

501.BB Palestine/6-849 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

LONDON, June 8, 1949—1 p. m.

2205. 1. Substance Paris' 367, June 6 delivered June 7 to Michael Wright (see Telac 50 and Telac 52).¹

2. Wright said UK will make no move for time being re extension British treaty but that it would have to watch situation from day to day. Foreign Office most anxious learn (a) Israeli reply US *démarche* mentioned by Secretary (paragraph two Paris' 2202, June 2 [*May 31*] to Department), and (b) possible steps Lausanne by Israelis (paragraph one Palun 182, June 2).

3. Re steps by Transjordan towards incorporation. Wright said he thought British Ambassador Kirkbride Amman would be able steady situation since he has been authorized tell Abdullah that UK will supply internal security arms (paragraph one Amman's 234, June 6 to Department²). Arms supply will begin next week along lines paragraph three, Embassy's 2177, June 3.³ Bevin excised from list some additional "doubtful items" in order conform strictly Bunche concept.

4. Re Ethridge observation Palun 182 that UK probably considers Negev gone anyhow, Wright said Foreign Office very much in dark re developments Lausanne and very conscious deep Transjordan discouragement re Israel. Nevertheless Foreign Office continues to hope that pressure upon Israel to make territorial concessions Negev would be successful because in British eyes importance land communication between Egypt and Transjordan is in no way lessened.

5. Wright asked time formulate thoughts re visit Washington which in any case will be impractical before return Sir William Strang⁴ from Middle East June 18.

¹ These telegrams to Paris are dated June 3. The former is printed on p. 1090; the latter, not printed, repeated the text of Palun 182, June 2, from Lausanne. No. 182 contained Mr. Ethridge's view that unilateral incorporation of Arab Palestine by Jordan "would probably provoke Israelis to take same action as to all territories they occupy and freeze situation as it is. That would effectively put off any concession in Negeb or elsewhere. British probably feel Negeb is gone anyhow and they are undertaking to protect Transjordan in negotiations on Arab Palestine. But, from American point of view, we are still pressing for concession in Negeb. Until we get a yes or no on that seems to US Delegation that we should not encourage any action that would prejudice American policy." (501.BB Palestine/6-249)

² Not printed; in paragraph one, Mr. Stabler reported information conveyed to him on June 4 by British Ambassador Kirkbride that as a "result Anglo-American talks British Government has decided to supply 'internal security arms' to Jordan, Iraq and Egypt." (890i.24/6-649)

³ Not printed; this paragraph stated that "Small arms and small arms ammunition only would be involved at this stage." (867N.113/6-349)

⁴ Permanent Under Secretary in the British Foreign Office.

Sent Department 2205, repeated Paris 405 (for Secretary), Bern 55 (for Ethridge and Hare).

HOLMES

867N.01/6-849 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NIACT

TEL AVIV, June 8, 1949—6 p.m.

439. Personal attention of President and Acting Secretary. Current press reports from Washington, New York, and Lausanne tend confirm judgment Israeli officials (given me privately, see Embtel 429, June 7¹) that United States is moving towards policy which will ask of this country surrender of at least portion southern Negev as "compensation" for its retention of territories Israeli armies have conquered outside November 29 partition area.

Though Department has given no specific indication that demand for surrender of Negev tip is its policy, I can see no other territory to which this insistence could be logically applied. From point of view of American and British strategic interests it would be advantageous if Britain could be guaranteed land bridge (either through Transjordan or Egyptian occupation) from Sinai desert to Transjordan; and only such possible bridge is, of course, southern Negev.

Two considerations should, however, I think give us pause before Department and President commit themselves irretrievably to this policy.

1. I am as convinced, as I have ever been of anything, that Israeli Government will not yield any portion of southern Negev unless forced to do so; and this force will have to be military force or such a degree of economic pressure as would be tantamount to war.

2. In its resistance to giving up southern Negev tip, Israel would have at least full moral support of Soviet Union.

New subject: Reply President's note (Deptel 322, May 28) promised for this afternoon.

MCDONALD

¹ Not printed.

501.BB Palestine/6-849 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY
NIACT

WASHINGTON, June 8, 1949—7 p. m.

347. Fol is draft article on Israeli-Syrian armistice demarcation lines which Bunche has instructed Mohn and Vigier to deliver Tel Aviv and Damascus.

"1. In view of the fact that the question of territorial settlement is one of the matters being dealt with in consultations with the UN Conciliation Commission now taking place at Lausanne, it is emphasized that the following arrangements for the armistice demarcation lines between the Israeli and Syrian Armed Forces are not to be interpreted as having any relation whatsoever to ultimate territorial arrangements affecting the two parties to this agreement.

2. The armistice demarcation line herein defined is in response to the request of the SC in its resolution of 16 November 1948, and without prejudice to the rights, positions, interests and claims of either party to this agreement. In pursuance of the spirit of the SC resolution, the armistice demarcation line has been defined with a view toward separating the armed forces of the two parties in such manner as to minimize the possibility of friction and incident.

3. The armistice demarcation line shall be delineated on the map attached to this agreement as annex (blank). Where the existing truce lines as certified by the UN truce supervision organization run along the recognized international boundary between Syria and Palestine, the armistice demarcation line shall follow the boundary line. Elsewhere, the armistice demarcation line shall follow a line midway between the certified truce lines for the Israeli and Syrian forces.

4. The armed forces of the two parties shall nowhere advance beyond the armistice demarcation line.

5. A. Where the armistice demarcation line does not correspond to the international boundary between Syria and Palestine, the area between the armistice demarcation line and the boundary, pending final territorial settlement between the parties, shall be established as a demilitarized zone from which the armed forces of both parties shall be totally excluded, it being understood that the Ein Gev and Dadara sectors shall also be included in the demilitarized zone.

B. The purpose of the demilitarized zone shall be to safeguard the territorial claims, positions and interests of both parties pending final territorial settlement and to separate widely the armed forces, while providing for the gradual restoration or normal civilian life in the area of the zone without prejudice to the ultimate settlement.

C. Any advance by the armed forces of either party into any part of the demilitarized zone, when confirmed by the UN representatives, shall constitute a flagrant violation of this agreement.

D. The chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission established in article (blank) of this agreement and United Nations observers attached to the Commission shall be responsible for ensuring the full implementation of this article.

E. The withdrawal of such armed forces as are now found in the demilitarized zone shall be in accordance with the schedule of withdrawal annexed to this agreement and in any case shall be completed within ten weeks from the date on which this agreement is signed.

F. The chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission shall be empowered to authorize the return of civilians to villages and settlements in the demilitarized zone and the employment of limited numbers of locally recruited civilian police in the zone for internal security purposes, and shall be guided in this regard by the schedule of withdrawal referred to in sub-paragraph (E) of this article.

6. On each side of the demilitarized zone there shall be areas, as defined in annex (blank) to this agreement, in which defensive forces only shall be maintained, in accordance with the definition of defensive forces set forth in annex (blank) to this agreement."¹

WEBB

¹This telegram was repeated to Damascus, The Department of State, in telegram 238, June 8, 6 p. m., to Damascus, expressed its belief that the Bunche "proposal is most practical solution current difficulties and desires you take earliest opportunity strongly urge FonMin or PrimMin in your discretion to accept proposal. You shld state USG has instructed you make this approach in sincere belief proposal is real contribution to lasting peace in Pal and will remove one major obstacle in way of final settlement." (501.BB Palestine/6-849)

Telegram 238 was repeated as No. 346 to Tel Aviv for action. Minister Keeley, on June 15, conveyed the sense of telegram 238 to Prime Minister Zaim. The latter stressed "Syrian willingness continue armistice negotiations and said he had instructed Syrian delegation to show greatest possible compromising spirit since . . . he is sincerely anxious to reach satisfactory *modus vivendi* with Israeli at earliest possible date." Mr. Keeley cautioned, however, that "stalemate likely unless some means can be found to restore Syrian faith in UN ability to control Israeli without which Syrian Government will understandably be reluctant to make concessions that could have domestic repercussions embarrassing to it but which may be necessary to reach agreement with Israel." (telegram 327, June 16, 8 a.m., from Damascus, 767N.90D/6-1649)

501.BB Palestine/6-849

*The Government of Israel to the Government of the United States*¹

TOP SECRET

[TEL AVIV,] June 8, 1949.

The Government of Israel has given very careful and serious study to the note delivered by the American Ambassador in Tel Aviv on May 29, 1949. While deeply appreciating the keen personal interest taken by the President of the United States in the fortunes of Israel and the Middle East, the Government of Israel regrets that the terms of the note appear to be based on a misunderstanding of the position adopted by the Government of Israel and by its delegation at Lausanne.

The Government of Israel cannot possibly accept the contention that its line has been "to reject the basic principles set forth by the Resolution of the GA of December 11, 1948". The cardinal injunction of that resolution is the call made in Article 5 upon the governments concerned "to seek agreement by negotiations, conducted either with the Conciliation Commission or directly, with a view to the final settle-

¹Transmitted to the Department by Tel Aviv in telegram 441, June 8, midnight, which began as follows: "ReDeptel 322 May 28. Foreign Minister handed me following reply, dated June 8, to President's note at residence at 9 p. m. today: "Excellency, I am directed by the Prime Minister to request you to transmit the following communication to the President of the United States:"

Telegram 441 ended with: "Signed Moshe Sharett, Minister Foreign Affairs."

ment of all questions outstanding between them." This course the Government of Israel has consistently pursued. It has continually and on its own initiative made direct approaches, before and during the Lausanne Conference, to representatives of Arab states with a view to exploring the possibility of peace negotiations. It has given its full cooperation to the Conciliation Commission for the purpose of effecting a comprehensive peace settlement. The Government of Israel is satisfied that Mr. Eytan and his colleagues have actively and unswervingly followed this line.

If today the position at Lausanne is one of virtual stalemate, this is due entirely to the attitude adopted in concert by the Arab states concerned. Their delegations have persistently refused even to meet the delegation of Israel under the Commission's auspices. None of them has declared itself willing to discuss outstanding problems in the context of a lasting peace settlement. All the concrete suggestions and the offers made by the Israeli Delegation through the Commission have so far remained unanswered. In these circumstances the Government and people of Israel would deeply resent any suggestion that a rupture in the conversations, if it should occur, would be due to Israel's "rigid attitude". In the face of this contrast between Israel's continued readiness to negotiate peace and the Arab states' obstinate refusal to do so, the Government of Israel is perplexed by the expression of concern on the part of the United States Government "lest Israel now endanger the possibility" of arriving at a peaceful settlement.

As for the general attitude of the Government of Israel to the provisions of the GA Resolution of December 11, 1948, it may be pointed out that it was to elucidate this very subject that the representative of Israel was invited to appear before the *Ad Hoc* Political Commission [*Committee*] on May 5, 1949.² The Government of Israel had instructed Mr. Eban to set forth fully its views on all points at issue and it may be deduced from Israel's subsequent admission to the membership of the UN that his explanation—all of them strictly in relation to the December Resolution—were considered satisfactory by the GA.

The US Government is criticizing the attitude of Israel on two specific counts: (1) The final territorial settlement; (2) the solution of the Arab refugee problem.

On the first count, what appears to be a factual misconception should first be eliminated. The Government of Israel is at a loss to understand the reference in the note to the alleged contemplation by

² See footnote 2, p. 979.

Mr. Eytan of "an additional acquisition of further territory within Palestine". The only suggestion for any such extension of Israel territory—viz. for the incorporation within it of the Gaza-Rafa area with all its present Arab population, including the refugees—came not from the delegation of Israel but from Mr. Ethridge, the US member of the Conciliation Commission.

On the main issue of Israel's boundaries, the Government of Israel is fully aware of the view expressed by the US representatives in the UN and at Lausanne that Israel should be expected to offer territorial compensation for any areas acquired by it beyond the boundaries laid down in the GA Resolution of November 29, 1947. The Government of Israel must respectfully point out that this view does not represent a UN policy. It forms no part of the Resolution of December 11, 1948. On the contrary, a proposal to introduce into that Resolution a provision for the giving-up by Israel of an area in the Negev in return for Western Galilee was rejected by the Assembly. Paragraph 5 of the Resolution, quoted above, left the field open for a territorial settlement between the parties completely unprejudiced by any a priori principle.

The principle of territorial compensation, related to the 1947 award, is one which the Government of Israel cannot accept. That territorial award was based on a series of assumptions which failed to materialize. The hopes of peaceful implementation were erased by the Arab revolt from within and the Arab invasion from without. The Arab state of Palestine and the economic union did not come into being. The Resolution of November 1947 was indeed a source of tremendous encouragement to the Jewish people, and the part played by the US in promoting its acceptance by the Assembly will never be forgotten. Yet in the decisive struggle which preceded and followed the termination of the British mandate, the Resolution itself proved of little avail. The state of Israel evolved out of chaos and bloodshed. It had to uphold its integrity and independence alone and unaided, fighting against overwhelming odds. Nothing has occurred to invalidate the justice of the assignment to Israel of the areas included in the Jewish state by the 1947 Resolution. On the other hand, the war has proved the indispensability to the survival of Israel of certain vital areas not comprised originally in the share of the Jewish state. In his report to the GA, the late UN Mediator as long ago as last September stated: "The constant question—is not whether it may be advisable to review and revise the Resolution of November 29, 1947. It has already been outrun and irrevocably revised by the actual facts of recent Palestine history". In any case, the Government of Israel cannot agree that the act of aggres-

sion committed by the Arab states in defiance of the Charter and of the GA calls for a territorial reward.

On the question of Arab refugees, the Government of Israel feels bound to restate the basic facts of the situation. It was never part of the Jewish design to force Arabs out of the country. The Jewish authorities accepted the plan of November 29, 1947, in full knowledge that it entailed the presence within the Jewish state of a very considerable Arab population. They were ready to mold the administrative structure and economic policy of the state accordingly. What produced the Arab exodus was the war on Israel. The exodus was partly spontaneous, partly decreed from above by Arab leaders and commanders. The population which fled was that from the midst of which the first murderous attacks on the Jews were launched. The alleged menace to its future was invoked by the aggressors in justification of their invasion of Palestine from outside. The refugees are thus members of an aggressor group defeated in a war of its own making. History does not record any case of large-scale repatriation after such experience.

Moreover, the exodus has wrought a profound change in the ethnic pattern and economic structure of Israel. What was to have been started as an almost equally balanced Jewish-Arab country has become an overwhelmingly Jewish society. The Arab economy lies in ruins. All the energies of Israel are focused on the absorption of the large-scale immigration now in progress, the task which so largely motivated the UN Resolution on Palestine and in particular its support by the UN. New social and economic processes are gathering momentum in Israel, and the wheel of history cannot be turned back. It is inconceivable that the Government of Israel should find itself able to undertake in one and the same breath the absorption of mass Jewish immigration and the reintegration of returning Arab refugees. Both are problems of resettlement involving stupendous efforts on the part of the state and the double burden is far more than Israel can bear. Nor are the returning Arab refugees likely to feel, in the long run, happy and secure in the new setting.

Israel is by no means unmindful of the humanitarian aspect of the problem. It has gone much further than many other nations when faced with a similar situation. It has declared itself ready to pay compensation for land abandoned, to reunite families separated by the war, and generally to make its contribution to the solution of the problem by resettlement. Such a contribution must needs be limited by two compelling considerations; first, national security, and second, economic feasibility. Israel cannot in the name of humanitarianism be driven to commit suicide. Nor can Israel be forced to adopt methods

of rehabilitation which would be economically ruinous and self-defeating.

In its earnest desire to approximate its policy on Arab refugees as closely as possible to the terms of the Resolution of December 11, 1948, the Government of Israel has gone as far as the self-preservation of the state of Israel would permit. That trend has been given full expression in the statements of Mr. Eban to the *Ad Hoc* Political Commission [*Committee*] and of Mr. Eytan to the Conciliation Commission. May it be recalled that the December Resolution does not provide for repatriation in absolute terms. It states in paragraph 11 that "the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date". It is submitted that practicability must primarily be tested by the touchstones of security and economic realism.

Certain limited, though not negligible measures of repatriation have actually been carried through in recent months and others are under urgent consideration. Anything more substantial, if it should at all prove feasible on economic grounds, must await the restoration of peace. The security consideration is here paramount. Israel received no armed assistance from the UN when it fought for its very existence and it would be idle for it to rely on such help in the future.

The Government of Israel earnestly trusts that on further consideration of the problem the US Government will agree that the Arab states cannot have it both ways by explicitly declaring, on the one hand, that it is not part of their purpose to conclude peace with Israel, and demanding, on the other hand, an immediate solution of the refugee problem at the expense of Israel. The exodus is a direct consequence of their criminal invasion. They should not be allowed to shirk their crucial responsibility and to represent the plight of the refugees as an isolated phenomenon, artificially torn out of its real context. The Government of Israel observes with deep satisfaction that the US Government shares its view "that the final settlement of the problem of refugees must await a definitive peace settlement". But as long as the Arab states do not evince any readiness even to discuss peace, any significant measure of repatriation is clearly impracticable. The Government of Israel is conscious of no conflict between this attitude and the principles of the Charter, which seeks to guarantee a secure existence to all peace-loving nations.

The Government of Israel regards the friendship of the Government and people of the US as an asset of Israel's foreign relations than which none is higher in value. It hopes that the consideration of the present reply will restore the sympathetic understanding of the US Government for the problems and anxieties facing Israel.

501.BB Palestine/6-949

*Memorandum by the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Rusk) to the
Under Secretary of State (Webb)*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] June 9, 1949.

Subject: Israeli Reply to United States Note.

Discussion:

Telegram No. 441 of June 8 from Tel Aviv² conveys the reply of the Israeli Government to the note which the President directed Ambassador McDonald to deliver to Prime Minister Ben Gurion.

The reply in effect rejects the cardinal points of the United States note concerning the territorial settlement and disposition of the Arab refugee problem. It states that the United States position on the territorial question does not represent a policy of the United Nations and that the Government of Israel cannot accept the principle of territorial compensation related to the 1947 boundaries. With regard to the refugees, the note repeats the familiar arguments blaming the Arab states for the plight of these people and stating the reasons why in the opinion of the Israeli Government it is impossible for a large number of refugees to return to their homes. The note maintains that Israel has gone as far as it is possible for it to go under the present circumstances in regard to repatriation and reiterates the position that nothing more can be done until a final peace settlement is reached.

Although firmly rejecting the points made in the United States note, the Israeli note is not aggressive in tone and concludes with the hope that consideration of the Israeli reply will restore the "sympathetic understanding of the United States Government for the problems and anxieties facing Israel".

