

501.BB Palestine/5-2348 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Jessup)

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, June 25, 1948—3 p. m.

429. Re telephone talks of Jessup with Gross and Sandifer (referred to in USUN 807 of June 23¹) Dept believes it would be inappropriate and unwise to attempt at this time to carry Lebanon, Syria or Egypt to ICJ concerning measures taken or announced by those states which US Govt has recently protested. In case of Lebanon, no measures in nature of blockade have been announced by that Govt, and *Marine Carp* incident is in process of settlement through diplomatic channels. Measures announced by Syria and Egypt, which are intended to result in blockade of Palestine, have not in fact been applied in any specific case which would give rise to US protest or claim. Apart from these legal considerations affecting US position, it is believed that taking a case against one of Arab countries to ICJ at this time, on a question concerning Palestine, might affect adversely chance of a political solution in Palestine being attained through truce and efforts of UN mediator. If a specific case were to arise, under Syrian or Egyptian measures, which affected US interests, Dept would again weigh at that time question of going to ICJ.

MARSHALL

¹ Not printed; this message, signed by Mr. Jessup, read as follows: "Confirming my phone talks with Gross and Sandifer, we feel it might be generally helpful if USG were to suggest to Egyptian and Syrian Governments that question of attempted blockade of Palestine be submitted to International Court or alternatively to the Court's Chamber of Summary Procedure." (501.BB Palestine/6-2348)

867N.01/6-2548 : Telegram

The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Childs) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

JIDDA, June 25, 1948—3 p. m.

373. Following summary conclusions regarding Palestine from point view SAG:

(1) King has issued orders enjoining strictest compliance by SAG with UN truce Palestine.

(2) There are no signs King can be reconciled Palestine settlement involving Arab acceptance Israel.

(3) Failure our part reply King's inquiry (Legtel 307 May 22¹) regarding US-Palestine policy is being interpreted as further indication US is resolved weight scales favor Israel at expense Arabs and is resulting in less friendly and more rigid policy towards US interests Saudi Arabia (Shaikh Yusuf Deputy Foreign Minister has indicated this cooling off toward US Government which formerly enjoyed

¹ Not printed, but see editorial note, p. 1030.

unique position this country will not extend to impairment close personal relations between members government and US Chief Mission).

(4) SAG policy Palestine will continue conform that Arab League and there will hence be no attempt at deviation therefrom nor will there be any pressure exerted in Arab League in favor moderate prudent policy as there was last year in effort to draw line between SAG's economic and political interests. Once US cast die by recognition Israel SAG has cast die in turn with Arab League.

(5) There is only faintest hope anything will come truce. If hostilities renewed and US pursues policy susceptible interpretation as substantial departure from one neutrality as between Israel and Arabs vigorous counteraction may be anticipated by Arab League with which SAG will conform including taking such sanctions as may be available. These may include one or all following or some modification thereof:

(a) Transfer Dhahran air base to British; (b) cancellation Aramco concession; (c) break in diplomatic relations.

It is my considered view we have every reason to be deeply concerned regarding decline in our position in this area of such great strategical economic importance to US. Extent to which our position may be retrieved in part or even our impaired position conserved depends I believe entirely upon policy which US will pursue henceforth. SAG will look however to acts rather than verbal assurances and will be guided exclusively by former.

Sent Department 373; repeated London 110, Dhahran 195, pouched Arab capitals.

CHILDS

501.BB Palestine/6-2548: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United Nations Mediator in Palestine (Bernadotte)*¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 25, 1948—6 p. m.

US Govt desires do all that is proper and possible facilitate your efforts discourage violations paragraph 6 peace proposals. At present time it is continuing pursue a policy inaugurated some time ago of refraining grant passport facilities to American citizens to visit Palestine and Arab countries unless it has been clearly established that their business is of an important and urgent nature and that they do not intend participate directly or indirectly in hostilities in or against Palestine.

Since however Mediator rather than US Govt may determine whether entry of American nationals or other persons proceeding from

¹ Sent to the Consulate General at Jerusalem in telegram 654, "For transmission by such means as available to Count Bernadotte".

US to Palestine and Arab countries would be in contravention of truce terms it is difficult for US authorities effectively to screen persons embarking at American ports for such destinations. It would be appreciated if the Mediator would inform the US Govt whether he desires that screening should be done at time vessels arrive in Near Eastern ports or whether he would prefer send an observer to US for consultation with officials of this Govt regarding screening prior embarkation. US Govt assures Mediator of full cooperation in rendering effective any decision which he may make this connection.

Repeated to USUN as 430.

MARSHALL

501.BB Palestine/6-2448: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 25, 1948—6 p. m.

2402. For the Ambassador from Lovett. Assumptions set forth Para. 4 your 2785, June 24, are correct. We hope, now the "entente cordiale" has been reestablished, that both govts will be able to pull in tandem to assist in the constructive working out of this onerous Palestine problem.

Since views on both sides are not yet crystallized in the form of top level policy we suggest that for time being these interchanges of views by telegram be classified "Top Secret".

Re channel of communications in development of our views on Palestine, we concur with Wright's view that you should be principal means of communication to British Govt. Neither Cadogan nor the Embassy here have as direct and as influential access to Bevin as you and, in consequence, while the description set forth of your task in the final sentence of Para. 5 is painfully exact, we shall be glad to look to you as our principal negotiator with the UK.

It will be apparent from summary of our thinking set forth in third para. of Deptel 2348¹ that there is a very large measure of agreement between ourselves and British Foreign Office as to the most sensible arrangement of the Palestine issue, keeping always in mind the requirements on this gov't to maintain its recognition of the State of Israel.

We thoroughly agree with British that Mediator's best course, in light of Arab intransigence and the extreme statements which Arab

¹ Dated June 22, p. 1133.

leaders have made, would be to temporize and to spin out the truce. We feel that, once the habit of not shooting at each other becomes more developed, its popularity will increase with both Jews and Arabs. We plan, as members of the Truce Commission, to give this advice to Count Bernadotte.

We are gratified by the energy and skill which you have displayed in treating with Bevin on this problem, which is so surcharged with emotion as well as difficulty, and would welcome your views as to an eventual *modus vivendi* and any comment you may have in mind on our own ideas in this regard. [Lovett.]

MARSHALL

501.BB Palestine/6-748: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 25, 1948—6 p. m.

876. Reurtels 692 June 7¹ containing text provisions truce Palestine, 740 June 12¹ and USDel NY unnumbered tel June 16¹ transmitting SC request all States Members extend cooperation and assistance to UN Mediator in implementation provisions of truce.

US Army AmZone Germany has requested State-Army for directions re movement DPs to Palestine. Depts Army-State cabling US mil authorities Germany Austria text para VI containing immigration provisions truce and simultaneously authorizing exit AmZones Germany and Austria of Palestine certificate holders specifically excepting fighting personnel. Authorization exit men mil age has been deferred until word recd from Mediator as to (1) whether he desires to send observers AmZones Germany Austria to consult with US mil authorities re exit men mil age and (2) if so, when observers will arrive AmZones Germany Austria. Pursuant SC request June 16 US mil authorities Germany Austria also being requested extend cooperation assistance Mediator. Pls secure Bernadotte's answers foregoing questions and such other observations as he may make for transmission by Dept to US mil authorities.²

MARSHALL

¹ Not printed.

² This telegram was repeated to Berlin, London, and Vienna. Count Bernadotte did not reply until August 3, when he advised that he did not intend to send observers to the American zones of Germany and Austria because of the necessity of concentrating them in the Middle East (telegram 1096, August 4, 6 p. m., from Cairo, 501.BB Palestine/8-448).

501.BB Palestine/6-2548: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Jerusalem

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 25, 1948—7 p. m.

658. For Macdonald.¹ As US member of Truce Commission we feel that you should indicate to Count Bernadotte our profound gratification at success which has thus far attended his efforts in maintaining the truce and cease-fire which are due to end on July 9. At same time, as US member of Truce Commission, you should contrive to make it clear to both Arabs and Jews that we are equally gratified by statesmanship and self-restraint which they have exhibited under conditions where such self-discipline was most difficult to apply.

We do not wish to intervene with unnecessary advice in a situation which is maturing delicately and slowly. However, it seems obvious that it will be necessary to extend truce and cease-fire arrangement for a longer period than the original 4-weeks ordered by the SC. You should prepare as a member of Truce Commission to exert every effort in assisting Mediator should he so desire to extend truce and cease-fire, expressing confident hope of this govt that to refrain from reengaging in hostilities will eventually make it possible for both Arabs and Jews to develop a lasting and peaceful arrangement for mutual accommodation in regard to Palestine.²

Repeated to USUN as 431 with request this message be transmitted for info to Count Bernadotte.

Repeated for info to London as 2415, Paris as 2307, Brussels as 979, Beirut as 375, Cairo as 877, Haifa as 180, Damascus as 252, Baghdad as 225, Jidda as 248.

MARSHALL

¹ John J. Macdonald, the Consul General at Jerusalem. The Department notified New York on June 24 that Mr. Macdonald had been designated United States Representative on the Truce Commission, succeeding the late Mr. Wasson (telegram 423, 501.BB Palestine/6-2448).

² Jerusalem reported, on June 28, that the contents of telegram 658 had been communicated to Count Bernadotte and that the contents of the last paragraph were being conveyed orally to the Arabs and the Jews (telegram 989, 501.BB Palestine/6-2848).

Minister Childs communicated the substance of the same message to Shaikh Yussef, who transmitted it to King Ibn Saud. The latter, having taken counsel with King Abdullah, then visiting the Saudi monarch, directed that a reply be made. The text of the reply, given in telegram 388, July 1, noon, from Jidda, stated that the two monarchs wished to reach a just solution of the Palestine question that would accord the Arabs their rights and that they were hoping for and counting on the justice of the United States Government (501.BB Palestine/7-148).

867N.01/6-2748 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Jerusalem (Macdonald) to the Secretary
of State*

RESTRICTED

JERUSALEM, June 27, 1948—2 p. m.

988. Representative of Israeli Foreign Office in Jerusalem said that Israeli Foreign Minister Shertok in speech in Tel Aviv on June 15 formally stated position of PGI that there can be no mass return of Palestinian Arabs to Israel until general political settlement and end of war. Shertok speech also stated that Arabs could not return except as full citizens Jewish state acknowledging its authority and sovereignty. Reference was also made to screening. Israeli Foreign Office representative Jerusalem indicated this speech does represent stated policy of PGI and as such is shift from previous policy.

Consulate General believes that majority of Arabs now refugees from areas within Israel will never return under conditions and that their bitterness, already deep rooted, will only be increased by PGI statement. So far, however, Palestinian Arabs with whom Consulate General officials have talked have not commented on Shertok's statement.

MACDONALD

867N.01/6-2848

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Lovett)¹*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] June 28, 1948.

Participants: Mr. James Grover McDonald, U.S. Special Representative to Israel
Mr. Lovett—U
Mr. Satterthwaite—NEA
Mr. Mattison—NEA
Mr. McClintock—UNA

Mr. McDonald called by appointment at 3 p. m., June 25. He had seen the President earlier in the day and had had a general conversation in which the President stressed his desire to have his own independent means of communication and of information to and from the State of Israel. The President had not indicated when he thought Mr. McDonald should proceed to his post. It was agreed that the Foreign

¹ Drafted by Mr. McClintock.

Service personnel for Tel Aviv should precede Mr. McDonald and establish the Mission in working order before he, himself, went to Israel.

[Here follows a discussion of Mr. McDonald's travel orders and of his salary and allowances.]

There was a general discussion of the background of the Palestine question, during which Mr. McDonald emphatically indicated his "curbstone opinion" that the Department's policy, as enunciated by Ambassador Austin on February 24, was wrong.

[Here follow personal observations by Mr. McDonald concerning Ambassadors Wadsworth and Tuck.]

I remarked that we were fortunate in having so able and distinguished an American as Ambassador Stanton Griffis as our next Ambassador in Cairo. I said it was a relief to have a man in such a post who was not either pro-Arab or pro-Zion or pro-anything, but just plain pro-American. Mr. McDonald seemed to be not unresponsive to this observation, since he reverted to it and said he wondered how my Foreign Service advisers would take such a crack. My Foreign Service advisers said that they knew perfectly what I had in mind.

*Text of Suggestions Presented by Count Bernadotte, at Rhodes, to the Two Parties on June 28, 1948*¹

[Here follows Part I, the introductory statement, in which the Mediator interpreted his role "not as one involving the handing down of decisions on the future situation in Palestine, but as one of offering suggestions on the basis of which further discussions might take place and possibly counter-suggestions be put forth looking toward a peaceful settlement of this difficult problem. My suggestions at this stage, then, must clearly be of such nature as to provide a reasonable framework of reference within which the two parties may find it possible to continue their consultations with me toward the end of a peaceful adjustment."]

PART II. SUGGESTIONS PRESENTED BY THE MEDIATOR ON PALESTINE

The Mediator advanced the following suggestions as a possible basis for discussion:

1. That, subject to the willingness of the directly interested parties to consider such an arrangement, Palestine, as defined in the original Mandate entrusted to the United Kingdom in 1922, that is including

¹ Reprinted from SC, 3rd yr., *Supplement for July 1948*, pp. 18-21. The text was released by the United Nations on July 4.

Transjordan, might form a Union comprising two members, one Arab and one Jewish.

2. That the boundaries of the two members be determined in the first instance by negotiation with the assistance of the Mediator and on the basis of suggestions to be made by him. When agreement is reached on the main outlines of the boundaries they will be definitively fixed by a Boundaries Commission.

3. That the purposes and function of the Union should be to promote common economic interests, to operate and maintain common services, including customs and excise, to undertake development projects and to co-ordinate foreign policy and measures for common defence.

4. That the functions and authority of the Union might be exercised through a central council and such other organs as the members of the Union may determine.

5. That, subject to the provision of the Instrument of Union, each member of the Union may exercise full control over its own affairs including its foreign relations.

6. Immigration within its own borders should be within the competence of each member, provided that following a period of two years from the establishment of the Union, either member would be entitled to request the Council of the Union to review the immigration policy of the other member and to render a ruling thereon in terms of the common interests of the Union. In the event of the inability of the Council to reach a decision on the matter, the issue could be referred by either member to the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations whose decision, taking into account the principle of economic absorptive capacity, would be binding on the member whose policy is at issue.

7. That religious and minority rights be fully protected by each member of the Union and guaranteed by the United Nations.

8. That Holy Places, religious buildings and sites be preserved and that existing rights in respect of the same be fully guaranteed by each member of the Union.

9. That recognition be accorded to the right of residents of Palestine who, because of conditions created by the conflict there have left their normal places of abode, to return to their homes without restriction and to regain possession of their property.

PART III. ANNEX TO THE SUGGESTIONS: TERRITORIAL MATTERS

With regard to paragraph 2 of the suggestions, it is considered that certain territorial arrangements might be worthy of consideration. These might be along the following lines:

1. Inclusion of the whole or part of the Negeb in Arab territory.

2. Inclusion of the whole or part of Western Galilee in Jewish territory.

3. Inclusion of the City of Jerusalem in Arab territory, with municipal autonomy for the Jewish community and special arrangements for the protection of the Holy Places.

4. Consideration of the status of Jaffa.

5. Establishment of a free port at Haifa, the area of the free port to include the refineries and terminals.
6. Establishment of a free airport at Lydda.²

COUNT FOLKE BERNADOTTE

United Nations Mediator on Palestine

² In a cablegram of June 30 to Secretary-General Lie, Count Bernadotte reported on his invitations to Arab and Jewish representatives to discuss his suggestions with him at Rhodes or to make counter-suggestions. If not feasible, he informed them of his willingness to meet each side at places of their choosing. The cablegram noted that the Mediator had not sought a joint meeting of Arabs and Jews at Rhodes or a round-table conference; for text, see SC, *3rd yr., Supplement for July 1948*, p. 12.

867N.01/6-2548

*Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to the President's
Special Counsel (Clifford)*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 28, 1948.

Subject: Activities of the Irgun Zvai Leumi and Stern Gang in Palestine

I wish to draw your especial attention to the two attached telegrams from Jerusalem (963 of June 24 and 973 of June 25).

As you know, we have been working on a plan for the internationalization of Jerusalem and have had some indication that the International Red Cross would be willing to cooperate in such a venture. Before the present truce they had succeeded in establishing three security zones in Jerusalem where non-combatants could take refuge, and it has been our hope that the idea of a security zone could be spread to include all of Jerusalem.

While there have been minor violations of the truce, it has to date been reasonably well observed by both the Jews and the Arabs. However, telegram no. 963 presents a rather alarming picture of the activities of the Irgun and Stern Gang. It appears that both groups have succeeded in bringing reinforcements into the city during the truce period and are now fortifying the strategic positions within the city. Dr. Joseph, Chairman of the Jewish Jerusalem Emergency Committee, has informed the Truce Commission that he is unable to be responsible for the acts of the Irgun and Stern Gang in Jerusalem. Telegram no. 973 of June 25 summarizes a circular of the Stern Gang which constitutes a veiled threat against the American, French, Belgian and Swedish observers now in Palestine. They characterize these observers as a "foreign body hostile to us which penetrated into our country under guise of neutrality".

Further difficulties which the Provisional Government of Israel is facing are illustrated by the incident at Tel Aviv in which an Irgun

ship operated by the Peter Bergson group engaged in open conflict with Hagannah.¹

I fear that the situation in Jerusalem may become increasingly serious and threaten the whole structure of the present truce. For this reason I suggest that you show the President the two telegrams attached.

ROBERT A. LOVETT

¹ See footnote 1, p. 1142.

867N.01/6-2848: Telegram

The Chargé in Egypt (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

CAIRO, June 28, 1948—9 a. m.

857. Embassy unable to verify as correct report Israel would bar 300,000 Arab refugees from Jewish state (Deptel 843, June 21, 1948¹). It is suggested that while such action can no doubt be justified by Israel as necessary security measure for new state, its application probably would (1) confirm current Arab view that no peace or security exists for Arabs if Jewish state is permitted and that statements by Zionists that they seek Arab friendship have no basis in fact; (2) convince Arabs that real intention of Jews is to dispossess refugee Arabs of property and enterprises in Israel in order to provide space and economic opportunities for Jewish immigrants.

Action would, therefore, probably intensify Arab bitterness towards Jews everywhere and possibly lead to recriminatory action against Jews in Arab section Palestine and in Arab states including eviction and confiscation of property.

Sent Department 857, paraphrase to Arab capitals.

PATTERSON

¹ This was a repeat of telegram 629 to Jerusalem; not printed.

501.BB Palestine/6-2848: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Jessup)

TOP SECRET

US URGENT

WASHINGTON, June 28, 1948—6 p. m.

436. With reference to Lie's note of June 25¹ requesting that the Belgian, French and US Govts supply contingents in equal numbers to make up the 1,000 man UN guard for Jerusalem to be at the disposal of the UN Mediator, please make the following reply to SYG Lie:

As members of the SC Truce Commission we agree to the formula

¹ Incorporated in telegram 817 from New York of the same date, not printed.

he has suggested, that members of the Jerusalem guard be recruited from nationals of the govts which compose the Truce Commission; i.e., Belgium, France and the US.

However, we are not in a position to second American forces for UN guard duty, nor are we able to recruit American citizens for such duty.

Please inform SYG Lie that we believe the most efficacious manner of handling this question would be for himself, as Secretary General, to employ 333 American citizens for UN guard duty in Jerusalem, and that he send representatives to France and Belgium to gather similar contingents in those countries. We prefer and think it wise that this be a UN effort under the responsibility and powers of the SYG. As indicated Deptel 419, June 23, we believe that Jerusalem guard should be entirely distinct from Lie's projected UN guard.

Repeated to Paris as 2344, Brussels as 990, London as 2435, Jerusalem 665.

MARSHALL

501.BB Palestine/6-2948: Telegram

The Chargé in Egypt (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

CAIRO, June 29, 1948—4 p. m.

875. Conversations Arab League officials and representatives Arab states since my telegram 778, June 16, suggest Bernadotte personally, and his mission, have lost influence with many leading Arabs. Failure to take vigorous action in alleged Jewish violations of truce as in *Altalena* incident at Tel Aviv and by Irgun and Stern at Jerusalem has raised concern as to ability or willingness to redress balance as announced. Bunche's connection with Anglo-American commission which recommended partition has also raised doubt his disinterestedness. Current opinion inclined to regard every US action as calculated not to produce lasting peace, but to hamper Arabs and assist Jews. Consequently, Bernadotte's mission held merely another UN instrument forged by US to support Jewish state. Press also points to US Jews among military observers as indicative America's lack of neutrality. Foreign Office official informally expressed view to me today that US exchange diplomatic representative with Israel was regarded by Arabs as violation truce since it violated *status quo* through implication that US supported Jewish state.¹

¹The Syrian Foreign Office sent a note to the American Legation, received June 29, which accused the United States of violating the truce by accrediting a Minister Plenipotentiary at Tel Aviv. This action, according to the Syrian note, ruptured the *status quo* called for by the truce (telegram 406, June 29, from Damascus, 501.BB Palestine/6-2948).

According to Military Attaché here, Egyptian military authorities have stated that US military observers in Palestine imply that full information concerning Arab positions will eventually fall into Jewish hands and that Military Attaché can no longer count cooperation Egyptian military authorities with his office.

Local attitude remains antagonistic to US. Sentiment stimulated by unilateral British action in Sudan also running high against British for refusal arms contrary to treaties, although American pressure on Great Britain is generally held to be responsible. Arab circles already suggesting that Britain can hardly break treaties at will, at same time it insists on strict treaty observance by Arabs.

PATTERSON

501.BB Palestine/6-1848: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

SECRET US URGENT

WASHINGTON, June 29, 1948—6 p. m.

2463. For Douglas from Lovett. British Embassy yesterday handed us text of telegram from UK FonOff to Count Bernadotte at Rhodes, regarding reopening of Haifa oil refinery. Cf. urtel 2702, June 18 and Deptel 2332, June 22.

Bevin's approach to Bernadotte seems to go somewhat further than originally contemplated in 4th para. your 2702. We had impression from that telegram that his suggestion for an international administration at Haifa to cover oil port under Mediator's auspices would be for a limited period and noted in particular that FonOff had in mind a very small international control element consisting possibly of one administrator with a small staff and police force. However, Mr. Bevin in his telegram to Bernadotte discusses establishment of an international administration over port area, including oil docks and refinery, or possibly an international regime covering entire city. He says that an additional argument in favor of establishing a free port in Haifa under international control is that this would guarantee freedom of transit to Arab ports of Palestine and to Transjordan, for which Haifa is normal port of entry.

This govt in assenting to Mr. Bevin's earlier views on Haifa had in mind that Mediator could assist both Jews and Arabs to maintain their normal civil economy by lending his good offices to reopening of Haifa refinery and to ensuring that use of refinery would not increase military potential of either side. Although a permanent international

regime for city of Haifa, which is an integral part of State of Israel which this Govt has formally recognized, might offer several advantages to both sides, we could not support such a regime unless it were freely consented to by PGI, without any pressure from US. We are, however, prepared to concur in a temporary international regime for petroleum facilities of Haifa and the oil port under Bernadotte's auspices so long as he is operating under terms of SC resolution of May 29 and GA resolution of May 14.

Kindly make our views known to Mr. Bevin and explain that we regret if there has been any misunderstanding on this score. You should add that this telegram is being repeated to Count Bernadotte for his info.

Repeated USUN as 437 with request that SYG transmit this telegram to Bernadotte for his info.

Repeated Haifa as 185, Jerusalem as 670, Cairo as 892, Paris as 2375, Brussels as 999. [Lovett.]

MARSHALL

501.BB Palestine/6-3048 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Jerusalem (Macdonald) to the
Secretary of State*

SECRET

JERUSALEM, June 30, 1948—4 p. m.

1009. During official call today on Commander Shaltiel, Jewish military commander Jerusalem, possibility of extending truce was mentioned. He said Israel does not desire extension for political and military reasons. He accused Arabs of constant violations truce stressing chiefly their refusal supply water Jerusalem. He also stated HMG is advising Transjordan ruler not to agree to renewal of truce and encouraging Arab Legion to resume hostilities.

Bernard Joseph, chairman Jewish Jerusalem Emergency Command liaison officer Truce Commission, claims Jews should not have agreed to truce as they were on verge of military victory. He does not think truce will be extended and judging from his remarks he is not in favor of extension.

Consensus Jews Jerusalem is that truce will not be extended. Jewish leaders give impression of feeling confident of military victory. If truce not extended they will undoubtedly try place entire blame on Arabs in hope of increasing pro-Jewish sympathy in US and repeal of arms embargo.

Arab attitude re truce extension will be reported after calls on Arab leaders tomorrow.

MACDONALD

501.BB Palestine/6-3048: Telegram

The Chargé in Egypt (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

CAIRO, June 30, 1948—4 p. m.

881. Amir Faisal today gave Ireland further details Bernadotte's suggestions which were confirmed by Syrian Prime Minister Mardam Bey. Suggestions advocate two states Jewish and Arab with common functions including economics. Jewish state to be established within boundaries set up by UN with relinquishment of Negeb in exchange for certain areas including western Galilee. Immigration to be unlimited. Arab state to be Transjordan plus Arab section Palestine. Future of Jaffa to be settled by negotiation.

Amir Faisal and Mardam while acknowledging Bernadotte had couched suggestions in conciliatory language and had requested they not be rejected out of hand made it clear that suggestions were unacceptable. Faisal declared suggestions denied everything Arabs sought and gave Jews everything they were seeking. Mardam declared suggestions worse than partition since if accepted would make Transjordan a Jewish colony through joint economic functions and constitute even greater menace to Arab world. Both clearly indicated opposition to aggrandizement Abdullah.

Amir Faisal declared that unless better suggestions forthcoming Arabs would have no choice but resume fighting July 9 notwithstanding consequences to Arabs through inability secure arms and possible UN sanctions including lifting arms embargo by US. Declared recent events showed Jews getting arms from US and hence lifting embargo would not greatly alter their situation. US must also be aware that Arabs could impose sanctions including cancellation oil concessions. He said withdrawal concessions did not mean Arabia would not reoffer them as to Belgium Italy or even Russia. Latter might lead to unfortunate results but cited Arab proverb "drowning man will grasp even a serpent."

Ireland gained unmistakable impression that weight of both Faisal and Mardam Bey would be thrown against acceptance Bernadotte's present suggestions or any proposal to extend truce. Both declared they had opposed acceptance truce and that events had shown their arguments justified.

Sent Department as 881; repeated London as 66; paraphrase by pouch to Arab capitals.

PATTERSON

501.BB Palestine/6-2548: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Jessup)

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, June 30, 1948—8 p. m.

438. Line you took as expressed in first para. your 819, June 25,¹ seems adequately to cover problem raised by Eban with regard to seating Representative of PGI in SC, if in fact, JA has ceased to exist as political body.

You may tell Eban that your line of response to him has been approved by this govt. As a matter of friendly counsel you may wish to suggest to him that it might do his cause more harm than good if question were made too much of an issue in Council at this time. We have in mind that from July 1 Manuilsky of the Ukraine will be Council Chairman and that he might be delighted to magnify this matter out of all proportion to suit ulterior motives of USSR.

You may tell Eban that, if issue comes to vote before Council, as govt which has recognized *de facto* authority of PGI, we will vote in favor of seating representative of PGI in SC in lieu of former representative of JA. However, if it seems evident that motion to this end will not receive necessary 7 affirmative votes, Eban will wish to consider whether some compromise language might not be preferable. We have in mind in this connection language taken from GA resolution of May 14 which speaks of "local and community authorities in Palestine". It might be possible for SC to seat Eban as "representative of Jewish authorities in Palestine" and he would still be free to style himself as representative of PGI. This is, however, merely a suggestion for his own consideration.

Although Eban states that JA has ceased to exist as political body we note that in Jerusalem JA is spokesman of Jewish interests there. It seems desirable for this situation to continue, since Jerusalem is not within state of Israel. Accordingly, Council should not take such action as might exclude possibility of hearing a representative of JA when matters concerning city of Jerusalem are under consideration.

MARSHALL

¹ Not printed; the first paragraph reported that Mr. Eban had sought the views of the United States concerning the instructions of his government to raise in the Security Council the question of his status as representative of the Provisional Government of Israel rather than of the Jewish Agency. "We told him we had anticipated this question might arise when SC commenced reconsideration of Palestine question immediately following close of special GA. At that time our view was there would be no reason to make an issue of this matter and that on basis precedent of Indonesian Republic, it seemed reasonable for us to agree to changing status of JA representative. The seating of a representative of the PGI of course had nothing whatever to do with the question of recognition of Israel. The question of recognition was one which individual governments, members of SC would have to decide for themselves." (501.BB Palestine/6-2548)

501.BB Palestine/6-3048 : Telegram

*The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations
(Jessup) to the Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET URGENT NEW YORK, June 30, 1948—8:30 p. m.

831. Department may find following comments, which are framed largely in light of accumulation of data acquired by USUN in conversations here over several months, helpful in formulating our policy with regard to the "peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine."

A. PROBABLE EFFECTIVENESS OF BERNADOTTE

1. Latest information from Bernadotte, in particular his personal telegram to Lie of June 20 (reported to Department orally June 21; text sent to Department as USUN 809¹) indicates that Bernadotte's tactics will be to try to gain time and to make rather vague proposals instead of precise and firm proposals during remainder of first four-week truce period.

2. Paragraph 3 of London's 2701² indicates that Bevin is inclined to think that Arabs and Jews may not reach agreement under Bernadotte's auspices without much delay, and then probably not without USG and HMG getting involved to some degree as sources of advice.

