees to temporary trusteeship, we must take our share of necessary respon-

<sup>1</sup> In telegram 217, March 26, 6 p. m., to Jerusalem, repeated to Arab capitals, the Department advised that "In light President's statement re Palestine Mar 25 Dept considers it imperative that highly qualified representatives Arab Higher Committee be present in NY for further UN discussion re Palestine no later than Tuesday Mar 30." (501.BB Palestine/3-2648)



sibility. Our regard for UN, for peace of world and for our own self-interest does not permit us to do less.

With such truce and such trusteeship, peaceful settlement is yet possible; without them, open warfare is just over horizon. American policy in this emergency period is based squarely upon recognition of this inescapable fact."<sup>2</sup>

Sent Cairo as 337 repeated Baghdad as 91 Beirut as 129 Damascus as 81 Jerusalem as 215 Jidda as 91, London as 1050.

MARSHALL

<sup>2</sup> A copy of the President's statement in the Elsey Papers contains a marginal notation in the handwriting of Mr. Elsey that the statement was drafted on March 24-25 by Messrs. Clifford, Bohlen, and Rusk, with the advice and counsel of Senator McGrath and Messrs. Ewing and Niles.

President Truman, in response to questions asked at his press conference of March 25 stated that "Our policy is to back up the United Nations in the trusteeship by every means necessary", but that did not necessarily mean that American troops would be used. He also said that his "position hasn't changed with regard to immigration in Palestine" and that he remained in favor of partition at some future date (*Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1948*, pp. 191, 192).

501.BB Palestine/3-2548: Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET URGENT NEW YORK, March 25, 1948—12: 50 p. m.

332. Am I authorized to reply to specific question:

"Would the US contribute armed forces to UN for maintenance of law and order in Palestine to maintain truce and trusteeship?"

What reply shall I make? <sup>1</sup>

AUSTIN

<sup>1</sup> Attached to an information copy of telegram 332 is a memorandum of March 29 sent by Gladys E. Schukraft, in the Under Secretary's Office, to Mr. Lovett which reads as follows: "Mr. Rusk asked me to give you the following:

"Question: Would the United States contribute armed forces to the United Nations for the maintenance of law and order in Palestine to maintain a truce and trusteeship?

"Proposed answer: Yes, if troops become necessary, along with other United Nations members."

Mr. Lovett, in a marginal notation, stated: "No—White House does *not* approve; language should conform to President's press statement of March 25th."

The editors have been unable to find a direct reply to telegram 332 in the Department of State files. Possibly Ambassador Austin was informed of Mr. Lovett's views by telephone.

The Clifford Papers contain an undated memorandum prepared presumably by Mr. Clifford for the President, which reads as follows: "State Department asked you late yesterday what Ambassador Austin should say today (Tuesday) if asked this question.

"I suggest this answer:

"In the first place, it has often been contemplated that UN forces should, whenever practicable, be made up of troops of the smaller nations which have no immediate partisan interest in the area to be policed, and should not be made up of units of larger nations with any special interest in the area. In the alternative, there can be an international volunteer force. . . .

"In the second place, it should be borne in mind that trusteeship is simply a method, a way station, a means to an end—and not the end, not the goal, not

867N.01/3-2648

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State  
(Lovett)*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] March 26, 1948.

Participants: The Secretary  
The Under Secretary  
Mr. Moshe Shertok, Jewish Agency for Palestine  
Mr. Eliahu Epstein, Jewish Agency for Palestine

Mr. Shertok called on the Secretary at the latter's request. He was accompanied by Mr. Epstein. The Secretary explained to these gentlemen that his purpose in asking them to come in was to find out from them the attitude of the Jewish Agency and the Palestine groups which it represented toward an attempt to bring representatives of the Jewish Agency and the Arab Higher Committee together in an effort to work out a cessation of hostilities and a truce.

Mr. Shertok asked for a more precise definition of the difference between the two expressions, and the Secretary pointed out that the normal concept was a cease fire order by both parties concurrent with a truce or immediately followed by negotiations for one. Mr. Shertok stated that the position of the Jewish Agency had been made clear in a formal statement and that the people of Palestine would not agree to a "truce" while "foreign troops were in Palestine and infiltration of reinforcements continued". By foreign troops he explained he did not mean the Mandatory Power but Arabs in substantial numbers (which he estimated at about 6,000) who had come into the country from Syria, Lebanon, Trans-Jordan, and Iraq. He mentioned particularly that these bodies of armed men were organized, equipped with arms, and in uniform, and that the British had done little or nothing to oppose them or eject them. He referred specifically to a group of several hundred Iraqi troops encamped at the location of the water supply of Jerusalem and in a position to seize it.

The Secretary pointed out that we were making earnest efforts to find a way of stopping the bloodshed and, through conciliation, to find some solution to the difficulties which remained unsolved and appeared almost insoluble in the light of the belligerent attitude taken by both of the parties involved. Picking up the statement of Mr. Shertok about the foreign troops in Palestine, the Secretary asked how they could be identified and whether they could be located. Mr. Shertok

---

the final result. The purpose of the suggestion of trusteeship is to obtain a peaceful implementation of the UN decision for partition. It may be that others in the UN will want to suggest some other and even better way of securing what the American Government has in mind—the preservation of the peace in aid of partition. Once the method which is best for this purpose is decided upon, the picture will become clearer for the decision of the kind and composition of any troops that may be useful to carry out that method."

replied that he did not know whether they could all be located, but that he felt in Palestine there were substantial numbers which could be identified. After further discussion along this line, Mr. Shertok was asked the direct question as to whether the Jewish Agency would agree to a truce if one of the terms provided for the withdrawal of such armed bands from Palestine. Mr. Shertok stated that this would not be enough, as the period of truce would be used by the Arabs to build up their forces through infiltration, to run in additional arms, and otherwise to improve their position, since the truce would assure them of a period of time during which they would not be attacked by the Haganah. He said that failure to require the withdrawal of the armed bands and prevent further border violation by infiltration or otherwise would be regarded by the Jewish communities in Palestine as a "complete capitulation to the Arabs". Long discussion brought out the fact that Messrs. Shertok and Epstein would recommend and they felt that the Jewish Agency would agree to the cessation of hostilities and accept a truce which provided :

(1) For complete cessation of hostilities by each party and the strict prohibition of acts of terrorism, etcetera ;

(2) That all "identifiable bodies of armed men" from neighboring states should be withdrawn from Palestine territory ;

(3) That strict border patrol be instituted as a protection against any further infiltration ; and

(4) That the rights of the Jewish Agency be "reserved" and its position be not "prejudiced" by this truce.

During the discussion Mr. Shertok emphasized that the Jewish Agency had been for some months perfecting its program for the take-over of the administrative functions on May 15 on the termination of the British Mandate. He explained that the British had reiterated again their purpose to lay down the mandate on the 15th of May and have their troops out by August 1, reserving in the meantime the military authority until the latter date, especially in certain areas. Mr. Shertok said frankly that the Jewish Agency would expect to continue during the truce its preparations for taking over the Jewish areas "allocated to them under the United Nations' Partition Program".

The Secretary questioned Mr. Shertok closely on the matter of the ability of the Palestine settlement to defend itself, and Mr. Shertok said that they were prepared to fight indefinitely, and that while they were "in desperate need of arms, including artillery, tanks and armored vehicles", they would fight and felt that they could do so successfully. When he was asked whether they were counting on foreign assistance if the Arabs began to get the upper hand, he said that he felt there would be Jewish volunteers coming in from all over the world and that this might cause international complications, as might "volunteered assistance from certain powers". He thought such a situa-

tion might cause the United Nations to use an "international force" to restore peace, and he felt that it would be far costlier than to do it now.

Toward the end of the conversation Mr. Shertok was asked whether he felt that there was any solution to the problem. After some thought he said that he did not feel that there was any which did not involve the use of "an international police force" which was, as he put it, as non-existent today as it was in November of 1947. He said that the Jewish Agency must insist on adequate immigration and that the Arabs, in his opinion, would oppose any increase over the present 1,500 a month. Mr. Epstein said that this was obviously inadequate and that in all of their efforts in the past to find a common ground with the Arabs they have ultimately broken on this point.

It was apparent that neither Mr. Shertok nor Mr. Epstein felt that the truce would solve anything basic, and they displayed considerable doubt that the trusteeship would help the situation. In fact, Mr. Shertok stated that it was wholly unacceptable to the Jewish Agency and that it would be "intolerable" if the British should remain as the operating trustee. He said that relations had deteriorated very rapidly over the past year and that the British part in the trusteeship was "unacceptable". Just before leaving Mr. Shertok made a strong plea for placing Jerusalem under an international trusteeship in order to keep it from falling into the hands of the Arabs. He said that the British had been turning it over little by little to the Arab tribal sheiks and that this was an appalling fact after 30 years of freedom from Moslem control. He said that the Jewish Agency would be prepared if necessary to deal with the question of Jerusalem separate from that of the rest of the Palestine question if there could be assurance that Jerusalem would be maintained as an internationalized holy city and not permitted to fall back into the hands of the Arabs.

In connection with his comments about the city of Jerusalem, Mr. Shertok said that a representative of the United Nations in Jerusalem had suggested that the Scandinavian token forces presently in Germany might be used as an international police force in Jerusalem and would be most acceptable to the Jewish Agency. The proposal apparently originated with a Norwegian officer. The Secretary asked Mr. Shertok if he had any indication that any of the Scandinavian countries might agree to such a proposal, or whether it had been taken up through the United Nations or otherwise. Mr. Shertok replied that he did not know but felt that the idea had merit and was well worth exploring.

He was bitter about the British position throughout and said that the Arab League was the agent through which the British worked in the Middle East and that it was intolerable that the British should put the Arab League over the Palestinians in a trusteeship or otherwise.

Mr. Epstein is returning to Palestine in about two weeks, and said he would make himself available to the Department upon his return for any information they might desire.

ROBERT A. LOVETT

867N.01/3-2648

*Memorandum of Conversation by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)*<sup>1</sup>

RESTRICTED

[WASHINGTON,] March 26, 1948.

Participants: Dr. Charles Malik, Lebanese Minister  
Mr. Henderson, NEA  
Mr. Merriam, NE

Dr. Malik came in by appointment at his request. He said that it would be helpful if we could make available to him any background or comment relating to the President's press conference yesterday which would be of assistance to him in reporting to his Government. He indicated particular concern over the possibility that a trusteeship might be slanted toward, or be a subterfuge for, partition. He said that it was particularly important that his Government have accurate information regarding the background and purposes of trusteeship, since his Foreign Minister was just about to leave Beirut for an Arab League meeting in Cairo.

In reply, I quoted to Dr. Malik the following passage in the President's statement:

"Trusteeship is not proposed as a substitute for the partition plan but as an effort to fill the vacuum soon to be created by the termination of the mandate on May 15. The trusteeship does not prejudice the character of the final political settlement."

I said that I fully realized that the Arabs would be suspicious of a slanted trusteeship, and that I felt sure we had nothing of the kind in mind. I pointed out that Arab cooperation was essential for the success of trusteeship in the General Assembly, for if it were opposed by both the Arab countries and the Soviet bloc a two-thirds majority could not be obtained.

It was also pointed out to the Minister that the terms of the trusteeship agreement would constitute a safeguard, since it would be bound to contain specific provisions concerning the purpose of the trusteeship, the circumstances under which it would be terminated, immigration, and so on, and that it would be impossible to allow these matters to be dealt with in vague language open to various interpretations as was

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Mr. Merriam.

done in the mandate. We would, of course, be bound by the terms of the trusteeship agreement.

Dr. Malik asked whether it was too early to secure information on our ideas for securing a truce. I said it was a little early but that I would let him know when the matter was further along.

In concluding I said that I did not believe trusteeship would work unless there was cooperation from both Arabs and Jews; that it would be an extremely difficult matter to secure the cooperation of both sides but that he could be sure we were urging cooperation as strongly upon the Jews as upon the Arabs.

L[OY] W. H[ENDERSON]

501.BB Palestine/3-2448 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom*

SECRET US URGENT

WASHINGTON, March 26, 1948—6 p. m.

1067. Embtel 1218 March 24. Dept regrets that FO has instructed Cadogan to tell USDel UN that while HMG sympathizes with motives USGovt in making further attempt to avert civil war Palestine it is not possible for HMG to depart in SC from its neutral attitude.

Dept suggests Ambassador Austin's statement Feb 24, his two statements March 19 in SC particularly latter and Sec's statement March 20 in Los Angeles re Palestine<sup>1</sup> clearly indicate constructive line which USGovt is following in UN in endeavor to prevent strife in Palestine and to create conditions under which it might be possible for Jews and Arabs in Palestine to reach agreement by peaceful means.

The President made statement March 25<sup>2</sup> on Palestine which further confirms constructive line USGovt is following at UN.

Statements by President, Secretary and Ambassador Austin to which reference is made, as well as official statements of HMG at UN and in London do not indicate, in Dept's opinion, nor could such contention seriously be maintained in press, that "State Dept and FO together have been concocting settlement unfavorable Jewish State." It would appear on other hand that future support by HMG in SC for measures proposed by USGovt to prevent strife in Palestine and make agreement possible would be in accord with HMG's traditional policies and would meet with favor in world press.

While Dept realizes necessity for immediate interim arrangements for Jerusalem and holy places it is suggested that it would be difficult to make any arrangements for Jerusalem without at same time con-

<sup>1</sup> Regarding the Secretary's statement of March 20, see editorial note, p. 748.

<sup>2</sup> See telegram 337, March 25, to Cairo, p. 759.

sidering arrangements for Palestine in its entirety, as became apparent when TC considered Jerusalem regime under partition plan. FonOff (Embtel 1191 March 23<sup>3</sup>) tacitly admits this fact by indicating that Jewish population of Jerusalem can be throttled by steps taken elsewhere in Palestine.

During recent years many proposals regarding possible trusteeship agreements have been given consideration publicly and privately. Dept feels certain HMG has constructive suggestions in this respect. Dept has given thought and study to this matter and stands ready informally to discuss draft agreements with HMG for purpose of developing most acceptable type of trusteeship agreement in light of present conditions.

Dept believes any discussion re trusteeship must of necessity take into consideration the following three types: (a) Single administering power; (b) Two or more administering powers; (c) UN as administering authority.

Dept does not consider first two as feasible under present circumstances because of political and military difficulties but believes that trusteeship with UN as administering authority would meet with greater approval in the UN and with greater success in Palestine. All types of trusteeship would in any event provide for governor general with broad powers acting within framework of trusteeship agreement under TC.

Trusteeship with UN as administering authority might provide that governor general could call on one or more powers, such as principal allied and associated powers of World War I, to furnish emergency forces under specific circumstances either in event local forces were not adequate for maintenance of internal law and order, or to maintain integrity of Palestine against external aggression.

Governmental administration would be detailed in trusteeship agreement to provide early working basis for independence.

Financial cost of such trusteeship, including security forces for maintenance of internal law and order would be borne by peoples of Palestine. Financial cost of security forces for maintenance of international law and order, should such be required, would be borne by members of the UN supplying them, or possibly pro rata among all members.

It would seem to Dept that informal discussions by HMG with responsible Brit leaders along lines of foregoing would dispel fears that the UN or any of its members were attempting to tie HMG up in new

---

<sup>3</sup> Not printed; it advised that the "Palestine Government foresees that Arabs may cut Jerusalem water supply which would be disastrous to Jewish quarter. . . . If and when electric power lines are similarly cut, Jerusalem sewage pumps will stop. Combination of both may make Jewish part city untenable for inhabitants in short time." (867N.01/3-2348)

agreement which would merely be a continuation of present Mandate.<sup>4</sup> Repeated to USUN as 167.

MARSHALL

<sup>4</sup> An Embassy officer discussed the substance of telegram 1067 with Mr. Beeley on March 27. The latter was reported to have said that the "new factor in Palestine situation to be evaluated was Arab and Jewish reaction to President's statement quoted Department's 1050 March 25 and President's replies to question at press conference. Beeley feels that Arabs 'who have shown themselves in principle ready to talk trusteeship' will interpret expression President's personal faith in partition and in immigration 100,000 as revelation 'true purpose' behind US trusteeship proposal and allege on strength President's remarks that US Government is maneuvering via trusteeship secure both partition and immediate immigration 100,000 Jews."

The officer "urged that neutral attitude HMG re constructive US proposals is making task US Government infinitely harder and asked Beeley to say frankly what would persuade HMG to emerge from its unhelpful passivity." Mr. Beeley replied that the British Cabinet "would not alter its attitude unless it were made 'absolutely clear . . . that US Government recognizes that any British participation in implementation US proposals would not take the form of provision of British forces.'" (Telegram 1248, March 27, 7 p. m., from London, 501.BB Palestine/3-2748)

Telegram 1050 was a repeat of 337 to Cairo, p. 759.

501.BB Palestine/3-2648: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State*

RESTRICTED

Moscow, March 26, 1948—6 p. m.

550. *Red Fleet* March 26 carried first Soviet comment on US trusteeship proposal for Palestine under heading American Maneuver in Palestine Question, stressing repudiation UN 1947 decision as "open violation USA international obligations". Article quotes chairman House Subcommittee on armed forces UN decision mistake as endangering American oil interests Middle East. American policy determined by fact Palestine transfer station oil Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Syria. New York *Post* quoted Forrestal conducts campaign against UN partition ruling as member American oil companies. Although UN decision taken with American consent, narrowly selfish aims American monopolists destroy own decisions.

SMITH

867N.01/3-2748

*Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)*

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] March 27, 1948.

On the morning of March 20 Sir John Balfour and Mr. Bromley of the British Embassy called on me in order to discuss the statement



made on the preceding day in the Security Council by Senator Austin on Palestine.

During the course of our conversation I stressed the importance of British and American cooperation in bringing about a cessation of fighting in Palestine and in working out a temporary trusteeship for Palestine which would facilitate the maintenance of law and order in that country until a permanent solution of the Palestine problem could be achieved by peaceful means. I referred to certain efforts which our respective governments had been making to cooperate in maintaining peace and stability in the Middle East; I said that the one area with regard to which we had not been following parallel policies was Palestine; and I pointed out that the time seemed to have come when the two Governments could cooperate to their mutual advantage and in the interests of world peace in disposing of the Palestine problem. I added that the British could not escape the repercussions of civil war in Palestine merely by pulling out their troops. Developments threatening to undermine the security of the Middle East could not be ignored by Great Britain any more than by the United States. In fact Great Britain stood to lose more than the United States in case the tranquility of the Middle East should be seriously disturbed. I realized that the British did not wish alone to continue to bear the main burden of maintaining law and order in Palestine. I could understand the desire of the British to terminate the mandate and withdraw their troops from Palestine as soon as possible. Nevertheless, the American Government hoped that the British Government would be willing to maintain British troops in Palestine for a short time beyond May 15 in case it should so transpire that an effective trusteeship regime could not be set up by that date.

Balfour and Bromley promised to submit the request at once to their Government by telegram. They said that they felt that the British Government, in any event, would not wish to indicate that it would be willing to retain British troops in Palestine beyond May 15. Such an indication would give rise to public resentment in Great Britain and might result in a relaxation of the efforts of members of the United Nations to bring about a speedy solution of the problem. I agreed that it might not be wise for Great Britain to indicate publicly at this time its willingness to retain troops beyond May 15. I said, however, that we would like to have some private assurances in that regard. I added that various offices in the Department had been working on draft trusteeship agreements and that within a few days I might be able informally to show the Embassy some of the results of this work.

On March 26 Sir John Balfour and Mr. Bromley came in to see me again and left with me the attached top secret message from the

Foreign Office<sup>1</sup> as well as the attached paraphrase of a telegram from the Foreign Office to Cadogan.<sup>2</sup>

During the course of the conversation I again emphasized how important it was in their own interest that the British should cooperate with us in the Palestine matter. I also handed to Balfour and Bromley copies of drafts which had been prepared in the Department of trusteeship agreements for Palestine. One of these drafts provided for the United Nations as administering authority and the other for the United States, Great Britain and France as the administering authority. I said that these drafts had been prepared at working levels; that they were still in an unfinished stage and would, of course, be subject to many alterations; that I had not had an opportunity myself to read them, and I doubted that any other director had read them. I said that I was handing them to the British Embassy, however, with the idea that it could send copies to the Foreign Office so that the working levels of the Foreign Office would understand the way in which the working levels of the Department of State were thinking. I stressed the fact that the documents in question should be treated as top secret.

Balfour said that he would send the drafts with the explanation which I had given him to the Foreign Office by courier leaving Washington on Sunday, March 28.<sup>3</sup>

L[OX] W. H[ENDERSON]

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> The paraphrase read: "The American appeal that we should support their new proposals on Palestine places us in a great difficulty. I sympathise with the motives which have led the United States Government to make this last minute effort to avert civil war in Palestine. But I feel that, for the time being at any rate, we must maintain our consistent line of abstention. The accusation has already been made, during last night's debate in the House of Commons on the Palestine bill, that the new American move was concerted with His Majesty's Government, and any support you gave to Austin in the Security Council would lend colour to this suspicion. For this reason I doubt whether our support would be helpful to the United States Government in dealing with their public opinion." The Foreign Office message was dated March 24.

<sup>3</sup> Mr. Ross, on April 12, transmitted telegraphically to Mr. Rusk the text of an *aide-memoire* dated April 9 left with him by Sir Alexander Cadogan. The message underscored the Foreign Office's doubts as to prospects for an agreement between the Arabs and the Jews on the basis of the trusteeship proposals handed by Mr. Henderson to Sir John Balfour on March 26.

The *aide-memoire* stated that there was little reason to suppose that the Arab and Jewish communities in Palestine would come to an understanding on a plan for self-government; that the trusteeship would prove to be an interim one in name only; that the provisions proposed for terminating the trusteeship would rule out any possibility of partitioning Palestine, a factor which might cause rejection of the proposed trusteeship by the Jews; that the Arabs would oppose the trusteeship agreements in that they postponed independence indefinitely and empowered the Jews to veto the constitution of an independent unitary state; and that the Arabs would object to the immigration and land transfer provisions in the trusteeship proposals. (Telegram 425 from New York, 501.BB Palestine/4-1248)

501.BB Palestine/3-2748: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, March 27, 1948—6 p. m.