The basic positions of the United States and Israel thus remain unchanged, and there is no reason for the United States to abandon the firm position it has taken as regards Israel. You may wish to inform the President this morning that the Department will immediately consider what steps should next be taken and will shortly make recommendations to him as to a possible course of action with regard to this problem.

¹ Sent also by Mr. Satterthwaite.

² See footnote 1 to Tel Aviv telegram, June 8, p. 1102.

501.BB Palestine/6-949: Circular airgram

*The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices*¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 9, 1949—9:10 a. m.

We transmitted to Ethridge, our rep on UN Palestine Conciliation Comm, as well as to our reps in Jerusalem and Amman,² our further comments on our suggestion that PCC appoint a rep to chair meetings of special comm. of Israeli-Jordanian reps, with ultimate power of arbiter. We stated our suggestion based on need for peaceful solution, failure of current efforts to negotiate agreement for Jerusalem, and offer of impartial procedure which would result in solution based on equity and having backing of international community. We feel would be difficult under this procedure for parties to reject our suggestion. With reference suggestion our rep in Amman³ that our suggested procedure be adopted except for omission of arbitral function, we feel arbitration should be attempted and, if unfruitful, it would be possible to recede from this position. We also believe that suggestion that Lausanne conference deal with Jerusalem problem⁴ as a whole would be acceptable if PCC has necessary technical info and if it desires take on these added negotiations.

WEBB

¹ This airgram, although prepared as a circular message, was sent only to the Embassy in the United Kingdom.

² In Unpal 139, June 7, to Bern, p. 1093.

³ As sent in telegram 233, June 4, 3 p. m., not printed.

⁴ This suggestion had been made in telegram 233 from Amman.

501.BB Palestine/6-949: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Delegation at Lausanne

SECRET NIACT

WASHINGTON, June 9, 1949—7 p. m.

Unpal 141. For Ethridge. In event definitive political discussions shld be suspended for extended period, we are deeply concerned over critical delay in activation proposed Economic Survey Group and implementation its terms of reference, since according to present plans further UN and Congressional action wld be based on Group's recommendations.

In your opinion, is there any possibility prior your departure of extracting sufficient commitment Israel and Arab states to permit immediate formation of Group, without reference remainder of political negotiations? As minimum conditions, such commitment

would appear require agreement Israel and Arabs repatriate and resettle respectively substantial number refugees prior to or at least by time of and as part of final peace settlement (without designation of specific numbers at present time if such designation cannot be obtained), and assumption both sides primary responsibility therefor subject to outside assistance; it wld also require both sides to request or accept, cooperate with and otherwise facilitate tasks of Economic Survey Group along lines set forth in Group's stated objectives (Unpal 119, Deptel 704 to Bern, May 27 numbered para 1). It shld be made clear both sides that Group's functions wld be wholly non-political in character, designed solely to expedite final settlement, and that USG wld require fullest cooperation both sides with objectives and activities of Group as pre-condition to extension any US economic aid to Near East through UN or otherwise.

If you consider such commitment adequate and obtainable, how wld you propose PCC issue resolution (Unpal 119) or otherwise establish Group? It is believed that nominations for Group cld be furnished you on short notice. Pls advise Dept urgently diplomatic support which US might extend to obtain foregoing objectives.

WEBB

501.BB Palestine/6-1049

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] June 10, 1949.

MEETING WITH PRESIDENT, THURSDAY, JUNE 9, 1949

ISRAELI REPLY TO UNITED STATES NOTE

The President read the attached memorandum¹ with respect to the Israeli answer to our note, and expressed satisfaction that the Israelis appeared to be reacting well to the essential objectives which he and the Department are trying to achieve. He informed me that he had let it be known by a number of Jewish leaders who had called on him that unless they were prepared to play the game properly and conform to the rules they were probably going to lose one of their best friends.

¹ The memorandum of June 9, p. 1107.

867N.01/6-1049

*Memorandum by the Department of State to the President*¹

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 10, 1949.

Subject: United States Relations with Israel.

On June 8 Israel replied to the United States note which Ambassador McDonald delivered in Tel Aviv upon your instructions on May 29. The reply firmly rejected the points made in the United States note concerning a final territorial settlement and the disposition of the refugee problem. Under the circumstances, the following course of action vis-à-vis Israel is suggested.

1. *Immediate adoption of a generally negative attitude toward Israel.* This would include: refusing Israeli requests for United States assistance, such as for the training of Israeli officials in this country and the sending of United States experts to Israel; maintenance of no more than a correct attitude toward Israeli officials in this country and toward American organizations interested in promoting the cause of Israel; and failing to support the position of Israel in the various international organizations.

2. *Export-Import Bank Loan.* The Export-Import Bank should be immediately informed that it would be desirable to hold up the allocation of the \$49,000,000 as yet unallocated of the \$100,000,000 earmarked for loan to Israel.

3. *United States Contributions to Israel.* The time is appropriate to undertake explorations as to whether it is proper, now that a Jewish state has been established as an independent foreign country, for United States contributions to the United Jewish Appeal and to other Jewish fund-raising organizations to continue to be exempt from income tax as having been made for charitable purposes. Such contributions are now of direct benefit to a sovereign foreign state.

4. *Reply to Israel Note.* A reply to the Israeli note will be drafted, answering the points made and reiterating the United States expectation that Israel will take action along the lines suggested by the United States.

¹ Drafted by Mr. Rockwell.

501.BB Palestine/6-1049: Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NIACT

TEL AVIV, June 10, 1949—10 a. m.

443. ReDeptels 344, 346,¹ 347, June 8 and further re Embtel 441, June 9 transmitting Israel's reply to President's note (Deptel 322, May 28).

¹ Telegram 346 was a repeat of 238 to Damascus, not printed, but see footnote 1 to telegram 347, June 8, p. 1102.

Ford and I June 9 conferred hour with Foreign Minister who invited me visit his office. Herlitz and Leo Kohn² also present.

1. Sharett noted press reports from Washington quoting Acting Secretary and said: "we here besieged for news". Nonetheless, Foreign Office has admitted merely "exchange of views". Sharett "will say no more unless US prefers and takes initiative fuller news". Israel "would not oppose publication of notes".

Comment: Publication of notes would, I think, be unfortunate because certain arouse strong public feeling. Morning June 10 Foreign Office had no explanation Israeli statement Lake Success June 9. *End comment.*

2. Sharett followed up Israel note on two points:

a. Boundaries. (Deptel 346, June 8). In conference with Secretary Acheson in New York³ Foreign Minister had accepted former's phrase "mutual adjustments" boundaries in sense of "minor adjustments" and not "compensations or exchanges". "Could not have possibly thought of concessions to Lebanon, Syria or Egypt as rewards for their unsuccessful war of aggression". Sharett thought Secretary Acheson's words "mutual adjustments" referred primarily to boundary between Israel and Arab Palestine. Is "sorry if Secretary misunderstood".

Comment: Noteworthy that Sharett emphasized twice evident satisfaction Department's conclusion that territorial "compensation" Gaza strip would depend on "desire" other government's "such compensation". *End comment.*

b. Refugees. "Measure of repatriation actually carried out" totalled approximately 24,000 divided nearly equally between Galilee and Negev. Total Arabs now in Israel 150,000. Measures "under urgent consideration" include specific permission to "round out families" and more "general permission return of women and minor children of Arabs resident in Israel".

Comment: Sharett's manner of presenting these admittedly limited concessions was possible indication Israel's softening on refugees. *End comment.*

3. ReDeptel 344, June 8, Sharett emphatically denied Eytan had ever used any expression indicating Israel had desire further territorial expansion except in connection with Ethridge's suggestion "Gaza plan". Foreign Minister emphasized there is no justification charge Israel's position was "rigid".

Comment: No doubt Sharett feels Israel wrongly charged with "rigidity". *End comment.*

² Political Adviser to Mr. Sharett.

³ Presumably the conversation of April 5; see Mr. Acheson's memorandum of that date, p. 890.

4. ReDeptels 346, 347, June 8, Sharett said cabinet would discuss Bunche's proposal "within two hours". Israel would attend armistice meeting tenth. Major obstacle in acceptance is demilitarization of Ein Gev. I argued this minor compared with larger issues. Foreign Office telephoned June 10, 9:30 a. m. Riley reported Syrians unable attend today.

Comment: Despite Foreign Minister's protest I believe even chance Israel acceptance Bunche plan. *End comment.*

McDONALD

501.BB Palestine/6-1049 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Vincent) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY

BERN, June 10, 1949—3 p. m.

909. Palun 194. From Ethridge. No progress made so far in reconciling Arab and Israeli positions and no possibility obtaining commitment of type outlined Unpal 141¹ before my departure.² Also practically no prospect obtaining such commitment in course subsequent PCC discussions here. However, I have some ideas on subject which hope discuss on arrival Washington June 14 and suggest Department delay action till then. [Ethridge.]

VINCENT

¹ Dated June 9, to Lausanne, p. 1108.

² Mr. Ethridge left Lausanne on June 10. He was succeeded on a temporary basis by Raymond A. Hare.

501.BB Palestine/6-1049 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Vincent) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED

BERN, June 10, 1949—3 p. m.

912. Palun 192. From Ethridge. On June 8 Eytan returned Lausanne from Tel Aviv after week's absence during which it was common knowledge Israel was reexamining its position regarding Israeli-Arab talks through PCC. On June 9 Eytan lectured PCC at length on manner in which talks should be conducted and made general restatement of Israeli position regarding outstanding matters including refugees and territory. Eytan's remarks indicated Israel had not modified its position in any way, shape or form.

Summary of Eytan's remarks follows:

(1) Conduct of talks: Eytan believed stalemate existed at Lausanne. General dissatisfaction reflected in irresponsible talk, gossip, threats and recrimination. Difficulty must be surmounted and fresh start made. Patience and frankness were necessary.

(2) General approach: PCC members and Arabs say Israel asks unreasonable. Outstanding problems between Israel and Arabs were discussed during Israel admission debate at Lake Success. Eban made full statement. GA admitted Israel. It follows GA was satisfied with Israel's attitude on outstanding problems.¹ We are acting in conformity with Eban statements at Lausanne. If others think us unreasonable it must be in another context.

(3) Reality in Israel: Conditions in Israel have changed since November 29² and continuing change rapidly. Jaffa, for example, is no longer Arab and in some sections no longer exists. Automatic Arab talk regarding return of refugees is unrealistic. Such talk will not advance Lausanne discussions one inch.

(4) Middle East peace: Israeli objective at Lausanne has been restoration of Middle East peace. But other questions including refugees, territory and compensation are subsidiary. Arabs want peace also. Thus far main obstacle has been sustained refusal of Arabs to negotiate peace. Refusal is main cause for present deadlock.

(5) Refugees: Detailed Israeli position known to PCC. Israel very much concerned regarding refugee problem in Palestine and Middle East. Tendency in world since World War I has been to eliminate minority problems. Minority problems cause national and international unrest and conflict. UNSCOP did not consider exclusion of Arabs and Jews from Jewish and Arab states respectively because it assumed peaceful implementation. War resulted. Exodus occurred. Grave minority problem for Jewish state thus solved itself by events. Israel never contemplated removal of Arabs. In light of world's tragic experience during past 30 years Israel believes "recreation of minority within Israel—as Arabs insist—would be retro-step for peace of Middle East and of world". Israel will, however, contribute as much as it can in context of general peace settlement.

Eytan proposed supply PCC with summary of statements by Arab leaders calling for revenge. Eytan cited recent discussion in Egyptian Parliament regarding 72 million pound budget for arms. In such circumstances Israel considered it unreasonable to permit return of refugees. Every government which has elementary regard for its people will adopt attitude similar Israel's.

(6) Territory: Israel accepted May 12 protocol as basis for discussion. Israeli principle is GA principle of mutual adjustment of borders to common advantage of each party by free negotiation. Israel cannot accept "purely arbitrary mathematical proportion of formula". Partition resolutions of November 29 are not sacrosanct. Israel is not bound to adhere. Partition was based on peaceful implementation. War results. Only Jewish state appeared. Arab state did not. Arabs

¹ The Department, on June 15, commented on this point as follows: "Dept believes entirely unwarranted construe GA debate and decision re admission Israel as endorsement their policy before PCC." It then cited Mr. Eban's statement before the *Ad Hoc* Committee on May 5 (see footnote 2, p. 979) that only the provisions of Article 4 of the Charter were relevant in considering an application for membership and that it was "unjust withhold consent admission on grounds difference opinion on solution certain internatl problems." (telegram Unpal 151, 501.BB Palestine/6-1049)

² The date in 1947 that the General Assembly voted to approve the partition of Palestine.

are, however, entitled to state. Israel cannot agree that because Arabs failed to establish state³ other Arab states are entitled to territory. It's too contrary UN principles to reward states which attempted to upset UN resolution by force. Decision along such lines would undermine UN and world peace. If there were Arab state Israel's territorial position would now be different. Israel is prepared, however, to discuss its frontiers with each of its present neighbors. Eytan considered direct talks with Arabs essential for any territorial arrangement.

(7) Israeli efforts at Lausanne: Eytan recapitulated various proposals and suggestions of Israeli delegation toward progress of Lausanne talks. Eytan recalled steps reported in Palun's 145, 146,⁴ 162,⁵ 173.⁶ Eytan stated points outlined in Palun 146 still formed basis Israeli thinking. Failure to receive response regarding preamble was grave disappointment. Arabs had not answered territorial proposals. Israeli delegation may be prepared to put forward further suggestions if useful. To help meeting, Israel is prepared to make free zone at Haifa for import and export without Israeli duty. Israel may make other suggestions to help other Arab states. Israeli efforts are fundamentality different than Arab efforts which consist entirely of demands.

(8) Future steps: (a) Israel continues accept May 12 protocol; (b) present despondency should be overcome; (c) Eytan would be glad state Israeli case directly to Arab delegates.

[Ethrige]
VINCENT

³ In Palestine.

⁴ Both dated May 10; identified also as telegrams 410 and 411 from Geneva, pp. 992 and 993, respectively.

⁵ Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 1036.

⁶ Identified also as telegram 820, May 28, from Bern, p. 1068.

501.BB Palestine/6-1049: Telegram

Mr. John C. Ross to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

NEW YORK, June 10, 1949—3:04 p. m.

709. Bunche has report from Riley in Jerusalem that Dayan has informed him that there was a misunderstanding and that he will withdraw Israeli troops from demilitarized zone around Government House, replacing them with MP's. A partition of area will be arranged by Riley following NAC meeting June 11. Foregoing message from Riley followed a previous one which indicated belligerence and hostility on Dayan's part. Reason for change not apparent.

Bunche says he does not understand motives for Israeli actions Government House zone since it obviously endangered their broader objectives. He does feel, however, that it was a deliberately planned action since Dayan is not a hot-headed or impetuous person.

Ross

Editorial Note

Ambassador McDonald, on June 11, cabled to the Department, for the personal attention of the President and the Acting Secretary, that "Press and private reaction here to incomplete reports from Washington and elsewhere of contents of President's note indicate complete unanimity that: (1). US has no right moral or legal for its 'demands'; (2). Such demands must be 'resisted'." He concluded by urging that "further US views not be expressed in terms of imperatives as in concluding paragraphs President's note unless President and Department are prepared to use extreme measures ultimate effort [*effect*] of which no one could now foresee." (telegram 445 from Tel Aviv, 501.BB Palestine/6-1149)

Later the same day Ambassador McDonald sent a followup cable to the Department for the personal attention of Clark Clifford at the White House. After referring to his telegrams 439, June 8, page 1100, and 445, he stated: "Motivated only by my grave concern Department, with best intentions of causing Israel to make what seems to Washington 'reasonable and necessary concession' on refugees and boundaries, our government so embittered Israel opinion that Ben-Gurion and Sharett would be forced despite their will and better judgement to resist US demands. Israel concessions with refugees are possible if request for these is not again put in form of demand. But under no circumstances except use of overwhelming force will Israel yield any part of Negev. . . ."

"This telegram and two referred to above have been written in full remembrance of your final words to me when I was leaving White House before coming Israel." (telegram 446 from Tel Aviv, 867N.01/6-1149)

867N.01/6-1149 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 11, 1949—2 p. m.

573. Egyptian Amb called on ActSec June 10 at own request and left memo¹ re lifting arms embargo. He stated Egypt greatly desires lifting of restrictions which as result embargo it has imposed on trade navigation, pointing out no serious fighting has occurred for six months and stating Arab states have no aggressive intentions.

He said sole concern Arabs is just settlement Pal question, to which major obstacle is Israel's aggressive attitude. While Arabs originally opposed partition, they now willing accept it although old

¹ Dated June 10, not printed.

not state fact publicly. Arab states have two major objectives, settlement refugee problem and final settlement which wld protect them against Israeli aggression. They desire all of the UN resolutions to be observed, particularly res calling for repatriation refugees. They also feel Pres' principle territorial compensation shld be observed. In response to query as to whether Amb felt independent Arab state cld be established in Pal, he stated this was matter which wld have to be settled by Arab states.

ActSec emphasized importance which USG attaches to Israeli Arab cooperation in achieving final solution. USG does not wish negots Lausanne to fail. Amb stated Egypt doing all possible to make negots succeed.

To specific query re his Govt's position on Israeli offer accept Gaza refugees in return acquisition Gaza strip,² Amb said Egyptian Govt regards proposal as "cheap barter". He stated first step is to permit those refugees in Gaza so desiring to return their homes, but had no suggestion re disposition remainder. He further stated Egypt wld wish make proposals re frontier rectification, which wld not involve large amount territory but wld be designed secure strategically defensible frontier for Egyptian and Israeli security. Did not state when these proposals wld be put forth.

ActSec stated question re arms embargo wld require careful study on part of Dept, pointing out it involved not only US regulation but SC truce res. Amb agreed, and indicated Egypt did not wish raise contentious argument in SC re question but desired prior discussion with SC members before raising question in SC.

Amb then took up subject training Egyptian officers in US. ActSec explained we had recently informed NME³ we no longer have any objections to training Israeli and Arab officers. However NME has very limited quota for foreign students and therefore needs of many countries require consideration. Moreover because security considerations, many courses open only to Amcits. ActSec stated we are anxious be helpful in matter but quite possible NME cld not place all students which Egyptians might wish send to US.