3. Opinion here, based on recent conversations with Beeley, McNaughton, Parodi, Asil, Eban, Lie and others, would go somewhat further than Bevin's somewhat modest comment. General view here is that sooner or later Bernadotte will be confronted with basically extreme and apparent irreconcilable Jewish and Arab positions and that at this point influence of US and UK will be essential to persuade parties to come to terms.

4. We are glad to note Department's agreement (2348 from Washington to London³) with Bevin's suggestion concerning the development of a common policy with UK in regard to Palestine as reported in paragraph 4 of London's 2701. It is our view that this is essential not only to facilitate Bernadotte's task but also for the broader reasons dealt with in earlier discussions with the British in London, Washington, and New York. Friendly delegations here have freely expressed to us view that US-UK cooperation re Palestine essential to prevent growth of Soviet influence in area.

5. We feel that Bernadotte should be given as free a hand as possible. Also, with a single reservation, we consider it axiomatic that any solution upon which Bernadotte can get the two parties to agree should be acceptable to US and UK (reference paragraph 2, London's

¹ Dated June 23, not printed; but see footnote 1, p. 1138.

² Dated June 18, p. 1121.

³ Dated June 22, p. 1133.

2701 and paragraph 6, London's 2785⁴). Reservation is that although perhaps very unlikely it is conceivable that such solution in some particular aspect might be contrary to our interests. We feel we should avoid giving to Bernadotte any impression that so far as we are concerned he has a completely blank check. To avoid such impression we suggest we inform Bernadotte discreetly that we are definitely interested in any proposed solution. This might best be done by letting Bernadotte know very informally through UN Secretariat here that USG would be very glad to give him its comments on any suggests or proposals he may make from time to time to the parties. This procedure would also serve dual purpose of keeping us fully informed concerning Secretariat views. We consider this very important since Secretariat influence is probably predominant in light of Lie-Bernadotte friendship, fact that strong Secretariat personnel is attached to Lie, and fact that US-UK have very little direct contact with Bernadotte.

B. EXTENSION OF TRUCE

1. Representative of PGI here has reiterated that truce is definitely to advantage of Israel. Obvious advantages are PGI is provided by truce with opportunity to consolidate its position; this includes putting down such revolts as recent Irgun affair at Tel-Aviv. Also opinion in Arab states as well as world public opinion would more readily get accustomed to idea of State of Israel under peaceful conditions. An opportunity would be provided for more diplomatic recognitions and exchange of representatives.

2. Parenthetically, it is obviously important from the viewpoint of our relations with Israel and other governments and in dealing with this question in UN to know whether or not PGI will continue to be able in fact to deal effectively not only with the Irgun but also with the Sternists and other dissident elements, particularly those susceptible to Communist influence. This is a particularly difficult problem with respect to Jerusalem (Jerusalem's 963⁵). As we see it, problem here to which we suggest Department give urgent attention is whether Mediator should be expected to deal with this aspect of problem in Jerusalem, bearing in mind possible complications with respect to use of proposed armed guards or whether PGI should be expected to deal with problem and if so how they might be assisted in doing so, bearing in mind Israel does not have nor does it claim any legal or *de facto* control in Jerusalem.

3. Arabs, of course, might object initially to extension of truce because of advantages derived therefrom by Israel. On other hand, evidence indicates that Arabs for most part are tired of fighting and

⁴ Dated June 24, p. 1143.

⁵ Dated June 24, p. 1141.

have been shown up as poorly organized and equipped from military viewpoint. It seems clear that only Transjordan has a respectable fighting force but stands more to gain by a negotiated settlement.

4. Extension of truce would provide opportunity to de-emphasize, to some extent at least, political aspects of the future settlement and in turn to begin emphasizing those aspects, particularly economic, with regard to which it might be considerably easier to find a common ground for agreement, thus facilitating the political settlement.

5. Having indicated in a general way to UK and to Bernadotte (Department's 658 to Jerusalem⁶) that we favor extension of truce, we suggest that Department now give urgent consideration to question whether truce should be extended only for additional four-weeks period or for a longer period, say a minimum of eight weeks or a maximum of six months. Advantages of six months extension, if feasible, would be (a) more time for passions to cool off; (b) more time and better atmosphere for Bernadotte to work out extremely complex and difficult negotiations; (c) more time to work out details of concerted policy with British; (d) more time for developing our relations with Israel and Arab states towards the desired ends; (e) minimizing risk of breakdown of mediation efforts because question extension of truce not coming up every few weeks; (f) minimizing of exploitation of issues in public discussion periodically in SC; (g) minimizing of opportunity for exploitation and possible reopening of whole question in Paris GA; (h) while we would not, of course, wish in any sense to delay peaceful settlement, Department might consider it preferable if recurrent issues and crisis of final stage of negotiations could be avoided before end of year or first of next year.

C. MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS FOR PEACEFUL ADJUSTMENT

1. Full sovereignty for Israel. We feel (a) that PGI will never accept any compromise with full sovereignty for Israel; (b) that opinion this country will not permit any deviation from this objective so far as USG is concerned; and (c) that Soviets, satellite and probably other governments will support Israeli view. Eban, PGI representative here, has recently made view his government on this point very clear to us. While current British thinking seems leaning direction basing future settlement on recognition Israel, it seems essential to us to clarify earliest with British and at appropriate time to make clear to Arabs, Bernadotte and others concerned exactly what "recognition of Israel" means. Even very moderate Arab opinion reflected in Asil-Ross conversation indicates Arabs would hold out for "compromising" Israeli sovereignty re (a) conduct foreign relations, (b) defense, (c) finance, and (d) immigration. Regarding (d), in our

⁶ Dated June 25, p. 1150.

opinion PGI must be given full freedom to control immigration but we would not exclude possibility PGI might adopt and announce in advance of settlement its own immigration limitation based upon capacity to support and absorb immigrants. Regarding (a), (b) and (c) we see no insuperable obstacle to agreement between PGI and Abdullah on some treaty formulation of common action perhaps by analogy to frequently mentioned Austro-Hungarian precedent. Viewpoint other Arabs, particularly Syria, as reflected recent conversations here with Khouri and cables from Damascus, indicates more extreme view. If Bevin, reported by Beeley two weeks ago still to be leaning in direction federated state, should feel impelled to support even moderate Arab viewpoint, result might well be another serious split on this fundamental point in US-UK understanding.

2. Support of Israel's application for membership in UN. While not necessarily a condition of the future settlement it is clear that Israel attaches considerable importance to support for its application for membership. It seems axiomatic that such assurances would be forthcoming from the US and the UK; at the proper time we might appropriately express to the Arab Governments the hope that if they could not fully support Israel's application they would at least refrain from opposing it.

3. Status of Abdullah. The process of peaceful adjustment is greatly complicated by relations among the Arab states and the AHC. Our evidence here, which is confirmed by cables from the area, indicates that the Arab [Higher] Committee and the Mufti are no longer a factor of any importance. The influence of Azzam, SYG of the Arab League, and the solidarity of the League with regard to Palestine also seem to be considerably lessened. This impression is strengthened by current reports of Abdullah's visits to Farouk and Ibn Saud. Although from political viewpoint the influence of certain Arab League governments may still be great, it seems clear that Abdullah is the only one who has any very substantial material bargaining power. Abdullah's influence is based principally on his army and UK backing. The evidence seems clear that none of the other Arab states have armed forces available which can even begin to compare in organization, efficiency, and numbers with the Haganah. On the basis of earlier conversations with Shertok when he was here and more recently with Eban it seems wholly clear that Abdullah is probably the only Arab with whom the Jews might successfully, from their viewpoint, undertake definitive negotiations. Same source (Eban) discounts importance and influence other Arab states, particularly Syria. It also seems clear as indicated above that Abdullah has far more to gain from a negotiated settlement than from continuing to fight. Moreover, it seems clear that in this affair Abdullah is more susceptible to UK influence and control than any of the other Arab states. These thoughts lead us to

the conclusion that we should reach an early understanding with the British on the point that Abdullah is the principal bargaining factor on the Arab side. This does not, of course, imply that we would in any way neglect the interests of the other Arab states or the importance of maintaining the friendliest of relations with them.

4. Recognition of Transjordan by the US. We are not familiar with reasons why US has not hitherto recognized Transjordan although we have supported her application for membership in UN. In any event, we feel that recognition of Transjordan, exchange of diplomatic representatives, and continued support of its application for membership in UN would be important ingredients in the overall solution.

5. Boundary adjustments. In return for unequivocal recognition of the full sovereignty of Israel it seems reasonable to us to envisage a readjustment of the boundaries of Israel. From the Israeli viewpoint the territorial case for Israel is based on the November 29 resolution and on *de facto* military control. We have expressed the personal view to Eban here that Israel's legal case under the November 29 resolution with respect to boundaries is relatively weak. Also personally, Eban has in effect admitted this and indicated they consider their *de facto* position resulting from military operations much stronger. On the latter point Eban claims that Israel is in *de facto* control not only of the November 29 territory but also of western Galilee. In recent conversations with Eban he has expressed in a general way the hope that the US would support the "territorial integrity" of Israel. On the other hand, he has specifically said that if there were any Arab (implying Abdullah) with whom Israel could negotiate on the basis of full recognition of Israel's sovereignty, they would be prepared to consider boundary adjustments. This comment was, of course, wholly personal and may have been meant to imply only minor boundary rectifications rather than any more substantial territorial changes. A more extreme Jewish viewpoint is represented by Rabbi Silver's recent statement attacking the British for desiring to impair the territorial integrity of Israel. Department has probably also noted Eichelberger's June 16 memorandum to AAUN chapters and affiliated organizations attacking the concept of territorial change, and Sumner Welles' column, June 29. It is our estimate that the PGI attaches far more importance to the question of sovereignty than to the question of the November 29 or present *de facto* boundaries and might be willing, therefore, to consider reasonable and balanced territorial adjustments.

6. Arab areas of Palestine. On the Arab side we should make up our mind whether we favor establishment of a Palestinian Arab state or extension of the boundaries of Transjordan to take in the Arab areas

of Palestine as those areas may be determined. We favor the latter course for the following reasons:

a. The British, as indicated recently by Beeley, would favor this course.

b. The Jews, as indicated by Eban, would favor this.

c. With the decline of the Mufti and the AHC there is no apparent leadership among the Palestinian Arabs around whom could be built the nucleus of a Palestinian state.

d. Presumably Abdullah would prefer this arrangement.

7. Specific territorial proposals. Assuming that Israel, having established the principle of full sovereignty as a basis of negotiation and settlement, would be willing to negotiate for territorial changes, such changes along the lines in part suggested very privately and personally by Beeley in conversation here and Washington, namely as follows, might seem reasonable:

a. Transfer of the Negeb to Transjordan.

b. Transfer of western Galilee to Israel.

c. Transfer of Jaffa to Israel.

d. Transfer to Israel of subdistricts marked Jenin and Tulkarm on November 29 GA map.

e. Rectification of eastern boundary of Israel to provide that coastal railway (Haifa, Tulkarm, Lydda, Gazza, etc.) lies within said boundaries rather than criss-crossing the boundary.

f. Internationalization of Jerusalem.

8. Comments on specific territorial proposals.

(*a.*) The transfer of the Negeb to Transjordan would provide an outlet to the sea for Transjordan and according to Beeley, in lieu of Jaffa a port could more or less readily be constructed along the Arab coastline. As Beeley has pointed out, principal communication routes between the Arab hinterland, on the one hand and the Arab coastal area and Egypt, on the other, run through the northern part of the Negeb. From the Jewish point of view there is some evidence that their interest in the Negeb may have been primarily for its bargaining value. There is also some hint, however, that there is a possibility of oil deposits in the area. On the latter point consideration might be given as a makeweight in the concession by Israel of the Negeb to arrangements for the joint and equitable economic development of the area, thus protecting the economic interests of Israel in the event that at some future time substantial oil deposits should be discovered. Such economic arrangements might also provide for Jewish participation in irrigation and colonization prospects.

(*b.*) The transfer of western Galilee to Israel would be part of the makeweight in return for concession of the Negeb by Israel. It is our understanding that this area is a richer one although very considerably smaller than the Negeb. Moreover, from the point of view of Israel, its transfer would create a more compact and defensible state. Although the population of this area is understood to be predominantly Arab, there is no reason to believe that this Arab population, in the event of a peaceful settlement, would suffer any disabilities. On the

contrary there is every reason to believe that their inclusion within the boundaries of Israel might well lead to a substantial improvement in their material welfare and guarantees of their minority rights would be provided for.

In general, particularly in light recent reports re Jewish restriction on return of Arabs to Jewish territory, minority regime, perhaps under UN guarantee on basis comparable to League of Nations Upper Silesian plan should be explored. It would, of course, be understood that Arabs could control or prohibit future immigration of Jews into Arab territory.

(c) Although Jaffa was set aside in the November 29 partition plan as part of the Arab state, we do not believe that it would be sound to perpetuate this enclave within Israel and next door to Tel-Aviv. Quite aside from the fact that the Jews are in *de facto* control of Jaffa, perpetuation of its status as an Arab conclave could only lead as we see it to perpetuation of the risk of conflict between Arabs and Jews.

(d) With reference to the Jenin-Tulkarm areas, in discussing the territorial aspects of the peaceful adjustment with Beeley, we raised with him the possibility of transferring the entire northern half above Jerusalem of the central Arab area under the November 29 plan to Israel, together with western Galilee. Our thought was that the transfer of this area to Israel would more nearly balance the transfer of the Negeb. Beeley felt that the transfer of the northern half of the central Arab area would be unwise since it was almost exclusively populated by Arabs, while an insignificant number of Jews would be involved in the transfer of the Negeb. We are not convinced, however, that this transfer would be unwise. As a minimum we feel that consideration should be given to the transfer of the above-mentioned Jenin-Tulkarm areas to Israel.

(e) The proposal that the eastern frontier of Israel be rectified to include the coastal railway was made by McNaughton in private conversation and not dissented from by Beeley. It seems to us obvious that if the frontier is not rectified as indicated, there might be innumerable petty administrative difficulties. On the other hand we have no evidence that such boundary rectification would be a substantial concession to the Jews.

(f) It is our belief that the Jews would be very strongly opposed to transferring Jerusalem to Transjordan. Also, for the reasons set forth in USUN's 808⁷ on armed guards for Jerusalem, the Jewish point of view is very likely to be strongly supported by public opinion generally in this country and elsewhere. Although Beeley personally opposed the internationalization of Jerusalem and favored its inclusion in a greater Transjordan as Abdullah's capital, Douglas' 2785 indicated the British might be willing to agree to internationalization. If Jerusalem were to be internationalized we feel that the international area should be reduced from the November 29 plan to include the city alone. If the mediator is successful in his current effort to obtain Arab-Jewish agreement for the demilitarization of Jerusalem and for the establishment of a UN armed guard, the first and most important steps will have been taken towards the internationalization of the city. This *de facto* arrangement might continue until such time as definitive arrangements can be worked out by the TC, should this

⁷ Dated June 23, not printed.

be necessary or by relying on Lie's power to appoint a successor to Evans which we understand Lie has under British municipal ordinance establishing this post.

9. Status of Haifa. We have noted recent telegrams concerning the status of Haifa and particularly the British view expressed in Douglas' 2785 that this city might also be internationalized. We would be inclined to oppose this, at least as part of a permanent settlement, for the following reasons: Haifa was included within the November 29 boundaries of the Jewish state; the Jews are in *de facto* control of the city; there would be far less support publicly for the internationalization of Haifa than in the case of Jerusalem; the responsibilities of international administration under circumstances we cannot now foresee would be greater in terms of the economic and strategic importance of the pipeline than we might be willing in advance to turn over to the UN Secretariat or a group of powers. Such considerations do not apply to Jerusalem which is now in the process of demilitarization and *de facto* international control. On the other hand, it would seem to us that an economic arrangement for Haifa would avoid many of the political problems and would be therefore more workable in view of the interest which both Israel and Iraq have in the oil supply. Such arrangement might provide for a free port at Haifa including the port and refinery area.

10. Territorial guarantees. Assuming that it may be possible to work out territorial adjustments that both Jews and Arabs can agree to, it seems clear that both parties would wish to have territorial guarantees. It has obviously been one of the greatest Arab fears that Jews, once obtaining a foothold in Palestine, would use this as a basis for territorial expansion not only throughout Palestine but into the neighboring Arab states. On the other hand, from our conversations with the Jews here, we have some indications that they are fearful Abdullah might be bent on conquest and therefore not long content with territorial adjustments worked out in dealing with the current phase of the problem. For reasons indicated to Beeley in recent conversations with him, UK treaty relations with Abdullah do not seem to us to meet fully what is required. A joint US-UK guarantee to both parties would not seem to be practical politics. It is difficult to anticipate any special territorial guarantee by the UN; in any event, it may be anticipated that neither party would feel entirely confident in the ability of the UN at this stage of its development to guarantee its frontiers. A combination of measures may be necessary in this situation.

11. Specific proposal for territorial guarantees. The most direct and simple approach would be arrangements including nonaggression and mutual defense pacts between Israel and greater Transjordan. Non-aggression and mutual defense pacts might also be concluded

between Israel and Syria and Lebanon. This might seem paradoxical in the case of Israel because of the present extreme anti-Israel views of the Syrian Government. It might be argued, however, that the real reason for present Syrian extremism is not so much fear of Israel as fear of the expansion of Transjordan and increase in Abdullah's prestige in the light of his former Greater Syrian ideas.⁸ In other words, a fear that a settlement based on arrangements between Israel and Abdullah would be only a stepping stone for the latter, his next step being attempted expansion into Syria. In view of the fact that from all accounts the Syrian Army is nothing to boast about it might be thought reasonable to assume that the Syrian Government would more than welcome non-aggression and mutual defense pacts with Israel. Such arrangements between Israel, on the one hand, and her immediate neighbors on the other might lead in turn to the transformation of the present Arab League, which is based on racial, religious and nationalist lines, into a politically mature organization along the lines of the Western European Union and our own arrangements in the Western Hemisphere. Such an organization might be expanded to include Turkey, Iran and possibly Afghanistan and in this sense provide a bulwark against Soviet aggression. It would be a regional organization within the purview of the UN Charter providing for guarantees of territorial integrity and procedures for consultation and action in the settlement of disputes.

12. Economic arrangements. It is our view that a settlement based on political and territorial factors alone would not be so easily attainable nor would it be viable unless substantial arrangements of an economic and related character were provided for. The prospect of finding common areas of agreement between Israel, on the one hand, and Arab states, on the other, might be greater in the economic field than in the political. Moreover, with the exception of Transjordan the Arab states initially at least are likely to assess at considerably less than their real value the advantages of restoring peace and stability in Palestine through a settlement based upon recognition of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Israel as that territory may be determined by agreement. Economic advantages offered in connection with, if not actually as a part of the future settlement would be a powerful inducement, as we see it, to acceptance by the other Arab states of a reasonable solution of the Palestine problem. Such assistance would also have the advantage of contributing to the stability of the governments concerned, thus permitting a more orderly and progressive economic and political development and minimizing the risk of an increase in Communist influence. Of the Arab representatives here, those of Iraq and Egypt in particular have frequently discussed the

⁸ For previous documentation on the efforts by Transjordan for a Greater Syria, see *Foreign Relations, 1947*, vol. v, pp. 738 ff.

question of economic assistance with US. The PGI representative here has indicated his belief in the importance of economic cooperation in Palestine. The PGI has also, we understand, formally requested from this government financial assistance in the form of a loan. The pressure to grant such a loan will presumably be very great and if granted we can hardly expect that our relations with the Arab states would be improved unless we grant comparable economic assistance to them. In any event, in the absence of an overall program of economic assistance and development for the area and taking into account the superior organizing ability, efficiency and resources, both human and financial, of Israel as compared with the Arab states, the economic development of Israel is likely to outstrip that of the surrounding Arabs, leading to expansionist pressures in Israel and jealousy and resentment among the Arabs.

13. Economic self-help. Section D of the November 29 partition plan concerning economic union provides a basis for the beginnings of an economic program, although perhaps not applicable in all particulars to the newly envisaged relationships between Israel and Transjordan. We envisage that an essential part of the settlement would have to be a minimum of economic arrangements between Israel and Transjordan. These might include as contemplated in the November 29 plan (a) a customs union; (b) a joint currencies system; (c) operation of railways, highways, ports, etc.; (d) joint economic development, and (e) access to water and power facilities. Specific projects might include a Jordan Valley authority and agreement, as indicated above, for the joint development of irrigation and colonization projects in the Negeb. Paralleling the development of political cooperation (paragraphs 10 and 11 above) economic arrangement between Transjordan and Israel might be extended to Lebanon and Syria and in turn the area as a whole. In this connection it should be envisaged that at an early date Israel would become a full-fledged member of the newly proposed Middle Eastern Economic Commission. It is unthinkable that Israel would be excluded from full partnership in this commission. As we see it, the advantages to the Arabs of full membership for Israel are obvious. We assume that the Department has these factors in mind in preparing for the forthcoming ECOSOC meeting at Geneva at which we understand the question of the ECME will be considered, although we do not anticipate time is yet ripe for forcing issue.

14. International assistance. We refer in this connection to the sections in Ambassador Austin's statement in Committee One of the recent special session concerning the economic development of Palestine and the role of UN agencies therein. Specialized agencies such as the FAO, the Bank, the Fund, the WHO and UNESCO might undertake at the request of the mediator with the concurrence of Israel

and Abdullah comprehensive studies of the needs of Palestine. Such studies might at a later stage be broadened to include other countries in the area, possibly in connection with the program of the ECME. The International Bank might be in a position to grant development loans to assist in the carrying out of joint Israeli-Transjordan projects and the Stabilization Fund might be of assistance in any currency arrangements. Because of special position of holy places in Palestine outside Jerusalem, Magnes plan for UNESCO Commission for this protection is worth consideration.

15. Assistance by US. It is our view that a program of economic assistance and development should be worked out to the fullest extent possible on an international (UN) basis. We should satisfy ourselves in considering any specific proposals that the project in question cannot be effectively dealt with by international means. Furthermore, we should assure ourselves that to the fullest extent possible any projects for which we grant loans or other assistance should be of a self-liquidating character. Instead of attempting to deal with the problem of US assistance on a piecemeal basis, we would suggest that Department formulate a comprehensive program of US aid to the Middle Eastern countries, including Israel, for presentation to the new Congress in January if possible. We suggest that such a program be developed on the basis of ERP principles and in consistency with the work of the UN specialized agencies, of the ECME, and in close collaboration with the UK. In developing such a program we should bear in mind the desirability of shifting the major portion of the load to private investment as soon as peaceful conditions permit.⁹

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⁹ For continuation of this communication, see telegram 837, July 1, p. 1180.

501.BB Palestine/7-148

Memorandum by Mr. Robert M. McClintock to the Director of the Office of United Nations Affairs (Rusk)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 1, 1948.

Subject: Check List on Palestine¹

[Here follow first two paragraphs containing personal observations.]

1. POLICY

A. LONG RANGE: A PEACEFUL ADJUSTMENT

Of the many facets of this question with which we have been endeavoring to deal during your absence, the most important is that of

¹ Mr. McClintock furnished copies of this check list to Messrs. Lovett, Satterthwaite, and Ross and to William Sanders of the Office of United Nations Affairs (his memorandum of July 2 to Mr. Rusk).

overall policy. In an explicit sense, recent United States action in the Security Council regarding Palestine was covered by the policy position paper of May 22 approved by the President on May 27. However, Mr. Lovett, about the time when we introduced our Chapter VII resolution in the Security Council on May 17, had requested George Kennan on the Policy Planning Staff to submit to the National Security Council a paper which would, it was hoped, elicit from the Council renewed advice as to future United States policy regarding Palestine.

When I was shown the first draft of the Policy Planning Staff's paper I was able to demonstrate to Mr. Kennan and Mr. Villard that it was subject to criticism from the UNA point of view. The upshot was that UNA was requested by Mr. Kennan to prepare two papers:

- (1) on US policy in the Security Council in the event that the present truce in Palestine were breached,
- (2) on a long-range possible *modus vivendi* for the peaceful adjustment of the situation in Palestine.²

The former paper was prepared by Messrs. Bancroft and Meeker and suggests that if war resumes in the Near East this government should be prepared to move into action under Chapter VII of the Charter. The paper of Messrs. Bancroft and Meeker has my approval. The second paper on the long range possible *modus vivendi* was written by myself and can be summarized in its concluding paragraph:

"In summary, therefore, a sensible territorial solution for the Palestine problem would be to re-draw the frontiers of Israel so as to make a compact and homogeneous state, the remainder of Palestine to go largely to Transjordan with appropriate transfers of populations where necessary; Jerusalem to remain an international entity with free access to the outside world; the boundaries of the two new states to be guaranteed mutually between themselves and the United Nations; and the economic prosperity of the region to be enhanced by a customs union between Israel and Transjordan."*

Both these papers were on June 29 submitted by Mr. Kennan without comment to Mr. Lovett for his criticism or approval. Mr. Lovett on June 30 requested me to send the memoranda to Secretary Marshall at Walter Reed [Hospital]. This was done today. I am told by the Policy Planning Staff that the papers have assisted their thinking, but that they do not at present intend to submit any paper to the National Security Council.

² See Mr. Meeker's memorandum of June 22 and Mr. McClintock's memorandum of the following day, pp. 1127 and 1134.

*It is interesting that there are a number of points of similarity between this suggested solution and the proposals made to Arabs and Jews by Count Bernadotte this week. I attach a copy of these proposals. I feel that Bernadotte has been statesmanlike and that his suggestions may contain the kernel of common agreement. [Footnote in the source text.]

B. SHORT RANGE: ACTION UNDER CHAPTER VII

I should like to add one word with respect to United States advocacy of action under Chapter VII. While I think that we should be resolute and live up to our responsibilities under the Charter, I do feel that as a matter of diplomacy we should not put ourselves in the position of becoming the self-appointed scapegoat for the Arab States. Recent telegrams from Cairo, Jidda, and Damascus indicate that the Arab Governments feel the necessity, under pressure of their public opinion, to resume hostilities after the end of the present cease-fire. I am convinced that these Arab Governments are looking for a way out of their present difficulty, since at least their commanding military officers know that they do not have the wherewithal to conduct a successful war against Israel. They will undoubtedly seek to claim vis-à-vis their own people that action by the United States (and this could easily be United States leadership in the Security Council under Chapter VII) was the reason why they have had to bow to superior force and have yielded a point vehemently desired by their own public opinion. In other words, they will seek to place the blame for their own bad judgments and emotion (which in statecraft amounts to bad judgment) on the United States.

As for the emotion of the Arabs, I do not care a dried camel's hump. It is, however, important to the interests of this country that these fanatical and over-wrought people do not injure our strategic interests through reprisals against our oil investments and through the recision of our air base rights in that area. Accordingly, while there will be counsels on your staff for immediate and dramatic action by the United States under Chapter VII, I would suggest that we fulfill our responsibilities but without being in the driver's seat.

(1) *Sanctions.*

In connection with possible action under Chapter VII, a series of meetings have been held, originally under my auspices and later under those of John Elliott in UNS, to explore the scope of economic sanctions should the Council decide to move in that direction under Chapter VII. The gist of very painstaking investigation on the part of the economic side of the Department is that, while Israel could be almost fatally injured by the application of economic sanctions, the Arab States would be hurt, but not vitally so, and would not, solely on account of such sanctions, be put out of the fight. Meanwhile it is generally assumed that application of economic sanctions by the United States, even in a universal framework of Security Council action, would result in reprisals with respect to petroleum and strategic bases.

(2) *Binding Effect of Resolution of May 29.*

An ancillary issue has been a debate within the Department as to the possible binding effect of the resolution of May 29. Messrs. Bancroft

and Meeker strongly believe that this resolution, although adopted under Chapter VI of the Charter, is legally binding upon all members of the United Nations. Other officers of the Department, including Mr. Hayden Raynor,³ feel that such is not the case and that it would be unwise for the Department to crystallize a position in favor of the thesis that Chapter VI resolutions are binding on all members. Mr. Sandifer, in light of these doubts, has not yet submitted a final memorandum on the point to Mr. Lovett. On the whole, I am inclined to think that, in light of our publicly announced willingness to forego the veto under Chapter VI, we would be wise not to firm up a policy that all resolutions adopted by the Council under Chapter VI were legally binding upon States members.

2. POLICY WITH REGARD TO EXTENSION OF TRUCE AND CEASE-FIRE

We have for sometime felt that Bernadotte would be wise not to attempt to get a black-and-white solution for the Palestine problem before the termination of the present cease-fire which ends on July 9. Various governments and people have not succeeded in four decades in finding a compromise on the basic issues between Arabs and Jews and it is hardly to be expected that Count Bernadotte will be able to achieve this miracle in four weeks. Rather, we have indicated to the British, the Secretary-General and to Bernadotte, himself, our feeling that he should content himself at this moment with an extension of the truce and cease-fire. We hope that the agreeable habit of refraining from mayhem and murder will become increasingly popular, and that both sides can be persuaded to extend the truce for, if not for an indefinite, at least a more prolonged, period than the present four weeks. Whether Bernadotte will succeed in this effort is problematic. The Jews apparently desire an extension of the truce, which involves automatic Arab suspicion as to whether continuation of the cease-fire is in their interest. If the truce could be spun out until the end of the year there might be good reason to hope that pressure of economic interest, to say nothing of other factors, would lead the way to some arrangement between the Jews on one hand, and certain Arab leaders, such as Abdullah on the other, along the lines of the paragraph quoted above. Bernadotte's proposals, attached, might lead to such a result, despite initial refusals on both sides. However, there has been too much public talk; the auspices are bad, and I am not optimistic:

3. JERUSALEM

A. DEMILITARIZATION

The fate of Jerusalem is a special case. On the whole, so far as a long-range settlement is concerned, thinking in the Department, in

³ G. Hayden Raynor, Special Assistant to the Director of the Office of European Affairs.

the Foreign Office at London, and also apparently at Lake Success, is in favor of an international regime for the Holy City under the United Nations. This, however, would necessarily be part of the long-range solution. From the aspect of immediate interest, Count Bernadotte has in mind securing the agreement of the Arabs and Jews to the demilitarization of the city by July 9. Presumably this would mean that the forces of the Hagannah and the Arab Legion would retire from Jerusalem, as well as—and this is of great importance—the irregular forces on both sides, including the Stern and the Irgun.

