

501.BB Palestine/5-2548 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Jerusalem

CONFIDENTIAL US URGENT WASHINGTON, May 25, 1948—1 p. m.

467. Burdett authorized informally to represent this govt on SC Truce Commission pending appointment by the President of official representative replacing Wasson.¹ Repeated to USUN as 321, Paris as 1787, Brussels as 779, London as 1898. Jerusalem repeat to Arab capitals.

MARSHALL

¹ Consul Wasson, on his return to the Consulate General at Jerusalem from a meeting of the Security Council Truce Commission on May 22, was fatally wounded by a sniper's bullet and died the next day; for Ambassador Austin's report of May 22 on the matter, see SC, *3rd yr., Supplement for May 1948*, p. 94.

867N.01/5-2548 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State*TOP SECRET US URGENT LONDON, May 25, 1948—2 p. m.
NIACT

2251. For Lovett from Douglas. At meeting this morning (paragraph seven Embtel 2225, May 22)¹ which will be described in later telegram, Bevin again raised with me question as to whether "cease-fire" order by Israel will effectively include Irgun and Stern groups. He asked me as matter of great urgency to suggest to you in interest of securing Arab acceptance cease-fire that USG urge upon Israel, whose President is now Washington, desirability of immediate statement by Israel to effect (a) that cease-fire on Jewish side includes Irgun and Stern groups and (b) that Israel for duration cease-fire will not permit immigration or will at least limit it to women and children.²

2. Bevin, speaking obviously with approval Attlee and at what amounted to informal meeting of Defense Committee, said that statement on these two points might help restore modicum belief in Jewish good faith among Arabs who cannot forget how Irgun and Stern have broken earlier cease-fires and that Jewish immigrants now arriving Palestine consist largely fighting men.

3. Bevin said for his part he undertook to advise Arab states today not to impose strict conditions as price acceptance cease-fire.

¹ *Ante*, p. 1032.

² The Department, on May 26, informed London that time and circumstances did not permit the action suggested by Mr. Bevin on these two matters. It noted also that it had queried Jerusalem on the Irgun-Stern matter (telegram 1929, 867N.01/5-2648). Regarding the query and the reply of Jerusalem, see footnote 2, p. 1034. The nature of the reply from Jerusalem was sent to London on May 25 in telegram 1896 (867N.01/5-2548).

4. Bevin expressed belief Jews would gain by Weizmann's issuing at this critical moment as gesture of good faith a statement along lines paragraph one above.

5. Bevin is hopeful next 48 hours will produce real chance to grapple with Palestine problem.

6. I undertook to put Bevin's views to you most urgently.

7. I have just been advised that FonOff telegram in sense paragraph three left London for Arab capitals in highest priority at 1 p. m. today.³

DOUGLAS

³ A marginal notation in the handwriting of Mr. McClintock, on an information copy of this telegram, states that this message was "Passed to White House 11 a. m. May 25 by Mr. Humelsine at Mr. Lovett's direction."

867N.01/5-2548 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

LONDON, May 25, 1948—8 p. m.

2267. Embassy's 2213, May 21 [22].

1. Further evidence British Government shares my concern re gulf widening between US and British over Palestine was calibre group assembled by Attlee and Bevin this morning at latter's private residence for secrecy purposes (Embassy's 2225, May 22, paragraph 7). Besides persons named above, present were Secretary State for Commonwealth Relations, Minister Defence, Lord Tedder of Air Ministry, Vice-Admiral Sir J. Edelston of Admiralty, Lt. General Templar of War Office, Major General Hollis of Ministry of Defence, Sir Orme Sargent and F. K. Roberts of Foreign Office. I was accompanied by Lewis Jones. Purpose of gathering was to make available to USG through me latest British views re political and strategic aspects Palestine problem.

2. Re strategic implications, Tedder said that strategically Palestine is not problem Arabs vs Jews but one of geography since Palestine is not only part of Middle East bridge between east and west, but also between Asia and Africa. British Chief of Staff believe Middle East is "other foot" of defense of UK and western Europe and that this also true with regard to USG vis-à-vis USSR because trans-polar route is "inadequate" and not likely be decisive. Tedder said Middle East oil is vital militarily both in peace and war. Speaking for British Chief of Staff, Tedder said that Moslem ideology is one of world's strongest, embracing as it does area from Casablanca through Pakistan into Indonesia. British Chief of Staff believe Moslem ideology capable of being worked up along anti-western lines because of Palestine and

if this happens it will constitute almost insuperable military problem. Tedder said that military criteria for Palestine solution were first, that it must not be one which would open Palestine to Soviet influence and, second, not be one which will alienate Moslem good-will towards US and UK. It is plain USSR wants to be in Middle East for same reasons US and UK wish to keep USSR out.

3. Re sanctions, Bevin said it is susceptibility Middle East countries to Soviet influence which in large measure caused him to take such a firm stand against UN sanctions. Few people seem to remember far-reaching difficulties experienced with 1935 sanctions against Mussolini which proved that there is no such thing as "half-sanctions": i.e., if applied to Middle East countries we could not hope to continue to get oil from these countries or to continue oil development and pipeline programs considered so vital militarily and for recovery of Europe. There is no doubt in his mind that very least Moslem states would do would be to ignore sanctions and this would in itself tend to pit west versus east. Bevin said Iraq offered excellent test re results sanctions. Iraqi Government is already tottering and has asked British Government for funds pay current expenses. Effect sanctions on Iraq (stopping oil royalties and oil exports) would be to topple Iraqi Government into chaos. Bevin had hoped that by this time in conjunction with USG large irrigation project in Iraq along lines TVA would have been started. Palestine has stopped this project because any funds or support given Iraq at this time would result in accusations this done to help fight Jews. If Iraq in which Communists already have strong foothold should be pauperized by sanctions it would be wonderful opportunity for USSR to intervene. British military intelligence recently reported secret offer by USSR to back Iraqi currency with gold loan.

4. I inquired where British Government thought Pakistan stood on Palestine question and was told that mainspring Pakistan is Moslem faith. Pakistan who regard themselves as leaders Moslem world, are showing not only solidarity with Arabs but also disturbing tendency to strengthen ties with USSR. It is not unlikely Pakistan token force may be sent Palestine and GOP would certainly not apply sanctions. Interestingly enough Palestine is one of few issues on which GOI and GOP see eye to eye.

5. Regarding Iran, Bevin said that Azerbaijan incident had already shown Iran's susceptibility to Soviet machinations. He thought Iran which as UN member would be called upon to apply sanctions would not comply and would be drawn into any Moslem anti-west orientation and in this event would serve as door to Soviet expansion.

6. Regarding Turkey, Bevin expressed view that if Arab countries are driven to adopt anti-west attitude, this coupled with Iranian

weakness would do what Turks have always feared most—encircle Turkey—which “would then become a satellite”.

7. Regarding military sanctions, Tedder said flatly “these were impractical” and Attlee asked “who would do it?” Bevin said speaking for himself, he was not willing advise UK take part in military sanctions. He understood USG unwilling to take leading role military sanctions: If this were true “military sanctions would be left largely to USSR”.

8. Bevin said Arab states now fighting in Arab Palestine are in “state of desperation” which could rapidly be converted to the “anti-west movement which we fear”. He had felt impelled during recent weeks to be “fair” (Embassy’s 2182, May 20¹) lest Arab tie with west via UK be severed.

9. Tedder expressed opinion that Jews, whose forces are numerically superior by about four to one and who are better armed, are likely win first phase fighting although that does not mean that “in matter of years Arab guerillas cannot wear down Jews”. Fact is neither Arabs nor Jews can get on without one another and “if we can hold the ring” best hope is fighting stalemate in which both sides will face necessity of living at peace with one another. What Tedder feared was repetition of civil war in Spain during which both sides were supplied with arms by different sets of outside powers.

10. Bevin said most important objective at moment is achieving cease-fire (Embassy’s 2251, May 25) and he thought next 48 hours might give opportunity to grapple with Palestine situation. Tedder said it would be extremely difficult for Arabs to establish effective cease-fire quickly. Bevin said this was true particularly with regard to Iraqi and Syrian volunteers. He thought cease-fire orders would be obeyed by armies of Egypt and Transjordan. However, Arabs are wary regarding Jewish promises since Jerusalem cease-fire was broken by Jews. What would make Arabs accept cease-fire order “almost certainly” would be statement by Jews that their cease-fire will include Irgun and Stern gang and that Jews for duration cease-fire will not permit immigration or will at least limit it to women and children (paragraph one, Embassy’s 2251, May 25). On first point it is likely USSR will endeavor incite Stern gang to break cease-fire; on second point Arabs know majority new Jewish immigrants are fighting men and ask rather naturally “if Jews bring in fighters by sea, why should we not do so by land?” Bevin hopes USG would urge the Jews, possibly through Weizmann, to make immediate statement this sense and said for his part he would advise Arabs not to set strict condition as price acceptance cease-fire.

11. I emphasized depth of resentment in US re presence in Arab Legion of British officers who are popularly believed in US to be actually leading Arab Legion contingents in Jerusalem fighting.

¹ Not printed.

12. Bevin said result of this meeting, he hoped, would be to lay foundation for US and UK working together re Palestine "which must be moved to sphere where it can no longer poison US-UK relations".

13. I said that I thought it would be helpful for British officers to be withdrawn from all participation in Jerusalem fighting and asked for precise information on this subject.

In reply representative British Chief of Staff stated that there was one regiment Arab Legion involved in Jerusalem fighting. He drew distinction between 30 British officers plus four or five enlisted men seconded to Arab Legion and soldiers of fortune of British nationality such as Glubb Pasha. Latter stated not to be under British Government control any more than were American soldiers of fortune in South American revolution. (While drafting this telegram I was advised that latest Foreign Office information is that no British officers in Arab Legion are engaged in fighting old city Jerusalem). Until today there was one volunteer British officer and one other British officer in Arab Legion in new city. These two are being withdrawn and Kirkbride at Amman has been instructed make every effort ensure Abdullah will withdraw all British officers (whether regular or volunteer), from Jerusalem area. Regular British officers, according Tedder, have in any case standing orders to leave their Legion units from moment units enter Jewish part Palestine, which has not occurred despite presence Jewish forces western Galilee and other Arab areas.

14. It is clear that Bevin hopes that considerations which emerged from this meeting will be kept in view by both US and UK in shaping their future policies re Palestine. Bevin feels that if agreement can be reached on assessment basic factors, US and UK will be at least half-way towards alignment of their policies.²

DOUGLAS

² Ambassador Douglas, on May 27, forwarded his reflections on the meeting discussed in this telegram, stating that "genuine hope of US-UK cooperation in solving Palestine problem exists only if neither government is so carried away with emotional factors as to back either one or other side for military victory. Peace in Palestine, not a sweeping victory by either Arabs or Jews, should be common US-UK objective. . . . we need a truce between the US and the UK under which both governments undertake to deal with two sides in Palestine on same objective footing and in close collaboration." (Telegram 2304 from London, 501.BB Palestine/5-2748)

Truman Papers, President's Secretary's File

*The President of the Provisional Government of Israel (Weizmann)
to President Truman*

NEW YORK, May 26, 1948.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Before leaving the shores of the United States, I should like to express to you my warmest thanks for the friendly re-

ception which you accorded me yesterday and for the kind hospitality given to Mrs. Weizmann and myself and to the members of my party at Blair House. This official visit, coming soon after the recognition given to the new State of Israel, will be a source of satisfaction and encouragement to my people.

I trust that the two questions of military assistance, and of financial help for constructive work and for the absorption of Jewish Displaced Persons, will receive urgent and favorable consideration. I shall not go into the details here as these are contained in the *aide mémoire*¹ which I had the opportunity of leaving with you.

There is, however, one matter to which I only made brief reference and which is of some importance to us. We are anxious that the United States recognition of the State of Israel should be put on a regular basis by an exchange of diplomatic representatives. In anticipation of this arrangement, we have designated Mr. Eliahu Epstein, who is now acting as the representative of the Provisional Government of Israel in this country, as the prospective Minister in Washington. Mr. Epstein, a Palestinian with intimate knowledge of the whole Middle East, has spent the last three years in Washington as the representative of the Jewish Agency for Palestine and has done invaluable work in explaining our aims, problems and activities. I am confident that he will be successful in the new task of increasing the ties between Israel and the United States and of deepening the friendly relations between the two peoples. I hope, Mr. President, that it may be possible for the United States to appoint a Minister to Israel at a very early date.

In taking my leave of you, Mr. President, I should like warmly to commend Mr. Epstein in whom I have every confidence.

Yours very sincerely,

CH. WEIZMANN

¹ Dated May 25, p. 1042.

701.67N11/6-448

*Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to President Truman*¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 26, 1948.

REQUEST OF ISRAEL FOR EXCHANGE OF DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES

1. The Secretary of State has received a request from Moshe Shertok,² Foreign Secretary in the Provisional Government of Israel, to approve the establishment of an Israeli Legation in the United States, with Eliahu Epstein as Minister. The same request expressed the hope that the United States would soon establish an American

¹ This memorandum was a copy of a memorandum of May 24 from the Legal Adviser to Mr. Lovett, except that some minor deletions were made in the third paragraph of the earlier memorandum (701.67N11/5-2448).

² See telegram MH98 of May 19, p. 1012.

Legation in Israel and send a representative to Tel Aviv with the status of Minister.

2. The President on May 14, 1948 stated that the United States recognized "the provisional government as the *de facto* authority of the new State of Israel". The effect of the President's announcement was that: (1) the United States recognized the existence of the State of Israel as a new state among the community of nations, and (2) the United States recognized the "provisional government" of Israel as the *de facto* authority in control of the new state. This latter expression did not constitute a recognition of the "provisional government" as the government *de jure* of Israel. It simply acknowledged that the "provisional government" was actually in control of the new state, and it implied that the United States would deal with this *de facto* authority concerning matters of mutual interest to Israel and the United States.

3. The establishment of legations and the exchange of accredited diplomatic representatives between Israel and the United States would constitute recognition by the United States of the "provisional government" as the government *de jure* of Israel. (Oppenheim, *International Law*, Vol. 1, p. 143). The visit of Dr. Chaim Weizmann would effect recognition *de jure*, unless the President were to make perfectly clear that Dr. Weizmann's reception did not constitute recognition *de jure*. Such recognition is, of course, dependent upon intention. (Oppenheim, *International Law*, Vol. 1, p. 140).

4. Whether or not the United States is to grant recognition *de jure* to the "provisional government" of Israel is entirely a matter of policy, to be determined according to the interests of this Government. (Hackworth, *Digest of International Law*, Vol. 1, p. 161). No legal requirements remain to be met, nor are there any legal reasons calling affirmatively for recognition *de jure*.

5. The differences in effect between recognition *de jure* of a government and recognition of a provisional regime as the *de facto* authority in a state are not of great legal importance in the case of Israel. The principal difference is a political difference of prestige; a government recognized *de jure* naturally enjoys much greater prestige, with all the political and psychological consequences of prestige.

A government recognized *de jure* is treated in the recognizing state as the authority entitled to control and dispose of state property, while a "government" recognized only *de facto* has been held not entitled to the assets of the state which it controls. (*Haile Selassie v. Cable and Wireless Ltd.* (No. 2), [1939] Ch. 182).

Although state property is entitled abroad to the benefits of sovereign immunity, the representatives of a government recognized only *de facto* are not accorded personal diplomatic immunity. Recognition by the United States of the "provisional government" as the *de facto*

authority in Israel would, of course, permit practical working relationships between that regime and the Government of the United States, to be carried on by special representatives of the "provisional government" and the United States.

6. United States policy in the past, with respect to the according of recognition *de jure*, does not furnish any consistent line of precedents. (See Hackworth, *Digest of International Law*, Vol. 1, pp. 222-318). The element of time between the establishment of a regime and its recognition by the United States has varied greatly. For example, the interval in the case of the Soviet government of Russia was sixteen years, while in the recent case of Pakistan recognition *de jure* was granted on the same day as the new government and state of Pakistan came into existence. The ascertainment of boundaries of the state controlled by a new regime has never been regarded as determinative in according recognition *de jure* to the regime. The element of constitutionality in the creation of a regime has sometimes (in the Wilson administration and occasionally thereafter) been mentioned as a criterion for the granting or withholding of recognition *de jure*. More consistently, mention has been made in official United States pronouncements of (1) actual control by a regime over the state, (2) popular acquiescence and stability, (3) willingness and ability of the new regime to discharge the state's international obligations.

It can only be concluded from an examination of the precedents in American history that none of the above "standards" have governed United States policy on recognition *de jure*. From time to time one or more of the "standards" in varying combinations have been invoked to justify a result grounded actually in policy, national interest, or expediency.

[ROBERT A. LOVETT]

867N.01/5-2648 : Telegram

The Vice Counsel at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

US URGENT NIACT

JERUSALEM, May 26, 1948.

755. Kohn of Jewish Agency has just given us following text of announcement from provisional government at Tel Aviv.

"Provisional Govt of Israel at its meeting this afternoon considered developments during the last 48 hours in regard to the cease-fire call issued by the Security Council. The Provisional Govt decided to renew the cease-fire order to all Jewish forces on all fronts for 2100 hours local Jewish time this evening, this being conditional upon the enemy's ceasing fire at that same hour."

Repeated to all Arab capitals.

BURDETT

501.BB Palestine/5-2648 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)*SECRET US URGENT
NIACT

WASHINGTON, May 26, 1948—1 p. m.

326. There are three possibilities with regard to the response of the Arab Govts to the SC cease-fire order of May 22, the extended date-line of which terminates at noon, EST, today :

1. Affirmative response to cease-fire order.
2. Qualified acceptance of cease-fire, predicated on conditions laid down by Arab Govts.
3. Flat rejection of cease-fire order.

If Arab States accept the cease-fire there is obviously no problem and Ambassador Austin's remarks will be congratulatory. However, if, as seems more probable, Arab Govts seek to attach conditions as prerequisite to their complying with cease-fire order, following line of action is suggested :

If conditions attached to compliance with cease-fire seem possible of negotiation with Jewish authorities you should urge on Council that it today propose to Arab Govts that their conditions not be regarded as prerequisite to observing the cease-fire order but that cease-fire take effect immediately while their conditions are negotiated out with Jews as basis for more extended truce. This would seem well within purview of SC resolution of May 22, which calls upon all govts and authorities, without prejudice to rights, claims or position of parties concerned, to abstain from hostile military action in Palestine. You should urge in strongest possible terms that there is a duty on both parties to this conflict to prevent further bloodshed and to make possible reestablishment of peace in Palestine. Reference should also be made, in discussing conditions of cease-fire to permit negotiation, to the useful functions of SC Truce Commission and the UN Mediator who is empowered, under Paragraph 1(a) (iii) of GA resolution of May 14, to promote a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine.

If either Jews or Arabs reject foregoing proposal this would be regarded as further refusal to comply with SC cease-fire requests.

If Arabs Govts flatly reject the SC cease-fire order, problems of very grave importance arise. Although you should make no reference to the fact, Council will then be confronted by question whether it should seek to impose cease-fire under threat of sanctions, presumably commencing with those measures outlined in Article 41.

Dept requests your best estimate of disposition of other members of SC to vote such sanctions. For your secret info Dept is giving in-

tensive study to this problem. We do not, however, desire to see action taken in this regard until we know (a) whether Council will in fact vote for universal sanctions to be applied by all members of UN against parties failing to observe cease-fire order and (b) sufficient time is had to safeguard American citizens residing in Near East. Dept does not favor the imposition of unilateral sanctions.¹

In consequence of foregoing considerations, should Arab response be flat refusal of cease-fire order, you should state that this presents a new and serious development in the Palestine situation upon which you must consult immediately with your govt. For your info we would, in light of President's recognition of State of Israel, consider that an Arab agreement to observe cease-fire, on condition that State of Israel be regarded as non-existent, was an outright refusal of cease-fire order.

MARSHALL

¹ As originally drafted, this sentence continued as follows: "*per se*, but, of course, relaxation of our arms embargo would, if decided upon by the President, be regarded by the Arabs as a unilateral sanction and would have immediate and grave repercussions upon US interests in Arab area". These words were deleted by Mr. Lovett.

501.BB Palestine/5-2648 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET US URGENT

NEW YORK, May 26, 1948—4:15 p. m.

707. From Ross. [Here follows discussion with Mahmoud Fawzi, Egyptian Representative at the United Nations, regarding a cease-fire in Palestine.]

Following is delayed report on conversation with Dr. Asil¹ late Monday afternoon, primarily on question of cease-fire.

Asil took a fairly moderate line to effect that Arabs could agree to a cease-fire but only on condition that Jewish immigration of fighting personnel and importation of arms be stopped and that further entrenchment of Jewish state politically be stopped. He referred to SC truce resolution of April 17.

I told him I saw substantial difference between cease-fire and truce. It seemed to me that the first most urgent, most essential thing was the cease-fire. Once there were a cease-fire other steps could be considered.

He said that it seemed to him an appropriate procedure to start with a cease-fire provided there could be assurances that other steps, which might be called part of truce, could be taken up next. Asil, in course

¹ Naji al-Asil, Iraqi Representative at the United Nations.

of our conversation, speculated on possible eventual settlement which he said he had discussed with Mr. Henderson. Asil described it as a "United States of Palestine". Thus, the Jews could have their own state and their own flag just as he observed in his short stay here, New York State had its own flag.

Asil said he fully understood and sympathized with factors which have conditioned development of American policy. He added that he was one of those who thought that friendship between Arab states and US should surmount all barriers.

Asil went on to say that he thought we were perhaps either not fully aware of or did not take fully enough into account the wider ramifications of problem of Palestine. As he saw it in terms of friendship between US and Arab states, we should not consider Palestine narrowly. We should not even consider Palestine in terms alone of the Middle East. We should rather, however, consider this problem in terms of much wider ramifications of the highest political importance in two directions: first, the effect of our Palestine policy throughout the Moslem world which extended much further than the Middle East; second, we should consider the matter in terms of the position of Russia in the world and the very serious risk that our entire policy of containment of Russia was being endangered. He thought the statement made by the Turkish Foreign Minister a couple of days ago was based on this same fear.

Dr. Asil went on to say that the game of the Soviet Union in present situation was obvious. For some years through their propaganda and in many other ways they had demonstrated strong feeling for Arab states. The Iraqi Government and other Arab Governments had then taken very strong measures to suppress and outlaw communism in their countries. At this point Soviet Union swung to support of world Zionism. Their effort now was, first, to establish a bridgehead in Middle East through their support of Zionist state; second, to cause disruption in Arab states; and third, to drive a wedge between UK and US in the area.² [Ross.]

AUSTIN

² Dr. Asil, in a statement before the Security Council on May 26, submitted the reply of the Arab League, on behalf of all the Arab States, to the Security Council's cease-fire request. The reply neither accepted nor rejected, explicitly, the cease-fire but raised these questions: "Is the cease-fire likely to put a stop to the flow of Jewish immigrants into Palestine to fight the Arabs, as well as the importation of arms? Is the cease-fire likely to stop the terrorists undertaking acts of violence and guarantee the safety of the Arab civilian population?" Dr. Asil concluded the reply with: "And yet, anxious to realize the purpose of the efforts of the Security Council, namely the arrival at a just solution and a lasting peace, I am authorized to inform you that the Political Committee of the Arab League is ready to study, within a time limit of forty-eight hours, any suggestion which the Security Council may make to them along the line of a solution of the Palestine problem." For the full text of the Arab reply; see SC, *3rd yr.*, No. 74, pp. 47-49.

867N.01/5-2248 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Legation in Lebanon

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, May 26, 1948—7 p. m.

267. Retels 203 May 22,¹ 208 May 24, Deptel 252 May 20 and 259 May 21,² please inform Lebanese Govt that this Govt considers the grounds for the detention of the Americans taken from *Marine Carp* set forth in FonOff Legtel 203 unsatisfactory. So far as US Govt has been advised, Lebanese authorities do not purport to have acted under the authority of any law or legal process of Lebanon; the Lebanese Govt has made no showing that these men have been charged with any offense against Lebanese law, or that the Govt's action has been in conformance with basic processes of law recognized throughout the world relating to arrest, charge of commission of a crime, hearing and trial. Accordingly, US Govt cannot but view the action of the Lebanese Govt as in disregard of the established principles of international law relating to the rights and duties of a state with respect to aliens.

The US Govt protests the continued detention of these American citizens and requests their immediate release.³

In the event Legation has any info concerning violation of local law, or charge to that effect by Lebanese authorities, please report fully urgently.

Also inform Dept whether in your discussions or those of Lebanese authorities with Americans any individuals professed to be proceeding to Israel to take oath of allegiance or to join Israeli Army, and whether individuals adhere to purpose of travel expressed in their passport applications.⁴

MARSHALL

¹ Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 1040.

² No. 259 not printed.

³ At this point in the telegram as originally drafted appeared the following two paragraphs which were deleted by Mr. Lovett: "You may add that the US Govt in the meantime is investigating the purposes of the travel of these American citizens to Palestine. The US Govt does not issue travel documents to American citizens going to foreign areas for the purpose of participating in hostilities.