² Mr. Eban informed Mr. Ross during the afternoon of June 10 that "following Rhodes armistice discussions with Egypt, Abdul Munim Mustapha, head of Egyptian delegation, had first raised question of Israel taking over Gaza strip. This discussion was inconclusive. Subsequently on April 30, presumably, Eban said, because Egyptians had talked in same sense, Ethridge at Lausanne in conversation with Eytan had suggested Israel take over Gaza strip including the 250,000 refugees therein (this is figure Eban used). The idea of taking over this number of refugees shocked Eytan who, however, reported matter to his government which, after much consideration and in sincere effort to get something tangible started at Lausanne, instructed Eytan to make proposal of May 20." (telegram 712, June 10, from New York, 501.BB Palestine/6-1049)

³ See letter of April 6, p. 898.

Pls take early opportunity discuss disposition Gaza strip with Egyptian Govt, requesting its views re Israeli offer. You shld emphasize to Egyptian Govt US concern re refugees that area, which has no economic potential for future settlement, and ask Egyptian Govt its plans re disposition those who do not wish return Israel, since latter might be considerable number. You might in this connection obtain Egyptian views with regard frontier in light Amb's reference to strategic rectification in order that we might explore possibility of exchange of Gaza strip for frontier rectification further south.

Rpt reply to USDel Lausanne.⁴

WEBB

⁴ This telegram was repeated to Bern as No. 778 (Unpal 145), for the American Delegation at Lausanne. Chargé Patterson, on June 14, reported that prior to receipt of telegram 573, i.e., on June 11, he had brought up the question of the Gaza strip proposal with Foreign Minister Khashaba. The latter's views "were to effect that while Egypt contemplated retention no portion Palestine as such Egypt required most effective frontier for defensive purposes. This frontier stated to be Gaza-Beersheba-Dead Sea line. Responsive to my question Minister admitted that Egypt at present not willing cede Gaza coastal strip to Israel in return for Israel's offer assumptions charge 200,000 or more refugees in Gaza-Rafa strip." (telegram 578 from Cairo, 867N.01/6-1449)

867N.00/6-1149: Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

JERUSALEM, June 11, 1949—6 p. m.

409. Present tense situation Jerusalem attributable in large part to failure reach agreement in Special Committee on questions both Jews and Arabs consider essential. Break in deadlock likely to result in quick relaxation and barring complete failure Lausanne eliminate in immediate future present danger resumption hostilities Jerusalem. Essential element is speedy solution through simplified procedure.

Consulate General considers not advisable refer question to Lausanne. Would thus become involved in whole peace treaty procedure with consequent long delays, personnel at Lausanne not familiar with details of problem and would have start all over again, extent of disagreement would not be diminished by simple reference to Lausanne. Same issues must be resolved regardless locale. Arbitration procedure would also involve delay, arbitrator would not be familiar with question, and Israel at least could be expected refuse accept principle arbitral award.

Consulate General therefore, suggests following approach combining certain features Department and Amman proposals. Settlement Government House matter necessary prerequisite. Request by Special Committee to MAC to hold series extraordinary sessions under direct

chairmanship General Riley. Section 3, Article 12 of Armistice permits changes in agreement by mutual consent. Both sides to present concrete plans for settlement along lines outlined below and under terms of reference specifically providing for territorial exchange. Riley would be able give publicity to proceedings and also use his prestige to facilitate agreement on terms he considered equitable.¹ At same time PCC and/or US Government should point out to respective governments (or if preferred to local authorities) in friendly manner necessity reaching agreement swiftly thus eliminating this great cause possible trouble. Israel again should be specifically admonished against use force or threats and ill effect present series incidents pointed out. Also could be told that because concessions made in past by Arabs and as measure of assistance in refugee problem, PCC and US hope will be able adopt generous attitude on quarters. In note to Transjordan, disadvantages of stalling should be forcibly brought out (although this may avoid causing Transjordan trouble with other states or Palestine Arabs delay certainly does not contribute towards peaceful settlement which is prime US objective). Transjordan also should be cautioned against excessive demands and inclination lure single issue of Scopus to recoup past losses of disproportionate nature. In this case Transjordan has shown tendency expand demands as Israel showed willingness make concessions. For example willing at one time trade access to Scopus for access to Arab College (Amman telegram 208, May 18 to Department) which Jews perfectly willing grant.

Consulate General believes best chances of success offered by final settlement on following basis: Israel to obtain free access to Scopus by new road from Sanhedriya in direction of "French Hill" plus territory vicinity Sanhedriya might also be given but need not constitute "land bridge." Arabs to receive in addition to Bethlehem road and electricity return certain Arab quarters and certain Jewish areas in South. Arabs must recognize not possible obtain wall their old quarters and area likely regain steadily diminishing. Baqa quarter now opened to new immigrants and once such persons settled down extremely difficult dislodge. Crucial point of course is amount area in North to be exchanged for quarters in South but Consulate General feels that with constant pressure by PCC, Riley and perhaps interested governments possible reach solution.

Above procedure advanced in interest speed, to avoid further stalling and to provide for use present UN machinery avoiding compli-

¹ Chargé Stabler, on June 17, gave his support to the suggestion regarding the Special Committee as set forth in telegram 409 (telegram 250 from Amman, 867N.01/6-1749).

cations of setting up new committee. Consulate General considers lines settlement mentioned will meet to maximum extent possible in limited agreement of nature under consideration desires of both parties.

Sent Department, repeated Amman 36, Geneva 27, Tel Aviv 52.

BURDETT

501.BB Palestine/6-1149: Telegram

The Minister in Syria (Keeley) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

DAMASCUS, June 11, 1949—7 p. m.

322. Views in Deptel 238, June 8¹ delivered to Vice Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Arslan 1 p. m. today. He asked me to thank Department for its advice but said its interest in seeking cause of peace in Palestine might be more effective if weight its influence were brought to bear upon Israel to respect its international engagements and thus help create atmosphere favorable to armistice and peace negotiations.

Contending that as small area Palestine territory now occupied by Syria was taken in fighting against Israeli before truce whereas Israel holds unchallenged vast areas occupied during truce, suggested demilitarization on Syrian front is scarcely equitable measure. Arslan admitted current Bunche proposal nevertheless seemed to offer best basis yet suggested for discussion and he had accordingly authorized Syrian delegation to reenter negotiations. However, as experience has taught Syrians to be wary of any agreement that depends upon Israeli respect for UN guarantees he thought moment inopportune to hope for agreement. Even Bunche must consider it unfortunate that Israeli had chosen this time to underscore their cynical disregard for their pledged word by entering and fortifying demilitarized Government House zone in Jerusalem.

This latest aggression took place, said Arslan, even while Bunche in personal message to Zaim earnestly appealed for most serious and sympathetic consideration his draft proposals assuring him that "UN responsibility over territory in proposed demilitarized zone gives adequate protection to Syrian interests" and citing Government House among others as example of UN demilitarized area which "gives convincing proof that such arrangements work well and give full protection to rights and claims of interested parties." Bunche must today be sadly disillusioned man, said Arslan.

Typical of their incomprehensible arrogance latest Israeli aggression has not only jeopardized Syrian Israeli armistice negotiations, but

¹ Not printed, but see footnote 1 to telegram 347, June 8, p. 1102.

has put wind up in all Arab circles, said Arslan. Added he has warned other Arab capitals that Government House may be first move in conquest of Jerusalem itself if not remainder of Palestine which now effectively within Israeli control.

As Prime Minister Zaim had shortly before my call on Arslan expressed similar views to Foreign Minister I feel that no useful purpose would be served by seeking to deliver Department's message to Zaim or otherwise trying further to pressurize Syrians into accepting Bunche proposal until some effective means are found and applied to guarantee Israeli respect for its engagements and for UN authority. To pressurize Syrians in face of Israeli action at Government House (Jerusalem's Contel 401, June 7² and sequence to Department) would I feel sure be interpreted by Syrians only as further evidence of our alleged pro-Israeli attitude and weaken such influence as we still have with them which might better be reserved for more propitious moment such as when Israel itself can be brought to show more accommodating spirit. My French colleague, with whom I am keeping close contact, fully shares my views in this regard. Zaim told him that while inclined to accept Bunche proposal if Israeli respect for UN guaranteed pledges better assured than recent unfortunate experience has given reason to expect, he is disinclined to commit Syria before presidential referendum June 25 (mytel 315, June 8).² To do so might well cause disturbing repercussions which he is not prepared to risk during crucial pre-election period.

[Here follow four paragraphs dealing primarily with Mr. Arslan's denunciation of Israel's aggressive attitude.]

If despite unfavorable atmosphere indicated above Department desires me to urge upon Zaim acceptance Bunche proposal it would be helpful to have its reasons why Syria should not let Government House incident influence its acceptance of similar UN guarantee of proposed demilitarized areas on Syrian-Israeli frontier.³

Sent Department 322, repeated Baghdad 61, Beirut 72, Jerusalem 48, London 84, Paris 68, Tel Aviv 37, Amman 32, Ankara 44, Bern for PCC 13, Cairo 41, Jidda 26.

Department pass Army, Navy, Air.

KEELEY

² Not printed.

³ The Department, in reply on June 16, directed Damascus to "urge upon Zaim acceptance Bunche proposal" and to "point out that as result intervention such officials UN as Bunche and Riley Israeli troops have now been withdrawn" from the Government House area (telegram 248, 501.BB Palestine/6-1149).

867N.01/6-1249 : Telegram

The Chargé in Jordan (Stabler) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

AMMAN, June 12, 1949—11 a. m.

243. According to reliable military source here number of incidents along entire Jordan-Israeli front have increased rapidly in past few days with ten such incidents being reported on June 10 alone. Casualties are also reported.

Legion troops at Latrun report "extraordinary" Israeli movements opposite them and believe Israelis are preparing some kind of attack on Latrun salient.

Same military source also reports greatly increased Israeli military activity "in and immediately behind" Jerusalem with two Israeli brigades—fourth and sixth—and armored cars in Jerusalem area. (According to Rhodes agreement only two battalions, but no armor, are allowed in Jerusalem.) Local authorities are seriously concerned that Israelis may be planning further operations in Jerusalem area, such as seizure Mt. Scopus or Latrun or both. Legion source stated few days ago that while Legion could cope with local incidents, it could not cope with any general outbreak of fighting.

Jordan Government has brought above (except for Latrun report) formally to attention Riley.

Comment—In view Israeli action in Government House area and above indications they are planning further aggression, I would now recommend that Department should make immediate representations Tel Aviv along lines suggested in penultimate paragraph Legtel 239 June 9¹ without awaiting further word from Bunche. I fear that probably protracted attempts by Riley to settle situation will only give Israelis more time in which to prepare further aggression. US should therefore make it quite clear to Israel at this time that troops must be withdrawn and that any further aggressive acts will not be tolerated.

End comment.

Sent Department 243, repeated Bern (for USDel PCC) 22, Jerusalem 119, London 46, Beirut 48, Baghdad 65, Damascus 50, Cairo 29.²

STABLER

¹Not printed; that paragraph read: "In meantime I strongly urge Department to recall its telegram 37, March 25 and President's message to Abdullah (Deptel 38, March 28) and urgently consider possibility, in event Riley and Bunche should feel such step desirable, making representations in most forcible terms to Israeli Government to effect that Israeli troops must be withdrawn at once and unless Israeli will give undertaking to renounce agency of force to achieve its demands, US Government will be obliged to reconsider its attitude toward that state which has received up to this time unstinting US support." (867N.01/6-949) Regarding telegram 38, see footnote 1, p. 878.

²The Department, on June 14, replied that it was keeping in close touch with Mr. Bunche, "who has intervened directly, is taking strong line, and at present does not desire US assistance." (telegram 78, 501.BB Palestine/6-1349)

501.BB Palestine/6-1249: Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Vincent) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED

PRIORITY

BERN, June 12, 1949—noon.

920. Palun 197 from Hare. On July 11 Eytan again appeared before PCC for further discussion of matters mentioned Palun 192.¹

Boisanger opened meeting by criticizing certain of Eytan's June 8 statements including unwarranted comparison Bunche's success with that of PCC, Eytan's allegation that PCC had opposed direct negotiations as well as unjustified Jewish press attacks on PCC.

Hare put 3 questions to Eytan regarding June 8 statement:

1. Did Israelis anticipate action on Arab memos (Palun 165 and 166² which might help break ice for further negotiations)?

Eytan replied memo mentioned Palun 166 under sympathetic study but sidestepped memo mentioned Palun 165;

2. How did Israelis reconcile position regarding minorities in light paragraph 11 GA resolution December 11?

Eytan replied Israel did not interpret GA resolution as "categorical imperative." GA debate November 1948 indicated "point of view close to that of Israeli Govt." Israel believed paragraph 11 linked return refugees with peace settlement. Some clauses of paragraph 11 are not "practical of implementation";

3. Did Israel distinguish regarding territory allotted Jewish state November 29 and territory subsequently occupied for purpose of final territorial adjustment and is latter subject to relinquishment or exchange?

Eytan replied evasively reiterating "mathematical approach does not commend itself to my govt."

Yalcin expressed belief these questions important and he personally not satisfied with replies.

Eytan then made 4 suggestions:

(1) Conference work retarded by limited authority of Arab delegations which appear able discuss only refugees. Could not PCC send member or high official of secretariat to Arab capitals and for appearance sake to Tel Aviv to explain situation and attempt remedy this deficiency;

(2) GA resolution December 11 clearly established authority for direct contact between parties. As 6 months have passed PCC entitled speak with vigor to Arab delegation or Arab Govts regarding direct contact;

(3) PCC should establish 5 subcommittees: general terms of peace, frontiers, refugees, Jerusalem, economic and allied matters, all of which should meet jointly with Israeli and Arabs.

¹ Also identified as telegram 912, June 10, from Bern, p. 1112.

² Both dated May 23, from Lausanne, pp. 1043 and 1044, respectively.

(4) Eytan pointed out present discussions based on May 12 protocol but suggested as possible additional approach that armistice agreements conclude under November 16 resolution form common ground and might be made fruitful basis further talks.

Yalcin and Boisanger immediately replied rejecting practically all Eytan's suggestions. Regarding first suggestion Arabs had full authority to negotiate and real difficulty lay in failure of Israelis to live up to December 11 resolution.

Regarding second direct contact useless until basic groundwork laid. Also resolution did not require them negotiate directly.

Regarding third no use establish subcommittees until substantial basic agreement.

Regarding fourth Yalcin did not understand Eytan's suggestion and expressed opinion that May 12 protocol was in effect and might therefore be dangerous shift this agreed basis to armistice agreements.

Hare said his initial reaction essentially [similar?] to Yalcin's and Boisanger's. Eytan's suggestions embodied thoughts which merited careful consideration. Hare hoped Eytan would be able express further ideas of constructive nature.

Eytan disappointed but said would endeavor develop further ideas.

Repeated Paris as 56 for immediate delivery to Mark Ethridge at Hotel Crillon. [Hare.]

VINCENT

501.BB Palestine/6-1249 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Delegation
at Lausanne*

TOP SECRET NIACT

WASHINGTON, June 12, 1949—1 p. m.

Unpal 146. In recent conversation with Sec, Bevin expressed concern re situation arising from Israeli claims to territory both sides upper Jordan which would give them complete control all water resources. He stated UK hopes for four-party agreement re water development to permit settlement 100,000 refugees TJ and leave adequate water for Israel. Michael Wright supplemented remarks emphasizing that first basic point UK position re Syrian-Israeli frontier is desirability prior or separate agreement in principle before frontier fixed that waters of Jordan Valley will be used benefit Israel, TJ, Syria, Lebanon under joint auspices. UK believes that if agreement reached re equitable use water, frontier line will settle itself. UK does not suggest US-UK express any opinion re location frontier.

UK pointed out that conflicting plans exist for use of waters, since TJ is studying plan for construction Jordan-Yarmuk canal to provide land for refugee settlement, and Israel has now received final plans

from Hays and associates providing for diversion most or all Jordan water for Israel before it reaches TJ.

Dept informed Sec of its concurrence re desirability agreement in principle before frontier delineation that water resources will be used benefit all states concerned.

What is USDel's opinion re possibility obtaining such agreement near future? If obtainable, such agreement might expedite territorial settlement. If Economic Survey Group cld be activated an important function cld be conduct resurvey water resources in question with view their equitable use by all states concerned for development and refugee settlement purposes.

WEBB

501.BB Palestine/6-1249: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

PARIS, June 12, 1949—1 p. m.

2413. From Ethridge. USDel at Lausanne commenting separately on Israel note.

(1) If there is to be any assessment of blame for stalemate at Lausanne, Israel must accept primary responsibility. Commission members, particularly USRep, have consistently pointed out to Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, and Israeli delegation that key to peace is some Israeli concession on refugees. USDel prepared memo months ago of minor concessions which could be made without prejudice to Israel's final position, pointing out that such concessions would lay the basis for successful talks at Lausanne. Israel has made minor concessions with reservations, but has steadfastly refused to make important ones and has refused to indicate either publicly or privately how many refugees she is willing to take back and under what conditions. Israel's refusal to abide by the GA assembly resolution, providing those refugees who desire to return to their homes, etc., has been the primary factor in the stalemate. Israel has failed even to stipulate under what conditions refugees wishing to return might return; she has given no definition of what she regards as peaceful co-existence of Arabs and Jews in Israel and she consistently returns to the idea that her security would be endangered; that she can not bear the economic burden and that she has no responsibility for refugees because of Arab attacks upon her. I have never accepted the latter viewpoint. Aside from her general responsibility for refugees, she has particular responsibility for those who have been driven out by terrorism, repression and forcible ejection.

(2) The statement, "the Government of Israel is at a loss to understand the reference in the note to the alleged contemplation by Mr. Eytan of 'an additional acquisition of further [territory] within Palestine'" is a falsehood. Also the statement that the GA [Gaza?] proposal was first advanced by me. As previously reported it was first advanced by Ben Gurion and so reported to the Department at the time. In appearing before the general committee Sassoon and

Lifschitz presented Israel's claim for more of Arab Palestine and used the Hayes (TVA) project map to justify proposed new boundaries with Arab Palestine. It was made clear that the proposed canal must be all inside Israel, which would mean that further territory, including Tulkarm and the northwest corner of the Triangle, must go to Israel. In addition members of Israeli delegation have told me that their demand for withdrawal of Arab troops was designed to establish bargaining position with Abdullah so that Arab Palestine could be further divided. Comay said, "we will point out to Abdullah that he is getting a bonus out of the war." Ben Gurion told me (see telegram re Tiberias talk; ¹ do not have reference here) Israel wanted the entire western shore of the Dead Sea. Sharett told the commission in his first meeting that strip from Haifa to Tel Aviv must be widened back to Samarian Hills for security reasons. Under threats Israel took over Tulkarm area villages. By force she has taken over new territory in Jerusalem.