B. A UNITED NATIONS ARMED GUARD

Bernadotte then proposes to fill the vacuum by a 1,000 man United Nations armed guard. He has formally requested through Secretary-General Lie that the governments of the three members of the Truce Commission, Belgium, United States, and France, furnish equal contingents of this guard. We have told Mr. Lie that as a government we are not prepared to order regular forces of the military establishment to such duty but that we have no objection if Lie, employing his powers as Secretary-General, employs 333½ American citizens for such purpose. The French Government, in a telegram received June 30, has indicated its readiness to make available 335 *Gardes Republicaines* for the Jerusalem duty, but have agreed to our formula for recruitment. No reply has yet been received from the Belgians.

We have twice officially stressed to Mr. Lie that there should be no confusion between the special armed guard for Jerusalem and Lie's project for a United Nations palace guard. I am personally convinced that the Secretariat, under the urging of Abraham Feller, has been promoting the Jerusalem guard idea, using Bernadotte's name as cover, with the dual intent first of improving the position of the Jews in Jerusalem and, second, of forwarding Lie's pet project for a United Nations guard. I am certain that the latter idea requires careful, if sympathetic, study, and that it should not be developed in connection with the infinitely embroiled Palestine problem.

Certain division chiefs of your staff have approached me with a draft telegram to New York to the effect that, if Lie has difficulty in recruiting the American contingent for the Jerusalem police, this government will "assign" 350 men to Lie's force for Bernadotte's use. I told them that I could not assent to such a telegram since I felt it was unwise policy for this government to order men of its armed forces to serve in Jerusalem as members of a United Nations guard; and that from the public relations point of view it would be highly unwise for this government to order American troops for duty in Palestine. If any of these men were killed the public reaction might not be favorable, whereas no one could object if free American citizens volunteered

for such hazardous duty as private citizens. I mention this merely because I shall not be here next month and the idea may recur.

C. JERUSALEM AND THE RED CROSS

Continuing with respect to Jerusalem, I should note the fact that the International Red Cross has two successfully operating zones of refuge in the city and has informally requested our support for a project to create a third zone on Mt. Scopus, taking in the Hadassah Hospital and the Hebrew University, both of which are American-endowed organizations. I told the President of the International Red Cross, Mr. Ruegger, who called on me, that we favored this idea but suggested that he make his own arrangements with Hadassah and Dr. Magnes in New York City.

The International Red Cross has refused Bernadotte's request to supervise the entry of food convoys into Jerusalem and to this extent has not acted as was contemplated by the Assembly's resolution of May 14. There has been some initial ill-feeling between Bernadotte and the Red Cross, due more to domestic politics inside the International Red Cross than to the Palestine situation. These difficulties, I am happy to report, have now been ironed out.

D. THE TRUCE COMMISSION

The Truce Commission continues to function in Jerusalem and will assume a very important role there if Bernadotte succeeds in demilitarizing the city. Although I have not seen any direct statement to this effect, the telegrams from Jerusalem have left the distinct impression in my mind that the Belgian and French members of the Truce Commission are timorous and indecisive, while young Burdett, during the time he acted as our Representative, was much more forthright and courageous. Burdett has now been replaced by a superior in the person of an experienced Foreign Service Officer, John Macdonald, our new Consul General in Jerusalem. Macdonald, who was recently our Consul in Bombay, was given a thorough briefing in the Department before he went to Palestine.

4. HAIFA OIL REFINERY

The British, Jews, Arabs and French have all evidenced a decided interest in getting the Haifa oil refinery going again. We supported a *démarche* by Mr. Bevin to Bernadotte, suggesting that if both the Arabs and Jews agree it might be useful to place the oil refinery under the Mediator's auspices for the time being. We have stressed, however, that since Haifa is an integral part of the state of Israel Bevin's other idea for an international regime over the city could only be contemplated if there were advance agreement by the Government of Israel. We feel, on the whole, that it would be unwise to establish another

international city at Haifa. We likewise indicated our view that the production of Haifa should not be used to increase the military potential of either side. Haifa, in my opinion, offers a unique opportunity for practical cooperation between the Arabs and Jews, since one side controls the crude oil and the other the refining capacity, while both sides need the final product. If an agreement can be found on Haifa the habit might spread to other areas.

5. EXPORT OF WAR MATERIAL

The Department has given strict compliance to the terms of the resolution of May 29 so far as sending war material to the Near East is concerned. On June 11, in a circular telegram to all Missions, we called the attention of all governments with which we have diplomatic relations to the need for strict compliance with the arms embargo imposed by the Council's resolution. We have had close liaison with the British on this subject and have even got the Foreign Office to agree not to send civil aircraft and spare parts to the Near East for the initial period of the truce. After July 9, if either government feels that it is necessary to send spare parts for civil aircraft to that area we feel that such exports can be accomplished, provided there are adequate safeguards that the spare parts will not be used for military purposes and that the Mediator has been informed of the contemplated shipment.

A more difficult problem has been to prevent renegade Americans from flying American aircraft to Israel, in some cases purchased by the Irgun or Stern gangs, and in others, by the Provisional Government. This is a complicated subject but the details may be had from John Elliott and Mr. Hamilton of MD, whom I have asked to follow this subject.

The Czech Government, despite its obligations to comply with the resolution of May 29, has actively conspired in gun running by air from Prague to Palestine. It is regrettable to report that the aircraft used in the operation apparently are American. Thus far it does not seem apparent that Mr. Steinhardt, our Ambassador to Prague, has been successful in doing anything to suppress this traffic.

6. IMMIGRATION

On Memorial Day we received an urgent request from Mr. Bevin to give him our definition of "fighting personnel" and whether or not this included men of military age. Our Niac 2015 to London of May 31, which I drafted under Mr. Lovett's direction, provided a definition which was successful in assisting the British to swing the Arab Governments to accept the truce. The essence of our definition—and this applies to the entire truce, and not merely to the question of immigration—is that during the period of the truce neither side shall

increase its military potential. Subsequently, on June 7, Count Bernadotte, in a note to the parties, defined his common-sense interpretation of "fighting personnel" and the problem of the immigration of men of military age. We have accepted his definition and have instructed our shipping and passport authorities to see that it becomes our rule of thumb with regard to the travel of American citizens to the Near East and the travel of aliens from this country to that area.

7. THE LOAN OF UNITED STATES OBSERVERS AND EQUIPMENT TO THE UNITED NATIONS MEDIATOR

At Count Bernadotte's request we promptly sent twenty-one military observers to be attached to his staff to implement Article seven of the truce resolution. So far as the American observers were concerned they were divided equally between Navy, Army and Air Force. Subsequently, at Bernadotte's request, we sent 10 more officers. The French and Belgian Governments have matched our contingent. In addition, Count Bernadotte has a staff of five hand-picked Swedish officers. His Chief-of-Staff and leader of the military observers is Colonel Bonde, with headquarters at Haifa. Bernadotte's representative in Jerusalem is Colonel Brunsson.

In addition to the military observers we have provided Count Bernadotte with four airplanes, three destroyers for naval patrol, and a complete installation on Rhodes of wireless communications equipment. Likewise, three Navy doctors have been assigned to Bernadotte's staff.

8. COOPERATION WITH UNITED KINGDOM

Thanks to the efforts of Ambassador Douglas and to a considerable change in position by Foreign Secretary Bevin, plus a certain amount of missionary work at home, a new "entente cordiale" has been established with Great Britain in respect of the Palestine problem. It is important that these cordial and intimate working relations be continued. We have officially concurred with Ambassador Douglas's suggestion, derived from the British Foreign Office, that he be the main line of communication with the United Kingdom; secondary channels being maintained with the British Embassy here (Denis Allen and Bromley), and the United Kingdom Delegation in New York. There is a good working arrangement to pool news and views on Palestine.

9. RELATIONS WITH THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL

At the President's request, Mr. James Grover McDonald has been appointed his Special Representative to the Provisional Government of Israel. He will sail for England on July 14 but the Foreign Service Staff, headed by Charles Knox, will fly to Tel Aviv this Sunday. They are scheduled to reach the Jewish capital on July 8. Mr. McDonald,

as you probably know, is a professional Zionist. He plans to take with him a personal assistant, not yet named, of whose devotion to the Zionist cause there can be little doubt.

The Provisional Government of Israel is keenly anxious that its representative in New York, Major Eban, be seated by the Security Council not as the Representative of the Jewish Agency but of the Provisional Government of Israel. Since we have recognized Israel we must agree with this view, but have pointed out to New York that the spokesman for the Jews of Jerusalem should not be the Provisional Government of Israel and that, accordingly, the Jewish Agency may still be a useful organization to be heard. Our policy in this problem is set forth in Department's telegram to New York #438, of June 30.

[Here follows paragraph numbered 10, consisting of personal observations.]

501.BB Palestine/7-148: Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, July 1, 1948—4 p. m.

Re Depcirtel June 11 covering UNSC Resolution May 29. Three B-17 Flying Fortresses recently left Miami reported destination Israel. Believed here these planes intend engage in transport munitions or troops to Middle East or as bombers. This is inconsistent with intent UN Security Council Resolution regarding Palestine Truce. Moreover, planes left U.S. in violation export laws and without proper clearance to land in foreign country. Various other cases have also been reported involving illegal export from U.S. of aircraft and use of American planes by American citizens in transporting arms between points outside U.S. Department desires all appropriate measures be taken prevent such traffic. Accordingly, you instructed request appropriate foreign authorities, unless you deem inadvisable, that any information concerning such clandestine activities be reported to this government. Particular attention should be given to activities of non-certificated irregular air carriers (tramp airlines) operating on non-scheduled basis, as some of these are known to be engaged in gun running.

Advise Department promptly of reaction foreign government as well as any information obtained.

Repeat to interested consular officers your jurisdiction.

For action to Ankara, Athens, Belgrade, Bern, Brussels, Caracas, Ciudad Trujillo, Copenhagen, Dublin, The Hague, Havana, Lisbon, London, Madrid, Mexico City, Oslo, Ottawa, Panama, Paris, Port au Prince, Praha, Reykjavik, Rio, Rome, Stockholm and Vienna.

For info to Beirut, Baghdad, Cairo, Damascus, Jerusalem and Jidda.
Repeated USUN New York for Jessup to be transmitted to UNSYG
for info of UN Mediator.

MARSHALL

501.BB Palestine/7-148: Telegram

*The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations
(Jessup) to the Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, July 1, 1948—4: 16 p. m.

837. Following supplements and continues our 831, June 29 [30],
on the peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine.

D. BASIC FACTORS

1. In evaluating the mission's views as set forth in No. 831, the Department may find useful the following analysis of the basic factors we have had in mind, in formulating those views.

2. Considering Palestine alone as a single factor, the prevention of further fighting and establishment and maintenance of peace in that country are first of all essential to the maintenance of peace in an area including not only the Near and Middle East but the Moslem world of North Africa and Southern Asia. Second, the establishment and maintenance of peace in Palestine could be the key to the progressive political and economic evolution of Palestine and the Near East. Third, the UN is deeply involved in the Palestine issue. While we do not agree with the prophets of doom who hold that failure of the UN to settle the Palestine question would ruin the organization, there is no question in our minds that such failure would deal a very heavy blow to the prestige and effectiveness of the UN. Conversely, a settlement of the Palestine question under UN auspices would greatly enhance the prestige and effectiveness of the organization.

3. The Palestine question cannot, however, be considered realistically as an isolated problem but from every point of view (political, strategic, and economic) the vital importance of the many complex ramifications of this question must be borne in mind in considering the future settlement. The most immediate and direct influences concern, as noted above, the Near and Middle East and the entire Moslem world.

4. US interests. Although the various interests of the US involved in the peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine may seem obvious, it seems wise to review them briefly as we understand them.

(a) Since the attainment of our other objectives in Palestine and the Middle East depend upon the establishment and maintenance of

peace and stability in Palestine these are the most immediate and vital of our interests. For this reason it is to our advantage to support the efforts of the UN fully. In a broader sense it is to our interest to support the prestige and effectiveness of the UN.

(b) From the political viewpoint it is to our advantage to minimize to the greatest possible extent Russian infiltration and influence in Palestine and the Middle East. This point is dealt with in somewhat more detail in paragraph 6 below.

(c) From the strategic viewpoint we assume that Palestine, together with the neighboring countries is a major factor presumably in any future major conflict this region would be of vital importance to US as a potential base area and with respect to our lines of communication. Presumably also the oil resources of the area are considered vital. It is our feeling that this last point may not perhaps have been dealt with adequately and frankly enough in official and public discussion of the Palestine question.

(d) From the economic viewpoint it is probable that with the exception of oil our trade and other economic relations with Palestine and the other Near East countries are not directly of any substantial importance. Indirectly, however, the economic stability and developing prosperity of Palestine and the Middle East area under peaceful conditions could make a very substantial contribution to the economic recovery of the world generally and thus contribute to the economic welfare of the US. With respect to oil, we recognize that the oil supply from the area is of great importance in the European recovery program. Were it not for this factor, however, and the strategic importance of oil, we should probably not allow the economic importance of this commodity to condition our judgment substantially with regard to Palestine.

5. UK interests. The basic factors influencing UK policy towards Palestine are similar if not wholly identical with ours. For this reason it is essential that both governments maintain the closest possible relations in developing a concerted policy with regard to Palestine and a common front in dealing with this matter diplomatically and in particular in the UN. In doing so, however, we must recognize the necessity of planning our policy on a very long-range basis since it is obvious that our interests in the area will continue for an indefinite period and since it is equally obvious that it will take a long time before real stability can be achieved. For this reason we feel that although no risk is involved in the foreseeable future the US must envisage the eventual possibility of changes in the British Government or even in the British political structure which might make it difficult for us to maintain a common policy with them and at the same time fully protect our national interests. Moreover, although the British position with the Arab states is at the moment stronger than ours, it is obvious that the UK is basically, perhaps regrettably so, not in a position to exercise as much long-range influence and leadership with regard to Palestine and the Near East as the US. This factor, we feel, may become more important even in the near future

and the demand by other governments for US leadership in the area which is already substantial, as we see it here, will increase. Meanwhile, the British are probably better informed and have a better "feel" for the Palestine problem than we do, despite traditional long-range Arab-world thinking of permanent FO staff. For all of these reasons and because of the complexities of the problem and our vital interest in its peaceful solution, the Department probably has in mind the necessity of developing at the earliest a long-term, comprehensive (political, strategic, economic, cultural), program for Palestine and the Middle East.

6. USSR interests.

(a) It is our impression that the influence of the USSR in Palestine and the Near East is not at present very substantial. It is certain that they have virtually no influence within the Arab Government, not only because of the fear of those governments of communism, but also because of the attitude of the USSR towards partition and the state of Israel. Moreover, as indicated in conversations here with Asil and Fawzi, although there are some individuals in the Arab countries inclined towards communism, for religious reasons, as well as because of the low economic and cultural level of the masses of the population of the Arab countries, it is not apparent that communism has any substantial following among the masses. On the other hand, there are apparently a substantial number of Communists in the Irgun, the Stern Gang and other dissident groups. Beyond that the Soviet Union, through its support of partition and prompt recognition of Israel, must be considered as having a substantial influence with the PGI. The Communist influence is, of course, capable of substantial expansion through whatever diplomatic and other missions the Soviet Government may establish in Israel.

(b) It would seem to us that the Soviet Union would have two main objectives; first, to counteract so far as possible the political, strategic, and economic advantages of the US, UK and other western powers in the area; second, to establish the influence of the Soviet Union to the greatest possible extent. A very important factor in our minds is that the decline of US influence and the growth of Soviet influence in Palestine and the states of the Arab League would undermine our policy of supporting Greece, Turkey, and Iran against Soviet aggression.

(c) There are three methods whereby the USSR might extend its influence. First by hindering or, should the occasion arise, preventing by veto the peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine; fighting between Jews and Arabs might be resumed with resultant chaos, and benefit to the USSR. Second, through its consistent support of the partition plan and its early recognition of Israel, the USSR is in a position to extend its influence through that state. This could be a very serious factor if the PGI should at any time feel that its vital interests were threatened by the mediator's proposals or by inadequate or inconsistent support by the US. As a corollary the Soviet Union may, of course, be expected to continue efforts to extend its influence through dissident groups in a position to take advantage of any sign of "weakness" on the part of the PGI. For the moment it is somewhat difficult to see how the Soviet Union might extend its in-

fluence further through the Arab states. On the other hand, it is perhaps not at all unlikely that in certain of these states the success of Communist agents or fellow travelers might increase substantially if existing governments are overthrown as a result of developments in the Palestine situation wholly unacceptable to those countries.

7. Israel. In our view a fundamental factor to bear constantly in mind is that we are no longer dealing with a political movement spear-headed by the Jewish Agency but rather with a new state established after a long struggle and despite great difficulties. This is no longer a speculative proposition but a hard political reality that neither we, nor the British, nor the Arabs, nor anyone else could escape even if they wanted to.

(a) The new state of Israel is in very strong political position. Externally it has been recognized not only by US but also by USSR. New state is also externally in strong political position in UN. Not only was partition plan approved last November, but [by?] a two-thirds vote, but this plan has not been superseded and it is at least extremely doubtful whether UN could take any action which would impair status of Israel. Internally PGI appears to be in very strong, well-organized position. It has dealt very effectively with recent Irgun affair at Tel Aviv. More important than this single affair is indication that PGI has courage and will to deal firmly with Irgun and other dissident elements.

(b) Israel is also in strong military position, perhaps stronger than they thought they might be. From point of view of numbers, organization, discipline and efficiency they are more than a match for most of Arab states put together. Abdullah has only very effective force on Arab side and effectiveness of this force is almost undoubtedly due to British elements. Israel has been successful in holding its own positions and beyond this has established effective control of western Galilee.

(c) Evidence available to us indicates that PGI fully recognizes responsibilities which go along with statehood. It is our impression that they desire to live as a good neighbor with surrounding Arab states and that they are willing and able to discharge their role as a responsible member of international community and in due course of UN. In contrast on whole with Arab representation they have shown dignity and strength in UN. There is no reason to believe they will not be willing to make concessions, even substantial ones, in interest of a peaceful adjustment of future situation of Palestine.

(d) If in process of negotiation PGI is pushed too hard to accept arrangements, intolerable from their point of view, [it] seems clear that this will increase its difficulties in dealing with Communist-inspired dissident elements and will also force it to rely more extensively on Russian support. From our conversations here we judge that PGI is aware of disadvantages to it of too close an association with Soviet Union and of risk of coming under Communist domination through a combination of internal and external pressures, thereby losing in fact if not in name, the independence which Jews have long struggled for and finally attained.

(e) On other hand, we feel it is reasonable to assume that PGI recognizes that greater advantages would be gained from a closer association with US and other western powers, principal advantages in this case being maintenance of real independence and opportunity to continue its political and economic evolution under peaceful circumstances and continued financial assistance from US.

(f) If in effect Israel is thrown into arms of Soviet Union it could become a force operating to very great disadvantage to US, UK and other western powers, and to Arabs.

(g) On other hand, Israel, if fairly treated, could become a force operating to our own advantage and to advantage of Arab countries.

8. Arab states.

(a) Arab countries are also relatively new states participating in international affairs on their own responsibility for a very short period. From a political viewpoint, both domestic and international, they are relatively immature. From economic and cultural viewpoints they are relatively underdeveloped.

(b) The immaturity of Arabs is revealed in blindspot which prevents even more moderate Arabs from recognizing existence of Israel as a political fact. Because of this blindspot the more extreme Arabs seem determined to continue their efforts to eliminate the Jewish state. While admitting that Arabs might continue a form of guerrilla warfare for many years against the Jews, it seems axiomatic to us that Arabs could never eliminate Jewish state which, failing support from US and other western countries, could get support from Soviet Union, and the eastern European countries. Moreover, even more moderate Arabs who consider themselves "realistic" and are therefore prepared to recognize existence of Israel are nevertheless apparently holding to line that Jews might be brought to agree (if there were sufficient pressure by US) to a drastically reduced territory and impaired sovereignty. We consider that even this moderate Arab viewpoint is unrealistic because we do not feel that Jews will accept any substantial reduction of territory without compensation, nor any impairment of their sovereignty. Furthermore, we doubt whether US would be likely to bring any pressure at all to bear upon them to these ends.

(c) It is clear from Arabs we have talked to here that they recognize threat of Communist infiltration and growth of Soviet influence. We do not feel, however, that they have an adequate appreciation of this risk in terms of a possible open door through Israel if because of Arab intransigence it is impossible to work out a fair and equitable peaceful adjustment acceptable to Israel.

(d) More moderate Arabs we have talked to here recognize the intelligence and ability of Jews but on whole Arabs have been accustomed for so long to look upon Jews as root of all evil that it is difficult for them to see contributions for good that Jews might make politically, economically, and culturally to welfare of Arabs. This is, of course, a very difficult and complex psychological problem, but worth emphasizing, we feel, since prospects of a peaceful settlement would be substantially advanced if even a small number of Arab leaders could be convinced of desirability from their own viewpoint of adopting a positive rather than a negative attitude towards Israel.

9. Other states. A large number of other states have a very substantial interest in Palestine problem. Greece, Turkey, Iran and even Afghanistan on basis of conversations with their representatives here, while taking on whole a pro-Arab view, are concerned lest failure to settle Palestine issue, impair their position vis-à-vis Soviet Union. As a Moslem country Pakistan has strongly supported Arabs. As Asiatic rather than Moslem countries India and China tend to support Arabs. Among western powers France has a particular interest because of large Moslem populations under French sovereignty; on other hand, as reflected by their representatives here, course pursued by French Government is one of moderation and objectivity with a rather strong humanitarian flavor. Western powers generally feel that US-UK cooperation is essential in peaceful adjustment of Palestine situation but on whole the policy and influence of US is most important factor. Western powers are keenly aware, as reflected by their representatives here, of risk of Communist infiltration. This is particularly true of Canadians who on whole follow British line, consider our influence probably greater but that most essential factor is US-UK cooperation.

10. United Nations. As indicated paragraph 2 above, the prestige and effectiveness of UN are deeply involved in Palestine question. UN thus constitutes a factor somewhat apart from individual and group interests of member states. Various aspects of UN factor are discussed below.

(a) On debit side, UN was first invited to deal with Palestine question in winter of 1947. Despite effort devoted to question for more than a year in a special session of Assembly, through a special commission, in 1947 regular session of GA, in another commission, in SC, and finally in another special session of GA, the UN failed to devise a peaceful settlement of issues acceptable to the parties, or, alternatively, an enforceable solution. Result of this failure was withdrawal of mandatory on May 14 leaving a political vacuum. This vacuum was partially filled by proclamation of Israel, which might be described as an extra-legal act, and by outbreak of violence and hostilities on a serious scale.

(b) On credit side, SC established a Truce Commission and laid down basis for a truce, and recent special session of GA arranged for appointment of a mediator who has been able to bring about cessation of hostilities and to organize apparently effective machinery for supervising truce. Finally, mediator has initiated discussions looking towards "peaceful adjustment of the future situation."

(c) Prospects of a peaceful settlement could be seriously impaired if UN is resorted to as a propaganda forum by Russians, Arabs or anyone else bent on preventing settlement. For this reason we are inclined to feel that it would be desirable, so far as possible, to deal with question of peaceful settlement through mediator and diplomatic channels.

(d) On other hand, question of demilitarization of Jerusalem and extending truce will presumably have to be dealt with in SC in immediate future and in this connection it may be difficult with

Manuilsky in chair to avoid dealing with substantive issues involved in future settlement.

(e) We must also envisage that unless substantial progress is made towards future settlement between now and September, whole Palestine question may be projected into Paris GA with resultant confusion if not complete breakdown of mediation effort. On the other hand, if the mediator is successful before September in getting the principal parties to agree on future settlement, possibly in form of treaty between Israel and Transjordan, he would presumably report this agreement to GA at Paris. It is difficult to see how any serious objection could be raised to such an agreement and GA might well put its stamp of approval on it, rescind the November 29, 1947 resolution, and approve admission of principal parties, Israel and Transjordan, to membership in UN. Parenthetically, this procedure might be helpful to those Arab Governments, if any, which could not "agree" to settlement envisaged in advance but might "acquiesce" in such settlement if approved by GA. Procedure envisaged in this paragraph would, of course, be ideal culmination of UN's efforts to deal with Palestine problem. Although agreement between two parties between now and early September may seem unlikely, the objective is clearly worthwhile enough to warrant every effort to attain it. In our view it could be attained if US Government is prepared to assume rather more leadership than at present and if we formulate promptly a comprehensive, although tentative plan, as a basis for discussion and agreement with UK. We might then take up with the secretariat question of communicating to mediator basic elements of such plan which would influence joint support by our two governments with parties of ultimate proposals.

JESSUP

501.BB Palestine/7-348 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 3, 1948—1 p. m.

2552. Please call on Bevin and say that our first impression of Bernadotte's "suggestions" to Jews and Arabs for peaceful adjustment of Palestine situation is favorable. We think his suggestions are statesmanlike and clearly designed to establish bargaining positions which will enable both sides to come closer to eventual agreement. Pending further study, however, we are not prepared to express a considered evaluation of Mediator's proposals.

As Bevin and you have agreed, we feel that matter of most immediate importance and urgency is extension of truce beyond July 9. Of secondary but still very great importance is Bernadotte's contemplated proposal that both Arabs and Jews agree to demilitarize Jerusalem.

We are considering instructing US Missions in Arab capitals and US officials available to Prov. Govt. of Israel to express in strongest possible terms hope of this govt as a friend of both Arabs and Jews,

as member of SC Truce Commission, and as a govt keenly desirous to see that international problems are settled only by peaceful means, to urge on Arab and Jewish Govts paramount necessity of extending present truce and cease-fire and if possible acceding to Bernadotte's suggestion for demilitarization of Jerusalem.

We would appreciate information as to whether Mr. Bevin feels that British could make similar approach, and any comments which he may care to offer.

Foregoing was drafted before receipt of your 2945 July 2,¹ and represents the most that can be said until receipt of official text of Bernadotte's proposals and their detailed consideration by Dept.

MARSHALL

¹ Not printed; it conveyed the query of the British Foreign Office as to whether United States views on Palestine could be made known to the British Government (501.BB Palestine/7-248).

501.BB Palestine/6-2948 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 3, 1948—1 p. m.

924. Attitude of Arab League officials and representatives Arab States, as well as local Egyptian authorities, as reported your 875, June 29, is distinctly not encouraging. Expressions of opinion you record are based largely on ignorance of, or disregard of facts. It will be disastrous for Arab States if they formulate policy on basis of stories reported in your reference telegram.

Taking certain points in your 875 seriatim, we note that you report Arab officials regard asserted "failure to take vigorous action in alleged Jewish violations of truce as in *Altalena* incident at Tel Aviv" as indicating that UN Mediator has not been impartial.

You are authorized on strictly informal and confidential basis to inform your Arab contacts that actually the Foreign Minister of Israel protested prompt and critical action of Mediator's Representative in Tel Aviv regarding *Altalena* incident and in official telegram from Shertok to his NY Representative, Foreign Minister said that Govt of Israel "has full right to resent strictures contained in Mr. Cremona's letter." So much for alleged pro-Jewish attitude of Bernadotte.

As for reported current opinion among Arabs regarding every US action as calculated to produce not a lasting peace but to hamper Arabs and assist Jews, it should be apparent to any serious Arab statesman that this govt, which has been subject to immense minority pressure, for example, to lift arms embargo in favor of Israel, has

been stalwart in attempting to find a peaceful, impartial and lasting solution of Palestine problem within a UN framework.

You say that a Foreign Office official told you that US exchange of diplomatic representatives with Israel was regarded by Arabs as violation of truce, since it violated *status quo* through implication that US supported Jewish State. You should point out that at the time the US extended *de facto* recognition to the Provisional Government of Israel it was contemplated that there would be an exchange of representatives and that agreement for the exchange of representatives was reached on June 7, prior to the start of the truce. There is therefore absolutely no ground for the claim that the US action was a violation of the truce.¹

You cite your Military Attaché as saying that Egyptian Military Authorities have stated that US military observers in Palestine "implied" that full info re Arab positions will eventually fall into Jewish hands and that MA can no longer count on cooperation of Egyptian Military Authorities with his office. You should request the MA to take every occasion to refute such charges, and to impress on Egyptian military officials that you are confident that US observers working on behalf of UN will in no way reveal any information of military value which may come to them from either side.