"Inform Leb Gov that in this case US Gov will make all appropriate efforts to effect the repatriation of those American citizens who are found to have improperly used American passports. In making these statements please make it clear that they should not be considered in any way as an undertaking on the part of the American Govt as a consideration for the release of the group."

⁴ An appropriate note was delivered by Beirut to the Lebanese Foreign Office on May 29 (telegram 226, May 29, 4 p. m., from Beirut, 867N.01/5-2948); for the Department's statement, released May 30, see Department of State *Bulletin*, June 13, 1948, p. 780.

The Secretary of State, in a letter of June 22 to Eliahu Epstein, replied to the latter's *aide-memoire* of May 29 which had requested "that every effort be made by the United States Government to assure the safe arrival of passengers on United States flag vessels bound for Israeli ports". After reviewing the action taken by the United States regarding the action of the Lebanese Government, the Secretary concluded: "The Government of the United States has protested and will continue to extend diplomatic protection to its nationals where action on the part of a foreign state is in disregard of the established principles of international law." (867N.01/5-2948)

501.BB Palestine/5-2648 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET US URGENT

NEW YORK, May 26, 1948—10:26 p. m.

713. For Rusk from Jessup. Following represents without any attempt at final drafting general nature of suggestion I made to you by telephone this evening for possible SC resolution which we might introduce tomorrow afternoon:

"The Security Council noting with grave concern the failure of certain governments to comply with its resolution of 22 May relative to the issuance of a cease fire order in Palestine,

Attaching particular importance to the continuation of hostilities in the City of Jerusalem despite the high priority accorded in that resolution to a truce in that city, which has been the object of special concern to the UN,

Declares that the Holy City must be preserved from destruction,

Decides that the conducting of any hostilities in the City of Jerusalem by any government or authority after 12 o'clock noon New York time, May 28, would constitute a breach of the peace and a violation of the charter of the UN,

Directs all governments and authorities controlling armed forces in Palestine to comply with this decision and to inform the SC that they have complied,

Instructs its Truce Commission, in collaboration with the UN mediator in Palestine, to assist in arranging for civilian supplies, etc., to be brought to Jerusalem under appropriate international supervision after the cessation of hostilities on May 28."

Manning of UP was told by Al-Asil (Iraq) after SC meeting that conclusion of his statement to SC meant Arab League will wait in Amman 48 hours for whatever suggestion SC wishes to send to it. [Jessup.]

AUSTIN

701.67N11/5-2748

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to President Truman

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 27, 1948.

Subject: United States Government Representation in Palestine

At the present time the United States Government is represented in Palestine by a Consulate General at Jerusalem and a Consulate at Haifa.

On May 14 the United States recognized the Provisional Government as the *de facto* authority of the new State of Israel.

On May 19, 1948 Moshe Shertok, Foreign Secretary in the Provi-

sional Government of the State of Israel, telegraphically requested the Secretary of State to approve the establishment in Washington of a Legation of Israel. Mr. Shertok at the same time asked the approval of the United States to the designation of Mr. Eliahu Epstein as the Minister of Israel. Mr. Shertok expressed his hope that the United States would soon establish an American Legation in Israel and would send a representative to Tel Aviv with the status of Minister.

Consideration should, therefore, be given to what changes may be required in United States Government representation in Palestine.

The Department of State recommends:

1. The Consulate General at Jerusalem should be continued. Jerusalem is the principal city of Palestine. It is revered by Christians, Jews and Moslems.

2. The Consulate at Haifa should be continued. Haifa is the principal port in Palestine.

3. A Mission of the United States should be established in the capital of the new state of Israel for the purpose of performing political and consular functions. It is believed that Tel Aviv or a suburb of that city will be selected as the capital by the Provisional Government of Israel. This Mission should be headed by a Special Representative of the United States.

4. Approval should be given to the establishment of a Mission of the Provisional Government of Israel in Washington, headed by a Special Representative of the Provisional Government of Israel. The United States should agree to the designation, by the Provisional Government of Israel, of Mr. Eliahu Epstein as Special Representative of the Provisional Government of Israel in the United States.

The above type of exchange of Missions and Representatives is recommended by the Department of State as being appropriate to maintain between the two Governments the *de facto* relationship expressed in the President's announcement of May 14, 1948, when he stated that the United States recognized "the Provisional Government as the *de facto* authority of the new state of Israel".

In view of the fluid situation in Palestine it is our suggestion that the consular districts be not specifically delimited at the present time. The consular offices in Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Haifa will report directly to the Department of State and each of them will deal in questions regarding the protection of American lives and property with those authorities with whom each of the consular offices may be able to maintain contact.

Attached to this memorandum is a draft of a letter which the Department proposes to send to Mr. Epstein in Washington, in reply to the request of the Provisional Government of Israel set forth in Mr. Shertok's telegram of May 19, 1948. If this letter is approved, the Department also contemplates making a copy available to the Jewish

authorities in Palestine through the American Consulate General in Jerusalem.¹

ROBERT A. LOVETT

¹ Marginal notation by Mr. Wilkins: "Approved by the President according to Mr. Lovett—May 27, 1948 2:45 p. m." For the letter sent to Mr. Epstein, see p. 1074.

In a memorandum of June 15 to President Truman, the Acting Secretary stated:

"Pending the selection and appointment of a special representative to head the Mission of the United States in Israel the Department proposes to establish its Mission in Tel Aviv or a suburb of Tel Aviv and will provide the necessary personnel. The Department has assigned Mr. Charles Frederick Knox, Jr., an American Foreign Service Officer, to the staff of its Mission and is assigning him as Acting Special Representative pending the selection and appointment of a Special Representative." (701.67N11/6-1548)

In a memorandum of June 16 to Mr. Clifford, George M. Elsey discussed Mr. Lovett's memorandum of the previous day. He observed that Max Lowenthal, an unofficial consultant in the White House, opposed Mr. Lovett's proposals in that they entailed a further delay in the *de jure* recognition of Israel. Mr. Elsey concluded that "I see nothing to be gained by an announcement at this time and I recommend that Lovett be informed that no action be taken until the President returns to Washington and a decision has been reached on the U.S. representative to head our mission to Israel. The designation of a Foreign Service officer as a temporary head is a snub." (Elsey Papers) The editors have found no evidence that Mr. Lovett's proposals were rejected.

867N.01/5-2748

*Memorandum Prepared in the Division of Near Eastern Affairs*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON, undated.]

EFFECT OF THE REPEAL OF THE ARMS EMBARGO TO PERMIT AID TO
ISRAEL

In the opinion of United States diplomatic and military observers in the Near Eastern capitals, repeal of the United States arms embargo in favor of the Jews would be regarded throughout the Near East as a virtual American alliance with the Jewish war effort and an American declaration of war against the Arab States. Such a move would immediately evoke hostile and violent mob reactions against the United States and irreparably damage American-Arab relations. It would result in the destruction of American tactical and strategic

¹ Transmitted to the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Mattison) in a memorandum of May 27 by Mary E. Hope of the same Division; it summarized telegram 598, May 25, from Cairo and telegrams 599 from Cairo, 214 from Beirut, 326 from Damascus, and 751 from Jerusalem, each dated May 26. These telegrams were sent in reply to a Departmental circular telegram of May 24, 1 a. m., which had requested appraisals of the six factors covered in the memorandum.

security throughout the entire Near East, and would lead ultimately to the loss of the American stake in this area.

The specific effects of repeal of the arms embargo would be the following :

(1) The security of United States Government officials and American citizens in the Arab States and in Arab-occupied areas of Palestine would be in jeopardy, making evacuation of American citizens advisable prior to or immediately following repeal.

(2) United States Government property, American educational institutions, oil installations and other private property in the Arab States and in Arab areas of Palestine would be singled out for molestation, destruction, or seizure as a result of popular reaction to the lifting of the arms embargo. In Egypt, American investments might eventually be excluded entirely.

(3) Although the Governments of the Arab States would endeavor to maintain the security of their local Jewish communities, it might be impossible to control local reactions, particularly in the event of Arab military reverses arising from the lifting of the embargo. Expected attacks on local Jews might spread to anti-foreign demonstrations as well.

(4) Popular hatred of the United States Government and people would be general, intense, and probably lasting in Lebanon. In Egypt, the United States can expect no further political or economic concessions as a result of United States *de facto* recognition of Israel, and this attitude would be intensified by repeal of the arms embargo. Syria, which considers that an "act of aggression" against the Arabs has already taken place, would shift the major blame to the United States if the embargo were lifted. In Transjordan and Arab-occupied areas of Palestine, the initial reaction against the United States and its citizens would be extremely violent.

(5) The attitude of the Arab States and of Palestinian Arabs towards the United Nations and the Western world, currently one of disillusionment and cynicism, would be intensified if the arms embargo were repealed. Since the United Nations and the United States positions on Palestine are generally regarded as synonymous, the United States could be expected to bear the major blame. Eventually, this would either lead to repudiation of the West, as in Syria, or the consolidation of the British position at the expense of the United States, as in Transjordan and Arab areas of Palestine.

(6) The effect on the preservation of law and order would be to prolong hostilities in Palestine; to jeopardize public security in Lebanon and to provide a powerful weapon for local demagogues in Syria; to endanger American lives and property in Palestine; and to increase the possibility of anti-foreign, anti-Jewish, and anti-Christian violence throughout the Moslem world.

867N.01/5-2748: Telegram

The Vice Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

JERUSALEM, May 27, 1948—2 p. m.

767. Battle of Jerusalem has now reached what may be described as near stalemate. Jews are in control of most areas of city while Arabs with sizeable garrison Arab Legion and irregulars still retain old city, except Jewish quarters and all approaches to old city except Zion and Jaffa gates. Neither side has been able to break grip of other side on areas held by it. Arab Legion and Arab operation army artillery continue bombardment several times daily of Jewish quarters new city from northern outskirts Jerusalem and Arab armies have blocked all roads leading into Jerusalem. Mortar, automatic and sniper fire continues daily throughout city in varying intensity and it appears that major effort has, however, shifted on both sides to battle for roads leading to Jerusalem. Evidence exists that Arab Legion and Egyptians have deployed toward Babelwad from Sheik Jarrah and Bethlehem areas respectively.

Jews report they have sufficient food and water to last for long period in new Jerusalem and that they prepared turn city into "another Stalingrad." However American correspondents believe that food, fuel and water supply situation in new Jerusalem is grave. Conditions in Jewish quarters old city desperate and may only be question of time before inhabitants and Haganah there capitulate. Arabs in old city probably have sufficient water for considerable period and are able receive food and fuel from Jericho area and Transjordan.

It, therefore, seems that Arabs are preparing for long siege of Jewish Jerusalem in hope starving inhabitants into submission while at same time Jews equally preparing withstand siege. Nobody cares hazard guess how long such siege could last.

BURDETT

501.BB Palestine/5-2748: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, May 27, 1948—4 p. m.

331. Following is draft instructions which have not been finally cleared but which are forwarded for your study pending clearance:

1. The attitude of the US remains the same as that expressed by us in the meeting of the SC on May 17. We believe that the situation in

Palestine constitutes a threat to the peace and a breach of the peace and that the SC should order the parties to bring about a cessation of hostilities. We do not wish at this time to charge either party as being an aggressor.¹ The SC did not accept our resolution of May 17 and we went along with the proposed action under Chap. VI in the hope that such action might succeed in bringing about a cease-fire. Thus far that has not been the result. We would, therefore, be glad to hear the views of the other members of the Council as to how the Council might now proceed.

2. Although the position of the US continues to be that stated in para. one above, nevertheless the Arab replies might open up the possibility of a short unconditional cease-fire, say for two weeks, during which time the Jews and Arabs could negotiate through the Truce Commission and the Mediator the conditions for a longer truce or even for a final political settlement. We do not believe the US should appear to weaken its position by urging such temporary solution in the SC. That should be the responsibility of the UK since they have opposed Chap. VII action and have strongly urged negotiations under Chap. VI. You should, therefore, privately indicate to the UK Delegation that if there is to be any further breathing spell for negotiations under Chap. VI they must take initiative in the SC. Further, we believe that additional delays are unsatisfactory unless such delays are accompanied by an immediate cease-fire. Extension of the deadline accompanied by a continuation of the fighting is no proper basis for SC action at this time.²

3. With regard to Jerusalem, the US supports any move to bring about a truce in Jerusalem. However, in order not to appear to be weakening our position, initiative in bringing about a special arrangement for Jerusalem must be assumed by another member of the Council. We presume Parodi will be willing to take such initiative. In supporting special arrangements for Jerusalem, you should point out that we have not changed our attitude toward the whole of Palestine (see para. one above) but we would welcome a truce in Jerusalem and would hope that such a truce would lead promptly to a truce for the whole of the country.

LOVETT

¹The Department, on May 29, quoted this sentence in a further message to New York and emphasized that "Our purpose is to achieve a cessation of hostilities in Palestine and your statements should be couched in language which will achieve this end." (Telegram 346, 501.BB Palestine/5-2848)

²For Ambassador Austin's statement along these lines before the Security Council on May 27, see SC, *3rd yr.*, No. 75, p. 14.

501.BB Palestine/5-2748 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative
at the United Nations (Austin)*SECRET US URGENT
NIACT

WASHINGTON, May 27, 1948—4 p. m.

332. The President has approved position paper whose text was set forth in Deptel 327, May 26, 4 p. m.,¹ but we doubt whether you will find it useful to take action in accordance with these instructions today.

The President has likewise approved position which US should take in today's meeting of SC, as contained in Deptel 331, May 27.²

LOVETT

¹ The telegram is not printed; for the position paper, see p. 1027.

² Mr. Lovett stated, in a marginal notation on a draft copy of telegram 331, that the message was "Cleared by President 1245 May 27th".

501.BB Palestine/5-2748 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary
of State*TOP SECRET US URGENT
NIACT

LONDON, May 27, 1948—7 p. m.

2311. For Secretary and Lovett from Douglas.

1. Further to my 2305, May 27.¹ I have just received from Bevin full text instructions under which UK delegation UN will deal with Palestine problem in SC today. Bevin referred to our meeting May 25 (Embassy's 2267, May 25) and pointed out that these instructions go a long way towards what he hopes will be a closer alignment of UK-US policy. He directed particular attention to concluding section of these instructions authorizing Cadogan to say that if British resolution is adopted for standstill cease-fire, during this period Britain will even suspend the small arms deliveries HMG is still making under existing treaties to Egypt, Transjordan and Iraq. Moreover, without conditions, Cadogan is authorized to announce withdrawal from Palestine all British officers seconded to Arab Legion (21 officers and 5 men) and to say that payment Arab Legion subsidy (due July 1948) will be made only if in accord UN decisions.

2. Bevin hopes fervently that in the spirit of the ideas he advanced May 25 US Government will feel able to support British resolution, and that at the very least, US Government will not oppose it. In his view it is of the utmost importance that advantage be taken of presence of Arab League leaders in Amman for next 24 hours to press for cease-fire. Once leaders are scattered it may be difficult to reassemble them and meanwhile emotions in Palestine, Iraq, Syria, and Egypt

¹ Not printed.

may grow so intense that it will be impossible for leaders to accept any cease-fire.

3. Bevin hopes that US Government if it supports or acquiesces in British resolution, will parallel his efforts with the Arabs by steps designated to secure Jewish acceptance standstill cease-fire under terms of British resolution.²

4. Summary British instructions appears in next following telegram.

DOUGLAS

² Mr. Bevin, in the morning of May 28, reiterated to Ambassador Douglas "his very strong hope" that the United States would support the British proposals in the Security Council. The Ambassador, in reporting this information to the Department the same day, observed that "the British proposals provide a substantial satisfaction of our general position, and that since the British are sincerely attempting to meet us and to move hand in hand with us in the Middle East, we should, on our part, acknowledge their sincere efforts in this direction by agreeing to their proposals." (Telegram 2316 from London, 501.BB Palestine/5-2848)

501.BB Palestine/5-2748: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the
Secretary of State*

SECRET US URGENT
NIACT

LONDON, May 27, 1948—7 p. m.

2312. Following is summary instructions sent by Bevin to Cadogan this afternoon:

1. While disappointment Arab reply suggests possibility constructive development. Bevin impressed by view apparently held by some Arab leaders that it would be easier for them to agree to cease fire or to negotiate if they were faced with overwhelming UN pressure. Cadogan authorized make statement following lines:

2. While disappointing Arabs have not accepted SC cease fire resolution Arab reply nevertheless is in conciliatory language and merits careful consideration. Point re SC resolution April 16 is valid and pertinent because this resolution has been broken by all parties concerned. Jews and those who recognize their claim to set up state have offended against provision that no political action should be taken to prejudice positions of either community. Arabs have broken provisions against bringing fighting men into Palestine. Jews have probably done same. HMG has always felt situation must be looked at as whole and that it is unfair to seize on last of series of developments and deal with that in isolation.

3. Concluding passages Arab reply constitute request to SC to suggest settlement terms for dispute as SC is entitled to do under Article 37.

4. SC cannot put forward proposals in 24 hours or while actual fighting continues. Object must be to bring fighting to end and create

conditions in which proposals for settlement can be considered. Therefore SC should make renewed effort to secure cease fire and should at same time instruct mediator and truce commission to be ready to use their good offices between two parties both to ensure observance of cease fire to begin discussion of proposals for final settlement.

5. Cadogan instructed suggest, in order to secure cease fire, it now seems necessary to incorporate some conditions and undertakings going beyond May 22 resolution and leading more directly to search of final settlement. He should say at same time that in view failure of previous recommendation under Chapter 6 HMG recognizes that if present proposals are unsuccessful Chapter 7 will have to be invoked. The SC Resolutions should therefore be cast somewhat in following form:

6. Preamble showing resolution is without prejudice to rights, claims and positions of either party.

7. Calling for cessation of acts of armed forces and for cease fire.

8. Calling on both sides to give undertaking not to bring fighting personnel or men of military age into Palestine.

9. Calling on all members of UN and on both sides to refrain from bringing war material into Palestine.

10. Calling on both sides to be particularly careful re cease-fire Jerusalem and to protect Holy places.

11. Instructing mediator to verify whether above provisions were being observed and for that purpose to appoint military observers responsible to himself.

12. Instructing mediator as soon as cease-fire is in force to make contact with both parties in concert with truce commission with view to making recommendations to SC about eventual settlement for Palestine.

13. Calling on all concerned to give greatest possible assistance to mediator.

14. Cease-fire would be stated to last say four weeks by which time mediator would report progress to SC.

15. SC would give short time-limit for replies to this resolution and if it were not accepted SC would consider matter under Chapter 7 with view to determining which party was the aggressor and considering imposition of sanctions. Resolution ends.

16. Cadogan authorized to announce in SC following decision re British treaty obligations to Arab states:

(a) HMG making immediate arrangements withdraw 21 seconded British officers from Arab Legion in Palestine. HMG has no control over 16 officers not seconded and therefore not subject British instructions.

(b) Re Transjordan subsidy, next quarterly installment due July twelfth. HMG will review situation before that date in light UN decisions.

(c) Re supply war material, if it were decided in pursuance resolution proposed above or independently, that there should be general embargo which would effectively prevent supply of arms to Jews and Arabs alike in Palestine. HMG would be willing to join in such action and stop such small deliveries which HMG's at present making to Egypt, Iraq, and TJ in completion of existing contracts.¹

DOUGLAS

¹ Ambassador Douglas, on May 27, opined that "Bevin's instructions to Cadogan go as far as we can expect British Government to go in establishing its neutrality toward Palestine" and that "USG should do no less to establish our own neutrality". He then recommended that "in formulating our policy for use in SC today we should not lightly reject, but should make every effort to accommodate our position to the British proposal which seems to me to be first important milestone on road ahead for genuine US-UK collaboration on this problem". (Telegram 2313, from London, 501.BB Palestine/5-2748)

501.BB Palestine/5-2748: Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)
to the Secretary of State*

NEW YORK, May 27, 1948—9:48 p. m.

717. Following USSR proposal submitted in Security Council on May 27:

"Considering that the Security Council's resolution of 22 May on the cessation of military operations in Palestine has not yet been complied with, considering that military operations in Palestine are increasing in intensity and that the number of casualties is growing; and considering that as a result of these events the situation in Palestine constitutes a threat to peace and security within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter of the UN, orders the governments of the states involved in the present conflict in Palestine to secure the cessation of military operations within 36 hours after the adoption by the SC of this resolution."¹

AUSTIN

¹ For the revised text of the Soviet resolution submitted to the Security Council on May 29, see SC, 3rd yr., *Supplement for May 1948*, p. 101.

501.BB Palestine/5-2748: Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)
to the Secretary of State*

SECRET

NEW YORK, May 27, 1948—10:04 p. m.

719. Text of Soviet and UK resolutions¹ introduced this afternoon in SC are being transmitted separately.

Soviet resolution closely parallels our resolution of May 17. We feel we must give it our unqualified support. Since it was introduced first

¹ See *supra* and *infra*, respectively.

it will have priority and we propose to attempt to have it given priority in the discussion at the beginning of the Council meeting in the morning before the UK resolution is discussed. The defeat of the Soviet resolution under present circumstances seems certain.

After this has occurred we would be free to discuss the UK resolution on its merits. We recommend that the US give it our general support in the same way that we gave the British Chapter VI amendment our support after our Chapter 7 resolution of May 17 was defeated. We would place special emphasis in supporting the British resolution on the last paragraph, which commits the Council in principle to take action under Chapter 7 if this effort fails.

There are a number of minor points in the British resolution which have arisen in discussions here and which have occurred to us may require modification. In regard to the last paragraph, as reported by Jessup to Rusk on the telephone, the UK instructions apparently contemplated stronger language for this paragraph along the line that the Council might have to apply sanctions to any party who refused to carry out orders of the SC under Chapter 7.

Beeley informs us that they wish to leave the impression in the minds of both sides that this would be the case, but that they wished to leave this question open in the resolution. They apparently do not wish to commit themselves at this time on exactly what form of Chapter 7 action they are prepared to take. There are some indications that the delegation at least is thinking in terms of general embargo applied to both sides without undertaking to assess which party is in the wrong.

Re paragraphs 3 and 4 of the UK resolution regarding the introduction of military personnel and the importation of war material into Palestine, the British admit that there may be difficulties of enforcement. They contemplate that perhaps 20 or 30 military observers should be supplied to the Truce Commission to help them carry out their task of supervision. They contemplate that personnel and supplies arriving in Israel after the date of the cease-fire may cause real practical difficulties, for example as to how the personnel should be handled and whether the material should be unloaded or held in bind, etc. They admitted the validity of the argument which the Jews will probably raise concerning the inequity of allowing the Arab states to continue to import war material and mobilize additional armed forces on their frontiers, while the Jews were not in a position to do likewise. They made it quite clear that this resolution was not intended to prevent them from continuing the supply of the Arab states under their treaties. Beeley indicated, however, that he thought the UK might be prepared to accept modification of these paragraphs so that they would call on all states to ban exports during the cease-fire period,

thus requiring Britain to temporarily cease shipments to the Arab states.

Will attempt to secure views JA on British proposal this evening and report further.

AUSTIN

501.BB Palestine/5-2748 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

NEW YORK, May 27, 1948—10:05 p. m.

720. Secretariat released on May 27 following suggested draft of UK resolution (final form to be circulated later) :

“The SC

Desiring to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Palestine without prejudice to the rights, claims and position of either Arabs or Jews,

Calls upon both parties to order a cessation of all acts of armed force for a period of four weeks,

Calls upon both parties to undertake that they will not introduce fighting personnel or men of military age into Palestine during the cease-fire,

Calls upon both parties and upon all governments to refrain from importing war material into Palestine during the cease-fire,

Urges both parties to take every possible precaution for the protection of the holy places and of the city of Jerusalem,

Instructs the UN mediator for Palestine in concert with the Truce Commission to supervise the observance of the above provisions, and decides that they shall be provided with a sufficient number of military observers,

Instructs the UN mediator to make contact with both parties as soon as the cease-fire is in force with a view to making recommendations to the SC about an eventual settlement for Palestine,

Calls upon all concerned to give the greatest possible assistance to the UN mediator,

Instructs the UN mediator to make a weekly report to the SC during the cease-fire,

Invites the states members of the Arab League and the Jewish and Arab authorities in Palestine to communicate their acceptance of this resolution to the SC within (a short period to be stated),

Decides that if the present resolution is rejected by either party or by both, the present situation in Palestine will be reconsidered with a view to action under Chapter VII of the Charter.”¹

AUSTIN

¹ For the revised text of the British resolution submitted to the Security Council on May 29, see SC, 3rd yr., *Supplement for May 1948*, p. 102.

501.BB Palestine/5-2748: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)*CONFIDENTIAL US URGENT WASHINGTON, May 28, 1948—11 a. m.
NIACT

337. Your tel 717, May 27. USUN should support the USSR resolution on Palestine if it remains substantially in its present form.¹ If USSR resolution fails, USUN should support UK resolution (your tel 720, May 27) with following changes:

1. Wherever expression "both parties" is used substitute "all parties".
2. In paras. 3 and 4 after Palestine insert "Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Transjordan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Egypt".
3. In para. 7 substitute after the expression "with a view to" the following "carrying out the functions of the UN Mediator as determined by the GA".