(3) I leave to the Department whether Israel's admission to UN sanctified what she is doing. Personally, I do not see how the argument can be accepted. Israel was state created upon an ethical concept and should rest upon an ethical base. Her attitude toward refugees is morally reprehensible and politically short-sighted. She has no security that does not rest in friendliness with her neighbors. She has no security that does not rest upon the basis of peace in the Middle East. Her position as conqueror demanding more does not make for peace. It makes for more trouble.

(4) As to Gaza strip: I have felt since it was first mentioned that it could be a basis for settlement of refugee problem to extent of Israel's responsibility and also a basis for territorial settlement. I have pointed out consistently that it is a good proposal providing it is accompanied by a *quid pro quo*: some part of the Negev. I have also pointed out that a concession in the Negev is more than a satisfaction of strategic concepts; it is a major point in Arab thinking. One thing that will make for eternal friction in the Middle East is to drive the wedge into the Arab world.

There never has been a time in the life of the commission when a generous and far-sighted attitude on the part of the Jews would not have unlocked peace. Perhaps they are too close to the siege of Jerusalem to see it now. As an advocate of the new state I hope they come on it eventually. Otherwise there will be no peace in the Middle East, no security for Israel and no possibility of lifting the economic blockade with which she must remain a remittance-man nation.²

Repeated Bern 37 for USDel Lausanne. [Ethridge.]

BRUCE

¹ See telegram 312, April 20, from Jerusalem, p. 925.

² Acting Secretary Webb met with President Truman on June 13. His memorandum of conversation stated: "The President read the enclosed telegram from Ethridge, No. 2413, with great interest, and was particularly impressed by the last paragraph.

"He also read the first paragraph of Palun 181 and indicated that he would leave it to my discretion as to whether to send a strong message to Ambassador McDonald insisting on his support." (Secretary's Memoranda, Lot 53 D 444) Palun 181 is dated June 2, p. 1085.

501.BB Palestine/6-1249: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Paris

TOP SECRET

PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, June 12, 1949— 10 p. m.

NIACT

Telac 78. Fol re Pal (Actel 63 June 12¹).

(1) General Pal Situation. As you know from Ethridge, Lausanne talks appear completely stalemated and PCC about to recess. Israeli Govt has made non-aggressive but completely negative reply to note which Pres directed be delivered Tel Aviv. Pres convinced firm line must be maintained and Dept now considering measures which might be taken to emphasize necessity modification Israel viewpoint to open way to settlement. Reply to Israeli note will be drafted in consultation Ethridge. In view PCC stalemate, now appears necessary US play more direct role re Pal settlement. US role would continue to seek basis of settlement among parties and not on basis preconceived notions of our own. After reply to Israeli note and certain steps to underline seriousness our purpose, we have in mind making strong specific suggestions both sides, particularly re: boundaries and refugees. Since precise proposals only in formative stage and depend upon further consultations Ethridge, Bunche, Israeli and Arab reps, suggest you limit yourself to informing Bevin negative character Israeli reply, that US Govt determined to maintain firm position and keep pressure on all parties, and that we are now considering what further steps should now be taken.

(2) Jordan situation. Dept giving further study extension Anglo-Jordan treaty to Pal territories now occupied by Jordan, in light of PCC stalemate and recent Israeli move Jerusalem. Essential point is UK attitude should Israelis seize upon extension treaty as excuse for grabbing more of Arab Pal. Israeli military could probably reach Jordan river in few days, probably before UK could get into action militarily. UK problem would then be to counterattack with forces not now in that area or to fail honor extension of treaty. View limited UK mil strength Jordan and divided UK public opinion re Pal, together with sharpest possible reaction large segments US public opinion, such decision by UK has most serious and far-reaching implications. You might by questioning draw out Bevin's own view of implications and UK line of action in event Israel-Jordan hostilities.

¹ Not printed; in this telegram from Paris, Secretary Acheson stated in part: "Bevin's secretary also stated Bevin wished talk with me again Monday or Tuesday regarding general Palestine situation, Transjordan situation, and recent Jewish aggressive moves in Jerusalem. Any guidance from Department would be appreciated." (740.00119 Council/6-1249).

Bevin should not rely upon US approval or support for all consequences treaty extension nor should he overestimate US influence with Israel. Past record suggests Israel has had more influence with US than has US with Israel; this particularly true on military matters since Israeli armament has come from eastern Europe and illicit traffic over which we have had no control. Believe US as member PCC should concentrate on negotiated settlement and not become involved with explosive issue extension Anglo-Jordan treaty unless situation reaches more of crisis stage than present. These are tentative views, subject to further study and consultation here.

(3) Israeli move Jerusalem. Judging from available reports Israeli move into Govt House neutral zone was violation spirit not letter Israeli-Jordan armistice agreement. Presence Arab civilians and military in or near area gave Israelis good pretext. Situation confused and Gen. Riley attempting bring parties to agreement on withdrawal forces both sides and partition area. Meeting reps both sides under chairmanship Riley likely in day or so. We understand Israelis may agree withdrawal troops from newly-occupied area and replacement by civilian police. View fluid situation Dept has taken no action and plans not to do so unless requested to by Bunche, who kept fully informed by Riley. Suggest Bevin be informed sense above.

WEBB

Editorial Note

The Palestine Conciliation Commission sent its third progress report from Lausanne on June 13. Mr. Hare, on June 17, transmitted a summary to the Department, noting that the report covered the period from April 9 to the departure of Mr. Ethridge from Lausanne. He described the conclusions of the report as follows:

“Immediate problem facing PCC consists in linking together negotiations on refugee problem and territorial questions. Pressure exerted by Arab delegations in favor of negotiations on refugee question combined with Israeli pressure in favor of territorial negotiations threaten to create situation in which it would be difficult to arrive at agreement on solution of these fundamental problems. PCC concentrating for moment on this problem. PCC is endeavoring to arrest tendency by leading respective delegations to discuss refugee and territorial questions. Solution must relate not only to general aspect including repatriation, resettlement and rehabilitation but also to more immediate and no less important preliminary measures re safeguarding of refugee rights and property.” (telegram 608, identified also as Palun 216, from Geneva, 501.BB Palestine/6-1749)

The text of the third progress report is printed in GA, *4th sess., Ad Hoc Political Committee, Annex, Volume II*, page 5.

501.BB Palestine/6-1349: Telegram

Mr. Raymond A. Hare to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

LAUSANNE, June 13, 1949—11 a. m.

Palun 198. USDel has following comment on Israeli reply to President's note (refDeptel 761):¹

General: Israeli reply should be read in conjunction Eytan's statement before PCC reported Palun 192.² Eytan put Israeli attitude re refugees and territory even more categorically. Return of refugees would be "retrograde step." Re territory, Israel cannot accept "purely arbitrary mathematical proportion or formula." USDel regrets that Israel unwilling approach refugee problem constructively through repatriation and resettlement and that Israel also unwilling consider territorial arrangement in terms fairness and equity. USDel notes with even greater regret Israel reply makes no reference whatsoever to support for UN and desire achieve peace and security on realistic basis as stated President's note. USDel reluctant conclude Israel does not share these objectives with US. USDel suggests US would be on strong ground in emphasizing these points in such further action which may be taken in matter.

Paragraph 1: Balance note proves Israeli position Lausanne has not been misunderstood as arguments advanced in Israeli reply are same those put forward Lausanne.

Paragraph 2: President's note made no reference to paragraph 5 GA resolution December 11 re conciliation although US might well have added that Israeli proposals at Lausanne were not of character to promote agreement with view final settlement all questions with Arabs. President's note confined itself to refugees and territory.

Paragraph 3: Israeli reply is not accurate. Paragraph 5 GA resolution December 11 provides for "negotiations conducted either with Conciliation Commission or directly." Arab delegates have not thus far found it possible meet officially with Israeli delegation. (approximately 20 characters garbled)³ meeting between Sassoon of Israel and Abdul Monem of Egypt appeared in press as result Israeli leak convinced Arabs further meetings premature. Official public meetings would be still more difficult for Arabs because of Arab public opinion. Virtual stalemate at Lausanne should be laid at door of both Israelis and Arabs. Following signature of May 12 protocol (Palun 148)⁴ Israelis advanced extremely [garble] proposals (Paluns 162⁵ and

¹ Dated June 9, 3 p. m., not printed; it transmitted the text of telegram 441, June 8, from Tel Aviv. Regarding 441, see footnote 1 to Tel Aviv telegram, June 8, p. 1102.

² Identified also as telegram 912, June 10, from Bern, p. 1112.

³ As in the source text.

⁴ Dated May 12, from Lausanne, p. 998.

⁵ Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 1036.

173⁶) but made no proposal re refugees other than limited measures mentioned Palun 145.⁷ Arabs advanced refugee proposals (Palun 166)⁸ but made no proposal re territory other than suggestion advanced Palun 165.⁹ Israelis have either failed take action or have not answered Arab memos re refugees and territory.

Arabs have not answered Israeli proposals re territory. USDel believes, however, that on balance Arab position more nearly in line protocol May 12 than Israeli and that at present stage negotiations next move up to Israelis and their failure act principal cause stalemate.

Paragraph 4: USDel perceives neither reason nor logic in Israeli deduction that GA considered Eban's explanations satisfactory because admission followed.

Paragraph 6: What Israelis at loss to understand in this paragraph is apparently quite clear in eighth paragraph in which it is stated "the war has proved indispensability to survival of Israel of certain vital areas not comprised originally in share of Jewish state." Israeli territory proposals advanced officially to PCC include western Galilee, Jaffa, area between Ramle Lydda Beersheba, areas north Gaza strip and south of Auja along Egyptian frontier, corridor to Jerusalem and other smaller areas throughout Palestine. Re Gaza strip Ethridge did not advance as previously indicated Palun 181.¹⁰

Paragraph 7: President's note did not present US position re territory as UN policy but as US policy. Rejection last fall of certain paragraphs of GA resolution December 11 might be considered in any event to be superseded by admission resolution which recalled GA resolution November 29. It may also be noted that Sharett on again being informed of US policy by Secretary on April 5 (Deptel 208 to Tel Aviv¹¹) replied that "he was familiar with our views on boundary questions, was hopeful an agreed solution could be reached and did not see any insurmountable difficulty."

Paragraph 8: Please see comment on seventh paragraph. Present paragraph as worded seems tantamount to unilateral revision GA resolution November 29, judicial findings re aggressors and award. It seems also to reject US views that territorial arrangement should be based on elementary principles fairness and security. US delegation fails understand why either Israel or Arabs have anything say about government of territory controlled by other.

Paragraphs 9, 10 and 11: USDel considers one-sided overstatement of developments in Palestine. It should be added for balance that

⁶ Identified also as telegram 820, May 28, from Bern, p. 1068.

⁷ Identified also as telegram 410, May 10, from Geneva, p. 992.

⁸ Dated May 23, from Lausanne, p. 1044.

⁹ Dated May 23, from Lausanne, p. 1043.

¹⁰ Dated June 2, from Lausanne, p. 1085.

¹¹ See footnote 2, p. 894.

Israelis attacked in Haifa, Jaffa and Acre before end British mandate and that incidents such as (approximately 10 characters garbled)¹² massacre accelerated refugee flight. Former Arab economy with Israelis not entirely in ruins as small Arab farmers could certainly return to their lands. Israel knows full well that neither US nor any other state expects it to tackle unaided reintegration of Arabs who elect return. Israeli measures on humanitarian grounds have thus far proved negligible. Israel has restricted compensation for land abandoned to that previously cultivated (Palun 145). Israel has made reunion contingent on census, close relationship and final settlement (Palun 145). Israeli contribution to resettlement consists only of technical experts (Palun 140¹³).

Paragraph 12: Israeli measures consist almost entirely of those listed Palun 145. USDel believed Department will agree these measures are hardly likely endanger self-preservation Israel. USDel also believes additional measures listed Palun 166 could be considered falling within this category. Second paragraph of President's note would seem also to indicate US has not considered repatriation "in absolute terms" but has approached refugee problem on basis both repatriation and resettlement.

Paragraph 13: Please see paragraphs 9 through 12.

Paragraph 14: Arabs might submit almost similar paragraph by substituting "Arab states" for "Israel" and "territory" for "refugee" throughout.

Paragraph 15: No comment.

HARE

¹² As in the source text.

¹³ Identified also as telegram 676, May 4, from Bern, p. 975.

501.BB Palestine/6-1349: Telegram

Mr. Raymond A. Hare to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LAUSANNE, June 13, 1949—4 p. m.

Palun 201. Regarding internationalization of Jerusalem. Department may wish discuss with Ethridge working paper and give USDel further instructions. In particular USDel desires Department's views on legal basis UN administration Jerusalem. Talks with Israeli representatives have elicited evidence Israel prepared oppose any provisions in derogation Israel "sovereignty" over Jewish zone of city. Specifically their greatest objection to provisions for UN administrators authority over questions of demilitarization and human rights as infringing rights of Israeli citizens by differentiating between one Israeli citizen and another on basis locus of residence. In addition they

oppose idea of administrator or municipal councils having any jurisdiction over common services except on basis *ad hoc* consultation with Israeli officials for advice only.

USDel believes that these and similar questions will be constant source trouble in future unless question of sovereignty is settled definitively in statute. We favor provision that sovereignty rests with people of Jerusalem but that UN is repository or custodian thereof and that under statute the exercise of certain attributes of sovereignty will be delegated to authorities of state adjoining the respective zones. Such provision if adopted would be consistent with continuing UN responsibility for Jerusalem and make more difficult future actions inimical to UN authority under color of right. At same time no practical difference need result in day-to-day exercise of municipal authority in respective zones by authorities of adjoining states. Difficulties in overcoming Israeli opposition to such a concept which interposes obstacle to possible plans for future expansion are apparent. Transjordan may also oppose.

HARE

501.BB Palestine/6-1349 : Telegram

Mr. John C. Ross to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW YORK, June 13, 1949—8:18 p. m.

720. Following is summary of information obtained from Bunche's staff on June 13.

In answer to specific question, Bunche does not request assistance from us in respect to Government House zone problem. He says that if Riley is unsuccessful, he may call for help.

Syrian-Israeli armistice negotiations postponed to June 14 or 15 since Vigier and Riley in Jerusalem, and Dayan has just been named to head armistice negotiation delegation. Israelis have already agreed to new date, which is to be finally set after situation re demilitarized zone at Government House is settled. Vigier has cabled Bunche that settlement of Jerusalem demilitarized zone affair is indispensable prior condition for Syrian-Israeli armistice agreement. He has transmitted a note from the Syrians to Bunche which states that Syria cannot ignore the new Israeli aggression in Jerusalem which constitutes a violation of the armistice agreement. It states that Syrians can have little hope for favorable issue from the armistice negotiations since Israelis infringe demilitarized zone agreements, and no guarantees appear to hold firm. Syrian note refers to Israeli promise to Riley of mutual withdrawal from demilitarized zone and its alleged subsequent violation.

In reply to foregoing, Bunche has cabled that the Syrian position is extreme and unwise. He recalled that there have been violations of

agreements by both sides in the past, and that it has been the responsibility of the UN to correct these violations. In the present instance the UN is making such correction. He further observes that if the criterion of compliance with agreements were used, neither side would qualify for participation in further negotiations. He also said he must challenge the implication that the UN is unable or not willing to carry out its commitments. He finally observed that recriminations were not helpful for the upcoming negotiations.

Bunche also cabled Israelis today that he considered incident at Government House would have harmful repercussions on the armistice negotiations at present critical stage. He termed affair a deplorable incident and urged that every step be taken urgently to rectify situation so that armistice negotiations may proceed soonest. Said it was understandable that Syrians wish efficacy of demilitarized zones and that UN could not guarantee sanctity of such zones. Cabled that there was no question but that UN had a special status at Scopus and Government House in connection with observation of demilitarization. Zones could only be altered by mutual agreement of parties. Pointed out that Rhodes armistice delegations of both parties could testify that no armistice agreement would have been possible were it not for the UN supervision of demilitarized Government House and Scopus zones. Pointed out that the lines of both zones were determined by the SC truce arrangements. Any change in these lines could be made only by mutual agreement. Unilateral change was violation of SC truce. While he had no responsibility of supervision of armistice, as acting mediator, he still had responsibility for SC truce. If lines were altered unilaterally and Israelis persisted in such truce violation, he would have no recourse except to report matter to SC.¹

Eban informed Reedman this morning, in Bunche's absence, that he was confident that Jerusalem situation would be straightened out. However, Eban alleged that UN had no business in being in Jerusalem demilitarized zone. In effect, he said that it was UN itself which had violated the armistice agreement. Reedman informed USUN that he had pointed out to Eban that armistice agreement provided that any change in lines must be made by mutual agreement. However, even in event of mutual agreement, UN as third party present in zone must be informed even if only by courtesy. Also referred to SC truce line provisions. Eban also argued that demilitarized zone lines had been altered by Israeli-Jordan agreement. Alleged that there had been no Jordan protest until it had been stirred up by other Arab states.

¹ New York, on June 14, reported further on Mr. Bunche's views on this matter as follows: "While UN has no responsibility re the armistice supervision since agreements are self-contained entities, the SC truce and cease fire arrangements are still in effect. Bunche has responsibility for reporting to SC on these and can therefore bring present situation to attention of SC as violation of November 30 cease-fire agreement." (telegram 724, 501.BB Palestine/6-1449)

Reedman was able to cite spontaneous Jordanian protests against Israeli action.

Eban, in letter to Bunche, dated June 10, received by latter today, asked him to use his influence on Jordanians to implement Article 8 of armistice agreement relative to Scopus. Stated that no progress had been made in negotiations. He did not offer any information regarding issues at stake or course of discussions. Since there is no UN observer at special committee meetings, Bunche is almost completely uninformed re status of these discussions.²

Ross

² New York advised, on June 14, that "Bunche this noon requested US support for his urgent request to Israelis that they withdraw from Government House demilitarized zone." It also reported that "Eban agreed fully with Bunche that UN was rightfully in demilitarized zone on request of parties and could only be asked to leave if mutual agreement on disposition of zone reached between parties." (telegram 724, 501.BB Palestine/6-1449)

501.BB Palestine/6-1349 : Telegram

Mr. John C. Ross to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY NEW YORK, June 13, 1949—11:30 p. m.

723. Bunche informed USUN this evening that at MAC meeting Riley and Jordan voted for proposal that both sides should withdraw from demilitarized zone in Jerusalem, but Israelis voted against, therefore proposal failed.