170. For Austin from Lovett.

1. The President's statement on Palestine March 25 makes amply clear urgent necessity for United States to exert every effort in SC to have a truce arranged between Jews and Arabs of Palestine. It is essential that representatives of JA and AHC state in SC their views on a possible truce.

2. Such a truce should be based on two fundamental considerations:

(a) It is absolutely essential that the violence and bloodshed cease in order that international peace may not be gravely endangered, particularly after May 15.

(b) Both JA and AHC must be prepared to accept truce arrangements which would not prejudice claims of either group at future date when atmosphere may be more conducive to peaceful solution of problem.

3. Following draft resolution on truce is sent for your guidance. You are authorized, however, to use broad discretion in final drafting terms in order to secure maximum support of other delegations for President's proposal.

*"The Security Council, in the exercise of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,*

*Notes with grave concern the increasing violence and disorder in Palestine and believes that it is of the utmost urgency that an immediate truce be effected in Palestine;*

*Calls Upon the Jewish Agency for Palestine and the Arab Higher Committee to make available representatives to meet at once with the Security Council for the purpose of arranging a truce between the Arab and Jewish communities of Palestine;*

*Calls Upon Arab and Jewish armed groups in Palestine to cease acts of violence forthwith;<sup>1</sup> and finally,*

*Calls Upon all governments, peoples, and groups, within and outside of Palestine, to prevent by all lawful means, and not to commit any act or acts which would further aggravate the situation in Palestine."*

4. Resolution on truce should be submitted in SC Tuesday. In discussing its terms with other delegations you should also state US believes SC must also proceed rapidly with consideration of "Additional Conclusions and Recommendations Concerning Palestine" contained in your statement to SC afternoon of March 19. In particular we feel that it is essential for SC to request SYG to convoke special session of

<sup>1</sup> Acting Secretary Lovett, on March 29, instructed Ambassador Austin to end the text of the proposed resolution at this point (telegram 171 to New York, 501.BB Palestine/3-2748).

GA to consider further question of future government of Palestine. Accordingly you should also submit on Tuesday the following additional resolution:

*"THE SECURITY COUNCIL,*

*Having on December 9, 1947, received the Resolution of the General Assembly concerning Palestine dated November 29, 1947, and*

*Having taken note of the United Nations Palestine Commission's First and Second Monthly Progress Reports and First Special Report on the Problem of Security, and*

*Having on March 5, 1948, called on the permanent members of the Council to consult, and*

*Having taken note of the reports made concerning those consultations,*

*REQUESTS the Secretary-General, in accordance with Article 20 of the UN Charter, to convoke a Special Session of the General Assembly to consider further the question of the future Government of Palestine."*

5. Dept believes it more desirable not to mention trusteeship in resolution set forth in preceding paragraph. However, when introducing resolution in SC you should reiterate US position contained in your statement March 19, and reaffirmed in that of Secretary in Los Angeles March 20 and of President on March 25 that a temporary trusteeship should be established in order to maintain the peace and that it would be without prejudice to character of final political settlement. We believe a trusteeship is essential to establish conditions of order which are essential to a peaceful solution. We are not incorporating reference to trusteeship in our resolution at this time, however, as we believe SC may wish to discuss proposal further. Resolution on trusteeship can be introduced at later stage following further SC discussion.

6. Additional points regarding terms and type of trusteeship US would consider favorable will be forwarded to you as soon as possible.<sup>2</sup>

[Lovett.]

MARSHALL

<sup>2</sup> Marginal notation by Mr. Rusk: "Cleared with Clark Clifford 5:45 p. m. March 27."

867N.01/3-2748

*Proposed Letter From President Truman to British Prime Minister Attlee*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON, undated.]

MY DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: I am taking advantage of the departure of Ambassador Douglas for London to send you this personal

<sup>1</sup> Drafted March 27 by Messrs. McClintock and Wilkins and transmitted to Mr. Lovett by Mr. Henderson with his memorandum of March 29; marginal notation by Mr. Lovett: "Not approved".

letter expressing my deep concern over the trend of events in Palestine.

I am fully aware of the deep-seated popular feeling in the United Kingdom that the time has come for your Government to terminate its Mandate for Palestine and to withdraw the forces which thus far have maintained the integrity of the Mandate. I would not be candid if I did not tell you frankly that the rapidity of British withdrawal in the face of the uncertain future for Palestine very much complicates the task which lies before the United Nations if by May 15 of this year it is to establish some form of rule in Palestine which will maintain the peace, not only internally, but also with regard to the security of the Middle East.

You may have read the statement which I made on March 25 on the position of the United States Government with respect to the Palestine situation. In this statement, I stressed our belief based on recent consultations among the permanent members of the Security Council and with the Jews and the Arabs of Palestine that the plan for partition of Palestine recommended by the United Nations General Assembly on November 29, 1947 cannot be carried out at this time by peaceful means. I also emphasized that we cannot undertake to impose this solution on the people of Palestine by the use of force, since the Charter of the United Nations does not empower the Security Council or the General Assembly to enforce such political recommendations.

My statement concluded with the proposal that an immediate truce be observed by the two dissident communities in Palestine—the Arabs and Jews. At the same time, we proposed that the United Nations establish a temporary trusteeship for Palestine to provide a government to keep the peace.

It would seem to me that your Government would have a special interest in the arrangement of an immediate truce in Palestine since it is still the Mandatory Power. We are, therefore, counting upon the full support and cooperation of your Government in urging the Jews and Arabs of Palestine to agree to a cease-fire order by the Security Council and to a truce which shall be without prejudice to the eventual solution of the Palestine problem.

It is clear that without the full support of your Government it would be extremely difficult if not impossible to work out the terms of a trusteeship and to set up in Palestine in the near future a temporary trusteeship regime which could maintain law and order following the termination of the Mandate. Such a trusteeship, as I stated

on March 25, would not prejudice the character of the final political settlement.

There is a possibility that if the United Nations Trusteeship Council should accept responsibility to become the administering authority for Palestine and should appoint a governor with wide powers to maintain the integrity of that country, security forces might be required at the request of the Trusteeship Council or the governor to maintain international peace and security with respect to Palestine. The Government of the United States is prepared to join with the Governments of the remaining Allied and Associated Powers of World War I—in other words, the United Kingdom and France—to provide contingents to the Trusteeship Council and the Governor of Palestine, if such should be required under emergency conditions, for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security under the terms of the trusteeship agreement.

The Department of State has given considerable study to the details of a temporary trusteeship agreement which would incorporate some of the thoughts which I have expressed in this letter. I have no doubt, on the other hand, that your Government has been able to study this matter in greater detail in view of its long administrative experience in Palestine. It is, therefore, my hope that officials of the British Government will be prepared to cooperate with corresponding officials of the United States Government in the preparation of a draft trusteeship agreement. Such a draft agreement could subsequently be considered more formally by our two governments and perhaps by other interested governments prior to presentation to the United Nations. It is my understanding that measures for an interchange of views are under way. You may be assured that we are anxious to cooperate with you in this matter and we stand ready to supply such information as we may be in a position to contribute.

We feel that prompt action is imperative in view of the early date on which your Government plans to terminate the mandate for Palestine. In order to proceed under the trusteeship provisions of the Charter, it would appear necessary for the United Kingdom as Mandatory Power to present a draft Trusteeship Agreement to the United Nations at the earliest possible moment. Such action should be welcomed by the United Nations and should strengthen its handling of the Palestine question. We are convinced that peace in Palestine and a successful political settlement for Palestine will not be attained unless we approach this increasingly difficult question in a cooperative manner.

Sincerely yours,

Forrestal Papers

*Diary Entry for March 29, 1948, by the Secretary of Defense  
(Forrestal)*

*Conversation With the President and Under Secretary Lovett re  
Palestine Trusteeship*

Under Secretary Lovett called up this afternoon to say that the State Department anticipated that in connection with the United Nations debate on Palestine tomorrow and the United States proposal for a trusteeship under British-French-American Mandate, the question might be asked of Austin whether the United States was ready to bear its share of the police forces required to produce peace in Palestine under such an arrangement. I said that at the moment we did not have such forces available and that I did not see how we could escape making an effort to contribute.

I then talked to The President who said he did not want to make any firm commitment to send troops into Palestine, but I told him what Lovett's problem was and that he was simply trying to get something affirmative for Senator Austin to say in case he was cornered. The President then said that he felt that if we had to respond that we would participate in the implementation of the trusteeship mandate by the associated allied nations (UK, US and France) up to the limit of our ability. I then called Mr. Lovett and reported my conversation with The President and suggested to him that he write out the precise language which he proposed to have Senator Austin use and send it to the White House so there would be no possibility of a misunderstanding. He said that that was what he was in the process of doing.

---

501.BB Palestine/3-3048 : Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to  
the Secretary of State*

SECRET      US URGENT  
NIACT

NEW YORK, March 30, 1948—6:20 p. m.

349. Please transmit following niact from Austin for the Secretary at Bogotá.<sup>1</sup>

USUN today submitted two resolutions to SC, one calling for immediate cessation of hostilities and truce in Palestine and the other

---

<sup>1</sup> Secretary Marshall was, at this time, Chairman of the United States Delegation at the Ninth International Conference of American States, which met at Bogotá from March 30 to May 2, 1948.

for convocation of special session of GA to consider problem of future government in that country.<sup>2</sup>

Argentine delegation has been under consistent instructions from its government to refrain on all motions concerning Palestine. However, Ambassador Arce<sup>3</sup> is tonight telephoning his Foreign Minister in Bogotá to request permission to vote affirmatively on both our resolutions. Arce is strongly in favor on humanitarian grounds of the US resolution proposing a truce and feels that our suggestion for a special session is only means of making progress at this juncture on Palestine problem.

You may accordingly feel that it would be opportune to suggest to Argentine Foreign Minister our view that calling of special session is indeed worthy of support of all members of SC.

While every indication is that Colombian representative will vote affirmatively on both motions, it might be useful if suitable representations were made to Colombian Foreign Office in order that this vote may be assured when Council meets on Thursday, April 1, at 2:30 p. m.<sup>4</sup>

AUSTIN

<sup>2</sup> For the text of Ambassador Austin's statement, see SC, 3rd yr., Nos. 36-51, p. 246.

<sup>3</sup> José Arce, Argentine Representative at the United Nations.

<sup>4</sup> Secretary Marshall replied, on March 31, that the Argentine Foreign Minister had authorized Dr. Arce to support the United States position and that the Colombian Foreign Office had advised of the standing instructions to its representative to support the United States position (unnumbered telegram from Bogotá, 501.BB Palestine/3-3148).

501.BB Palestine/3-3148: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom*

SECRET US URGENT

WASHINGTON, March 31, 1948—11 a. m.

NIACT

1099. USDel understands that UKDel intends vote for truce resolution in UNSC but to abstain on resolution calling for special session GAUN on Palestine.<sup>1</sup>

Dept feels that UK would in no way be receding from its present neutral position by voting for resolution calling for special session as

<sup>1</sup> Mr. McClintock informed Mr. Rusk on March 30 that as of that afternoon seven named members of the Security Council were in favor of the United States truce resolution but that only six supported the resolution to convoke a special session. He conveyed the recommendation of the United States Mission at the United Nations that immediate representations be made at London and Paris to swing British and French votes to the affirmative on the latter resolution. (Telegram 350 from New York, 501.BB Palestine/3-3048)



the resolution is so worded as not to commit the GA to any particular plan (i.e. Trusteeship or any other plan).

In view of irresponsible Soviet attack on our position<sup>2</sup> (USSR offering no constructive proposals) Dept feels it most desirable to get the maximum number of votes possible and you should strongly urge that instructions be sent to UKDel to support US resolution calling for special session.<sup>3</sup>

LOVETT

<sup>2</sup> For the text of Ambassador Gromyko's remarks before the Security Council on March 30, see SC, *3rd yr., Nos. 36-51*, p. 248; he asserted that the decision to partition Palestine into independent Jewish and Arab States had been a just one and he denounced Ambassador Austin's arguments as preparing the ground to bury the partition plan and justifying the new United States proposals.

<sup>3</sup> A telegram similar to No. 1099 was sent to Paris on March 31 to secure French support for the calling of a special session (1023, 501.BB Palestine/3-3148).

#### *Editorial Note*

Mr. Shertok, on April 1, addressed the Security Council on the two United States draft resolutions. The truce resolution, he said, was a wrong starting point in the quest for peace in Palestine, for it omitted "all reference to the central and salient feature of the country's disturbed condition, namely the presence of Arab aggression from outside, sponsored and organized by Arab States, members of the United Nations, in an effort to alter by force the settlement envisaged by the General Assembly's resolution of 29 November 1947. . . . It is the presence of these foreign Arab forces on the soil of Palestine and the preparation for further incursions which constitute the main threat to law and order in Palestine today. But for these invasions from neighboring States, the situation in Palestine would hardly have raised a problem which could not be quickly resolved." He expressed astonishment, therefore, that the United States saw "the problem of violence in Palestine in terms of a conflict between the 'Arab and Jewish communities of Palestine.'"

He then raised various questions: "Is it legitimate for Member States to use force against a settlement adopted by the General Assembly?"; "Is it proper for the Security Council, having received conclusive evidence of aggression actually committed, to take no steps at all to suppress, nay, not even to condemn—nor even to record—that aggression?"; and "Is it a just interpretation of the Security Council's function in this question that it should obey the demand of the aggressor at pistol-point, and advocate a revision of a General Assembly resolution for no other reason than that resolution is assailed by armed force?"

Mr. Shertok concluded this phase of his statement by indicating that a truce would be most welcome, but must be accompanied by the

evacuation of foreign forces and the prevention of further incursions of armed bands into Palestine. He assumed further that "any arrangement for a truce will be carried out within the framework of the implementation of the resolution of the General Assembly and in strict conformity with time-table provided in that resolution."

Turning then to the second United States draft resolution, Mr. Shertok stated that although silent on the point, the resolution proposed a special session, which would establish a temporary trusteeship. He denounced the forcing of "trusteeship upon a country ripe for independence, without any assurance that a trustee is available, that means of enforcement can be supplied, that any section of the population will cooperate, that the General Assembly will approve an agreement, or that a working regime can be established by 15 May. The charted course of the implementation of partition is to be replaced by a leap into the perilous unknown." The Jews, he asserted, would refuse to accept postponement of independence (SC, 3rd yr., No. 52, pages 5-23).

The Egyptian Representative at the United Nations, Mahmoud Fawzi, in reply, emphatically denied participation by the Arab States in the conflict in Palestine. Then, commenting on the first United States draft resolution, he stated that "If, contrary to our belief, the truce were to be interpreted and applied to mean the use of armed force to keep the peace during the partition of Palestine, then each and every Arab is opposed to it. On the other hand, if it is order that is meant, then indeed the Arabs are all for it." (*ibid.*, pages 23-26)

The Security Council voted on the two draft resolutions on April 1. After United States agreement to delete the words "with grave concern", the Council unanimously adopted the first draft resolution. It then adopted the second draft resolution by 9 votes in favor, with the Soviet and Ukrainian representatives abstaining<sup>1</sup> (*ibid.*, pages 34, 35).

With regard to carrying out the latter resolution, Ambassador Austin stated that the United States had not yet formulated its views in finished form and he therefore invited his colleagues in the Security Council to meet with him informally on April 5 (*ibid.*, pages 37, 41).

---

<sup>1</sup> The provisions of the resolutions, which are numbered 43 (1948) and 44 (1948), respectively, are summarized in the circular telegram of April 6, p. 800. Their texts are printed in United Nations, *Official Records of the Security Council, Third Year, Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council, 1948* (hereinafter cited as SC, 3rd yr., *Resolutions, 1948*), pp. 14, 15.

With regard to proposals for a temporary trusteeship over Palestine, Ambassador Austin stated that the United States had not yet formulated its views in finished form and he invited his colleagues on the Security Council to meet with him informally on April 5 for discussion of such proposals (SC, 3rd yr., No. 52, pp. 37, 41).

501.BB Palestine/4-848

*Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] April 2, 1948.

## DRAFT TRUSTEESHIP AGREEMENT FOR PALESTINE WITH THE UNITED NATIONS AS THE ADMINISTERING AUTHORITY

## PREAMBLE

WHEREAS the territory known as Palestine has been administered by His Britannic Majesty under a mandate confirmed by the Council of the League of Nations; and

WHEREAS Article 75 of the Charter of the United Nations, signed at San Francisco on 26 June 1945, provides for the establishment of an international trusteeship system for the administration and supervision of such territories as may be placed thereunder by subsequent individual agreements; and

WHEREAS under Article 77 of the said Charter the international trusteeship system may be applied to territories now held under Mandate; and

WHEREAS His Majesty accordingly has indicated his desire to place Palestine under the said international trusteeship system; and

WHEREAS the General Assembly has recommended that Palestine be provisionally administered under trusteeship, without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned or to the character of the eventual political settlement; and

WHEREAS in accordance with Articles 75 and 77 of the said Charter, the placing of a territory under the international trusteeship system is to be effected by means of a Trusteeship Agreement;

NOW THEREFORE the General Assembly of the United Nations hereby resolves to approve the following terms of trusteeship for Palestine.

## Article 1

## ESTABLISHMENT OF TRUSTEESHIP

The territory of Palestine, delimited on the east by Transjordan, on the north by the Republics of Syria and Lebanon, on the west by the Mediterranean and on the south by the Sinai Province of Egypt is hereby placed under the trusteeship system established in the Charter of the United Nations.

<sup>1</sup> Copies transmitted under instructions to officers in charge of missions at London, Paris, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jerusalem, and Jidda on April 8 with the directive that they were "to be held without communication to anyone other than selected members of your office pending further telegraphic instruction from the Department."

## Article 2

## THE ADMINISTERING AUTHORITY

The United Nations, acting through the Trusteeship Council, is hereby designated as the Administering Authority for Palestine.

## Article 3

## POWERS OF THE ADMINISTERING AUTHORITY

Subject to the terms of this Agreement, the Administering Authority shall have full powers of administration, legislation, and jurisdiction over Palestine which shall be exercised through the agency of the Government of Palestine as hereinafter provided.

## Article 4

## GENERAL OBJECTIVES

1. The Administering Authority undertakes to administer Palestine in such a manner as to achieve the basic objectives of the international trusteeship system laid down in Article 76 of the Charter of the United Nations.

2. The administration will be conducted in such a manner as to encourage the maximum cooperation between the Jews and Arabs in Palestine leading to a form of self-government which will be acceptable to both communities.

## Article 5

## TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY

1. The territorial integrity of Palestine and its status as defined in this Agreement shall be assured by the United Nations.

2. The Governor-General shall inform the Trusteeship Council of any situation relating to Palestine the continuance of which is likely to endanger the territorial integrity of Palestine, or of any threat of aggression or act of aggression against Palestine, or of any other attempt to alter by force the status of Palestine as defined in this Agreement. If the Trusteeship Council is not in session and the Governor-General considers that any of the foregoing contingencies is of such urgency as to require immediate action by the United Nations, he shall bring the matter, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the immediate attention of the Security Council.

## Article 6

## PRESERVATION OF ORDER

The Governor-General shall be responsible for the organization and direction of the police forces necessary for the maintenance of internal

law and order and for the protection throughout Palestine of the Holy Places, religious building, and sites.

### Article 7

#### LOCAL DEFENSE AND THE MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER

1. The Governor-General shall, in accordance with Article 84 of the Charter, organize a volunteer force to provide for local defense and for the maintenance of law and order within Palestine.

2. Until such time as the force provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be able to function effectively, or if subsequent to such time a situation arises with respect to which the force requires assistance, the Governor-General shall call upon the Governments of \_\_\_\_\_ to assist in the defense of Palestine or in the maintenance of law and order within Palestine.

### Article 8

#### CITIZENSHIP

Without prejudice to the provisions of legislation which may subsequently be enacted in Palestine, the following categories of persons shall be regarded as citizens of Palestine:

(1) Persons resident in Palestine on July 1, 1947, who were not on that date nationals of any state outside of Palestine;

(2) Persons resident in Palestine on July 1, 1947, who were nationals on that date of a state outside of Palestine, if they have filed with the Government of Palestine at any time before November 1, 1948 a declaration, in such form as may be provided by the Government of Palestine, that they renounce their former nationality in favor of Palestinian citizenship;

(3) Persons who have resided in Palestine for three months and who, while continuing to be residents of Palestine, file with the Government of Palestine a declaration that they renounce the nationality of any state outside of Palestine of which they may be nationals, and take an oath of allegiance to the Government of Palestine;

(4) Children of Palestinian citizens, wherever born [provided such children have not at birth or subsequently acquired the nationality of a state outside of Palestine<sup>2</sup>].

### Article 9

#### FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS

1. All persons in Palestine shall enjoy freedom of conscience and shall, subject only to the requirements of public order, public morals and public health, enjoy all other fundamental human rights and free-

<sup>2</sup> Bracketed portion as in the source text.

doms, including freedom of religion and worship, language, education, speech and press, assembly and association, and petition, including petition to the Trusteeship Council.

2. No discrimination of any kind on grounds of race, religion, language or sex shall be made against any person in Palestine.

3. All persons in Palestine shall be entitled to equal protection of the laws.

4. No person within Palestine may be arrested, detained, convicted, or punished except according to due process of law.

5. No person or property within Palestine shall be subject to search or seizure except according to due process of law.

6. The legislation of Palestine shall ensure that accused persons shall have adequate rights of defense.

7. The legislation of Palestine shall neither place nor recognize any restriction upon the free use by any person of any language in private intercourse, in religious matters, in commerce, in the press or in publications of any kind, or at public meetings.