In supporting UK resolution you should call attention to the fact that paras. 3 and 4 are taken substantially from the Apr. 17 resolution of the SC.

LOVETT

¹ For Ambassador Austin's statements before the Security Council on May 28, in support of the Soviet resolution, see SC, *3rd yr., No. 76*, pp. 19, 43.

501.BB Palestine/5-2748: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom*TOP SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, May 28, 1948—4 p. m.
NIACT

1962. For the Ambassador. Most careful consideration has been given your Niacr telegrams 2304, 2305, 2311 and 2313 of May 27.¹ You can be assured that we are fully aware of need to work with and not against Britain on Palestine problem. Our mutual task would have been easier, however, had British not been extremely laggard until eleventh hour in dealing with a crisis largely of their own making.

Foregoing for your personal info only. You may say to Bevin that this Govt will not lift arms embargo except in conjunction with SC action or inaction.

The President yesterday approved following policy:

a. The US will continue to urge that SC act immediately to bring about a cease-fire in Palestine. If this can be done under Chapter 6 of UN Charter as British urge, well and good; if not, SC should act under Chapter 7.

¹ Nos. 2304, 2305, and 2313 not printed; regarding Nos. 2304 and 2313, see footnote 2, p. 1050, and the first footnote 1, p. 1067.

b. If SC issues cease-fire order under Articles 39 and 40 of Charter or calls upon parties under Chapter 6 to effect cease-fire for all of Palestine and there is failure to comply, US will be prepared to adjust its arms embargo policy to support action of SC.

c. US will support action by SC under Article 41 to order all govts. to refrain from shipment of weapons and war materials and rendering of other military assistance to govts and authorities now participating in hostilities in Palestine. If Council succeeds in bringing about a cease-fire and placing an effective general arms embargo, US will retain its present arms embargo on entire Near East until such time as there is no longer any danger of hostilities.

d. If SC is unable to take effective action to bring about cease-fire or to impose general arms embargo, US will inform SC that we shall resume our freedom of action with respect to licensing of arms shipments.

In light of foregoing policy US is prepared to support UK cease-fire resolution introduced yesterday in SC (your tel 2313, May 27). We shall, however, first vote affirmatively on USSR resolution which calls for a cease-fire in Palestine within 36 hours because it is almost identical with our own resolution submitted to SC on May 17 and which failed of acceptance for lack of necessary seven affirmative votes. If USSR resolution of May 27 fails to pass UK resolution will then come up for vote. We are instructing USUN in such event to support UK resolution with following changes:

[Here follow changes called for in telegram 337, May 28, to New York, and a summary of the last paragraph of that message.]

We regard Bevin's assurances to you as reported your tel 2311, to effect that if British resolution is adopted during four weeks' cease-fire period Britain will even suspend small arms deliveries HMG is still making under existing treaties to Egypt, Transjordan, and Iraq, as of first importance. Likewise we welcome British announcement of withdrawal of officers from Arab Legion and indication that Legion subsidy will not be paid in July unless in accord with UN decisions.

On question of immigration we take it that if UK resolution is adopted British will be prepared to retain on Cyprus the approximately 25,000 Jews which we understand from British Embassy here it had been intended to transfer to Jewish area of Palestine by Aug. 1. Since most of the Cypriote Jews are apparently of military age such action by UK would appear essential.

Info from Jewish Agency Representatives at Lake Success indicates Jews will balk at UK resolution, objecting particularly to paras 3, 4, 7, and final para.² However, our suggested amendments to paras 3 and 4 would seem to go far to remove Jewish objection that standstill bears more injuriously upon them than upon Arab States.

² As reported by New York in telegram 721, May 28, 12:30 a.m., not printed (501.BB Palestine/5-2848).

You may inform Bevin fully of foregoing and add that while we do not at all agree with his tacit conclusion that UK will be responsible for Arabs while US will assume similar responsibility for Jews, we are nevertheless prepared officially to suggest to Provisional Government of Israel wisdom at this juncture of accepting cease-fire along terms of UK resolution.³

Repeated for info only to Paris as 1851, Brussels as 813, USUN as 341.

LOVETT

³ Ambassador Douglas, on May 29, advised that "Dept's 1962, May 28 is best news I have received in many weary weeks. When I saw Bevin this morning he said that he was glad US and UK relations are back on track again." The Ambassador noted also that Mr. Bevin agreed with all the United States amendments and that the British Government would have to retain the Jews on Cyprus if the Security Council accepted the British resolution (telegram 2349 from London, 501.BB Palestine/5-2948).

867N.01/5-2848 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 28, 1948—6 p. m.

1978. For Douglas for info. Ref Embtel 2273, May 26.¹ Following account White House press conference May 27 re Palestine:²

"Q. Mr. President, Dr. Weizmann said the other day that you gave him hope for lifting the arms embargo. Can you give us any more detail?

A. The President said that the arms embargo is under consideration by the United Nations; that he had no comment on it.

Q. Mr. President, that is the United States embargo, and not the United Nations embargo?

A. The President said that the embargo by the United States was made by the Security Council of the United Nations; that it was still pending in the United Nations.

Q. Mr. President, your Ambassador in England has been in conference repeatedly with the Foreign Office spokesman and representatives of Britain during the past few days. Can you say anything about relations between America and Britain, and relations between America and Palestine,—the difference between the two?

A. The President said that he could not.

¹ Not printed; it stated that "Because of great jeopardy to possibility [of] securing Arab-Jewish cease-fire which seems to have resulted from Weizmann's reported press conference May 25... it would be extremely helpful for me [i.e., Ambassador Douglas] to know as soon as possible exactly what President did say to Weizmann." (867N.01/5-2648)

² The official text differs somewhat from that given in telegram 1978: for the former, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1948*, p. 278.

Q. Mr. President, can you tell us anything about the status of the request for the Jewish State of Palestine for a loan of \$90-million to \$100-million?

A. The President said that as far as he knew, none had been made; that if one was made, it would be handled in the usual manner, as all those things are.

Q. Mr. President, did Dr. Weizmann suggest a loan?

A. The President said that he did suggest a loan; that he said Israel would like to have a loan, like any other country. The President added that if the correspondent knew of any other country that would not like to have a loan, he wished the correspondent would tell him.

Q. Mr. President, is there any way in which financial aid could be extended to the Jews, say at this time, by special act of the Congress, or are there any funds or appropriations that you could use without consulting the Congress?

A. The President said that there is the Export-Import Bank, and there is the World Bank, that make loans of that kind.

Q. Mr. President, Dr. Weizmann said he wanted part of that loan to be used for tank and anti-tank guns?

A. The President said that Dr. Weizmann did not discuss the details with him; that all he knew was what he had seen in the papers.

Q. Mr. President, that obviously would not come under the Export-Import Bank?

A. The President said that he could not answer that question.

Q. Mr. President, did Dr. Weizmann state what he wanted the loan for?

A. The President said that he did not; that he said he wanted a loan, period.

Q. Mr. President, and what did you say?

A. The President said that if the State of Israel needs a loan after it is in existence, it would have to go through the usual channels that such things go through.

Q. Mr. President, regarding arms embargo shipments to Israel, the British as I understand it, are shipping arms to the Arabs. What is the difference between the position of the British and our position?

A. The President said that he was not sure there should be any difference.

Q. Mr. President, has the United Nations asked for the embargo on shipping arms?

A. The President said that the United Nations Council requested the arms embargo several months ago and that we complied with it to prevent bloodshed, and that that request still stands.

Q. Mr. President, did they also ask the British to stop shipping arms?

A. The President said that he did not know.

Q. Mr. President, well, it is a parallel case?

A. The President said that he did not think so; that he thought we were in a much better position to ship arms than any other country in the world.

Q. Mr. President, do you expect the United States to initiate any action on it in the United Nations?

A. The President said let us wait and see what our representative in the United Nations decides to do; that whatever he did, would have his backing.

Q. Mr. President, is there any indication of how soon some action will be taken?

A. The President said that there was not.

Q. Mr. President, would you care to comment on the exchange of diplomats between the United States and the State of Israel?

A. The President said that he did not; that he thought Secretary Marshall commented on that yesterday very well."

LOVETT

701.67N11/5-1948

The Acting Secretary of State to Mr. Elishu Epstein, at Washington

WASHINGTON, May 29, 1948.

DEAR MR. EPSTEIN: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of a telegram dated May 19, 1948, addressed to the Secretary of State, from Moshe Shertok, Foreign Secretary in the Provisional Government of the State of Israel, with regard to the exchange of Missions and Representatives.

It will be appreciated if you will inform Mr. Shertok that the United States Government is giving careful consideration to the exchange of legations and envoys extraordinary and ministers plenipotentiary between the United States and Israel and will communicate later with the Provisional Government of Israel on this subject.

In the meantime, the Government of the United States would welcome the establishment in this country of a Mission from Israel headed by Mr. Epstein as Special Representative of the Provisional Government of Israel and is prepared, if agreeable to the Provisional Government, to establish in Israel a Mission headed by a Special Representative of the Government of the United States.¹

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT A. LOVETT

¹ Mr. Epstein acknowledged Mr. Lovett's communication in a letter of June 7 to the Secretary of State, stating that his Government accepted the proposed arrangement, with the expectation that there would be no undue delay in an exchange of legations and envoys extraordinary and ministers plenipotentiary (701.67N11/6-748).

867N.01/5-2948 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, May 29, 1948.

1015. *Pravda* May 29 carries rare front page editorial "on events in Palestine", expressing full support for Israel and condemning Arab aggression. Reviewing adoption UN partition resolution, editorial describes it as assuring "liberation of Palestine from foreign dependence, satisfaction of national aspirations Jewish and Arab peoples, creation of possibility for both Jew and Arab populations of Palestine be masters own land, independent of foreign imperialist influences". Though decision "should have been welcomed by all peoples of Near East", military conflict has broken out as result British and American policy and fact that "rulers of certain Arab states are carrying out policy which in no way corresponds to interests Arab people, but is subordinated to foreign interests and influences". After contrasting British and American efforts upset partition with clear consistent position Soviet Government, editorial concludes: "Soviet Union has defended and continues defend independence Arab states and peoples. Must be clear, however, that waging war against young Jewish state, Arabs are by no means fighting for own national interests, own independence. . . .¹ Despite its sympathy for national liberation movement Arab peoples, Soviet public opinion cannot but condemn aggression of Arab states against state of Israel and right Jewish people to establish own state in accord decision UNGA".

SMITH

¹ Omission indicated in the source text.

867N.01/5-2948 : Telegram

The Vice Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED

JERUSALEM, May 29, 1948—9 a. m.

783. Terms surrender of Jews in Old City are:

1. Approximately 2000 women, children, old and religious people to be evacuated to Jewish quarters new Jerusalem under supervision International Red Cross.
2. Three hundred men of military age to be taken prisoners of war to Amman.
3. Of 150 wounded, slightly wounded to be taken prisoners of war, seriously wounded to be turned over to IRC.¹

¹ According to the telegram sent by the Truce Commission to the President of the Security Council on May 29, the unconditional surrender of the Jewish quarter of the Old City of Jerusalem took place at 6 p. m. (Palestine time) on May 28; for text, see SC, *3rd yr.*, No. 77, p. 16.

At 2310 hours local last night, Major Abdullah el-Tel, Arab Legion Commander Old City, telephoned Consulate General that Jews were attacking Zion, Jaffa, New, and Damascus Gates while evacuation of Jews from Zion Gate was still proceeding. Approximately 900 Jews including wounded still proceeding Old City and if attack continued, he said he could not vouch much longer for their safety. He requested Consulate General intercede with JA for immediate cease-fire Old City area. Consulate General called JA at once. JA stated it had been informed one hour previously that evacuation had been completed. Regarding firing, JA official stated that Arab irregulars on Old City walls had opened fire on Jewish armored buses bringing evacuees from Zion Gate and that Jews had been obliged return fire. Around midnight firing ceased.

Azcarate of United Nations who was in Old City at time told Consulate General that Arab Legion had carried out evacuation efficiently and according surrender agreement. Major el-Tel informed Consulate General this morning that evacuation except for wounded had been completed without further incident. JA official stated this morning that Arab Legion had launched attack last night against Jewish position in Sheikh Jarrah quarter while evacuation being carried out. Added that certain Jewish prisoners might be exchanged for Arab prisoners taken at Acre.

BURDETT

501.BB Palestine/5-2948 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET US URGENT
NIACT

LONDON, May 29, 1948—noon.

2348. For the Secretary and Lovett from Douglas.

1. Relative to our telephonic conversation yesterday in regard to Palestine and the news in the London *Times* that the US delegate is announcing his support for the Soviet proposal without making any reference to the British proposal, I cannot too strongly urge that if the Soviet proposal is defeated US delegate in supporting the British proposal will express some courteous acknowledgment of the long step forward which Britain has taken.

2. I do not urge this out of any sentimental considerations or because I agree with British behavior prior to the relinquishment of the mandate but because I can assure you that after the sincere and strenuous effort that HMG has made, a cavalier treatment by US of Britain would aggravate an already strained situation between US and the only natural ally we have on earth.

3. I gather from the British press that Jewish elements are determined to defeat the British proposal and are using the argument that it has an Arab cast because, they assert, it fails to prohibit a shipment of arms from source other than the United Kingdom to the Arab states.

HMG has told Cadogan that this was not the intention of British proposal and has instructed him to offer an amendment which will unmistakably remove this alleged infirmity.

4. It may be that the British proposal will not muster enough support to carry it. In this event, the French proposal in regard to recovering Jerusalem alone would be before the Security Council, so I understand, for consideration. The British feel that however desirable may be action in regard to Jerusalem, it is lamentably defective if it does not deal with Palestine as a whole. This has not been finally cleared. The British will, in all reasonable expectancy, propose that the sense of the French resolution be incorporated with the British proposition.

HMG hopes that the consolidation of the French resolution with the British resolution as amended along the lines indicated above will receive our support and sufficient strength for its adoption. I share fully this hope.

DOUGLAS

Resolution 50 (1948) Adopted by the Security Council on May 29, 1948¹

The Security Council,

Desiring to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Palestine without prejudice to the rights, claims and position of either Arabs or Jews,

1. *Calls upon* all Governments and authorities concerned to order a cessation of all acts of armed force for a period of four weeks;

2. *Calls upon* all Governments and authorities concerned to undertake that they will not introduce fighting personnel into Palestine, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Transjordan and Yemen during the cease-fire;

3. *Calls upon* all Governments and authorities concerned, should men of military age be introduced into countries or territories under their control, to undertake not to mobilize or submit them to military training during the cease-fire;

¹ Reprinted from SC, *3rd yr., Resolutions*, p. 20. The Security Council voted on the Soviet draft resolution on a paragraph-by-paragraph basis on May 29. None of the paragraphs received the affirmative votes of the required seven members; see SC, *3rd yr., No. 77*, pp. 35-37. The Council then turned its attention to the British draft resolution, which was adopted in paragraph-by-paragraph votes. No vote was taken on the text as a whole; for the discussion and balloting, see *ibid.*, pp. 38-63.

4. *Calls upon* all Governments and authorities concerned to refrain from importing or exporting war material into or to Palestine, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Transjordan or Yemen during the cease-fire;

5. *Urges* all Governments and authorities concerned to take every possible precaution for the protection of the Holy Places and of the City of Jerusalem, including access to all shrines and sanctuaries for the purpose of worship by those who have an established right to visit and worship at them;

6. *Instructs* the United Nations Mediator in Palestine, in concert with the Truce Commission, to supervise the observance of the above provisions, and decides that they shall be provided with a sufficient number of military observers;

7. *Instructs* the United Nations Mediator to make contact with all parties as soon as the cease-fire is in force with a view to carrying out his functions as determined by the General Assembly;

8. *Calls upon* all concerned to give the greatest possible assistance to the United Nations Mediator;

9. *Instructs* the United Nations Mediator to make a weekly report to the Security Council during the cease-fire;

10. *Invites* the States members of the Arab League and the Jewish and Arab authorities in Palestine to communicate their acceptance of this resolution to the Security Council not later than 6 p. m. New York standard time on 1 June 1948;

11. *Decides* that if the present resolution is rejected by either party or by both, or if, having been accepted, it is subsequently repudiated or violated, the situation in Palestine will be reconsidered with a view to action under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations;

12. *Calls upon* all Governments to take all possible steps to assist in the implementation of this resolution.

501.BB Palestine/5-3148: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, May 31, 1948—1 p. m.

2367. For the Secretary and Lovett from Douglas.

1. At a meeting with Bevin this morning, he told me that Egypt's Ambassador had just called on him to tell him that Egypt is considering response it will make to SC resolution. In this connection Egypt Government is disturbed in relation to their amendment by information to effect that there are ships at Costanza about to depart with emigrants for Palestine. Egypt Government is also worried lest some Jews known to be in Italy, and who have received military training

there, might also be transported to Palestine. Egypt Ambassador made point that it would be very hard to check whether Jewish men of military age after reaching Palestine are mobilized or given military training during cease-fire.

2. Bevin assured Egypt Ambassador that UK would hold Jews on Cyprus, and that he would make representations to the Italian Government, and to any other governments which might be concerned, with regard to carrying out the SC resolution. Bevin expressed hope that US Government will take parallel action with the Italian and any other governments involved. Bevin believes this action by HMG and US Government might importantly influence the decision of the Egypt Government.

Sent Department 2367, repeated Rome 140, US Mission Bucharest 23, Cairo 68.

DOUGLAS

501.BB Palestine/5-3148 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate at Haifa

SECRET US URGENT
NIACT

WASHINGTON, May 31, 1948—1 p. m.

90. Cairo's 3, May 30 sent Dept as 640.¹ Please inform UN Mediator Count Bernadotte that this govt is giving active consideration as member Truce Commission to his suggestion that military observers be made available to supervise observance of SC resolution of May 29. Please stress that owing to holiday we have not been able to make final arrangements and that we could only participate provided other governments' members of Truce Commission join in sending military observers.

Subject to foregoing consideration that our policy has not yet received final clearance, you may tell Bernadotte that we believe that, following precedents established in providing military observers to Balkan Commission and to Good Offices Committee in Indonesia, personnel to assist Mediator and Truce Commission should be recruited from the three states members of Commission: Belgium, France and US. Tentatively we would suggest that each Govt send 21 officer

¹ Not printed; it stated in part: "UN Representative Count Folke Bernadotte requested Military Attachés of American, British, and French Embassies to call on him noon May 30 in relation to Security Council's Palestine cease-fire resolution of May 29, inquired as to what military or civilian observers he could expect in enforcing terms of resolution in form of land, sea, and air border patrols of the various states concerned as well as observers sufficient in number to function at principal land, sea, and air ports of entry to Palestine. Count Bernadotte also inquired if in formulating his plans he might count on any air patrols from one or more of the three above mentioned countries. He added that he would prefer to have observers from small countries such as the Scandinavian, but that since time was of the essence, aid must come if at all from those countries having some forces in vicinity Palestine." (501.BB Palestine/5-3048)

observers with necessary subordinate staff and equipment, including airplanes. Our own team would be made up of seven officers from each of the three services.

If field experience demonstrates necessity of larger number of observers we should be prepared to give favorable consideration to request for additional officers if asked for by Mediator and Truce Commission.

It is felt that SC resolution of May 29 is sufficient authority for Mediator and Truce Commission to recruit military observers along lines suggested above, and without further reference SC.

Repeated Paris 1884 and Brussels 824 with request these views be brought to immediate attention of Foreign Office and competent military authorities. Repeated Jerusalem 510; Cairo 680; Damascus 199; Beirut 280; for action in event Bernadotte not first reached by Consul Haifa. Repeated for info to Baghdad 175; Jidda 208; London 2010; USUN 347.²

LOVETT

² At Mr. Lovett's request, Mr. McClintock, on June 1, sent copies of telegrams 640 and 90 to Mr. Clifford for President Truman's information. His transmitting letter concluded with the statement: "It is not possible to determine whether or not we shall in fact be called upon to supply military observers to the United Nations Mediator until replies have been received from the Arab Governments and the Provisional Government of Israel, in response to the request of the Security Council of May 29 that they cease hostilities in Palestine. If all parties do accept the Security Council's resolution, undoubtedly Count Bernadotte will have immediate need of military observers and the Department will then wish to secure the President's approval of our sending our fair share of such officers to assist the United Nations Mediator." (501.BB Palestine/6-148)

The letter bears the following marginal notation by Mr. McClintock: "Mr. Clifford said June 3 that President had given his approval".

501.BB Palestine/5-3148: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

SECRET US URGENT

LONDON, May 31, 1948—2 p. m.

NIACT

2368. 1. Wright raised urgently with Embassy today interpretation to be placed on paragraphs three and four of SC Palestine resolution of May 29. Because this constitutes vital point for Arab states as Egyptian Ambassador pointed out to Bevin (Embassy's 2367, May 31, 1 p. m.).

2. FonOff legal adviser is of opinion that no distinction is intended between "fighting personnel" (paragraph three) and "men of military age" (paragraph four). He believes that intention of paragraph four is that if notwithstanding paragraph three fighting personnel should be introduced they should not be mobilized or given military training. If paragraph three meant armed forces it would have said so. Legal

adviser said that above is consistent with basic concept of British draft that neither side should improve its position during cease-fire by acquiring new recruits.

3. Wright said Arab countries are holding cabinet meetings today re SC resolution and that FonOff regards it as most important that US, UK and France not only agree on interpretation these two paragraphs but communicate this interpretation to all parties since this may affect their decision. FonOff has just telephoned Beeley, UK delegate UN, ascertain US views. FonOff is also telephoning Paris.

4. Please advise urgently Department's interpretation and action Department takes.

Sent Department 2368; Department please repeat to USUN, and also repeat to Palestine, repeated Cairo as 69; Baghdad 55; Beirut 21; Jidda 67; and Damascus 25.

DOUGLAS

867N.01/5-3148: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

Moscow, May 31, 1948—4 p. m.

1016. An Arab colleague tells me that during recent conversation on other matters, Vishinsky insisted, despite his (Arab's) expressed unwillingness, on discussing Palestine. Vishinsky justified Soviet support of partition on familiar lines of right of Palestine Jews to self-determination and independence, and rehearsed Soviet support Arab independence. He then went on to say Soviet Government had always been opposed to Zionism as tool of British imperialism and had not changed this view. However, distinction must be made between Zionism and Jewish population in Palestine. Latter wants and is prepared for real independence and "real democracy." Soviet Government, he indicated, would give no support to Israel which would be in conflict with its opposition to Zionism as such or with its support of national liberation movements in Arab countries.

Department pass London as Moscow's 61.¹

SMITH

¹ London cabled on June 1: "Soviet policy re Palestine described Moscow's 1016, May 31, to Department is partially confirmed by recent report received by Foreign Office from Bucharest quoting 'reliable student Communist source' to effect that first Soviet objective is to get UK forces out of Palestine and neighboring countries. USSR recognized Israel as ME state most likely to offer opportunity for Soviet domination. With same hope USSR would extend recognition promptly to any Palestine Arab state. Once in control either or both states USSR would energetically support both Jewish and Arab states against their reactionary leaders." (Telegram 2383, 867N.01/6-148)

501.BB Palestine/5-3148: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom*SECRET US URGENT
NIACT

WASHINGTON, May 31, 1948—9 p. m.

2015. British Embassy has discussed points raised your Niaacts 2368 and 2372 May 31¹ with Dept and USUN. Embassy has also read us text of telegram which FO sent UK missions in Near East May 30, urging unconditional acceptance by Arab Govts of SC resolution of May 29. Please call on Bevin and say that we much appreciate his prompt and, we hope, effective action.

As for advice which friendly govts might give Arabs or Jews on moot points in SC resolution, you may tell Bevin and Bidault (repeated to Paris for similar action as 1890) that Jewish Agency has today informally approached USUN with a number of questions of interpretation on which Shertok requests our informal opinion.² JA was referred to President of SC, with advice that this Govt could not unilaterally undertake to interpret SC resolution. For your info only, our preceding telegram repeats gist of JA questions.

Because of attitude taken vis-à-vis JA we do not feel that US should seek to coach Arab govts on interpretation of paragraphs three and four of SC resolution of May 29. We do feel however, and this [*the*] US missions to Arab Govts may state to Foreign Ministers, that essence of May 29 resolution is to secure cessation of hostilities during a four week period in which neither side would be able to build up its military potential. In consequence, to us most commonsense interpretation of paras 3 and 4 of SC resolution is that no men of military age should enter countries mentioned therein during four week period of cease fire. Four weeks are in fact a short time in which to recruit an army. If, however, there were legitimate need to permit immigration of men of military age to take up exclusively civilian pursuits, there should be adequate safeguards to ensure that these men are not to be used for military service.

On the whole, therefore, our interpretation is similar to that set forth in para 2 urtel 2368, which you should repeat to Paris and capitals listed below. We repeat that essence of SC resolution of May 29 is to achieve immediate end of hostilities in Palestine and that

¹ Latter not printed.