Bunche informed us that he is calling Eban in tomorrow to tell him bluntly that Israelis must withdraw from demilitarized zone or he will immediately resign as Acting Mediator and inform SC that reason is Israeli violation of agreement. Bunche says he will state publicly that there is no point in his attempting to negotiate a Syrian-Israeli armistice agreement if the Israelis are not going to observe such agreement. Upon his return to New York this evening, he reviewed the entire situation and is thoroughly disgusted with Israeli policy re Jerusalem demilitarized zone. He terms policy as "criminally crooked", stating that there could be no doubt that whole basis of armistice agreement was that Israeli-Arab lines should remain as they were unless changed by mutual agreement.¹

Ross

¹ Jerusalem reported, on June 14, that "At conclusion 6-hour meeting yesterday MAC passed resolution providing for simultaneous withdrawal troops of both sides by 1000 hours GMT today. . . . Resolution stated both sides violated armistice by moving troops into neutral zone. Riley cast deciding vote siding with Arab Delegation against Israel." (telegram 417, 501.BB Palestine/6-1449)

Later the same day, Jerusalem reported an unofficial statement by a United Nations officer that Israeli and Arab forces had withdrawn from the Government House zone on schedule (telegram 421, 501.BB Palestine/6-1449).

867N.48/6-1449

The Secretary of Defense (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

WASHINGTON, 14 June 1949.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In reply to your letter of May 4, 1949, concerning the probable effects of the Arab refugee problem upon our military and strategic interests in the Near East, the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been obtained and I wish to give you the position of the National Military Establishment on this matter.

The primary significance for the Military Establishment of the Arab refugee problem lies in the strategic importance of the Middle East to the U.S. and its security interests. This area is important not only from the point of view of actual military operations, but for its valuable petroleum resources which may be essential to the conduct of a future war. As the Joint Chiefs of Staff have frequently indicated, either unfriendly control of that area or the failure of the United States to retain the orientation of the area toward the West could, in the event of a global war, have profound effect upon the course of such a war.

It follows that all reasonable political and economic effort toward the maintenance and improvement of friendly relations with the nations of the Middle East is justified. It follows, further, that our policy logically should extend to strengthening of the Arab States so that their friendliness in war emergency may be useful.

The present refugee situation as pointed out in your letter will, unless rectified, serve to perpetuate and aggravate conditions of insecurity, unrest, and political instability, with attendant opportunity for Soviet penetration. In addition, constructive United States assistance with respect to refugees would be an asset with respect to maintenance and improvement of friendly relations with the Arab States, while the withholding of such assistance would add to the trend toward Arab embitterment.

In connection with this matter I should like to refer you to a recent intelligence estimate prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency (Intelligence Memorandum No. 180, a copy of which is attached¹). In this memorandum, the CIA points out the serious risks inherent in the continuation of the present situations. These risks, insofar as they affect U.S. security, cause us serious concern.

The refugee problem, if unresolved, may not have specific, direct effect upon present U.S. military (as distinguished from strategic) interests in the Middle East area. The refugee problem can, however, have very serious repercussions on our strategic interests because those

¹ Not printed.

interests are bound to suffer unless the stability and friendship of the Middle East area are maintained and unless conditions there are sufficiently improved to permit Israeli and Arab reconciliation, at least to the extent that the area as a whole might reasonably be expected to resist Soviet penetration and to act in concert to oppose Soviet aggression.

We have offered no proposals for the solution of this very serious problem, but we stand ready to cooperate with you in taking appropriate steps to do so. We agree fully, however, with the tenor of your letter. We believe that a satisfactory long-term solution for security in that area and the earliest resolution of this and other major differences between Israel and the neighboring Arab States will pay important dividends in terms of our national security.²

Sincerely yours,

LOUIS JOHNSON

² Secretary Acheson, in a memorandum of July 7, transmitted to President Truman a copy of Secretary Johnson's memorandum and of the intelligence estimate (867N.48/7-749).

501.BB Palestine/6-1449: Telegram

The Consul at Geneva (Troutman) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY

GENEVA, June 14, 1949—4 p. m.

577. Palun 204. From Hare. On June 13 PCC held private meeting with Eytan re some of Israeli suggestions reported in Palun 197.¹ Boisanger reiterated Arabs continued find it difficult meet directly with Israelis and pointed out Arabs and Israelis had both agreed as result Beirut meeting merely come to Lausanne for exchange views.

Hare summarized Israeli and Arab proposals to PCC and observed next move up to Israeli delegates.

Eytan replied that six months had passed since adoption GA resolution December 11, and it seemed logical believe Arabs should now be able to meet directly with Israelis. Although Israel still had Arab memo outlined in Palun 166² under study, Eytan did not believe immediate affirmative action would be productive as Arabs had not thus far even commented on action already taken by Israelis as reported in Palun 145.³ Furthermore he seriously doubted efficacy of particularist approach to general settlement. Eytan then put hypothetical question whether, if Israel accepted principle of repatriation "without any strings attached," Arabs would be persuaded to conclude

¹ Identified also as telegram 920, June 12, from Bern, p. 1122.

² Dated May 23, from Lausanne, p. 1044.

³ Identified also as telegram 410, May 10, from Geneva, p. 992.

peace. Eytan continued that under present circumstances in Israel and elsewhere in Near East it would be impossible for Israel actually to consider return refugees until Israel was informed of complete scientific, economic and financial plan for repatriation and resettlement of refugees. Until latter was known in detail, Israel would not even be in position to consider how many refugees could be repatriated to Israel. Meanwhile, Eytan contended that Israel's proposal re separated families (Palun 145) and its willingness to take Gaza strip and refugees therein (Palun 162⁴) was liberal realistic approach to refugee question. Here again Eytan observed Arab delegates had not even commented on Israeli proposals.

Yalcin made moving statement re more affirmative approach by Israel pointing out Israel could accept principle of repatriation subject to such provisions as those who wished to return, those who wished to live at peace with their neighbors, special categories, international aid. Yalcin's contention was that acceptance in principle contingent on numerous provisos would provide Arabs with point of departure and thereafter permit both Israelis and Arabs to tackle refugee question constructively.

Hare observed that all were convinced that Israel and Arab states sincerely desirous of establishment lasting peace in Palestine and Middle East. If refugee question remained unsolved, such peace would hopelessly be delayed. But to approach refugee question, it would be necessary to have preliminary agreement of both sides. Unless such agreement were obtained UN, international agencies, member governments and private organizations would have considerable difficulty in developing economic and financial plans for Palestine and Middle East which would assist in solving refugee question.

Eytan listened attentively although Ethridge discussion reported Palun 174⁵ must have been familiar to him. Eytan's argument might be described as: "Tell me how much you will pay and I will tell you what, if anything, I will sell."

Eytan agreed further discussion with PCC would be helpful at some future date. At moment it is difficult to determine Eytan's motivation and intent in refugee question. Developments during next few days may make his meaning clear.

Sent Department 577, repeated Paris 73 (for Jessup). [Hare.]

TROUTMAN

⁴ Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 1036.

⁵ Identified also as telegram 821, May 28, from Bern, p. 1069.

501.BB Palestine/6-1449 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel*¹

TOP SECRET PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, June 14, 1949—7 p. m.

367. Deputy Under Sec Rusk June 14 called in Israeli Chargé, said Dept had received reports cancellation all Israeli Army leave June 9 and 10 and of unusual Israeli mil activity Jerusalem vicinity and Syrian border region,² and inquired whether Chargé could tell Dept if these reports true and if so what they meant. Chargé said had received no info.

Rusk then stated view signature armistice agreements and admission Israel UN, US now considered mil phase Pal definitely at end. Resolution problem Syrian-Israeli armistice now being worked on by Bunche and also was matter which in no way justified recourse to mil action by either side. Same thing applied to situation in Jerusalem which had been prejudiced by recent Israeli move. Peace and stability NE extremely important to US and Dept perturbed by above reports from Israel. Rusk did not presume state what these reports meant but desired Chargé inform his Govt that US, as friend of Israel, would be deeply disappointed if Israel should undertake new mil action. No one cld foresee consequences of such action, which would be completely unjustified by circumstances.

Chargé said wld immediately convey info to his Govt.

WEBB

¹ This telegram was repeated to Arab capitals and Jerusalem and to Bern for the United States Delegation at Lausanne.

² Tel Aviv advised, on June 17, that the resumption of Syrian-Israeli armistice talks had tended to relieve tensions in that area (telegram 467, 867N.00 (W)/6-1749).

501.BB Palestine/6-1549

*Memorandum by Mr. Mark F. Ethridge to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Rusk)*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] June 15, 1949.

The U.S. Delegation at Lausanne wants instruction on the following points:

(1) Recess. In the attached telegram² Hare points way in which a shorter recess can be achieved and still avoid danger that Arabs will not show up at New York.

¹ Mr. Ethridge, on his return to the United States, informed President Truman that "the Arab-Israeli negotiations at Lausanne under the auspices of the Conciliation Commission are 'deadlocked' and that both Israeli and Arab representatives must adopt 'entirely new approaches' if a formal peace is to be reached." (Department of State *Bulletin*, June 19, 1949, p. 780) The date of Mr. Ethridge's interview with the President is not indicated in the *Bulletin*.

² Not found attached.

In the light of his telegram and my own further thinking, what I would suggest is this:

That the American delegation be instructed, unless constructive proposals are forthcoming by the end of next week, to propose a recess in the talks to a date one month before the September Assembly, the Commission to meet then in New York (not at Lake Success).

The Jerusalem committee, technical committee on refugees, and the general political committee be instructed to continue their work.

The Commission to have temporary headquarters at League Palace in Geneva or in Jerusalem and members to be available to consider any new proposals or any other matter at the call of the Chairman.

Agreement to recess on the part of Israel and Arab states is not necessary. Neither side will agree because it will be an admission that they were in some way responsible. The Commission should assume the responsibility and regard it as a form of pressure on both sides.

Both sides should be warned by Commission and by the U.S. that any resort to force in any circumstance would be regarded most seriously.

Both sides should be told that the Commission, as always, welcomes any proposals that either side may make in the interim and that both parties are of course free to have any negotiations, direct or otherwise.

(2) Refugee Plan: You will remember that Eytan proposed to the Commission that the refugee problem be taken out of the context of the negotiations: that is, the United States is to pick up the check. Eytan appeared before the Commission again on Monday of this week and Hare summarizes his position in Palun 204³ as, "Tell me how much you will pay and I will tell you what, if anything, I will sell."

Israel's position on refugees has stiffened, rather than modified, since the Tel Aviv conferences. Whereas she said at first that she would be willing to consider the return of refugees within the context of a general peace settlement, she now says (quoting Hare), "Under the circumstances in Israel and elsewhere in the Near East it would be impossible for Israel actually to consider the return of refugees until Israel was informed of a complete scientific, economic and financial plan for the resettlement of refugees. Until the latter was known in detail, Israel would not even be in a position to consider how many refugees could be repatriated to Israel." In other words, Israel is trying to force us to buy her into accepting her own obligation.

Her new position raises the question whether, having partially conditioned our promises of help on Israel's fulfillment of her obligation under the resolution to our satisfaction, it would be prudent, helpful to a peace settlement, or possible either with the White House or with Congress, to abandon that position.

³ Identified also as telegram 577, June 14, from Geneva, p. 1135.

Israel's great burden in accepting refugees is of course apparent, but in her Gaza proposal she admitted the possibility, with help, of absorbing the 230,000 refugees there, the 80,000 normal population and the broken families (estimated at between 35,000 and 140,000 people). In the Gaza proposal she made no such condition as she makes now. She could certainly with help absorb from 200,000 to 250,000 refugees even if she did not get the Gaza strip. If she would make a statement to that effect, hedging it with reservations as to what sort of refugees and under what conditions, we could then get a commitment from the Arab states.

I doubt very much, however, if in buying Israel into that agreement in principle we are satisfying the Arab demand for her to evidence her good faith under the resolution or that we are helping the position of the United States vis-à-vis either Israel or the Arab states. If we are going to buy peace let us make sure that it is to be peace and not disgruntlement which would arise in Arab states from further financial concessions to Israel without requiring her to fulfill the obligations of a UN member. I do not, therefore, think it is either prudent or contributory to peace to accept her conditions.

I leave to the Department the question whether the President or Congress would be willing to modify conditions under which help might be extended in resettlement and repatriation of refugees.

I would suggest, therefore, that you and George McGhee consider this course:

(1) Instruct the American delegation that in view of the fact that the President's conditions have not been met, the United States is not willing to introduce into the Commission the "McGhee plan"⁴ at this juncture, although it renews the commitment that it is willing to help in the refugee situation under the conditions already outlined to the Israeli and Arab delegations and to the members of the Commission. It should be said, also, that if and when those conditions are met the United States will be willing to introduce the plan.

(2) In the meantime work on a governmental, rather than Commission level, to get acceptance of the conditions.

(3) Recognizing that time is vital, in view of the expiration of UNRPR funds and the approach of the General Assembly, establish an organization that is ready to go quickly into action once it has been approved by the UN. I think it is necessary even to go so far as to have personnel on paper, though that would have to be quietly done.

(4) Make every effort to obtain funds for interim aid, not on a basis of relief, but on a basis of employment. The morale of the refugees is deteriorating daily and becoming more dangerous. If winter comes with no help, there will be an explosive situation in the Middle East. Money will obviously have to be obtained from sources other than Congress for that interim help.

M[ARK F.] E[THRIDGE]

⁴This refers, presumably, to Mr. McGhee's memorandum of April 22 and its several annexes, p. 934.

867N.48/6-1549

*The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Coordinator on
Palestine Refugee Matters (McGhee)*

SECRET

TEL AVIV, June 15, 1949.

DEAR MCGHEE: Back of my telegram of today¹ for your personal attention, copy of which is attached, lies the following reasoning.

Negatively, it is now indisputable that the PCC has shown such inherent organizational weaknesses that not even the super-energy and devotion of Mark Ethridge could galvanize it into life. Of course, its problems have been difficult and neither Arabs nor Jews have co-operated as they should; but the indictment that the PCC has shown itself "an inefficient postoffice" cannot be argued away.

Because the PCC is organically so weak, I think it a grave and unnecessary risk to contemplate using it as the base—no matter how indirectly—for the long term resettlement operations so wisely envisaged in your April 27 memorandum.² To tie up those difficult and technical operations with an organization as political and as weak as the PCC would be to invite failure.

On the affirmative side, I urge in the strongest possible way that the basis for the resettlement operations should be a single individual with authority to give binding directions. At every stage in the development of these plans, there will arise prickly questions which unless grasped firmly by someone who has the power and the will to override nationalist and other obstructive tactics will cause the history of the refugees resettlement program to be a repetition of the old one—too little and too late.

Could not Griffis's office have its mandate so broadened as to constitute a requisite base for the projected resettlement operations? The advantages of such a setup would be several:

1. Single-headed direction in the formulation and execution of basic policies, thus avoiding the acknowledged and unacknowledged cross purposes in the PCC which have tended to paralyze its actions.
2. The energy and devotion at the top which are essential and can be secured only through the driving leadership of an executive of the highest calibre.
3. Just recognition of the leading role which the United States through its generous contribution is making to a refugee solution. Such recognition will never be adequate through any tripartite base such as the PCC.

I recognize that it may be difficult or possibly embarrassing for the Department to reconsider its organizational plans. Nonetheless, I feel

¹ No. 452 from Tel Aviv, not printed; it expressed the Ambassador's doubts that a "triple-headed PCC can be effective as base essential resettlement and related operations." (867N.48/6-1549)

² This reference is presumably to the "Proposed Plan of Action," p. 939.

impelled to make the above suggestions in the conviction that such reconsideration is essential.³

Cordially yours,

JAMES G. McDONALD

³ Mr. McGhee, in reply on July 1, advised Ambassador McDonald, in part, as follows:

"Let me hasten to assure you that we have never contemplated utilizing the PCC as an operating agency. We have viewed the PCC as a body which could initiate studies and pave the way for the development of a resettlement program rather than one which would implement such a program with any funds which might be made available for that purpose. We have had in mind for some time the establishment by the PCC of an Economic Survey Group to be composed of outstanding individuals whose personal authority would carry great weight. It has not yet been possible to activate this Group, the principal reason being that we have not been able to get a specific commitment from the Israeli or Arab Governments with regard to the number of refugees which they would undertake to repatriate or resettle. Under these circumstances it may be necessary to approach the problem in a somewhat different manner, but we are convinced that the PCC should have a carefully formulated program as a basis for its recommendations to the General Assembly which will need to take the necessary action to initiate the future program. . . . We fully agree with you that, whatever the form of the organization, its success will in large part depend upon the selection of a director who can give strong leadership to the program." (S67N.48/6-1549)

S67N.01/6-1549: Telegram

The Chargé in Jordan (Stabler) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

AMMAN, June 15, 1949—8 a. m.

247. During talk with Prime Minister June 11, following discussed:

1. Referring to present situation in Jerusalem, Prime Minister said Transjordan Government determined not to make further concessions to Israelis and would not recede from its position by Israeli threat or use of force. It would be preferable for Israel, which appears to have no end to its expansionist ambitions, to make good its demands by force and conquest than for Transjordan to make any further concessions in hope of settling problem on reasonable basis. Every effort by Transjordan to meet with Israelis in spirit of reason and compromise had ended in failure. (In earlier talks same day King made similar comments stating that although he had endeavored to be reasonable, Israel always trying to get "stranglehold" on him). Prime Minister emphasized that his remarks did not mean that Transjordan had changed its attitude re desire settle Palestine problem and that Transjordan had no thought resuming hostilities. He only wished to make clear that Transjordan had gone about as far as it could in acceding to Israeli demands.

[Here follow paragraphs numbered 2 to 5, giving the Prime Minister's views on the desire of Transjordan to establish good relations with Syria; the determination of Transjordan not to enter into separate negotiations with Israel; the need of Transjordan, Egypt, and Iraq for internal security arms "as every bit of strength gained by

Arabs meant that much less feeling of superiority and aggressiveness on part Israel"; and the "fact" that continuation by Israel of its present policy would only result in increasing the determination of the Arab peoples "to prepare themselves for final destruction of Jewish state."]

Sent Department 247, repeated Bern 25 for USDel PCC, pouched London, Tel Aviv, Arab capitals, Jerusalem.

STABLER

501.BB Palestine/6-1549 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Vincent) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

BERN, June 15, 1949—noon.