8. Except as may be required for the maintenance of public order, good government and public health, no measure shall be taken to obstruct or interfere with the enterprise of religious or charitable bodies of all faiths. No measure shall be taken which discriminates on grounds of religion or nationality against any representative or member of such bodies.

9. The family law and personal status of the various persons and communities and their religious interests, including endowments, shall be respected.

#### Article 10

##### ORGANS OF GOVERNMENT

1. During the trusteeship period, the Government of Palestine shall be composed of a Governor-General, a Cabinet responsible to the Legislature, a bicameral legislature, and a judiciary: Provided that, pending the coming into being of the Cabinet and Legislature and during such times as they may be dissolved or suspended, as provided in this Agreement, the Governor-General shall be assisted by an Advisory Council, which shall function until such time as in the opinion of the Governor-General the citizens of Palestine demonstrate their willingness to cooperate in a Cabinet and Legislature as provided in this Agreement or in any other form of government on which both Jewish and Arab communities have reached agreement.

2. The Advisory Council referred to above shall be composed of the permanent chiefs of the administrative departments of the Government and of representative Palestinian citizens appointed by the Governor-General from each community.

## Article 11

## SELECTION AND RESPONSIBILITY OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL

The Governor-General of Palestine shall be appointed by the Trusteeship Council and shall be responsible to it.

## Article 12

## TERM OF OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL

1. The term of office of the Governor-General shall be three years from the time of his appointment, provided that

(a) the Trusteeship Council may extend the term of office of the Governor-General in any particular case for such period as it may think fit;

(b) the Governor-General may resign his office upon due notice to the Trusteeship Council, and the Trusteeship Council may terminate his appointment for due cause at any time.

2. At the expiration of his term of office or extended term the Governor-General shall be eligible for reappointment.

## Article 13

## GENERAL POWERS OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL

1. The Governor-General shall be the representative of the United Nations in Palestine.

2. The Governor-General, on behalf of the United Nations, shall exercise executive authority in Palestine and shall act as Chief Administrator thereof, subject only to the provisions of this Agreement and Instructions of the Trusteeship Council. He shall be responsible for ensuring the peace, order and good government of Palestine.

3. The Governor-General and his official and private property shall not in any way be subject to the jurisdiction of the Legislature or of the courts of Palestine.

## Article 14

## POWER OF PARDON AND REPRIEVE

The Governor-General may grant to any offender convicted of any offence in any court of Palestine a pardon, either free or conditioned, or any remission of the sentence passed on such offender, or any respite of the execution of such sentence, for such period as the Governor-General thinks fit, and may remit fines, penalties or forfeitures which may accrue or become payable to Palestine by virtue of the judgment of any court of Palestine or of the operation of any legislation of Palestine.

## Article 15

## GOVERNOR-GENERAL'S EMERGENCY POWERS

1. If, in the opinion of the Governor-General, the administration of Palestine is being seriously obstructed or prevented by the non-cooperation or interference of persons or groups of persons in Palestine, the Governor-General during the period of the emergency shall take such measures and enact by order such legislation as he may deem necessary to restore the effective functioning of the administration, and such orders shall have effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any legislation in force in Palestine.

2. The circumstances in which the Governor-General may have exercised any power conferred upon him by this Article shall be reported to the Trusteeship Council as soon as may be practicable.

## Article 16

## ORGANIZATION OF THE ADMINISTRATION

1. The Governor-General, after consultation with the Trusteeship Council, shall appoint a Chief Secretary to assist him in his duties. He shall be neither a citizen nor a resident of Palestine.

2. The Governor-General shall appoint an administrative staff, including an Attorney General, the members of which shall be selected on a non-discriminatory basis for their competence and integrity and, whenever practicable, from the residents of Palestine. Subject to any Instructions of the Trusteeship Council and to any legislation of Palestine, the appointments of members of the administrative staff may be terminated by the Governor-General at any time.

3. In the performance of their duties, the administrative staff shall not seek or receive any instructions from any government or authority other than the Government of Palestine.

## Article 17

## ACTING GOVERNOR-GENERAL

If the office of Governor-General is vacant, or if the Governor-General is absent from Palestine or otherwise unable to exercise his powers or perform his duties, the officer holding substantively the appointment of Chief Secretary, or, if there is no such officer or he is absent from Palestine or unable to act, such person as may have been authorized to act in the circumstances by the Trusteeship Council, may exercise all the powers and perform all the duties of the Governor-General so long as the office of Governor-General is vacant or the Governor-General is absent from Palestine or otherwise unable to exercise his powers or perform his duties.



## Article 18

## DISQUALIFICATION FROM PUBLIC OFFICE

A person shall be disqualified from holding any public office, central or local, in Palestine, including membership of the Advisory Council and of the Legislature, if he holds any office under any other State: Provided that the Governor-General may appoint to any public office in Palestine for a limited period any person seconded from the service of another State.

## Article 19

## THE CABINET

1. The Cabinet shall be composed of Ministers selected by a Prime Minister, all of whom shall be appointed by the Governor-General. Each Minister shall, during his term of office, serve as head of one of the administrative departments. Under him shall be a permanent chief of the administrative department and permanent administrative staff appointed by the Governor-General.

2. The Cabinet shall be individually and collectively responsible to both chambers of the Legislature.

3. Upon a vote of no-confidence by either chamber of the Legislature, the Cabinet shall tender its resignation to the Governor-General who may then call upon responsible leaders in the Legislature to form a new Cabinet or may dissolve the Legislature and cause a general election to be held. The Cabinet shall also tender its resignation upon suspension or dissolution of the Legislature in accordance with the Agreement.

## Article 20

## LEGISLATURE

1. The Legislature shall consist of two chambers.

2. The House of Representatives shall be composed of Palestinian citizens 25 years of age or older elected from single-member districts, each of which districts shall be a geographical unit with a population approximately equal in number to that of every other electoral district.

3. The Senate shall be composed of 30 Palestinian citizens 25 years of age or older elected in equal numbers by the registered members of the Arab and Jewish communities in Palestine. The Arab representation shall consist of Moslems and Christians in proportion to their numbers in the Arab population. [This paragraph requires further consideration.<sup>3</sup>]

4. Legislative provision may be made as to disqualification for election to or membership in either chamber of the Legislature resulting from loss of legal capacity.

<sup>3</sup> Bracketed portion as in the source text.

5. Remuneration of members of both chambers of the Legislature shall be determined by legislation.

### Article 21

#### ELECTIONS TO THE LEGISLATURE

1. The members of both chambers of the Legislature shall be elected by the citizens of Palestine 21 years of age and over, on the basis of universal suffrage and by secret ballot.

2. Legislative provision may be made as to disqualification from voting resulting from loss of legal capacity.

### Article 22

#### DURATION OF THE LEGISLATURE

1. The term of both chambers of the Legislature shall be three years from the date of its election unless earlier dissolved.

2. If, at the end of a three-year term of the Legislature, it is the opinion of the Governor-General that circumstances are inappropriate for the conduct of a general election, the Governor-General may temporarily prolong the term of the Legislature then in existence.

3. If, in the opinion of the Governor-General, the special objectives of this Agreement are being gravely imperilled by the conduct of either or both Houses of the Legislature, the Governor-General may temporarily suspend the Legislature as a whole and shall forthwith report the circumstances to the Trusteeship Council for instructions. The Trusteeship Council shall either instruct the Governor-General to revoke forthwith his order for the suspension of the Legislature, or maintain the suspension of the Legislature for such period as it may deem fit.

4. The Governor-General may at any time dissolve the Legislature. In the event of a dissolution, new elections shall be held as soon as circumstances are, in the opinion of the Governor-General, appropriate.

### Article 23

#### LEGISLATION AND RESOLUTIONS

1. Bills and resolutions may be introduced in the Legislature by any member thereof.

2. The Governor-General, or a member of his staff designated by him, may make statements or answer questions before the Legislature or may introduce any bill or resolution and may participate without vote in the deliberations of the Legislature on the bill or resolution so introduced.

3. A bill adopted by the Legislature shall become law only upon approval and promulgation by the Governor-General except that on

the expiration of thirty days after the transmission of a bill to the Governor-General, if he has by that time neither approved nor disapproved it, he shall promulgate it as a law. The Governor-General may disapprove a bill, if, in his opinion, it is in conflict with the provisions of this Agreement, or it would impede the administration of Palestine or inflict undue hardship on any section of the inhabitants, and he shall then inform the Legislature of the reasons for his disapproval.

#### Article 24

##### LEGISLATION BY ORDER OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL

1. At any time when there is no Legislature for Palestine or the Legislature is suspended, the Governor-General may legislate by order and any such order shall become law.

2. If the Governor-General shall consider that it is essential to the normal functioning of the administration (which expression shall, without prejudice to its generality, include the obligations imposed by this Agreement and all matters pertaining to the creation or abolition of any public office or to the appointment, salary or other conditions of service of any public officer) that any bill or resolution introduced in the Legislature should have effect, and if the Legislature fail to adopt such a bill or resolution within such time and in such form as the Governor-General may think reasonable and expedient, the Governor-General may, at any time in his discretion, notwithstanding any other procedures for legislation set out in this Agreement or in the Standing Orders of the Legislature, declare that such bill or resolution shall have effect as if it had been adopted by the Legislature, either in the form in which it was so introduced or with such amendments as the Governor-General shall think fit which have been proposed in the Legislature. The said bill shall thereupon become law or the said resolution shall have effect.

3. The Governor-General shall forthwith report to the Trusteeship Council any action taken by him by virtue of this Article.

#### Article 25

##### STANDING ORDERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND THE SENATE

1. Each chamber of the Legislature shall adopt such Standing Orders for the conduct of its business as it may deem appropriate, provided that the Trusteeship Council shall have the authority to revoke any such Order.

2. Each chamber shall elect a chairman from its own membership: Provided that if a chamber fails to elect a chairman within a period

prescribed by the Governor-General, the Governor-General shall appoint the chairman.

3. The Governor-General shall convene the first session of each Legislature and may at any time convene an extraordinary session.

4. Subject to the provisions of Article 22 of this Agreement, subsequent sessions of the Legislature shall be convened annually on the first Monday of October.

5. The Governor-General may at any time prorogue or adjourn the Legislature.

6. Subject to the provisions of Article 22 of this Agreement, the Governor-General shall convene an extraordinary session of the Legislature upon the request of not less than a simple majority of the members of either chamber.

### Article 26

#### IMMUNITY OF MEMBERS OF THE LEGISLATURE

1. No member of the Legislature shall be liable to any judicial or administrative penalty, or be called to account in any other way outside the Legislature, by reason of anything which he may have uttered, or of any vote which he may have cast, in the course of his duties as a member of the Legislature.

2. No member of the Legislature shall be liable during the sessions of the Legislature to criminal, administrative or disciplinary proceedings, nor shall he be deprived of his liberty, without a two-thirds vote of the chamber of which he is a member: Provided that he may be apprehended in the act of committing a crime and detained if his detention is or becomes imperative in the interests of justice or in order to counteract the effects of such crime, but in any such case his apprehension shall be reported as soon as may be practicable to the Legislature and he shall be released without delay should the chamber of which he is a member so request.

### Article 27

#### JUDICIAL SYSTEM

1. There shall be established by legislation an independent judicial system for Palestine, including a Supreme Court and such subordinate and other courts as may be deemed appropriate. Such legislation shall establish the jurisdiction of the courts, and provide for their organization.

2. All persons within Palestine shall be subject to the jurisdiction of Palestine, subject to any immunity for which provision is made in this Agreement.

3. The Supreme Court shall consist of such number of Judges, not being less than three or more than five as the Trusteeship Council

may determine, of whom one shall be President of the Supreme Court and shall be designated Chief Justice. They shall be appointed by, and their appointments shall be terminated only by, the Trusteeship Council.

4. Judicial personnel other than the Chief Justice and the Judges of the Supreme Court shall be appointed and may be suspended or dismissed by the Chief Justice with the approval of the Governor-General, in accordance with any procedure for which provision may be made in the Instructions of the Trusteeship Council.

5. The existing status and jurisdiction of religious courts in Palestine shall be respected. In the case of any conflict regarding jurisdiction between religious courts or between religious courts and civil courts, the Supreme Court shall be competent to decide in which court the jurisdiction shall lie.

6. Decisions by the Supreme Court shall be by a majority of its members: Provided that, if in any case the opinion of the Court be equally divided, the opinion of the Chief Justice shall prevail.

#### Article 28

##### CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LEGISLATION AND OFFICIAL ACTION

1. In cases brought before the Courts of Palestine this Agreement shall prevail over any legislation or official action. The Supreme Court shall have original and appellate jurisdiction in all cases involving claims that such legislation or action is incompatible with the provisions of this Agreement.

2. In any case in which the Supreme Court decides that any legislation or official action is incompatible with the provisions of this Agreement, such legislation or official action shall be void and of no effect.

#### Article 29

##### IMMIGRATION

1. During the first two years of trusteeship, the immigration of Jewish displaced persons shall be permitted into Palestine. The selection and administration of the immigration of Jewish displaced persons to Palestine shall be conducted by the IRO, subject to the conditions of this Trusteeship Agreement and any regulations established thereunder by the Governor-General.

2. Thereafter, further immigration shall be without distinction between individuals as to religion or blood and shall be in accordance with the absorptive capacity of Palestine, as determined annually by the Governor-General: Provided that not more than \_\_\_\_\_ persons shall be permitted to enter Palestine to establish permanent residence in any one year.

## Article 30

## ACCESS TO PALESTINE

Subject only to the requirements of public order and security, and of public morals and public health, freedom of entry into and of temporary residence in Palestine shall be ensured to all foreign pilgrims and visitors without any distinction as to nationality or faith.

## Article 31

## LAND POLICY

1. The Governor-General shall establish and maintain a land system appropriate to the needs of Palestine, in which there shall be no limitation on the sale, purchase, lease or use of land which discriminates on grounds of race, nationality, community or creed. However, under the authority of the Governor-General, adequate measures shall be taken to assure protection for the interests of small owners or tenants in cases of transfer of arable or grazing lands.

2. The Governor-General shall appoint a commission of impartial experts, who shall be neither Arab nor Jew, to recommend the criteria upon which the land system described in paragraph 1 shall be based.

## Article 32

EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM AND CULTURAL AND  
BENEVOLENT INSTITUTIONS

1. Education in Palestine shall be directed to the full physical, intellectual, moral and spiritual development of the human personality, to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and to the combating of the spirit of intolerance and hatred against other nations or racial or religious groups.

2. There shall be maintained in Palestine an adequate system of primary and secondary education on an equitable basis for the Arab community and for the Jewish community in their respective languages and in accordance with their respective cultural traditions.

3. Subject to such educational requirements of a general nature as the legislation of Palestine may impose, the right of any community or of any specific group within any community, to maintain its own institutions for the education of its own members in its own language shall not be denied or impaired.

4. Foreign education establishments shall be permitted in accordance with the legislation of Palestine: Provided that existing rights shall continue unimpaired.

5. Educational and cultural establishments, charitable institutions and hospitals shall not be liable to any form of taxation from which they were exempt on the day preceding the termination of the Mandate.

## Article 33

## FINANCE AND BUDGET

1. The legislation of Palestine shall govern, in accordance with principles laid down in this Agreement, the fiscal and credit policies of Palestine, including the operation of a system of currency, the establishment of a central bank, the conduct of international financial operations, the raising of funds through loans or taxation, the disbursement of such funds, and similar financial operations, the execution of which is not otherwise provided for in this Agreement.

2. The Governor-General shall be responsible for the preparation of the annual and supplementary budgets of Palestine, and only the Governor-General, or a member of his staff designated by him, shall introduce bills pertaining to budgets in the Legislature.

3. The expenses of government under this Agreement, except those incurred under paragraph 2, Article 7, and the salaries and emoluments of the Governor-General, Chief Secretary, and the Judges of the Supreme Court, shall be defrayed from the revenues of Palestine, provided that such funds as are deemed by the Governor-General and the Trusteeship Council essential to accomplish the provisions of this Agreement and which cannot be raised by the Government of Palestine, shall be provided by the United Nations, either through subsidies or through loans repayable from future revenues of Palestine. The salaries and emoluments of the aforementioned officials shall be borne by the United Nations.

4. Any subsidies or loans made by the United Nations under paragraph 3 of this Article shall be shared by the United Nations as a whole in the proportions according to which Members of the United Nations contribute to the budget of the United Nations at the time such subsidies or loans may be granted.

## Article 34

## LOCAL GOVERNMENT

1. Existing local autonomous units and such new local autonomous units as may be created in Palestine shall enjoy wide powers of local government and administration in accordance with the legislation of Palestine.

2. The Governor-General shall be responsible for the organization of local government in Palestine in such a manner as to encourage the maximum cooperation between all elements of the local citizenry.

## Article 35

## EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

1. Subject to the provisions of this Agreement, and to any Instructions of the Trusteeship Council, the Governor-General shall conduct the external affairs of Palestine.

2. The Trusteeship Council, and the Governor-General to the extent that he is given general or special authority so to do by the Trusteeship Council, shall make arrangements by means of special international agreements or otherwise for the protection abroad of the interests of Palestine and of its citizens.

3. The Governor-General, on behalf of Palestine, may sign treaties which are consistent with this Agreement.

4. The Governor-General shall adhere on behalf of Palestine to the provisions of any international conventions and recommendations drawn up by the United Nations or by the specialized agencies referred to in Article 57 of the Charter of the United Nations which may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of Palestine.

5. Such international undertakings entered into by the Governor-General shall be subject to approval by the Trusteeship Council, unless the Trusteeship Council should decide otherwise in any particular case or class of cases. The Governor-General shall inform the Legislature when it is in session concerning such international undertakings.

6. To the extent that they may be applicable to it, Palestine shall be bound by all international undertakings, both general and special, to which it has become a party. Subject to any right of denunciation provided for therein, such international undertakings shall be respected by Palestine throughout the period for which they were concluded.

7. Foreign powers shall enjoy immunities in respect of their property within Palestine no less than those in force on the day preceding the termination of the Mandate.

#### Article 36

##### HOLY PLACES, RELIGIOUS BUILDINGS AND SITES WITHIN THE CITY

1. The protection of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites within Palestine shall be assured by the United Nations and shall be the special concern of the Governor-General.

2. If any question arises as to whether any place, building or site not hitherto regarded as a Holy Place, religious building or site shall be a Holy Place, religious building or site for the purposes of this Agreement, the Governor-General shall decide. For the purpose of deciding any such question, the Governor-General may appoint a Committee of Enquiry to assist him.

3. If any dispute arises between any religious communities or within any religious community in connection with any Holy Place, religious building or site, the Governor-General shall decide on the basis of existing rights. For the purpose of deciding any such dispute the Governor-General may appoint a Committee of Enquiry to assist him. He may also, if he shall think fit, be assisted by a consultative council



of representatives of different denominations acting in an advisory capacity.

4. A decision of the Governor-General under paragraphs 2 or 3 of this Article shall not be called in question in any court. No court shall have jurisdiction to determine any such question as is mentioned in the said paragraphs, and, if any such question shall arise in any proceeding in any court, the court shall refer the same to the Governor-General for decision.

5. If at any time it appears to the Governor-General that any Holy Place, religious building or site is in need of urgent repair, he may call upon the community or denomination or section of the community concerned to carry out such repair. If the repair is not carried out, or is not completed within a reasonable time, the Governor-General may himself carry out or complete the repair and his expenses of so doing shall be a charge on the revenues of Palestine but may be recovered from the community or denomination or section of the community concerned, subject to existing rights.

6. No form of taxation shall be levied in respect of any Holy Place, religious building or site which was exempt from taxation of that form on the day preceding the termination of the Mandate. No change in the incidence of any form of taxation shall be made which would either discriminate between the owners or occupiers of Holy Places, religious buildings and sites or would place such owners or occupiers in a position less favorable in relation to the general incidence of that form of taxation than existed on the day preceding the termination of the Mandate.

7. The Governor-General shall ensure by order that :

(a) decisions of the Governor-General under paragraphs 2 and 3 of this article are carried into effect and provision is made for the method of recovery of sums recoverable by virtue of paragraph 5 of this article;

(b) existing rights in respect of Holy Places, religious buildings and sites are not denied or impaired;

(c) subject always to the requirements of public order, decorum and public health, free access to the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites and free exercise of worship therein are secured in conformity with existing rights, and that, for this purpose, freedom of transit through Palestine shall be ensured to all foreign pilgrims and visitors without any distinction as to nationality;

(d) the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites are preserved;

(e) no act is committed which may in any way impair the sacred character of the Holy Places, religious buildings or sites; and

(f) generally that the provisions of this Article are carried into effect.

8. An order under paragraph 7 of this Article may contain penal provisions.

9. An order under paragraph 7 of this Article shall have effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any legislation enacted in Palestine.

10. The Governor-General shall transmit a copy of every order made under paragraph 7 of this article to the Trusteeship Council as soon as practicable and the Trusteeship Council may give such Instructions to the Governor-General in relation thereto as it may think fit.

### Article 37

#### PROTECTION OF ANTIQUITIES

The legislation of Palestine shall provide for the protection of the antiquities of Palestine.

### Article 38

#### EQUAL TREATMENT

1. In accordance with the provisions of Article 76 of the Charter of the United Nations and subject to the provisions of Article 39 of this Agreement, the Trusteeship Council, acting through the Governor-General, shall take all necessary steps to ensure equal treatment in social, economic, industrial and commercial matters for all Members of the United Nations and their nationals and to this end:

(a) shall ensure the same rights to all nationals of Members of the United Nations in respect of entry into and residence in Palestine, freedom of transit and navigation, including freedom of transit and navigation by air, acquisition of property both movable and immovable, the protection of person and property, and the exercise of professions and trades;

(b) shall not discriminate on grounds of nationality against nationals of any Member of the United Nations in matters relating to the grant of concessions for the development of the natural resources of Palestine, and shall not grant concessions having the character of a general monopoly;

(c) shall ensure equal treatment in the administration of justice to the nationals of all Members of the United Nations.