² As transmitted in telegram 727, May 31, 12:43 p. m., from New York, not printed (501.BB Palestine/5-3148); for the questions of interpretation as they evolve into assumptions, see footnote 2, p. 1085.

during period of cease fire neither side shall be able to build up its military potential.³

Sent for action to London 2015; Paris 1890; Cairo 682; Beirut 283; Damascus 201; Baghdad 177; Jidda 210; Jerusalem 514. Repeated USUN 348; Haifa 92; Brussels 826; Moscow 616.

LOVETT

³ Ambassador Douglas, on June 1, reported that "When I informed Bevin of contents Department's 2015, May 31, he expressed appreciation for prompt manner in which Department dealt with this problem and welcomed warmly the attitude which Department has adopted. . . . He thought that in Amman, Arab delegates would be quick to note similarity US and UK views." (Telegram 2403, from London, 501.BB Palestine/6-148)

501.BB Palestine/6-148: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

SECRET US URGENT
 NIACT

WASHINGTON, June 1, 1948—6 p. m.

349. There are four principal possibilities confronting SC when it meets tomorrow to receive replies from Arab Govts and the Provisional Govt of Israel responsive to its resolution of May 29:

1. Acceptance by all Govts of SC call to cease hostilities for 4 weeks and otherwise to comply with requirements of SC resolution.
2. Rejection by all Govts of SC res. of May 29.
3. Acceptance of SC res. by Prov. Govt. of Israel and rejection by Arab Govts.
4. Rejection by Prov. Govt. of Israel and acceptance by Arab Govts.

There is also possibility that there may be conditional acceptances by one or both sides which may require further consideration by SC and Dept.

If, as we profoundly hope, both sides accept the resolution, your remarks should be warmly congratulatory of the statesmanship and restraint exhibited by the Govts concerned. You should on behalf of this govt say that we look now to UN Mediator, Count Bernadotte, and to SC Truce Commission in Palestine, not only to supervise compliance with Resolution of May 29 but to use this breathing space of 4 weeks as an opportunity to work out a lasting *modus vivendi* between Arabs and Jews.

You should pledge fullest support of this govt, as member of Truce Commission, to the Mediator in his difficult task, and say that we stand ready to assist him to the utmost.

If contingencies (2), (3) and (4) materialize, penultimate para-

graph of res. of May 29 comes into immediate effect. We feel that for purpose of meeting of June 2 it would be unwise for Council immediately to debate resolutions with a view to action under Chapter 7. We feel that there should be adequate discussion among delegations as to exactly what course such action should take. In this case you should keep in mind but not as yet discuss Deptel 327, May 26,¹ setting forth US policy as approved by the President.

Since action under Chapter 7, consisting merely of an order to the parties to cease fire and end hostilities, has twice been rejected by the Council, first in the form of our res of May 17 and latterly by rejection of the USSR res of May 29, it is to be doubted whether a reiteration of our Chapter 7 res of May 17 would prove effective.

Please discuss possibilities with your colleagues on the Council. We value in particular the British views and should prefer if possible to work in concert with UK del. Naturally the joint participation of such other delegations as the French, Canadians, and Belgians would be most welcome.

Depending upon your report of the attitude of other delegations, Dept will formulate instructions as to the course of action this Govt will be prepared to support if necessary under Chapter 7 at the next meeting of the Council subsequent to June 2.

Repeated to London as 2025, Paris as 1897, Brussels as 832, Moscow as 619.

LOVETT

¹ Not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 1027.

867N.01/6-148

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Mr. Fraser Wilkins of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] June 1, 1948.

On June 1, 1948 Mr. Epstein informed me that he had received a telegram from Mr. Shertok in Tel Aviv in which the Provisional Government of Israel accepted the Security Council's request for a cease fire of May 29.¹ A copy of the text of this telegram as taken down over the telephone is attached.

Mr. Epstein said that he had been instructed by Mr. Shertok to request the support of the United States Government for Israel's acceptance of the Security Council's cease fire on the basis of the five

¹ For text, see SC, 3rd yr., No. 78, p. 2.

assumptions contained therein.² I told Mr. Epstein that I would communicate with my superior officers and would communicate with him later.

The attached text was subsequently discussed by Mr. Henderson, Mr. Sandifer³ and Mr. McClintock with Mr. Lovett. On instructions from Mr. Henderson, Mr. Sandifer and Mr. McClintock I telephoned Mr. Epstein that the Department regarded Mr. Shertok's telegram of June 1 as an acceptance of the Security Council's resolution of May 29 and that, with regard to the five assumptions contained in that telegram, the Department considered such interpretations for determination by the United Nations through the agency of the UN Mediator, the Security Council Truce Commission or the Security Council itself.

Mr. Epstein asked me if we would support their interpretation of the Security Council's resolution of May 29 in the United Nations. I told him that it seemed to me on the basis of the information I had already given him that this question could not be answered at this moment, as it remained to be seen what action the United Nations would take with regard to the assumptions as stated.

Mr. Epstein told me that two main considerations had dictated Israel's acceptance of the Security Council's resolution of May 29: (1) Israel's desire to act in accord with international public opinion, and (2) Israel's desire to cooperate with the United Nations in its handling of the Palestine question.

² The assumptions as furnished by Mr. Epstein comprised:

"1. That ban on import of arms into territories Arab states enumerated in resolution should apply also to deliveries arms from stocks owned or controlled by foreign powers within these territories.

"2. That during cease fire armed forces of neither side will seek to advance beyond areas controlled by them at commencement of cease fire and that each side will be entitled maintain the positions in its military occupation at that time.

"3. That freedom of access to Jerusalem will be insured for supply of food and other essentials as well as for normal civilian entry and exit.

"4. That any attempt by parties concerned to stop or impede normal transport of goods consigned to Israel and other states concerned will be regarded as an act of armed force.

"5. That while provisional government is ready comply with injunction that persons of military age admitted during cease fire should not be mobilized or submitted to military training, its freedom to admit immigrants regardless of age will not be impaired."

³ Durward V. Sandifer, Deputy Director of the Office of United Nations Affairs.

Editorial Note

The reply of the Arab League, transmitted by the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs in a telegram of June 1 to Secretary-General Lie, accepted the Security Council's request for a four-week cease-fire. The reply asserted that one of the most important of the Mediator's func-

tions was to reach a peaceful and just solution of the Palestine problem. It then stated that "The Governments of the Arab States are confident that the United Nations Mediator and the members of the Truce Commission . . . will realize that any solution which does not ensure political unity for Palestine or respect the will of the majority of the population of that country will not have the least chance of success." The full text of the reply is printed in SC, *3rd yr., No. 78*, page 4.

The President of the Security Council, on June 2, announced to the Council that acceptance of the cease-fire was unconditional and that the comments made by all parties were not to be considered as setting conditions (*ibid.*, page 16).

Sir Alec Kirkbride, British Minister in Transjordan, gave Wells Stabler an account of the meeting of the Political Committee of the Arab League at Amman concerning Arab acceptance of the cease-fire, as furnished to him by the Transjordanian Prime Minister, Tawfik al-Huda. According to this account, Egypt and Transjordan pressed for acceptance and were soon joined by Iraq. Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon were more difficult to convince because of their concern for local public opinion, but they finally voted for acceptance. After adoption of the resolution, the Syrian, Lebanese, and Saudi Arabian delegates proposed an additional resolution stating that all Arab states rejected a Jewish state and that anybody entertaining contrary ideas was a traitor to the Arab cause. The Transjordanian Prime Minister told the three delegates that this matter was entirely outside the scope of the meeting and that the proposed resolution was a direct attack on the Hashemites. He thereupon closed the meeting and walked out (telegram 237, June 3, 1 p. m., from Beirut, 501.BB Palestine/6-348).

501.BB Palestine/6-148: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

SECRET US URGENT

WASHINGTON, June 1, 1948—6 p. m.

NIACT

350. British Embassy has made oral representation here today soliciting our support of UK interpretation of Articles 3 and 4 of SC resolution of May 29 along lines of paragraph 2, Douglas's telegram 2368, May 31. (Reference Deptel 348, May 31, 9 p. m.¹).

British request that we either support their interpretation in SC or, failing that, do not oppose their interpretation.

You are authorized to state in SC, but only if necessary, our view of meaning of paragraphs 3 and 4 of SC resolution of May 29 in terms

¹ This was a repeat of 2015 to London, p. 1082.

set forth in Deptel 348 (sent London for action as 2015, May 31). However, we should much prefer at this delicate juncture that SC does not get involved in debate as to interpretation. We feel it far preferable that questions of interpretation of SC resolution of May 29 be left to UN Mediator in Palestine, Count Bernadotte, and would prefer that you suggest this course of action if situation should arise.

Repeated Haifa as 94, Jerusalem as 518, Beirut as 285, Damascus as 202, Cairo as 690, with request that Count Bernadotte be apprised of our foregoing views and also interpretation set forth Deptel 348 (Sent London as 2015).² Repeated London for info as 2026, Paris as 1898, Baghdad as 179, Jidda as 212, Brussels as 833, Moscow as 620.

LOVETT

² The question of the interpretation of Articles 3 and 4 continued to agitate the Department. On June 2, Messrs. Sandifer and McClintock discussed the matter further by telephone with Mr. Ross at New York. Mr. McClintock's memorandum of the conversation states: "Although from an ideal point of view we should prefer that no men of military age should enter the countries mentioned during the four-week period of cease-fire, if there were legitimate need to permit the entry of men of military age to take up exclusively civilian pursuits this should be possible provided there were adequate safeguards to ensure that these men were not to be used for military service.

"With the approval of Mr. Lovett, the following language was submitted as making this position more clear:

"Paragraphs 3 and 4 do not preclude the admission of men of military age for exclusively civilian purposes provided this is carried out in good faith in light of the acceptance of the obligations of these paragraphs by the parties, and under supervision of the UN Mediator.'" (501.BB Palestine/6-248)

PPS Files, Lot 64-D 563

*Minutes of the Policy Planning Staff, Wednesday, June 2, 1948,
4 p. m. to 5 p. m.*

SECRET

Present: George Butler Carlton Savage
 Bernard Guffer Henry Villard¹
 Willard L. Thorp, E
 Loy W. Henderson, NEA
 John D. Hickerson, EUR
 Carlisle H. Humelsine, S/S
 Samuel K. C. Kopper, NEA
 Robert M. McClintock, UNA
 Gordon P. Merriam, NE
 Durward V. Sandifer, UNA
 Fraser Wilkins, NE

There was a discussion of the question of placing the Palestine problem before the National Security Council, in accordance with the

¹ Messrs. Butler, Guffer, and Villard were members of the Policy Planning Staff; Mr. Savage, who drafted these minutes, was the Staff's Executive Secretary.

Policy Planning Staff recommendation, approved by the Secretary and Mr. Lovett, that the course which this Government pursues with respect to Palestine should be cleared with the National Security Council. It was agreed that we should begin immediately to develop a paper on Palestine and its overall policy implications, particularly with respect to the Middle East, for submission to the Secretary and Mr. Lovett and eventual clearance through the National Security Council.

501.BB Palestine/6-248

Memorandum by the Deputy United States Representative on the Security Council (Jessup) to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

CONFIDENTIAL

[NEW YORK,] June 2, 1948.

Subject: Final Solution in Palestine

It would seem important immediately for the Department to formulate its views concerning the eventual solution in Palestine toward which the mediator will be working during the cease fire period. Although presumably the mediator will exercise a free hand, it is clear that the views of the United States will exercise a strong if not controlling influence on what is ultimately recommended or accepted.

The first alternative to be considered is the question whether during the four week period there should be an effort to reach a permanent solution or whether a temporary solution should be aimed at. On the one hand, it can be argued that the Arabs may need time for adjustment to the idea of a Jewish State and that some temporary arrangement, say for six months, might pave the way for future long range agreement. On the other hand, there are some indications that since Arab councils are divided, they may wish to be forced and would like a strong recommendation to which they would have to bow. Our best political judgment is needed in regard to this Arab attitude.

With reference to a possible final solution, the following assumptions may be valid:

First Assumption

There will be a State of Israel.

If this is taken as certain, then it could be argued that the best way to get the Arabs to acquiesce in this fact is to secure as many recognitions as possible, particularly the recognition of the United Kingdom. If the United Kingdom admitted this fact and committed itself to it, it might help to put it over in the minds of the Arabs. The more states that recognize, the easier it would be to get Arab acquiescence.

Second Assumption

There must also be an Arab State in Palestine.

The question exists as to whether the Arabs can agree on Abdullah as the head of the Palestinian state regardless of its exact boundaries. If the Arabs were agreed on this, it might be possible to hold out the hope of recognition and support of application for United Nations membership. Attention should also be given to the thought that recognition of a greater kingdom of Abdullah's would solve the problem of recognition of Transjordan.

Third Assumption

There must be close relations between the Jewish and Arab states in Palestine, especially on economic lines.

Here it would be necessary to explore all of the various solutions which have been suggested, including the November 29 plan for economic union and Tsiang's suggestion for some kind of dual commonwealth with a head man or mediator appointed by the United Nations and having charge of foreign relations and finance.

One point which seems to be dominant in Arab minds is the possibility of subsequent Jewish expansion. Consideration might be given to some kind of guarantee of the Arab state which would prevent possible subsequent Jewish expansion. It might be assumed that in regard to immigration, the Arab state would be free to exclude Jewish immigrants since each state presumably would have control of its own immigration policy.

Methods: While it would seem desirable that negotiations should be carried on in New York, in Washington and in the Arab capitals, and in Tel Aviv, it would appear that nothing should be done to stultify the role of the mediator or to weaken his hand, and that the lead should be given to him in the negotiations.

In order to support the mediator, it would seem desirable immediately to strengthen the Truce Commission by appointing to its membership persons of highest ambassadorial rank from Belgium, France and the United States.

Consideration might be given to the appointment during the four week period of a boundary commission which could continue its work after the termination of the cease fire period. The mediator might act as Chairman of such a boundary commission.

It might be desirable to draw up something of a balance sheet showing what advantages or concessions would be given to each side. One might also note what factors would be common to both a temporary and to a permanent solution. Common factors would include separate Jewish and Arab governments, common services and the problem of the City of Jerusalem. In regard to Jerusalem, the alternatives might be either to let the Arabs have it as Abdullah's capital, to make it an

international city as under the November 29 plan, or possibly to find a combination of the two schemes. Perhaps the old city could be made a *corpus separatum* as under the November 29 plan and have a purely religious significance comparable to, but different from that of the Vatican City. Access would, of course, have to be secured.

The boundaries laid down on November 29 would certainly seem to be capable of adjustment and modification. The Arabs would seem to be entitled to a port on the Mediterranean Sea. Further consideration would need to be given to the Negeb.

501.BB Palestine/6-248 : Telegram

The Chargé in Egypt (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

CAIRO, June 2, 1948—5 p. m.

659. Data supplied by Department's 680, May 31,¹ were conveyed to Count Bernadotte in call which I paid him at his hotel this morning accompanied by Assistant Military Attaché, Colonel Wyman. Bernadotte, who had returned last evening from Amman, stated he had not received Department's message at Haifa. He was much encouraged by its cooperative tenor while realizing that it represented merely tentative and preliminary thinking on part of Department. It was evident however that Bernadotte felt a larger number of officers than that suggested by Department would become necessary if truce observance were to be adequately enforced and that equipment would require ships as well as airplanes; moreover his own duties would not permit of his active supervision of observer teams so that a deputy would become necessary. He inquired if in my belief a Swede or Swedes would be acceptable for this purpose. I replied to effect my personal view was that since apparently Bernadotte himself a Swede had been unanimously accepted by the UN in capacity of mediator it would seem not unreasonable for him to be assisted by other Swedish men. Bernadotte then requested facilities of Embassy for sending a telegram to Truce Commission at Jerusalem to effect that if acceptance of truce proved correct (he had had no word from UN confirming reports in today's Cairo press) his entire time would be taken up with implementing the truce so that it would be well if the Truce Commission could visit Cairo where facilities for communications with the UN were better than other cities such as Amman.

On my pointing out that the US Government believed that the military observers should be taken from nationals of those governments represented on the Truce Commission; namely, Belgium, France, and the US, Count Bernadotte stated that he would communicate with the Belgian Minister in Cairo on the subject. He was evidently inclined

¹ This was a repeat of telegram 90 to Haifa, p. 1079.

to a belief that British advice would still be helpful in setting up teams of observers in view of British experience in Palestine and hoped that interested governments would give their assent to his obtaining aid from British as well as from Belgium, France and US even though observers might be limited to nationals of the three last named countries. Bunche² as well as another member Bernadotte's staff together with Harold Evans were present during our talk on conclusion of which Bernadotte requested Colonel Wyman remain for second meeting of Military Attachés. In view of receipt immediately before my departure for Bernadotte's hotel of Department's 682, May 31³ and 690, June 1,⁴ I took texts along from 682. However I read solely the final sentence relating to Department's belief that SC's resolution of May 29 in effect was a standstill agreement.

On my reading to Bernadotte that portion of 690, paragraph 3, which begins with the word "however" and goes on to mention that the interpretation of the SC's resolution might be left to Bernadotte, the latter gave a wry smile accompanied by an ejaculation.⁵

Sent Department 659, repeated London, Brussels, Paris, Jerusalem; sent Arab capitals by pouch.

PATTERSON

² Ralph J. Bunche, Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations with Count Bernadotte.

³ This was a repeat of telegram 2015 to London, p. 1082.

⁴ This was a repeat of telegram 350 to New York, p. 1086.

⁵ Count Bernadotte, on June 2, sent a cable to Secretary-General Lie in which he proposed that he, the Mediator, be authorized to fix the effective date of the cease-fire and truce; for text, see SC, *3rd yr.*, No. 78, p. 16. In the telephone conversation alluded to in footnote 2, p. 1087, Mr. Ross was informed that the Department concurred with the Mediator's proposal.

The President of the Security Council, at its meeting of June 2, announced that the Council agreed to the Mediator's proposal. The Soviet and the Ukrainian Representatives, however, specifically abstained from approval (SC, *3rd yr.*, No. 78, pp. 23, 24).

501.BB Palestine/6-248: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

LONDON, June 2, 1948—7 p. m.

2419. 1. Department's 2015 of May 31 and 2026, June 1 to London.¹ I am gratified that our interpretation of paragraphs 3 and 4 SC resolution May 29 is in line with that of British Government, and I agree that on future questions of interpretation these should be left so far as possible to Count Bernadotte.

2. There is one problem to which I am sure the Department has already given its attention but which might soon come very much to fore—treatment to be accorded Jewish DP's in American zone Ger-

¹ The latter was a repeat of telegram 350 to New York, p. 1086.

many with regard to emigration to Palestine during cease-fire Bevin, although British interest would be served by getting rid of them, took note of query Department's 1962, May 28, and agreed unconditionally to retain Jews in Cyprus (see Embassy's 2349, May 29,² paragraph 4) during cease-fire period and has so advised Arab states. This action may have gone far to achieve Arab acceptance cease-fire.

3. Jews in DP camps in American zone Germany are in position analogous to that of Jews in Cyprus. Am I correct in assuming that until there is a definitive SC ruling to contrary, USG in accordance with its own interpretation of paragraphs 3 and 4 will retain male Jews of military age in our DP camps for period of cease-fire? It seems to me that if in this regard we do less than UK with which USG first raised question, it would be inconsistent with our interpretation and we will create thereby an opportunity for the enemies of US and UK to drive fresh wedge between us. Surely introduction of any kind of manpower of military age builds up a country's military potential (Department's 2015, May 31, paragraph 3).

Sent Department 2419; repeated Baghdad 59; Cairo 75; Beirut 25; Damascus 29; Jidda 71; Paris 253; Berlin 167.

DOUGLAS

² Not printed; but see footnote 3, p. 1072.

501.BB Palestine/6-248: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, June 2, 1948—7 p. m.

2420. Following obtained informally from Burrows today regarding Palestine:

1. As British Delegation UN will explain to USUN today Foreign Office feels that while it agrees that other questions of interpretation should be left to Bernadotte, Foreign Office feels regarding paragraphs three and four of SC resolution Bernadotte should have guidance because HMG has already committed itself to Arabs regarding its interpretation. If Bernadotte should take contrary view, Arabs would claim that they had been tricked. Possible alternative, though less satisfactory, line would be Bernadotte ruling that men of military age should not be allowed enter Palestine until there are adequate safeguards to insure that these men are not used for military service (Department's 2015 May 31 and 2026 June 1¹).

2. Foreign Office understands Bernadotte created favorable impres-

¹ The latter was a repeat of telegram 350 to New York, p. 1086.

sion Amman where he pleased Arabs by showing willingness make decisions and accept responsibility for implementation SC resolution.

3. Preliminary Foreign Office guidance comments to UK Delegation regarding Israeli assumptions² as given Radio Bulletin No. 696, June 2 were:

Reference one, UK Delegation should give assurances regarding British stores ME;

Reference two, this seems reasonable;

Reference three, this seems reasonable subject to safeguards as to what constitutes "essentials" and "normal entry";

Reference four, HMG would prefer not to comment without further study;

Reference five, see paragraph one above and previous.

Repeated Baghdad 60, Cairo 76, Beirut 26, Damascus 30, Jidda 72. Department please repeat Palestine.

DOUGLAS

² For the assumptions, see footnote 2, p. 1085.

501.BB Palestine/6-348: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the
United Nations (Austin)*

SECRET US URGENT
NIACT

WASHINGTON, June 3, 1948—3 p. m.

357. Careful consideration has been given to request of Syrian President of SC for our support of his proposal that supervisors of UN Mediator in Palestine include representatives of Arab and Jewish sides as well as representatives of the three principal religions in Palestine.

You should tell Faris El Khouri that, although we are sympathetic to the motives which prompted his suggestion, we do not feel it would be wise to include in Bernadotte's staff of military and other observers the representatives of the parties at interest. The essence of the Mediator's task and that of the Truce Commission is to be impartial and to carry out the terms of the SC resolution of May 29 without fear or favor to either party.

You may tell Faris Bey, however, that we should have no objection if Count Bernadotte were assisted in his work by liaison officers representing the Jews on one hand and the Arabs on the other. Precedents for such liaison officers are to be found in the case of the Balkan Commission and in the Indonesian Good Offices Committee's work.

We do not feel that it would be useful to interject religious considerations into the Mediator's task under resolution of May 29. Faris, himself, as a Christian, should appreciate that it would be difficult to

decide which Christian sect should represent the Christians of Palestine and he should also be able to appreciate embarrassment which might be caused if representative of the Moslems of Palestine were their titular leader, the Grand Mufti.

As for your own suggestion that our representatives from the three Services should be headed by officers of Flag rank, we are inclined to doubt whether in fact this would achieve the useful purpose you envisage. On the contrary we feel that presence of high-ranking officers might serve to detract from preeminent position of the Mediator who is making an excellent beginning and who we feel is fully capable of exerting all the prestige that is needed in this situation. Our concept of the role of military observers is that they should be a group of fairly young hard-working officers of rank not higher than Army colonel or Navy captain, who would thus be clearly subordinate to UN Mediator and who would be able to rough it in the field.

With respect to your suggestion that representatives be named to Truce Commission of rank and caliber of Ambassador, we feel that this would be injurious to and a reflection on work of present truce commissioners, the Consuls General in Jerusalem. These men, with great devotion and at grave personal risk, have done their utmost to carry out SC terms of reference and their failure to secure a truce was less due to their own personal qualifications than to intransigence of the parties with whom they dealt. Accordingly we are not disposed to suggest that persons of Ambassadorial position now be assigned to Truce Commission. Commission should continue on working level to assist and advise Count Bernadotte but we shall look principally to UN Mediator for top-level decisions on the spot.

Ambassador Austin is authorized to state at SC meeting this morning that this govt as member of Truce Commission will do its utmost to fulfill terms imposed on it by SC resolution of May 29. We are also prepared, if UN Mediator so requests, to furnish him military, naval, and air observers to implement Paragraph 7 of that resolution, provided that other nations are also called upon by Mediator for similar service. You should state that in our opinion most logical formula for fixing which nations should contribute these observers would be to follow precedent established for Balkan and Indonesian cases and to look to governments members of Truce Commission for this service. However, you should make it clear that this is a suggestion and that we will defer to wishes of Count Bernadotte. You may also in your judgment support suggestion as coming from Faris El Khouri that liaison officers of Jewish and Arab parties might do useful work attached to Bernadotte's staff.

For your information President and Defense Secretary Forrestal have indicated their approval of this government contributing its fair

share of military observers if other members of Truce Commission do likewise. Repeated Cairo as 706 for immediate information of Count Bernadotte. Repeated Jerusalem as 528, Haifa as 101, for information of Bernadotte if he has not first been approached by Cairo. Repeated for information to London as 2054, Paris as 1925, Brussels as 842, Beirut as 293, Jidda as 215, Baghdad as 184.

MARSHALL

501.BB Palestine/6-348: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt

SECRET US URGENT

WASHINGTON, June 3, 1948—7 p. m.

712. Please inform Count Bernadotte that we are highly gratified at success which has thus far attended his energetic and conciliatory efforts with Arabs and Jews.

You may likewise inform UN Mediator that President has assented to this Govt contributing its fair share of military observers in conjunction with other Govts, preferably France and Belgium, as the other members of Truce Commission, to implement Paragraph 7, SC resolution May 29.