940. Palun 207 from Hare. USDel doubts possibility obtaining agreement mentioned Unpal 146¹ in near future for following reasons:

1. Israel is unwilling negotiate with Syria at Lausanne on any question including political and economic matters under GA resolution December 11 pending conclusion Israeli-Syrian armistice.
2. Arabs unwilling meet Israelis directly at Lausanne or even to reply indirectly through PCC pending affirmative Israeli action re refugee question.
3. Resulting stalemate as Israelis unwilling talk refugee question outside context general settlement including territorial question.
4. PCC including French, Turkish and US delegates as well as Arab delegates and perhaps Israeli Delegation are not technically prepared to discuss.

USDel believes water resources question should be studied by economic survey group before it is considered by PCC or meeting of states concerned. [Hare.]

VINCENT

¹ Dated June 12, to Lausanne, p. 1123.

501.BB Palestine/6-1549 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Vincent) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

BERN, June 15, 1949—noon.

939. Palun 208. From Hare. At PCC general committee meeting June 14 Sassoon and Hirsch dispelled any hope which Eytan's statements (reference Palun 205[204² 1]) might have contained.

Agenda consisted points 1 and 2 in Palun 166 and point 3 in Palun 165.²

¹ Identified also as telegram 577, June 14, from Geneva, p. 1135.

² Both dated May 23, from Lausanne, pp. 1044 and 1043 respectively.

Re point 1 Sassoon stated Israelis were unable consider refugee return separately but only in context of whole peace settlement consequently immediate return was not possible. Israelis would, on other hand, take certain limited steps to preserve Arab property in orange groves. Sassoon indicated however, Israel had general economic plan for Israel which might provide for only certain acreage in orange groves. Some Arab groves including those lacking care or destroyed by war would probably be put to other use.

Re point 2, Sassoon indicated present Israeli currency regulations would prevent unblocking of Arab accounts. Sassoon suggested International Red Cross might make use of Arab accounts within Israel which would permit use of equivalent amount International Red Cross money outside Israel for refugees.

Israeli delegation stressed answers were preliminary as both points are still "under sympathetic consideration in Tel Aviv".³

Re point 3, as result long involved discussion it became clear Israelis do not consider this Arab proposal on basis May 12 protocol as basis for negotiation of either refugee or territorial question (reference Palun 169⁴). Arabs consider Israeli territorial proposals in Palun's 162⁵ and 173⁶ as violation of May 12 protocol. Result is deadlock.

Sent Department 939, repeated Paris 58 for Jessup. [Hare.]

VINCENT

³ The Department commented, on June 20, that the use of blocked Arab accounts in the manner suggested in point two of the Sassoon statement "appears clear violation spirit of GA Res Dec 11. Even if state claims right confiscate property own citizens, applicable portions GA Res based on equity as well as law and refugees fleeing from war seem to have position equivalent aliens whose property entitled protection.

"[The question of] Blocked accounts presents more clearcut case but different only in degree from that of orange groves discussed under point 1. Shld be made clear no implication condoning any misuse Arab property contrary to principles law or equity." (Telegram Unpal 157 to Bern, repeated to Tel Aviv, 501.BB Palestine/6-2049)

⁴ Identified also as telegram 819, May 28, from Bern, p. 1067.

⁵ Dated May 23, from Lausanne, not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 1036.

⁶ Identified also as telegram 820, May 28, from Bern, p. 1068.

501.BB Palestine/6-1549 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

PARIS, June 15, 1949—7 p. m.

Actel 74. During call on Secretary June 14 Bevin inquired as to our current thinking on Palestine situation, including Lausanne conference and problem of Transjordan. Secretary outlined to him views expressed by Ethridge during visit Paris, mentioning probable adjournment Lausanne talks and Ethridge view neither side wants to make peace. Bevin inquired whether we thought Jews would start to

fight, stating this raised urgently question of supplying arms to Transjordan. Secretary discussed recent US note to Israelis and Israeli reply, reading substance paragraph two Telac 78¹ and pointing out Department wished Bevin consider carefully problem which might be created if UK becomes involved in conflict between Israel and Transjordan. Bevin said he had not had report from British chiefs of staff. He was much concerned about abandonment of Abdullah and said trend of UK thinking was now in direction of giving Abdullah arms and *de jure* recognition of incorporation of administered territories in Palestine. Bevin said Abdullah had strong support in House of Commons, including Churchill's support. He promised to give us considered answer on this question in day or two.

Secretary then gave Bevin substance first paragraph Telac 79² reporting McDonald's views on current Israeli claims, adding that Ethridge agreed with general view of Bevin about desirability of concluding agreement on water rights. Jessup mentioned view expressed by both Ethridge and Cordier, who had just come from Lausanne, to effect Arabs counting on weakening of Israel in next two years. Bevin said some of his people believed civil war in Israel quite possible, and they doubted whether Ben Gurion could maintain his hold. Secretary also commented on difficulties Jewish drive for funds in US now experiencing.

ACHESON

¹ Dated June 12, to Paris, p. 1126.

² Dated June 13, 5 p. m., to Paris, not printed; the first paragraph of this "top secret summary for the Secretary" digested Mr. Sharett's views as set forth in telegram 443, June 10, from Tel Aviv, p. 1110, and Ambassador McDonald's views as given in his two telegrams of June 11; regarding these two latter messages, see editorial note, p. 1115.

501.BB Palestine/6-1649

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] June 16, 1949.

MEETING WITH PRESIDENT, THURSDAY, JUNE 16, 1949

U.S. APPROACH TO TRANSJORDAN

I delivered to the President the original of the attached memorandum with respect to the recent U.S. approach to Transjordan. The President read the pertinent sections and kept it. He indicated approval of the action taken in the Department.

J[AMES E.] W[EBB]

[Annex]

MEMORANDUM

Subject: Department's Message to Transjordan concerning Separate Negotiations with Israel.

The following is the pertinent section of a message sent by the Department on June 1 to the American Legation at Amman, Transjordan: [Here follows first paragraph of telegram 72 to Amman, except that the last sentence is omitted.]

The background of this matter is as follows:

In the latter part of May, at a time when the discussions being conducted by the Palestine Conciliation Commission at Lausanne were approaching a crucial point, Elias Sassoon, a representative of the Israeli Government, sent from Paris a message to King Abdullah of Transjordan asserting that the Lausanne talks were a complete failure and requesting Transjordan to enter into separate talks, parallel to the Lausanne discussions, in Jerusalem. King Abdullah, who had placed great hopes in the Lausanne talks and had instructed his representatives to make every effort to reach agreement with the Israelis there, reacted strongly against this proposal and confided his concern to the United States Chargé d'Affaires. He was not inclined to accede to the Israeli request, since the talks were progressing at Lausanne and in view of what had happened when separate talks last took place between Israel and Transjordan without the presence of a third party.

This occurred in March, while Dr. Bunche was conducting negotiations for an armistice between Transjordan and Israel with representatives of the two countries at Rhodes. Without Dr. Bunche's knowledge Israel proposed a secret meeting with Transjordan, to take place in Jerusalem while the Rhodes talks were going on. Transjordan agreed, and during the meeting the Israeli representatives stated that Israel would not sign an armistice at Rhodes unless Transjordan agreed in Jerusalem to turn over to Israel certain areas in central Palestine then occupied by Iraqi forces. Upon the withdrawal of the Iraqi Army, Transjordan was scheduled to take over the areas occupied by Iraq, but in Jerusalem the representatives of Israel warned that if Transjordan attempted to do so without agreeing to turn over the areas in question, Israel, in addition to not signing the armistice, would not be responsible for the consequences. The Israeli representatives gave those of Transjordan 24 hours to agree. Abdullah appealed to the United States, but when no help came he signed the forced agreement on the theory that when this was done and the armistice signed at Rhodes, it might be more difficult for the Israelis to make more territorial demands. As a result, some of the richest land in Palestine

passed to Israeli control and the number of Arab refugees was considerably increased.

Although no agreement had been reached at Lausanne, largely because of the rigidity of the Israeli position, the Department felt that Sassoon was totally incorrect in stating that the talks were a complete failure. The Department also believed that it was essential to give the strongest support to the Conciliation Commission, which was attempting to reach an equitable agreement between the parties and offered all the necessary facilities to the parties for reaching such an agreement. Under the circumstances, separate talks seemed totally unnecessary, and likely to lead to circumstances similar to those under which Transjordan was forced to give up considerable territory in order to achieve an armistice with Israel. Accordingly, the Department, in the interests of a just settlement, suggested to King Abdullah that he not enter the separate talks with Israel.

An additional motive for the Department's approach to King Abdullah was the possibility that Israel and Transjordan, by negotiating together on the question of Jerusalem without the presence of the Conciliation Commission, might reach an agreement concerning the City which would disregard the international and Christian interests in Jerusalem and in the Holy Places.

501.BB Palestine/6-1649

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] June 16, 1949.

MEETING WITH PRESIDENT, THURSDAY, JUNE 16, 1949

MARK ETHRIDGE

The President expressed himself as being satisfied with the approach of Mr. Mark Ethridge to the Israeli problem and said he felt the proposal that the meeting be adjourned and then reconvened a month before the UN session was a good one.

The President desires to have for his information and files copies of the memoranda covering the talks between Ethridge¹ and President Ben Gurion.

J[AMES E.] W[EBB]

¹ Mr. Ethridge submitted a letter dated June 17 to President Truman confirming his resignation as a member of the Palestine Conciliation Commission. The Department of State drafted a reply for the President, dated June 24, accepting the resignation at the close of business the following day (501.BB Palestine/6-2149).

501.BB Palestine/6-1649: Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

JERUSALEM, June 16, 1949—noon.

426. Dayan yesterday explained to Consulate General Israeli position on relation between Jordan armistice agreement and SC resolution on Palestine and present status UN personnel here. Armistice agreement which was signed to implement November 16 SC resolution represents one step beyond SC truce order of July 15 and previous SC resolution on Palestine. Israel and Jordan have progressed from truce stage to armistice stage on road to final peace. Armistice agreement supersedes various SC resolutions which no longer apply and powers conferred by them on UN personnel as well as restrictions imposed no longer in effect. To interpret situation otherwise would result in numerous contradictions. Terms of armistice conflict with SC resolution and interpretation of mediator. For example, SC truce resolution of July 15 and mediator's instructions prohibit any change in lines while armistice provides for various shifts. Also under SC resolution UN observers empowered to issue orders to either party in case of violation of truce; under armistice Chief of Staff can only vote as one member of PAC [MAC]. Under SC resolution UN officers free move anywhere, observe and enforce truce; now can only move when requested by MAC and lack enforcement powers. Bunche at Rhodes much concerned with these contradictions but urged both parties proceed on basis realities rather than technicalities.

Because only armistice now binding UN no longer possesses rights at Govt House and personnel privilege of moving as wishes. PCC never possessed special right conferred by SC resolution. UN personnel in same position as any other civilians and have no more right remain in No Man's Land than any other. Dayan denied any intention challenging entire position UN in Jerusalem.

I replied stating was expressing only personal views, that did not believe armistice supersedes and cancels out SC resolution. Latter could only be altered by SC and remains in force until SC takes specific action or peace established. Mediator and UN personnel hold same powers and rights as before but could logically refrain from exercising certain ones. Restrictions in SC resolution on both parties remain fully in force. If Israel feels situation incongruous and wishes change should as UN member apply to SC. Not proper question for consideration by MAC. However, I doubted SC willing rescind various resolutions until final peace treaties signed.

Sent Department 426, repeated Geneva 38, London 21, Baghdad 39, Beirut 86, Damascus 41, Tel Aviv 58. Pouched Amman, Cairo, Jidda.

BURDETT

501.BB Palestine/6-2249

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary
of State*

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] June 17, 1949.

Participants: The Acting Secretary—Mr. Webb
G—Mr. Rusk
Mr. Mark Ethridge
NE—Mr. Rockwell
Mr. Aubrey Eban—Israeli Representative in United Nations
Mr. Reuven Shiloah—Special Assistant to Prime Minister Ben Gurion
Mr. Uriel Heyd—Chargé d'Affaires a.i., Embassy of Israel

The meeting, which had been arranged at the request of Messrs. Heyd, Shiloah and Eban, began at 11:45 and lasted until 1:45.

Mr. Eban opened the conversation by stating that he and Mr. Shiloah had been instructed by the Israeli Government to offer certain verbal comment in connection with the Israeli reply¹ to the note which the President directed be delivered in Tel Aviv on the basic aspects of a final settlement in Palestine.

Mr. Eban stated that he first wished to assure me of the deep feeling of friendship which Israel felt for the United States and of the profound Israeli gratitude for all that the United States had done for Israel. I said that this friendly feeling was reciprocated and that the United States desired its friendship for Israel to continue as strong in the future as in the past. It was because of friendly interest in the welfare of Israel that the President's note had been despatched.

Mr. Eban then said that the President's note dealt with two main subjects: territorial compensation and the refugees.

TERRITORIAL COMPENSATION

With regard to the first, the Israeli Government had the following objections.

Moral Objection—

Israel felt that it was immoral that anyone should think of rewarding the Arabs for the aggression which they launched against Israel. There had been extremely heavy loss of life among the population of Israel as a result, and Israel believed that rather than receiving compensation, the Arabs owed reparations to Israel.

¹ Dated June 8, p. 1102.

Territorial Compensation Rejected by the General Assembly—

Israel understood that the United States is attempting to implement the December 11 resolution of the General Assembly. However, this resolution made no mention of territorial compensation but rather called upon the parties to reach agreement among themselves without any predetermined territorial formula being involved. As a matter of fact, the General Assembly had specifically rejected such a territorial formula. In the debate in the General Assembly Mr. Dulles² had stated that the boundary settlement should be left entirely to the parties. The Palestine Conciliation Commission, while invoking the principle contained in the December 11 resolution concerning refugees, should also approach the territorial question in the manner envisaged by the resolution.

Effect on Armistice Agreements—

The territorial compensation formula prejudices the issues decided in the various armistice agreements which have been concluded. While, of course, these agreements are dependent upon the final settlement, no one can say that the decisions arrived at in the agreements will not have a very important effect upon the form of the final settlement. It is thus undesirable to undermine what has already been accomplished by the agreements. Eban maintained that Israel holds no territory wrongfully, since her occupation of the areas now held has been sanctioned by the armistice agreements, as has the occupation of the territory in Palestine now held by the Arab states.

Psychological Effect on Arab World—

It is most undesirable, by means of the territorial compensation formula, to raise in the Arab world hopes which are impossible of fulfillment. The Israelis have noted a definite change in the Arab attitude. Arab representatives who formerly alleged they wanted no part of Palestine are now making demands for large slices of the Negev.

REFUGEES

Eban maintained that Israel had not adopted a negative attitude concerning the refugees. He said Israeli representatives had made the following concrete proposals.

1. The proposal to take over the Gaza strip with all its occupants.
2. An offer to repatriate members of broken families, after a census of such members had been taken. He thought that maybe 50,000 persons might come back to Israel if this were done.
3. Israel has accepted the responsibility for refugees who have managed to filter back into Israel. All in all, Eban thought these

² John Foster Dulles, member of the United States Delegation at the Second Part of the Third Regular Session of the General Assembly.

Israeli proposals would mean the eventual repatriation of some 300,000 refugees. Accordingly, it could not be said that Israel had adopted a negative attitude or rejected the principle of repatriation.

In this connection, Mr. Eban said that Mr. Acheson, during a conversation with Mr. Eban and Mr. Sharett in New York,^a had agreed that the security question was an important deterrent to the beginning of repatriation. Mr. Rusk interjected that this was not exactly so since what the Secretary had said was that Israel should begin the repatriation of refugees into areas where there was no security problem.

4. Mr. Eban maintained that Israel had agreed to unfreeze Arab bank accounts and to accept the responsibility for abandoned Arab lands in Israeli territory.

Mr. Eban then stated that the Israelis felt that their initiative at Lausanne had been unilateral and that although they were ready to make peace at Lausanne, there was no reciprocity. As further indications of the initiative taken by Israel, Mr. Eban cited the Israeli agreement to the internationalization of the Holy Places and the creation of a free-zone for Jordan at Haifa. There had been no response to any of these concessions by the Arab representatives.

Mr. Eban continued by stating that despite the provision in this sense contained in the December 11 resolution, there had been no direct meetings at Lausanne between Arabs and Israelis. This had not been the case with the negotiations conducted by Dr. Bunche. The Conciliation Commission should bring the two parties together and this was one reason why Israel had made its proposal for the creation of separate committees to discuss the various items upon which there were differences. Mr. Ethridge replied that the Conciliation Commission had always encouraged direct negotiation. Israel bore the main responsibility for the failure of such negotiations to materialize, because on the few occasions when Israeli and Arab representatives had met together the results of their meetings had immediately appeared in the *Palestine Post*. This procedure put the Arab representatives in an awkward position and discouraged further meetings.

Mr. Shiloah said that he felt the Beirut meeting between representatives of the Arab states was primarily responsible for the fact that the Arabs did not meet with the Israelis at Lausanne, because the Arabs were mutually suspicious of each other and having adopted a common attitude at Beirut they did not dare depart from this. Mr. Ethridge said that without the Beirut meeting the Arabs would never have agreed even to go to Lausanne.

Mr. Eban then stated that the duty of the United States Government and the Palestine Conciliation Commission was to call upon the Arabs

^a See Mr. Acheson's memorandum of April 5, p. 890.

to meet in separate negotiations with the Israelis according to the terms of the December 11 resolution.

Mr. Eban then took up the Israeli territorial proposals, stating that with Lebanon Israel had proposed the political frontier as the final boundary, the same with Egypt, and the present armistice line with Jordan.

At this point I said that so far I had seen no indication that the Israeli Government had any realization of the United States attitude in this matter. As far as I could see, Mr. Eban had had nothing new to add to what had been said so many times before. How, I asked, could we reconcile the reports of Israeli troop movements⁴ with the stated reasonable attitude of Israel toward a final settlement?

Mr. Eban said that Israel had no intention of undertaking military activity. If there were any troop movements, it was because of concern regarding the possible intentions of Colonel Zaim, who was known to be an ambitious militarist. All of Syria's neighbors, including Israel, were fearful of a possible Syrian attack.

At this point the United States efforts to get Syria to agree to the Bunche proposal for an armistice with Israel were outlined to Mr. Eban.⁵

I then stated that with regard to the recent note to Israel, the Department had of course scrupulously observed Ambassador Elath's special plea that the utmost secrecy be maintained. Under these circumstances, we thought it most unusual that so much of the contents of the note had been made known in various parts of the world.

I said that it seemed to me essential that both sides should subordinate their special desires to the overall necessity for a real peace, and that I had the feeling that the desire to accomplish such a peace was not yet strong enough in Israel.