Your attitude toward Egyptians and other Arab officials should be that this Govt is trying, with other govts who are sincerely anxious to preserve peace, to see that hostilities do not again break forth in Near East. We desire friendship of Arab world and friendship of all peace-loving peoples but do not intend to let gossip of the type reported be developed into a pretext to blame US for ill results of Arab Govts erroneous decisions. Same policy applies equally to Jews.

Please repeat your reference telegram to Arab capitals and London to which this telegram is likewise sent for info and appropriate action.

Sent Cairo; rptd London as 2550, Baghdad as 232, Jidda as 257, Damascus as 264, Beirut as 393, Jerusalem as 690,² Haifa as 202.

MARSHALL

¹ The Department, on July 7, requested Damascus to reject as without foundation the allegations made by the Syrian Government in its note of June 29 (see footnote 1, p. 1156). The reply to the Syrian note was to be made along the lines of this paragraph, noting additionally that Mr. McDonald had been appointed Special Representative, not Minister Plenipotentiary. (Telegram 269, 501.BB Palestine/6-2948)

² Jerusalem, on July 5, expressed an opinion that the substance of telegram 690, particularly paragraphs four, five, and seven, should be communicated to the Transjordanian Government. It requested the Department to consider a suggestion that a representative of the Consulate General proceed to Amman and present these views to Transjordanian authorities (telegram 1024).

The Department, in reply on July 7, concurred in Jerusalem's views and concluded that "As soon as Stabler has proceeded Amman he is authorized discuss matter ref tel with Govt Transjordan". (Telegram 703; both telegrams are filed under 501.BB Palestine/7-548).

501.BB Palestine/7-348 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET US URGENT
NIACT

LONDON, July 3, 1948—2 p. m.

2964. Wright said July 3 Foreign Office submits for Department's consideration and comments following as suitable advice for HMG to give Abdullah of Transjordan in response to his request (Embassy's 2959, July 2¹).

2. Abdullah should realize that he must acquiesce to the existence of a sovereign Jewish state as a permanent entity in Palestine. He should realize that it is impossible to get rid of this state by fighting and that resumption of conflict as far as Arabs are concerned is likely to weaken the negotiating position which Arabs now enjoy.

3. Abdullah should realize also that if the Jews agree to continue negotiations with Mediator and Arabs do not, the Arabs will lay themselves open to sanctions under Chapter 7.

4. In view of circumstances described in paragraphs two and three above, HMG strongly recommends that Abdullah use his influence in Arab League to continue both the negotiations and the truce. The King would be given discretion to quote HMG if he so desired.

5. Foreign Office suggests that this advice should stand without specific reference to the nature of the Mediator's proposals of which HMG has not seen full text, and upon which, consequently, cannot comment.

6. Wright said HMG is most anxious to keep USG fully informed and to receive US comments but he realizes the Monday is a holiday US. Since USG and HMG are already agreed (Department's 2348, June 22) that it is imperative that truce should be continued Wright said he thought HMG would be safe in conveying foregoing advice to Abdullah solely as that of HMG even in advance of receiving US comments. He wishes, however, to give Department an opportunity of commenting and unless events make earlier action necessary, Foreign Office will not telegraph Amman before Monday July 5.

7. Wright said he wished to place before the Department another question of equal urgency: so far as HMG knows, Mediator is still awaiting replies from parties and has not specifically proposed extension of truce. There is no way of knowing when Mediator will report to SC, as it is possible that this might be done so late that

¹ Not printed; it reported a conversation between King Abdullah and Sir William Mack, British Ambassador in Iraq, in which the former made known his views that the Mediator's proposals were totally unacceptable to Transjordan since they involved diminution of her sovereignty. The Ambassador urged the King not to make a hasty decision. The King agreed, expressing the hope that the British Government would furnish him with good advice (501.BB Palestine/7-348).

truce would end without time for SC action re extension if that should be necessary. Consequently, Wright urgently desires views USG (which will also be sought through Cadogan) re convening SC on July 6 or 7 with a view to taking any steps necessary to assure continuance of truce in the event Mediator (a) fails to secure agreement to his proposals and (b) fails himself to secure an extension of the truce by agreement. Wright visualizes several ways which this could be done: One might be SC sending instructions to Mediator for use in eventualities named above, to call formally upon both Arabs and Jews in the name of SC to extend the truce for one month irrespective status Mediator's proposals and prospects for negotiations.

8. Please advise Department's views urgently.²

DOUGLAS

² The Department, in reply on July 4, stated that "action by HMG along lines paras 2-6 irtel 2964 July 3 would be most helpful. Regarding para 7, Dept is anxious to obtain extension of truce (Deptel 2552) and tentatively believes SC extension of May 29 resolution will be required." (Telegram 2557, 501.BB Palestine/7-348) For No. 2552, July 3, see p. 1186.

*The United Nations Mediator in Palestine (Bernadotte) to the Secretary-General of the United Nations (Lie)*¹

[RHODES?] 5 July 1948.

For the President of the Security Council:

The following proposals have been submitted to the parties on 3 and 5 July 1948:

During that very short period, a first effort has been made to explore the possibilities for effective mediation of the Palestine dispute. It could have been expected that in these four weeks a peaceful adjustment of the future situation in Palestine could have been achieved on the basis of agreement between the parties.

On the whole, the truce has worked well. There have been complaints from both sides as to the alleged violations of the terms of Truce Agreement. There have been instances of violation, but all fighting on a major scale has been stopped, and it can be said quite confidently that the truce has worked well, and by 9 July 1948, neither State will have gained any significant military advantage from its application. In the meantime, through the operation of the truce, much bloodshed and destruction have been avoided and many lives spared.

The expiration of the date of the truce on 9 July is now imminent. The parties to the truce must answer the question whether, in the absence of agreement on the procedure and substance of mediation, they will again resort to armed conflict.

¹ This telegram reprinted from SC, 3rd yr., Supplement for July 1948, p. 24.

There can be little doubt that a decision to resume fighting in Palestine will be universally condemned and that the party or parties taking such a decision will be assuming a responsibility which will be viewed by the world with the utmost gravity.

The truce, in effect, is based on the resolution of the Security Council of 29 May 1948. It was the fighting in Palestine which induced it to adopt that resolution. Unless the parties themselves agree to extend the truce beyond 9 July, it may be assumed that the Security Council will again consider the matter and take such action as circumstances may demand.

In order that the efforts toward mediation of the dispute may continue, and in the interest of a peaceful settlement of the problem by means of patient and tolerant effort and reciprocal good will, I ask the United Nations, as the United Nations Mediator on Palestine, to urgently appeal to the interested parties to accept in principle the prolongation of the truce for such period as may be decided upon in consultation with the Mediator.

501.BB Palestine/7-648 : Telegram

*The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations
(Jessup) to the Secretary of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

NEW YORK, July 6, 1948—11:25 a. m.

845. From Ross. Following are highlights of conversation with Eban late Friday afternoon based on telegrams he had received from Shertok re Bernadotte suggestions: ¹

1. Suggestion concerning Jerusalem is unacceptable. PGI could never consent to turning over to Arabs the hundred thousand Jews in Jerusalem.

2. Suggestion concerning review of immigration at end of two years by proposed joint council is unacceptable since it would be a clear impairment of Israeli sovereignty.

3. Idea of a concerted policy with Transjordan with regard to foreign affairs and defense is unacceptable as part of a settlement. Such a concerted policy might evolve naturally provided Abdullah's intentions were satisfactory to Israel.

4. Eban had received no comment from Shertok on territorial suggestions re the Negeb and western Galilee. Eban said this did not mean that Israel was prepared to accept these suggestions. Tone of Eban's comment confirmed impression we have had that question of unimpaired sovereignty including control of immigration is much more important to PGI than question of territorial changes. This by no means indicates that territorial question viewed as unimportant. Both questions very important but sovereignty question not negotiable while territorial question might be.

¹ See p. 1152.

Clearly indicated that PGI favors extension of truce and probably also demilitarization of Jerusalem provided latter could be accomplished without impairment welfare Jews that city and without impairment relative military position Israeli army.

Following is text of informal and confidential memorandum subsequently sent to me by Eban on PGI position in Jerusalem:

[Here follows text of memorandum.]

[Ross]
JESSUP

Editorial Note

Israeli Foreign Minister Shertok's formal reply to Count Bernadotte, dated July 5, was in the form of observations on the latter's suggestions. The observations were negative in character. Mr. Shertok concluded his message with an expression of hope that Count Bernadotte, after examining his observations, would reconsider his whole approach to the problem; for text of the reply and Major Eban's transmitting letter of July 7 to the Secretary-General, see SC, *3rd yr., Supplement for July 1948*, page 27.

The Arab reply to Count Bernadotte was made by Azzam Pasha under cover of a letter of July 3. The reply adversely criticized the Mediator's suggestions and offered various counter-proposals. Some of these called for Palestine to be a unitary, sovereign, and democratic state, with guarantees of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and of the sanctity of the holy places. A provisional government was to be established, representative of all important sections of the citizenry in proportion to their numerical strength (telegram 920, July 6, 6 p. m. from Cairo, 501.BB Palestine/7-648). The text is printed in United Nations, *Official Records of the Third Session of the General Assembly, Supplement No. 11 (A/648)*, page 19.

501.BB Palestine/7-648: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET US URGENT

LONDON, July 6, 1948—4 p. m.

2989. Bevin has been so preoccupied by Germany that most effective channel for dealing with Department's 2552, July 3 and 2557, July 4¹ has been through Wright who got to Bevin last night with following results:

1. HMG believes it would be most helpful for USG to urge upon Arab and Jewish Governments paramount necessity of extending

¹ Latter not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 1190.

cease fire and truce and acceding to Bernadotte suggestion for demilitarization of Jerusalem. (para three Department's 2552). HMG agrees that it should make similar approach re truce and this was done today in FonOff telegram sent Arab capitals. This telegram does not mention demilitarization because FonOff has no official info as to what Bernadotte has in mind. Wright pointed out that FonOff could send another telegram re demilitarization as soon as it knew more about it. He hoped Department would supply info this subject. Wright said HMG for obvious reasons would not approach PGI.

2. Telegram containing reply to Abdullah's request for advice (Department's 2557) was cleared by Bevin last night and despatched to Amman today with repeats to Arab capitals. Since Mediator's proposals are now available, HMG enumerated to Abdullah as arguments for Arabs continuing negotiations and truce those features of proposals more favorable to Arabs' cause than November 29 resolution. In another telegram sent to Arab capitals HMG has embodied its preliminary comments re Mediator's proposals with particular reference to features proposals which might further in Arab eyes our common aim of maintaining truce.

3. Re SC action (final sentence, Department's 2557), Wright said that Cadogan has been advised that HMG believes it preferable for SC action, if it should be necessary, to be based upon recommendation from Mediator since this might lessen controversy. However, Cadogan has been given discretion to raise in SC as British proposal question truce extension.

4. I hope to telegraph later today summaries British telegrams mentioned above.

DOUGLAS

501.BB Palestine/7-648: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET US URGENT

LONDON, July 6, 1948—8 p. m.

3002. 1. Bevin sent Wright to me this afternoon with two "disturbing" telegrams just received by Foreign Office. First is telegram from Amman dated today to effect that Arab Legion command in Palestine has been informed by Colonel Bonde that UN observers will cease to operate in Palestine as of tomorrow (July 7). Kirkbride commented that he has no clue as to reason for this decision but that in circumstances prospects survival truce seem remote.

2. Other telegram is from Troutbeck BMEO Cairo (Embassy's 2965, July 3¹) also dated today in which recommendation is made that

¹ Not printed.

Arabs should be made aware British views re resumption arms deliveries, British attitude towards Jewish state, and whether HMG believes Arabs should acquiesce to Mediator's proposals as basis for negotiations. Troutbeck opined that both Jews and Arabs are poised ready to fight.

3. Wright said HMG is deeply conscious only three days of truce remain and that Bevin wishes to leave no stone unturned in British efforts to extend truce. Consequently, Wright asked me to give on the spot clearance to another "most immediate" telegram to Arab capitals (see paragraph 4 below for summary of this message). Reinforcing points in telegrams described Embassy's 2989 July 6. Wright stressed Bevin's anxiety to keep in step with Department and pointed out new element in latest telegram is British advice to Arabs to accept Mediator's proposals as basis for discussion. Although Foreign Office does not know Department's considered views re Mediator's proposals, on basis paragraph 1 Department's 2552, July 3, Foreign Office assumes that Department is favorably inclined towards them. Time being of essence Wright hoped I would in this instance signify US acquiescence to the despatch of this telegram which in essence is an urgent and further effort HMG to extend truce.

4. Following is summary British telegram: First essence is that truce and cease-fire should be extended. If fighting is resumed on the responsibility of Arab Governments, SC will undoubtedly condemn them and it will be impossible for HMG, which is bound by its obligation to UN, to resume deliveries of arms to the Arabs. A Jewish state is already in effect and has come to stay in some form. Proposals of Mediator offer an opportunity for a solution on lines much more favorable to the Arab Governments than before. If Arabs were to receive added safeguard of guarantees against expansion of frontiers of Jewish state, they would be in better position than under any alternative now possible. HMG therefore considers it is in interests of Arab Governments to acquiesce in Mediator's proposals as basis for discussion. Governments can suggest modifications if necessary. If Arab Governments disregard these considerations and make themselves responsible for resumption of hostilities all indications are that victory in the field is impossible for them. Indeed possibility of serious military reversals must be taken into account.

5. Since in my view foregoing is clearly in line with our common aim to extend truce, and since I doubt that general character Department's first impressions of Mediator's proposals unlikely to alter greatly, I told Wright that I saw no objection to HMG sending above telegram. Foreign Office will despatch this telegram within the hour.

6. It occurs to me that there may be similar occasions in future when

time is vital and when HMG may consult me as above. Since framework of our common ideas re extension truce is now pretty well established, I believe that Department would wish me to act as I have done in above instance so long as HMG sticks to the generally established line. Am I correct in this? ²

DOUGLAS

² The Department, on July 7, informed London as follows: "Dept. agrees with action described urtel 3002 and answers question your para. 6 affirmatively." (Telegram 2586, 501.BB Palestine/7-648)

Editorial Note

The Arab and Israeli Military Commanders in the Jerusalem area signed an agreement on July 7, 1948, for the demilitarization of Mount Scopus. Two officials of the United Nations were also signatories; for the text of the agreement, see SC, *8th yr., Suppl. for April, May and June 1953*, page 30.

501.BB Palestine/7-748 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt

SECRET US URGENT
 NIACT

WASHINGTON, July 7, 1948—noon.

933. Please make representations strongest possible terms to FonOff at earliest opportunity regarding great importance US attaches to prolongation Palestine truce proposed by Bernadotte. As friend of both Arabs and Jews, as member UN Truce Commission and as nation prepared to support in every practicable way settlement of international disputes by peaceful means, US urges upon governments concerned overriding necessity for further period of truce and negotiation as only avenue to lasting settlement and to protection of vital interests of governments and peoples involved. Resumption of fighting under present circumstances could lead to no tangible benefit to either side and would create bitterness and resentment against the parties which would greatly outweigh the speculative benefits of armed action. Security Council meets Wednesday morning on Palestine and may call upon parties for truce extension.¹

MARSHALL

¹ This telegram was repeated for action to Baghdad, Jidda, Damascus, Beirut, Jerusalem, and Haifa and for information to London. The Department, on July 7, directed Jerusalem to inform the Provisional Government of Israel that "Stabler authorized bring contents refel attention Govt Transjordan". (Telegram 704, 501.BB Palestine/7-748).

501.BB Palestine/7-748: Telegram

*The Chargé in Egypt (Patterson) to the Secretary of State*SECRET MOST IMMEDIATE
NIACT

CAIRO, July 7, 1948—2 p. m.

922. On informing Count Bernadotte at 9:30 this morning of content Deptel 929, July 6,¹ he stated that Arab League had not rejected his proposals for continuation of truce. Bernadotte, however, apparently expected truce to lapse. He viewed Arab counter-proposals (Embtel 920, July 6²) as hardly more than repetition of year-old arguments for unitary state. He could not, accordingly, consider them as bases for discussion. The Jews had made no counter-proposals whatever. Bernadotte was hopeful that Arabs would accept demilitarization of Jerusalem as proposed by him. He fancied, however, that they would not assent to demilitarization of Haifa.

Accordingly, he had proposed and was hopeful that both Arabs and Jews would at least concede a request which he had just made for a three-day prolongation of the truce which would enable observers and other personnel and materiel to be evacuated to ports. Colonel Bonde had already elaborated a plan whereby observers and other Mediator personnel would be evacuated to Haifa, Amman, and Cairo with eventual concentration at Beirut for transportation to Athens.³

Bernadotte felt neither side would care to reject this modest extension of truce and that indeed each would be reluctant to assume responsibility for resumption of hostilities, truce or no truce. He felt that the four-weeks truce had entered into effect too soon since the Arabs, at least, were still "feeling their oats" and had not, through continuation of hostilities, had enough of the fight knocked out of them.

Sent Department 922, repeated Jerusalem 107, Haifa 74.

PATTERSON

¹ Not printed; it requested that Count Bernadotte be apprised of press and other reports concerning termination of the truce in Palestine and of the United States "hope that he will issue necessary orders to assure safe withdrawal of observers and equipment to ports where they may be safely embarked if and when he is convinced such action should be taken." (501.BB Palestine/7-648)

² Not printed, but see editorial note, p. 1192.

³ The Department, on July 7, told Jerusalem that Count Bernadotte had formally requested removal of UN personnel and equipment from the Near East by the United States Navy (telegram 710, 501.BB Palestine/7-748). In a letter of July 9, to Secretary Forrestal, Acting Secretary Lovett requested that the evacuated personnel and equipment remain in the immediate vicinity until it became certain that the truce would not be extended (501.BB Palestine/7-948).

501.BB Palestine/7-748 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt*RESTRICTED
NIACT

US URGENT

WASHINGTON, July 7, 1948—11 p. m.

942. The Security Council adopted today by a vote of eight to zero (USSR, Ukraine, and Syria abstaining) the following resolution on Palestine.

"The Security Council, taking into consideration the telegram from the UN Mediator dated 5 July 1948 addresses an urgent appeal to the interested parties to accept in principle the prolongation of the truce for such period as may be decided upon in consultation with the Mediator."¹

MARSHALL

¹ This message was repeated to Beirut, Jidda, Damascus, Baghdad, Haifa, and Jerusalem. The resolution was submitted by British Representative Cadogan and received the warm support of Mr. Jessup; see SC, *3rd yr.*, No. 93, pp. 11, 12.

Editorial Note

Mr. Jessup reported that at a dinner in New York given for Ambassador Gromyko by Secretary-General Lie on the evening of July 8, he had been asked by Gromyko "whether we would be prepared to introduce a resolution at the next meeting of the Security Council. I said that it seemed to me that it would be clearly necessary for the Security Council to act if the current reports were confirmed. I asked him what his view was. He said that I would recall that they had generally voted with us on this question and indicated that they would be prepared to vote for a resolution under Chapter VII." (Memorandum of conversation, July 9, by Mr. Jessup, 501.BB Palestine/7-948)

501.BB Palestine/7-848

*Draft Resolution Prepared by the United States Delegation at the United Nations*¹

The Security Council,

Taking into consideration that certain governments have rejected the appeal of the United Nations Mediator for prolongation of the truce in Palestine;

Determines that the situation in Palestine constitutes a threat to the peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter;

Orders all governments and authorities which have not already done so to accept immediately the prolongation of the truce for such period as may be decided by the Mediator;

¹ As telephoned from New York to Mr. Rusk on July 8.

Requests the Mediator to continue negotiations with the parties concerned relative to the terms and conditions applicable to the continued period of the truce.²

² Marginal notation of July 9 by William I. Cargo, Acting Assistant Chief of the Division of Dependent Area Affairs: "Above text suggested by USUN for introduction into SC on 7/8/48. Indicated that UK would support. In meeting in Mr. Lovett's office (Mr. Lovett, Mr. Rusk, Mr. Satterthwaite, and Mr. Cargo present) decision taken not to introduce resolution. Decision taken in view of continuing strong UK diplomatic pressure on Arabs and desire to allow this initiative to continue, fact of Bernadotte's forthcoming visit to Amman, and possibility of Abdullah accepting and urging a prolongation of truce. Decided that USSRDel should speak strongly in SC emergency meeting for extension of truce pointing out that a resumption of hostilities would be a breach of the peace under Chapter VII and that US would support, in such a contingency, appropriate SC action pursuant to the Charter. Mr. Rusk informed USUN in this sense."

501.BB Palestine/7-848

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Lovett)*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 8, 1948.

Participants: Mr. Lovett

Mr. Epstein, Special Representative of the Provisional
Government of Israel

Mr. Mattison (NE)

Mr. Epstein stated that he had requested an urgent appointment in order to acquaint the Department with certain facts regarding the truce in Palestine.

He stated that the Israeli Government had accepted Count Bernadotte's proposals for an extension of the truce, without condition.² Unfortunately, he had received word that the Arabs were not willing to accept the extension of the truce, and that Egyptian forces had, in fact, attacked Israeli positions south of Tel Aviv before the end of the truce.

Mr. Epstein expressed the hope that the U.S. Government would take action in the Security Council of the United Nations to put a stop to the conflict in Palestine. He pointed out that Israel needed peace in order to proceed with the development of the country and to put its own house in order. He indicated that the strong measures taken by the Israeli Government against the Irgun when the Irgun had attempted to break the truce by landing men and weapons at Tel Aviv had been successful. He implied that a renewal of the fighting with the Arabs might make it more difficult to control the Irgun.

¹ Drafted by Mr. Mattison.

² Mr. Epstein, in note 322 of July 9 to Mr. Lovett, transmitted a message of July 8 from Mr. Shertok stating that the Provisional Government of Israel had decided on July 6 to accept extension of the truce and had so advised Count Bernadotte the following day (501.BB Palestine/7-948). For the formal notification of these developments by Mr. Shertok to the President of the Security Council in a cablegram of July 9, see SC, *3rd yr., Supplement for July 1948*, p. 37.

I told Mr. Epstein that we were following the situation with the closest attention, that we earnestly desired a return to peace in the area, and that we were striving through the UN to achieve this objective.

Mr. Epstein mentioned that he had received "reports" that the British were encouraging King Abdullah to continue hostilities. I informed Mr. Epstein that we had documentary evidence to the contrary, and that to our knowledge the British were cooperating fully and were putting extremely heavy pressure on Abdullah and the other Arab States to accept the extension of the truce. Mr. Epstein stated that he was glad to have this news, and to learn that his reports were unfounded.

The conversations then turned to the question of recognition of the State of Israel. I took pains to explain our position in the matter. I pointed out that our recognition of the State of Israel was unqualified. We recognized that the State existed, and that recognition was not qualified in any way. The only qualification which existed was that we recognized the Provisional Government of Israel as the *de facto* Government of the State. The reason for this qualification was that the Government had come into being without the people of the State having had a chance to participate in the election of the Government. When it was possible for the people to elect a government by constitutional processes it would follow that *de jure* recognition would be granted. Mr. Epstein commented that their legal advisers had told him much the same thing and that he was endeavoring to explain this situation to his "American friends" who felt that *de jure* recognition should be extended.

In conclusion, I took occasion to remind Mr. Epstein of the friendly warning which I had given him and Mr. Shertok last fall of the possibility that the Iron-Curtain countries might seek to penetrate the dissident groups in Israel, and told him that our intelligence reports indicated that such penetration might be occurring. Mr. Epstein said that he was fully aware of the dangers involved, and that he felt that it would now be possible to do more towards controlling this danger. Last fall there had been no Israeli Government and the situation was more difficult to control. He then inquired whether it would be possible to have access to, and exchange views regarding the subject matter of the intelligence reports. I explained that many of the reports were of such high classification that it would be impossible to make such an arrangement. I suggested that undoubtedly his Government monitored the broadcasts of the dissident groups, and that these broadcasts alone were sufficient to give an indication of the thinking of those groups and their orientation.

Mr. Epstein concluded by saying that there were a number of other pending subjects which he hoped to take up with me at a later date.

CIA Files

*Memorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence (Hillenkoetter)
to President Truman¹*

SECRET
IM-48

[WASHINGTON,] 8 July 1948.

Since 15 May 1948 when the UK abandoned its mandate over Palestine, the Arabs and Jews have experienced four weeks of bitter hostilities and four weeks of uneasy truce. Neither war nor peace, however, has in any way weakened the determination of the Jews to establish a sovereign state of Israel or the determination of the Arabs to prevent the establishment of such a state. The period of hostilities led to a military stalemate; the truce has favored the Jews.

Count Bernadotte's proposal that the Palestine truce be extended beyond 9 July has been accepted by Israel. The Arab states, on the other hand, have rejected it in view of Bernadotte's refusal to adopt the Arab proposals (a unified Palestine with restricted Jewish immigration) as the only basis for further negotiations.*

In the resumption of full-scale hostilities, the Jewish forces will probably attempt to consolidate their positions in the coastal area and Galilee and to gain control of Jerusalem. The Arabs will probably try to break the military stalemate which had developed prior to the truce. They will attempt to reimpose their blockade of Jerusalem by cutting the Tel Aviv supply route and will try to isolate Tel Aviv from the hinterland by making concerted advances with the Egyptian, Transjordan, and Iraqi Armies. The Syrian Army will probably launch a limited offensive in northeastern Galilee.

The success of the Arab campaign is doubtful in view of acute ammunition shortages. Unless the Arabs can force political concessions from Israel within the next two months, they will probably be compelled by logistic difficulties to withdraw most of their army units from Palestine. However, they can be expected to support guerrilla activities indefinitely. Arab guerrilla incursions, political non-recognition, and economic sanctions will completely isolate Israel from the rest of the Near East. Under such circumstances, its security will be continuously threatened, its economy stifled, and its future existence consequently will be entirely dependent on the continuing good will of some outside power or powers.

R. H. HILLENKOETTER



¹ Attached to the source text is a CIA map entitled "Military Situation—1 June 1948", which is reproduced facing this page.

* Despite the resumption of hostilities, Arabs and Jews are expected to cooperate with the Mediator in the evacuation of UN personnel. [Footnote in the source text.]











MILITARY SITUATION - 11 JUNE 1948



(On effective date of U. N. cease-fire order)

PALESTINE

-  Jewish held area
-  Jewish controlled area

Jewish area (as accepted by U. N. General Assembly, November 1947)

-  Partition Boundary (as accepted by the United Nations General Assembly, Nov. 1947)
-  International Boundary
-  District Boundary
-  Standard Gauge Railroad (4'8 1/2")
-  Narrow Gauge Railroad (3'5 1/2")
-  First Class Road
-  Second Class Road
-  Oil Pipe Line
-  Intermittent Stream
-  Jewish Communal Area



Sources:
Palestine, 1:500,000, Gen. Philip and Son, 1942
Survey of Palestine Major Map, 1:500,000, 1939
Palestine, 1:250,000, M.D.R. 1509/12375, 1946

501.BB Palestine/7-848 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Jerusalem (Macdonald) to the Secretary
of State*

SECRET

JERUSALEM, July 8, 1948—5 p. m.

1041. Truce has improved military potential PGI considerably while no information is available that would indicate Arabs have benefitted appreciably. Depcirtel July 7.¹ Jewish officials openly state they have more and better equipment than when truce began. This has been mentioned to me by Shaltiel, commanding officer of Jerusalem district and Bernard Joseph. Also see my telegram July 6 Number 1028.¹

New road which has been constructed by PGI to by-pass section on Tel Aviv, Jerusalem road between Latrun and Babelwad which is held by Arabs, has been improved during truce and is completely in Jew hands giving them supply route from Haifa to Jerusalem via Tel Aviv.

Arab refusal allow Jerusalem water has been greatest advantage to them during truce. Food position Jerusalem is definitely better now than at beginning of truce.

There has been no attempt to conceal improvements of minor fortifications in Jerusalem and erection of new ones although such construction visible to civilians has been on comparatively small scale. New troops have been recruited and trained.²

MACDONALD

¹ Not printed.

² Haifa reported, on July 13, that the Jews during the truce had brought in quantities of heavy equipment, especially in guns, and at least 2,000 trained men of military age and had built fortifications and gun emplacements in the coastal area. Consul Lippincott concluded that the Jews had profited from the truce period and were in a much better position to fight than before the truce (telegram 245 501.BB Palestine/7-1348).

Editorial Note

In a cablegram of July 9 to Secretary-General Lie, the Mediator transmitted the Arab reply to his proposals for a prolongation of the truce. The reply noted the "impossibility of persuading Jewish minority to abandon political ambitions . . . and its determination to impose its will by force and terrorism on the overwhelming majority of inhabitants of country . . . coupled with its violations of conditions of truce and utilization of interval as means for intensification of aggression against Arabs and for over-flooding country with continuous flow of immigrants, all these factors make it imperative for Arab States not to agree to prolongation of truce under present conditions and to take all measures necessary to bring these conditions to end. This, however, should not shut door in face of further efforts by Mediator, nor should it preclude whatever proposals His Excellency may put forth in that capacity." The full text of the cablegram is

printed in SC, *3rd yr., Supplement for July 1948*, page 31.

The Mediator sent a second cable to Mr. Lie on July 9, which contained his appeal to all interested parties for acceptance of an unconditional ceasefire in Palestine for a ten-day period; for text, see *ibid.*, page 33.

501.BB Palestine/7-948: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET US URGENT

LONDON, July 9, 1948—4 p. m.