We feel that before formal action can be taken Bernadotte should make an official request of this Govt for assistance contemplated. You should in terms of strictest confidence inform Count Bernadotte that this Govt would not be pleased to serve if Russians or satellite states were asked also to send military observers.

Re your 659, June 2, we feel that Count Bernadotte should have complete liberty of choice in selecting his deputy and we would have no objection to a Swede in this position nor to whatever additional Swedish staff Bernadotte might require.

Question of payment of military observers has not yet been resolved in UN but this Govt considers that simplest arrangement would be for govts which send military observers to defray their expenses and also to accept charges incidental to furnishing of necessary equipment such as airplanes and land transport. However, if other govts have different views we are prepared to concert our policy with theirs. It might be that for Bernadotte's staff use he could make arrangements with British, who have large supply of military equipment on the spot, to loan him such airplanes and naval or land transport facilities as he may require. This is offered purely as a suggestion.

Sent Cairo as 712 for action. Repeated Haifa as 107 and Jerusalem as 534 for similar action if Bernadotte not first reached by Cairo. Repeated for info to USUN as 359, London as 2069, Paris as 1934, Brussels as 848, Moscow as 628.

MARSHALL

501.BB Palestine/6-448: Telegram

*The Chargé in Egypt (Patterson) to the Secretary of State*SECRET MOST IMMEDIATE
NIACT

CAIRO, June 4, 1948—7 p. m.

675. At 3:30 p. m. today I informed Count Bernadotte content Department's 712 June 3 in course of call at his hotel. He took due note of substance of paragraph one, which I repeated to him, and stated Americans and Belgians having accepted to supply observers with response being now awaited from French, there would be no need to look elsewhere. Bernadotte hoped for some British equipment and interestingly added that Nokrashy Pasha had urged him endeavor obtain British naval vessels to patrol coasts.

Department's assent appointment Swedish deputy and other supervisors of observer corps much appreciated. Bernadotte has been in provisional touch with Stockholm on subject, and finds Swedish Government willing cooperate. Both Bernadotte and Bunche, who had yesterday flown Amman and Haifa but not Beirut, stated immigration men of military age seemed sole serious obstacle in way of Arab and Jewish agreement on truce. They had conferred at Haifa with Moshe Shertok such length as to have been unable visit Beirut. Bernadotte is telegraphing UN on subject desired clarification SC's intent,¹ while Bunche is telegraphing Reedman, UN agent Haifa, to work on Shertok to agree self-limitation immigration men of military age while preserving principle of immigration. Bunche expressed hope Department might use its influence in bringing about reasonable interpretation phrase in dispute.

Bernadotte stated he had overcome Arab objections to provisioning of Jerusalem by pointing out unless supply of city were permitted its position would deteriorate during four weeks truce period, and so not represent maintenance of desired standstill in military potential.

Sent Department 675, repeated London 54, Paris 49, Jerusalem 74, Brussels unnumbered. Pouched Arab capitals.

PATTERSON

¹ His message, dated June 4, stated that the question of immigration into Palestine was the sole obstruction to agreement on an effective truce date. It then raised these questions: "Does resolution envisage that men of military age may be brought in Jewish area Palestine during period truce provided they are not mobilized or submitted to training? Is resolution permissive this regard or does resolution seek exclusion all men military age?"; for full text of message, see SC, 3rd yr., Supplement for June 1948, p. 77.

501.BB Palestine/6-448: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, June 4, 1948—8 p. m.

2482. Embassy's 2442, June 3,¹ paragraph 1. Bevin raised with me today question mediator's observers and said that in proposing nationals small neutral states he had in mind as primary objective keeping out USSR. US formula of Nationals Truce Commission member-states assisted possibly by Swedes or other neutrals accomplishes this and hence Bevin is entirely agreeable to our proposals. When I read him Department's 2069, June 3,² Bevin said it was fully in accord with his views.

2. Bevin told me that in difficult period ahead regarding Palestine he hoped the closest four-way cooperation and exchange of information can be worked out between Cadogan, USUN, British Embassy Washington and Department.

3. Bevin told me of June 3 telegram from British Embassy Cairo reporting call from Bernadotte to effect that Prime Minister Nokrashy Pasha is anxious for British Navy and Air Force to assist Bernadotte in securing observance terms truce. Bernadotte told British Ambassador that he had no objection in principle to this and asked Ambassador to put question urgently to Bevin. Later Nokrashy directly approached British Ambassador with same request.

4. Bevin said that although he was willing to think it over his first reaction to use Royal Navy and RAF is negative due to apprehensions that use British Navy and AF might give rise to demands from USSR to be included among military observers or otherwise.

5. I was advised later today by Michael Wright that further consideration in Foreign Office has led to conclusion, which Bevin and Attlee approved this afternoon, that this might turn into first formal request from mediator to HMG and that under terms SC Resolution HMG could not refuse to "give the greatest possible assistance to the United Nations mediator". Consequently Bernadotte will be told that if he makes formal request Bevin would be prepared to recommend to his colleagues that British aircraft and such vessels as might be necessary be put at the disposal of mediator to observe both sea and land frontiers Palestine with view to reporting to mediator any suspicious movements which might be designed to contravene terms truce.

¹ Not printed.

² This was a repeat of telegram 712 to Cairo, p. 1095.

So far as possible British sea and aircraft would carry members mediator's observer staff and in no circumstances would they stop vessels or engage in positive enforcement action. Their function would be to report only.

6. I note that final sentence Department's reftel envisages British aid along these lines to Bernadotte.

Sent Department 2482; repeated Baghdad 64, Cairo 82, Brussels 91, Paris 259, Moscow 93, Beirut 30, Damascus 34, Jidda 77, Jerusalem 80. Department please repeat Haifa and USUN.

DOUGLAS

501.BB Palestine/6-548: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET URGENT

NEW YORK, June 5, 1948—12:33 a. m.

753. The Secretariat, in the late afternoon of June 4, upon receiving the queries of Count Bernadotte regarding need for clarification of the SC May 29 resolution in respect to immigration, initially called a meeting of the SC for June 5. Secretariat officials agreed with El-Khouris¹ view that neither he nor the SYG were competent to interpret the resolution. However, after some delay, and with the assistance of USUN, telephonic communication was established between Lake Success and Cairo, in which Cordier² expressed to Bunche the SYG's view that an SC meeting to interpret its resolution would lead to confusion rather than clarification.

Bunche reported that Arabs and Jews were not far apart in their position and apparently did not absolutely insist that the SC must define the terms of the resolution in minute detail. However, Bernadotte wished to be sure that he would not later be accused of preempting SC functions if he were to interpret the SC resolution as best he could. He also sought assurance that if he took a strong initiative he would not be accused of exceeding his role.

After consultation with El-Khouris, Cordier, on instructions from

¹ Faris el-Khouris, Syrian Representative at the United Nations and, at this time, President of the Security Council. During the proceedings of the Council on June 3, he announced that: "The matter is already in the hands of the Mediator, who has the full confidence of the Security Council to understand and interpret the text of the resolution which he now has, in a way which he may deem to be correct."

"If that interpretation is challenged, the matter will then be submitted to the Security Council for further consideration. Then and only then would such a point as interpretation be discussed."

He concluded that the Mediator "should be given a free hand to act in accordance with the resolutions which he now has before him" (SC, 3rd yr., No. 79, p. 29).

² Andrew W. Cordier, Executive Assistant to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Lie, informed Bunche for Bernadotte that it was the view of the President of the SC and the SYG that the SC resolution basically meant that neither side should improve its military position during the cease fire and, as El-Khouri insisted on adding, the resolution did not prejudice the rights or position of either party. Bernadotte was also assured that it was the intention of the SC that he should have a free hand to bring about an end to the hostilities.

In presenting this opinion, the SYG was reinforced by the strong protest which Parodi had entered against an SC meeting to interpret the resolution.

Cordier informed USUN that Bunche was quite optimistic about the prospects of achieving a cease fire by Monday, June 7.

The Secretariat was informed by Bernadotte during the course of the telephone conversation that the 5 Swedish officers flying to Cairo on June 5 would be considered by him as members of his personal staff to be used in supervising the cease fire order. He expected the French, Belgian and American observers to have a somewhat different status as officers of members of the SCTC. Neither Bunche nor Bernadotte has mentioned the alleged request to the USSR to provide military observers.

Bunche informed Cordier that Bernadotte would probably ask for 3 or 4 naval patrol vessels, preferably neither British nor American, to patrol the Palestine and adjacent coasts.

AUSTIN

501.BB Palestine/6-648

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] June 6, 1948.

Participants: Mr. Beeley, U.K. Delegation Mr. McClintock, UNA
 Mr. Allen, British Embassy Mr. Kopper, NEA
 Mr. Bromley, British Mr. Merriam, NE
 Embassy Mr. Wilkins, NE
 Mr. Henderson, NEA Mr. Mattison, NE
 Mr. Satterthwaite, NEA
 Mr. Villard, S/P

Mr. Beeley called at his request for the purpose of having an informal and personal exchange of views on the current situation in Palestine and the future possibilities.

Principal points made by Mr. Beeley were:

1) It was considered of highest importance that the British and United States Governments keep "in step" on the Palestine question and avoid giving an appearance of disunity to the outside world.

¹ Drafted by Mr. Mattison.

2) That the cooperation in the last two weeks had been heartening. The British on their side had put extreme pressure on the Arab States to accede to the May 29 resolution. This pressure had been successful largely due to the reservoir of good will which the British had built up with the Arab States because of their attitude vis-à-vis the Palestine question.

3) The British, in obtaining Arab consent had made commitments with regard to their interpretation of the crucial question of immigration, particularly with regard to men of military age on Cyprus. They hoped that we would support them in their interpretation should the question be raised in the Security Council.

4) That as far as an eventual settlement of the Palestine problem went, the British believed that it might be possible to secure Arab acquiescence to the establishment of a Jewish State if there were boundary modifications particularly in the Negeb. This would enable the Arab countries to have a land bridge between their capitals. A Jewish State lying across their lines of communication had been one of the chief causes of concern to the Arab leaders.

5) That the British Government would not easily give up the idea of a Federal State, which they regarded as the most practical solution.

In reply to Mr. Beeley's points, I made the following personal observations:

1) That in my opinion the position of the United States Government was such that it could not support any measure which did not provide for the establishment of a Jewish State substantially along the lines envisaged in the November 29 resolution. The Jews had, in fact, a state, and we had recognized it. We would probably follow a policy of continuing to recognize it unless the Zionists of their own accord merged it into some other entity.

2) If territorial modifications were proposed, such as the Negeb, we might find it necessary to ask for a *quid pro quo* such as the cession of Western Gallilee to the Jewish State. In any event, modifications would have to be acquiesced in by the Jews.

3) That with respect to point 3 which we substantially concurred with the British interpretation of the resolution, we wished to avoid if possible debate on that subject in the Security Council, and preferred to have Count Bernadotte rule on the question.

I also took occasion to raise with Mr. Beeley the question as to the attitude of the British Government in the event that a settlement was reached which gave southern Palestine to the Arabs. Would it be to their strategic advantage to have the Arab territory ceded to Abdullah? Mr. Beeley felt that it would be of definite strategic value, because of the possible port development at Gaza. As things stood at present, the British had no land connection from the sea to Transjordan.

I also asked Mr. Beeley what he thought the British attitude would be in the following circumstances: If warfare should continue in Palestine, it might become necessary for the United States to lift its arms embargo. With immigration and arms it was quite likely that the Jews would win. Extremist elements might push on into Transjordan

(raids have already occurred into Transjordan). What would be the British reaction to such attacks? Mr. Beeley replied that the British Government would have no alternative under its treaty with Transjordan but to repulse such attacks.

501.BB Palestine/6-548 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt

CONFIDENTIAL US URGENT WASHINGTON, June 6, 1948—7 p. m.
NIACT

728. Dept expects final clearance assignment 21 officers (7 each from Army, Air Force and Navy Departments) by Defense Department Monday morning June 7. Officers are expected to depart by air for Cairo on June 7 or June 8. Army and Air Force Officers are being selected in European theatre and will leave from there. Navy officers are being selected in US and will leave from here. Officers will be accompanied by minimum transportation for use in Palestine such as planes and jeeps. Balance of needs will be determined following arrival in Near East and discussion with Count Bernadotte regarding availability from local sources such as British Army Palestine. (Embtel 685 June 5¹)

Dept will telegraph names and rank of all officers as soon as available. Each officer will be supplied as soon as possible with diplomatic passport indicating assignment as "Military Observer attached to the United Nations Mediator for Palestine and the Security Council Truce Commission for Palestine". If time permits Dept will secure Egyptian visas in Washington. If not Dept requests you obtain Egyptian visas in Cairo as well as visas for such other Arab states as may be needed.

Dept is repeating this message to AmEmbassies Brussels and Paris for info FonOff. Dept requests that these missions urge Belgian and French Governments each to contribute 21 officers as requested by Count Bernadotte and point out how important it is to maintain presently existing balance in Truce Commission during this critical period.²

¹ Not printed.

² The Department, on June 8, informed Cairo that the "Naval observer team to assist Count Bernadotte and Security Council Truce Commission, composed of five naval officers and two marine officers, will leave by air today at 1300 hours for Cairo." They were instructed to "report to United Nations Mediator, Count Bernadotte, through intermediary of American Chargé d'Affaires, American Embassy, Cairo. Likewise instructed to report as occasion warrants to US Member of Security Council Truce Commission in Jerusalem or elsewhere; and to American Consulate—Haifa, American Special Representative—Tel Aviv (when established), and American Missions—Beirut, Damascus, Baghdad, Jidda, as occasion warrants." (Telegram 739, 501.BB Palestine/6-848)

Count Bernadotte informed Chargé Patterson, on June 9, that "he had in conversation yesterday with Prime Minister Nokrashy Pasha obtained latter's full assent to entry into Egypt of American, Belgian and French military and naval personnel for purposes of implementing proposed Palestine truce." (Telegram 710 from Cairo, 501.BB Palestine/6-948)

Sent to Cairo, Brussels and Paris for action; repeated to Baghdad, Haifa, Beirut, Damascus, Jerusalem, Jidda and USUN (New York) for info.

MARSHALL

Editorial Note

Count Bernadotte, on June 7, sent a note to the Arab states and to the Provisional Government of Israel in which he gave formal notice that he had fixed June 11, 6 a. m., GMT, as the date and hour for the cessation of all acts of armed force in Palestine for a period of four weeks. He requested that notification of acceptance or rejection of his proposal to be in his hands not later than June 9, noon, GMT. Embodied in paragraph numbered 6 of the note were his nine interpretations of the Security Council resolution. The second of these read as follows: "As regards men of military age, the Mediator shall exercise his discretion during the period of the truce in determining whether men of military age are represented among immigrants in such numbers as to give one side a military advantage if their entry is permitted, and in such event shall refuse them entry. Should men of military age be introduced in numbers necessarily limited by the application of the foregoing principle, they are to be kept in camps during the period of the truce under the surveillance of observers of the Mediator, and shall not be mobilized in the armed forces or given military or paramilitary training during such period."

For the full text of Count Bernadotte's note, see SC, *3rd yr., Supplement for June 1948*, page 81.

501.BB Palestine/6-748

Memorandum by Mr. Robert M. McClintock to the Chief of the Shipping Division (Saugstad)

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] June 7, 1948.

I attach a copy of the resolution adopted by the United Nations Security Council on May 29, looking toward a cessation of hostilities and a four-weeks' cease-fire in Palestine. You will note that Article 3 of this resolution reads as follows:

"Calls upon all Governments and authorities concerned to undertake that they will not introduce fighting personnel into Palestine, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Transjordan and Yemen during the cease fire."

The adoption of the Security Council's resolution imposes an obligation on this government as a member of the Council and the United Nations for its strict compliance. UNA would appreciate your courtesy in drawing the attention of American shipping companies which trade to Palestine to the provisions of the resolution as cited above, and informally to urge these companies to refrain from carrying any passengers who might be considered as "fighting personnel" from American ports to Palestine during the period of the cease-fire. Although the United Nations Mediator, Count Bernadotte, has not yet given a definition of the term "fighting personnel", it would seem prudent for American shipping companies to regard any male of military age traveling to Palestine as potential fighting personnel unless the person in question can prove conclusively that his journey to Palestine is intended for an exclusively civilian pursuit and that appropriate safeguards will be offered to ensure that he will not become available to increase the military potential of the country to which he is bound.

You will note that the same requirements apply also to persons who might possibly constitute "fighting personnel" destined for the Arab countries of the Near East, and similar precautions should be used by American shipping companies with respect to passengers for Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Transjordan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Yemen.

For purposes of coordination, NE (Mr. Gordon Mattison) will have general supervision over controls of the nature outlined above.

501.BB Palestine/6-748: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt

SECRET

US URGENT

WASHINGTON, June 7, 1948—6 p. m.

733. At SC meeting on Palestine this afternoon Gromyko formally indicated willingness of his govt to participate in supplying military observers under Paragraph 7 of SC resolution May 29. Prior to Council meeting Soviet Representative made similar statement to press.

It is obvious that Gromyko cannot secure favorable SC action on his suggestion since a motion to broaden representation of govts supplying military observers would certainly not receive necessary seven affirmative votes.

You are authorized informally to impart foregoing view to Bernadotte and to add that our attitude as to proper composition of military

observer teams remains as set forth in our 712, June 3 and 357, June 3, to USUN, repeated Cairo as 706.

Repeated to USUN as 368, London as 2118, Paris as 1980, Brussels as 872, Moscow as 641.¹

MARSHALL

¹ The Department's views were conveyed orally to Count Bernadotte on June 9. The Mediator commented that "he adhered to view that military observers should be supplied by members of Truce Commission only, namely, Belgium, France and US." (Telegram 712, June 9, 5 p. m., from Cairo, 501.BB Palestine/6-948)

501.BB Palestine/6-248 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 7, 1948—8 p. m.

2122. Question raised urtel 2419 June 2 re emigration Palestine Jewish DP's in US Zone Germany has recently been under discussion by Dept and Army. As result, Am military authorities Germany notified May 28 by State-Army that no action should be taken authorizing emigration until (1) U.S. military authorities Germany have received official notification from provisional govt Israel as to officials designated arrange resettlement Jewish DP's in Israel and (2) current UN Security Council endeavors to arrange cease fire and truce are concluded. Also requested no public statement be made this subj and no action taken until further instructions from Washington.

State-Army now considering question further instructions. Repeated to Baghdad as 194, Cairo as 735, Beirut as 311, Jidda as 223, Paris as 1991, Berlin as 1001, U.S. UN as 369.

MARSHALL

867N.01/6-848 : Telegram

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Provisional Government of Israel (Shertok) to the Secretary of State

TEL AVIV, June 8, 1948.

MH 334. Your undoubted sympathy with constructive resettlement and rehabilitation of Jewish victims of Nazi persecution in State of Israel concurrent with utmost development of Israel's economic resources for future peace and prosperity of Palestine and Middle East encourages us to solicit your favourable consideration of application of provisional government of Israel to Import and Export Bank of

USA for loan of \$100 million.¹ This loan is intended to facilitate productive absorption of large numbers of refugees in Israel and to promote country's agricultural and industrial development as well as to finance housing schemes and alleviation of temporary supply of shortages caused by present emergency conditions. Application is based on sound schemes of investment and economic development and bulk of loan will be self-liquidating.

We believe that record of Jewish development in Palestine in last 25 years in teeth of far-reaching disabilities imposed by outside tutelage is reliable indication of constructive potentialities of independence now gained and consequently of credit-worthiness of our state. We sincerely hope that your favourable consideration will enable us to obtain this measure of assistance for carrying through a programme of reconstruction based on our self-reliant effort and clear undertaking of complete repayment.

Awaiting your reply at your earliest convenience either direct or through our special representative Washington.

MOSHE SHERTOK

¹ In identical letters of May 21 to Senator James E. Murray and Representative Emanuel Celler, the Secretary of State wrote: "During the past three years informal conversations have taken place on several occasions with regard to various types of financial and economic assistance for Palestine and other countries of the Near East. These informal conversations were generally an integral part of parallel conversations with regard to such proposals as the report of the Anglo-American Committee and the discussions of the Cabinet Committee on Palestine. No proposals have thus far been made by the State of Israel with regard to the granting of a loan by the United States." (867N.01/5-1248)

867N.01/6-848 : Telegram

The Vice Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

JERUSALEM, June 8, 1948—1 p. m.

872. From conversations in Amman Consulate General officer gained distinct impression that Transjordan at least desires see end to present hostilities. During interview June 3 King Abdullah indicated it would still be possible for Arabs Jews live together Palestine. Said he did not hate Jews did not wish make war on them and stated that war had been forced on him by Arab League which had placed entire responsibility on him.

After interview Sherif Husein Nasser, King's son-in-law, former Iraqi Consul General in Jerusalem and now on loan from Iraqi Government as Abdullah's Rais El Diwan, asked Consulate General officer remain for further talk. Said he spoke not as official of King's house-

hold but as member King's family. Stated King had never wished to make war on Jews, that it had been forced on him by Arab League and that King would be glad see it come to an end. Abdallah realized strength of Jews and did not wish risk losing his army which would mean end of King's present strong position vis-à-vis other Arab States. Sherif Nasser spoke almost pleadingly as appealing for way to be found out of war which would permit King save face and honor. He indicated that acceptance of SC truce resolution was due in fact to pressure exerted by King.

Further talks with many persons in Amman including Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Kirkbride, Glubb and others in and out of government circles indicated feeling exists that war has gone on long enough, that it could not possibly end in victory for Arabs and that time works in favor Jews. Various persons pointed to fact that Arab Legion which is admittedly best Arab army in field has not yet attempted any large scale operation against Jews in Jewish territory. Jerusalem operation was relatively small and simple. Operations at Latrun have resulted in no gains by either side although Jerusalem-Tel Aviv road still blocked. British officers Arab Legion appear to be proceeding cautiously to avoid risking any major engagement with Jews.

It also of interest that King has appointed Ibrahim Hashem Pasha as Governor Arab areas occupied by Arab troops. He former Transjordan Prime Minister and supporter of partition of Palestine as proposed by Peel Comm. He still believed be pro-partition.

Another factor which may influence continued course of war is open reappearance of rivalry between Hashemites on one hand and Syria, Saudi Arabia and possibly Lebanon on other. This rivalry was apparent in Arab League political commission meetings in Amman last week (Beirut's 46 June 3, 2 [1] p. m.¹). Former Under Secretary Transjordan Foreign Office Abdel Moneim Rifai, who still close to Transjordan political adviser, told Consulate General officer he believed Arab war effort would be considerably weakened by return of undercurrent of dissension which will make common front on Palestine more difficult. Lack Arab military successes will also serve increase bitter feelings among Arab States.

In summary Consulate General officer found widespread desire among persons who responsible for conduct Transjordanian affairs to see end to war if honorable way out involving no loss prestige could be found for Transjordan.

Department please pass London, Arab Capitals.

BURDETT

¹This was a repeat of telegram 237 from Beirut, not printed, but see editorial note, p. 1085.

501.BB Palestine/6-748 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt*SECRET US URGENT
NIACT

WASHINGTON, June 8, 1948—5 p. m.

740. For your info we are most favorably impressed by note whose text was reproduced in your Niacr 692, June 7,¹ and you may tell Bernadotte that we feel his approach to the parties is both statesman-like and firm. Other missions to which this telegram is repeated are authorized if occasion warrants to inform govts and authorities to which accredited of the foregoing view and to add that we very much hope that Count Bernadotte's cease-fire proposal will be unconditionally accepted by noon GMT, June 9.

British Embassy has just informed us that a telegram dated June 6 has been received from British Ambassador, Cairo, indicating that American Chargé d'Affaires at Cairo had stated he had not yet informed Bernadotte of our interpretation of Articles 3 and 4 of SC resolution, May 29. This interpretation was set forth in Deptel 2015, May 31, to London, repeated to Cairo as 682. Although you were authorized by Deptel 690, June 1,² to inform Count Bernadotte of our interpretation of these two articles it would seem now, in light of satisfactory interpretation contained in Bernadotte's note as reported your Niacr 692, June 7, that it may not be necessary to give Bernadotte our views on this point. We feel in particular that interpretation set forth in sixth paragraph of his note is reasonable and should be accepted by both sides. In essence his view regarding men of military age accords with our own: namely, that there should be no increase in military potential during period of cease-fire.³

Repeated to London as 2129, Paris as 1997, Brussels as 878, USUN as 371, Jerusalem as 556, Haifa as 120, Beirut as 315, Damascus as 214, Baghdad as 198, Jidda as 225.

MARSHALL

¹ Not printed; it transmitted the text of Count Bernadotte's note of June 7 to the Arab states and the Provisional Government of Israel, with the request that it be passed to the United Nations (501.BB Palestine/6-748). For summary, see editorial note, p. 1102.

² This was a repeat of 350 to New York, June 1, p. 1086.