2. The rights conferred by this Article on nationals of Members of the United Nations apply equally to companies and associations controlled by such nationals and organized in accordance with the law of any Member of the United Nations.

### Article 39

#### PUBLIC SERVICES AND MONOPOLIES

Measures taken to give effect to Article 38 of this Agreement shall be subject always to the over-riding duty of the Administering Au-

thority in accordance with Article 76 of the United Nations Charter to promote the political, economic, social and educational advancement of the inhabitants of Palestine, to carry out the other basic objectives of the international trusteeship system, and to maintain peace, order and good government. The Trusteeship Council, acting through the Governor-General, shall in particular be free:

(a) to organize essential public services and works on such terms and conditions as are considered just;

(b) to create monopolies of a purely fiscal character in order to provide Palestine with the fiscal resources which seem best suited to local requirements, or otherwise to serve the interests of the inhabitants of Palestine;

(c) where the interests of the economic advancement of the inhabitants of Palestine may require it, to establish or permit to be established, for specific purposes, other monopolies or undertakings having in them an element of monopoly, under conditions of proper public control; provided that, in the selection of agencies to carry out the purposes of this paragraph, other than agencies controlled by the Government or those in which the Government participates, there shall be no discrimination on grounds of nationality against Members of the United Nations or their nationals.

#### Article 40

##### RECIPROCITY

Nothing in this Agreement shall entitle any Member of the United Nations to claim for itself or for its nationals, companies and associations the benefits of Article 38 of this Agreement in any respect in which it does not give to the inhabitants, companies and associations of Palestine equality of treatment with the nationals, companies and associations of the state which it treats most favorably.

#### Article 41

##### COOPERATION WITH INTERNATIONAL BODIES

The Trusteeship Council may arrange for the cooperation of Palestine in any regional advisory commission, regional technical organization or other voluntary association of states, any specialized international bodies, public or private, or other forms of international activity not inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.

#### Article 42

##### COLLABORATION WITH THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND THE TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL

1. The Governor-General shall collaborate fully with the General Assembly of the United Nations and the Trusteeship Council

in the discharge of all their functions as defined in Article 87 of the Charter of the United Nations, and to facilitate any periodic visits to Palestine which they may deem necessary.

2. The Governor-General shall make to the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations an annual report on the basis of a questionnaire drawn up by the Trusteeship Council in accordance with Article 88 of the Charter of the United Nations. The Governor-General shall also submit such special reports as may be requested by the Trusteeship Council. Such reports shall include information concerning the measures taken to give effect to suggestions and recommendations of the General Assembly and the Trusteeship Council. The Governor-General shall designate an accredited representative to be present at the sessions of the Trusteeship Council at which the reports with regard to Palestine are considered.

### Article 43

#### AMENDMENTS

The terms of this Agreement may be altered or amended in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

### Article 44

#### SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

If any dispute whatever should arise between Members of the United Nations concerning the validity, interpretation, or application of provisions of the present Agreement, such dispute, if it cannot be settled by negotiation or other means, may be submitted, by any party, to the International Court of Justice for decision, pursuant to Chapter XIV of the Charter of the United Nations and the Statute of the International Court of Justice. The decision of the Court shall be binding upon all parties to the dispute.

### Article 45

#### ENTRY INTO FORCE

1. The present Agreement shall come into force upon approval by the General Assembly, acting by a two-thirds majority of the Members present and voting, [and by the Governments of the Administering Authority in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.<sup>4</sup>]

<sup>4</sup> Bracketed portion as in the source text.

2. The governance of Palestine shall be based solely upon the Charter of the United Nations, the terms of the present Agreement, and measures pursuant thereto.

#### Article 46

##### TRANSITIONAL MEASURES

1. As a transitional measure during the period immediately following the entry into force of this Agreement and prior to such time as the Government of Palestine envisaged in this Agreement can be fully established, the Governor-General may utilize, conformably with the terms of the present Agreement, such governmental machinery as the Mandatory Power may, through prior agreement, leave in existence. During this period the Governor-General shall be empowered to act in accordance with paragraph 1, Article 24 of this Agreement.

2. All legislation in force in Palestine on the day preceding the entry into force of this Agreement, in so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement, shall continue to apply to Palestine, with such modifications as may be required by reason of the entry into force of this Agreement, until such time as it may be amended or revoked by other legislation of Palestine.

#### Article 47

##### TERMINATION OF TRUSTEESHIP

1. In order to enable the inhabitants of Palestine to attain full self-government as soon as possible, it shall be the responsibility of the Governor-General to take all possible steps to bring about agreement between the leading citizens of both Palestinian Jewish and Arab communities upon a plan of government for Palestine, and when such a plan has been agreed upon, to arrange and conduct a plebiscite, under the supervision of the Administering Authority, to determine the acceptability of such plan to the people of Palestine.

2. Any plan which is approved by a majority of the registered members of both the Arab and Jewish communities of Palestine shall be submitted to the General Assembly for its approval.

3. This Trusteeship Agreement will terminate as soon as the General Assembly has approved a plan of government in accordance with paragraph 2 above and a government [or governments<sup>5</sup>] has [or have<sup>5</sup>] been established thereunder.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Bracketed portion as in the source text.

<sup>6</sup> Ambassador Austin presented the draft trusteeship agreement, with minor changes, to the First Committee on April 20; see editorial note, p. 835.

Forrestal Papers

*Draft Diary Entry for April 4, 1948, by the Secretary of Defense  
(Forrestal)*

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

[WASHINGTON,] 4 April 1948.

At 2:00 P.M., I met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Gruenther and Dean Rusk to consider the number of troops which would be required to support a temporary trusteeship in Palestine, including any necessary control of the borders. Mr. Souers, Mr. Symington, and General Norstad<sup>1</sup> were also present, together with the principal planners of the Joint Strategic Plans Group. The meeting was the outgrowth of a specific request from Mr. Lovett for such an estimate, such estimate to be based upon the assumption that the following two conditions were met: First, that the Jewish Agency and the Arab Higher Committee agreed to cooperate by abstaining from further violence (i.e., a truce between the responsible elements), and second, that the United Kingdom agreed to share in the undertaking.

Mr. Rusk explained the State Department's proposed course of action, including the fact that Senator Austin would be called upon on 5 April 1946 to indicate generally the type of trusteeship which the United States had in mind. While Austin would not be required to make any definite commitments as to troops, and his meeting with other members of the Security Council would be merely tentative and exploratory, he could not conscientiously present and support the trusteeship proposal unless the U.S. was prepared, if the two conditions specified above were met, to furnish troops. He stated that the program being advanced had to be examined in relation to possible alternative courses of action. If we did nothing, it was likely that the Russians could, and would take definite steps toward gaining control in Palestine through the infiltration of specially trained immigrants, or by otherwise capitalizing on the widespread, violent civil war that would be likely to break out. Moreover, the slaughter of thousands and perhaps hundreds of thousands of Jewish residents would present difficult questions for the United States. In the event of such developments, the United States might be forced to intervene, and intervention under those circumstances might require a substantially larger force than the force required simply to support a trusteeship. He also pointed out that the presence of our forces in Palestine might be advantageous from a strategic standpoint, and would give us the opportunity to construct bomber fields in the Middle East.

Members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were of the opinion that a completely effective truce was impossible in Palestine. Even if the

<sup>1</sup> Adm. Sidney W. Souers, Executive Secretary of the National Security Council; W. Stuart Symington, Secretary of the Air Force; and Maj. Gen. Lauris Norstad, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations of the United States Air Force.

responsible elements should agree to terminate hostilities, there was little chance that the extremists on either side would feel bound by the commitments of the responsible agencies. For this reason, any determination of the forces required had to take into account: (a) the possibility of extensive violence by irresponsible groups, and (b) the possibility that the truce itself might, under such circumstances, break down. To meet the first of these contingencies, the Joint Chiefs of Staff estimated that a minimum of approximately 104,000 troops would be required. Subsequent developments might well indicate that this force could be greatly reduced, but the extent of such reduction would depend upon the general effectiveness of the truce. It would be unwise, however, from a military standpoint, to start with a lesser number in the optimistic anticipation of such developments. On the contrary, the presence of the larger number at the outset would in itself be an important factor in permitting such developments to take place. The Joint Chiefs felt that the particular type of operation was one which required almost exclusively ground troops rather than any substantial air components. They also appeared to agree with Rusk that the United States might be faced with a worse situation in the Middle East if it failed to support the trusteeship proposal. In the event that the truce itself should break down, then the number of troops required would have to be significantly increased—perhaps doubled or tripled.

It was agreed that the Joint Chiefs should prepare and submit a memorandum for the President<sup>2</sup> which would reflect the number of troops required to support the trusteeship under the conditions indicated above, the cost of providing a United States contingent and the effect of doing so upon (a) our reserve, and (b) the necessity for further increases in our total forces. In general, it seemed to be the view that the deployment of substantial forces to this area would be desirable, provided that such forces were available. In this connection, it was suggested that the British might undertake to hold the fort alone pending the augmentation of our forces following the adoption of selective service, gradually reducing the number as we became fully able to assume our share of the task.

<sup>2</sup> *Infra.*

Department of Defense Files

*Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to President Truman*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 4 April 1948.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT (THRU THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE):

Subject: Provision of U.S. Armed Forces in Palestine.

1. In a memorandum from the Secretary of Defense dated 2 April 1948,<sup>1</sup> subject, "Provision of U.S. Armed Forces in Palestine," the

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

Joint Chiefs of Staff are asked three specific questions to be answered upon the assumption that the following two conditions, stated by the Acting Secretary of State, are in fact met :

*a.* That the Jewish Agency and the Arab Higher Committee agree to cooperate by abstaining from further violence (i.e., a truce between the responsible representatives of the two principal groups in Palestine).

*b.* That the United Kingdom agree to undertake its share of the responsibility for supporting the program proposed.

2. The questions asked, and the answers of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, are as follows :

Question *a.* What armed forces would be required to be supplied from outside of Palestine in order to maintain law and order under a temporary trusteeship, including any necessary action to control borders to prevent the illegal entry of persons, either Jewish or Arab, from other countries?

Answer *a.* Subject to the above assumptions and conditions, we estimate that the following forces would be required :

<i>Army</i>	<i>Naval</i>	<i>Air</i>
1 Corps of 3 Infantry Divisions plus appropriate Corps, Service and Special Troops, totalling 100,076 personnel.	6 Destroyers (or destroyer escorts) 6 PCs (for harbor patrol) 1 Air Reconnaissance Sqdn. About 3124 personnel.	1 Sqdn Troop C (16 a/c) 2 Sqdns Ln Type (32 a/c) 1 Sqdn Photo Ren (25 a/c) (Photo equipped Fighter Bombers) Necessary Maintenance Units. About 921 personnel.

It is our considered opinion that a truce between the responsible representatives of the Jewish Agency and the Arab Higher Committee would not assure the termination of violence by irresponsible elements. The extent of that violence cannot be predicted, but based on past history it must be assumed that it will be considerable.

Question *b.* From a United States military standpoint, what should be the composition of such forces in terms of the nations which should furnish contingents and in terms of the size of the contingent to be furnished by each such nation?

Answer *b.* Based upon the second assumption that the United Kingdom agrees to undertake its share of the responsibility for supporting the program proposed, it is our belief that the United States should share equally with the United Kingdom. However, because France is one of the remaining members of the Allied and Associated Powers, it is believed that that country should also participate. Moreover, French



participation would give the United Nations a broader representation. On this basis, we believe that the participation should be as follows:

United Kingdom.....	45%	.....	46,800 personnel
United States.....	45%	.....	46,800 personnel
France.....	10%	.....	10,400 personnel

The above figures are subject to minor adjustments inasmuch as certain service functions provided by the United States and United Kingdom will be duplicated and overlapping in scope, for example, communications and engineers.

Question *c*. What are the military implications of the course of action proposed?

Answer *c*. (1) At least partial mobilization will be required, which includes the early implementation of Selective Service.

(2) The United States could not fully deploy its share of forces before 15 May.

(3) It would further over-extend the Armed Forces by increasing the dispersion of United States forces overseas.

(4) A supplementary budget would be required to defray additional cost, which expenditure quite probably will continue over a considerable period of time.

(5) The United States would have to accept the loss of the bulk of its general reserve for at least six months until new units could be constituted by partial mobilization.

3. The foregoing replies deal only with the stated specific questions, and are not intended to imply any conclusion as to the desirability of taking the action under consideration.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WILLIAM D. LEAHY

*Fleet Admiral, U.S. Navy,*

*Chief of Staff to the*

*Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces*

501.BB Palestine/4-648: Circular telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, April 6, 1948—6 a. m.

You are hereby instructed immediately to see Prime Minister or Foreign Minister of countries to which you are accredited, or, in your discretion, chief of state and to discuss with him current developments with respect to Palestine. In your discussion you should present following line:

On Feb 25 American rep in SC introduced resolution providing for acceptance by SC of GA recommendation Nov 29 providing for Palestine partition. SC however refused accept these recommendations and

decided call upon permanent members SC to consult as to means by which GA recommendations might be implemented.

On Mar 19 American rep stated consultations among members SC had revealed partition plan could not be implemented by peaceful means and that it was clear SC was not prepared to go ahead with efforts to implement plan in existing situation. Immediate truce, special session GA, and temporary trusteeship for Palestine were suggested by American rep at that time.

On April 1 SC by unanimous vote adopted American resolution calling upon Arab and Jewish armed groups in Palestine to cease acts of violence immediately and calling upon Jewish Agency and Arab Higher Committee to make representatives available to SC for purpose of arranging truce between Arab and Jewish communities of Palestine; and emphasizing heavy responsibility which would fall upon any party failing to observe such truce. SC also adopted by 9 affirmative votes and 2 abstentions American resolution requesting SYGUN to convoke special session GA to consider further question of future govt of Palestine.

Regarding truce, Ambassador Austin remarked in SC Mar 30 that statement made by President Mar 25 indicated urgent necessity exerting every effort in SC to arrange truce between Jews and Arabs of Palestine. Such truce should be based on two fundamental considerations: First it is urgently essential that violence and bloodshed in Palestine cease for humanitarian considerations. We must prevent anarchy and preserve international peace. Second both Jews and Arabs of Palestine must be prepared to accept truce arrangements which would not prejudice claims of either group. Truce should include cessation of political as well as military activities.

Regarding temporary trusteeship USGovt adheres to views stated in SC Mar 19, reaffirmed by Sec Mar 20 and again by President Mar 25 that temporary trusteeship should be established to maintain peace. Trusteeship would be without prejudice to character final political settlement in Palestine. Trusteeship is essential to establish order inaugurated by truce and provide interim governmental machinery after May 15 without which peaceful solution Palestine problem cannot be found or put into effect.

On April 5 members SC with exception USSR, Ukraine, informally met Ambassador Austin's office NY to exchange views re trusteeship.<sup>1</sup> At this time Ambassador Austin on behalf USGovt presented working paper entitled "General Principles which Might be Included in a

---

<sup>1</sup>New York transmitted an account of this meeting in telegram 382, April 5, 11: 45 p. m., not printed.

Temporary UN Trusteeship Agreement for Palestine."² It was made clear these general principles do not commit USGovt at this stage and that suggestions of other members on similar tentative basis would be welcomed. General principles are as follows:

"1. A temporary trusteeship agreement for Palestine would be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned or to the character of the eventual political settlement.

2. The agreement should be designed to be of indefinite duration, but subject to prompt termination whenever the Arab and Jewish communities of Palestine agree upon the future government of that country.

3. The agreement might designate the United Nations itself as administering authority. This responsibility could best be discharged by the Trusteeship Council. It would be undesirable for the Trusteeship Council to undertake day-to-day governmental functions. Administrative, legislative and judicial powers should be exercised in Palestine through a separate body called the Government of Palestine, acting in accordance with (1) the principles of trusteeship contained in the Charter and (2) such instructions as the Trusteeship Council might find it necessary to give in accordance with the terms of the agreement.

4. A temporary trusteeship agreement for Palestine could include many of the features developed by the Trusteeship Council for its draft statute for the proposed International Territory of Jerusalem.

5. The Government of Palestine should be headed by a Governor-General appointed by and responsible to the Trusteeship Council.

6. The Government of Palestine should include a Cabinet and a democratically elected Legislature, possibly in two chambers. In the event, however, that such a Legislature could not be assembled or if assembled could not function effectively, the Governor-General should have the authority to Legislate by order.

7. The Trusteeship Agreement should provide for the maintenance of law and order within Palestine. In so far as possible, the Government of Palestine should be responsible for law and order through its locally recruited police and volunteer forces under Article 84 of the Charter. When the forces of the Government of Palestine are insufficient for this purpose, the Governor-General should be authorized to call upon such states as would be specified in the Agreement to assist in the maintenance of security in Palestine. A separate protocol to this trust agreement would contain an undertaking by those named to accept such responsibility on specified conditions.<sup>3</sup>

8. The agreement should make it possible for the Government of Palestine to take over on a temporary basis existing arrangements in Palestine pending the establishment of the organs specified in the agreement.

<sup>2</sup> A copy of this paper, dated April 3 and comprised of the 15 numbered principles quoted in the circular telegram of April 6, is in the Truman Papers, President's Secretary's File.

<sup>3</sup> The Department, on April 5, had informed New York that "If question arises in connection with para. 7 as to what part the U.S. is willing to play in maintaining security, it should be indicated that the U.S. should not be expected to answer that question alone and that this matter must be the subject of further discussions among member governments at an early date. We must not be drawn in at this stage on an American commitment. Further instructions on this point will be provided." (Telegram 188, 501.BB Palestine/4-548)

9. The agreement should make specific provision for immigration and land purchase, on a basis to be negotiated in consultation with representatives of the Jewish and Arab communities of Palestine.

10. The standard of living and public services in Palestine under the temporary trusteeship should, in general, be those which can be supported by the resources of Palestine; large subsidies by the United Nations should not be anticipated. The costs of the government of Palestine under the trusteeship regime should, in general, be met from funds available to the Government of Palestine from Palestine revenues. This principle accords with the information which has been made available concerning the fiscal situation of Palestine under the mandate, which is to the effect that Palestine, except for extraordinary security expenditures, is budgetarily self-supporting.

11. Under a United Nations trusteeship, expenditures arising in connection with the employment of forces of Members of the United Nations to assist in the defense of Palestine or in the maintenance of law and order should be defrayed by those Members.

12. The United Nations would presumably wish to pay the salaries and emoluments of certain principal officers of the Government, such as the Governor-General and the Chief Justice, as an evidence of the responsibility of those officers to the United Nations.

13. If the General Assembly, on the recommendation of the Trusteeship Council, considers that funds which cannot be raised by the Government of Palestine are essential to accomplish the minimum purposes of the temporary trusteeship, those funds should be supplied, as subsidies or recoverable loans, by the United Nations as a whole on the regular scale of contributions to the budget of the United Nations. The Palestine budget should be handled by the United Nations as a separate budget, not as a part of the ordinary budget of the organization.

14. The agreement should contain adequate guarantees for the protection and preservation of the Holy Places in Palestine, for the settling of disputes pertaining to them and for assuring, subject to necessary safeguards of public order and security, freedom of entry into Palestine for all foreign Pilgrims and persons who desire to visit the Holy Places.

15. The trusteeship regime for Palestine should terminate as soon as a majority of the members of each of the two principal communities in Palestine—Arab and Jewish—have agreed upon a plan of government for Palestine. It should be a responsibility of the Governor-General to take all possible steps to bring about such an agreement.”<sup>4</sup>

Views Govt to which you are accredited would be appreciated.

For your background info only, Dept proposes to consult certain other govts shortly re armed forces indicated under point 7 above. Pending such consultations US Govt will not make any commitment or answer questions on this point. Fundamental consideration is that US does not propose to substitute itself for Brit in Palestine and will act only as member of UN.

<sup>4</sup>The members of the Security Council, except for the Soviet Union, held a second informal private meeting on April 7 concerning Palestine. During the two-hour meeting, they discussed various aspects of trusteeship and the truce. A detailed summary was provided the same day by New York in telegram 395 (501.BB Palestine/4-748).

Sent for action to London, Paris, Ottawa, Brussels, The Hague, Canberra, Wellington, Cairo and Nanking. Sent for information and appropriate use to Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Jidda, Jerusalem, New Delhi, Karachi, Ankara, Tehran, Kabul, Buenos Aires, Moscow, Bogota, New York, Stockholm, Mexico City and Rio de Janeiro.<sup>5</sup>

LOVETT

<sup>5</sup>The Department sent this circular telegram to Manila on April 9 for information and appropriate use (telegram 447, 501.BB Palestine/4-948). It also authorized the Embassy in Egypt, on April 12, to supply Azzam Pasha with the purport of the circular telegram, from the second paragraph through the fifteen general principles. (Telegram 404, 501.BB Palestine/4-1048)

Ambassador Tuck, on April 15, reported the reactions of Egyptian Prime Minister Nokrashy. The latter considered American advocacy of trusteeship as a step towards elimination of partition. "However, a grave doubt continued to exist in Arab minds that this proposed step of temporary trusteeship might not prove to be the 'burial' of partition. Therefore . . . means should be found for dissipating this doubt which could be done by statement specifying duration of trusteeship accompanied by an assurance that trusteeship would not jeopardize national aspirations of Arabs towards final complete independence of Palestine 'united Arab nation.'" The Prime Minister also noted that the trusteeship should be presented in a way to eliminate Arab fears of favors to the Jews, in connection with an increase in their armaments and numbers in Palestine and in purchasing land from the Arabs. (Telegram 373, from Cairo, 501.BB Palestine/4-1548)

Ambassador Tuck, on April 18, reported concerning the reaction of Azzam Pasha that "The Arab League does not favor American plan of temporary trusteeship which in League's opinion would serve only to create a new regime and bring about another phase of trouble between Arabs and Jews." The League was said to favor, as a practical matter, continuance of the British mandate, since the "use of existing British forces with moral and material backing of UN could contribute to final disarmament and in establishment of a new Palestine state to which present mandate could hand over." (Telegram 385 from Cairo, 501.BB Palestine/4-1848)

501.BB Palestine/4-948

*Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Acting Secretary of State (Lovett)*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] April 9, 1948.