3081. On Bevin's personal instructions further telegram along following lines will be despatched by Foreign Office this afternoon to all Arab capitals including Amman. *Begin summary:*

1. You should again impress on government to which you are accredited grave danger to Arabs if they persist in refusing SC appeals for extension truce, particularly in view of the fact Jews have accepted extension. In circumstances SC bound consider action under Chapter 7 Charter against Arab states and in that even HMG can do little or nothing for Arabs.

2. Fact that decision Arab League political committee was taken before July 7 SC resolution was available makes latter bridge over which Arab leaders should be able to retreat without loss prestige.

3. HMG is prepared to make further effort to facilitate withdrawal Arab League from dangerous position in which it has placed itself. HMG has noted that Arabs have based themselves on benefits truce to Jewish military potential. Consequently HMG has instructed UKUN to try to get SC to resolve upon truce extension in order to give time for Mediator to report on truce operations and accusations made by both sides. Thus if Arabs would agree to brief extension they would have chance to explain to SC their grounds for believing truce one-sided in its effects and propose if they so desire modification truce terms.

4. HMG does not know at what stage UKUN can do this, but action in SC must necessarily depend to some extent on readiness Arab governments to cooperate with efforts HMG is making to save them from consequences of their own hasty decision. *End summary.*

DOUGLAS

501.BB Palestine/7-948: Telegram

The Chargé in Egypt (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET US URGENT

CAIRO, July 9, 1948—5 p. m.

NIACT

957. Following from Stabler¹ now in Amman. Count Bernadotte accompanied by Bunche and Mohn arrived this morning at invitation

¹ Wells Stabler, the Vice Consul at Jerusalem; detailed to Amman.

of King Abdullah. Bunche on behalf of Bernadotte requested that following message be transmitted to Department:

"Bernadotte feels that Security Council should take immediate and strong action to bring Arab states to their senses. Now that Arab League has made decision rejecting truce, some formula must be found immediately to permit Arab states to change their decision without loss of face. Bernadotte believes that if Security Council should adopt resolution threatening use of all provisions of charter including armed intervention, Arab states would back down. Bunche said that Arab officials have privately intimated to Bernadotte that such resolution would give them a way out without incurring risk of internal dissension. It would permit Arabs to say in effect we are unable to fight the world; therefore, we must bow to the UN.

Bunche indicated that Bernadotte might suggest to Security Council some aerial or naval demonstrations as example UN's determination to stop hostilities in Palestine.

Bernadotte will leave Amman at noon for Haifa and then return to Rhodes to see whether Arabs will discuss further demilitarization of Jerusalem; if so, he will proceed Cairo tomorrow."

[Stabler]
PATTERSON

501.BB Palestine/7-948 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

LONDON, July 9, 1948—7 p. m.

3096. Bevin assembled this morning his top Foreign Office advisors to consider road ahead Palestine. Following is report views expressed and my interpretation of them since I was present:

1. Bernadotte's visit to Amman today is most hopeful event on horizon particularly if Abdullah, as he told British Minister Kirkbride yesterday he might do, takes bold step of accepting unilaterally Mediator's truce proposals. Pros and cons of such action by Abdullah were discussed. There was one school of thought (Embassy's 3055, July 6¹) which felt that Abdullah should be urged by His Majesty's Government to take onus of going against decision of political committee Arab League and to accept unilaterally extension truce. Against this another school advanced view that if Abdullah takes this step as result British advice, and if Arab States turn against him, or if Jews as a consequence Arab Legion inactivity greatly expanded Israel by force of arms, consider a moral responsibility would rest on His Majesty's Government for worsening Abdullah's material and moral position. Bevin and McNeil opined that Abdullah is still only Arab

¹ Not printed.

leader capable of retrieving situation (Embassy's 3056, July 8,² paragraph one) and that it was to be considered whether important asset of Abdullah's tractability should be risked at this juncture without further appeal to Arab Governments to retreat over bridge which may be laid if British resolution passes SC (Embassy's 3081, July 9, paragraph two). No final decision was reached this morning as to whether Abdullah should be given more His Majesty's Government advice but later Bevin sent message given in my 3085, July 9.³

2. Bevin made following comments re Mediator's proposals as basis for discussion if truce continued or if further UN action on them seems desirable:

a) In Bevin's view it would be in interests of Arabs for Jerusalem to be under international regime policed by international force drawn from Belgium, France, US, et cetera; (I interjected in this regard that to my mind it is highly important that future regime for Jerusalem should not be fixed as Arab, but at least should be open for discussion in order that Jerusalem could be made international city. Bevin expressed agreement).

b) Frontiers Israel drawn under November 29 resolution are unsatisfactory: How much better are frontiers indicated by Mediator is question for examination;

c) It would be better, contrary to what may have been in Mediator's mind, to have clearly defined Jewish state unconnected with Arab areas.

3. Bevin advanced thought that Arab leaders may be so committed to their unequivocal opposition to Jewish state that UN decision which would force state upon them might be welcomed to some degree by leaders.

4. Bevin raised question as to whether UNGA alone can change UNGA November 29 resolution unless the parties agree to a change under auspices Mediator (Paragraph five, Embassy's 3080, July 9⁴).

² Not printed.

³ Not printed; the message stated that the Arab Legion had borne the brunt of the fighting and that the recent Arab League decision meant that the governments which had made little contribution to the Arab war effort were dictating that the Arab Legion should again engage in hostilities. Under these circumstances, Abdullah might point out that the Legion had only a few days supply of ammunition and that, if the Arabs took the initiative in breaking the truce, it could not expect further supplies from the United Kingdom. Therefore, Abdullah should order his forces to stand on their present positions, not taking the offensive but resisting attack if necessary (501.BB Palestine/7-948).

⁴ Not printed; paragraph 5 read: "It will be clear no doubt to SC that under resolution Mediator would be recalled to report re operation truce and possible continuance truce and not on his proposals for resolution Palestine problem. In this connection SC is not empowered to change November 29 resolution UNGA which can be changed only (a) By agreement parties through good offices Mediator, or (b) By new UNGA decision.

"Bevin states it may be necessary to ask SC refer this question back to UNGA and Foreign Office is examining possibility action to this effect. For time being, however, Cadogan should use all his influence to persuade SC to extend truce and to avoid any precipitate action which might make this more difficult." (501.BB Palestine/7-948)

He has asked UN Department Foreign Office to make special study of this question.

5. If foregoing is not very coherent it is because conclusions of gathering itself did not have this quality. Clearly His Majesty's Government has as yet not decided when to risk their trump card of Abdullah in an effort to persuade Arab states to accept a Jewish state as permanent feature Middle Eastern landscape (see Paragraph one above). My telegrams 3080, 3081 and 3085 show the results of meeting as sorted out by Foreign Office officials later.

6. If Abdullah would himself take decision to break, or to threaten to break with Arab League countries, thus freeing His Majesty's Government from moral responsibility for consequences of this act, British Government would, I am sure, welcome this development.

7. Throughout this meeting the provisions of Chapter 7 were mentioned as the sword of Damocles hanging over Arabs: I detected no hint of any desire on part of those present to flinch from a fair share in imposition sanctions in unhappy event that this should be necessary. We need have no worries, I think, on this score.

DOUGLAS

501.BB Palestine/7-1048: Telegram

*The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations
(Jessup) to the Secretary of State*

SECRET NIACT

NEW YORK, July 10, 1948—1:19 p. m.

870. Following are our analyses of present situation re Palestine and recommendations for action based on hypothesis that latest ten-day truce extension proposed by mediator will be rejected by Arabs. Just informed Israel has accepted ten-day truce. If Arabs accept ten-day truce, following suggestions on tactics would require substantial change but basic policy considerations would still be pertinent:

1. The documented evidence is incontrovertible that states of Arab League have created a threat to the peace by refusing to extend truce.

2. The circumstantial evidence is equally clear that military action by Egypt at least, probably also by Iraq and Syria, constitutes a breach of the peace and an act of aggression.

3. It is unfortunate that for the moment it will probably be difficult to verify any breach of the peace or act of aggression in view of the fact that Mediator has, mistakenly, in our opinion, withdrawn the UN observers and other UN personnel from Palestine. (Compare conflicting reports in No. 3086 from London¹ and unnumbered from

¹ Dated July 9; it reported an Egyptian denial that Egyptian troops had made attacks in southern Palestine (501.BB Palestine/7-948).

Navy July 8, 2:12 p. m. [7:12 a. m.?²] However, while avoiding basing action on controversial facts, it would be sheer quibbling and grossly inexpedient politically to delay action on this account.

4. In view of fact that Israel has accepted extension of truce unconditionally on terms proposed by Mediator, military action by Israel cannot possibly be considered to be a breach of the peace or act of aggression. Such action on the contrary must be considered as defensive action as contemplated by Art. 51 of the charter pending appropriate action by SC. Fact that Israel is not a member of UN does not alter principle involved.

5. It is possible that UK and certainly Arab line will be that Arab failure to extend truce and resumption of hostilities by Arabs result from Jewish breaches of truce while it was operative; hence there should be no finding or action under chapter VII of charter pending further investigation. This is wholly specious constituting no excuse for Arabs and no reason for delay. Questions of breaches of truce should be dealt with while it is in effect by peaceful means through machinery available and created by UN for purpose, namely, Mediator and SC. We must obviously also oppose Arab argument that they are still acting to defend Palestine against "Zionist invaders".

6. The fact that Mediator has decided to come to Lake Success to report (it is now anticipated that he will not arrive until late Monday) and that he has made a new appeal to parties for ten-day truce extension should not be occasion for any further delay in SC consideration and action. Every hour that passes is likely to intensify fighting and renders more and more difficult restoration of peace and maintenance of conditions necessary to working out of peaceful adjustment of future situation. Prolongation of truce should still be our first objective, but meanwhile events are outstripping our policy.

7. Delay will reflect very adversely on prestige and effectiveness of SC.

8. Delay will increase risk of new dissension between US and UK.

9. Delay will increase risk of serious breach in our bipartisan foreign policy and of hindering thereby a settlement, in view of fact that both our parties are wholly committed to support of Israel and that in present political circumstances one or other party may feel impelled to take some precipitate action.

10. Arabs are living in a dream world where the political fact of existence of Israel (supported by USSR and US—in the US strongly by both political parties) is denied and where it is imagined that even the ghost of this fact may be laid by resort to arms. It is wholly contrary to our political and strategic interests and our oft repeated

² Not printed; it reported information from Israeli sources that Egyptian forces were attacking Isdud (867N.01/7-848).

professions of friendship for Arabs to allow them to continue to delude themselves in this manner.

11. While we must so far as possible try to maintain maximum possible friendly relations Arab states, we cannot ignore our relations with Israel. Failure to support Israel in SC would almost certainly induce pressures which might be irresistible and because not planned by us, far less satisfactory than a well-considered policy of strong public support.

12. Delay, weakness or equivocation in our policy will unquestionably give Russians strong propaganda advantage not only in SC and in Israel but also among world Jewry.

In light of foregoing we propose following specific actions:

1. That we formally request an SC meeting to be called at earliest possible, preferably no later than Monday.

2. That preferably over weekend but in any case no later than Monday the President issue a statement from White House as follows:

a. We have hoped that parties would agree to prolongation of truce and we have exerted every effort at our command to this end. Prolongation of truce is still our primary objective.

b. To our great regret, however, states of Arab League have rejected three appeals for prolongation of truce and certain of them have resorted to armed force in Palestine in a manner wholly inconsistent with purposes and principles of UN charter.

c. Present situation in Palestine clearly constitutes at very least a "threat to the peace" within meaning of Art. 39 of charter requiring immediate action by SC.

d. Accordingly he is instructing the acting US representative to introduce a resolution in SC at earliest possible moment (along lines of draft resolution sent Department in USUN 863.³)

e. During four weeks period of truce under SC resolution of May 29, US has followed a course of strict neutrality and impartiality between the parties, and has lived up faithfully to all of its obligations under that resolution. Furthermore, as a member of Truce Commission, US has assisted UN Mediator in many different ways at his request in carrying out his responsibilities.

f. So long as there is prospect of immediate resumption of truce, US will continue to act on basis SC resolution of May 29.

g. However, May 29 resolution would no longer be applicable if Arab states have finally repudiated truce and full-scale fighting is resumed. Under such circumstances, US would consider itself under obligation to maintain measures designed to prevent military aid

³ Dated July 9, not printed; the draft resolution provided that the Security Council order those governments which had resumed hostilities to cease and desist from further hostile military action (paragraph 3), that the Council order all other governments which had refused to accept prolongation of the truce to refrain from any threat or use of force (paragraph 4), and that the Council order all governments to which paragraphs 3 and 4 applied to accept immediately the prolongation of the truce. Failure to do so would be evidence of a breach of the peace and an act of aggression within the meaning of Article 39 and would require further immediate action under Chapter 7 (501.BB Palestine/7-948).

reaching Arab states which were illegally waging war in violation of charter.

h. At same time US would remove restrictions on aid to Israel on ground that having been attacked after agreeing to truce, it was acting in self-defense. US policy will continue to be based on Charter and our responsibilities as member of UN to assist in restoring and maintaining peace in Palestine.

i. Meanwhile, he is having instructions issued to all US personnel loaned to UN as observers and in other capacities to stand by for further assistance to Mediator as may be required.

3. That without delaying action here, our line as outlined above be communicated immediately to UK through US Embassy London and simultaneously through UK Del here. We believe we must not yield too much to UK desire to stall action and Presidential statement could be used as leverage in our representations in London and New York.

4. That in connection with above we, jointly with UK, make clear in strongest terms and without equivocation to all Arab capitals (as UK has already done in Amman—see London's 2964 and 2989 ⁴), our judgement that sovereign state of Israel is here to stay, that no amount of fighting or other action by Arabs can possibly alter this situation in either short or long run, and that this simple fact of political life must be taken as basis for continued truce and efforts to work out peaceful adjustment of future situation. Our representatives should point out that apparent Arab reliance on theory that US support for Israel is inspired by local political considerations is specious; both major political parties emphatically taking same position; no change in this bipartisan position is conceivable. We fully recognize that this action requires a great deal of courage in light of probable shock to Arabs and resultant risks of Arab action re oil concessions, air base facilities, etc. On other hand, this action in view of strong bipartisan support of Israel in this country will have to be faced up to sooner or later and we are not at all convinced that risk of Arab retaliation is nearly as great as they would have us believe, particularly from long run viewpoint. We believe that Bernadotte is right in theory Arabs would be relieved to have to yield to strong UN pressure. (See Niac 957 from Cairo, July 9.)

5. That we proceed immediately without further delay to determine at least main outlines of tentative plan we could support for peaceful adjustment of future situation in Palestine (see our tels 831 and 837 ⁵) and that we discuss this plan immediately and simultaneously with UK and Israel. In case of UK we suggest discussion through three channels, London, Washington and New York. In case of Israel we suggest discussion initially in New York where because our personal

⁴ Dated July 3 and July 6, respectively, pp. 1189 and 1192.

⁵ Dated June 30 and July 1, respectively, pp. 1161 and 1180.

relations with Eban plan can be discussed entirely unofficial, personal, trial-balloon basis.

6. That following discussion with UK and Israel we then take the plan up, as it may be revised in light of said discussions, with Mediator for his guidance in further negotiations, and at same time jointly with UK communicate our views to Arab states as well as to Israel.⁶

JESSUP

⁶ A marginal notation indicates that no action was taken on this telegram.

501.BB Palestine/7-1048 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Jessup), at New York

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 10, 1948—2 p. m.

456. For Jessup from Rusk. Following is entirely unofficial and furnished for your consideration during weekend conversations with Cadogan. Bernadotte's personal report may suggest major alterations. Dept. would wish to have your comments before issuing specific instructions.

Overriding US objectives in present Palestine situation are (1) extension of the truce, (2) negotiated final settlement, and (3) continuance concerted action with UK to maximum extent consistent with US policy. Regarding last point, Dept. welcomes vigorous steps being taken by UK to bring about extension of truce and to impress upon Arabs fact that Jewish State in Palestine is here to stay. Every possible opportunity should be given UK to maintain this initiative as important element toward final settlement. It would be most desirable from US point of view if UK would introduce necessary resolutions in SC; US should be prepared to make concessions on details in order to support UK resolutions directed toward broad joint objectives.

US can support in SC at this time resolution along lines of SC resolution of May 29. Such resolution might afford Arab Govts. opportunity to explain to Arab public opinion necessity for extending truce. Our preference, however, is for a resolution under Chap. VII clearly ordering parties to accept truce since there is some indication action of this nature will be required to force Arab reconsideration.

If such stronger resolution is required, general line your 863 appears preferable to your 859.¹ However, it would seem that precise

¹ Dated July 9 and 8, respectively, neither printed; they presented for Department consideration the texts of alternative draft resolutions for possible submission to the Security Council by Mr. Jessup (501.BB Palestine/7-948, /7-848). Regarding No. 863, see footnote 3, p. 1207.

allocation of responsibility as between Jews and Arabs should be based upon clear refusal to accept a renewed order by the SC to cease hostilities, not merely on public announcements of their respective attitudes toward accepting truce. We see no special advantage in going beyond concept of threat to peace at this stage, connected with a provisional measure to extend the truce, without drawing sharp distinctions among govts. in the operative part of the resolution. Fundamentally, of course, US position remains that set forth in Deptels 327² and 331³ which were basis for US position before SC passage of May 29 resolution. In any new resolution, SC might apply resolution generally to all parties and then specifically to those which have refused to accept a truce in order to bring all parties within the resolution but at the same time specify those who are now recalcitrant. [Rusk.]

MARSHALL

² Dated May 26, not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 1027.

³ Dated May 27, p. 1062.

501.BB Palestine/7-1148 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

LONDON, July 11, 1948—noon.

3111. Embtel 3096, July 9.

1. Bevin asked me to meet again with him and his top advisers on Palestine late yesterday. Lewis Jones accompanied me.

2. Bevin, speaking from brief based on telegrams summarized my 3110, July 10¹ (full texts are obtainable from British Embassy Washington), established the facts as HMG understands them, most crucial of which is that both King Abdullah and intermediary King of Egypt have expressed desire that SC should threaten Arabs with sanctions. He sketched following as HMG's suggestions with regard to the road ahead re Palestine along which he hoped devoutly US and UK could proceed together.

3. Present aims British policy re Palestine as sketched to me by Bevin and telegraphed last night to Cadogan for his private guidance are:

(a) To avoid resumption hostilities;

(b) There being no good purpose in declining accept Jewish state, HMG hopes to arrive by peaceful means at settlement approximating that indicated by Mediator but thinks it fatal to acceptance of this by Arabs if Mediator and UN insist upon political union between Arab and Jewish states.

¹ Not printed.

4. To accomplish three (b) above Foreign Office thinks it would be better for UN to settle frontiers Jewish state and demilitarization Jerusalem, leaving future remainder Palestine to be determined by Arabs, probably by incorporating it in Transjordan. Thus UN would fix Jewish state frontiers and violation of these by either party would be aggression. This would give Arabs feeling of security and help bring about their acquiescence.

5. British view is that final political settlement must be arrived at either by agreement between parties under auspices Mediator or by action UNGA (paragraph five my-3080, July 9²). SC would have no right to interfere with authority UNGA by itself attempting to modify in some radical manner basis plan of November 29 resolution. It should, however, be British aim to ensure SC acts in way consistent with ultimate objective defined paragraph three (b) above.

6. Immediate British aim is to end fighting on conditions ensuring so far as possible that it will not be resumed. Because of facts paragraph two above, Foreign Office sees advantage in adoption by SC of resolution containing threat of sanctions against Arabs but considers it essential this should be presented in such way as to diminish as little as possible British influence over Arab governments. It should therefore contain reference to accusations made re truce breaches and to machinery for dealing with future breaches. Cadogan should vote for such a resolution if it fulfills British requirements. Otherwise, he should seek further instructions.

7. Above covers general British future policy as now conceived. Bevin emphasized British view that as first step before considering any resolution SC should hear Mediator's report on his activities under original truce resolution. This is important because if political committee of Arab League meets Beirut as press indicates there is chance situation may be entirely changed by Arab decision to comply after all with proposals for extending truce.

8. If, however, truce has not been renewed, Cadogan has been instructed to urge in SC a hearing of complaints of both sides re application of truce. Foreign Office believes SC should examine carefully whether Arabs alone are at fault.

9. British thinking re text of resolution which may be required is well advanced and has been based on US draft. Most important amendments which Foreign Office has instructed UKUN to discuss with USUN are that resolution:

(a) Should specify that hostilities are not to be resumed pending definitive political settlement;

(b) Should instruct Mediator to establish machinery (see paragraph eleven below) for examining alleged breaches of the truce in order that he may take appropriate action without delay;

² Not printed, but see footnote 4, p. 1204.

(c) Should make no reference at this stage to an act of aggression within meaning of Article 39 of Charter.

10. Foreign Office draft resolution incorporating ideas paragraph nine above was sent Cadogan last night with instruction to discuss it today with USUN.

11. Re machinery for examination past and future breaches of peace (paragraph nine (b) above) Bevin referred repeatedly to investigation "tribunals" made up of observers of three different nationalities.

12. Bevin expressed belief that Arabs will accept truce extension on basis SC resolution drafted along lines suggested by Foreign Office (paragraph ten above).

13. In advising me of foregoing views which have been worked out here with utmost thought and care since long term British relations with Arab world are at stake, Bevin said he was laying all of his cards on the table and he hoped that the logic underlying the steps he proposed would commend itself to the Department and so result in a parallel course of action on our part.

14. Having in mind the step-by-step evolution during past weeks of British policy, ever closer to our own policy as I understand it, and the nature of the ideas set forth above, it seems to me that the latter stand on their own merits and that comment by me is superfluous.

DOUGLAS

501.BB Palestine/7-1148: Telegram

The Consul General at Jerusalem (Macdonald) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

JERUSALEM, July 11, 1948—4 p. m.

1061. Cynical attitude towards United Nations and increasing demand for incorporation new Jerusalem within state of Israel now apparent here. Immediately following May 14 projected international status for Jerusalem was accepted by Jewish officials and people but prior beginning truce and during cease-fire noticeable shift in attitude occurred which will probably be accentuated with resumption fighting.

In addition to private conversations, following public statements illustrate trend: Decision by Jerusalem community council's committee for municipal affairs request Israel Government press for inclusion Jerusalem Jewish state; statement in Tel Aviv by Mayor Jerusalem that since city neglected by United Nations no choice remains but ask Israel take over authority; speech by Haganah Jerusalem commander stating "we shall fight to last man among us for our survival and our capital city"; warning by Stern gang to US, France and Belgium that it will fight any forces sent to internationalize city.

Jews justify claim to Jerusalem by pointing to failure United

Nations take effective action protect city or establish government. Maintain Israel forces only ones which have defended city from Moslems and now in fact occupy most of city.

Accompanying above attitude is feeling among local Jews that they must depend entirely on selves and readiness to adopt whatever measures necessary achieve victory. Apparent Christian indifference to plight of holy city often mentioned and authorities appear willing take any military action necessary regardless possible destruction old city.

Consul General feels official demand for inclusion new Jerusalem in Jew state may soon be made and that possibility all out attack on old city in near future should not be discounted.

MACDONALD

Editorial Note

The Minutes of Policy Planning Staff meeting of July 12 state that Mr. Kennan "had said that short-term developments now occurring so rapidly left no basis on which to attempt at this time to develop a long-term policy paper on Palestine. No Policy Planning Staff paper on Palestine is contemplated for the present." (PPS Files, Lot 64 D 563)

*Report of the United Nations Mediator in Palestine (Bernadotte) to the Security Council, July 12, 1948*¹

[Extract]

35. A first essential in Palestine today is an immediate cessation of hostilities. But that is only a first step. For the question must be answered, at some stage, whether the international community is willing to tolerate resort to armed force as the means for settlement of the Palestine issue. Willingness to do this could well involve many risks for the peace of the entire Near East, if not for the larger world. In this regard a distinction may properly be drawn between forbidding the use of force in Palestine and making it unprofitable to use force, on the one hand, and enforcing a political settlement, on the other. Ending the use of force in Palestine will, in fact, make possible an eventual peaceful settlement.

36. For many and compelling reasons, the international community has a vested interest in a peaceful settlement of the Palestine problem. Viewed realistically, the situation is as follows. If armed force is forbidden in the settlement of the problem and it is made prohibitively

¹ Reprinted from SC, 3rd yr., *Supplement for July 1948*, p. 47.

unprofitable for the Arab States to employ it, there will be in Palestine a Jewish community with a separate cultural and political existence, a Jewish State, whose strength and prosperity and capacity for economic and social development, by the admission of its own leaders, must largely depend on its ability to cultivate friendly relations with its Arab neighbours. If the employment of armed force is not forbidden, the issue of the Jewish State in Palestine will be settled on the field of battle. The decision which may be taken with regard to the resort to armed force in Palestine will determine the immediate prospects for further effective mediation over the settlement. In this vital regard, the decisions of the Security Council on the matter will be controlling.

501.BB Palestine/7-1248: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the
Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET US URGENT
NIACT

LONDON, July 12, 1948.

3138. For Lovett.

1. Bevin has just spoken with me to give me information that while we [*they?*] agree to support substance of US resolution on Palestine with UK amendments, we [*they?*] are not prepared ourselves [*themselves?*] to introduce amended resolution for reason that it does not go far enough.

2. Bevin while instructing Cadogan to support resolution is unwilling to instruct him to introduce it on behalf of UK for fear that such action by UK will destroy remaining influence UK possesses with Arabs, particularly Abdullah, so necessary to maintain if truce is to be reinstated.

3. Situation appears to be, therefore, we are apprehensive lest by introducing resolution we will impair our influence with Israeli followers while UK is apprehensive lest by introducing resolution she will destroy her residual influence with Arabs, especially Abdullah.

4. To break this impasse of legitimate apprehensions, representatives of some other country may be persuaded to introduce resolution. UK is approaching Canadian and Belgian representatives and possibly also Argentinians.

5. Suggest we remain in closest association with Cadogan and attempt to reinforce UK efforts to persuade the representatives of any one of the three referred to above or some other power to introduce resolution, thus avoiding for US and UK respectively the dangers implicit in proposing the resolution by either.

6. Lurking in the background is the menace of Soviet behavior and the consequences thereof if our side allows the matter to go by default.

7. If this appears to be rushing the gate, it is due to Bevin's pre-occupation with persuading the Arabs to acquiesce in a settlement based on an independent Israel.

Department please repeat Niact USUN.

DOUGLAS

Editorial Note

Count Bernadotte, in an address before the Security Council on the morning of July 13, amplified his written report; for text, see SC, 3rd yr., No. 95. In the afternoon session the same day, Mr. Jessup paid tribute to the Mediator and then stated that "Fighting is now going on in Palestine. It is going on because one party has not agreed to any suggestion or appeal to avoid fighting, although the other party, the Provisional Government of Israel, declared its readiness to accept each and every suggestion and appeal.

"The Security Council must accept its responsibility.

"The general, the practically universal opinion, is that there is a threat to the peace in Palestine within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter. . . ."

Later in his statement, Mr. Jessup suggested that "The Security Council should call attention to the consequences of a failure to stop fighting. Such a warning would clearly have particular meaning for that party which has so far rejected all appeals." (*Ibid.*, page 39.) He then submitted a United States draft resolution, the text of which is printed *ibid.*, page 40.

The Syrian Representative sharply criticized the United States proposal (*ibid.*, page 41) and submitted a draft resolution requesting the International Court of Justice to give an advisory legal opinion as to the international status of Palestine after the termination of the British mandate (*ibid.*, page 52).

501.BB Palestine/7-1348: Telegram

*The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations
(Jessup) to the Secretary of State*

RESTRICTED

NEW YORK, July 13, 1948—11:49 a. m.

880. Reference Deptel 274 to Damascus, July 10,¹ it is our understanding that US recognition of State of Israel is unqualified, that is,

¹ Not printed; this message was the same as telegram 269, July 7, and seems to have been sent in error. Regarding No. 269, see footnote 1, p. 1188.

de jure, while our recognition of PGI was a *de facto* recognition of government that state. Is this interpretation correct? ²

JESSUP

² The Department, on July 15, stated its agreement with New York's understanding and set forth its belief that "in cases of recognition of new states as distinguished from new govts no question of *de facto* as against *de jure* recognition is involved." (Telegram 465, 501.BB Palestine/7-1348)

501.BB Palestine/7-1348 : Telegram

The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Childs) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

JIDDA, July 13, 1948—1 p. m.

412. Legtel 406, 12th.¹ British Ambassador states he received yesterday from FO verbal reply to his representations in behalf SA acceptance prolongation truce. Reply characterized Bernadotte proposals as being worse than *status quo ante* but said SAG would support with Arab states acceptable prolongation. Trott said he had been authorized to make strong representations including reminder that if Arabs rejected truce and UN applied sanctions HMG would be unable to fulfill its arms commitments to Arab states.²

Pouched Arab capitals.

Sent Department 412, repeated London 124.

CHILDS

¹ Not printed.

² Damascus, on July 12, reported a conversation with the Syrian Acting Foreign Minister in which the latter insisted that Count Bernadotte had proved himself pro-Zionist and that Syria would never consent to an extension of the truce until the Mediator's absurd proposals had been scrapped. (Telegram 439, 501.BB Palestine/7-1248)

867N.01/6-2948 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Belgium

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 13, 1948—4 p. m.

1068. Dept believes request for material referred urtel 1328, June 29,¹ should be denied as being inconsistent with SC Resolution of May 29. These items not on US arms list but US Govt studying possibility control such items under general export control authority.