Mr. Ethridge then reviewed the course of action taken by the Palestine Conciliation Commission. He explained how after considerable difficulty the Commission had succeeded in getting the Arabs to abandon their attitude that the refugee question was the only point which should be considered and to come to Lausanne for general peace talks.

⁴ Tel Aviv, on June 13, reported the cancellation on June 9 and 10 of all leave from the Israeli Army, with the apparent intention of "preparing for action if as result of Zaim's reported refusal discuss Bunche proposal Syrian armistice negotiations fail." (telegram 448) The Department replied the following day, giving its assumption that "you are doing everything possible prevent new Israeli mil venture." (telegram 365) Both telegrams are filed under 867N.20/6-1349. Tel Aviv advised, on June 17, that Miss "Herlitz categorically denied that army leaves had been cancelled" (telegram 465, 867N.20/6-1749).

⁵ Tel Aviv advised, in telegram 465 cited in footnote 4 above, of further information from Miss Herlitz that Israeli-Syrian negotiations resumed on June 16 "in spirit of friendly cordiality," that "some actual progress" was made, and that next meeting called for June 21. Not expected any definite conclusion will be reached for "some weeks" as it is anticipated Syrian elections will tend slow up proceedings, but Israeli officials appear optimistic of eventual outcome."

The United States delegation had told the Arabs that their position on the refugees was totally fantastic. The United States delegation had also taken the main responsibility in drafting the proposals on Jerusalem, which were very favorable to the Israeli point of view.

The Arabs regarded the United Nations and the United States as responsible for the refugee problem and maintained that the United States must obtain evidence of the good faith of Israel concerning the refugees. Some temporary concession by Israel on this point, which could have been surrounded by provisos, would have satisfied the Arabs and provided the key to the opening of final peace negotiations. Despite all the efforts of Mr. Ethridge and the State Department, Israel made no such concession and the Conciliation Commission went to Lausanne with nothing to offer the Arabs.

Mr. Ethridge said that he noted that the Israelis were attributing the Gaza proposal to him, but the record was clear that Prime Minister Ben Gurion first broached the Gaza plan at Tiberias on April 18 in a conversation with Mr. Ethridge. Mr. Eytan later took up the subject again at Lausanne.

Mr. Ethridge said that the Arab representatives had never stated that they were not willing to talk peace at Lausanne.

Mr. Eban admitted "within these four walls" that it was true that Israel had refused to make the commitment which Mr. Ethridge had urged concerning the refugees.

He asked whether in view of the steps concerning the refugees which Israel had subsequently taken and which he had previously outlined it would still not be possible to go to the Arabs and ask them to begin serious talks. Mr. Ethridge said that if Israel would make a concrete numerical commitment concerning the refugees the stalemate at Lausanne could be resolved.

Mr. Ethridge then stated that Mr. Shiloah had been wrong in previous statements in this country that Israel had demanded no territory in central Palestine. Although Israeli representatives had not made such demands to the Palestine Conciliation Commission they had stated them in the General Committee of the Commission, and had discussed the necessity for more land in central Palestine in connection with the Israeli development scheme.

Mr. Ethridge stated his opinion that if Israel would assume the burden of taking back a portion of the Arab refugees, the world would rally to Israel for having taken such a step based on ethics and humanity.

Mr. Eban inquired whether Mr. Ethridge could refute the observation that the Arabs want to get the refugees back into Israel but do not wish to make peace. In reply, Mr. Ethridge said that at Lausanne the Egyptian representative had told him that if Israel would take

back more than a token number of refugees, Egypt would be willing to talk about a territorial settlement and to lift the economic blockade.

Mr. Shiloah said that the security question could not be disregarded. Israel had not seen the McGhee plan and was not sure that an overall scheme existed for resettlement of the refugees. All that was happening was that pressure was being put upon Israel to take back a definite number of refugees. Egypt, Syria and Jordan were rearming.⁶

⁶The Department, the same day, summarized for the U.S. Delegation at Lausanne the meeting with the Israeli officials. The Department noted that the "Israelis reiterated at length familiar arguments why Israel unable take affirmative action re refugees and territorial settlement as set forth US note. US reps maintained firm line refuting number of allegations made by Israelis." The summary concluded as follows: "US reps reiterated belief that if Israel wld make firm commitment to PCC repatriation specific and substantial number refugees, deadlock at Lausanne wld be resolved and way to negotiations with Arab states for overall settlements would be opened. Pointed out no possibility US assistance re refugees unless Israelis and Arabs definitely accept their responsibilities re repatriation and resettlement.

"Israelis were told US believes fair final settlement cld not be achieved on basis Israel retaining all 1947 territory plus all territory under mil occupation." (Unpal 154 to Bern, 501.BB Palestine/6-1749)

867N.00/6-1149: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 17, 1949—6 p. m.

375. Dept has decided to propose Israel and TJ accept the procedure for Jlem along lines suggested in Jlem Tel 409 Jun 11 rptd to you as 52. Bunche has indicated agreement and requesting Riley act this capacity. You are accordingly requested to make presentation and leave *aide-mémoire* with Israeli Govt along fol lines:

"The US Govt is increasingly concerned that the situation in Jlem constitutes a threat to peace in Pal. It therefore is presenting the fol proposals to the govts of Israel and TJ with a view to obtaining an agreed settlement as to the questions immed in issue between them.

It is proposed that the two states agree that for this purpose the Special Comite established by the Armistice agreement shld be superseded by the Mixed Armistice Comm which shld meet under the chairmanship of Gen Riley. The terms of reference shld include such questions relating to the demarcation of Jewish and Arab zones, the use of roads and other questions of access to places in the Jlem area, and the functioning of public utilities as require agreement between the parties. Chmn shld have power to make proposals when he deems desirable. Agreed settlement these questions will be without prejudice to final decisions to be taken in collaboration with the UN regarding internatl status of Jlem area, but parties will agree to recommend inclusion agreed settlement in these decisions to extent conformable such decisions.

The Govt of TJ [*Israel*] is urged to accept this proposal in a spirit of accommodation and with determination that an agreement must be reached with all possible speed in order eliminate threat Jlem now presents to cause of peace in Pal."

We realize it may be difficult to achieve final agreement on terms reference thru separate negots Amman and Tel Aviv. However if you can achieve agreement in principle, parties cld meet in Jlem and finalize terms reference under chairmanship Riley.¹

WEBB

¹ This telegram was repeated to Jerusalem. A virtually identical message was sent to Amman as telegram 82 the same day and time. The text of No. 375 was also sent as Unpal 153 to Bern, for the American Delegation at Lausanne, on June 17 (501.BB Palestine/6-1749).

Ambassador McDonald discussed the subject matter of telegram 375 with Miss Herlitz at the Israeli Foreign Office on June 19 and left an appropriate *vide-memoire* the following day. He also described "Burdett's plan Jerusalem telegram to Department 409 June 11 as sound both in principles and details. It illustrates perfectly why immediate problem Jerusalem solvable only on spot." (telegram 469, June 20, from Tel Aviv, 501.BB Palestine/6-2049)

501.BB Palestine/6-1749: Telegram

The Consul at Geneva (Troutman) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, June 17, 1949—7 p. m.

612. Palun 219. From Hare. On June 17 PCC met Arab delegates to discuss their memos of May 18, and 21 (Palun 166 and 165¹) and to elicit their further views regarding territorial matters. It was obvious Sharett statement before Knesset reported in Paris *Herald Tribune* June 16 to which Arab delegate referred at commencement of meeting served as background for Arab remarks.

Egyptian delegate made it clear that until progress is made regarding Arab memos of May 18 and 21 which dealt with both refugees and territory and, in effect, until refugee problem is settled in this manner in accord with GA resolution December 11, he could not on basis of instructions from his government take up other matters such as territorial arrangements. Recent statements have been reported from Tel Aviv regarding frontiers but nothing regarding refugees. It would not serve any purpose, therefore, in placing other matters before Arab delegates (such as Israeli proposal regarding territory).

Yalcin pointed out seriousness of Egyptian statement and asked if three other delegates had similar instructions. Lebanon, Transjordan and Syria supported Egyptian delegate.

[Here follows a detailed summary of the views of the delegates of the three Arab States, stressing Arab lack of trust in the good will and

¹ Both telegrams dated May 23, from Lausanne, pp. 1044 and 1043, respectively.

intentions of the Israelis, their violations of the decisions of the United Nations, and their expansionist tendencies. The Arabs, on the other hand, had "taken progressive steps in signing May 12 protocol and submitting on May 18 and 21 memos. Arabs unlike Jews have signed protocol May 12 without reservation."

Lebanese concluded Arab delegates were legitimately preoccupied, that Jewish attitude was no help in common problem and that PCC should therefore act. [Hare.]

TROUTMAN

501.BB Palestine/6-1849 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Legation in Switzerland

SECRET PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, June 18, 1949—11 a. m.

NIACT

Unpal 155. For US Del Lausanne. For Hare. After fullest consultation Ethridge, Dept concludes useful purpose wld be served by proposing adjourn PCC for two or three week period, during which delegations wld have fresh opportunity consult their govts with view to advancing constructive proposals upon reconvening Lausanne.

During adjournment, Jlem comite, technical comite on refugees, and genl political comite wld continue their work. Members PCC wld be subject to recall upon request either side. Both parties wld of course be entirely free to conduct direct or indirect negots. Despite adjournment, PCC and USG wld under no circumstances tolerate resort to force by either side.

Pls telegraph your comments on this proposal. If you concur in it Dept will seek Pres's agreement and thereafter approach Ankara and Paris requesting their support and suggesting they so instruct their reps Lausanne.¹

WEBB

¹ Mr. Hare, in reply on June 20, raised the "question of exactly what we could hope to achieve by such a step. Eytan has just returned from consultation with his government and Sharett's speech would hardly presage changed policy. Arab delegates here continue keep refugees doggedly to fore but they are split wide open on territorial issue and would be hard put to discuss territory even if refugee obstacle removed. In face these basic substantive differences it is difficult to see how short recess and reconvening here would further settlement as far as parties are concerned. Furthermore renewed contact French and Turkish PCC members with their governments could hardly be expected yield productive results. This leads to conclusion that, unless Department itself foresees possibility of using interim to advantage, probability is that negotiations would be renewed here on essentially same basis as present impasse except that by that time I hope, Ethridge successor would have been appointed. Should such be the case I find it difficult to see what would have been gained and would suggest that in that event further consideration be given to original idea of recess until August 15 in order make use of GA pressure where other expedients have failed.

Basic fact of course is that neither side actually ready for peace at this time." (telegram 974, identified also as Palun 220, from Bern, 501.BB Palestine/6-2049)

767N.90D/6-1649: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Legation in Syria

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, June 18, 1949—2 p. m.

252. Referring to conversation reported in your tel No. 327 of June 16,¹ you may tell Arslan that US regards armistice agreements as very important stabilizing factors ME. The US will accordingly be prepared exercise its influence in SC to end that SC should take any necessary measures within scope Charter to deal with any threat to or violation intl peace and security arising from any threat to or breach these agreements. You may inform Arslan that Israeli Gov being informed this message with assurances impartial application.²

Reftel indicates possible misapprehension Arslan that Bunche proposal requires Syria withdraw several kilometers behind its own border. If necessary please make clear that proposal only requires withdrawal to intl boundary and that Syrians may station forces right up to the border, according Bunche's own interpretation.

WEBB

¹ Not printed.

² The Department repeated this paragraph in telegram 379 sent to Tel Aviv the same day. It concluded the message with an instruction to "inform Israeli Gov that our application foregoing policy will be impartial, depending entirely upon findings as to responsibility in event of threat or breach armistice agreement." (501.BB Palestine/6-1849)

Minister Keeley was received separately by Foreign Minister Arslan and Prime Minister Zaim on June 20 (telegrams 332, June 20, 501.BB Palestine/6-2049, and 335, June 21, 867N.01/6-2149, both from Damascus). The latter message expressed his optimism that "there is now good chance of early agreement on basis Bunche proposal of June 8 if Israeli show equal accommodating spirit. Department's expressed willingness to put weight its influence in SC behind observance any agreement reached has had marked reassuring effect."

501.MA Palestine/6-1849: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, June 18, 1949—3 p. m.

2104. Congressional action US appropriation for UN Refugee Relief nearly completed. Of \$16 million appropriated, \$4 million is conditional upon finding by Pres that other nations have met their obligations to UN Relief Palestine Refugees. Congressional feeling strong that total contribution should be made only if effective support forthcoming from other UN Members. To date only \$6,690,000 contributed by govs other than US. Under terms of appropriation bill Dept considers it may be necessary to limit US contribution from conditional \$4 million to amount total contributions from other nations exceeding \$12,000,000.

Griffis informed UK considering contribution one million pounds to British Red Cross for refugee program in Trans-Jordan and plans approach UK on possibility channelling that contribution through UNRPR. Additional UK contribution in this amt combined with anticipated French contribution of 500 million francs and listing of Arab contributions in services and supplies estimated at approximately \$4 million would bring total contributions from govs other than US to about \$16 million. If UK contribution Red Cross does not go thru UNRPR we see little prospect obtaining US conditional contribution \$4 million without which UNRPR would be obliged close down Oct. 1.

Therefore most essential for success of both present and long range programs that proposed UK contribution for British Red Cross be channeled thru UNRPR. We see no reason why under terms UN resolution of Nov. 19 conditional gift could not be made to UNRPR so that UK could obtain credit at home for supporting British Red Cross and abroad for supporting UNRPR. Dept hopes Griffis can proceed London immediately explore matter with FonOff. UNRPR Lake Success informed Dept that parliamentary questions on proposed contribution scheduled June 21.

Please bring foregoing attention FonOff and express hope satisfactory formula can be found for purposes indicated.¹

WEBB

¹ This telegram was repeated to Paris for Ambassador Griffis and to New York. A message of similar import was sent to Paris at the same date and time. It stated that it was "Most essential for success of both present and long range programs that French contribution be effected." (telegram 2177, 501.MA Palestine/6-1849)

867N.01/6-1849: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Legation in Jordan*¹

SECRET PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, June 19, 1949—2 p. m.

84. Ur niact 253, June 18.² At time sending Deptel 82³ Dept was under impression parties had reached satisfactory interim agreement Govt House. Dept also acted under impression urgency Jerusalem negotiations be brought under effective UN chairmanship.

¹ This telegram was repeated to Tel Aviv and Jerusalem.

² Not printed; its first paragraph read: "Deptel 82, June 17 received this afternoon must have crossed mytel 250, June 15 [17]. As pointed out in my reftel am strongly of opinion that Government House question must be resolved before any action can be taken on Department's proposal. Unless that matter can be settled, there would seem little chance that Transjordan Government would be prepared to agree, even in principle, to this proposal. I believe Jerusalem would concur in this opinion and also feel Riley would agree. Therefore recommend Department authorize me and Tel Aviv delay presentation of proposal until Government House dispute is satisfactorily settled." (867N.01/6-1849) No. 250 is not printed.

³ Dated June 17, not printed, but see footnote 1 to telegram 375, p. 1154.

Dept does not know at this time whether proposal has already been presented Tel Aviv. We therefore consider you shld proceed present proposal unless possible arrange directly with Tel Aviv more satisfactory timing.

Dept does not regard its proposal as effecting any great change in situation. Principal objective is place Riley in charge negotiations re territorial and other related matters Jerusalem area with object relieving tension. Agreement in principle both parties would permit Riley in consultation parties arrange priorities. If TJ insists prior settlement Govt House zone, this would also fall under Riley's jurisdiction and he could proceed accordingly. We feel simple fact agreement of parties to international chairmanship of negotiations on comprehensive scale may itself tend relax tension and cause parties direct their thinking toward peaceful settlement rather than seeking gain advantage by unilateral acts.

In approving presentation proposals Bunche said that since one method had failed we shld try another. Did not seem feel this marked notable change in procedures already under way.

Tel Aviv please note that in last para quoted material Deptel 375⁴ "TJ" shld read "Israel".

WEBB

⁴ Dated June 17, p. 1154.

867N.01/6-2049 : Telegram

The Chargé in Jordan (Stabler) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

AMMAN, June 20, 1949—4 p. m.

255. In view Deptel 84, June 19, and since it not possible communicate with Tel Aviv expeditiously I presented proposal contained in Deptel 82 June 17¹ to Foreign Minister this morning and left him with *aide-mémoire*. Foreign Minister stated that Transjordan was anxious to settle questions at issue peacefully but felt Israeli demands excessive. If agreement could be reached on principle of returning life in Jerusalem to normal he believed there would be no difficulty in reaching understanding on present problems. Without agreement on this principle he was not hopeful. Foreign Minister promised take matter up with government urgently and give reply soonest. (It is understood Cabinet will consider proposal at Wednesday meeting, in meanwhile I will discuss matter with King and Prime Minister.)

¹ See footnote 1 to telegram 375, p. 1154.

Suggestion that presentation proposal be delayed (Legtel 253, June 18²) was predicated on my belief that if Government House question finally settled to satisfaction both parties, MAC under Riley could start on other questions with clean slate and Transjordan Government would have more faith in Riley's ability to bring about agreement and in Israel's sincerity.³

Sent Department 255, repeated Jerusalem 124, Tel Aviv 21.

STABLER

² Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 1157.

³ Chargé Stabler reported, on June 22, that earlier the same day he had been handed an *aide-mémoire* by the Jordanian Foreign Minister, which welcomed the U.S. proposal but noted that any agreement must be without prejudice to the ultimate status of Jerusalem (telegram 259 from Amman, 867N.01/6-2249).

501.BB Palestine/6-1349 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Legation in Switzerland

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 20, 1949—8 p. m.

Unpal 159. For USDel, Lausanne. Re internationalization Jerusalem. (Palun 201¹) In view insistent Israel refusal relinquish sovereignty New City, Dept felt this was point on which most important PCC submit proposals which cld be agreed to. Your proposal ingenious but Dept fears it wld give basis Israeli rejection entire plan. We also consider it preferable avoid reference sovereignty and merely specify respective powers exercised by authorities in area.

Dept considers that Secretariat working paper² wld place important attributes sovereignty in adjacent states, especially actual governing power, except UN authority will exercise direct control over Holy Places and routes giving immed access to them.

As to points 2 and 3 in Art 6, adjacent states would actually govern subject to obligations enumerated Parts IV and VI. As to these points wld appear possible to specify that administrator shall exercise powers of supervision as enumerated in Parts IV and VI.