I am attaching, for your approval and signature, proposed messages from me to Dr. Judah Magnes of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem and to Azzam Pasha, Secretary General of the Arab League, with regard to Palestine.<sup>1</sup>

It has become apparent in recent days that the extreme public positions taken by the Jewish Agency and the Arab Higher Committee make it increasingly difficult for them to modify their positions sufficiently so that the United Nations can arrange a truce and provide interim governmental machinery after May 15 in Palestine.

It is my hope that the influence of moderate and temperate Jews and Arabs such as Dr. Magnes, Azzam Pasha and associates of their choosing might break the present log jam in the United Nations. I am, there-

<sup>1</sup>The telegrams were signed by Mr. Lovett and sent on April 10 as No. 258 to Jerusalem and No. 398 to Cairo, pp. 811 and 812, respectively.

fore, endeavoring to prevail on them to come to the United States as soon as possible. I hope that the proposed telegrams attached will persuade them to do so.

L[OY] W. H[ENDERSON]

501.BB Palestine/4-948 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom*

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, April 9, 1948—7 p. m.

1260. Cirtel April 6 outlines Dept views regarding necessity for truce and trusteeship for Palestine. Working draft possible trusteeship agreement has been furnished UKDel New York and additional copies being forwarded you airmail.<sup>1</sup>

You are requested to see Bevin earliest practicable and seek UK agreement to following joint course of action :

1. US, UK and France to use maximum effort diplomatic and other means to obtain truce between Arabs and Jews of Palestine. Terms of truce should be conditional on attitude of parties but elementary basis would have to be military cease-fire coupled with political stand-still.

2. US, UK and France to agree to present trusteeship proposal jointly to GA. Dept considers draft statute for Jerusalem, recently worked out by TC (in which UKDel played most active and helpful role) could be quickly adapted for Palestine as whole and substantially shorten task of agreeing upon draft for joint sponsorship. This is, in effect, basis of working draft mentioned in Par. 1. Refinements could be worked out during course GA consideration.

3. Reference #7 general principles contained Cirtel April 6, US, UK and France to agree to accept jointly responsibility for assisting Governor-General Palestine maintain security if his locally recruited police and volunteers need reinforcement. Present expectation, of course, is that reinforcement will be required, scale depending upon course of truce negotiations.

4. US, UK and France to join in inviting number of other members UN to share security responsibility in order to provide broad UN basis and to maintain solid group of friendly states interested in peaceful settlement Palestine problem. Dept tentatively suggests such joint invitations be extended to Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Egypt, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden. UK suggestions regarding such list would be welcome.

In presenting matter to Bevin you should make following points to impress upon HMG critical importance to world peace and to security of US-UK that war in Palestine be avoided :

1. Security of Middle East is essential to security of Western World.

<sup>1</sup> See footnote 1, p. 778.

2. Large-scale fighting between Jews and Arabs over political settlement in Palestine must be prevented for humanitarian reasons. The continuance of such fighting would probably result in further Soviet exploitation of the situation which might result in the establishment of a Soviet satellite in at least a part of Palestine.

3. Present efforts to ensure the security of Greece, Turkey and Iran would be threatened by Soviet penetration of Palestine; settlement of the Palestine question for the time being would open the way for further steps by US and UK to ensure the security of the Middle East.

4. The temporary location of US, UK and French forces in Palestine would exert a stabilizing effect in this area which is particularly important at this time.

5. US cannot undertake unilateral commitments in the Middle East; if US and UK are unable to cooperate in preventing development of a situation in Palestine which would render that country vulnerable to Soviet penetration joint efforts on our part to maintain security of the whole Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East will be jeopardized.

6. Continued heavy fighting in the Middle East would seriously jeopardize ERP success because large scale European oil requirements from Middle East could not be met.

7. Unless some temporary settlement can be found, competing Jewish and Arab governments will be declared on May 15, each urging legal claim to legitimacy. Each would obtain recognition by a number of states and precipitate a situation of utmost gravity.

8. Failure of US, UK and France to bring about peaceful conditions in Palestine after May 15 would seriously impair prestige of the three governments and of UN and would result in loss of support of other nations which will be needed if the general political situation continues to deteriorate.

9. Unless US, UK and France exert genuine and responsible leadership in this situation, it will not be possible to obtain the firm action by overwhelming majority of UN necessary to settle Palestine question without giving USSR opportunity for exploitation of Palestine situation.

10. In view of UK insistence upon termination of mandate May 15, trusteeship offers only possibility providing emergency government for Palestine. Trusteeship is firmly rooted in governmental powers which UN has under the Charter and does not rest upon recommendation; under the Charter, UK is an essential party to a trusteeship agreement, else no legal basis for UN action exists.

11. As matters now stand, there will be no authority in Palestine (UN or otherwise) after May 15 capable of exercising governmental or administrative responsibility. The abandonment of Palestine under such circumstances will make UK in the eyes of world opinion solely responsible for the results of such abandonment.

12. Other members UN openly expressing increasing irritation at lack of UK cooperation in finding and sharing in UN solution to problem which UK itself placed before UN for recommendation. If UK continues to adhere to present attitude of refusal to participate in working out solution public opinion in this country is certain to be deeply aroused and may handicap us in obtaining the kind of close British-American cooperation which the international situation demands.

Instruction along same general lines is being sent to Paris.<sup>2</sup>  
Repeated to USUN New York 202 for info.

LOVETT

---

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 1178, April 9, 7 p. m., not printed; it instructed the Ambassador in France to seek the agreement of Foreign Minister Bidault to the proposed joint action. It was virtually identical in wording to the telegram to London, except that points 5 and 12 were omitted from the message to Paris (501.BB Palestine/4-948). The following day, the Department instructed Paris to delete the words "by US and UK" in paragraph 3 of the points to be pressed on the Foreign Minister (telegram 1179, 501.BB Palestine/4-1048).

---

Truman Papers, Official File

*Dr. Chaim Weizmann to President Truman*

NEW YORK, April 9, 1948.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I had intended to take the liberty of addressing you in writing immediately after the interview which you kindly accorded me on March 18th. The events which followed, however, impelled me to wait until I could formulate some clearer impressions on the new situation which has developed. In inviting your consideration of my views at this time, I wish to thank you, Mr. President, for the personal kindness which you have so often shown me, and for the sympathetic interest which you have constantly devoted to the cause of our people in its grave ordeal.

I noted with satisfaction that in your statement of March 25 you indicated that the United States had not abandoned Partition as the ultimate political settlement in Palestine. I welcome this assurance because my long experience of this problem has convinced me beyond doubt that no more realistic solution exists. Palestine is inhabited by two peoples. These peoples have separate political aspirations and common economic interests. The settlement by Partition and economic union recognizes this logic. Partition is further reinforced by the support of two distinguished investigating Commissions (in 1937 and 1947), by the binding force of the General Assembly's Resolution and by the fact that a virtual Partition is now crystallising in Palestine. Jews and Arabs are both mature for independence and are already obedient in a large degree to their own institutions, while the central British Administration is in virtual collapse. In large areas Jews and Arabs are virtually in control of their own lives and interests. The clock cannot be put back to the situation which existed before November 29. I would also draw attention to the psychological effects of promising Jewish independence in November and attempting to cancel it in March.

It is the logic of partition and of the present situation in Palestine which compelled me to go on record against the idea of trusteeship.



One fails to see how any of the admitted difficulties of Partition are avoided by Trusteeship. The problem of enforcement becomes even more acute, as neither the Arabs nor the Jews of Palestine have accepted Trusteeship which appears likely to deprive each of them of Statehood. It is proposed to institute a Trusteeship in a country threatened by foreign Arab aggression, torn by internal warfare, and already moving inexorably towards Partition under a valid international resolution. The proposal is made without any assurance that a trustee is available, that Arabs or Jews will cooperate, that the General Assembly will approve an agreement or that any effective measures can be improvised by May 15th.

The difficult but clear course of implementing Partition is thus replaced by a leap into the unknown, and I am forced to regret, Mr. President, the great increase of trouble, danger and responsibility which must ensue for the United States from the unfortunate reversal on March 19th, with its inauguration of new uncertainty and new political conflict.

If I may venture to leave you, Mr. President, with one or two reflections on the major aspects of the problem, I would sound a note of solemn warning against any prolongation of British rule in Palestine. As you may know, I have cherished the British-Jewish relationship all my life. I have upheld it in difficult times. I have been grievously disappointed by its recent decline. It is because I hope for its renewal that I tremble to think of the wave of violence and repression which would sweep Palestine if the conditions and auspices of the recent unhappy years were to be continued under British, or indeed any foreign rule. I also know how passionately the British people desire the end of this troubled chapter. Should your administration, despite all this, press for any prolongation of British tenure, it would incur a responsibility for terrible events and, almost certainly, the equal resentment of the British and Jewish peoples.

I recall that it is exactly two years since the Anglo-American Committee so emphatically endorsed your moving plea for the immediate admission of 100,000 Jews from the Displaced Persons Camps to Palestine. They are still in those camps. Reports have reached me of the grave effect produced on their dwindling resources of hope and morale by the United States declaration of March 19th. I cannot for a moment believe, Mr. President, that you would be a party to the further disappointment of pathetic hopes, which you yourself have raised so high. Their hope is solely for personal and national integration in a Jewish State in Palestine.

In conclusion, I am convinced that the present situation in Palestine is making a profound impact on the conscience of the American people. Having recognized the right of our people to independence last No-

vember, the great powers now expose them to the risk of extermination and do not even grant them the arms to provide for their own defense. Arab aggression is now more confident than ever. Arabs believe that an international decision has been revised in their favour purely because they dared to use force against it. Mr. President, I cannot see how this belief can honestly be refuted. The practical question now is whether your Administration will proceed to leave our people unarmed in the face of an attack which it apparently feels it is unable to stop; and whether it can allow us to come directly or indirectly under Arab domination which is sworn to our destruction.

The choice for our people, Mr. President, is between Statehood and extermination. History and providence have placed this issue in your hands, and I am confident that you will yet decide it in the spirit of the moral law.<sup>1</sup>

Respectfully yours,

CHAIM WEIZMANN

<sup>1</sup> A marginal notation on the source text by Rose A. Conway, Administrative Assistant in the President's office, indicates that the letter was not answered.

Dr. Weizmann transmitted a copy of the letter to the Secretary of State on April 9; it was acknowledged by Acting Secretary Lovett in a letter of April 24 which concluded as follows:

"I sincerely hope that action which has been and will be taken in the United Nations will lead to the restoration of peaceful conditions in Palestine and to agreement between Arabs and Jews resident there on their future government." (501.BB Palestine/4-948)

501.BB Palestine/4-1048: Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State*

SECRET URGENT

NEW YORK, April 10, 1948—12:09 a. m.

417. Following is report of third informal meeting of members of SC at the offices of USUN to discuss future of Palestine:

Present were delegates of all SC members except Gromyko. Hsia replaced Tsiang for China. SYG was absent. Sobolev and Protitch represented Secretariat. The meeting, which lasted more than two hours, began with an account by SC President Lopez of his meetings with representatives of AHC and JA to explore possibilities of truce in Palestine. Lopez stated he was discouraged at the prospects and could find no common ground between extreme positions as described by JA and AHC. He thought it was necessary for SC itself to decide what action it should take regarding truce and to make its own recommendations in this regard. Arguing with AHC and JA will not be successful. Two meetings with the two representatives separately showed that their conditions for a truce were incompatible. For example, with regard to immigration, JA would not stop what the Arabs

called "illegal" immigration. This, Lopez thought, was the crux of the problem. The JA viewpoint was that the Arabs were attempting to make the JA stop immigration "at the point of a pistol". Meanwhile, the Arabs said that immigration was illegal and must be stopped. On the other hand, JA accused AHC of illegal immigration with violent intent.

In the meantime, both sides claimed that because the mandate will end May 15, and that because administration is now steadily being dismantled and disrupted, they must create an administration in their zones to replace chaos and anarchy. In addition, the Arabs insist that nothing should be done to implement partition. "If nothing is done," said Lopez, "there will certainly be anarchy in Palestine. I fail to see how the SC can discuss new proposals (by which he meant trusteeship) or get the Arabs and Jews to cooperate. I have tried the very best I could to show both parties that their position would only be helped by having a truce and eventually by permanent cooperation."

Lopez added that Shertok said that JA action was "self-preservation", that UK was getting out of Palestine, and that "we must protect our lives." Shertok added that an administration and government were necessary for self-preservation. Lopez replied that, "you can't create a provisional government unless it is done under the GA recommendation." Shertok answered, "this is beside the point. Our lives are at stake and something must be done." Lopez thought both sides were too worked up emotionally to listen to reason.

Lopez concluded that the SC under these circumstances should not only appeal for a truce but should take another step and ask UK to keep the mandate for some time longer. Otherwise he felt that this most perplexing and unfortunate problem of Palestine would only become more complicated. "I doubt whether we can reach a settlement which will meet with Arab-Jewish agreement at the present time," he said. "I want the advice of members of the SC as to what to do next, but I fear that our efforts will bear no fruit unless we can ease the tension."

Following Lopez' statement, Tarasenko<sup>1</sup> stated, "you have told us in effect that the truce can not be implemented. You are suggesting new measures for the SC to take. Why are these suggestions being made outside of the SC?" Lopez replied that he took it for granted that before an official report was made by him to SC concerning his truce efforts, members of the SC should have private discussion. All members, he said, were invited to this meeting. All have the right to

---

<sup>1</sup> Vasilii Arkady Tarasenko, Ukrainian Representative at the United Nations.

exchange views, and indeed one of those views might be that this very question of the truce should no longer be discussed at this meeting.

[Here follows remainder of informal discussion.]

AUSTIN

501.BB Palestine/4-1048: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Jerusalem*

SECRET US URGENT

WASHINGTON, April 10, 1948—2 p. m.

NIACT

258. For Wasson<sup>1</sup> from Henderson. Unless you perceive some reason for not so doing it is suggested that you make arrangements at once to see Magnes and give him orally following confidential message from me:

“Gravest danger exists that unless success is achieved in UN efforts to bring about truce and an arrangement whereby interim governmental machinery will be provided for Palestine after May 15 chaotic conditions involving great loss of life and property will prevail in Palestine. At no time has there been a greater need for courageously conciliatory attitude such as yours on part of both Arabs and Jews. If such attitude is to prevail cooperation on part of moderate and conciliatory Arabs and Jews is essential. It is therefore hoped that you either alone or accompanied by such other Jewish leaders as you may consider appropriate will come to US at earliest possible moment.”<sup>2</sup>

LOVETT

<sup>1</sup> Consul at Jerusalem.

<sup>2</sup> Henderson's message was delivered to Magnes on April 12. Jerusalem advised that Magnes had “indicated great interest in proceeding to US but in view precarious health must consult his doctors who heretofore have prevented his travelling. He also seemed concerned re auspices under which he would travel. He felt that his hand would be strengthened if he could say he had been invited by Senator Austin or by Dept. of State to assist in bringing about peace in Palestine. Failing this he mentioned possible creation ad hoc committee his friends and supporters in United States who would invite him.” (Telegram 425, April 13, from Jerusalem, 501.BB Palestine/4-1348)

Henderson sent a further message to Magnes on April 15 which read in part as follows:

“I made my suggestion because of my belief that your presence in the U.S. during the discussions of the Palestine matter might have a helpful moderating influence on both Jews and Arabs. We feel that if a truce and an interim government are to be arranged for with a minimum amount of bloodshed the advice and assistance of outstanding Jewish leaders would be helpful. In my opinion your ability to aid might be adversely affected if the erroneous impression should be created that there was any especial relationship between you and the U.S. Government. If you should come we would like to have you do so only because you personally feel that you may be helpful and not because of any suggestion which I have made. It is also essential that everyone understand that you have a free hand.” (Telegram 269, April 15, to Jerusalem, 501.BB Palestine/4-1348)

Jerusalem advised on April 17 that Magnes agreed with Henderson's “view concerning relationship US Government” and that Magnes expected to arrive in New York on April 21. (Telegram 451, April 17, from Jerusalem, 501.BB Palestine/4-1748)

501.BB Palestine/4-1048: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt*SECRET US URGENT  
NIACT

WASHINGTON, April 10, 1948—2 p. m.

398. For Tuck from Henderson. Unless you perceive some reason for not so doing please get in touch at once with Azzam Pasha and give him orally following personal message from me:

"Unless we can achieve success in UN efforts to bring about truce between Arabs and Jews in Palestine and effect an arrangement whereby interim governmental machinery will be provided for Palestine after May 15 chaotic conditions will prevail in that country resulting in great loss of life and destruction of property and the security of whole Middle East may even be threatened. If this disastrous situation is to be avoided counsels of moderate Arabs and Jews must prevail. We therefore feel it is important that there should be wider representation of wise and temperate Arab leadership in US at present time. I urge therefore that you plan to come to US at earliest possible moment either alone or accompanied by other Arab leaders whom you consider might be helpful in this emergency."<sup>1</sup>

LOVETT

---

<sup>1</sup> The message was delivered to Azzam on April 11; Cairo advised Henderson that Azzam had "expressed warm appreciation for your views which indicated that 'both you and he were united in objective.' Definite decision not yet taken re trip to US but he firmly believes he can be more effective in achieving aims by remaining here where he can influence Arab leaders and governments in desired direction." Cairo believed that "in spite of Azzam's sincere reluctance to come [to] US he will in fact be persuaded by Arab leaders, Amir Faisal [the Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister] in particular, who are strongly urging his visit." (Telegram 357, April 12, from Cairo, 501.BB Palestine/4-1248)

501.BB Palestine/4-1248: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)*

SECRET US URGENT

WASHINGTON, April 12, 1948—6 p. m.

208. For purposes of your conversations tomorrow with President Lopez and colleagues from delegations of UK, France and Canada on truce terms in Palestine Dept recommends that you urge following terms be incorporated in any truce proposal to be formulated by SC:

1. An immediate cease-fire and cessation of hostilities.
2. Assurances from both Arabs and Jews to permit continued functioning of essential public services in Palestine.
3. An agreement to suspend all activity of a military or political nature pending reconsideration of the Palestine problem by the Special Session.
4. Appointment of a Truce Commission to ensure the observance of a cease-fire order.

5. Admonition by SC to all peoples, governments and organizations to refrain from permitting or committing any acts which may tend to violence in Palestine or to breach of truce in Palestine.<sup>1</sup>

LOVETT

<sup>1</sup> In a memorandum covering his telephone conversation with Ambassador Austin on April 13, Mr. McClintock noted that the Ambassador was "considerably disturbed" with the text of telegram 208, preferring that the terms of the truce be spelled out in greater detail. Mr. McClintock explained that "there was no conflict between the more broad principles suggested by the Department and his [Ambassador Austin's] deductions from these principles." Mr. McClintock noted further that "Our conversation left Ambassador Austin much relieved in his mind. I cautioned him, however, that the Department's telegram had been signed by Mr. Lovett personally and had received White House clearance. In consequence it possessed the very highest authority. Ambassador Austin said that he might in the course of negotiation have to defer to the suggestions of others. I said that we should be delighted if this was the case since this was not an American truce but a Security Council truce." (501.BB Palestine/4-1348)

501.BB Palestine/4-1348

*Memorandum by Mr. Fraser Wilkins of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

ACTION ON THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY'S RESOLUTION OF NOVEMBER 29,  
1947 ON THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION

PROBLEM

To determine the position which the United States Delegation to the Special Session of the General Assembly should adopt with respect to action by that body on the General Assembly's resolution of November 29, 1947 on the Palestinian Question.

RECOMMENDATIONS

A. If the General Assembly's resolution of November 29 is amended at the Special Session, the United States should support changes which would have the effect of bringing about its peaceful implementation and of making it acceptable to the peoples of Palestine.

B. If a new resolution providing for a temporary trusteeship agreement is approved by a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly the United States should initiate or support the suspension of the General Assembly's resolution of November 29, preferably by statement to this effect in the new resolution.

<sup>1</sup> Drafted on April 13 and transmitted the same day to Mr. Lovett with a joint memorandum by Messrs. Henderson and Rusk, which noted that the position paper had been cleared by NEA, UNA and L. A. marginal notation by Mr. Lovett reads: "Approved by President & returned to me by Clifford on May 3, 1948-5: 45 p[m]."

A copy of the memorandum by Mr. Wilkins is in the Truman Papers, President's Secretary's File.

C. If a new resolution providing for a political settlement is approved by two-thirds vote of the General Assembly, the United States should initiate or support the withdrawal of the General Assembly's resolution of November 29, preferably by a statement to this effect in the new resolution.

*Discussion:*

I—On November 29, 1947 the General Assembly adopted a resolution on the Palestinian question. This resolution provided for a plan of partition with economic union for Palestine. It included provisions for a future constitution and government of Palestine, boundaries, a special regime for the City of Jerusalem and an invitation with regard to capitulations in Palestine.

The General Assembly's resolution recommended to the United Kingdom, as the Mandatory Power for Palestine, and to all other Members of the United Nations the adoption and implementation with regard to the future government of Palestine, of the plan of partition with Economic union as provided for in that resolution.

The General Assembly's resolution also requested that:

"(a) The Security Council take the necessary measures as provided for in the Plan for its implementation;

"(b) The Security Council consider if circumstances during the transitional period require such consideration, whether the situation in Palestine constitutes a threat to the peace. If it decides that such a threat exists, and in order to maintain international peace and security, the Security Council should supplement the authorization of the General Assembly by taking measures, under Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter, to empower the United Nations Commission, as provided in this resolution, to exercise in Palestine the functions which are assigned to it by this resolution;

"(c) The Security Council determine as a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, in accordance with Article 39 of the Charter, any attempt to alter by force the settlement envisaged by this resolution;

"(d) The Trusteeship Council be informed of the responsibilities envisaged for it in this Plan;"

The General Assembly's resolution in addition called upon the inhabitants of Palestine to take such steps as may be necessary on their part to put this plan into effect; and appealed to all governments and all peoples to refrain from taking any action which might hamper or delay the carrying out of these recommendations.