³ The Department, on June 8, conveyed to the Consulate at Haifa a message from Mr. Eban to Foreign Minister Shertok which stated that "Washington" regarded the Mediator's proposals as reasonable and assumed that he would exercise his discretion fairly and equitably. The message also advised of the hope of the United States that both parties would accept a cease-fire on these bases. Mr. Eban had requested the United States Delegation at the United Nations to use its good offices to see that his message was communicated immediately to Mr. Shertok because of his uncertain communications facilities with Tel Aviv (telegram 123, 501.BB Palestine/6-848).

883.801/6-948: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, June 9, 1948—6 p. m.

759. Reurtels 586 May 22,¹ 637 May 30,² Port Said Consulate A-76 May 17.³ Dept concurs your view Egyptian Govt committed under International Convention of 1888, Suez Canal, to recognize that the Suez Canal "shall always be free and open, in time of war as in time of peace to every vessel of commerce or of war" and that "high contracting parties agree not in any way interfere with the free use of the Canal, in time of war as in time of peace" (Art I). Further Art IV provides that no "act having for its object to obstruct the free navigation of the Canal, shall be permitted in the Canal and its ports of access". Dept's view that provisions of 1888 Convention apply to vessels in ports of access if vessels in process of transit through Canal, and without regard to ultimate destination of goods.

Dept considers that Art X 1888 Convention empowers Egypt to take certain steps in order secure defense of Egypt and maintenance of public order, but that purposes present action have no relation either of these factors. Moreover, although US is not party to 1888 Convention, that instrument by its terms, to which parties thereto have obligated themselves, is applicable to shipping of all nations including US. Emb requested to convey these views informally to Egypt Govt. Keep Brit and French colleagues informed.⁴

MARSHALL

¹ Not printed; it stated that Egyptian search of vessels had thus far been confined to coastwise shipping (883.00/5-2248).

² Not printed; it reported that a British freighter transiting the Canal with a British-owned cargo of flour bound for Palestine had been ordered to discharge its cargo by the Egyptian Government. It also conveyed a statement by an Egyptian spokesman that all Palestine-bound cargoes would be confiscated (883.801/5-3048).

³ Not printed; it advised that the Egyptian Director of Customs had issued a circular letter requiring the production of manifests covering all goods on vessels arriving at Port Said and that no vessels would be permitted to depart unless the manifests were presented. It also reported press reports that customs authorities would confiscate all cargo destined for Palestine (883.801/5-1748).

⁴ This telegram was repeated to London and Paris. The Department, on June 18, instructed Cairo to inform the Egyptian Government that "US Govt adheres to its previous position regarding Egypt Govt's memorandum calling attention to danger to ships of friendly countries in approaching Palestinian coastline. US Govt does not consider as satisfactory or in conformance with international law and usage arguments advanced by Egypt Govt in support of memorandum, and will hold Egypt Govt responsible for any acts attributable to agencies of that Govt which may result in interference with, or injury to, American interests." (Telegram 827, 501.BB Palestine/6-1848) Damascus, the same day, was requested to make similar representations to the Syrian Government. (Telegram 235, 890D.00/6-948)

501.BB Palestine/6-348

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Director of the Office of Transport and Communications (Radius)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] June 10, 1948.

DEAR MR. RADIUS: We have given careful study to your memorandum of June 3¹ regarding possible effects of the present policy regarding exports of aircraft and components upon U.S. aviation interests in the Middle East.

Unfortunately, we feel that it would be impossible in the present international and domestic situation for us to make exceptions in the application of the arms embargo which would permit the shipment of aircraft or aircraft parts to Egypt or any other Arab country. If we should make exceptions of this kind, the United States might well be charged with violating the resolution of the Security Council on which the present truce is based.

We deeply regret any injury which our policies with regard to Palestine might be having on U.S. aviation interests in the Middle East. As you are aware, our policies are injuring a number of American interests in the Middle East. This fact, however, does not seem to warrant a changing of our policies.

LOY W. HENDERSON

P.S. We have evidence that leads us to hope that the British are going to adopt our definition of arms, ammunition, and implements of war and accordingly include civil aircraft under their embargo.

¹ Not printed; it noted Mr. Radius' understanding that "the present policy toward the export of aircraft and aircraft parts . . . involves a refusal to license any export of aviation materiel for use on civil aircraft which might conceivably be employed in operations supporting the present conflict in Palestine." The memorandum then set forth as major objectives of United States aviation policy toward the Middle East the promotion of the sale of American aircraft and equipment and the breaking down "the policy of certain Arab League states, notably Egypt, involving the application of severe restrictions on the way in which international civil aviation operations may be conducted." After citing the applications made by two Middle East airlines for spare parts to keep their aircraft in operation, Mr. Radius recommended that "serious consideration be given to the effects of our present policy upon our aviation interests in the Middle East and that if it is considered desirable . . . the policy be relaxed" (501.BB Palestine/6-348).

For documentation on the efforts by the United States in 1945 to conclude civil air transport agreements with various governments of the Middle East, see *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VIII, pp. 64 ff.

501.BB Palestine/6-1148: Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to All Diplomatic Offices

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 11, 1948—1 a. m.

[The circular telegram begins with a reference to the resolution of May 29 by the Security Council and a quoting of paragraphs 1 and 4 and a summary of paragraph 6 of that resolution.]

State of Israel and Arab States have accepted cease fire order¹ and time for commencement of truce is June 11, 1948, 6 a. m., GMT.

US has had in effect since November 14, 1947, an embargo on arms shipments to Arab States and Palestine.² US also revoked outstanding export licenses for arms destined to these areas as of that date.

This Govt considers these clauses May 29 Resolution of SC to be binding upon all members of UN and to require that all members take necessary steps to prevent shipments war material to Palestine and Arab States as of effective date of truce. Accordingly US will continue its embargo on arms to all areas referred to in Resolution utilizing existing governmental control machinery over arms, ammunition, and implements of war as defined in President's Proclamation. (See *Federal Register*, March 27, 1948, Vol. 13, No. 61, Page 1623.)

Dept desires to be informed of any preparations made by the Government to which you are accredited for imposition of embargo on war material to affected areas. You should ascertain through informal friendly inquiries or in any manner you consider feasible the measures which Government to which you are accredited takes to prevent shipment war material to areas concerned. In this connection you may call to attention of foreign government procedures adopted by US Govt to implement resolution in this respect and, if in your opinion it would be helpful, furnish list of items contained President's Proclamation.

Dept should be informed of any information concerning foregoing as soon as it becomes available. In addition, Dept should be advised of any shipment war material which appears to be inconsistent with terms of SC Resolution.

With respect to States not members of UN attention is invited to Article 2 (6) of Charter of UN. While no specific steps have been taken by UN to insure that non-members adhere to resolution, Dept is desirous of being advised of extent of adherence of such governments or

¹ Arab and Israeli unconditional acceptances were made on June 9. Egyptian Prime Minister Nokrashy's communication to Count Bernadotte did so on behalf of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Lebanon. Israel, Yemen, Iraq, and Transjordan sent their acceptances in individual communications to the Mediator. The texts of the five messages are printed in SC, *3rd yr., Supplement for June 1948*, pp. 85, 88, and 89.

² See telegram Telmar 42, December 6, 1947, to London, *Foreign Relations*, 1947, vol. v, p. 1300.

acts by such governments or persons under their jurisdiction which appear inconsistent with the terms of the SC resolution.

Repeat this telegram or paraphrase thereof to consular offices within your jurisdiction.³

MARSHALL

³ Lancelot Pyman, Assistant Head of the Eastern Department in the British Foreign Office, informed an Embassy officer that the circular telegram of June 11 was a "welcome action". He noted that his Government had begun a partial arms embargo in December 1947, although this action was not made public until February 4. He noted further that the British military had initiated a total arms embargo on May 31 and that the Ministry of Supply and the Board of Trade had done the same the following day through their controls over the sales of surplus property and exports. He advised also that the British Government had been subjected to considerable criticism in the Middle East for these actions and that Iraq and Egypt had objected strongly (telegram 2656, June 16, 7 p. m., from London, 501.BB Palestine/6-1648).

501.BB Palestine/6-1248: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Jerusalem

SECRET US URGENT
 NIACT

WASHINGTON, June 12, 1948—1 p. m.

587. Please obtain urgently from Bernadotte who we understand is now in Jerusalem clarification of use which he would like to make of 3 vessels suitable for coastal patrol service requested in his letter June 10 to US Emb Cairo.¹

Important that we have as much detailed info as he may be able to give re intended use these vessels. In particular we would like to know whether he contemplates that officers and crews will engage in boarding and searching other vessels or whether these vessels are merely to be used by observers as means of transport.² Cairo or Haifa should take action if he should happen to be in one those cities.

Sent Jerusalem as Depts 587 rptd Cairo as Depts 779 Haifa as Depts 139, and USUN New York as Depts 389.

MARSHALL

¹ Summarized by Cairo in telegram 729, June 11, 3 p. m., not printed (501.BB Palestine/6-1148).

² Haifa replied, on June 13, as follows: "Count Bernadotte states that vessels are to be used only for patrol purposes, giving warning of the approach of any shipping. The officers and crew will not engage in boarding and search. The vessels may be used for water transportation of observers." (Telegram 149, 501.BB Palestine/6-1348)

New York, on June 11, transmitted a message from Secretary-General Lie embodying an urgent request from Count Bernadotte for three small planes and crews to carry his personnel quickly to any part of the truce area (telegram 773, 501.BB Palestine/6-1148). Mr. McClintock, in a marginal notation, advised that he had arranged with the Air Force on June 11 to send two C-45's from Germany to Cairo and had spoken with the Navy about the loan of a Navy plane.

501.BB Palestine/6-1348: Telegram

The Vice Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

US URGENT NIACT

JERUSALEM, June 13, 1948.

908. Following message was communicated at 2100 hours local tonight to Jewish authorities in Jerusalem by Truce Commission and Count Bernadotte's special representative in Jerusalem.

"The Truce Commission and Colonel Brunsson,¹ special representative of Count Bernadotte, have carefully considered the question of Jewish convoys to Jerusalem. They feel such convoys must be checked at Bab el Wad in order to insure effective control. Until further notice the Jewish authorities are requested to stop all vehicles before they reach Bab el Wad. If any vehicles pass Bab el Wad before clearance by representatives of the mediator, the Truce Commission and Colonel Brunsson consider that the Jewish authorities will bear full responsibility for any resulting breach of the cease-fire agreement."²

BURDETT

¹ Nils Brunsson, Personal Representative of Count Bernadotte at Jerusalem and Chief Military Observer in that city.

² The Truce Commission, on June 14, sent a further communication to Dr. Bernard Joseph, the Israeli head of the Jerusalem Emergency Committee, fixing a deadline of 8 p. m. that night for accepting establishment of the checkpoint. Mr. Burdett reported that "Five minutes before deadline Joseph notified Commission he agreed on own responsibility and in absence instructions from Tel Aviv to establishment Bab El Wad check post. Added he assumed no responsibility for safety observers and that in event his decision countermanded by Tel Aviv, check point would have to be evacuated." (Telegram 918, June 14, from Jerusalem, 501.BB Palestine/6-1448)

501.BB Palestine/6-1448

Memorandum of Telephone Conversations, by Mr. Robert M. McClintock

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] June 14, 1948.

In conversation with Dr. Jessup on Friday, June 11, he said that consideration had been given in the Mission to Gromyko's rather plaintive remark to Dr. Jessup on the 10th, that all the USSR wished with regard to participating in the sending of military observers to Palestine was a very small representation on Count Bernadotte's staff of observers.¹ Senator Austin and Dr. Jessup had been turning over in their minds whether it might not in fact be useful for the United States to agree to the Soviet Union sending a few military observers to Palestine and the Near East.

Today Mr. John Ross, Deputy to Senator Austin, inquired what the Department's reaction to this suggestion was.

¹ Mr. Jessup's memorandum covering this conversation is filed under 501.BB Palestine/6-1048.

I told Mr. Ross what I had told Dr. Jessup on Friday. I thought that we could not at all rely upon Mr. Gromyko's promises that the Soviet Representation would be kept to a minimum. One could not exclude the possibility that, if the United States had three patrol vessels off the Palestine coast, the Russians would ask for three destroyers to be sent there also. Furthermore—and this I regarded as very important—we had taken a firm position from the outset on limiting the military observers to be provided from the governments represented on the Truce Commission. We had got Count Bernadotte to accede to this view and had made it stick with Mr. Bevin. I thought, in consequence, that it would be unfortunate for us now to wobble.

I told Mr. Ross that other officers in the Department shared the foregoing views and that, in consequence, I did not feel that we should accede to Gromyko's suggestion.²

²Mr. Gromyko, on June 15, submitted a draft resolution to the Security Council providing that the military observers attached to the Mediator's staff be appointed by Member States of the Security Council, except for Syria; for text, see SC, *3rd yr.*, No. 84, p. 8. Only the Soviet Union and the Ukraine voted for the resolution. The remaining nine members abstained and the resolution failed of adoption, *ibid.*, p. 11.

501.BB Palestine/6-1448: Telegram

The Vice Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

JERUSALEM, June 14, 1948—2 p. m.

913. During meeting with Count Bernadotte June 12, Dr. Joseph of Jewish Agency stated Jewish authorities unable assume responsibility for "dissident" elements in Jerusalem. Assured Bernadotte his representatives would receive every possible protection and assistance but with above reservations. At meeting June 13 with Truce Commission Joseph stressed importance of proper permits for observers and advisability their always being accompanied by Haganah officers while within Jewish areas. He again pointed out inability authorities to control Stern and Irgun effectively in Jerusalem.

[Here follows one paragraph dealing with the question of Soviet espionage activities in Palestine and Lebanon.]

BURDETT

501.BB Palestine/6-1548

Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] June 15, 1948.

MR. SECRETARY: After further study we have concluded, and Mr. Lovett agrees, that no useful purpose would be served by placing the

Palestine question before the NSC at this juncture for a decision of principle.

For the moment, responsibility for seeking a settlement lies with Bernadotte. Until he reports to the UN (which is hardly likely in less than two weeks) on the results of his efforts to mediate between the parties, the UN Security Council will have no major decision to take, unless the cease-fire should be broken.

Work has been put in hand for a study of the alternative courses we would have before us if the cease-fire should be broken or if Bernadotte is not able to achieve a settlement.

The matter is not on the agenda for this week's meeting of the NSC.¹

G. F. KENNAN

¹ This memorandum was initialed by the Secretary of State.

867N.01/6-1548

The Chargé in Egypt (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL
No. 503

CAIRO, June 15, 1948.

SIR: I have the honor to forward herewith as of possible interest a memorandum of a short conversation¹ between Azzam Pasha, Secretary General of the Arab League, and Secretary Ireland relative to Palestine questions.

It may be observed that Azzam Pasha, in common with many Arab leaders, is probably more optimistic concerning the military achievements of the Arab states than the facts merit and that he, therefore, quite apart from any political motives, stresses beyond reality the military advantages lost by the Arabs in accepting the truce. On the other hand, it would appear that the activities of the Arab Legion, particularly at Jerusalem, and their stout resistance between Latrun and Wadibab, and that the advances made by the Arab troops surprised even the most realistic of the military leaders of the Arabs, to the extent that the various reverses and failures to achieve original objectives as in the north are now forgotten. Nevertheless, according to several independent observers the initial initiative of the Arabs at Jerusalem is not likely to be regained, should fighting be renewed after the truce, so that the Arabs have in reality lost military advantage, which is balanced by the fact that the truce came in time to save the Arab Legion from impending ammunition shortage. It must also

¹ Dated June 14, not printed.

be pointed out that the military communiques, usually couched in extravagant terms, together with eulogistic comments thereon by the press have greatly stimulated the Arab masses to believe in the invincible quality of their troops.

In his conversation Azzam Pasha did not go into detail as to the reason why the Arabs accepted the truce beyond the fear of being labelled aggressors, a reversal of an earlier attitude (Embassy's telegram No. 471, May 5²). It has been reliably learned, however, that in addition to their reason Abdullah's insistence on a truce, supported by Egypt and Iraq, turned the tide against the demands of Lebanon, Syria and Saudi Arabia that fighting continue. Tewfik Abdul Hoda Pasha, Transjordan Prime Minister, is authoritatively related to have silenced the Syrian demands that truce be rejected, with the argument-ending statement "I suppose you Syrians want to fight the war in Palestine to the last Transjordanian". Thus while Transjordanians' desire for a truce, augmented by the shortness of supplies of ammunition calculated on June 10 to exist in seven days supply and by Abdullah's desire not to fritter away his army, his principal defense against his antagonists in the Arab world, it would also appear that the British pressure exerted at Amman and at Cairo also greatly influenced Arab acceptance of the truce.

One interesting detail, which cannot be fitted into the picture of negotiations for the truce as usually reported, is the statement made to Secretary Ireland by Mr. Ralph Bunche, of the staff of Count Folke Bernadotte, that Count Bernadotte had received notes, about June 5 or 6, from the Lebanon, Syrian, Saudi Arabian and Yemeni Governments stating that Egyptian representatives had been authorized to act on behalf of these governments in consultations with him. In view of the role played by the representatives of the individual countries in agreeing to a truce and in subsequent conversations in the Arab League Committee meeting here it would appear that these notes are no longer effective. On the other hand should Mr. Bunche's account of the existence of these notes be accurate it would seem to point to a grouping of Arab states under the egis of Egypt against the Hashimis and to contradict a rumor current in some circles that Saudi Arabia and Egypt have recently been drawing apart in their foreign policy.

Azzam Pasha's expressed pessimism as to final results to be achieved by Count Bernadotte may also be of interest to the Department. His further views as the period of truce progress draws to a close will be reported as they become available.

Respectfully yours,

JEFFERSON PATTERSON

² Not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 916.

501.BB Palestine/6-1148: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 16, 1948—5 p. m.

799. (1) We have no objection to detail by British of a few officers to assist Count Bernadotte in a technical capacity with regard to conditions in Palestine and have so indicated to British Embassy here, which on June 14 gave us information identical to that set forth in your 759, June 14, 6 p. m.¹

(2) Dept will today formally request Secretary of Defense for loan of 3 destroyers for patrol purposes as requested by Bernadotte in your telegram 729, June 11, 3 p. m.² Conditions under which vessels will be made available to Bernadotte form subject of separate telegram.

(3) As indicated Deptel 771, June 11,³ once Bernadotte is established on Rhodes and has direct communication with Lake Success, we will look to Secretary General to be main channel of communications between us and Bernadotte. However, if Col. Bonde⁴ remains in charge of military observer group with headquarters in Cairo we shall expect him to use Embassy, Cairo, as main line of communications with Dept.

[Here follows paragraph numbered 4, which evaluated a member of Count Bernadotte's staff.]

Repeated to USUN as 399, London as 2246.

MARSHALL

¹ Not printed. The message stated that "British detailed to Bernadotte few officers experienced in Palestine to act in a technical capacity in orienting UN observers, most of whom had no Palestine experience. Such technical officers could, for example, advise observers concerning the geography of a given area, the existence or nonexistence of airports, et cetera. They would in no event enter Palestine" (501.BB Palestine/6-1448).

² Not printed; see footnote 1, p. 1111.

³ Not printed.

⁴ Thorde Bonde, a Swedish army officer and Chief of Staff to Count Bernadotte. He informed Chargé Patterson that the Mediator's civilian secretariat would for the most part have its headquarters on Rhodes and would have to do with making peace. Colonel Bonde also informed the Chargé that the Cairo group, headed by himself, would be concerned with implementing the cease-fire and truce agreement and assuring that its provisions were not violated (telegram 759 from Cairo).

501.BB Palestine/6-1648: Telegram

The Chargé in Egypt (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

CAIRO, June 16, 1948—11 p. m.

778. Count Bernadotte expressed himself to Ireland tonight as "reasonably encouraged" by progress in talks yesterday and today and at friendly, even conciliatory, attitude of Arab League POL Committee and of liaison subcommittee set up to work with him consisting of Egyptian Prime Minister Nokrashi Pasha, Lebanese Prime Minister

Al Sulh, Transjordan Prime Minister Abdul Hoda and Azzam Pasha. Bernadotte made no propositions but heard Arab complaints at violations truce which Bunche characterized as less violent than expected, and drew out by questions Arab views on future settlement. He has not yet proposed Arab-Jewish conference Rhodes but in response to suggestion that League might designate experts at working level to go Rhodes to supply detailed and technical knowledge for assistance his formulation proposals for settlement. Azzam Pasha named four in League note dated June 16. Those named are Abdul Moniem Mustafa, Egyptian Foreign Office and seconded to POL Section AL, Henri Cattan and Ahmad al Shukeri, lawyers of Palestine, and Abdul Rahman al Falahi, Iraqi Foreign Office.

Bernadotte and party go June 17 to Tel Aviv to hold similar conversations with Israelis.

Mediator reported by Bunche as encouraged by fact for first time since June 11 no violations truce reported today. Question convoys to Jerusalem still resolved [*unresolved?*] but in view necessity to move food and supplies to Jerusalem, UN will be asked tonight to expedite 50 additional guards to accompany convoys and to guard munitions and petrol dumps.

Arab League yesterday set up own report on observance truce consisting Arab consuls Palestine under chairmanship Takhiddin Solh. Arabs leaders here impressed with sincerity and integrity Bernadotte but regard prospects of acceptable solution as slight. It may be observed, however, that membership liaison subcommittee represents most moderate and conciliatory Arab leaders and should guarantee, notwithstanding Azzam's declaration today that solutions involving partition or Jewish State would be rejected, consideration of reasonable compromise proposals.

Paraphrase to Arab capitals.

PATERSON

Clifford Papers

Memorandum by the President's Special Counsel (Clifford)

[WASHINGTON ?,] June 17, 1948.

PALESTINE

Are there any technical obstacles to asking full action rather than temporary, tentative or provisional action such as we have taken to date?

(1) *Exchange of full diplomatic representatives.*

Several weeks ago Loy Henderson proposed to Eliahu Epstein that he ask his Government to request of our government an exchange of full diplomatic representatives; Henderson said that the United

States would undoubtedly take action favorably within ten days after receipt of such a request.¹

About two weeks ago, after receiving the request,² Loy Henderson handed Epstein a letter signed by the Under-secretary, stating that in view of the situation in Palestine, our government would not at present agree to an exchange of full diplomatic representatives. The letter suggested instead that working missions be exchanged—the very proposal that is now being urged on the President.

When Mr. Epstein presented reasons against the State Department's decision, including the consideration that the Arab states would be encouraged to believe that our government was again of two minds and that if the Arab States continued to hold out for better terms than the UN decision of November 29, 1947, they might be able to make a better trade—Mr. Henderson was so disturbed he did not want the letter to be said to be actually delivered.³

Next day Mr. Henderson gave Mr. Epstein a substitute letter, also signed by the Under-secretary, stating that the request for exchange of full diplomatic representatives was under consideration, and suggested that in the meantime working missions be exchanged.

On Mr. Henderson's own representations, it is plain that there is no technical difficulty about exchanging full diplomatic representatives. The reason for the change in attitude seems to be that Mr. Henderson or the British deemed it necessary to conciliate the Arabs.

On the other hand, the failure to arrange the exchange of full diplomatic representatives is an indication to the British and the Arabs that they may make some progress toward securing better terms if they only hold out.

Furthermore, one result may be that full acceptance of the UN decision of November 29, 1947, by the British and the Arabs, may not be accorded at the end of the four weeks cease-fire; that there may be attempts to extend the cease-fire period. So that there may be more bargaining, the situation would continue to hang fire, and the threat of a renewal of hostilities would remain to cloud the situation.

One further consequence of delaying the exchange of full diplomatic representatives may be that the President will not be selecting and sending forthwith a big calibre man of large reputation to represent

¹ Mr. Clifford's memorandum is printed here as an indication of his thinking in June 1948, not as a primary source on Henderson-Epstein conversations in May of which he had no first-hand knowledge. The editors have found no documentation in Department of State files on those conversations, and Mr. Henderson, in an interview with Department historians on January 12, 1976, stated that he had never made to Mr. Epstein the suggestion attributed to him here. Mr. Henderson also had no recollection of substituting one letter for another, as recounted later in Mr. Clifford's memorandum, and he denied the accuracy of the penultimate paragraph of the Clifford memorandum (see p. 1119).

² The request was made in a telegram of May 19 from Mr. Shertok, p. 1012.

³ The only Lovett-Epstein letter found is that dated May 29, p. 1074. On May 27 Mr. Lovett had submitted to President Truman his proposed letter to Mr. Epstein and the President had approved the draft the same day; see pp. 1058-1060.

this country in Israel. Another danger is that a regular career officer, being first sent as a head of a working mission, will be gradually eased into the post of Diplomatic Minister when there is a full exchange.

A third consequence may be that through easing the situation along in this way and thereby having a career man as American Minister to Israel, Mr. Henderson's hand will be strengthened and his hold on the situation will be further entrenched.

(2) *De Jure Recognition*

In the Loy Henderson-Eliahu Epstein conversation, Henderson asked whether the State of Israel would give up some territory in exchange for *De Jure* recognition.⁴

This is some indication that there is no genuine technical obstacle to *De Jure* recognition, but that some person or government is trying to use, for the purpose of trading territory away from Israel, the power and right of the United States Government to act as sound American policy, rather than as some other country's territorial ambitions, may determine.

⁴ See footnote 1, p. 1118.