MARSHALL

¹ Not printed; it reported that the Israelis wished to purchase military radios, field telephones, field switchboards, and field wire and that the Egyptians wished to purchase 436 surplus Army trucks (867N.01/6-2948).

867N.113/7-1448

Memorandum by the Acting Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Satterthwaite¹) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON, undated.²]

Subject: Possible or Probable Results if US Arms Export Policy is modified unilaterally to permit Arms Shipments to the State of Israel

SUMMARY

In the considered judgment of this office, American strategic interests and international security would be seriously prejudiced if the arms embargo were raised unilaterally in favor of the State of Israel. The military setbacks which the Arabs could be expected to suffer would probably result in the overthrow of some of their governments. The attendant chaos would provide a breeding ground for communism, or a series of dictatorships might arise on a wave of anti-American and anti-British sentiment. Governments hostile to the Western powers would mean the loss of vital strategic facilities in the Near East coveted by the Soviet Union. The intensification of the disturbances might undermine our strategic position in Greece, Turkey, and Iran as well.

The unilateral raising of the arms embargo might well result in the imposition of oil sanctions by the Arab states, or even in the cancellation of American concessions. Such action would result in further depletion of our domestic oil reserves and would in all likelihood prevent the use of Near Eastern petroleum in support of the European Recovery Program. Our action might also result in a Saudi Arab request that we evacuate Dhahran air base, the loss of which would disrupt our strategic air communications network.

If the United States were to lift the embargo unilaterally in favor of the State of Israel, Great Britain might take similar action in behalf of the Arabs, which would certainly result in a dangerous Anglo-American rift and might well jeopardize the entire basis of US policy in Europe.

The raising of the embargo would immediately place the lives of

¹ Joseph C. Satterthwaite became Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs on July 16, succeeding Loy W. Henderson, who, two days before, had been designated Ambassador to India.

² A copy of this memorandum was received in the Office of United Nations Affairs on July 14.

most American citizens and official representatives in the Arab states in serious jeopardy, necessitating their repatriation under difficult and dangerous circumstances. It is probable that American property, investments, and philanthropic enterprises would be singled out for molestation, destruction, or seizure as a result of popular reaction.

The governments of the Arab states would probably be incapable of controlling mob action arising from the unilateral repeal of the embargo, and mob attacks against some of the 700,000 Jews residing in Arab countries could be expected. Such attacks might turn into anti-foreign or anti-Christian demonstrations as well.

The Arab governments and peoples would regard our action as a virtual American declaration of war against them, and popular feeling against us would be intense and lasting. It is not unlikely that the Arab League states would take concerted action in breaking diplomatic relations with the United States. Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen might even withdraw from the United Nations.

Conclusion: Unilateral action to repeal the arms embargo outside the framework of the United Nations would in effect constitute independent punitive action by the United States against the Arab states.

In the event that the Security Council continues the arms embargo, provided for in the Security Council resolution of May 29, 1947, unilateral action by the United States lifting the embargo as it affects either side would not only be inconsistent with the United Nations action, but would violate our obligations under the Charter to support United Nations action.³

³ Attached to this document is an undated memorandum of virtually identical title, going into greater detail concerning the matters discussed in the summary.

501.BB Palestine/7-1448

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chairman of the Civil
Aeronautics Board (O'Connell)*

WASHINGTON, July 14, 1948.

MY DEAR MR. O'CONNELL: As you are aware all aircraft are considered implements of war by virtue of Presidential Proclamation 2776 of March 26, 1948. As such, exports of aircraft are subject to licensing controls exercised by the Department of State. In accordance with Departmental policy licenses to export arms, ammunition and implements of war, including aircraft and components, to countries of the Middle East are being denied.

Moreover, it is the announced foreign policy of this Government

that it shall not aid or abet either faction to the strife in the Middle East and it has called upon United States authorities to take all possible steps to assist in the implementation of this policy. This Government is on record before the UN Security Council that it may be necessary to request the Council to declare the Holy Land situation a formal threat to peace. The specific countries to which this neutrality applies are Palestine, Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Saudi-Arabia, Transjordan and Yemen.

It has come to the Department's attention that several non-certificated irregular air carriers operating under Letters of Registration issued by the Civil Aeronautics Board are allegedly engaged in transporting munitions into the Middle East area. Actions of this nature by American citizens are regarded as inconsistent with the established policy and security safeguards of the U.S. and as such are contrary to the public interest.

In addition, Letters of Registration frequently provide the basis for obtaining customs clearance at the time of departures from the U.S. of aircraft purported to be leaving on temporary sojourns abroad. In this connection, attention is invited to Section 201.34 and 201.35 of Title 22, Code of Fed. Regs. The sale abroad of such aircraft or components thereof constitutes a violation of the export control laws.

It is my understanding that approximately 100 Letters of Registration have been issued for aircraft weighing over 10,000 pounds gross take-off weight. Many of these engage in overseas operations.

In view of the foregoing, it is suggested that consideration be given to advising all holders of CAB Letters of Registration for "large irregular carriers," that during the period of the Palestine disturbance and throughout the existence of the arms embargo to the Middle East, this Government looks with disfavor upon the transportation by U.S. air carriers of war material or fighting personnel into the countries mentioned herein, from any point in the world. In addition, it may be well to advise these carriers that departures from the U.S. of aircraft destined for the Middle East must be disclosed to Customs officials at the time of customs clearance. This would enable the Department to observe, through its Missions abroad, the nature of the cargoes of such aircraft for possible discovery of contraband.

If appropriate, these air carriers should be warned that in cases of non-compliance with the foregoing requirements or upon receipt of proof of their participation in activities of a nature inconsistent with the established foreign policy of this Government, remedial action with respect to their Letters of Registration will be taken. It is assumed that the Board will find that such corrective measures are required in the public interest.

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT A. LOVETT

501.BB Palestine/7-1448 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

LONDON, July 14, 1948—7 p. m.

3188. Bevin sent me word this afternoon re remarks which Cadogan was instructed by Foreign Office telegram noon today to make in SC before he cast British vote for our resolution. Bevin thought it would be clear to Department that Cadogan's remarks in no way receded from official British position of yesterday and that they constitute amplifications of some of points made by Cadogan which, in Bevin's view, have been dangerously misinterpreted in today's press (see my 3173¹ for strong Arab office statement).

2. As Bevin sees situation, there is grave danger that hands of Azzam Pasha and other Arab extremists will be strengthened against more moderate group led by King Abdullah if idea is spread that HMG has lost all sympathy for Arabs and that UN is a British-Zionist body from which Arabs can expect nothing resembling justice. (Foreign Office understands Azzam now at Amman doing his best to persuade Arab states to continue hopeless war of desperation.)

3. To rectify the somewhat unbalanced picture of British position as presented by press today, which has caused number of MP's to express alarm lest HMG "let the Arabs down", and to persuade the Arabs, insofar as this is possible, that SC dice are not loaded against them, Bevin instructed Cadogan to amplify his remarks.

4. The danger of Arabs losing faith in HMG, Bevin advised me, [was] consensus opinion of British ME missions was [and?] that White [while?] resolution such as ours might be successful in causing Arabs to end hostilities, and consequently should be objective of UKUN it would cause most unfortunate anti-British local impression in Arab states if UKUN voted for it. British missions suggested UKUN should abstain. Bevin debated a long time between voting and abstaining and decided in favor of voting for resolution partly because of his desire to keep in step with us, but most of all because "I think it is right".

5. In my view it would be calamity for American, British, European and PGI interests in the Middle East were Britain to lose such vestiges of influence as she still possesses with the Arab Governments. The game being played by HMG is one requiring courage and it may be lost if remaining British influence among Arabs vanished from the

¹ Dated July 14, not printed.

Middle East. There is little doubt that Soviet is ready take Britain's place. (Embassy's 3175, July 14²)

DOUGLAS

² Not printed; it gave the text of a letter sent to the British Foreign Office by the British Representative on the Trusteeship Council. The letter recounted that Semyon K. Tsarapkin, Soviet Representative on the Council, had complained to the Iraqi Representative on the same body concerning the latter's support of the administering powers. After the Iraqi Representative had stated to Mr. Tsarapkin that he was not on either side but voted as he thought best on each occasion, Mr. Tsarapkin replied that he was making a mistake; that Britain was deserting the Arabs; that the time was coming when the Arab world would need a friend; and that the Soviet Union was that friend. He then proceeded to warn that the Soviet Union would not help the Iraqis in time of need if they continued to support the British position in the Trusteeship Council (501.BB Palestine/7-1448).

PPS Files, Lot 64 D 563, Near and Middle East, 1947-1949

Memorandum by Mr. Gordon P. Merriam, Member of the Policy Planning Staff, to Staff Members

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 15, 1948.

For your information, there are attached certain UNA papers relating to the Palestine question.¹

You will note that the basic paper is the Appendix to the Position Paper of June 22, 1948. This Appendix is a memorandum to the President dated May 22, which the President approved. S/P's views on this memorandum were not requested. The Position Paper is in the nature of an application of the policy approved by the President to the situation which would result if the truce were broken or not extended. It has been approved by the Secretary.

Present United States action with respect to Palestine is apparently taking place in pursuance of the policy laid down in the two papers above-mentioned.

However, the Democratic platform adopted on July 14 contains the following splinter in the Palestine plank:

"We favor the revision of the arms embargo to accord the State of Israel the right of self-defense. We pledge ourselves to work for the modification of any resolution of the United Nations to the extent that it may prevent any such revision."

This passage appears to be inconsistent with paragraphs (c) and (d) of the memorandum approved by the President.

I am informed by NE that as of 10:30 this morning no directive had been received which would alter our present policy. Accordingly, we

¹ The reference is to a memorandum of June 23 from Mr. McClintock to Mr. Kennan and to Harry S. Villard, a Member of the Policy Planning Staff. The memorandum transmitted copies of Mr. Meeker's memorandum of June 22; its appendix, the memorandum of May 22 to President Truman; and Mr. McClintock's memorandum of June 23. The three papers are printed on pp. 1127, 1027, and 1134, respectively.

are persisting in trying to get a SC resolution which, among other things, would continue the arms embargo to the whole Near East.

The UNA paper dated June 23 on a territorial settlement is interesting, but this is not a pressing matter at the moment.

Before joining S/P, I had some knowledge of S/P's difficulties in dealing with the Palestine problem. Since joining, my impression has deepened that S/P's difficulty is essentially no different from that of the operating divisions, the crux of the matter being, as I understand it, that we have no long-term Palestine policy. We do have a short-term, open-ended policy which is set from time to time by White House directives.

In S/P, I have sensed a feeling that in some way we should be on record, at least, with respect to a positive Palestine policy, in addition to being on record as "viewing with alarm". We have been asked to contribute, but thus far we have not found a good formula.

I am wondering whether the formula might not be a NSC paper on: "The United States Position with respect to Israel". Israel does exist, and nothing that anyone can definitely foresee is going to overthrow it. Our long-term policy with respect to it has not been worked out.

The preparation and submittal of such a paper would involve obvious difficulties and dangers. On the other hand, this is an important question on which neither S/P nor NSC has taken a positive long-range position, and in the absence of a long-range policy we are unable to put our shoulders behind a constructive and comprehensible Middle East policy; and we lack a sound foundation on which to build a long-term policy for two of the three members of the Middle Eastern "security arch", i.e. Turkey and Iran.²

GORDON P. MERRIAM

² The Policy Planning Staff prepared a report, dated August 18, whose purpose it was "To assess and appraise the position of the United States with respect to Israel and related problems". Attached to the report is a memorandum of August 19 from Mr. Kennan to Mr. Savage which states "I had this ready for delivery to the Secretary this morning; but after hearing, by chance, the briefing given him orally by Rusk on this subject, decided not to use it." The report and Mr. Kennan's memorandum (neither printed) are filed in the PPS Files, Lot 64 D 563, Near and Middle East, 1947-1948.

501.BB Palestine/7-1548

*Memorandum by the Director of the Office of United Nations Affairs
(Rusk) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)*

[WASHINGTON,¹] July 15, 1948.

There is less support for the Syrian resolution² in the Security Council than we first supposed. Syria, China, Belgium and Colombia

¹ A marginal notation indicates that this memorandum was telephoned from New York at 8:50 a. m., July 15.

² Regarding this draft resolution, see editorial note, p. 1215.

will probably vote for it. Canada, France, Argentina, U.S.S.R., and the Ukraine are expected to abstain. The United Kingdom is definitely cool toward the resolution; the United Kingdom Foreign Office had given the UK Delegation preliminary permission to vote for the motion, but now is thinking it over again. USUN estimate is that if the United States not only votes for the motion but strongly supports it in debate, it might pass. United States abstention would let motion die with four or five votes.

Jessup, Ross and I have gone over various alternatives at some length. We agree that it would be unfortunate to allow this issue to become magnified beyond its real merits. Israel Representatives are bitterly opposed on grounds there is nothing to adjudicate and Israel has no guarantee that it can even be heard at present as a party before the Court under the proposed action. Further, Israel believes that if matter goes to Court, this fact would be used by the Arabs to postpone settlement and by other states to delay recognition. Another factor is general view among Security Council delegations that this motion is diversionary in intent and cannot be considered as a bonafide effort to use the Court to move closer to a final settlement.

Jessup and I are concerned about denying a party to a dispute its proper day in Court. Nevertheless, the Court statute provides ways and means for parties to adjudicate certain types of questions. In this case, the Arabs have shown no inclination to settle the Palestine question by adjudication. In any event, direct issue between the parties goes to Court on basis of consent of parties, lacking in this instance. We have no assurance Arab League would accept opinion of Court if it favored Israel.

In present situation Security Council is dealing with threat to peace and is seeking to bring an end to present hostilities. Answer to question posed by Syrian motion is not required for that purpose. That question concerns the substance of the political issues which were before the General Assembly. The General Assembly chose to try to deal with such issues through recommendation and mediation. Our position might be, therefore, that the Security Council should not interfere with approach decided by the General Assembly unless it should become necessary to maintain international peace, which is not the case at this time.

I recommend that we abstain, either with no statement at all or with very short statement based on above line. If the United Kingdom decides to support motion, we may have to reconsider in light of need to maintain common US-UK line. Neither Jessup nor I is entirely satisfied with recommended position but we are unable to propose a more satisfactory course in light of all the factors.³

³ Marginal notation by Mr. Lovett: "Talked with Clifford 10 a. m. 7/15. He agrees abstain. We should *not* support motion under any circumstances since
Footnote continued on following page.

*Resolution 54 (1948) Adopted by the Security Council on
July 15, 1948¹*

The Security Council.

Taking into consideration that the Provisional Government of Israel has indicated its acceptance in principle of a prolongation of the truce in Palestine; that the States members of the Arab League have rejected successive appeals of the United Nations Mediator, and of the Security Council in its resolution 53 (1948) of 7 July 1948, for the prolongation of the truce in Palestine; and that there has consequently developed a renewal of hostilities in Palestine,

1. *Determines* that the situation in Palestine constitutes a threat to the peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter of the United Nations;

2. *Orders* the Governments and authorities concerned, pursuant to Article 40 of the Charter, to desist from further military action and to this end to issue cease-fire orders to their military and paramilitary forces, to take effect at a time to be determined by the Mediator, but in any event not later than three days from the date of the adoption of this resolution;

3. *Declares* that failure by any of the Governments or authorities concerned to comply with the preceding paragraph of this resolution would demonstrate the existence of a breach of the peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter requiring immediate consideration by the Security Council with a view to such further action under Chapter VII of the Charter as may be decided upon by the Council;

4. *Calls upon* all Governments and authorities concerned to continue to co-operate with the Mediator with a view to the maintenance of peace in Palestine in conformity with resolution 50 (1948) adopted by the Security Council on 29 May 1948;

5. *Orders* as a matter of special and urgent necessity an immediate and unconditional cease-fire in the City of Jerusalem to take effect twenty-four hours from the time of the adoption of this resolution,

Footnote continued from preceding page.

'he feels it is a device and a tricky one at that.' Do not use veto as this involves 'pacific settlement'."

The amended Syrian draft resolution (see SC, *3rd yr.*, No. 98, p. 33) came to a vote of the Security Council on July 27. The United Kingdom and five others voted for the measure; the United States, the Soviet Union, and two others abstained; and the Ukraine was recorded in opposition. The resolution was not adopted, having failed to attain the required seven affirmative votes (*ibid.*, p. 34).

¹ Reprinted from SC, *3rd yr.*, *Resolutions*, p. 22. The resolution was adopted in paragraph-by-paragraph votes and was also adopted as a whole by seven votes in favor, with Syria opposed and Argentina, the Soviet Union, and the Ukraine abstaining (SC, *3rd yr.*, No. 97, p. 66).

Mr. Shertok, in a cablegram of July 16 to Secretary-General Lie, transmitted the decision of the Provisional Government of Israel to comply with the Security Council's request for a resumption of the truce in Palestine and for immediate cease-fire in Jerusalem; for text, see SC, *3rd yr.*, *Supplement for July 1948*, p. 77.

and instructs the Truce Commission to take any necessary steps to make this cease-fire effective;

6. *Instructs* the Mediator to continue his efforts to bring about the demilitarization of the City of Jerusalem, without prejudice to the future political status of Jerusalem, and to assure the protection of and access to the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites in Palestine;

7. *Instructs* the Mediator to supervise the observance of the truce and to establish procedures for examining alleged breaches of the truce since 11 June 1948, authorizes him to deal with breaches so far as it is within his capacity to do so by appropriate local action, and requests him to keep the Security Council currently informed concerning the operation of the truce and when necessary to take appropriate action;

8. *Decides* that, subject to further decision by the Security Council or the General Assembly, the truce shall remain in force, in accordance with the present resolution and with resolution 50 (1948) of 29 May 1948, until a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine is reached;

9. *Reiterates* the appeal to the parties contained in the last paragraph of its resolution 49 (1948) of 22 May 1948 and urges upon the parties that they continue conversations with the Mediator in a spirit of conciliation and mutual concession in order that all points under dispute may be settled peacefully;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide the Mediator with the necessary staff and facilities to assist in carrying out the functions assigned to him under General Assembly resolution 186 (S-2) of 14 May 1948 and under this resolution;

11. *Requests* that the Secretary-General make appropriate arrangements to provide necessary funds to meet the obligations arising from this resolution.

501.BB Palestine/7-1548: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET US URGENT
NIACT

LONDON, July 15, 1948—5 p. m.

3205. FonOff was disturbed to learn from telegram from Cadogan sent July 14 that USUN is considering possibility of permitting Soviet observers in Palestine as a means of bringing USSR into line re US resolution.

2. FonOff has just learned by telephone from NY that USUN is not prepared to accept Chinese amendment to effect that both parties

be called on to secure a political solution in consultation with Mediator and that so far as Cadogan can judge USUN is discussing with Soviet delegation question observers.

3. FonOff feels impelled to take adamant stand against Soviet observers whose presence would confirm Arabs views re sinister character UN so far as Arabs are concerned and possibly strengthen pro-Soviet minority in Israel. FonOff believes that between Chinese suggestion and wooing USSR first alternative offers the sounder course of action.

4. It seems to me that having stood out against Soviet observers in past, if US accepts them at this moment when gravity of Berlin problem can not be exaggerated, US retreat re Soviet observers might be interpreted by USSR as forerunner of further concessions by US to Soviet demands.

Sent Dept 3205, repeat USUN.

DOUGLAS

Cablegram Dated 16 July 1948 From the United Nations Mediator (Bernadotte) to the Arab States and to the Provisional Government of Israel Concerning the Security Council Resolution of 15 July¹

Third paragraph of the resolution on the cease-fire and truce in Palestine adopted by the Security Council on 15 July at its 338th meeting provides that the cease-fire is "to take effect at a time to be determined by the Mediator, but in any event not later than three days from the date of the adoption of this resolution".

In pursuance of this provision of the resolution and following consultations at Lake Success, I wish to notify you that the date and hour on which the cease-fire is to be effective is 3 p. m. GMT, Sunday, 18 July 1948. In order that each party may be informed of the intentions of the other, will you be so kind as to confirm to me this issuance of the cease-fire orders in accordance with the decision above noted at my Rhodes headquarters at the earliest possible moment.

Eighth paragraph of the resolution "instructs the Mediator to supervise the observance of the truce".

In order that there shall be no misunderstanding regarding the discharge of my responsibilities in the supervision of the truce, I take this opportunity to inform you that, although I will do my utmost to establish and put into operation a system of observers as quickly as possible, I cannot ensure that the functioning of this system, in view of the short time available, will coincide with the effective date of the truce. It is my earnest hope that both parties will undertake to observe scrupulously both the letter and the spirit of the truce. I will, of course, give advance notice and at the earliest possible moment, of

¹ Reprinted from SC, 3rd yr., Supplement for July 1948, p. 80.

the institution of the system of supervision, and of the arrival of the observers and their equipment at the observation posts.

501.BB Palestine/7-648: Telegram

*The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations
(Jessup) to the Secretary of State*

SECRET US URGENT
NIACT

NEW YORK, July 16, 1948—4:40 p. m.

907. Remytel 900, July 16.¹ Note dated 17 July from SYG to Acting US Representative to [re] SC Palestine resolution of July 15 states the following:

"The SYG has the honor to inform the Acting Representative that the UN mediator, in carrying out the instructions of the SC, has notified him that, in the light of the mediator's experience, he will require 300 military observers to assist him in the supervision of the truce provided for in that resolution. The mediator has accordingly asked the SYG to request the US Government to place at his disposition 125 military observers of appropriate seniority and experience to assist him in the supervision of the truce. He has indicated that he would need the services of these observers at his headquarters on the island of Rhodes beginning Sunday morning, 18 July 1948. He has also indicated that after further examination of the situation he may inform the SYG of requirements of non-officer personnel to assist the observers."

We would appreciate Department's earliest instructions regarding reply.

JESSUP

¹ Not printed; it summarized Mr. Jessup's discussions with Count Bernadotte, the French and Belgian Representatives at the United Nations, and other United Nations officials concerning the Mediator's needs in carrying out the truce in Palestine (501.BB Palestine/7-1648). New York, at 11:51 p. m., July 16, transmitted the pertinent sections of a *note verbale* from Secretary-General Lie making known the Mediator's requirements of equipment and technical personnel (telegram 904, 501.BB Palestine/7-1648).

501.BB Palestine/7-1748: Telegram

*The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations
(Jessup) to the Secretary of State*

SECRET URGENT

NEW YORK, July 17, 1948—12:08 a. m.

905. Remytel No. 900, July 16.¹ Count Bernadotte phoned me this evening to advance suggestion which he had previously made to Rusk, that the US provide approximately 100 non-coms and enlisted men

¹ Not printed; but see footnote 1, *supra*.

to assist officer observers already requested for supervision of truce. Bernadotte explained that in his opinion a group assigned on this basis would not form a military unit and from a legal point of view would not be on military duty. He emphasized that the type of service contemplated in no way involved combat, but would be confined to duty as drivers, guards, communications operators, et cetera.

I assured Bernadotte that while we were in no position at present to commit our military establishment along these lines, prompt and serious consideration would be given to his proposal. He stressed that time was valuable and that a prompt decision could make all the difference in the next few days. He concluded with the remark that having just received word of Arab assurance of the cease-fire for Jerusalem,² he was taking off for the Middle East with high hopes and his "flag at the top".

In our opinion Arab acceptance of Jerusalem cease-fire gives the Mediator's suggestion a sound foundation which will doubtless be enlarged and strengthened if and when the cease-fire becomes effective for the whole of Palestine. In line with our general recommendations made in previous telegrams, we urge that earnest consideration be given this proposal as a practical way to assist the Mediator in his difficult and important task.

JESSUP

² Secretary-General Azzam, in a telegram of July 17 to Secretary-General Lie, announced the Arab States' acceptance of that part of the Security Council's resolution of July 15 dealing with the cease-fire in Jerusalem; for text, see SC, *3rd yr., Supplement for July 1948*, p. 79.

501.BB Palestine/7-1748: Telegram

The Chargé in Egypt (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

CAIRO, July 17, 1948—4 p. m.

1005. Mytel 957, July 9. In connection with Bernadotte's advice that SC should adopt resolution threatening use all provisions of Charter including armed intervention in order to bring Arabs to their senses. Department may find comments of this Embassy of pertinence in view of July 15 action SC in ordering cease-fire.

In regard to Bernadotte's statement under reference Embassy convinced that necessity exists to provide Arabs with face-saving formula but Department may wish to consider whether application of sanctions as proposed will produce effect envisaged by Bernadotte either by (a) Bringing Arabs to their senses or (b) Constituting a face-saving formula enabling Arab leaders to reverse present policy. It may be suggested that effect may possibly be to contrary. Aerial and naval demonstrations as suggested by Bunche might well prove contra productive.

Arabs have been already cognizant possibility application of sanctions so Bernadotte's proposals were apparently rejected in realization of consequences. Application and effect therefore already discounted. Further threat of their actual application by UN (UN[*in?*] which US will be regarded as taking leading part) may thereby fail to bring them to their senses as predicted. Consequently in present fatalistic mood of Arabs contrary effect may be produced. Such view also held by British Ministers Clayton and Troutbeck here the latter having changed his views as reported by London telegram to Department No. 2965 July 4, 1948.¹

This Embassy unaware of Arab officials to whom Bernadotte refers as seeking UN application of sanctions in order to provide way out. Such, no doubt, exist among those who seek resolution of conflict but as Department aware most Arab leaders have committed themselves so strongly and raised hopes of masses so high through press and other media as to incur considerable personal risk by withdrawal from current Palestine policy at least without period of preparation of public opinion. Current and continuing statements along these lines as by Iraqi Prime Minister and Nokrashy (Embtel 993 July 15¹) and critical press comments suggest that such dangers are present. It is felt by observers here that even should Arab leaders accept truce on ground that application of sanctions implies that world is against Arabs, the masses which now more intensely interested in Palestine than are leaders, might not concur in such action. Indignant reaction among masses can be reasonably foreshadowed with conceivable overthrow administrations with consequent disorders and increased resentment against west highly detrimental to personal safety of American citizens and their commercial interests including oil concessions and aviation throughout Arab world.

Collapse of Arab League and disappearance of Azzam Pasha who in all issues except Palestine have exerted moderating influence on Arab world would also seem to be a sequel.

Department has no doubt considered possibility action would be followed by withdrawal Arab States from UN.

For possible consideration in ameliorating situation Embassy suggests regarding truce extension that prospect for possible face saving formula lies in Azzam Pasha's letter to UN Secretary General Lie pointing out that Arabs in rejecting Bernadotte's request for truce extension were not adverse to truce as such but only to truce of previous four weeks which Arabs are firmly convinced gave Jews opportunity to expand strategic and political positions with no approach to meet-

¹ Not printed.

ing of minds of two parties and which held out no prospect of final solution at its termination.² However, in this connection Department should be aware that antagonism to America and loss of confidence in it has reached such point here that future representations will have little effect unless concrete evidence is available that similar pressures are being exerted on Zionist leaders and on PGI.

As for possible formula for future settlement Azzam's public pronouncement through AP interview for Jewish "Vatican State" might be studied. Represents first public break in Arab front.

PATTERSON

² Secretary-General Azzam, in a telegram of July 18 to Secretary-General Lie, announced the Arab States' acceptance of that part of the Security Council's resolution of July 15 dealing with a cessation of hostilities in Palestine. The communication set forth the view that the new truce would not achieve its purpose unless various deficiencies in the four-weeks' truce were remedied. Thus he requested that all Jewish immigration into Palestine be stopped during the truce and that the 300,000 Arab refugees be returned home with guarantees of their lives and property. He requested also that the new truce not be indefinite, but with a fixed duration to permit a last effort to reach a peaceful solution; for text, see SC, *3rd yr., Supplement for July 1948*, p. 82. Egypt, Trans-jordan, Israel, Syria, and Lebanon also accepted the cease-fire arrangements in Palestine, and Iraq and Saudi Arabia made interim reply; for the texts of their communications to Count Bernadotte, see *ibid.*, pp. 80, 81.

501.BB Palestine/7-1948: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United Nations Mediator in Palestine (Bernadotte), at Rhodes

WASHINGTON, July 19, 1948—8 p. m.

Please be assured that the United States will assist you in every practicable way in the execution of your heavy responsibilities.¹ Orders have already been issued to place immediately at your disposal the assistance furnished by us during the earlier cease-fire in June. Our observer personnel should now be arriving in Rhodes. We are giving urgent attention to the possibility of sending additional observers and equipment and will communicate with you shortly on this point. We wish you success in the performance of your most difficult and important task.

GEORGE C. MARSHALL

¹ This telegram was in response to an undated telegram from Rhodes, in which Count Bernadotte had made an urgent appeal to Secretary Marshall for 125 observers and needed equipment. The telegram was received in the Department on July 19 (501.BB Palestine/7-1948).

501.BB Palestine/7-2048: Telegram

*The United Nations Mediator in Palestine (Bernadotte) to the
Secretary of State*¹

SECRET PRIORITY

[RHODES?], July 20, 1948.

Unnumbered. I am deeply appreciative of assurance of your support conveyed in your cable of 20 [19] July.

I am greatly concerned about the situation in Jerusalem. As you know an agreement between the Arabs and Jews in Jerusalem for the neutralization of Mount Scopus and Victoria Augusta Hospital had been negotiated during the four week truce on condition that the United Nations as a bulk provide guards for these places. At present I am able to dispose of one Swedish colonel, one senior member of the UN secretariat and eight untrained and unarmed UN guards for this purpose. I have most urgent and immediate need of 250 armed guards for this purpose. The function of these guards does not involve any risk of engagement with regular Arab or Jewish forces. Their function is a police function consisting primarily of protecting these areas against possible activities of irresponsible irregular elements from both sides.