The General Assembly's resolution also contained authorization to the Secretary General with regard to expenses of the Commission provided for in the plan and for withdrawals from the working capital fund.

On December 1, 1947 the Trusteeship Council received Part 3 of the General Assembly's resolution of November 29 and commenced work on a draft Statute for the City of Jerusalem.

On December 9, 1947 the Security Council recorded that it had received the General Assembly's resolution of November 29 and, having been seized of this matter, had agreed to postpone further consideration.

On February 1, 1948 the Palestine Commission provided for in the plan, which had commenced its activities on January 9, 1948, submitted its first monthly progress report to the Security Council.

On February 16, 1948 the Palestine Commission presented its first special report on the problem of security in Palestine to the Security Council.

On February 24, 1948 the Security Council resumed its consideration of the Palestine question.

On February 25, 1948 the United States representative on the Security Council introduced a resolution providing for the acceptance, subject to the authority of the Security Council under the Charter, of the request addressed by the General Assembly to it in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of the General Assembly's resolution of November 29, 1947.

On March 1, 1948 the Palestine Commission submitted its second monthly progress report to the Security Council.

On March 5, 1948 the Security Council by a vote of five in favor with none against and six abstentions, declined to accept the requests of the General Assembly.

On March 12, 1948 the Trusteeship Council, having continued its work on a draft Statute for the City of Jerusalem, decided that it was in a satisfactory form and agreed that the question of its formal approval together with the appointment of a Governor of the City should be taken up at a subsequent meeting to be held not later than one week before April 29, 1948.

On April 1, 1948 the Security Council adopted by nine affirmative votes with two abstentions the United States resolution requesting the Secretary General of the United Nations to convoke a special session of the General Assembly to consider further the question of the future government of Palestine.

The action of the Security Council on March 5 in declining to accept the requests of the General Assembly under its resolution of November 29 in conjunction with the action on April 1 in requesting the convocation of a Special Session clearly indicates that the Security Council was not prepared to accept or implement the General Assembly's resolution of November 29.



II—The United Nations might adopt one of the following courses of action with regard to the General Assembly's resolution of November 29, 1947:

A. The General Assembly might amend its resolution of November 29.

B. The General Assembly might suspend its resolution of November 29.

C. The General Assembly might withdraw its resolution of November 29.

In the case of (A), amendments to the General Assembly's resolution of November 29 which would have the effect of bringing about its peaceful implementation and of making it acceptable to the peoples of Palestine would have the support of the United States Government in the United Nations.

In the case of (B), it may develop that the General Assembly will approve by a two-thirds vote a new resolution providing for a temporary trusteeship agreement for Palestine without prejudice to the rights, claims or position of the parties and without prejudice to the eventual political settlement relating to the government of Palestine. In this event, the question arises as to whether the General Assembly's resolution of November 29 should be suspended or withdrawn. If the trusteeship is for a temporary period; if it is without prejudice to the rights, claims or positions of the parties; and if it is without prejudice to the eventual political settlement relating to the government of that country, it follows that suspension rather than withdrawal of the resolution of November 29 would be equitable. Withdrawal of the General Assembly's resolution under such conditions would undoubtedly be considered as prejudicial to the rights, claims and position of one of the parties and would also undoubtedly be considered as prejudicial to the eventual political settlement. It would, accordingly, appear to be preferable to suspend the General Assembly's resolution of November 29 by a statement to this effect in the new resolution providing for a temporary trusteeship agreement.

In the case of (C), it may develop that a new resolution providing for a political settlement will be approved by a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly. In this event, it might be presumed that the new resolution would automatically supersede the resolution of November 29. It would be preferable, however, for the General Assembly to withdraw its previous resolution. Such action might be accomplished (a) by the introduction of a separate resolution before the passage of the new resolution; (b) by the introduction of a separate resolution after the passage of the new resolution; or (c) by a statement in the new resolution itself. From a parliamentary point of view no objection would appear to any of these three courses. From a politi-

cal point of view, however, it would appear that the preferable course would be by a statement in the new resolution. Such action would definitely link the new resolution with the previous resolution and might avoid the necessity for a separate vote on the withdrawal of the General Assembly's resolution of November 29.

867N.01/4-1348 : Telegram

*The Consul at Jerusalem (Wasson) to the Secretary of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

JERUSALEM, April 13, 1948—5 p. m.

431. Early morning April 9 combined force Irgun and Stern Gang numbering over 100 attacked Arab village, Deir Yasin, several miles west Jerusalem. Attackers killed 250 persons of whom half, by their own admission to American correspondents, were women and children. Attack carried out in connection battle now still in progress between Arabs Jews on roads leading to Jerusalem from Tel Aviv.

Arab reaction to attack has been violent and emotions, already at high pitch following death April 8 of Abdul Kader Husseini (Arab Jerusalem commander) during Arab attempt retake village captured by Haganah, now at bursting point. Officer ConGen visiting Hussein Khalidi, secretary Arab Higher Executive, April 11, found him still trembling with rage and emotion and referring to attack as "worst Nazi tactic".

As indignation, resentment and determination to avenge Deir Yasin spread among Arabs, we believe, chance for cease-fire and truce increasingly remote. With growing criticism in Irgun and Stern Gang circles over Haganah leadership further attacks this nature can be expected and Arabs will react violently.

WASSON

501.BB Palestine/4-1348 : Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)  
to the Secretary of State*

SECRET US URGENT

NEW YORK, April 13, 1948—5:50 p. m.

431. For Rusk from Knox. Following is gist of statement made at private meeting in USUN offices of members of SC April 12. (Gromyko present for first time: all other SC members present. Secretariat represented by Sobolev; SYG Lie absent.)

Austin opened meeting stating he noticed news statement in press that USUN responsible for fact no news released concerning these private meetings. This was not a fact. Parodi replying, agreed that Austin had stated accurately the understanding regarding release of

news. "We are all in agreement," Parodi said, "that each delegation can say what it wants to the press but no delegation will state what the views of other delegations might have been."

Austin then stated that he hoped delegations had specific ideas concerning the truce. These ideas, he emphasized, would be entirely informal and not binding on their governments. He outlined his idea of the truce as follows:

(a) The truce in Palestine should be a "standstill" arrangement.

(b) The truce should be operative until the GA sets up a new governmental arrangement to replace the mandatory power.

(c) The truce should maintain the *status quo* without making any political decisions.

(d) The truce should provide that the inhabitants of Palestine, namely, the people who are now there should be able to live comfortably without fear of violence. For example, there should be no threat to them of a break in water supplies, food provisions or the means of carrying on their customary peaceful livelihood. There should be no interventions from outside during the period of the mandate except with the approval of UK.

(e) Neither side is to import arms or material or people. The existing *status quo* of military organizations on both sides is to be kept static.

(f) There is to be no political action by either side unless said action is approved by the constituted power, that is, by the UK during the period of the mandate and until the GA inaugurates the next government of Palestine.

"These ideas," Austin added, "are for members here present to consider. They may be changed if members so desire. Their main objective is tranquility."

[Here follow observations by various Representatives, particularly with respect to the question of immigration and as to whether the United Nations Palestine Commission would be the appropriate agent of the Security Council to supervise the truce in Palestine. Views of Ambassador Austin then follow.]

[“]We must be sincere. We have heard the Syrian reaction to use of Palestine Commission to observe the truce.<sup>1</sup> This is a reasonable and natural reaction. I am inclined to favor Lopez’ idea that we set up a commission of observation, but one that obviously and clearly to everyone will not be trying to put across any political settlement. Therefore, I think the commission should not be the Palestine Commission. This is no reflection on Palestine Commission which has another frame of reference. The truce is an entirely different matter. Furthermore, the Palestine Commission is a part of the GA recommendation and the Palestine Commission should be here in New York for the special session.”

<sup>1</sup> Faris el-Khouri, the Syrian Representative at the United Nations, had asserted earlier in the discussions that the Commission had been appointed to establish partition and that its members were pro-partition.

[Here follow further views of various Representatives.]

At this point Gromyko intervened for the first time. He objected to such meetings "behind closed doors." He thought them without justification. He thought the truce was important. More important was the fact that a decision (the truce) of the SC was being ignored. This meant, he thought, that SC resolution was not strong enough. "Everybody knows who is responsible for violence in Palestine." Continuing, Gromyko said that US had expressed interesting ideas but overlooked who was responsible for the trouble in Palestine. UK took part in these meetings but the UK was either unable or unwilling to keep order in Palestine.

He thought that the question of Palestine should now be discussed in open session of SC; since the SC resolution was being ignored SC should find out who was ignoring it and if necessary carry out more effective steps. Someone might perhaps be embarrassed by an open discussion; maybe for that reason itself it would be better to have an open discussion.

Syria and Colombia denied that private meetings in any way were out of order.

Following the meeting, Colombia told certain members privately that there would be a meeting of some drafting experts at Colombian delegation offices, April 13, 10:30 a. m. for purpose of writing a truce proposal. All members of SC were welcome but those specifically invited to attend (and who accepted) were US, UK, France, Canada, China and Colombia.<sup>2</sup> [Knox.]

AUSTIN

---

<sup>2</sup> Mr. McClintock's memorandum of April 13 to Mr. Lovett noted that a draft resolution "was the product of a five-hour session today in the offices of the Colombian Representative to the Security Council, who consulted with Representatives of the US, UK, France, and Canada. This paper will be submitted to the other members of the Security Council at an informal meeting of tomorrow morning in Ambassador Austin's office. On the whole the paper seems to cover most of the points which were cited in the Department's instruction to Ambassador Austin contained in Deptel 208 last night." New York, in telegram 433, April 13, summarized the session (501.BB Palestine/4-1348).

In a marginal notation to Mr. Rusk on Mr. McClintock's memorandum, Mr. Lovett said: "I am doubtful about #4." Paragraph numbered 4 of the draft resolution read: "[The Security Council] Appoints a Truce Commission consisting of the Chief Consular Officers of those members of the Security Council which have Consulates in Jerusalem to assist the Mandatory Power in supervising this truce."

In a memorandum of April 14 to Mr. Rusk, Mr. McClintock noted Mr. Lovett's request to Mr. Rusk to clear the text of the draft resolution with Mr. Clifford. A marginal notation indicates that this was done (501.BB Palestine/4-1448).

---

*Editorial Note*

In telegram 438, April 14, 1:51 p. m., from New York, Mr. Ross sent to Mr. Rusk the informal, written comments of the Jewish Agency

on the American 15-point trusteeship program for Palestine. The telegram noted that Mr. Ross had received the comments the night before. At one point in the 14-page telegram, appeared the following Jewish Agency comment: "It is because the very concept of trusteeship is so flagrantly out of accord with the general principles and current realities of the Palestine situation that no improvement of the US proposals can make them a useful starting point in the quest for a political settlement." (501.BB Palestine/4-1448)

---

501.BB Palestine/4-1448: Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to  
the Secretary of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

NEW YORK, April 14, 1948—2:30 p. m.

US URGENT

439. For Rusk from Ross. Following is revised text of draft SC resolution agreed upon at informal meeting of Council members in long session this morning. Gromyko, Tarasenko, and Khouri specifically reserved their positions. Council meeting set for 2:30 tomorrow afternoon.

"Considering the Council's resolution of 1 April 1948 and the conversations held by its president with the representatives of the JA for Palestine and the AHC with a view to arranging a truce between Arabs and Jews in Palestine;

Considering that as stated in that resolution, it is of the utmost urgency to bring about the immediate cessation of acts of violence in Palestine, and to establish conditions of peace and order in that country;

Considering that the UK Government, so long as it remains the mandatory power, is responsible for the maintenance of peace and order in Palestine and should continue to take all steps necessary to that end; and that in so doing it should receive the cooperation and support of the SC in particular as well as of all the members of the UN;

The SC:

1. Calls upon all persons and organizations in Palestine and especially upon the AHC and the JA to take immediately without prejudice to their rights, claims, or positions, and as a contribution to the well-being and permanent interest of Palestine, the following measures:

(a) Cease all activities of a military or para-military nature, as well as acts of violence, terrorism and sabotage;

(b) Refrain from bringing into Palestine armed bands or individuals, whatever their origin, armed or capable of bearing arms and from assisting or encouraging the entry into Palestine of such armed bands and individuals;

(c) Refrain from importing or acquiring or assisting or encouraging the importation or acquisition of weapons and war materials;

(d) Refrain, pending further consideration of the future government of Palestine by the GA, from any political activity which might prejudice the rights, claims, or positions of either community;

(e) Cooperate with the mandatory authorities for the effective maintenance of law and order and of essential services particularly those relating to transportation, communications, health, and food and water supplies;

(f) Refrain from any action which will endanger the safety of the holy places in Palestine.

2. Requests the UK Government for so long as it remains the mandatory power to use its best efforts to bring all those concerned in Palestine to accept the measures set forth under paragraph 1 above and subject to retaining the freedom of action of its own forces to supervise the execution of these measures by all those concerned and to keep the SC and the GA currently informed on the situation in Palestine.

3. Calls upon all governments and particularly those of the countries neighboring Palestine to take all possible steps to assist in the implementation of the measures set out under paragraph 1 above and particularly those referring to the entry into Palestine of armed bands, individuals armed or capable of bearing arms and weapons and war materials.”<sup>1</sup>

AUSTIN

<sup>1</sup> Paragraph 4 of the original draft (see footnote 2, p. 819) was eliminated from the revised draft, for reasons indicated in telegram 446, April 14, *infra*. Otherwise the differences in the two drafts involved minor language changes. The Department, on April 15, authorized New York to support the draft resolution given in telegram 439 (telegram 217, 501.BB Palestine/4-1448).

501.BB Palestine/4-1448 : Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State*

SECRET

NEW YORK, April 14, 1948—9:41 p. m.

446. For Rusk from Knox. With reference to USUN 439<sup>1</sup> containing draft of truce proposal to be discussed at SC meeting Thursday following is gist of comments made at private meeting of SC members, held at USUN office April 14. (All members of the SC were present, except Parodi who was represented by a staff member, Dr. Arce appeared for the first time following his return from Bogotá and Buenos Aires, Sobolev represented Secretariat, Lie was absent):

Lopez explained that working paper containing truce terms which was to be discussed at the meeting had been prepared at the staff level by representatives of Colombia, UK, US, China, Canada and France.

<sup>1</sup> Dated April 14, *supra*.

Gromyko claimed that he had no knowledge that such drafting group was being formed and he apparently resented that this unofficial document had been prepared in his absence. There was a brief exchange between Gromyko and Lopez during which Lopez became rather heated. The matter ended when Gromyko indicated that the matter was not of great importance and when Lopez apologized for any misunderstanding which he (Lopez) may have unwittingly caused when he announced that this drafting meeting would be held.

Cadogan stated that his government wanted to get the views of the High Commissioner of Palestine on the proposed draft before committing itself.

El Khouri questioned the phrase (paragraph 1-b) "of military age". This he thought was too vague. It was subsequently changed to "capable of bearing arms".

Gromyko asked what clause in the resolution guaranteed the prevention of more armed bands from entering Palestine. Syria replied rather aggressively that Jews were coming into Palestine and that the Arabs in view of the present ratio of population had the right to enter Palestine in twice the number in order to keep the proportion even. This matter was settled, at least temporarily, when Lopez stated that the proposal was "for a standstill", and when Cadogan indicated that for the duration of the mandate the legal immigration quota of 1,500 per month would be continued.

Syria apparently accepted Canada's assurance that immigrants not armed or capable of bearing arms would not affect the military position in Palestine. Gromyko challenged point 4 of the proposed draft. This paragraph provided for a truce commission. Gromyko thought that the choice of members of the SC who had consulates in Jerusalem to compose the truce commission was arbitrary. At Lopez' suggestion this paragraph was eliminated (also some feeling in USUN that the presence of Syria on a truce commission might cause a bad public reaction to the commission and, by implication, to the truce proposal). Syria approved of the truce commission, and seemed determined not to withdraw voluntarily from the commission if it were eligible for membership.

During the paragraph by paragraph examination of the proposed draft, Austin suggested:

Insert "provisional" in paragraph 1 in order to make the phrase read "the following provisional measures". There was general objection, however, that this addition might shorten the duration of the truce.

In paragraph 1-a, Syria proposed substituting "as well as" in place of "including" and this was generally agreed to. In paragraph 1-b Syria supported by Canada and China replaced "military age" by wording which appears in USUN 439. In paragraph 1-c, Austin at-

tempted to replace "refrain from" by "prevent". There was general feeling, however, that the word "prevent" would encourage Arabs and Jews to enforce this provision on each other and hence increase the fighting. In paragraph 1-f, Austin suggested "protect" instead of "refrain from any action which will endanger". Members, however, objected that this might encourage Jews and Arabs to send armed forces to protect the Holy places.

Paragraph 2 was reworded as now appears in USUN 439 at the request of Cadogan. Paragraph 4 was dropped, because of Russian objection but might be introduced in the SC meeting on Thursday.

AUSTIN

501.BB Palestine/4-1548: Telegram

*The United States Representative of the United Nations (Austin)  
to the Secretary of State*

SECRET URGENT

NEW YORK, April 15, 1948—10:45 a. m.

449. [For] Rusk from Ross. Ambassador Austin, Jessup<sup>1</sup> and I called on Chaim Weizmann on his invitation late yesterday afternoon and had a very interesting talk with him for about three-quarters of an hour. Weizmann said he had tried very hard but could not understand the reasons for the "switch" in the US position. Was it fear of the Arabs? Was it oil? Or was it fear of Russia? He said there was no reason whatever to fear the Arabs. They were woefully weak. The Arabs could do nothing with their oil except sell it to the US. Did we fear they would sell it to Russia? If so, what would the Arabs do with Russian rubles? Were we afraid that the Jewish state would be dominated by Russia? There was no possible occasion for such fear. Bolshevik agents had tried very hard in the 1920's to get a foothold in Palestine and had failed miserably. Weizmann went on to say that the Jews were confronted with an extremely difficult psychological problem. They were granted independence in November and independence was withdrawn in April.

Assuming that there were no two-thirds majority in GA for trusteeship, the Jews would have the legal, and if not the legal certainly the moral right to go ahead with their plans to establish the Jewish state.

In response to our questions and comments, he said that the Jews had absolutely no fear of the Arabs and he elaborated on this by indicating that the Arab states were so disorganized and weak as to constitute almost the military factor of zero.

We made it clear that we felt such action by the Jews would be a mistake from their point of view.

<sup>1</sup> Philip C. Jessup, a representative of the United States at the Second Special Session of the General Assembly.



The Senator turned the conversation to the positive side and asked whether the Jews did not feel that their welfare would be far better if trusteeship would get a two-thirds vote in the Assembly.

This led to a discussion of essential Jewish requirements as Weizmann saw them. If trusteeship would include three essential points for the Jews, namely, immigration, land settlement, and economic development, it was wholly conceivable to Weizmann that trusteeship might be beneficial to the Jews, and also provide an opportunity for cooperation of the closest kind between Jews and Arabs, ending in due course to an agreed political settlement.

Weizmann, of course, undertook no commitment with regard to the foregoing but it was clear that his mind is rubbing strongly in this direction.

We did not discuss the question of possible US aid but we did discuss the possibility of UN assistance with particular reference to the specialized agencies, such as the FAO, the World Bank, and the WHO.

In concluding our conversation, the Senator indicated that he would like to deal in his Assembly opening statement with the question of economic development and Weizmann promised to have Eban, who was with us, send us material on economic development projects.<sup>2</sup>

AUSTIN

<sup>2</sup> Acting Secretary of State Lovett transmitted a copy of telegram 449 to President Truman in a memorandum of April 21, which stated in part: "The most interesting part of this telegram is found on the second page, where Dr. Weizmann suggests that a trusteeship which would include immigration, land settlement and economic development might provide an opportunity for an agreed political settlement between Jews and Arabs." (501.BB Palestine/4-1548; Truman Papers, President's Secretary's File)

501.BB Palestine/4-1548

*Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Director of the Office of United Nations Affairs (Rusk)*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] April 15, 1948—11:15 a. m.

Mr. Clifford stated that he had received the draft truce resolution<sup>1</sup> and the position paper on the attitude of the United States toward the November 29 resolution<sup>2</sup> and had given them to the President at the nine o'clock meeting today. He said that the President would read them over at the earliest possible moment and would inform him of any comments he might have.

I told Mr. Clifford that it was necessary for Senator Austin to vote in the Security Council this afternoon on the truce resolution. Mr. Clifford then said that he thought we should proceed to instruct Senator Austin to support the resolution, since he (Mr. Clifford) had looked

<sup>1</sup> See telegram 439, April 14, from New York, p. 820.

<sup>2</sup> See undated memorandum by Mr. Wilkins, p. 813.

it over very carefully and had told the President that he saw no objections to it and that it was in conformity with our previous discussions.

I told Mr. Clifford that we would proceed to instruct Senator Austin but that, of course, if the President subsequently wished to raise any points, we would attempt to deal with them by telephone.

---

*Editorial Note*

The United States Delegation to the Second Special Session of the General Assembly held its first meeting on April 15 to discuss the "United States Position on Palestine". At this meeting, "Mr. McClin- tock suggested it would be unwise at the present time to talk with other delegations regarding the possibility of sending funds and troops to enforce a trusteeship plan. He thought it enough to say that we were prepared to carry our fair share of responsibility in cooperation with other United Nations members." (Excerpts from the Minutes of Meeting, IO files, US/A/1086.)

The Second Special Session of the General Assembly convened in New York on April 16 to consider further the future government of Palestine. The *Official Records* of the Session, published by the United Nations, consist of the following:

Volume I, *Plenary Meetings of the General Assembly: Summary Records of Meetings, 16 April-14 May 1948*, hereinafter cited as "GA (II/SS), *Plenary*".