501.BB Palestine/6-1748 : Telegram

The Vice Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

JERUSALEM, June 17, 1948.

932. Demarcation of "no man's land" to be observed in Jerusalem during truce finished night June 15 and complete agreement reached. Maps showing respective front lines and accompanying protocol signed afternoon June 16 by Arab and Jewish Commanders in presence of Truce Commission and Colonel Brunsson. BURDETT

125.00901/6-1748 : Telegram

The Vice Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

JERUSALEM, June 17, 1948—10 a. m.

933. During present Palestine crisis, Amman has increasingly become center for Arab political and military decisions. We rely on occasional visits to Amman by Consulate General officer and on such material as British choose to make available for information on political and military developments that area. Since it appears likely that influence and strategic importance of Transjordan will increase in Middle East (because of Arab Legion if for no other reason) would Department wish consider informal assignment to Amman of consular officer and one code clerk for political reporting purposes. Cable and

Wireless maintains full radio facilities in Amman for communications with Washington.

If Department approves this plan Consulate General could make informal approach to Transjordan Government through Prime Minister.¹

BURDETT

¹The Department, in reply on June 22, requested Jerusalem's comments on the feasibility of its tentative thinking that an "officer might proceed to Amman in capacity of liaison officer for Amer member Truce Commission. This would avoid raising question of recognition of Transjordan yet permit officer to report to Jerusalem and to Dept." (Telegram 633, 125.0090i/6-1748)

Vice Consul Burdett, on June 26, advised that the Department's thinking was "entirely feasible" and suggested that the "officer proceed soonest in order purpose his assignment may be clearly established prior end present cease fire." (Telegram 977, June 26, 10 a. m., from Jerusalem, 501.BB Palestine/6-2648)

867N.51/6-1848

Memorandum by Mr. Robert M. McClintock to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)

[WASHINGTON,] June 18, 1948.

Mr. Havlik of ED telephoned me this morning to say that his division was studying the request of the Provisional Government of Israel, made to the Export-Import Bank, for a \$100 million loan. Mr. Havlik said that Messrs. Ginsberg and Gass of the staff of Mr. Epstein had gone into great detail on the purposes of the loan and indicated that a goodly proportion of the money would be spent on a rather grandiose immigration scheme for the settling of 400,000 Jewish immigrants in Israel. \$25 million of the loan, however, would be used for financing current deficits arising out of the military situation in Palestine, such as petroleum supplies and food imports.

Mr. Havlik said that the initial reaction of the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank had been to reject the request of the Provisional Government of Israel. However, the Bank was ready to examine the Israelite application for a loan if the Department of State indicated that it had no objection to a loan being granted, provided that it met with the requirements of the Export-Import Bank.

I told Mr. Havlik that I personally was sympathetic to the idea of a loan for the State of Israel, provided it was based on sound business principles and would be repaid. However, I said it was obvious that the granting or withholding of such a credit provided this government with considerable leverage on the government of Israel. We were now at a very delicate and critical juncture in conversations under the auspices of the UN Mediator, seeking to find a peaceful adjustment of the Palestine problem. I would not, therefore, wish to see this government give its approval to the \$100 million loan until we were sure that

the conversations between the State of Israel and the Arabs were going forward to a successful conclusion. It was quite easy to envision a situation at the end of the four weeks' cease-fire, for example, when we might find it necessary to apply diplomatic pressure both to the Arabs and the Jews in order to continue their truce while a more lasting settlement was being worked out.

I asked Mr. Havlik to let me know before approval was given to the Export-Import Bank for the Israelite loan. Mr. Havlik said that in any case the clearance of NEA would be required. I trust that NEA will consult with UNA before final approval is given.

501.BB Palestine/6-1848: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the
Secretary of State*

SECRET US URGENT

LONDON, June 18, 1948—8 p. m.

2701. For Secretary and Lovett. Bevin sent Michael Wright to see me June 16 and today I continued the discussion directly with Bevin who said that he is most anxious to consolidate and extend beyond truce period the common ground found with USG re Palestine: He wished fervently that we would work together until both sides agreed on final settlement. The following is summary of views and hopes expressed by Bevin (and in Bevin's name by Wright) on these two occasions:

1. British Government has not in the least altered its views re disastrous consequences which would flow from imposition sanctions under Chapter 7 (Embassy's 2267, paragraph 3).¹

2. Any solution upon which Jews and Arabs can agree would be welcome to HMG.

3. Regretfully Bevin is inclined to think that Arabs and Jews may not reach agreement under Bernadotte's auspices without much delay and then probably not without USG and HMG getting involved to some degree as sources of advice. Already Bevin had been asked by Lebanese Prime Minister for British counsel (for Prime Minister's use in Cairo talks) with regard to how far Arab states can push their case without losing sympathy British Government. (See Paragraph 5 below). It is not unlikely, Bevin thinks, that British Government will receive other similar requests to this one and question arises as to what reply if any British Government should make.

¹ Dated May 25, p. 1047. Ambassador Douglas, on June 19, sent a telegram for the special attention of the Secretary of State and Under Secretary Lovett, which stated: "Lest there be any misunderstanding, I must emphasize that nothing in paragraph 1 of Embassy's 2701 is contrary to official UK position with regard to Chapter VII taken in SC (Embassy's 2312, May 27, paragraph 5). Bevin is in full agreement that if present efforts break down it may become necessary to invoke Chapter VII. It is Bevin's earnest hope that by US and UK moving together it will be possible to work out a final settlement without recourse to sanctions." (Telegram 2713 from London, 501.BB Palestine/6-1948)

4. Bevin said British Government could prefer not to get into position of giving advice different from US views. If this happened a new divergence re Palestine would arise between USG and HMG. He thinks it advisable, consequently, for USG, and HMG to agree in so far as possible that when either government is asked for counsel (and he foresees possibility that occasion might arise in which USG and HMG might find it necessary even to volunteer counsel) neither HMG or USG will give advice without either agreeing its substance between themselves or at least informing the other sufficiently in advance as to its character.

5. Bevin said that he has decided not to comply with request of Lebanese Prime Minister for advice. His question was too vague and the mediator should be given a clear field with both sides.

6. Future opportunities might occur, however, when such advice might be crucial to a settlement and he would feel greatly reassured if Department would agree with his thinking in Paragraph 4 above.

7. Bevin said he hoped also that USG and HMG are agreed that it is their common aim, even if first truce does not succeed, that truce itself should be extended and thus avoid recourse to compulsion by SC under Chapter 7.

8. Bevin said that he felt that Foreign Office knows too little of how the mind of Bernadotte is working and suggested that since mediator is hard man to catch, it would be advisable for USG and HMG to pool their information in this regard. Time might come when both governments might be able to help mediator's task considerably if they knew the trend mediator's negotiations.

9. I told Bevin that I thought his idea of cross-clearing advice before it is given in response to requests is a good one, which I would put to Department for consideration with my favorable recommendation. I said that I had little doubt that if this cease-fire failed to result in solution USG would in any case wish to see truce extended. I said that I thought an American-British pooling of information re mediator would be of mutual advantage and that in so far as messages reaching this Embassy are concerned I thought that we are already doing this. I suggested that we might both endeavor to stimulate flow of reports of this character.

10. I feel that the conversations described above constitute an extension of the meeting with Attlee, Bevin, Chiefs of Staff and others, May 25 reported Embassy's reference telegram and as such are to be welcomed as a further British effort to keep US and UK in step re Palestine. I hope the Department will specifically endorse the tentative replies I made to Bevin (Paragraph 9).

11. See my immediately following telegram re Haifa.

DOUGLAS

501.BB Palestine/6-1848: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

SECRET US URGENT

LONDON, June 18, 1948—8 p. m.

2702. For Secretary and Lovett. Bevin said this morning that future of Haifa is a specific problem of great concern to HMG, to the Medi-

ator, to the Jews and to the Arabs, and to European recovery. Matter is urgent because plans British military call for last British troops leave Haifa by June 30. This fact is not as yet known to Arabs,¹ but Mediator is alarmed at possible results British withdrawal before end truce and he is going to discuss matter with GOC Haifa.

2. Jews have asked that refinery should be opened (Embassy's 2700, June 18²) and have stated that in absence sufficient Arab laborers Jewish manpower would be provided.

3. On June 14 Iraqi Defense Minister advised British Ambassador Baghdad that ultimate fate Haifa is most important Palestine problem. He expressed view that if Haifa cannot be in Arab state it must be free port; otherwise pipeline would have to be relaid through Syria and Lebanon because although Iraqi economy is dependent on oil royalties, Iraq "could not tolerate outlet for its oil being in Jewish state". British Ambassador commented to Foreign Office that "it becomes more than ever clear that Haifa is sorest of all Arab points and the evacuation Haifa during cease-fire will be severe shock to Arabs and considered as disturbing in favor Jews present balance.

4. Bevin said he is faced by necessity of deciding on course which HMG should follow. If British troops remain at Haifa after June 30, fresh troops would have to be sent in and HMG is most anxious to avoid this. On other hand, he thought British Government, because of (a) British and Western European interests in refinery, (b) Jewish desire to reopen refinery, and (c) Iraqi approach (paragraph 3 above), would be fully justified in laying these facts before Mediator either with or without British comment. If HMG commented, it would express to Mediator the view that before British troops withdraw Mediator might consider possibility of getting Arabs and Jews to agree on establishment, if only for a period and if only with reservations on both sides, of an international port at Haifa under Mediator's or UN auspices. This port might consist either of whole town or be confined to port area including refinery now occupied by British troops. Such an arrangement would have the advantage of possibly attracting back to Haifa the Arab laborers essential to refinery operations. These laborers are presently unwilling to return to work in Jewish state. If Mediator acted along these lines, it would be important that international regime in Haifa should exclude USSR; Foreign Office has in mind a very small international control element; perhaps only one administrator with small police force and staff.

¹ The British Foreign Office informed the Embassy in the United Kingdom on the morning of June 22 that this fact had been made known to the Arabs (telegram 2751, June 22, 8 p. m., from London 841.2367N/6-2248).

² Not printed.

5. At this point Bevin digressed to say that early action by Mediator to achieve international regime Jerusalem seems highly desirable to Foreign Office although perhaps it would not be as appropriate for HMG to comment with regard to Jerusalem as with regard to Haifa. He thought international regime, both Haifa and Jerusalem, particularly if area Jerusalem is reduced, might go far to stimulate confidence among Arabs.

6. Bevin said there was no compulsion upon him to do so, but in line with his thoughts embodied in paragraph 4, Embassy's 2701, June 18, he is unwilling to raise the pressing problem of Haifa with Mediator without having first consulted US Government. The present was not too early to begin the working arrangement he hoped for with regard to advice. Bevin said he would like to know:

a. Does US Government perceive any impropriety in HMG's advising Mediator of the approaches to it by Jews and Arabs with regard to reopening Haifa?

b. Does US Government believe that it would be appropriate for HMG to lay before Mediator in addition to a its views with regard to the desirability of international regime for port or town of Haifa along lines paragraph 4 above?

c. If HMG takes either action with US concurrence, would US Government be willing to so advise Mediator or at least to let HMG do so?

7. I told Bevin that I understood the urgency of these questions and appreciated the motive which caused him to consult the US before acting. I said that I would ask the Department to reply to his questions within 48 hours. I said that in my view Haifa oil is essential to ERP and if some international regime or control by mediator would result in refinery resuming operations near future, this would not only be contribution to Jewish economy and to Arab economy: it would also be a vital contribution to the economy of Europe.

DOUGLAS

867N.01/6-1948: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, June 19, 1948—2 p. m.

2712. Conviction is growing in all levels FonOff and among English Arab experts outside government that early establishment small compact sovereign Jewish state would be in best interests Arabs (Embassy's 2469, June 4,¹ paragraph 4). This milestone in British think-

¹ Not printed.

ing has its origin in the contrast between the efficiency displayed by Jews in setting up Israel and in defending it, and the Arab counter-performance. Holders of this view believe that Arab population in unitary Palestine state would quickly be dominated by Jews through democratic processes and that Communist element among Jews would thus have a greater opportunity to advance Soviet objectives if infiltrated among larger number Palestine Arabs. This group also believes that only Jews themselves can control Jewish immigration; a unitary state with Arab majority could not hope to enforce its immigration laws in face opposition Jews who would show no concern for economic consequences too many Jewish immigrants. It is believed, however, Jews will take different attitude in own state.

2. In private conversations this view is now being expressed as "personal thoughts" by important British officials to Arabs both here and abroad although it is too early to say that this is the official "line" of HMG. It seems likely, however, that it may become the "official line" to Arab Governments at some later stage (e.g. when Arab Governments seek British advice in mediation talks under Bernadotte).

3. This evolution of British thought to my mind punctuates the importance of the US and UK working together along the lines of my 2701, June 18.

DOUGLAS

501.BB Palestine/6-1948: Telegram

The Chargé in Egypt (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

CAIRO, June 19, 1948—8 p. m.

805. In conversation today Nokrashy Pasha emphasized to me that Arab group which is accompanying Bernadotte to Rhodes is designed primarily as a group of experts to inform the UN Mediator in response to any requests for information which he may address to the members of the group. They will however act as transmitting agents for any data which Bernadotte may care to forward to the states members of the Arab League. Nokrashy Pasha expected Bernadotte's proposals for the basis of a Palestine truce to reach Cairo on June 25.

The Prime Minister expressed great indignation over alleged Zionist violations of the current truce stating that they had seized a number of villages in the Negev, southern or Egyptian sector of Palestine. These acts had not been irresponsible or isolated occurrences but showed on the map a development of a strategic plan. The Egyptians had been instructed to refrain from endeavoring to regain the lost villages or to take reprisals against the Zionist aggressors.

PATTERSON

501.BB Palestine/6-1648: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Jessup)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 21, 1948—2 p. m.

413. Dept has received telegram signed by Trygve Lie, dated June 16,¹ stating that SC on June 15 at request of UN Mediator decided to ask all States members to report on steps taken to implement Palestine resolution of May 29 and also to request all States members to extend cooperation and assistance to UN Mediator in implementation of his truce proposals.

Please inform SYG and also, for info of SC, President of SC that this Govt has taken following steps to implement resolution of May 29:

1. Instructions have been sent to appropriate authorities to take necessary steps to prevent departure of "fighting personnel" from the US to countries named in paragraph 3 of resolution.

2. Instructions have been sent to appropriate authorities and also to Chairman of US Maritime Commission drawing attention to statement concerning "men of military age" set forth in Paragraphs VI (2) (3) and (4) of Count Bernadotte's truce proposals.

3. With respect to paragraph 5 of the resolution, the US Govt has since November 14, 1947 applied a rigorous arms embargo covering shipments of all war material from US and its possessions to Palestine and the countries of the Near East.

4. As SYG is aware, this gov't has been active in cooperating as a member of SC Truce Commission in Palestine in supplying UN Mediator with military observers, aircraft and communications equipment. Sympathetic consideration is now being given to Mediator's request for 3 naval patrol vessels and for 10 additional military observers.²

In addition to the foregoing this gov't has circularized all its diplomatic missions calling particular attention to paragraphs 2 and 5 of SC May 29 resolution and stating its view that all members of UN are obligated to abide by these clauses and consequently to take necessary steps to prevent shipments of war material to Palestine and Arab States as of effective date of truce.

You should conclude your communication to SYG by reaffirming profound hope of this gov't that measures thus far adopted by UN Mediator will prove fruitful in leading to successful accomplishment of his broader task under terms of Assembly resolution of May 14, 1948; namely, to "promote a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine".³

MARSHALL

¹ Copy transmitted by New York in an unnumbered telegram, not printed.

² The Department, on June 21, informed New York of Secretary Forrestal's instructions to assign four Army, three Navy, and three Air Force officers to serve as military observers for Count Bernadotte (telegram 416, 501.BB Palestine/6-1548).

³ For the text of the letter sent by Mr. Jessup to the Secretary-General on June 21, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 4, 1948, p. 11.

501.BB Palestine/6-3048

*Memorandum by Mr. Leonard C. Meeker, Assistant to the Legal Adviser (Gross)*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] June 22, 1948.

The Problem.

To determine the position which the United States should take in the Security Council in the event that (a) the four-week Palestine truce is violated, or (b) hostilities are resumed in Palestine at the expiration of the four-week truce or an extension thereof.

Recommendation.

The United States should initiate or support action in the Security Council under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter if developments there constitute, in the opinion of the United States, a threat to or breach of international peace. Such action would include a finding under Article 39, a cease-fire *order* under Article 40, with appropriate sanctions if necessary.

Discussion.

1. The question of the policy of the United States with respect to fighting in Palestine has already been determined by the President. On May 22, 1948 the Secretary of State presented to the President a memorandum* requesting approval of proposed United States policy on Palestine. The memorandum proposed that the United States continue to urge immediate action by the Security Council to bring about a cease-fire in Palestine. This action was to be an order for a cease-fire under Articles 39 and 40 of the Charter. Such action was described in the memorandum as the basis of the resolution proposed by the United States in the Security Council on May 17, 1948, and it was stated that this would continue to represent United States views so long as the fighting continued in Palestine.

This statement of policy applied not only to the period preceding an effective truce in Palestine, but was applicable to the period following a truce or the violation of truce terms, in conformity with the purpose of the United States to achieve and maintain peace in the Palestine area. The memorandum of proposed United States policy was approved by the President on May 27, 1948.

The United States has consistently, since the ending of the 1948

¹ Transmitted as Tab B to Brigadier General Carter by Mr. McClintock in his memorandum of June 30, with the statement that "Mr. Lovett has requested me to forward the attached memoranda concerning our future Palestine policy to the Secretary of State for his comment or approval." Accompanying this memorandum were Mr. McClintock's memorandum of June 23 (see p. 1134) and the "Comments of the Policy Planning Staff", transmitted as Tabs A and C, respectively; Tab C not found attached to the transmitting memorandum.

*A copy of the memorandum for the President, dated May 22, 1948, is attached as an appendix to this paper. [Footnote in the source text.]

special session of the General Assembly, regarded the situation in Palestine as a very serious one, calling for action under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. To this end the United States on May 17, 1948 introduced a truce resolution based on Articles 39 and 40 of the Charter. Ambassador Austin on May 22, 1948 in the Security Council elaborated the position of the United States concerning the necessity for Chapter VII action. Again later, after the Security Council's resolution of May 22, 1948 had failed to bring about a truce in Palestine, the United States supported a resolution under Chapter VII, introduced in the Council by the Soviet representative, which closely resembled the United States resolution of May 17. Both Chapter VII resolutions failed of adoption in the Council, receiving the votes only of the United States, Soviet Union, France, Colombia, and the Ukraine.

In its resolution of May 29 under Chapter VI of the Charter, the Security Council included the following penultimate paragraph, on the motion of the United States:

"The Security Council, . . . Decides that if the present resolution is rejected by either party or by both, or if, having been accepted, it is subsequently repudiated or violated, the situation in Palestine will be considered with a view to action under Chapter VII, . . ."

Thus the Security Council itself decided that it would consider again the Palestine situation with a view to Chapter VII action if the Chapter VI resolution of May 29 proved ineffectual.

2. As pointed out above, the United States has, since May 17, 1948, formally advocated the taking of action by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter if necessary to restore international peace in Palestine. The purpose of United States policy continues to be achievement of peace in that area. In the event that the truce in Palestine under the resolution of May 29 were violated or that hostilities were resumed upon expiration of the truce, the situation in that country would be at least as grave, from the standpoint of international peace and security, as it was before the May 29 resolution was adopted. The United States has been subject to charges of oscillation and unreliability in its Palestine policy. If the United States now altered its stand on Chapter VII action, this Government would probably be subject to renewed and aggravated charges of inconsistency, resulting in embarrassment to the United States, particularly in the forum of the United Nations.

3. According to a telegram received from Ambassador Douglas on June 19,² Foreign Secretary "Bevin is in full agreement that if present efforts break down it may become necessary to invoke Chapter VII."

4. In considering whether or not to press for Chapter VII action

² Telegram 2713, not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 1121.

by the Security Council, the United States would base its approach, as it has in the past, on the determination of whether or not there was such fighting in Palestine as to constitute a threat to or breach of international peace. The approach would not depend merely upon determination that there had occurred an act of aggression, nor would the approach be merely with a view to fixing responsibility for aggression upon any particular government or authority.

S90.11/6-2248

*Memorandum by the Acting Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Satterthwaite) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)*¹

[WASHINGTON,] June 22, 1948.

Subject: Departmental Policy with Respect to Travel from the United States to the Arab Countries and Palestine.

Discussion:

You will note from the attached documents that, in accordance with the memorandum of May 21, 1948 (Tab A)² approved by you, we have been observing the following policy with regard to the issuance of passports to American citizens to visit the Arab Countries and Palestine:

"In view of this general situation it is recommended that the Department should continue to refrain from granting passport facilities to American citizens to visit the countries of the Near East (Israel, Palestine, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Yemen), unless it is clearly established that their business is of an important and urgent nature and that they do not intend to participate directly or indirectly in the hostilities in Palestine."

We have as yet formulated no policy with regard to travel from the United States to Palestine and the Arab countries of persons who are not American nationals.

You will also note from Mrs. Shipley's³ memorandum to me of June 14, (Tab B),² that she feels that we should ascertain the views of the Mediator respecting the screening of persons of military age proceeding to the Near East and Palestine. You will also observe from the attached telegram, No. 740 of June 12, 9 a. m., (Tab C), from Cairo,⁴ that Bernadotte has requested the Secretary General of the

¹ Drafted by Mr. Henderson.

² Copy not found attached.

³ Ruth B. Shipley, Chief of the Passport Division.

⁴ Not printed.

United Nations to call paragraph 6 of the truce proposals to the attention of all members of the United Nations from which substantial immigration to Palestine and the Arab countries might emanate. Bernadotte has asked the Secretary General to request the governments concerned to call to the attention of their immigration control authorities "the significance of this provision to the operation of the truce and to advise them to extend cooperation and assistance to such representatives of the Mediator as he might find it possible to send to one or another port in the implementation of the immigration provisions of the truce proposals".

On June 16, 1948 the Secretary General of the United Nations addressed a note to the United States Delegation to the United Nations⁵ calling the attention of this Government to paragraph 6 of the truce resolution of May 29 (Tab D), as requested by Count Bernadotte.

On June 21, 1948 the Department sent a telegram to the United States Delegation to the United Nations⁶ (Tab E), setting forth our reply to the note of the Secretary General of the United Nations and requesting the United States Delegation to inform the Secretary General that "instructions have been sent to the appropriate authorities to take necessary steps to prevent departure 'fighting personnel' from the United States to countries named in paragraph 3 of the resolution."

It would appear that the two following considerations are involved in the determination of what our policy with regard to travel to the Arab countries and the Near East should be:

1. The desirability, until the danger of hostility and of acts of violence against American citizens has abated, that the number of American citizens in Palestine and in the Arab countries should be at a minimum.

2. The importance that the United States fully cooperate with the Mediator in his efforts to discourage violations of the truce.

With regard to the first consideration, it is believed that we should continue to follow our present policy not to issue passports for travel to the Near East and Palestine unless the purpose of the travel is urgent and important and unless it is clearly established that the applicant for passport does not intend to participate directly or indirectly in the hostilities in Palestine. We should, therefore, continue carefully to screen all applicants for passports to the Arab countries and Palestine.

With regard to the second consideration, it is our belief that it would

⁵ Not printed.

⁶ No. 413, p. 1126.

be preferable for such screening as might be necessary to discourage the entry of "fighting personnel" from the United States to Palestine to be performed in the United States by an official of this Government in consultation with a representative of the Mediator. The United States official would do what was proper to discourage the departure from the United States for Palestine and the Arab countries of persons who had been screened in this manner.

In view of the above, we have prepared for your approval the attached telegram to the Mediator.⁷

Recommendation:

It is recommended that you sign the attached telegram to the Mediator.

Concurrences:

PD UNA L

⁷ See telegram of June 25, p. 1147.

867N.01/6-2248

*Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)*¹

[WASHINGTON,] June 22, 1948.

Mr. Clark Clifford called me at 4:25 this afternoon to say that he had just come from the President with instructions to call me and say that the President "directed me to have the papers prepared at once for the appointment of Mr. James Grover McDonald of New York to the Tel Aviv post; that he wanted this handled at once and that he wanted the announcement made this afternoon."

I asked Mr. Clifford who Mr. McDonald was and he said that all he knew about him was that the President said he had been a member of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine. I stated that I assumed this meant that Mr. McDonald was recognized as a proponent of the Zionist cause and that I queried whether the President had considered the possible effects, if the facts were as I surmised, of such an appointment during the truce period. I pointed out that the tension was considerable, that the situation was delicate enough, and that any precipitate action on our part might have untold consequences.

Clifford replied that he knew none of the background but that the President was positive, had made up his mind, and that there was obviously no room for argument. I asked if the Department could have time to consider the matter and Mr. Clifford replied that the

¹ Initialed by the Secretary of State.