My understanding is that the French Government is willing to provide 80 armed guards from their armed forces immediately if the USA and Belgium each would make a similar number available. These guards from the three states, members of the Truce Commission, would be required only until such time as the United Nations would be able to recruit and make available an internationally recruited guard force.

I understand that there is one reinforced US Marine engineer battalion combat loaded aboard the *Marquette* now in Rhodes harbor. Since the hoped for demilitarization of Jerusalem and permanent peace in Palestine generally depend largely upon the United Nations demonstrating its ability to discharge its obligations with regard to Mount Scopus and Victoria Augusta Hospital, I appeal to you urgently to permit the temporary assignment of this Marine unit to the United Nations for employment on the above mission until they are relieved by the 80 man contingents from the three states members of the Truce Commission.

If this unit can be made available as I earnestly hope, it would, of course, be with the understanding that it could be immediately withdrawn by your government without prior notice should any emergency require its deployment elsewhere.

COUNT FOLKE BERNADOTTE

¹ Transmitted by the Department of the Navy as CTF 167.

501.BB Palestine/7-2148

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Lovett)*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 21, 1948.

Participants: Mr. James G. McDonald—Special Representative of
the United States of America
Mr. Lovett—U
Mr. Wilkins—NE

Mr. McDonald called on me this afternoon prior to his departure from New York on July 23 for London on his way to Tel Aviv.

Mr. McDonald said that he had called on General Bradley,² Secretary Forrestal, Mr. Royall,³ Mr. Symington,⁴ Mr. Clifford and the President this morning to pay his respects and to say goodbye.

Mr. McDonald said that Secretary Forrestal had instructed the Secretaries of Navy, Army and Air Force to take immediate action on his request for service attachés for Tel Aviv. Mr. McDonald said he wanted good men to report on military matters in Israel as he himself was a novice at such affairs.

Mr. McDonald said that he had not discussed the question of *de jure* recognition with the President but that the President's advisers seemed to be of the opinion that the United States could give *de jure* recognition to the *de facto* Government of Israel. Mr. McDonald explained that he had not studied this question of international law since his early days as a student and that, as a result, he was somewhat confused.

I replied that the United States had recognized the Provisional Government of Israel as the *de facto* authority of the new State of Israel. I pointed out that this action constituted recognition of the State completely and fully and *de facto* recognition of the Provisional Government. I added that *de jure* recognition of a government of Israel as opposed to a provisional government of Israel could normally be expected to follow the holding of elections for such government. Any other course might result in a demand for immediate recognition by any junta or group seizing power by force or by some other unconstitutional means. I also referred to the present character of the Provisional Government of Israel and pointed out Ben Gurion's presently successful efforts to maintain control. I noted, however, that the

¹ Drafted by Mr. Wilkins.

² Gen. Omar N. Bradley, Chief of Staff, United States Army.

³ Kenneth C. Royall, Secretary of the Army.

⁴ W. Stuart Symington, Secretary of the Air Force.

Irgun and the Stern gang were still active in Palestine and stressed the fact that premature *de jure* recognition of the Provisional Government of Israel might, unless we were satisfied as to its stability, place the United States Government in the position of having relations with a government under Soviet influence.

I informed Mr. McDonald that although we were unable to obtain Marine guards for Tel Aviv we had been able to obtain a group of highly qualified consular guards from other Departments of the Government such as ex-servicemen, ex-FBI men and CIA men. Mr. McDonald said he appreciated our arranging for a guard and, in this connection, expressed concern for the safety of Mr. Stanton Griffis, the new American Ambassador to Egypt, and for the safety of the personnel at the American Embassy in Cairo. I asked Mr. Wilkins to inquire what action the Department was taking in this respect and to follow through on it.

Mr. McDonald showed me a copy of the President's letter of July 21, 1948 to him which read as follows :

"In wishing you Godspeed in your important mission I am well aware of the difficulties in making effective our policy aimed at the peaceful settlement of differences among the nations of the Near East and cooperation among them.

"Success of your efforts will depend largely on teamwork and alertness of all persons concerned with this problem both here and abroad and upon hearty collaboration with you. In addition to your regular reports to the Department of State, I shall expect you to keep me personally informed on such matters as relate to the arms embargo, the appropriate time for full recognition, and the types of assistance as may be required by and can properly be granted to the new state.

"Let me assure you that you have my fullest confidence and support."

Mr. McDonald referred to Count Bernadotte's recent mediation proposals in which it had been suggested that the City of Jerusalem and its environs be placed under Arab control. Mr. McDonald asked me what the Department's policy was in this respect. I told him that it was possible that Count Bernadotte had made this suggestion for bargaining purposes and that, in any event, the United States had consistently supported the internationalization of Jerusalem as was evidenced by our stand in the General Assembly in the fall of 1947, by our position as expressed during the Special Session in the Spring of 1947 and by the attitude which we had adopted on the French proposals in the Security Council in the Spring of 1948. I asked Mr. Wilkins to supply Mr. McDonald with the various papers in this respect.

I told Mr. McDonald that I had no specific instructions to give him at this time with regard to American policy toward Palestine but that we would inform him of developments as they took place in the future. I added, however, that I would appreciate his informing the Department of the manner in which the United States Military Observers attached to Count Bernadotte performed their functions. I told Mr. McDonald that it appeared that the activities of the American-French-Belgian Military Observers during the four-week truce under the Resolution of May 29 appeared to have been somewhat disorganized but expressed the hope that the Military Observers under the new truce would be able to function more effectively than they had on the previous occasion.⁵

⁵ For Mr. McDonald's account of his conversation with Secretary Marshall on July 21, see his *My Mission in Israel, 1948-1951* (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1951), p. 7.

501.BB Palestine/7-2148: Telegram

The Consul General at Jerusalem (Macdonald) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

JERUSALEM, July 21, 1948—5 p. m.

1108. Protocol regarding truce and defining lines of Arab and Jewish positions was signed at noon by commander of Arab and Jewish forces in Jerusalem in presence of Truce Commission. Both commanders appeared satisfied with general outline of demarcation no man's land presented by UN observer and general attitude of meeting was friendly.

Jewish commander told me he considered a Palestine war over and said he now feels matter can be settled by peaceful negotiations. Arab commander also mentioned to me that he hoped this would lead to peace but reiterated it would have to be a just and honorable peace. Although he was in a better frame of mind than he was on July 17 (mytel 1097, July 19¹) it is my impression that he is still skeptical regarding the sincerity of the UN and particularly the US in its efforts of find a fair solution to the Palestine problem.

MACDONALD

¹ Not printed; it stated that Commander Abdullah el-Tel "expressed considerable distrust of US intentions and displeasure over renewal truce. He feels that US through SC forced Arabs accept truce in order to allow Jews time and opportunity to improve their military position as they did during last truce. There is no doubt now whatsoever that Jews gained materially in military strength during former truce period." (501.BB Palestine/7-1948)

501.BB Palestine/7-2148 : Telegram

*The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations
(Jessup) to the Secretary of State*

SECRET US URGENT

NEW YORK, July 21, 1948—6:50 p. m.

932. Reference unnumbered from Navy Department dated July 20 (CTF 167 to SecState¹) transmitting text of message to Secretary from Bernadotte requesting temporary assignment of Marines for duty in Jerusalem. We suggest Department consider following points in preparing reply:

1. We consider public opinion reaction in US would be adverse to assignment our service personnel for guard duty in Palestine.

2. Adverse public opinion reaction would be strengthened if any of this personnel were injured or killed.

3. We consider psychological reaction of Arabs in their present attitude towards US would be adverse.

4. Proposed action would strengthen Soviet propaganda case against US participation in truce supervision.

5. We have repeatedly pointed out orally to Secretariat officers at all levels, and formally in our letter of June 29 (to Lie) (Ref. Deptel 436, June 28) (copy sent McClintock June 29) that US is not in a position to second American forces for UN guard duty nor to recruit American citizens for such duty. In same formal communication and orally before and since that date, we have urged Secretariat to do their own recruiting for UN guard force in Palestine. I took specifically same line with Bernadotte at lunch last Friday.

6. Persistence of idea that US armed forces be supplied suggests that Bernadotte or members his staff may be persisting in idea that show of force is necessary to impress Arabs and Jews and that such show of force would be more effective if carried out by armed personnel of major powers. Department will recall Bunche's repeated urging of a naval demonstration. Show of force idea has been a recurrent one for long time past.

7. Perhaps a minor point is apparent desire of Bernadotte to develop new channel of communication direct with Secretary. This is presumably not likely to result in any real confusion within US Government, although we should be careful that Bernadotte does not get impression that he can get more favorable attention this way. On other hand, confusion may well result if we are getting some requests direct from Bernadotte and others through Secretariat. In our view there should be single channel of communication and it may well be that most effective cooperation could be brought about by direct communica-

¹ See footnote 1, p. 1231.

tion between Bernadotte's headquarters and Washington if communications facilities are now adequate for this purpose.

JESSUP

501.BB Palestine/7-2348

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Director of the Office of United Nations Affairs (Rusk)

[WASHINGTON,] July 23, 1948.

Mr. Ohly¹ called and said that the War Council (Secretary of Defense and Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force) had been briefed by Mr. Bohlen on the Palestine situation and had come to the following conclusion, subject to the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

1. That the maintenance of the truce in Palestine was of vital interest to the security of the United States;
2. That the United States should do everything we properly can to help Count Bernadotte implement the truce;
3. That instructions should be issued to Admiral Sherman to see Count Bernadotte immediately to work out an observation plan and a program of United States assistance;
4. That consideration should be given as to whether the whole job of assistance should be turned over to a single service or should be continued on an inter-service basis.

¹ John H. Ohly, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense.

501.BB Palestine/7-2348 : Telegram

The Consul General at Jerusalem (Macdonald) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

JERUSALEM, July 23, 1948—2 p. m.

1113. Yesterday and last night Chairman Truce Commission and I visited forward positions Arab Legion with Legion Commander Arabs Jerusalem and several Legion officers of both British and Arab nationality. Arab Legion officers including Jerusalem Commander are very worried about Jewish troop movements in vulnerable forward areas and feel Jews are improving positions in an attempt to cut off various Arab units. They have no confidence in Jewish forces observing truce and expect an attack any time. Intelligence officer said they have reports that Stern Gang and IZL plan to attack Old City. Brigadier Lash, Commander of Arab Legion Forces in Palestine, said last night that he is concerned about observance of truce and fears that minor incidents and rumors which are rife will lead to collapse of cease-fire. A feeling of tenseness and expectation of sudden attack is obvious at all Arab Legion posts visited. On other hand there is

evidence that Legion Officers are making every effort and taking precautions for observing truce.

From observation point at Nilin we could see Jews who had moved forward from their positions at time of cease-fire to within rifle range of Arab lines. Similar actions are reported on other fronts and although Arab lines have not been crossed it is such movements and infiltrations that is causing Arabs worry and mistrust of Jewish intentions. Truce commission will request UN observers due arrive today to investigate this matter.

MACDONALD

501.BB Palestine/7-2048 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Jessup)

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, July 24, 1948—9 a. m.

477. Re urtel 926, July 20¹ quoting note from Acting SYG. Dept believes it would be inappropriate for U.S. and other individual govts to designate national members to tribunal envisaged by UN Mediator for examining alleged breaches of truce. Under SC resolution of July 15 this responsibility devolves on Mediator rather than on any body of examiners to be constituted of representatives of states (such as those states represented on Truce Commission). Indeed note of Acting SYG states that function of examining alleged breaches would be "on behalf of the mediator." Dept believes it would be appropriate for Mediator to designate members of his international staff to examine alleged breaches. If Mediator prefers to retain services of examiners selected specifically for this work, Dept would be glad to suggest names of qualified individuals. Request you reply to note of Acting SYG in sense of above. For your info, Dept wishes to avoid tribunal composed of national representatives with consequent likelihood of charges by Arab states or Israel, in particular cases, attacking on a national basis the operations or findings of examiners.

MARSHALL

¹ Not printed; the note, dated July 19, transmitted the Mediator's request to the United States Government for one legal assistant with the status of judge, or similar legal status, to examine on behalf of the Mediator allegations of truce violations in Palestine (501.BB Palestine/7-2048).

501.BB Palestine/7-2548 : Telegram

Mr. Wells Stabler to the Secretary of State

SECRET

AMMAN, July 25, 1948—4 p. m.

20. During conversation with King this morning he said he thought any final settlement Palestine problem would have be imposed on

both parties by Security Council. Asked whether he believed Arabs would accept such settlement he replied emphatically in affirmative. He did not feel actual force would be required as adequate number observers with planes and ships at their disposal could carry out task.

He said Transjordan ready proceed with demilitarization of Jerusalem [and] to withdraw Arab Legion.

Re territorial readjustments in Palestine settlement, King commented that Arabs and Jews could not share Palestine and it would be necessary have separate Jewish and Arab areas. Arab areas of Palestine should be attached to Transjordan (mytel 6, July 13¹) and these areas should also include Negeb, Jaffa and parts of Western Galilee. Felt that shifts of population should take place to eliminate minority problems. Asked whether Egypt and Saudi Arabia would agree such territorial changes King said former would raise no objection while in case of latter he and Ibn Saud in complete harmony. Re other Arab states indicated that Hashemite Federation could overcome any objections.

Re reports that Iraq had announced it would continue fight King said Transjordan and all Arab states wished continue war. However, he realized that for various reasons Arabs could not afford continue war and had persuaded other Arab states agree to truce.

King made usual uncomplimentary remarks about Arab League and also referred to his Greater Syria scheme² as the one hope of Arabs. He seemed in very good spirits and it is believed present cessation of hostilities in addition to possible prospect of large kingdom agree with him.

Department please pass Jerusalem as 12.

STABLER

¹ Not printed.

² For previous documentation on this subject, see *Foreign Relations, 1947*, vol. v, pp. 738 ff.

867N.01/7-2648

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Mattison)

[WASHINGTON,] July 26, 1948.

Mr. Bromley¹ called to state that he had been requested to inform the Department that the British Government intended to resume the subsidy payments to Transjordan which had been held up because of the "obscure" situation in Palestine. The British Government felt that inasmuch as Transjordan had accepted the truce, and had proved to be cooperative, they could no longer suspend the subsidy payments.

¹ T. E. Bromley, First Secretary of British Embassy.

Mr. Bromley said that his Government wished to inform the Department in advance of its intention, before it became a matter of public knowledge.

501.BB Palestine/7-2648 : Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 26, 1948—1 a. m.

Reference SC Resolution Jul 15 regarding renewal truce in Palestine and Israel Dept considers acceptance by Israel and various Arab states as unconditional. Dept considers differing views of Arabs and Israelis re immigration and other matters are subjects for consideration by Mediator and do not in any way invalidate truce.

Sent to Baghdad, Cairo, Damascus, Beirut, Jidda, Amman, Jerusalem, Tel Aviv.

Rptd to London for communication to FonOff.

MARSHALL

501.BB Palestine/7-2648 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, July 26, 1948—8 p. m.

3385. According to Wright July 24 Bevin's mind is still working along same lines Paragraph 1 Embassy 3252 July 17¹ regarding Palestine. He is gratified by larger staff of observers and feels that it would be desirable for Mediator to remain as close as possible to the two parties and in this connection thinks it would be advantageous move for Mediator to transfer his headquarters from Rhodes to Jerusalem. However, when this idea was advanced to Mediator by British Consulate Rhodes (it had earlier been put forward to Mediator by Sir Hugh Dow on his own initiative) Mediator stated July 20 that he hoped representatives both Jews and Arabs would come to Rhodes shortly. Mediator stated that according to his representative Jerusalem would not be suitable for such meeting until demilitarization

¹Not printed; this paragraph stated that "Bevin spent hour this morning discussing Palestine with his top advisors. Wright has reported to me that Bevin is encouraged by news that cease-fire has already begun Jerusalem and believes utmost use should be made of this development. Bevin through Wright expressed hope US Government and other Truce Commission powers will give highest priority to supplying Bernadotte with his requirements in men and equipment so that start can be made at once in setting up new regime in Jerusalem. If Jerusalem is demilitarized and set up as working entity Bevin believes it may set example for similar developments elsewhere. Bevin thinks also that it would have beneficial effect if Bernadotte would transfer his headquarters from Rhodes to Jerusalem." (501.BB Palestine/7-1748)

takes place² and international police force is established. There are no accommodations in Jerusalem and in present circumstances it would not be safe for leaders of either side to go there. Chief observer has reported that in Jerusalem there is "complete disregard of UN representatives." More recent information, said Wright, indicates that Mediator may now view move to Jerusalem somewhat more favorably than of July 20. Azcarate³ is urging move.

Wright said it was hard to analyze present situation in Middle East and to decide whether relative to Guillion⁴ in Arab states represents acquiescence accompanied by embitterment against West and UN or whether it is lull before storm while extremists lay their plan.

DOUGLAS

² Count Bernadotte's draft proposal for the demilitarization of Jerusalem was transmitted by the Consulate General at Jerusalem in telegram 1122, July 26, 11 a. m., not printed (501.BB Palestine/7-2648).

³ Pablo de Azcarate, Deputy Chief of the Secretariat of the Truce Commission in Palestine.

⁴ The words "to Guillion" are rendered as "tranquillity" in the London Embassy copy of telegram 3385.

CIA Files

*Report by the Central Intelligence Agency*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 27, 1948.

ORE 38-48

POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS FROM THE PALESTINE TRUCE²

1. In response to a request from the Office of the Secretary of Defense regarding the probable duration of the 18 July truce in Palestine and developments that may arise as a result of it, CIA presents the following estimates:

a. The current continuation of the truce is for the most part nominal, and sporadic fighting continues. Israel benefited greatly from the previous truce period in improving its military potential. A continuation of the truce on the conditions of the previous one would be to Israel's advantage, and the Arabs probably would not long respect it. On the other hand, a really effective and adequately enforced truce would have a reasonable chance of being prolonged. Therefore, the Mediator's success in prolonging the truce is in direct proportion to the support he is given in establishing effective means of enforcement.

b. It is unlikely that the Mediator himself will be able to effect a settlement of the basic controversy. Provided, however, that effective means of observation and enforcement are made available and utilized,

¹ Included in the source text is a copy of the CIA map entitled "Military Situation—18 July 1948", reproduced facing this page.

² According to a note on the source text: "The information in this report is as of July 21. The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and the Air Force have concurred in this report."

MILITARY SITUATION - 18 JULY 1948

(At beginning of second U. N. Truce)

PALESTINE


APPROXIMATE LINES BETWEEN ARAB-CONTROLLED AND JEWISH-CONTROLLED AREAS:

- During period of 1st U. N. truce (11 June-9 July 1948)
- - - Beginning of 2nd U. N. truce (18 July 1948)

JEWISH GAINS BETWEEN 1st AND 2nd TRUCES

- Partition Boundary (as accepted by the United Nations General Assembly, Nov, 1947)
- International Boundary
- District Boundary
- Standard Gauge Railroad (4'8 1/2")
- Narrow Gauge Railroad (3'5 1/4")
- First Class Road
- Second Class Road
- Oil Pipe Line
- Intermittent Stream
- Jewish Communal Area

0 10 20 30 Miles
0 10 20 30 Kilometers



Sources:
Palestine, 1:500,000, Geo. Philip and Son, 1942
Survey of Palestine Minor Map, 1:500,000, 1939
Palestine, 1:250,000, M.D.R. 1509/12375, 1946

it is probable than an unstable truce can be maintained until the problem can be referred back to the United Nations General Assembly in September or to the International Court of Justice.

c. The present intentions of the USSR are to promote instability and insecurity throughout the Middle East and to undermine the positions of the US and the UK therein. To do so the USSR has given, and presumably will continue to give, support in varying degrees to both Israel and the Arab countries. The collapse of the truce and the intensification of hostilities would afford the USSR increased opportunities to pursue its aims. Conversely, any measures which might prolong the truce would be detrimental to Soviet aims.

d. A critical factor in the continuance of the truce will be the ability of the Israeli government to control the activities of its extremist elements (Irgun Zvai Leumi and the Stern Gang) and of the Arab governments to control popular outbreaks directed against the maintenance of the truce. It is not believed that complete control by their governments of either Jewish or Arab extremists will be possible, but the conditions for such control will be much more favorable under a fair truce, rigorously enforced, than under an inadequate truce, half-heartedly supported.

2. Further discussion concerning the possible outcome of the truce is in Enclosure A; of the current military situation in Palestine in Enclosure B; of Soviet intentions in the area in Enclosure C.

Enclosure A

POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS FROM THE PALESTINE TRUCE

1. GENERAL

The UN mediator has two objectives: an effective truce of indefinite duration; and a final compromise solution, between Jews and Arabs, of the Palestine problem. The present truce was agreed to on 18 July and has been violated repeatedly by both Arabs and Jews. The violations have resulted from the absence in Palestine of UN observers and machinery for preventing infractions, and from the determination of various Arab and Jewish groups to gain last-minute advantages which they feel to be of vital importance. The Mediator's success in establishing an effective truce will depend on the effectiveness of the machinery which is given him, the ability of Israel to control its extremist groups (the Irgun Zvai Leumi and the Stern Gang), and the reaction of the Arab peoples against the acceptance of the truce by their leaders.

2. POSSIBILITY OF AN EFFECTIVE TRUCE

a. *Observer Teams.*

Current efforts to organize UN observer teams include plans for 300 observers—three times as many as were sent to Palestine during the previous truce. The effectiveness of the current truce will depend largely on the incisiveness with which these observers carry out their

duties and the forcefulness with which the Mediator deals with violations. If violations are ignored to the same extent as during the previous truce, the success of the current truce will be doubtful. The Jews will, as before, bring in men, aircraft, and heavy military equipment; present Arab opposition to the truce will then become intensified, and the Arabs will probably reopen hostilities.

b. Israeli Extremists.

It is probable that any concessions that the PGI might make to obtain Arab agreement to permanent peace would be met by open and violent action by the Jerusalem extremists. If, however, the Mediator attempts to establish a special UN regime over Jerusalem before a final settlement is achieved or to revise the territorial boundaries to what they consider detrimental to Israel, the extremist groups will almost certainly resume fighting. At the present time it is believed that the PGI can control extremist elements within the partition boundaries, but it may not be able to control them in other parts of Palestine, especially in Jerusalem.

c. Reaction of Arab Peoples.

The Arab people were confident of victory and were assured by their leaders that the truce would not be extended. Their bitterness may well erupt into violence against their governments or the Western powers or both. If their wrath is turned against their leaders, some of the Arab governments in an attempt to survive may well resume the Palestine war. Arab leaders, however, will first make every effort to turn the anger of their people against the UN, the US, and the UK, or even against one another.

The timing of such developments cannot be predicted because they depend partly on spontaneous eruptions of popular feelings, which are subject to violent change, and partly on organized agitation. Rioting, however, has already developed in Cairo. Serious Jewish violations of the truce (particularly the bombing of Arab cities) would further inflame Arab public opinion and would make it more difficult for the Arab governments to continue the truce. Communist agents in the Arab countries will probably exert themselves to stir up the people against their governments in order to bring about the downfall of the present regime as well as to destroy the truce. The rapidity with which the observer teams are mobilized and their effectiveness will obviously have great bearing on this problem.

3. POSSIBILITY OF A COMPROMISE SOLUTION BETWEEN ARABS AND JEWS

It is extremely unlikely that the Mediator himself will be able to persuade Arabs and Jews to agree to a compromise solution for Palestine. The Jews, with a *de facto* government and because of their mili-

tary strength and the political support of the US and the USSR, are in an extremely strong position. The provisions of the UN partition scheme constitute for the moment their minimum demands. The Arabs, in spite of their weakness, have given no official indication that they are prepared to recognize Israel as defined in the UN partition plan. At the present time no Arab government feels it could survive if it consented to negotiate with Israeli representatives. Israel and the Arab governments might accept some sort of international status for Jerusalem or its de-militarization, but such a development might well be resisted by the Israeli extremist groups.

If, after repeated attempts, the Mediator is unable to make any progress toward a solution, he may recommend some further course of action to the Security Council. Should the truce prove reasonably effective, he might as an alternate move recommend the advisability of securing an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice. If, on the other hand, the truce collapses, he undoubtedly will recommend sanctions against Arabs, or Jews, or both. One difficulty in the way of getting negotiations started is the firm statement of the Arabs, frequently repeated, that under no circumstances will they recognize an Israeli state, which they would appear to do if they sat at a council table with Israeli delegates. Encouragement must therefore be given to the present Arab governments as well as an excuse furnished to them to give to their own people. This might well be secured through an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice; e.g. as to whether a government of Israel exists with which the Arabs can negotiate.

4. CONCLUSIONS

Unless strongly backed by the Security Council and efficiently enforced, it is unlikely that the truce will be effective. Even with an effective truce it is unlikely that a compromise agreement will be reached between Arabs and Jews for a considerable period of time. Judging from present events in Palestine and should the effectiveness of the observer machinery be no better than during the first truce, it is probable that sporadic fighting will continue and that the Jews will greatly increase their military potential under the cloak of the truce. Thus the state of Israel would be further consolidated, and the Arabs would be further weakened and isolated. If, however, the truce is effectively enforced and the present comparatively moderate Arab governments can stay in power, the truce may be prolonged by the Arabs in the hope that a revision of the UN partition resolution may be secured at the September meeting of the General Assembly or that the issue will be submitted to the International Court of Justice. If, on the other hand, these governments are overthrown, the Arabs will resume the fight, be seriously defeated, break all contact with the US and the UK,

and almost certainly (in one way or another) eventually find themselves open to Soviet exploitation.*

Enclosure B

THE MILITARY SITUATION IN PALESTINE AT THE BEGINNING OF THE SECOND TRUCE—18 JULY 1948

The military situation on 18 July, the beginning of the second truce in Palestine, shows that the Jews have made substantial gains during the nine-day period of fighting between 9 July and 18 July. (See map.) During that period the Jews captured Lydda, Ramle, and Ras el Zin, thereby removing the danger of an Arab thrust on Tel-Aviv. In the north they took the strategic Arab-Christian town of Nazareth and consolidated their positions along the Lebanese border into which units had been moved during the truce. In the south the Jews thrust southeast into the Egyptian-occupied area near Isdud and widened and strengthened the strip of Jewish-controlled territory along the roads between Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv. The only successful Arab action during that period, the Iraqi advance north from Jenin toward Afule, was halted by the truce before any significant gain was made.

During the period of the truce the Jews gained considerably from a military point of view. They strengthened and improved their existing fortifications and built new ones in the areas recently taken over from the Arabs. They improved the by-pass road to Jerusalem, which skirts Arab-held Latrun and Bab el Wad on the main road from Jerusalem to Tel-Aviv. They recruited and trained troops both abroad and in Palestine, and reinforcements were flown in from abroad. They increased their supply of tanks, aeroplanes, and artillery. The Jews brought heavy artillery into the Jerusalem area and are reported to have acquired at least 13 German ME-109 fighter planes—which can be converted into light bombers—and 3 B-17's. (They are now reported to possess a total of 60 ME-109's, of which 24 are operational.) The food situation in Jerusalem was greatly improved during the truce.

The Arabs made certain gains during the truce, but these were insignificant compared to the Jewish gains. The Arabs received some Italian and Belgian arms and brought more arms and ammunition to the front.

The truce resulted in so great an improvement in the Jewish capabilities that the Jews may now be strong enough to launch a full-scale offensive and drive the Arab forces out of Palestine. Events during the

*If, however, a settlement is imposed upon the Arabs by force, it should be pointed out that guerrilla warfare may be expected to continue for an indefinite period. Furthermore, resistance to authority through well proved nuisance techniques, boycotts, and other political devices may defeat ultimately the goal of permanent peace and security in Palestine and the Middle East. [Footnote in the source text.]

truce, and the enormous increase in Jewish strength resulting from them, considerably change the previously held estimate of the probable course of the war in Palestine. The Arabs' logistical position generally is very bad and their ammunition supply is exceedingly low. It is estimated that they could not continue to fight, even on the previous moderate scale, for more than two to three months.

The Military Forces involved are estimated as:

Arab Forces in or near Palestine

| Army | In Palestine | Near Palestine | Total |
|--------------|--------------|----------------|--------|
| Transjordan | 6,000 | 4,000 | 10,000 |
| Iraq | 9,000 | 1,000 | 10,000 |
| Egypt | 5,000 | 8,000 | 13,000 |
| Syria | 1,000 | 1,500 | 2,500 |
| Lebanon | | 1,800 | 1,800 |
| Saudi Arabia | 3,000 (?) | | 3,000 |
| Irregulars | 3,000 (?) | 3,500 | 6,500 |
| Totals | 27,000 | 19,800 | 46,800 |

ISRAELI FORCES

Haganah

| | |
|--|--------|
| Mobile Striking Force | 17,000 |
| Semi-Mobile (Local operation) | 18,000 |
| Garrison or Defense (settlers-urban militia) | 50,000 |

Irgun Zvai Leumi

The Irgun has gradually increased from 7,000 to 12,000 during the past 4 to 6 months.

Stern Gang

A similar rise in Stern Gang numbers from 400-800 has been recently confirmed.

Total

97,800

Enclosure C

SOVIET POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

1. SOVIET OBJECTIVES

a. The ultimate objective of Soviet policy vis-à-vis the Middle East is the assumption of the dominant role in the area.

b. To implement this main objective, Soviet policy is directed toward the accomplishment of four secondary objectives:

- (1) Instability in the Arab world.
- (2) A complete break between the US and the Arab states.
- (3) Strained relations between the US and the UK concerning Middle East policy.
- (4) A complete break between the UK and the Arab states.