Volume II, *Main Committees: Summary Records of Meetings, 16 April-14 May 1948*, hereinafter cited as "GA (II/SS), *Main Committees*".

*Annex to Volumes I and II*, hereinafter cited as "GA (II/SS), *Annex*".

*Supplement No. 1, United Nations Palestine Commission, Report to the General Assembly.*

*Supplement No. 2, Resolutions, 16 April-14 May 1948*, hereinafter cited as "GA (II/SS), *Resolutions*".

The Report of the Palestine Commission, dated April 10, 1948, reviewed the Commission's activities in connection with implementing the measures recommended by the General Assembly for the partition of Palestine, with economic union. The Commission concluded "that the armed hostility of both Palestinian and non-Palestinian Arab elements, the lack of co-operation from the mandatory Power, the disintegrating security situation in Palestine, and the fact that the Security Council did not furnish the Commission with the necessary armed assistance, are the factors which have made it impossible for the Commission to implement the Assembly's resolution." (page 36)

501.BB Palestine/4-1648 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State*TOP SECRET      US URGENT  
NIACT

LONDON, April 16, 1948—3 p. m.

1583. 1. Discussed with Bevin yesterday afternoon, before his departure for Paris, substance Deptel 1260, April 9, which had been promptly submitted to him for consideration; Deptel 1315, April 14;<sup>1</sup> and cirtel April 6, contents of which had been delivered to Bevin on receipt.

2. Bevin's personal view is as follows, though the matter has not been submitted to the Cabinet:

(a) While he cannot prejudice the decision of the Cabinet, he feels that to the extent to which he has discussed matter with one or two of his colleagues it would be unacceptable both to the Cabinet and to the House of Commons. Moreover, it would create a very unfavorable reaction in Britain.

(b) Goldmann<sup>2</sup> has been to see him recently. Bevin gathers from Goldmann that he and his group are trying to push for a settlement along the lines of the original British proposal of about two years ago with Cantons, et cetera established throughout Palestine.

(c) He hopes that there will be a meeting in Geneva during the course of the next two or three days, attended by some forty prominent Jewish residents of Palestine, among others the head of the University of Jerusalem. This meeting, he expects, will pass a resolution urging a truce and recommending a settlement along the lines of the original British proposal of some two years ago.

(d) He noted the peace parade which took place in Jerusalem the day before yesterday.

(e) When asked what proposal he would suggest as an alternative to the one which we had put forward, he said at the moment he would prefer to make no commitment, and that in his judgment it would be preferable to let developments in the GA proceed for a few days before taking a position.

(f) In view of the above, he prefers to postpone full Cabinet consideration until early next week.

(g) HMG has great influence with the Arabs and will be persuasive with them in regard to any reasonable proposal. HMG does not, however, have any influence with the Jewish faction.

3. Lewis Jones tells me that everybody in the FonOff with whom he has discussed the question is unanimously of the view that the inclusion and re-entry of French troops into the Arab world would be disastrous and would project violent reaction because of general Arab attitude towards France.

DOUGLAS

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.<sup>2</sup> Nahum Goldmann, American Zionist leader, at this time representing the interests of the Provisional Government of Israel at London.

*Resolution 46 (1948) Adopted by the Security Council on April 17, 1948<sup>1</sup>*

*The Security Council,*

*Considering* its resolution 43 (1948) of 1 April 1948 and the conversations held by its President with the representatives of the Jewish Agency for Palestine and the Arab Higher Committee with a view to arranging a truce between Arabs and Jews in Palestine,

*Considering* that, as stated in that resolution, it is of the utmost urgency to bring about the immediate cessation of acts of violence in Palestine and to establish conditions of peace and order in that country,

*Considering* that the United Kingdom Government, so long as it remains the Mandatory Power, is responsible for the maintenance of peace and order in Palestine and should continue to take all steps necessary to that end; and that, in so doing, it should receive the co-operation and support of the Security Council in particular as well as of all the Members of the United Nations,

1. *Calls upon* all persons and organizations in Palestine, and especially upon the Arab Higher Committee and the Jewish Agency, to take immediately, without prejudice to their rights, claims, or positions, and as a contribution to the well-being and permanent interests of Palestine, the following measures:

(a) Cease all activities of a military or paramilitary nature, as well as acts of violence, terrorism and sabotage;

(b) Refrain from bringing and from assisting and encouraging the entry into Palestine of armed bands and fighting personnel, groups and individuals, whatever their origin;

(c) Refrain from importing or acquiring or assisting or encouraging the importation or acquisition of weapons and war materials;

(d) Refrain, pending further consideration of the future government of Palestine by the General Assembly, from any political activity which might prejudice the rights, claims, or position of either community;

(e) Co-operate with the Mandatory authorities for the effective maintenance of law and order and of essential services; particularly those relating to transportation, communications, health, and food and water supplies;

(f) Refrain from any action which will endanger the safety of the Holy Places in Palestine and from any action which would interfere with access to all shrines and sanctuaries for the purpose of worship by those who have an established right to visit and worship at them;

2. *Requests* the United Kingdom Government, for so long as it remains the Mandatory Power, to use its best efforts to bring all those concerned in Palestine to accept the measures set forth under Paragraph 1 above and, subject to retaining the freedom of action of its

<sup>1</sup> Reprinted from SC, 3rd yr., *Resolutions, 1948*, p. 15. The resolution was adopted by 9 votes to none, with the Soviet Union and the Ukraine abstaining.

own forces, to supervise the execution of these measures by all those concerned, and to keep the Security Council and the General Assembly currently informed on the situation in Palestine;

3. *Calls upon* all Governments, and particularly those of the countries neighboring Palestine, to take all possible steps to assist in the implementation of the measures set out under paragraph 1 above, and particularly those referring to the entry into Palestine of armed bands and fighting personnel, groups and individuals, and weapons and war materials.

---

501.BB Palestine/4-1648 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom*

TOP SECRET

NIACT

WASHINGTON, April 17, 1948—1 p. m.

1375. Personal from Lovett to Ambassador Douglas. I have just seen urtel 1583<sup>1</sup> and find Bevin's reply deeply disappointing. Please see him at the earliest possible moment and take up with him again the contents of Deptel 1260,<sup>2</sup> particularly the reasons why US-UK cooperation in finding settlement for Palestine is essential to vital interests of both countries. Tell him that we have not made the proposals contained therein in any belief that they or any other proposals are likely to work out in a fully satisfactory manner. We have not been able, however, to devise any more practical way out of a situation which is being created by the termination of the Palestine mandate. Some stand-still arrangement appears to us to be necessary to allow for cooling off before any agreed final settlement is possible. If Bevin has any alternative suggestions we would be glad to consider them at once.

You can not emphasize too much the vital necessity for joint US-UK action within the UN to prevent chaos and heavy fighting in Palestine. The feeling is growing rapidly in this country that UK is failing to cooperate with other Members of UN on the very question on which it has itself sought UN action. We are very much concerned by the increasingly bitter attitude to be observed among other delegations in UN. We find it difficult to believe that UK can continue to assume non-committal attitude and pursue a policy which will result in a situation so dangerous to its own security as well as to world peace.

It will be necessary for the United States Representative to speak at an early stage of the Special Session of the GA. The nature of our public statement will depend in large part upon the degree of cooperation which can be expected from the UK. We hope therefore to receive a more helpful reply at the earliest possible minute.

---

<sup>1</sup> Dated April 16, p. 826.

<sup>2</sup> Dated April 9, p. 805.

In pressing upon Mr. Bevin the serious threat to broad US-UK cooperation inherent in a failure of the UK to assume an active role in this problem, you should make it clear that we are merely stating the practical situation which will be faced by this government in dealing with Congress and the U.S. public. Our informal talks with Congressional leaders have left us in no doubt as to their attitude. Since you know the incalculable harm which will result to every aspect of US-UK interests and activities from a continuance of uncooperative UK attitude in this matter, you will be able in your own words to reflect the urgency which we place on this aspect of the Palestine question.<sup>3</sup>

(Sent London 1375 Rptd New York 224.)

LOVETT

---

<sup>3</sup> This telegram was cleared with the White House.

---

501.BB Palestine/4-1848: Telegram

*Memorandum by the Director of the Office of United Nations Affairs (Rusk) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)*

[WASHINGTON,] April 18, 1948.

MR. LOVETT: The attached draft<sup>1</sup> is for an initial statement, *provided* one has to be made by Senator Austin Monday morning. The Russians have refused to forego a general debate in plenary session, hence we may have to speak.

The attached speech does not drive hard on the British because it is too early to bear down on them; we need an answer to our latest effort.

I believe this is the minimum we should say in an opening statement.

On page 9, you'll find the paragraphs on troops<sup>2</sup> which have been cleared by the President and Mr. Forrestal. Jack Ohly, in Forrestal's office, later suggested informally that we insert the words "selected by

---

<sup>1</sup> Not printed; it was prepared for delivery by Ambassador Austin before the plenary meeting on April 19 of the Second Special Session of the General Assembly and was transmitted to New York in telegram 227, April 18, 6 p. m., not printed.

<sup>2</sup> These two paragraphs read: "The United States has raised with certain other governments the question of joint responsibility for the security of a temporary trusteeship. These discussions have thus far produced no tangible result. The United States is willing to undertake its share of responsibility for the provision of police forces which are required during a truce and a temporary trusteeship, along with other members who may be selected by the General Assembly and who are willing to carry out such a task in accordance with the will of the Assembly and with the provisions of the Charter.

"While the United States is prepared to carry its fair share of the United Nations burden involved in such a temporary trusteeship, it is not prepared to act alone in this matter. Our participation will be conditioned upon a readiness of other governments to provide similar assistance."

the General Assembly" after the word "governments" in the third line from the bottom of the page.<sup>3</sup>

For the record, Mr. Elsey stated that the President had read the two paragraphs and had written on the bottom of the sheet of paper the word "approved" and had initialed it. Clark Clifford had approved the text earlier.

D[EAN] R[USK]

<sup>3</sup> The insert is to be made after the fifth from the last word in the latter paragraph of footnote 2 above.

Forrestal Papers

*Diary Entry for April 18, 1948, by the Secretary of Defense  
(Forrestal)*

*Under Secretary of State Lovett*

Under Secretary Lovett came in this afternoon to discuss two things:

1. The continuous and extended disturbances in Central America. . . .
2. He stated that Senator Austin was scheduled to speak in the United Nations on Monday and that his statement would include an acceptance by the United States of the responsibility in making its portion of the contribution to the forces required for the maintenance of peace during the period of truce and trusteeship discussions. The nature of these forces, in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, will total 105,000 men of which the United States proportion would be on the order of 45,000. (Palestine)

501.BB Palestine/4-1848: Telegram

*The Ambassador in Egypt (Tuck) to the Secretary of State*

SECRET

CAIRO, April 18, 1948—9 a. m.

382. Azzam Pasha called yesterday to convey confidentially reaction Arab League to truce proposals suggested by UN to Arabs and Jews. Azzam said the "general lines" or instructions which would be sent representatives member states Arab League N.Y. as agreed upon by League Political Committee in which Arab Higher Committee is represented are:

1. League accepts in principle idea of an armistice or truce.
2. League will insist, however, that *status quo* of belligerents must be maintained. The truce in other words must not be used to increase armaments or number of belligerents through "infiltration by [land?] and/or sea".

3. This truce in League opinion is not an ordinary truce between belligerents but must have as its objective the bringing about of a final settlement and making further hostilities impossible.

4. Such a truce should give UN opportunity to seek pacific solution.

5. Partition in opinion of League is not a pacific solution since it can be implemented only by force. Therefore, it cannot be considered as a solution.

6. The League with a view to making this truce instrument of final pacification and rendering further fighting impossible is prepared to cooperate in complete disarmament population of Palestine, dissolution of all parliamentary organizations and dismantling of all military strongholds.

No other conditions were mentioned by Azzam. He stated his intention of informing British Ambassador of above and added he had already telephoned gist of it to his UN representative in New York. See also mytel 357, April 12.<sup>1</sup>

TUCK

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

501.BB Palestine/4-1848: Circular telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices*

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, April 18, 1948—8 p. m.

Reference Dept's Confidential instruction April 8, 1948,<sup>1</sup> forwarding copy of draft trusteeship agreement for Palestine. Copies this agreement have informally been made available on confidential basis to reps. of members of the SC, of certain other members of UN and of Jewish Agency and Arab Higher Committee. Dept has stressed that agreement is in draft form for use as working paper and that all suggestions for improvement would be welcomed. Dept has emphasized necessity for interim governmental machinery in Palestine following termination of British mandate on May 15 and has suggested that draft trusteeship agreement represents means of obtaining such machinery on sound legal basis under Charter.

You are authorized to discuss draft trusteeship agreement on similar basis with appropriate officials of govt. to which you are accredited. Thus far drafting rather than substantive changes have been made in draft. Important changes will be telegraphed shortly. In meantime draft in your possession may be used in your discussions.

Brief report re your discussions including views obtained and changes suggested is requested by telegraph as soon as possible.

<sup>1</sup> See footnote 1, p. 778.



Legation Damascus is also authorized to discuss with reps. AHC. ConGen Jerusalem is authorized to discuss with JA and to bring to attention of Palestine Govt.<sup>2</sup>

Sent to Jidda, Cairo, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Jerusalem, London and Paris for action. Repeated to USUN, N.Y. for info.

LOVETT

<sup>2</sup> The Department, on April 19, authorized Ambassador Tuck to discuss the draft trusteeship agreement with Azzam Pasha (telegram 438 to Cairo, 501.BB Palestine/4-1948). Cairo reported, on April 22, that the latter was "frankly and bitterly hostile to agreement as unnecessarily replacing mandate by new regime possessing some handicaps, many additional defects and no redeeming features . . . Document would convince Arabs that US still sponsored eventual creation Jewish state not merely in part of Palestine but . . . in all Palestine." (Telegram 398, 501.BB Palestine/4-2248)

Consul Wasson, on April 21, discussed with Mr. Kohn the question of a trusteeship agreement. The latter, after consultation with members of the Jewish Agency, informed the Consul on April 30 that "the Jewish Agency does not find in the draft agreement even a basis for discussion, since it does not provide for establishment Jewish state." (Telegram 515, April 30, 6 p. m., from Jerusalem, 501.BB Palestine/4-3048)

501.BB Palestine/4-1948

*The Secretary of Defense (Forrestal) to the Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, 19 April 1948.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In view of the position to be taken by the United States in the General Assembly with respect to Palestine, as discussed with Mr. Lovett yesterday afternoon, I believe it is desirable to consider the concrete consequences of this action in terms of our future course of action elsewhere. Every future decision must take into account the potential deployment of troops to that area, and I believe it may be helpful to all of us to outline briefly the results as I see them.

The United States commitment to undertake a proportionate share of the burden of providing the police forces required during a truce and temporary trusteeship in Palestine, is going to affect materially our ability to use military forces for any other purposes for a substantial time to come. Based upon the Joint Chiefs of Staff estimate as to the number of troops required to support this truce and trusteeship, and assuming the United States would have to supply, as would probably be the case, approximately 50 per cent of such forces, fulfillment of this commitment will probably require the deployment of approximately 50,000 men. This number represents substantially our entire present ground reserve, both Marine and Army. In other words, there will be no troops available for deployment to any other area, at least until such time as the strength of our total establishment has been

replenished through the operation of Selective Service, provided a Selective Service law is enacted. For at least six months, the United States will have to accept the loss of the bulk of its general reserve.

It should also be brought out that the logistical support of such troops will require a great deal of work within the zone of interior. This in turn may seriously affect our ability to carry out existing and projected programs of military assistance. Moreover, the acceptance of this undertaking will result in substantial additional costs to the National Military Establishment. These will in turn require the submission of a further supplementary budget of a size which cannot now be determined, or the reduction of other current military activities.

I bring out all these points because I feel that it may now be desirable to review the United States policy in such areas as Italy, Iran, Greece, China and Turkey, and its proposed policy with respect to Western Union. Since these policies are partly based on our ability to provide troops and military equipment, either currently or under certain future contingencies, the non-availability of such troops and equipment as a result of the United States position on Palestine may render these policies meaningless.<sup>1</sup>

Sincerely yours,

JAMES FORRESTAL

---

<sup>1</sup> An "Excerpt from Minutes of Meeting of United States Delegation to Second Special Session of the General Assembly, April 19, 1948, 9:30 a. m." cites Mr. Rusk as stating that "the United States was not going to buy into a war between the Jews and the Arabs of Palestine. The United States had no troops to be used in such a war, and, if it had such troops, they would not be used in Palestine. A war in Palestine was beyond the military possibilities of the United States. The scale of warfare there would commit absolutely all of the strategic reserves of the United States, and such a commitment was impossible for the United States to undertake. He re-emphasized repeatedly that the United States was not going to buy into a war in Palestine.

"Therefore, every effort should be made to put across the Security Council Truce, and to make it effective. The United States would, and all other United Nations members should be persuaded to put all possible pressure on the Arabs to preserve the truce. This was fundamental to a settlement of the Palestine Question." (IO files, US/A/M (Chr)/79 Add. 1)

USUN Files

---

*Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] April 19, 1948.

During the past few weeks there has been increasing discussion in the press and among the delegates at Flushing and Lake Success (but not officially in the United Nations itself), with regard to the present danger of civil strife to the Holy City of Jerusalem.

These discussions indicate two main lines of approach :

(1) Immediate dispatch of security forces by the United Nations to Jerusalem as suggested by members of the French Delegation (USUN Telegrams Nos. 457 and 458 of April 16,<sup>1</sup> copies of which are attached) ;

(2) The setting up of a temporary trusteeship or some other form of interim government by the United Nations for the City of Jerusalem only.

I am also attaching a copy of Deptel No. 228 of April 18<sup>2</sup> in which it is stated that the main United States effort in the United Nations should be concentrated on the achievement of a temporary trusteeship for all of Palestine rather than for security measures or a temporary trusteeship in a part of Palestine. It also stated that in discussions between members of the United States Delegation and other delegations it would be helpful to obtain suggestions regarding a temporary trusteeship for Jerusalem as a preliminary to or part of a temporary trusteeship for all of Palestine. It is believed that if we approach the immediate problem of Jerusalem in this manner we will increase the likelihood of support for a trusteeship for all of Palestine and at the same time develop constructive suggestions with regard to the City of Jerusalem.

It is my thought that if the United Nations should give all of its attention to Jerusalem, we may end up with interim governmental machinery for Jerusalem and with no form of government for the rest of Palestine following the termination of the British Mandate on May 15. In such eventuality, I can envisage a situation, as has previously occurred in China and in Morocco, in which conditions of anarchy and famine would prevail beyond the borders of a restricted international area with thousands of refugees pouring into the area to obtain emergency protection, food and housing. If a situation of this character should develop in Palestine and if refugees from all parts of Palestine descended upon Jerusalem, the difficulties which would confront the United Nations administration would be almost insuperable.

If a special area for Jerusalem were extended to the coast to include the ports of Tel Aviv and Jaffa, conditions would undoubtedly be alleviated; nevertheless, I feel we should be under no misapprehension regarding the difficult financial and administrative problems which would confront the United Nations. It is for this reason I recommend that we should continue to stress and support the necessity for a temporary trusteeship for all of Palestine rather than for a

---

<sup>1</sup> Neither printed.

<sup>2</sup> To New York, not printed.

restricted part of that country. At the same time I agree that, as a last resort, we should be preparing plans within the Department for the protection of Jerusalem and environs in case all else fails.

---

501.BB Palestine/4-1948

*Memorandum by Mr. Robert M. McClintock to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)*

[WASHINGTON,] April 19, 1948.

Mr. Rusk telephoned at noon to say that the Plenary Session this morning of the General Assembly decided not to stage any general debate on Palestine but to refer the matter immediately to the First Committee (Political and Security Affairs).<sup>1</sup> Since Ambassador Austin's statement will now be made before Committee 1, which meets at 10:30 tomorrow morning, there may be some minor textual changes in his speech which had been intended for delivery at the Plenary Session. Mr. Rusk says he knows what you have in mind for the statement but that he will endeavor to send us the text of any modification which might be made in Ambassador Austin's remarks.

Following the Plenary Session this morning, Ambassador Austin and Mr. Rusk told the press that the decision of the Plenary to suspend debate and send the question immediately to Committee 1 represented the fastest possible action and was therefore all to the good.

---

<sup>1</sup> See GA (II/SS), *Plenary*, p. 9. The Assembly decision was made by 44 votes to none, with 10 abstentions.

---

*Editorial Note*

Ambassador Austin set forth the United States position before the First Committee on April 20, calling for a truce in Palestine and the establishment of a trusteeship there; for text of his statement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 2, 1948, page 568. The Ambassador, at the same time, presented as a working paper the United States draft trusteeship agreement, with minor changes from that printed on page 778; for text of the working paper, see GA (II/SS), *Annex*, page 12.

Mr. Jessup, on April 21, introduced a draft resolution into the First Committee which called for reference of the United States working paper to the Fourth (Trusteeship) Committee; for Mr. Jessup's statement on that occasion, see GA (II/SS), *Main Committees*, page 26. The text of the draft resolution is printed in GA (II/SS), *Annex*, page 31.

IO Files: US/A/1070, US/S/462

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Dean Rusk of the United States  
Delegation at the United Nations*

SECRET

[NEW YORK,] April 20, 1948.

At my request I had an hour's discussion with Fawzi Bey<sup>1</sup> at Lake Success this afternoon. I told him that I had been looking forward to an informal and personal conversation for some time and that what I had to say was of a personal rather than an official character.