President's directive was positive and that the decision had already been made; that it, therefore, called for no additional consideration.²

ROBERT A. LOVETT

² At 5:15 p. m., June 22, Mr. Satterthwaite telephoned Mr. Epstein and told him that the President would like to appoint Mr. James Grover McDonald as Special Representative and announce his appointment the same day. Mr. Satterthwaite "inquired whether Mr. Epstein was authorized to approve this action. Mr. Epstein replied that this matter had been left to his discretion and that he was authorized by his Government to make the decision. He stated that he was replying now, and that the United States proposal to appoint Mr. McDonald to the post had his approval." (Memorandum of conversation, by Mr. Satterthwaite, 867N.01/6-2248) For President Truman's statement of June 22 on the appointment of Mr. McDonald and on the designation of Mr. Epstein as Special Representative of the Provisional Government of Israel in the United States, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1948*, p. 382; or Department of State *Bulletin*, July 4, 1948, p. 22.

For Mr. McDonald's account of the circumstances of his appointment and his discussions with President Truman and other government officials before his departure for Tel Aviv on July 23, see his *My Mission in Israel, 1948-1951* (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1951), pp. 3-19.

501.BB Palestine/6-1848: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

SECRET US URGENT

WASHINGTON, June 22, 1948—noon.

2332. We share Bevin's concern, as reported your 2702, June 18, for continued functioning of important oil refinery at Haifa. However, it would seem that since neither Jews nor Arabs can profit by operation of oil refinery without agreement between themselves, since Jews will control refinery and Arabs the crude oil, there exists in the case of Haifa a unique opportunity for mutual accommodation which may serve as a constructive example of how Jews and Arabs can manage to get along peaceably throughout all of Palestine and the Near East.

We do not find it easy to give advice to Mr. Bevin regarding evacuation of Haifa by British forces during period of cease-fire. We feel that person best qualified to give advice on this subject is Count Bernadotte, who is charged with maintaining the truce and cease-fire and who, as Bevin hopes according to Para. 7, your 2701, June 18, we trust will be successful in extending the present truce and cease-fire.

Re specific questions put in your 2702, June 18, para. 6, please see Deptel 2302, June 18.¹ Following are answers seriatim:

a. We see no impropriety in UK informing Mediator of approaches to it by Jews and Arabs re reopening Haifa.

b. We think it would be useful for UK to inform Mediator of its views regarding an arrangement for Haifa along lines of Para. 4 of reference telegram.

c. We shall be glad to inform Bernadotte of our views as set forth

¹ Not printed.

in (a) and (b) above and have no objection if UK likewise informs him of our concurrence.

It would seem from para. 3, urtel 2700, June 18,² that there have been conversations in London between unofficial representative of PGI and UK FonOff regarding Haifa refinery. We are encouraged by Goldmann's reported remark that PGI would not object if representative of Mediator controlled production in Haifa refinery, Arabs receiving a fair share of output.

We believe that Mediator will wish to keep in mind importance of Haifa production going to ERP and to legitimate civilian requirements of Near East, including Israel. In conformity with principles of truce agreement we do not feel that Haifa production should be used to increase military potential of either Israel or Arab States.³

MARSHALL

² Not printed.

³ In telegram 172, June 23, 6 p. m., to Haifa, the Department furnished the text of 2332 "for your info and communication to UN Mediator if he is in your vicinity." No. 172 was repeated for action, if necessary, to Jerusalem and Cairo (501.BB Palestine/6-2348). The following day, the Department authorized Cairo to convey informally the contents of 2332 to the French Ambassador there, stating that "We see no objection to French Govt making representations to UN Mediator with regard to protecting Haifa refinery and securing its rapid resumption of full production in interest not only of Near East economy but of ERP." (Telegram 860, 501.BB Palestine/6-2448)

501.BB Palestine/6-1848 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

SECRET US URGENT

WASHINGTON, June 22, 1948—6 p. m.

2348. You may assure Mr. Bevin and Foreign Office that this government cordially welcomes desire of British government to concert its views with ours in respect of Palestine. We agree with Bevin's suggestion as indicated in Para. 4 urtel 2701, June 18, and hope it will be possible for both UK and US to formulate and recommend a common line of policy.

Your 2701 does not indicate Bevin's thinking as to best practical approach which our two governments might make regarding Palestine if they should judge it wise to give advice to Count Bernadotte or if they should be requested for advice by Arab States or Provisional Government of Israel. We infer, however, that Foreign Office thinking has progressed along lines indicated in your 2712 June 19. It is highly important to know whether Bevin agrees with this trend of thought or whether he has some other solution in mind, as, for example, federation.

Dept is rapidly evolving its line of policy re future settlement of Palestine problem. For your own info and not for use as yet with UK

officials, our thinking—conditioned by fact of recognition of State of Israel—is that best solution for a sensible adjustment of Palestine problem would be to re-draw frontiers of Israel so as to make a compact and homogeneous state; remainder of Palestine to go largely to Transjordan with appropriate transfer of populations where necessary; Jerusalem to remain an international entity with free access to outside world; boundaries of Israel and enlarged Transjordan to be guaranteed mutually between themselves and UN; and economic prosperity of region to be enhanced by a customs union between Israel and Transjordan.

As soon as firm policy has been agreed upon you will receive further instructions.

Re Paragraph 7, your 2701, June 18, we are in entire agreement that even though a final solution is not reached during present 4-weeks' period of cease-fire it is imperative that truce be continued.

You may inform Bevin that our most recent info from SYG Lie, based on telephone conversations and telegrams from Bernadotte, is that UN Mediator is not attempting to work out a final settlement at this time but will concentrate his efforts on Rhodes to extend period of truce and cease-fire and likewise to achieve demilitarization of Jerusalem. Apparently to this latter end Bernadotte has in mind recruiting UN armed guards for Jerusalem but full details of what he intends are not yet available. Foregoing with reference to Paragraph 8, your 2701, was given us as top secret by Lie.

We welcome your 2713, June 19,¹ with its indication that British are willing to face up to responsibilities under Chapter 7 in event that this should become necessary. However, we very much share Bevin's hope that a final settlement can be evolved without recourse to sanctions.

MARSHALL

¹ Not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 1121.

501.BB Palestine/6-3048

*Memorandum by Mr. Robert M. McClintock*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] June 23, 1948.

PEACEFUL ADJUSTMENT OF THE FUTURE SITUATION OF PALESTINE

Reports from Cairo indicate that Count Bernadotte, the United Nations Mediator, operating under the resolution of the General As-

¹ Transmitted to Brigadier General Carter on June 30 (see footnote 1, p. 1127). Mr. McClintock had prepared a first draft on June 18, which he had sent for comment to Messrs. Henderson, Sandifer, and Meeker and to Harding Bancroft, Associate Chief of the Division of International Security Affairs. The first draft was also submitted to Mr. Lovett for information and was read by the Under Secretary (501.BB Palestine/6-1848).

sembly adopted on May 14, 1948, and the resolution of the Security Council of May 29, will shortly convoke a conference on Rhodes between representatives of the Arab League and the Arabs of Palestine on the one hand, and the Jews of Palestine as represented by the Provisional Government of Israel, to discuss, in the language of the resolution of May 14, "a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine".

It is possible that during the course of these conversations the United States may be called upon for advice either by the United Nations Mediator or by the parties to the Palestine dispute. In any event, it would seem necessary for this government to have a clear idea of what "peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine" would most conduce to the national interests of the United States.

The policy of the American Government in this regard has been conditioned since May 14 by the recognition that day of the Provisional Government of the State of Israel as the *de facto* authority in that new republic. Because of the act of recognition, United States policy with relation to the Palestine settlement is postulated upon the continuing existence of the State of Israel. The sovereignty of Israel is a fact so far as the United States is concerned and this government could not agree to any diminution of its sovereignty except with the consent of the Government of Israel.*

The proposed boundaries of the Jewish State as delineated by the resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on November 29, 1947, were predicated on the assumption that there would also be an Arab State in Palestine linked to the Jewish State by economic union. It is now clear in the light of facts and events which have supervened that there will be no separate Arab State and no economic union as envisaged in the General Assembly resolution. In consequence, the boundaries of the State of Israel, if they are regarded as those traced on the map which formed a part of the resolution of November 29, are aptly described by the understatement of a Jewish group recently formed in New York to promote Jewish-Arab cooperation. According to this definition "the borders of the State of Israel and of Arab Palestine, as laid out by the United Nations, bear an unusually high ratio to the area of the land". More bluntly, a delegate to the United Nations Trusteeship Council last autumn likened the map of United Nations partition of Palestine to a portrait by Picasso.

It would seem logical, accordingly, given the postulate of a State

*It is pertinent to quote excerpts from the official Republican Party Platform for 1948, Section VI: "We welcome Israel into the family of nations and take pride in the fact that the Republican Party was the first to call for the establishment of a free and independent Jewish commonwealth. . . . Subject to the letter and spirit of the United Nations Charter, we pledge to Israel full recognition, with its boundaries as sanctioned by the United Nations and aid in developing its economy".

The Democratic Party Platform will undoubtedly include equivalent references to the State of Israel. [Footnote in the source text.]

of Israel, and given the fact that its boundaries in the absence of economic union with an Arab State are fantastic, that there should be a new drawing of the frontier which circumscribes the State of Israel. Study might profitably be made to re-drawing the boundary of Israel along the lines suggested by the Peel Report, in which the Jewish State would have occupied the coastal area from Tel Aviv to Haifa, with a considerable portion of Western Galilee. If such new boundaries should be drawn, the present areas in the Negeb now held by Israel should be given to the neighboring Arab countries, principally Transjordan, and there should be an appropriate exchange of populations so that the State of Israel would contain most of the Jews of Palestine and the Arabs would reside in purely Arab areas.

If the State of Israel were thus redefined geographically it would be a more homogeneous unit possessing an improved economic patrimony. The United States could consent to changes in territory, however, only if they were made with the consent of Israel.

As for the Arab areas of Palestine, it is suggested that Transjordan be permitted to expand, taking over almost all the remainder of the country except for possibly a small transfer of territory in the extreme north to Syria, where the finger salient based on Safad seems to possess little justification. Similarly, in the extreme south the port of Aqaba, now in Transjordan, might be transferred to Saudi Arabia, while in the Negeb territorial adjustments could be made in favor of Egypt as well as Transjordan.

If the boundaries of Israel were re-drawn and the adjustments suggested above agreed to by the Arabs and Jews there should then be an international guarantee by the United Nations, and, if possible, by treaty between Israel and the Arab States, of the territorial settlement. This would be of particular advantage to the Arabs as "freezing" the boundaries of Israel and thus affording protection to the Arab States against the wider pretensions of the Jewish revisionists and such fanatics as those of the Irgun who have pretensions to the conquest of Transjordan.

Other proposed arrangements to promote a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine center largely on federation in one form or another. A representative of the British Foreign Office on June 6 told officers of the Department that the official policy of the British Government would undoubtedly favor a Palestinian federation made up of a Jewish and an Arab canton or state. However, despite this official view of the British Government, the Colonial Secretary, Sir Arthur Creech Jones, has recently indicated his belief, both to American official representatives and to the present Foreign Minister of Israel, that a deal is possible of arrangement between King Abdullah of Transjordan and the State of Israel for a territorial settlement similar to that outlined in the preceding paragraphs.

Another protagonist of federation is Dr. Judah Magnes, the distinguished American President of the Hebrew University. Dr. Magnes favors a "United States of Palestine", in which Arab and Jewish States would retain sovereign jurisdiction in a Palestine federation except for the control of foreign affairs, security, economic cooperation, a supreme court, and a separate regime for Jerusalem.

As a matter of practical politics it is much to be doubted whether the Jews of the State of Israel will agree to relinquish an iota of their sovereignty and that in consequence the foregoing proposals for federation will have slight chance of acceptance.

Should an arrangement be possible of accomplishment for a consolidation of the State of Israel along the coast from Tel Aviv to the border of Lebanon, including a transfer of Western Galilee in return for the cession of the Negeb to Transjordan and Egypt, it would seem useful that the two States principally falling heir to Palestine—Israel and Transjordan—be bound together in a customs union.

With regard to Jerusalem it would seem on balance preferable that this Holy City be administered by the United Nations as a separate international entity. Jerusalem is as much a Jewish city as it is an Arab metropolis and it contains shrines sacred to three of the principal world religions. To permit it to be made the capital of King Abdullah would rouse Jewish passions and irredentism while to allow Jerusalem to be a Jewish capital would incite reciprocal emotions in the Arabs. Should, however, Jerusalem be made an international responsibility, it should be incorporated in the Israel-Transjordan *Zollverein* and guarantees should be given by the States concerned for its unrestricted access to free port facilities at Haifa or Jaffa.

In summary, therefore, a sensible territorial solution for the Palestine problem would be to re-draw the frontiers of Israel so as to make a compact and homogeneous state, the remainder of Palestine to go largely to Transjordan with appropriate transfers of populations where necessary; Jerusalem to remain an international entity with free access to the outside world; the boundaries of the two new states to be guaranteed mutually between themselves and the United Nations; and the economic prosperity of the region to be enhanced by a customs union between Israel and Transjordan.

867N.01/6-2348: Telegram

The Consul at Haifa (Lippincott) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

HAIFA, June 23, 1948.

173. ReDeptel 164 June 21.¹ Upon inquiring whether it was true Jewish authorities were refusing permission Arabs return Haifa,

¹ This was a repeat of No. 629 to Jerusalem, not printed.

Victor Khayat, Honorary Spanish Vice Consul and an American citizen, told me this afternoon in strictest confidence.

1. All Arabs who remained Haifa being thoroughly screened by Jewish authorities, required obtain identity cards and must swear allegiance to Israel state.

2. Arabs who return Haifa are considered illegals. Of these Jews are permitting only those to remain whom they consider satisfactory after thorough investigation. These also required take oath allegiance Jewish state. Result is remaining Arabs determined leave. Khayat informed that he had recently arranged for departure seven sailing vessels for Lebanon each carrying average 120 persons passage free. One additional vessel scheduled leave twenty-second ending operation. Khayat said departures were arranged with assistance British Commandos now controlling port. Approximately 1500 Arabs now Haifa. Of these some expected infiltrate Nazareth and other towns in nearby Arab controlled areas.

Khayat added that he is issuing "emergency certificates" for purpose entering Syria or Lebanon to "all Arabs applying". He called on me some time after giving the above information inquiring whether Jews could legally object to his issuing visas to Syrians and Lebanese whose interests he represents. I gave him no definite suggestions or advice. When asked what orders Jewish authorities had given with regard refusing Arabs return Haifa Khayat said "word was just passed around."

LIPPINCOTT

501.BB Palestine/6-2348: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Jessup)

SECRET US URGENT

WASHINGTON, June 23, 1948—5 p. m.

419. Dept has given urgent consideration to your telephonic advice that SYG Lie has telegraphed Count Bernadotte regarding latter's suggestion that he hopes to demilitarize Jerusalem and will need an armed UN guard numbering 1,000 men to be available by July 9.¹ You

¹Count Bernadotte, in a message to Secretary-General Lie dated June 20, gave his views that the truce was under control and that both parties would be careful not to break it. Since he felt it impossible to obtain an agreement before July 9, his tactics would involve trying to gain time and to make vague proposals rather than firm ones, lest their rejection result in the ending of the truce. The Mediator advised that he would concentrate on attaining agreement on demilitarizing Jerusalem and the Holy Places, for which he would require at least 1,000 armed guards (telegram 809, June 23, 5:54 p. m., from New York, 501.BB Palestine/6-2348).

report that Lie has suggested that he feels that Bernadotte's request should be submitted to SC for its recommendation and has so informed Bernadotte.

We do not feel that Bernadotte's purpose would be served by SC debate of this question. The Soviet faction would be given an opportunity to make long speeches and to insist that their nationals be recruited as a proportion of the proposed armed guard and this Soviet tactic would very probably result in other members of the Council failing to vote for any recommendation to Bernadotte, thus leaving him in a more negative position than before.

On the contrary we feel that sufficient authority now exists in Para. 6 and 7, SC resolution of May 29, in GA resolution of May 14, and in Section B(a) of the UN budget for 1948, for SYG at Bernadotte's request to recruit and pay for the police forces Bernadotte has in mind.

We feel it is of utmost importance that there be no confusion between UN guard which SYG would like to create² and concerning which he has had informal discussions with Secretary Marshall, and the police force for Jerusalem desired by Count Bernadotte. You may tell SYG that we are giving sympathetic consideration to his UN guard proposal but would prefer to view it on its own merits and not in light of the complex Palestine problem.

It would be extremely helpful for Dept to have more explicit knowledge of details of Bernadotte's plan. Clearly it would not serve our interest if any considerable number of Soviet or Soviet satellite nationals made up Jerusalem force.

We assume Bernadotte's plan is based on achieving agreement of parties on demilitarization of Jerusalem. If parties could further agree on source and composition of armed guards so much the better. Arabs and Jews might agree, for example, each to supply 500 men to Jerusalem force.

Sent USUN with request foregoing be imparted to SYG and that latter transmit our views for info of UN Mediator on Rhodes with comment that US as member of Truce Commission is naturally concerned in these arrangements and desires to be of utmost help.³

Repeated for info and action if Bernadotte in that vicinity to Jerusalem as 639, Haifa as 167, Cairo as 853.

Repeated to London as 2364, Paris as 2243, Brussels as 959.

MARSHALL

² For documentation on this subject, see vol. I, Part 1, pp. 29 ff.

³ New York reported, on June 25, that action had been taken on 419 and that the United Nations Secretariat had indicated general sympathy for United States views and would communicate them to the Mediator (telegram 821, 501.BB Palestine/6-2548).

867N.01/6-2248

*Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)*¹

[WASHINGTON,] June 24, 1948.

At 2:40 today, in accordance with instructions from the Secretary, I called Clark Clifford at the White House and reverted to the matter of the appointment of the U.S. Special Representative to the State of Israel. I told Clifford that the Secretary had been very much concerned at the procedures followed in the appointment made on June 22, and particularly the precipitate action and failure to give the Department of State an opportunity to put the President in possession of any pertinent facts which might be at its disposal.

I stated that the Secretary's concern had been such that he had written a long-hand letter from Walter Reed Hospital to the President yesterday. The Secretary was persuaded, after discussion this morning at the hospital, not to send the letter in today but he will discuss the matter fully with the President on Monday.

I told Clifford that I wanted him to know the above facts for background and also to give him an indication of the serious view which the Secretary took of the method of procedure, particularly at the present time.

ROBERT A. LOVETT

¹ Initialed by the Secretary of State.

501.BB Palestine/6-1648

*The Secretary of State to the Secretary-General of the United Nations (Lie)*¹

WASHINGTON, June 24, 1948.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor, with reference to your note to the United States Mission to the United Nations of June 15, 1948,² requesting the loan of three naval coastal patrol vessels to the United Nations Mediator, Count Bernadotte, for his use in giving effect to the Security Council's resolution of May 29, 1948 on Palestine, to inform you that the Secretary of National Defense of the United States has made available three destroyers now serving with the United States Mediterranean Fleet.

The Commander of the unit of these three United States Navy

¹ Sent to Ambassador Austin in instruction 147, June 24, for transmittal to Mr. Lie.

² Not printed.

destroyers will report to the United Nations Mediator for Palestine through the United States Chargé d'Affaires at Cairo with the understanding that their employment shall be limited to transportation of persons and material in connection with supervision of the truce together with observation and reporting duties. In carrying out these duties, the commanding officers of the vessels are not authorized to employ force nor to stop or board shipping encountered.

Accept [etc.]

G. C. MARSHALL

867N.01/6-2448 : Telegram

The Vice Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

JERUSALEM, June 24, 1948—1 p. m.

963. During past few days increased activity of Irgun Zvai Leumi and Stern gang in Jerusalem has become extremely apparent. Both groups have succeeded in bringing into city reinforcements, arms and supplies from Tel Aviv and have taken over strategic areas in Jerusalem which are being turned into fortified enclaves. Haganah authorities here admit that IZL and Stern gang do not submit to Haganah discipline and it is known that Haganah has considerable difficulty in dealing with 2 groups. It also appears that IZL and Stern enjoy preferred positions regarding food and wartime restrictions. Since unification agreement signed by IZL and Stern with Haganah are only valid within Israel, former consider themselves free to act as they wish in Jerusalem. Reliable Jewish source indicates that 2 groups are augmenting their forces here to serve as threat and reminder to Israel Government that IZL and Stern will not tolerate any concession on immigration or status of Jerusalem. Regarding latter it is possible that IZL and Stern will reject international status for city believing that Jerusalem should be capital of Jewish State which they regard as ultimately including all of Palestine. Dr. Bernard Joseph, Chairman of Jewish Jerusalem Emergency Committee, has stated to Truce Commission his inability be responsible for acts IZL and Stern in Jerusalem. Moreover as proven in recent failure by Haganah to dislodge Stern members from enclave in Talbieh quarter of Jerusalem, Haganah unable cope with situation. It is also known that Haganah commander in Jerusalem, David Shaltiel, is under severe censure by Stern for what they consider his conciliatory attitude in present truce negotiations.

Reliable Jewish sources believe that in Israel IZL and Stern support in general policy of Israel Government provided that policy does not weaken or change. In particular 2 groups reject any compromise or concessions on immigration. Stern group is reported to mistrust Ben

Gurion and Shertok in this respect. Both IZL and Stern signed agreements to amalgamate with Haganah and to submit to authority of state. Israeli authorities announced several weeks ago that Stern gang had disbanded with[in] Israel and that arms turned over to Israeli Army. Irgun announced June 16 that within Israel it was now political party under name "Jewish Freedom Movement" but that outside Israel it remained military organization. It is reliably reported that while members IZL and Stern have joined Israel Army, they have been formed into separate battalions under their own officers. Operational command is theoretically responsibility Haganah High Command but IZL and Stern are believed to have representatives on High Command. Considerable and important evidence exists (such as that reported in Haifa's 76, May 18 and 172 June 22 both to Department ¹) that amalgamation and submission do not in fact exist and that both groups retain independence of action which Israeli authorities will find increasingly difficult to bring under control and suppress.

Various sources indicate that guidance, money and arms were being provided to Stern gang by Russia through Satellites particularly Poland. Polish Consulates in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv are believed to be in close touch with Stern gang and its commanders Nathan Friedman Yellin and deputy Dr. Israel Scheib. It is also believed Russia will make every effort widen this support as effective means of gaining subversive foothold in Israel. While reports have been received that Menachem Beigin, Commander of IZL, has ordered his followers to orient themselves toward Russian recognition of [and?] Russian support of Jewish State, no concrete evidence is available to substantiate report.

Regarding future real possibility exists that IZL and Stern will prove of increasing embarrassment to Israel authorities both in Israel and Jerusalem and that they will attempt thwart any attempt to settle present impasse in reasonable way. Russia can be expected to increase influence in Stern gang and make efforts penetrate.

Sent Department 963, repeated Haifa 76.

Department pass Arab capitals, London and Moscow.

BURDETT

¹ Neither printed; the latter message and telegram 174 of the following day reported that the *Attalena*, a vessel controlled by the Irgun Zvai Leumi had attempted to land at Nathanya near Tel Aviv on the morning of June 22 in order to disembark some 600-1,000 armed Jews and possibly arms and munitions. Haganah forces shelled the vessel, causing it to burn, turned over its passengers to United Nations officials, and arrested about 700 IZL members ashore (867N.01/6-2248, 6-2348).

501.BB Palestine/6-2448: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the
Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET

LONDON, June 24, 1948—8 p. m.

2785. 1. I am immensely gratified by contents Department's 2332, June 22, and Department's 2348, June 23, substance of which (except paragraph 3 last reftel) was delivered June 23 to Wright in Bevin's absence.

2. Wright warmly welcomed Department's helpful response to ideas advanced by Bevin (Embassy's 2702, June 18 and 2701, June 18).

3. Re Haifa, Wright said Foreign Office in light Department's 2332 would telegraph at once to Rhodes (repeating to Haifa) substance paragraph 4, Embassy's 2702, June 18. He said Mediator would be told that UK has consulted USG which sees no impropriety in HMG informing Mediator of approaches to it by Jews and Arabs and that USG thinks it would be useful for HMG to inform Mediator of HMG views re an arrangement for Haifa. Wright assumes Department will advise Bernadotte similarly.

4. Wright said he took two Deptrefelts to mean that USG and HMG have accepted as common aims the following:

(a) Extension cease-fire and truce (paragraph 5, Department's 2348).

(b) Efforts to concert views (paragraph 1, Department's 2348).

(c) Pooling information re Mediator (penultimate paragraph, Department's 2348).

5. Wright said that he thought above common aims now would probably open way for Foreign Office to put to Department more clearly its thinking re various alternatives with which Mediator may be confronted. In this connection he mentioned possibility, which Mediator himself seems to envisage (paragraph 6, Department's 2348) of temporizing in the event neither side is willing to agree on final settlement near future. (Embassy's 2510, June 7,¹ paragraph 7). Wright wondered whether Department entertains views re most effective channel for communicating Foreign Office thinking. He suggested that this Embassy to Department might be main channel and that Foreign Office to British Embassy Washington might be secondary channel to be kept fully advised with view to British Embassy officers discussing points with the Department. In view of what seems to be close association with British Government on this problem and gradual shift in British position (see paragraph 6 below) as result compulsion

¹ Not printed.