2. APPLICATION AND RESULTS OF SOVIET POLICY (29 NOVEMBER 1947-
18 JULY 1948)

With the above objectives in mind, the USSR voted for the UN partition of Palestine. From November to May it consistently supported partition but took no initiative in urging effective action to implement partition. Officially the Soviet position was unimpeachable; unofficially, the Kremlin was content to sit back and watch matters go from bad to worse in Palestine. The Soviet delegation loudly denounced and obstructed the US proposals for a temporary trusteeship over Palestine, the *one* possibility which might have prevented an Arab-Jewish war after 15 May. Since 15 May the delegation has been lukewarm on truce attempts and has obstructed mediation efforts. On 7 July it abstained in the Security Council from voting on the resolution to extend the four weeks' truce. Although it voted for the resolution on 15 July ordering the belligerents to cease hostilities, it abstained from voting on the proposal to give the UN Mediator authority to negotiate a settlement between Jews and Arabs.

By pursuing the tactics outlined in the preceding paragraph, the USSR has increased its prestige among Zionist groups throughout the world. Moreover, its support of partition has done little to impair Soviet-Arab relations, which could hardly have been made worse in any case. (The retaliatory outlawing of the Communist parties in Syria and Lebanon merely sent the Communists underground and, in view of the ineffectiveness of Arab police and security measures, did not greatly impair the capabilities of the Communists in these countries.) Soviet tactics in the UN have also contributed directly to instability in the Middle East, the first secondary objective of Soviet policy.

The inability of the UN to formulate a compromise solution of the Palestine problem has contributed directly to the other three Soviet secondary objectives. US support of partition immediately drove a wedge into US-Arab relations. This breach in relations could never be mended unless a compromise was reached between Arabs and Jews. By opposing a compromise solution, the USSR contributed directly to increasingly strained relations between Arabs and the US, its second objective. As the UK was compelled for strategic and economic reasons to support the Arabs, strained relations between the US and the UK, the third Soviet objective, inevitably followed. The Kremlin doubtless reasoned that UK dependence on ERP would compel the UK to bow to US pressure. This would in turn lead to the fourth Soviet objective, the rupture of UK-Arab relations. While the USSR was doubtless prepared to take positive steps toward the attainment of its objectives, it has been unnecessary for it to do anything beyond obstructing the possibility of a compromise solution between Arabs and Jews. US support of partition, UK support of the Arabs, and UK economic dependence on the US have combined to produce a situa-

tion favorable to the USSR and one which they can be expected to exploit in the future.

3. FUTURE POLICY (AFTER 18 JULY 1948)

The future policy of the USSR vis-à-vis Palestine will aim at consolidating the objectives already partially attained. It will continue to be the Soviet plan to follow a line of opportunism and readiness to exploit what the USSR considers US and UK mistakes. While continuing to support the partition scheme, the USSR may be expected to abstain on or to block any UN action which is likely to bring Jewish-Arab hostilities to a permanent end. This trend is forecast by the USSR abstention on the 7 July Security Council resolution calling on both parties to agree to an extension of the four weeks' truce, and subsequently on the question of granting Bernadotte powers to mediate.

It may come about that the UK, as a result of US and UN pressure, would find it difficult to maintain all its ties with the Arab states, which would contribute to the fourth major objective of the USSR. In such an event it may be expected that the USSR will shift the emphasis of its propaganda from "Jewish independence" to "US imperialism in Israel" and under the latter slogan will woo the Arab governments with promises of military advisers and supplies. It can be expected to "encourage" its own candidates in the political turmoil which will follow Arab military defeats. By such methods it will continue its drive toward the attainment of its basic objective, the assumption of the dominant role in the Middle East.

4. SOVIET ARMS POLICY ON PALESTINE ISSUE

There is a large body of evidence which indicates that arms shipments from the Communist-dominated countries have been made both to the Arab states and to Israel. The Israeli have received the bulk of these arms, which have included ammunition, small arms, automatic weapons, artillery and military planes.†

The major source of arms supply for Israel has been Czechoslovakia. Other countries which have supplied arms are Yugoslavia and Poland, and possibly the USSR. The governments of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia have actively cooperated in these shipments by furnishing protection, maintaining secrecy, or supplying government facilities, including airfields in the case of Czechoslovakia. Ports in Albania and Italy have been utilized for transshipment purposes to provide additional secrecy as to the countries of origin of these military supplies.

Some of the Arab League countries have purchased arms from

†There is no indication that any B-29 type aircraft are being used by either Arabs or Jews. [Footnote in the source text.]

Czechoslovakia; the largest shipments to the Arabs from that country have gone to Syria and Lebanon. Small shipments from the USSR or Balkan ports are also reported to have been landed on the Syrian and Lebanese coasts; also, petroleum products are now being shipped to Lebanon by Rumania.

501.BB Palestine/7-2748 : Telegram

*The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations
(Jessup) to the Secretary of State*

RESTRICTED

NEW YORK, July 27, 1948—1:55 p. m.

957. Following is text of letter received from Comay (PGI) on subject Arab refugees. We have acknowledged this, requesting we be advised any additional information which PGI representatives here obtain.

"A few days ago, Mr. Reed of your delegation discussed with me the question of Arab refugees. In the light of further information, which has now come to hand from the PGI, its general attitude can be noted as follows:

(a) The Government of Israel must disclaim any responsibility for the creation of this problem. The charge that these Arabs were forcibly driven out by Israel authorities is wholly false; on the contrary, everything possible was done to prevent an exodus which was a direct result of the folly of the Arab states in organizing and launching a war of aggression against Israel. The impulse of the Arab civilian population to migrate from war areas, in order to avoid being involved in the hostilities, was deliberately fostered by Arab leaders for political motives. They did not wish the Arab population to continue to lead a peaceful existence in Jewish areas, and they wished to exploit the exodus as a propaganda weapon in surrounding Arab countries and in the outside world. This inhuman policy has now faced the governments concerned with practical problems for which they must assume full responsibility.

(b) The question of the return of Arab refugees cannot be divorced from its military context. While a state of war continues to exist between Israel and the surrounding Arab states, it would gravely prejudice the security and defense of Israel if its borders were flung open to an unrestricted influx of Arabs from those states, who would be a disruptive element in the maintenance of internal law and order, and a formidable fifth column for external enemies. It must be appreciated that a truce is not peace, but merely an interruption of active warfare, and that the governments which are now pressing for the return of these refugees, in order to relieve themselves of a problem they have created, are in the same breath making it clear that they have not relinquished their bellicose intentions.

(c) While permission to return is at present being granted in individual cases on special compassionate grounds, and subject

to security screening, the general question can only be considered as part of a permanent peace settlement with the Arab states.

(d) Such future consideration will take into account the position and treatment of Jewish minorities in the Arab countries.

(e) The Arabs remaining in Israel are assured of equal status, full protection, and due care by the state as regards their social services".¹

JESSUP

¹ For the letter of July 30 from Foreign Minister Shertok to Count Bernadotte expressing Israeli inability to agree to the readmission of Arab refugees to Israeli-controlled areas, see SC, 3rd yr., *Supplement for August 1948*, p. 106.

501.BB Palestine/7-2748 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

LONDON, July 27, 1948—8 p. m.

3413. Embassy's 2785, June 24, paragraph 6.

1. I was informed by Wright today that in extension of ideas mentioned by him earlier Bevin is sending instructions to Cadogan to initiate this week discussion in SC of the bearing upon the political future of Palestine of (a) international refugee problem in general, and (b) problem Arab refugees.

2. In telegram sent Cadogan today, as basis for his remarks it is pointed out that Nazi persecution Jews was new factor in Palestine situation which destroyed British hopes of carrying out mandate and led to Arab fears of influx all Jews in Europe. While 200,000 Jewish DP's plus unknown number Jews now living in Europe are now anxious to go to Palestine, British Govt is inclined to believe that total number might be somewhat reduced if there were "real opportunity for Jews to settle elsewhere". Consequently His Majesty's Govt believes there would [should?] be serious effort on international scale to dispose of all European DP's, Jews and non-Jews and that this would "diminish inter European fears re Palestine and would remove feeling that world is trying to solve problem, which Arabs had no part in creating, at expense of Arabs alone." Cadogan is to say while SC cannot take practical steps itself, it can call matter to attention ECOSOC in present session.

3. Re Arab refugees (see 1b above and Embassy's 3293, July 20¹) Cadogan has been instructed to invite SC to consider situation Palestine Arab refugees in Europe² [who?] number not less than 250,000 compared to 200,000 Jewish DP's in Europe and to inform His Majesty's Govt that "since position Jewish refugees was

¹ Not printed.

² The words "in Europe" appear to be superfluous.

major factor in UNGA deliberations last autumn it is only logical contention that larger problem of the position of Arab refugees should be regarded as major factor in Palestine problem as it now presents itself". Consequently UKUN will suggest that SC should ask Mediator to investigate problem Arab DP's and to make proposals for dealing with it. In particular His Majesty's Govt believes Mediator should be asked to ascertain whether refugees will be able to return to their homes.

4. Wright said UKUN has been instructed to discuss its instructions summarized above with USUN assurance of taking action and to report US views.

Sent Department 3413, Department pass USUN.

DOUGLAS

867N.01/7-2848 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Jerusalem (Macdonald) to the Secretary
of State*

SECRET

JERUSALEM, July 28, 1948—3 p. m.

1132. Delay in demilitarizing Jerusalem is leading to critical situation and unless positive action taken within few days demilitarization may be impossible.

Although Jews express willingness demilitarize they actually resent it for fear it will lead to internationalization. From private conversations during last few days increasing opposition by Jews to demilitarization is very evident and excuse given is alleged refusal of Arabs to agree but press reports state Arabs have agreed.

It is reported a military governor will be appointed for Jerusalem. If true it will complicate question demilitarization and will encourage Jews considerably in their demands to include Jerusalem as part of Israel. Yesterday newly-appointed district attorney Jerusalem and group prominent Jews gave me long argument that inasmuch as Jerusalem captured by Jewish forces it should be part of Israel.

Current reports of expected trouble between Haganah and IZL forces presents gravest threat to demilitarization Jerusalem (see mytel 1125, July 26¹).

If hostilities between these two forces break out Government Israel will insist remaining Jerusalem on grounds protecting it from dissident forces who they will allege oppose Israel's efforts cooperate with UN. In such eventuality Jewish state would likely proclaim Jerusalem part Israel and it is unlikely such claim would be relinquished.

Should this unfortunate delay result in failure demilitarize Jerusalem and encourage Israel Government issue official statement claim-

¹Not printed.

ing Jerusalem part Israel, Arabs will be given just cause to accuse UN of assisting Jews through truce (see mytel 1097, July 19²).

In my opinion Bernadotte made serious error by not visiting Jerusalem on recent trip. Truce Commission has had no communication or instructions from Bernadotte or Security Council except outline for demilitarization Jerusalem since truce went into effect.

MACDONALD

² Not printed; but see footnote 1, p. 1234.

501.BB Palestine/7-2848: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Jerusalem

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 28, 1948—7 p. m.

778. You are instructed immediately to approach Count Bernadotte in person and to discuss with him his request for the assignment of a battalion of the US Marine Corps as a guard force for the policing of the Mt. Scopus area of Jerusalem.¹ It is hoped that you will be able to arrange a meeting with Count Bernadotte in Jerusalem or elsewhere in Palestine. If Count Bernadotte has returned to Rhodes and does not plan to visit Palestine for several days, cable Dept. in advance and authorization will be given you to proceed to Rhodes.

You are instructed to discuss question of Marine Corps guard force along following lines:

“We have given most careful consideration to your telegram July 20 and to recent reports from Admiral Sherman² of his subsequent conversations with you on July 23 with regard to your request for the temporary assignment of a battalion of the US Marine Corps as a guard force for the policing of the Mt. Scopus area of Jerusalem.

We regret that we are unable to accept a military commitment of this nature in Jerusalem. We are compelled to adhere to the position which we took with the Secretary-General on this point and which Dr. Jessup discussed with you prior to your recent departure from Lake Success.

We suggest for your earnest consideration the possibility of a plan for policing Jerusalem which would enlist the active cooperation and participation of Arab and Jewish authorities and armed forces. Responsibility for carrying out the SC resolution of July 15 rests primarily upon the Arabs and Jews who should be able to undertake the policing of the City without employing the services of UN personnel in other than an observing capacity. Although we have not consulted either the Arabs or the Jews on this point, there is some reason to believe that arrangements could be found which would be acceptable to Jewish authorities. You are, of course, in a better position to ascertain whether that is the case.”

¹ See unnumbered telegram of July 20, p. 1231.

² Vice Adm. Forrest P. Sherman, Commander of the Sixth Task Fleet of the United States Navy, operating in the Mediterranean area.

In discussing foregoing with Count Bernadotte you might point out that Arab-Jewish cooperation in policing of Jerusalem might be effected through employment of former Arab and Jewish units of civilian police or, if such units are dispersed and cannot quickly be collected, through employment of well-disciplined units of Israeli and Arab forces serving as military police pending the establishment and expansion of civilian units.³

MARSHALL

³ This telegram was repeated to London and New York. Consul General Macdonald, on July 29, advised the Department that at Count Bernadotte's invitation, he was proceeding to Rhodes the following day on a United Nations plane to discuss the matter (telegram 1139 from Jerusalem, 501.BB Palestine/7-2948).

501.BB Palestine/7-2848 : Telegram

*The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations
(Jessup) to the Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET US URGENT New York, July 28, 1948—7:15 p. m.

963. Cadogan called this morning and showed us his instructions to bring up in SC question of Jewish DP's and Arab refugees. Substance as reported by Douglas in London's 3413, July 27. Cadogan was instructed to request special meeting SC, if necessary, for early consideration these subjects. Although instructed consult USUN, he also on no account is to defer action unless specifically instructed to contrary. He said he would, however, take no action before tomorrow (Thursday) morning in order give us opportunity consult Department, but his present view is he must then request meeting for Friday.

We urge Department cable Douglas immediately asking him to request Bevin instruct Cadogan to defer action at least over weekend, pending fuller opportunity exchange views.¹

For reasons given in our comments below, we are strongly inclined to view that proposed British action is not advisable. This morning we told Cadogan we had no comments from Department. I said we were puzzled to know how UK Government thought proposed action would contribute to smoothing of situation in Palestine during next few weeks and months. Continuing in a general and personal way, we raised some of questions implied in following comments:

1. International refugee problem.

(a) The proposed British action may be confusing and possibly prejudicial to President's request made in special session yesterday that our DP legislation be liberalized.

¹ The Department did so the same day, in telegram 2988 to London, 501.BB Palestine/7-2748. At Ambassador Douglas' urgent request, Mr. Bevin authorized the British Delegation at New York to postpone action on the refugee problems until Monday, August 2 (telegram 3448, July 29, 6 p. m., from London, 501.BB Palestine/7-2948).

(b) Some members of Congress, hostile to liberalizing our DP legislation, might take line that British were attempting to dump European DP's in our laps. Other hostile members of Congress might take line that since SC is dealing with this matter there is no need for further legislation.

(c) PGI would probably feel obliged to state that most of European DP's want to go to Jewish homeland in Palestine. This would be provocative to Arabs (thereby having effect contrary to that contemplated by UK), and might also diminish prospects for liberalization DP legislation.

(d) Although they might not do so publicly, it is likely that PGI through propaganda channels would spread word, whether justified or not, that this action was hidden effort by UK Government to impair Jewish sovereignty in matters of immigration.

2. Arab refugees.

(a) PGI views on this problem set forth in USUN 957, July 27. Raising of this question by UK in SC would create at least some embarrassment for PGI and in turn for US Government, risking impairment our solidarity with British in Palestine matters because, in effect, we would be public advocate PGI position while UK would be public advocate Arab position.

(b) Public declaration by Bernadotte July 25 dealt specifically with his plans for dealing with question Arab refugees (Beirut's 386, July 26,² numbered paragraph 3). Bernadotte, having commendably taken initiative this regard, it would be gratuitous and tend to undermine his prestige for SC to take matter up and ask Mediator to do what he is already doing.

3. Proposed British action would encourage Arab extremists in their attempt to lay down conditions for maintenance present truce. Department will recall that telegram of July 18 from SYG Arab League to SYG UN (S/908, 19 July)³ in reply to SC July 15 resolution attempted to lay down three conditions for maintenance truce, two of three being complete cessation Jewish immigration and return of Arab refugees to their homes during truce. SYG Arab League reiterated this view in communiqué issued following recent conference with Bernadotte (Beirut's 387, July 26²). In this connection please refer to USUN 930, July 21² and Department's circular, July 26, 2 [Z] a. m., stating Department considers acceptance of truce as unconditional and differing views re immigration and other matters are subjects for consideration by Mediator.

4. We feel that proposed British action reflects confusion in their minds concerning proper functions of SC with regard to Palestine. While related to maintenance of truce we feel that question of European DP's and immigration into Palestine, on one hand, and fate of Arab refugees, on other hand, are predominantly matters which must

² Not printed.

³ See footnote 2, p. 1230.

be dealt with in connection with "peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine." For obvious reasons the Soviet and Ukrainian representatives in SC have missed no opportunity to discuss future settlement in Council; the proposed British action would give them still another opportunity. Future settlement, we feel strongly, is a matter which concerns GA and Mediator under Assembly's resolution May 14, and not the SC which is concerned primarily with maintenance of peace in Palestine.

5. Our estimate of British motives in proposing this action is as follows:

(a) They are undoubtedly sincere in wishing to alleviate problems presented by unfortunate status of Jewish DP's in Europe and Arab refugees.

(b) They wish to minimize Jewish immigration and Arab refugee problem as factors which might impair prospects of future settlement.

(c) They probably feel that proposed action might help mend their fences with Arabs.

6. While we do not question sincerity of these probable motives we do feel that British are misleading themselves because it is our estimate that effects of their proposed action would be directly contrary to hoped for results. It is our view that public discussion of these problems in SC at this time would exacerbate rather than relieve problems, and stiffen both Jewish and Arab positions and impair rather than minimize risk of impairing prospects of future settlement, and by misleading Arabs would worsen rather than improve US-UK relations with Arabs.

7. On last point, while we agree with view expressed by Douglas in paragraph 5, London's 3188, July 14, it is our impression that evidences of lowering of British prestige in Near East resulting from their commendable attitude towards July 15 resolution, has caused them to become somewhat squeamish, and as a result to consider taking hasty and ill-advised action. British have certainly not lost nearly as much influence in Arab countries as we have. While Bevin's stand and British courage in recent dealings with Arabs have been wholly admirable, it is our view we should spare no effort to encourage them to stand firm with us in inducing Arabs to take the bitter pill which sooner or later they must swallow, given the circumstances with which we have to deal.

8. Although we have received very little first-hand information concerning situation of Arab refugees, what little information we do have indicates these people will be in serious condition unless steps are taken promptly to assist them. We would suggest following alternatives, therefore, separately or in combination, to British proposals for dealing with these particular problems in SC. These alternatives should,

of course, be coordinated with President's legislative program concerning DP's.

(a) US and UK might jointly take action in ECOSOC and, if feasible, directly with IRO (paragraph 3, London's 3362⁴).

(b) US and UK might jointly suggest to Mediator that he request ECOSOC and IRO for advice and assistance in dealing with these problems. The Mediator clearly would have authority to do so under paragraph 1(c) of GA resolution of May 14 and this action would be consistent with his statement of July 25 (Beirut's 386).

(c) US and UK might jointly encourage philanthropic organizations in respective countries (Amman's 23, July 26⁴) to organize large-scale joint program Near East relief, corresponding so far as US is concerned with large-scale Jewish relief projects.

9. In a broader sense we feel that most effective way for us to mend our fences with Arabs and deal with such specific problems as Jewish immigration and Arab refugees is to get together promptly as possible with UK on details of plan of settlement along lines set forth USUN 831, June 29 [30]; 837, July 1; and paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of 870, July 10. In this connection please note particularly paragraph 4, Amman's 18, July 22,⁴ indicating Transjordan Prime Minister's view that US and UK should decide between themselves what plan should be adopted. In particular most effective steps we feel might be taken to improve US-UK relations with Arab states and would be active development of plans for recognition Transjordan and economic assistance as recommended in paragraphs 4 and 12 USUN 831. Amman's 17, July 20 and Jerusalem's 1118, July 24,⁵ are pertinent to question recognition Transjordan. A program of economic assistance would be particularly important in case of Iraq which, together with Syria, reflects the most extreme Arab position involving greatest risk of political instability.

JESSUP

⁴ Not printed.

⁵ The latter conveyed Special Representative McDonald's strong recommendation that the Department consider extending recognition to Transjordan at this time (890i.01/7-2448). Mr. Jessup, on July 29, supported Mr. McDonald's recommendation (telegram 970 from New York, 890i.01/7-2948).

501.BB Palestine/7-2948 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United Nations Mediator in Palestine
(Bernadotte), at Rhodes*

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, July 29, 1948—2 p. m.

Before your recent departure from United States Philip Jessup of US Mission to UN presented to you the following questions con-

cerning implementation UNSC ban on war materiel to Arab States and Palestine:

"1. The UK has adopted the position that transfer of parts, accessories, and aircraft replacements for maintenance of existing non-British civil airlines in the Middle East would not be contrary to the ban on war material prescribed by the SC resolution of May 29. On the other hand, the US has followed the practice of refusing to license such shipments to non-American airlines in this area. Having in mind the desirability of having the US and UK, the two principal suppliers of aircraft, follow a uniform policy, what is the view of the Mediator on this question?"

"2. The US has furnished to the Mediator the list of items controlled by this government as arms, ammunition, and implements of war with which the Mediator has expressed satisfaction. This list does not include borderline items such as motor vehicles (non-military), uniforms, military communications equipment, and other items of military significance. Does the Mediator wish the items mentioned above to be brought under control and their export prohibited unless his consent is obtained? In any event, does the Mediator wish this government to continue to consult him regarding items not included on the list furnished him, and, if so, will his office find it possible to give prompt replies?"

"3. Are there any further steps contemplated by the Mediator to make the ban on war material more effective?"

"4. The US has received numerous reports on alleged violation of the ban on war material. Where such reports are believed by this government to be reliable, does the Mediator wish to be informed of the details?"

Bunche promised Jessup reply from Rhodes at earliest possible moment. Can you now give your views on these questions? US Govt urgently desires your advice on questions one and two.¹

MARSHALL

¹ This telegram was repeated to New York as No. 485.

501.BB Palestine/7-2948: Telegram

*The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations
(Jessup) to the Secretary of State*

CONFIDENTIAL US URGENT NEW YORK, July 29, 1948—5:35 p. m.

968. From Ross. Following is text of letter from Eban concerning attitude of PGI re its legal status in Jerusalem:

"As you know, the obscure legal position in Jerusalem gives rise to many difficulties, not least of which is the difficulty of the Provisional Government of Israel in asserting its authority over dissident elements.

["I have now ascertained from Mr. Shertok that the view of the Provisional Government of Israel is that the parts of Jerusalem occupied by Jewish forces are, in the legal sense, occupied territory

whose political future is still undecided. The Provisional Government of Israel proposes to make a statement very shortly declaring the status of that area to be that of occupied territory, without prejudice to its future political status.

[“]In his cable to me, Mr. Shertok points out that this proclamation will ensure the legality of measures taken by the Jewish military command and also enable it to tighten its control over dissidents.”

[ROSS]

JESSUP

501.BB Palestine/7-2948 : Telegram

*The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations
(Jessup) to the Secretary of State*

CONFIDENTIAL US URGENT NEW YORK, July 29, 1948—5:35 p. m.

969. Following is text of two letters and enclosures received from Eban concerning demilitarization of Jerusalem: Text of letter dated July 26:

“Your delegation will be aware that negotiations are now proceeding on the question of the demilitarization of Jerusalem, in accordance with the Security Council resolution adopted on 16 [15] July, paragraph 7 [6]. I enclose for your information the text of the first draft proposals presented by the Mediator to the parties, and also the text of a telegraphic agency message which correctly reflects the government of Israel’s reaction to them.

In accepting the principle of a demilitarized Jerusalem, the Government of Israel never imagined that a ring of steel would be put around the city, barring access or residence to all but the aged and the infirm. These negotiations are now faced with considerable difficulty owing to the conditions of access, enumerated in Articles 13, 14 and 16.¹ In a conversation with representatives of the Provisional Government of Israel on July 26, the Mediator showed some understanding of these objections and the negotiations are presumably proceeding further.”

First enclosure to letter of July 26:

[Here follow the Mediator’s draft suggestions for the demilitarization of Jerusalem.]

Second enclosure to letter of July 26:

“Tel Aviv, July 25, (JTA) (daily news bulletin of July 26).—Count Bernadotte’s plan for the demilitarization of Jerusalem which he formally submitted to the Arab League Political Committee in Beirut yesterday, was received with incredulous astonishment in Israeli

¹ The three articles as set forth below were as follows: “Men of military age not normally residing in the demilitarized area would be admissible only upon special permission of the Truce Commission.” (Article 13); “Men of military age normally residing in the demilitarized area, who had at any time been enrolled in military or defense forces of either party, would be admissible only upon special permission of the Truce Commission.” (Article 14); “Men of nonmilitary age and women and children not normally residing in the demilitarized area would be admissible only upon special permission.” (Article 16).

Government circles here. His latest proposal stipulates that every male who was a member of Haganah should be compelled to leave Jerusalem, according to reports here. This means, in effect, that 20,000 Jews would be compelled to quit Jerusalem, leaving their families and virtually destroying the economic life of the city. It appears that Israel will not even consent to discuss this plan, which government circles suggest is so fantastic as to cast doubts on Bernadotte's capacity to mediate."

Text of letter dated July 29 :

"With reference to my letter to you yesterday about the demilitarization of Jerusalem, I have now received a further cablegram from Mr. Shertok.

As I anticipated, the plan submitted by the Mediator proved to be unacceptable, chiefly because of the tight control of access which would have made it difficult for any but the aged or infirm to secure entry or residence in Jerusalem.

You will notice that in the third paragraph of the enclosed cable, the Provisional Government of Israel reaffirms its readiness to approve the principle of demilitarization, so that if a scheme with more liberal provisions of access were devised, it is quite likely to be favorably received."

Enclosure to letter of July 29 :

"To Eban, Memisrael,* New York. Communicated Mediator today following decision: 1. Memisrael reaffirms rejection Mediator's plan demilitarization Jerusalem communicated us July 22. Memisrael assumes this particular scheme no longer stands.

2. Attitude Memisrael to any plan demilitarization emanating from Mediator cannot but be influenced by fact Mediator proposed place Jerusalem ultimately under Arab rule and not withdrawn that proposal.

3. Memisrael ready as before examine any scheme which without prejudicing ultimate settlement problem Jerusalem or prejudicing vital interests Jewish people in Holy City would protect it from further destruction in event hostilities, being resumed other parts Palestine. Signed Shertok."

JESSUP

*Memisrael is code name for Government of Israel. [Footnote in the source text.]

501.BB Palestine/7-2848: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Jerusalem

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 29, 1948—6 p. m.

781. Dept concerned re developments outlined in Contel 1132 July 28 re demilitarization Jerusalem.

SC Resolution July 15 ordered as matter of special and urgent necessity immediate and unconditional cease-fire in city Jerusalem

(which both the Arabs and Jews accepted) to take effect twenty-four hours from time of adoption resolution and instructed Truce Commission take any necessary steps to make cease-fire effected [*effective?*]. Instructed Mediator to continue his efforts bring about demilitarization city Jerusalem without prejudice to future political status Jerusalem and to assure protection of and access to Holy Places, religious buildings and sites in Palestine.

Dept suggest you discuss this matter with your French and Belgian colleagues on Truce Commission and thereafter communicate your conclusions in name of Truce Commission to UN Mediator informing him of such action as Commission may agree to take and requesting instructions from Mediator as to such further action as he may desire.¹

MARSHALL

¹This telegram was repeated to Arab capitals, Tel Aviv, New York, and London.

501.AA/7-2248 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Jessup)

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, July 29, 1948—7 p. m.

489. You may answer inquiries (reurtel 939 July 22¹) by saying we would support an application by Israel. There is, however, no effective deadline for SC approval of applications for GA action this autumn, except end of session of GA itself. Thus in 1946, Siamese application was, at Siamese request, considered and approved by SC on December 12 and approved by GA on December 15, last day of session.

Our position re Israeli qualifications (Art. 4) is that Israel is a peace-loving State that accepts and is able and willing to carry out obligations of Charter. We assume that Israeli application, when submitted, will contain formal undertaking to that effect in accordance with SC Rule 58 and GA Rule 123. In our opinion, Part I, F, of Partition Resolution of 29 November 1947 would not preclude present admission of Israel.

MARSHALL

¹Not printed; it stated that Mr. Eban was sounding out the attitude of the United States and other members of the Security Council to an Israeli application for membership in the United Nations. The telegram noted that if Israel decided to file such an application, it would have to be done soon to meet the deadline of August 21 when the Security Council would recess. (501.AA/7-2248)

Mr. Ross read telegram 489 to Mr. Eban on July 30 and "emphasized that we were not going to take the initiative in pressing these views on other delegations; if, however, other delegations sought our views, we would give them along the lines indicated." (Telegram 974, July 30, 8:04 p. m., from New York, 501.BB Palestine/7-3048)