I told Fawzi Bey that we had been thinking for some time about an international force which might be required in connection with a truce and trusteeship for Palestine. It seemed to us important that a number of governments who could be relied upon to carry out the wishes of the General Assembly should agree to accept responsibility for the security of Palestine if the police available to the Governor General proved inadequate. I said that it was common knowledge that this question had been raised with the British and the French but that I felt he would be interested in knowing that we had given considerable thought to Egypt's participation along with ten or twelve other United Nations Members in such a force. Any such proposal would, of course, be presented to the Egyptian Government for its consideration and we would not wish to embarrass Egypt by raising the question if they were unwilling to participate. I said that a considerable number of states would be desirable, even if their contributions varied considerably, in order to underline the broad United Nations aspect of the question and to afford a representative group of members. Egypt's position as a leading member of the Arab League and the moderation shown by their delegations in the United Nations had led us to believe that Egypt could play an important and helpful role in this matter.

Fawzi Bey replied that he appreciated my letting him know informally that we had been thinking about this matter and that he realized that I was not making any proposals to him. He stated that such participation would raise serious questions for them among certain Arab groups who would not be enthusiastic about Egypt playing this role. He wondered if we had considered Trans-Jordan. I told him that we had but had supposed that there would be political difficulties about Trans-Jordan's participation, particularly in view of the fact that that country was not a Member of the United Nations and the fact that our suggestion of Trans-Jordan might be seriously misunderstood. He agreed that that might raise many difficulties. He then said that the Arabs as a whole were not very enthusiastic about international forces coming into Palestine. He did not wish to question any motives of any government but he merely wished to report the concern among

---

<sup>1</sup> Mahmoud Fawzi, Egyptian Representative at the United Nations.

many Arabs lest an international force brought into Palestine for one purpose might suddenly be turned to another. I told him that our thought was that the nations who might be willing to contribute such forces would agree among themselves by means of a special protocol as to the numbers, role and conditions of such a joint venture and that Egypt's participation might itself be a guarantee that the agreed purposes of the international force would in fact be followed.

[Here follows Mr. Rusk's account of the remainder of the conversation.]

501.BB Palestine/4-2048 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET      US URGENT  
 NIACT

LONDON, April 20, 1948—11 a. m.

1630. Personal for Lovett from Douglas.

1. I had a long discussion with Bevin last evening reviewing the substance of Deptel 1260, April 9, and considerations which should prompt US-UK cooperation in finding solution to the problem of Palestine. (Deptel 1375, April 17, received here Sunday.)

2. Bevin is deeply concerned, and I am confident is not deliberately adopting a "Dog-in-the-manger" attitude. Indeed, he is particularly anxious that UK's position be not interpreted as non-cooperative. He is, however, at his wit's end to know what to do. He is giving the matter, I am confident, earnest thought, will discuss it with his colleagues, and will discuss the matter again with me tomorrow.

3. For your information, the Conservative Party would vigorously oppose any suggestion that British troops be retained in Palestine. More than a week ago Churchill<sup>1</sup> stated this view to me in unqualified terms. Most of the Labor members of Parliament would be equally opposed. This political situation which, I am confident I accurately assess, makes Bevin's position doubly difficult.

4. I regret that I cannot give you any assurance in these circumstances that HMG will agree to our proposal. It is remotely possible that Bevin may suggest some alternative plan. Will cable again as soon as I see him tomorrow.

DOUGLAS

<sup>1</sup> Winston S. Churchill, leader of the Conservative Party.

*Editorial Note*

The Trusteeship Council, on April 21, adopted a Draft Statute for the City of Jerusalem. The Council prepared this twenty-one page

document pursuant to a directive from the General Assembly to elaborate and approve a detailed Statute for the City.

The Statute defined the special international regime for the City of Jerusalem, constituting it a *corpus separatum* under the administration of the United Nations in accordance with the resolution of the General Assembly on November 29, 1947; for the text of the Statute, see United Nations, *Official Records of the Trusteeship Council, Second Session, Third Part, Annex*, page 4.

The British military authorities in the Haifa area, on the night of April 21, announced withdrawal of their forces to the airport, port area, and main road of that city. They made known also their firm intention not to interfere in clashes between Jews and Arabs or in any other problems apart from the British security and evacuation program. That same night fighting broke out between the Jews and Arabs for control of the evacuated area. (Telegram 29, April 22, from Haifa)

The Jews were successful in the fighting (telegram 33, April 23, from Haifa). Local Mufti-dominated Arab leaders urged all Arabs to leave the city and large numbers did so, the British providing convoy escorts to Lebanon and sea transport to Acre (telegram 40, April 22, from Haifa). By April 26, some 6,000 to 7,000 Arabs had fled from Haifa, the Arab Higher Committee, "reportedly" ordering all Arabs to leave. The Jews wanted the Arabs to "remain for political reasons to show democratic treatment[;] they will also need them for labor although Jews claim latter not essential." (Telegram 44, April 26, from Haifa)

The Arab States protested vigorously to the British Foreign Office that British withdrawal from most of Haifa was contrary to the understanding under which they agreed to refrain from intervention in Palestine until May 15. They also accused the British of giving the Jews a considerable advantage for which the Arabs were unprepared. (Telegram 1717, April 23, from London)

The American Consul at Haifa, Aubrey E. Lippincott, drew the following conclusions:

"1. The local Arabs are not 100% behind the present effort. Those who are fighting are in a small minority.

"2. A large number of Arabs in this country are entirely depending on outside forces to settle this dispute.

"3. Such forces as the Arabs have are quite amateur. Although they have some organization, the essential discipline for such an organization is lacking. Their sense of organizational supply and tactics is almost nil.

"4. For the time being we shall probably see large Jewish successes in the field. Unless the Arabs get some organization and training, they will be a very minor obstacle to the Jews on the battlefield. If outside forces come in, the whole matter is a different story. Here again, however, there are signs of disorganization, and there have been as yet

no signs of discipline and training comparable to that of the Jews." (Airgram 5, April 23, from Haifa)

All telegrams cited in this editorial note are filed under 867N.01.

501.BB Palestine/4-2148 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom*

TOP SECRET      US URGENT      WASHINGTON, April 21, 1948—3 p. m.  
NIACT

1418. UK Delegation to UN in press conference at NY yesterday made following 4 points as reported in today's *NY Times*:

"(1) Britain will retain no civil responsibility in Palestine after May 15.

(2) No British troops will be left in Palestine for any purpose whatever after Aug. 1.

(3) Between these two dates, there will be no enforcement by British forces of any settlement not having the agreement of both Jews and Arabs.

(4) Within these limits, however, the British Govt. will cooperate in every way possible with any authority established in Palestine."

In addition, official spokesman of UK delegation said that if any group of other powers were to request it, British Govt. would be willing to consider what adjustments could be made in its plans for withdrawing from Palestine, so as to help bridge gap while forces of this UN group were being organized and transported to Palestine. Britain would consider using its forces if necessary, even after May 15, for execution of SC political and military truce in Palestine. UK now urgently preparing next steps in this truce attempt.

Goldmann's report of his conversation with McNeil, as set forth para. 1, your 1635, Apr. 20,<sup>1</sup> would seem to corroborate foregoing press statement. However, para. 3, your 1630, Apr. 20, suggests that both Labor and Conservative Parties "would vigorously oppose any suggestion that Brit. troops be retained in Palestine." If press conference statement and remarks attributed to McNeil are a correct reflection of British policy, we feel that this opportunity to utilize UK forces for an interim period should be promptly availed of.

Please check these points immediately with Bevin. Stress to him our hope that UK will find it possible to fill the breach in Palestine until a UN solution such as temporary trusteeship or some other arrangement can be found. You should make it clear, however, that we have not ceased to hope that UK, France and other Powers may find their

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



way clear to join with us in sharing burden of implementation of temporary trusteeship if such a trusteeship is voted by GA.

Repeated to USUN as 240.

LOVETT

867N.01/4-2248

*Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)*

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] April 22, 1948.

In a little more than three weeks, unless some change can be effected in the situation, the British will abandon their mandate and will relinquish responsibility for law and order in Palestine. There is no necessity to enlarge upon what is likely to happen in the Middle East if the British wash their hands of Palestine before some kind of arrangements can be effected for the maintenance of law and order in that country.

The National Security Council decided some time ago, after considerable deliberation, that the security of the Middle East was vital to the security of the United States.<sup>1</sup> The developing situation in Palestine threatens the security of the United States and world peace. Any kind of an international arrangement which we may effect for preserving world peace on a basis which would be compatible with the security of the United States is lacking in substance so long as the cancerous Palestine situation continues to develop unchecked. We are not likely to make much headway in the atmosphere of indecision and confusion which envelops the United Nations at the present time unless Palestine is tackled by us at once dramatically and energetically as one of our most vital and urgent international problems.

The present policy of the United States Government with regard to Palestine is two-fold: 1) The United States will act on the Palestine question only as a Member of the United Nations. The United States will accept no unilateral responsibility and will take no unilateral action in this situation. 2) The United States is now supporting the Security Council's call for a truce in Palestine and believes that a temporary trusteeship for Palestine should be established by the General Assembly which would provide interim governmental machinery in Palestine following the termination of the British Mandate on May 15 and which would be without prejudice to the rights, claims and position of the Jews and Arabs of Palestine and without prejudice to the eventual political settlement for Palestine.

<sup>1</sup> See letter of November 24, 1947, from the Acting Secretary of State to President Truman, *Foreign Relations, 1947*, vol. v, p. 623.

In dealing with the Palestine problem through the United Nations we must face this problem on at least four fronts:

1. We must persuade the more moderate Jews in this country to break the hold which a minority of extreme American Zionists now has on American Jewry so that Jewish leaders in this country, instead of continuing to push Palestine Jews into an extremely nationalistic position, will endeavor to impress upon them the importance of assuming a reasonable and moderate attitude of cooperation with the Arabs.

2. We must make the Arab leaders, particularly those of the Arab League and of the Arab countries, understand that unless they on their part are willing to adopt a conciliatory and reasonable attitude of cooperation with the Jews, the security and prosperity of the whole Middle East will be gravely threatened.

3. We must sternly insist that Great Britain and other democratic powers join us wholeheartedly and energetically in an effort to find a peaceable way out of the Palestine impasse and point out to them that our failure in this respect may well undermine the security of the Western world.

4. We must impress upon both Republican and Democratic leaders, including Presidential candidates and members of Congress, the gravity of the Palestine problem and endeavor to gain their cooperation in seeing that the Palestine problem is no longer to be treated as a football of domestic politics, but as a matter seriously involving the security of the United States.

#### *Recommendations:*

A procedure along the following lines is recommended, subject, of course, to the approval of the President:

1. That you suggest to the Secretary that as soon as he can do so without seriously risking the success of the Conference, he leave Bogotá, announcing that he is returning to the United States to devote a major portion of his time and energy to the Palestine problem.

2. That the Palestine problem again be considered by the National Security Council as a matter of urgent national importance and that a firm, clear-cut decision be taken with regard to it which meets with the approval of the President and the Secretary.

3. That in consultation with the President, the Secretary have a conference or a series of conferences with leaders of Congress and the two political parties in order to remove Palestine from domestic politics and to give it its rightful place as a dangerous and difficult international problem. The support of these leaders for the decision taken by the National Security Council should be solicited.

4. That in consultation with the President, the Secretary call a conference of the outstanding leaders of the Jewish Community in the United States in order to obtain their support for our policy as developed by the National Security Council. Their cooperation should be requested to the end that the Jewish Community in the United States do its utmost to prevail upon the Jews in Palestine to adopt a reasonable and conciliatory attitude. The influence of Americans of Italian origin exerted in the Italian elections is an example of what might be done along this line.

5. That he talk both in Washington and in New York with representatives of the Western Powers in order to obtain their cooperation with regard to Palestine and that he send personal messages on the subject to Bevin and other key persons.

6. That he impress in personal conversations upon representatives of the Arab countries in the United States the fact that the Arab world will face political and economic disaster if the Palestine situation develops into mass fighting, and that unless the Arabs adopt a reasonable and conciliatory attitude, such fighting involving an increasing number of peoples and nations is likely to take place. These talks should be followed up with appeals to key Arab leaders abroad. These appeals should be of a friendly but stern nature.

7. Every effort should be made to explain through the press, radio, public addresses, etc., our position to the American people and to gain public support. We should abandon our present defensive attitude and take the offensive in a confident and courageous manner, calling upon all loyal citizens to back up the policy of the Government in an effort to achieve bipartisan support.

L[OY] W. H[ENDERSON]

---

*Editorial Note*

President Truman, in reply to a question at his press conference of April 22, 1948, concerning the possible sending of American troops to Palestine, stated: "We offered to furnish our share of a United Nations police force. That is the only way we will send troops anywhere under the United Nations. As a part of a United Nations police force for the enforcement of the orders of the United Nations, we will furnish our share, just as Mr. Austin said we would." (*Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1948*, page 229.)

---

867N.01/4-2248: Telegram

*The Consul at Jerusalem (Wasson) to the Secretary of State*

JERUSALEM, April 22, 1948.

468. Following is text of declaration adopted by General Zionist Council in Tel Aviv April 12:<sup>1</sup>

"We have decided, relying on the authority of the Zionist movement and the support of the entire Jewish people, that upon the termination of the mandatory regime there shall be an end of foreign rule in Palestine, and that the governing body of the Jewish state shall come into being.

"The state which the Jewish people will set up in its own country will guarantee justice, freedom and equality for all its inhabitants

<sup>1</sup>The Department, citing press reports of April 13, had requested the text of this declaration (telegram 265, April 13, 6 p. m., to Jerusalem, 501.BB Palestine/4-1348).

regardless of religion, race, sex, or land of origin. It is our aim to make it a state in which the exiles of our people are gathered together, in which happiness and knowledge shall prevail and the vision of the prophets of Israel shall illumine our path.

"At this hour, when bloodshed and strife have been forced upon us, we turn to the Arabs in the Jewish state and to our neighbours in adjacent territories with an appeal for brotherhood, cooperation and peace. We are a peaceful people, and we are here to build in peace. Let us then build our state together, as equal citizens with equal rights and obligations, with mutual trust and respect, each with a true understanding of the others needs.

"Our lives are dedicated to defending the liberty of our people. If further trials and battles are in store for us, we shall defend with all our might the achievement upon which we place our hopes.

"Right is on our side. With us are the hopes of the past generations of our people. With us is the conscience of the world. With us are deposited the testament of the millions of our martyred dead and the resolute will to live of the millions who have survived. The sanctity of our martyrs and heroes rests upon us, and the God of our Fathers will help us."

WASSON

---

501.BB Palestine/4-2248: Circular telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, April 22, 1948—7 a. m.

Reference is made to Dept Radio Bulletin No. 94 of April 20 quoting statement regarding Palestine by Ambassador Austin in the First Committee of the General Assembly on that date.

Particular attention is directed toward those paragraphs dealing with efforts which US has made in concert with other members of UN since Special Session of May 1947 to achieve solution of Palestine problem which would be acceptable to Jews and Arabs of Palestine.

Particular attention is also directed to conclusion informally reached by members of SC on March 19 that "it was impossible to find the necessary agreement, either among the peoples of Palestine or among the members of the Security Council, to permit the peaceful implementation of the Assembly Resolution" of November 29, 1947 which provided for partition with Economic Union. It was for this primary reason that US thereafter suggested necessity for immediate truce in Palestine, early convocation of Special Session of GA and temporary trusteeship for Palestine which would provide interim governmental machinery in Palestine following termination British Mandate on May 15.

Call for truce was issued by SC April 17; Special Session GA was convoked April 16; US submitted draft trusteeship agreement April 20

as working paper to members UN for their consideration as feasible form interim governmental machinery for Palestine following termination British Mandate May 15. It is hoped other members UN will have suggestions to make concerning this draft, that it will be debated shortly and that if any members have alternative suggestions as to other forms interim governmental machinery they will make them as soon as possible.

You are instructed to discuss question of Palestine along foregoing lines immediately with Prime Min, For Min or Chief of State or if you deem it helpful with all of them. You should make it clear during your talks that unless way can be found at once to prevent situation in Palestine from developing into open warfare security of whole ME will be seriously threatened and economic situation of Arab world is certain to deteriorate with result that its economic development will be retarded for many years to come. You should also make it clear that so long as Palestine situation continues to remain serious threat to peace of ME it would seem to be pointless for US to endeavor to enter into any arrangements of political or economic nature looking forward to promotion of security or economic improvement of ME.<sup>1</sup>

You should impress upon officials with whom you are talking that no matter how deep an interest US may have in maintenance of security of ME and in development of ME prosperity it feels that there are no effective measures which it can take in this direction until way is found out of Palestine impasse.<sup>2</sup>

Sent to Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Jidda and Cairo for action; repeated to Jerusalem, London, Paris and New York for info.

Baghdad, Beirut and Jidda please await immediately following telegram<sup>3</sup> before taking action.

LOVETT

<sup>1</sup>The Office of Financial and Development Policy called a meeting on May 7 to discuss the economic implications of the political situation in the Middle East. The meeting was attended by nine economic officers and two NEA representatives. The memorandum covering the conversation was prepared by Samuel J. Gorlitz of the Division of Investment and Economic Development. It stated that "after general discussion, it was agreed that the circular telegram of April 22 to Middle East missions should be interpreted to mean that despite our long-range policy of positive economic assistance to the Middle East states, execution of specific projects should be delayed until the Palestine situation has been clarified, but that planning activities should continue." (890.50/5-748)

<sup>2</sup>Ambassador Tuck conveyed the purport of the circular telegram of April 22 to Egyptian Prime Minister Nokrashy on April 24. He advised that "Nokrashy Pasha listened attentively, then remarked that message which I had delivered was very serious. While he did not say so in as many words, I had the inescapable impression that my statement to him—with reference to pointlessness for US to endeavor to enter into any arrangement of a political or economic nature looking forward to promotion of security or economic improvement of the ME pending solution Palestine impasse—was, in fact, an attempt by our government to force Arab states to modify their present policy toward defense of Palestine." (Telegram 410, April 24, 5 p. m., 501.BB Palestine/4-2248)

<sup>3</sup>See telegram 117 to Baghdad, April 22, p. 850.

501.BB Palestine/4-2248

*Memorandum by Mr. Robert M. McClintock to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)*

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] April 22, 1948.

The following comments present a preliminary view and are offered on my own responsibility as I have not had an opportunity to discuss them with Mr. Rusk:

1. On the basis of the initial reception of our trusteeship suggestion it is apparent that the delegations in New York City are distinctly lukewarm. They await concrete evidence of our willingness to send troops to Palestine to maintain a temporary trusteeship. They will not vote for such a trusteeship unless there is implementation by the United States, to say nothing of other powers.

2. Ambassador Douglas reports in his #1672 today<sup>1</sup> (attached) that an agreed truce by the Arabs and Jews is most unlikely; that, in the absence of agreement between the parties, the proposal for trusteeship will require the use of substantial force; and that the British will not participate in the use of force against either the Arabs or Jews to impose an unacceptable regime.

3. The Australian Delegation announced yesterday that it would today introduce a resolution (copy attached<sup>2</sup>) which, in effect, would reaffirm the recommendation of November 29, 1947, for the partition of Palestine. The Australian resolution does not indicate by what means this recommendation can be carried out. It is much to be doubted whether the Australian resolution could muster a two-thirds vote of the members of the United Nations. However, it is possible that the Australian resolution, in light of the fact that there will be many abstentions on the vote, may receive a majority in Committee 1 of those delegations which do vote.

4. As indicated in my earlier memorandum to you, the French Representative, Ambassador Parodi, has strongly urged that something be done to save Jerusalem. It seems probable that this will strike a responsive chord in the United Nations and elsewhere. Measures to protect Jerusalem will be popular measures; they will be highly attractive to the Jews, who are concerned for their 100,000 fellows now cut off in the capital city, and they will give the impression to the world that the United Nations is "doing something" about Palestine. The chances are strong, therefore, that the basic Palestine problem will

<sup>1</sup> *Infra.*

<sup>2</sup> Copy not found attached; see UN document A/C.1/279, April 21.

presently be placed to one side in favor of immediate measures for the security of the Holy Places in Jerusalem or, in other words, Jerusalem itself. A copy of the French resolution on Jerusalem is attached herewith.<sup>3</sup>

5. I have a strong hunch that if the Jerusalem enclave, as traced on the map<sup>4</sup> which I sent you this morning, is established by the General Assembly and if the other Powers subscribe forces for its protection, the Palestine problem may be well on the road to a more or less automatic solution. If the enclave were defended against the admission of refugees from without (which is a valid point raised by Mr. Henderson in his memorandum to you of April 19), the partition of Palestine along the lines of ethnographical boundaries would come about almost automatically except for the two cities of Jaffa and Haifa, each of which have large segments of both Jewish and Arab inhabitants.

6. It seems to me that, not receding from our present position in favor of trusteeship (which gives us leverage in both directions with either the Arabs or the Jews), we might find it convenient to go along with the French suggestion for special measures in behalf of Jerusalem; secure, on the basis of a crusading contribution, the dispatch of a fairly numerous group of armed contingents from United Nations members for the protection of Jerusalem, and then sit down to let nature take its course.<sup>5</sup> A further step at this Assembly would be, in light of our proposal for a temporary trusteeship, to move the suspension pending further developments of the Assembly's resolution of November 29, 1947. An additional and necessary step would be an agreement by Great Britain, the United States, and France, under United Nations auspices, to maintain a naval patrol of the Palestinian coasts to prevent illegal immigration, while at the same time undertakings should be given by the Arab States to prevent immigration from the land frontiers of Palestine.

7. Although prophesy is perilous, it is possible that the establishment of a hard core of security from Jerusalem to the sea would bring about a *de facto* partition of Palestine with the Jewish State centered on Tel Aviv and extending north along the coast to almost, if not including, Haifa.<sup>6</sup> I should not care if Transjordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Egypt took over the rest of the country.

<sup>3</sup> Copy not found attached; see UN document A/C.1/280, April 22.

<sup>4</sup> Copy not found in Department of State files.

<sup>5</sup> Marginal notation by Mr. Lovett: "I have talked to Rusk and told him we must push Jerusalem safety as directed."

<sup>6</sup> Marginal notation by Mr. Lovett: "I think you are wrong."