It appears encouraging that Israel has not objected to principle demilitarization. If they accept principle it wld seem difficult for them to reject element UN supervision of character specified since this calculated only to effect supervision by impartial internatl body. As to human rights, Dept does not envisage these obligations as resulting in disparate treatment Israeli citizens inside and outside Jlem. We contemplate Decl of Human Rights serving as standard of achieve-

¹ Dated June 13, from Lausanne, p. 1130.

² Presumably Com. Jer/W.18, dated May 18, p. 1023.

ment for administrations having general governing responsibility in Jlem, as we assume Decl would serve in all of Israel by virtue of Israeli membership in UN. We do not contemplate attempt to enforce specifically the provisions of Decl in Jlem as such treatment not appropriate to character of Decl. Primary reliance, for giving genuine effect to principles set forth in Decl as objectives, wld be on administering authorities in Jlem. Role of UN Administrator and Internatl Tribunal wld be to take cognizance of serious departures from standards proclaimed in Decl, and through judicial procedures to secure redress in such cases and bring about necessary changes by administering authorities. Tribunal wld take into acct all relevant circumstances in determining whether an administering authority was living up to its obligation to be guided by Decl as a standard of achievement in human rights field. Suggested redraft of Art 17 in Secretariat working paper is as follows:

Art 17. The authorities responsible for govt in the two zones of Jlem shall, in administering their respective zones, be guided by the principles and standards set forth in the Universal Decl of Human Rights approved by the GA on Dec 10, 1948 "as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations". If the UN Administrator believes that zonal authorities in Jlem are failing to comply with this obligation, he shall bring the matter to the attention of the Internatl Tribunal in an appropriate proceeding, or, if necessary, bring the matter before an appropriate organ of the UN.

We feel that if basic provisions re sovereignty cannot be rejected by parties, PCC will have more latitude in making other proposals even though parties may object. Israeli and Arab spokesman in GA may propose amendments and GA wld decide. Doubtful if parties wld reject entire plan if basic outline is reasonable. These considerations wld apply to jurisdiction given municipal council over common services mentioned reftel. Such provision does not appear important from UN point of view but shld be valuable to efficient functioning of city.

Dept generally concurs opinion ConGen Jlem last para Tel 412, Jun 13,³ rptd to you as No. 30.

Foregoing discussion is for your assistance and does not have nature instruction.

Dept expects to pouch shortly composite suggestions for changes in Secretariat draft for Jlem instrument.

WEBB

³ Not printed; it reported that the draft proposals for an internationalized Jerusalem had been discussed with French Consul General Neuville. The last paragraph dealt with certain of the latter's suggestions (867N.01/6-1349).

501.BB Palestine/6-1449: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Legation in Switzerland

SECRET PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, June 20, 1949—8 p. m.

Unpal 160. USDel Lausanne. For Hare. Palun 204, June 14.¹ You shld inform Israeli rep US views along fol lines: USG greatly disturbed over present Israeli attitude refugee question, which represents marked departure assurances expressed by Eban May 5² before *Ad Hoc* comite GA when seeking UN membership. This attitude equally difficult reconcile with Gaza strip proposal, which represents firm admission on part Israel its ability assume responsibility 230,000 refugees plus 80,000 normal residents area. By refusal come forth with constructive proposal based on quantitative acceptance without territorial acquisition (penultimate para Palun 174, May 28³), Israel has effectively blocked any possibility obtaining cooperation Arabs in resolving refugee question and any justification further US approaches to Arabs this purpose.

You shld express to Israeli rep USG's disappointment re failure his Govt carry out purposes GA res Dec 11, despite Elath's formal assurances contained his letter May 11 to SecState re Israel's desire make utmost effort to bring its policy into conformity with resolutions of UN, and despite US offer technical financial assistance to Israel and Arabs in implementing program for solution of refugee problem under conditions specified and as part UN program (Unpal 114, May 23⁴). You shld emphasize that onus of responsibility resolving refugee question lies squarely on Israelis and Arabs, and that USG is under no mandate from UN to lend its material resources to solve problem of Israeli-Arab making.⁵ Therefore USG greatly regrets Eytan's implication that Israeli agreement repatriation is contingent upon assump-

¹ Identified also as telegram 577 from Geneva, not printed.

² See footnote 2, p. 979.

³ Identified also as telegram 821 from Bern, p. 1069.

⁴ Identified also as telegram 674 to Bern, p. 1047.

⁵ Mr. Hare, on June 23, advised the Department that prior to and after Mr. Ethridge's departure, the American Delegation had been reluctant to raise the question of general economic aid at PCC meetings, in the absence of general political agreement between the Arabs and Israelis. Its reluctance was based on the expectation of "almost certain leak" to the press and on the possibility that the PCC and the UN Secretariat might devote their entire attention to this subject. The American Delegation, however, had "privately discussed substance Unpal 114 and Palun 180 with French and Turkish members PCC but does not plan discuss question officially in PCC until commitments mentioned Palun 168 and 174 are forthcoming. We continue to attach importance to reservation in Palun 180 because of importance keeping PCC handling of refugee and territorial questions in step." (telegram Palun 226 from Lausanne, 501.BB Palestine/6-2349)

Palun 180 from Lausanne and Unpal 114 to Lausanne are printed on pp. 1086 and 1047, respectively. Palun 168 and 174 from Bern are printed on pp. 1065 and 1069, respectively.

tion financial responsibility by US, and must reiterate that agreement repatriation is obligation placed upon Israel by international community under Dec 11 res.

USG further notes with disappointment that Israeli Govt has shown no inclination meet conditions on which US offer assistance (Unpal 114) was based. In event conditions met at future date, USG wld be prepared at that time consider question of assistance to Israel and Arab states. However, you shld emphasize implications such delay, since US support of refugee settlement program conditional upon UN action and sponsorship. Such program wld necessitate time-consuming and laborious preparation by PCC prior to presentation to GA this autumn. Under present circumstances, PCC not in position initiate preparation such program in absence necessary political cooperation. Therefore any additional delay will mean increasing difficulty if not impossibility obtaining UN action this year.

You shld also inform Arabs USG attitude.⁶

WEBB

⁶ Mr. Hare delivered the message contained in Unpal 160 to Mr. Eytan on January 22. The latter "made no comment on substance of message other than to say it would be duly considered and that he assumed reply in action rather than words would be preferred. I said that was exactly the case." (telegram Palun 227, June 23, 11 a. m., from Lausanne, 501.BB Palestine/6-2349)

The Department, on June 27, directed Tel Aviv to take the line set forth in Unpal 160 in discussing the refugee question with the Israeli Government (telegram 406, 501.BB Palestine/6-2749).

501.BB Palestine/6-1649: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Jerusalem*¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 20, 1949—8 p. m.

275. Dept endorses your reply Dayan conversation reported Contel 426 Jun 16. We consider SC Res May 29 and July 15 in force. Some changes brought about by armistice agreements which were negotiated by parties pursuant subsequent SC Res but these do not invalidate those provisions earlier resolutions left untouched. Bunche regards these resolutions as in force and plans proposed new res superseding them when Syrian armistice concluded. He wld retain only simple cease-fire and transfer mediator function this respect to PCC. Dept's position on this proposal not yet formulated.

Dept not certain whether UN position Govt House area can be properly described as legal right or as privilege. Issue lies primarily

¹This telegram was repeated to Tel Aviv and Amman and to Bern for the American Delegation at Lausanne.

between UN and states involved but we wld support UN contention right of free access. Neutral zone has been created by agreement parties and UN access recognized by them and confirmed by usage.

Dept wld consider it appropriate, subject your concurrence, inquire Dayan reasons for raising technical questions concerning UN rights this zone. As he says situation has progressed one step from truce to armistice. Assume all concerned hope hostilities phase concluded and moving toward final peace. Challenging existing neutral zones appears retrogressive step. UN has important work in this process. It has made financial investment in Govt House and our understanding will continue use of it so long as it has mission to perform in Jlem. If parties really desire peaceful settlement and coop with UN logical course wld be preserve existing neutral area and lend full facilities to UN. When opposite attitude is taken we can only speculate as to motives and naturally take into account strategic value of area.

WEBB

867N.48/6-2149 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

TEL AVIV, June 21, 1949—11 a. m.

471. Personal attention President and Acting Secretary of State. At my request Herlitz of Foreign Office called residence evening nineteenth remaining two hours to read portions, paraphrase others and discuss Eban's cabled report of Israeli's long meeting with Acting Secretary and other Department officials June 18 [17]. According to Herlitz President and Department are primarily disturbed by:

1. Israel's failure make specific pledge repatriation refugees;
2. Fear lest Israeli be planning enlarge territory by force.

Although some extremists in army and Knesset advocate expansion by use or threat of force and despite general opinion of both Israelis and foreigners that Israel is strong enough to impose its will on Arabs, I believe fear of Israel aggression is not warranted. My belief based on:

1. Present task which government dare not shirk of absorbing a quarter of a million immigrants annually requires every available economic resource;
2. Battle to reduce fantastic cost of living must be won if Ben-Gurion cabinet is to survive;
3. Outbreak war would wreck Israel's basic purpose "in gathering of exiles" and defeat government on vital economic front;
4. Israeli's repeatedly expressed confidence in General Riley and readiness accept and even on occasion to request wider scope his mediation inconsistent with aggressive intentions;

5. Aggression would alienate world opinion and risk economic or other sanctions.

Certainly Ben-Gurion, Sharett and General Staff are fully aware that further Israel expansion by force, even if war were won quickly, would be disastrously self-defeating. None of these men are reckless adventurers. On contrary their record during struggle against Britain and Arabs and now against enormous domestic problems shows Israeli leaders as highly intelligent and practical. They, knowing that aggression would lose American support and President Truman's friendship have no intention invite self-destruction.¹

McDONALD

¹In a Summary of Daily Meeting with the Secretary, Mr. Rusk "reported receipt of a telegram from Ambassador McDonald in which McDonald said that the Israelis will not commit any acts of aggression. Mr. Rusk emphasized that this was only McDonald's view and that we had not received any assurances from any official of Israel. It was agreed that in replying to McDonald we should ask him to attempt to get such assurances." (Executive Secretariat files, lot 58-D609)

501.BB Palestine/6-2049: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Legation in Switzerland

SECRET PRIORITY
NIACT

WASHINGTON, June 21, 1949—3 p. m.

Unpal 161. For USDel Lausanne. For Hare. We have carefully considered ur views Palun 220, June 20.¹ However we still believe recess preferable to present stalemate, as means endeavoring obtain objective set forth para 1 Unpal 155.²

Shorter recess after which PCC wld reconvene Lausanne about July 15 wld be preferable to longer adjournment, since latter might result in producing psychological atmosphere militating against further negots through PCC and wld probably remove any possibility activating Econ Survey Group for purposes GA action autumn session.

USG will utilize recess to continue its efforts obtain more cooperative attitude both sides and to brief Ethridge's successor as soon as appointed.

Pls discuss foregoing and Unpal 155 with Boisanger and Yalcin, informing them we are approaching Paris and Ankara with view requesting them issue similar instructions their delegates PCC. Dept informing SYG its views.

¹ Not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 1155.

² Dated June 18, to Bern, *ibid.*

If agreement your colleagues obtainable, you shld seek to begin recess weekend June 25 or soonest thereafter and proceed Washington immed.³

WEBB

³ The Department, on June 21, transmitted the substance of Unpal 155 and 161 to Paris, except that it altered the wording of the second paragraph of the former message to read: "Members PCC wld emphasize that resort to force by either side during or after recess wld under no circumstances be tolerated by PCC or UN." (telegram 2203, which was repeated to Ankara for action (501.BB Palestine/6-2149)). No 2203 was also sent to New York the following day as the basis for urgent discussion with Secretary-General Lie (telegram 328, 501.BB Palestine/6-2249).

Mr. Lie and the French and Turkish Foreign Offices concurred with the American proposal, except that the French Foreign Office, without withdrawing its agreement, felt that the present was not an opportune time for a recess (telegrams 761, June 22, from New York; 2595, June 22, from Paris; and 285, June 25, from Ankara, all of which are filed under 501.BB Palestine).

501.BB Palestine/6-2249: Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEL AVIV, June 22, 1949—noon.

478. At my request Sharett received Ford and me Foreign Office June 21 for hour and quarter.

With marked show of resentment at what he termed "Rusk's peremptory fifteen minute summons" to Israel Chargé June 14¹ Sharett outlined in great detail successive steps from May 25 to June 9 to secure personal conference with Zaim or Arslan and of Syrian "endless evasions and delays". Sharett exclaimed that to be accused of imminent aggression in midst such Israeli "patient conciliatory procedure" was "shockingly unjust" and made Zaim's "intransigence a model for other Arab governments."

As to present Syrian-Israeli relations, Foreign Minister hopes MAC negotiations will succeed, but warned that Zaim could not expect indefinitely avoid withdrawal from Israel territory. "US should understand that Israel will exhaust every peaceful means through MAC, UN direct negotiations, etc., to secure mutual agreement but if Zaim persists in refusal accept Bunche proposal Israel does not intend remain quiescent."

Comment: Foreign Minister evidently under heavy strain result of bitter criticism press and Knesset that government's "pro-American policy" has resulted "national humiliation". I believe his words meant to emphasize with us that justice and expediency "require pressure on

¹ For an account of the conversation between Mr. Rusk and the Israeli Chargé, see telegram 367, June 14, to Tel Aviv, p. 1137.

Zaim to evacuate Israel territory" comparable to that exerted on Israel evacuate Lebanese territory. *End comment.*

Related subject: Regarding Department's *aide-mémoire*, Deptel 375, June 17, Sharett took strong exception to opening sentence to effect that actual situation Jerusalem threat to peace. As to substance Department proposal Israel "quite prepared to consider this important suggestion."

Foreign Minister took exception also to "undue importance" given in Acting Secretary's conference with Eban, et al, June 18[17], to report that Dayan had arrived Government House "in armored car". This was not fact: Dayan "never uses armored car". By mistake an armored car did appear at Government House but Dayan "immediately ordered it away."

New subject: Regarding reunion Arab refugees families, Sharett explained this principle being maintained and procedure "being worked out". Decisions will be in individual cases with "security considerations paramount."

Comment: I fear this foreshadows relatively few reunions near future. *End comment.*

New subject: Regarding Gaza proposal, Foreign Minister said Prime Minister "disclaims conception at Tiberias" but Israel "still willing accept strip including refugees."

Conclusion: As we were leaving, I said: "I trust nothing will happen to give grounds for fear about Israel's pacific purposes toward Syria". Foreign Minister replied: "If all peaceful means fail, we can't preclude possibility of ultimate use of force."

Comment: I believe this remark to be move in Israel's efforts to secure that US influence Zaim to accept Bunche formula. Certainly non-armistice with Syria weakens all peace efforts with other Arab states. Support therefore Bunche proposal is "key log" in present jam.

McDONALD

501.BB Palestine/6-2349

*Memorandum by the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Rusk) to Mr. Matthew J. Connelly, Secretary to the President*¹

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 23, 1949.

The Secretary of State hopes to be able to speak to the President about Palestine immediately after the Cabinet meeting on Friday,

¹ At the "9:30 meeting" on the morning of June 23 in the State Department, Mr. Rusk submitted a proposed telegram and *aide-mémoire* regarding Palestine which he requested Secretary Acheson to bring to the attention of President Truman. The Secretary thereupon instructed Mr. Rusk to forward the two papers to the President (memorandum of June 23 by William J. McWilliams, of the Executive Secretariat, to the Secretary, 501.BB Palestine/6-2349).

June 24. The attached papers deal with the points which the Secretary will wish to discuss in the event the President has an opportunity to see them beforehand.

At Tab A is the text of a proposed *aide-mémoire*² to be handed to the Israeli Chargé d'Affaires in Washington as an informal reply to the Israeli note of June 8, 1949 (Tab B), which itself was a reply to a United States note of May 29, 1949 (Tab C).³ It is felt that it would be desirable to reply to the Israeli note in order to correct certain misunderstandings and points of fact in the event it becomes necessary to publish the exchange at some future date. The proposed *aide-mémoire* is moderate in tone and indicates the continuation of discussions between the United States and the Government of Israel on the work of the Palestine Conciliation Commission.

At Tab D is a telegram⁴ which it is proposed to send to Ambassador McDonald in reply to the latter's telegrams (Tabs E and F)⁴ on the question of further military action by the Government of Israel. No new policy question is raised in the proposed telegram but it is believed that the President would be very much interested in the question of possible military action.⁵

² Not found attached.

³ See telegram 322, May 28, to Tel Aviv, p. 1072.

⁴ See telegrams 471 and 478, dated June 21 and 22, respectively, pp. 1163 and 1165.

⁵ Secretary Acheson, on June 24, discussed the matter with the President, who approved both documents (memorandum of conversation by the Secretary, 501.BB Palestine/6-2449); for their texts, see telegrams 397 and 398 to Tel Aviv, June 24, pp. 1173 and 1174, respectively.

501.BB Palestine/6-2249 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to United States Mission at the United Nations

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 23, 1949—7 p. m.

331. Dept suggests reply to Eban ltr (urtel 759 Jun 22¹) along the fol lines:

"The US Govt has also been concerned by the lack of progress of the Special Comite. Since this Comite is strictly bilateral, composed of representatives of Israel and Hashemite Jordan Kingdom, the US has not participated in the negots directly or indirectly. For this reason my Govt does not have complete info as to the proceedings and has not been in a position where it cld appropriately undertake to advise the parties.

¹ Not printed; it gave the text of a "letter addressed to Austin by Eban, dated June 21, received today, requesting UN [US] good offices to urge Jordan to implement provisions of Article 8 of Israeli-Jordan armistice agreement, and containing assurances that the armistice agreements between Israel and Jordan 'are working smoothly and show all signs of continuing to do so'." (501.BB Palestine/6-2249)

My Govt has nevertheless become convinced that the Special Comite wld not be productive of results and that a new approach to the problem is desirable. It is understood that a similar view was expressed by the Israeli representative on the MAC in Jlem on Jun 13, 1949 (FYI Jerusalem Tel 419, Jun 14²).

Accordingly my Govt, considering this to be its best contribution to a solution, has ventured to suggest to the Govts of Israel and the Hashemite Jordan Kingdom that the problems under consideration by the Special Comite be transferred to the MAC which wld for this purpose meet under the chairmanship of Gen Riley. It was also suggested that the terms of reference shld include questions requiring agreement between the parties relating to the demarcation of Jewish and Arab zones, the use of roads and other questions of access to places in the Jlem area and the functioning of public utilities. It was also suggested that agreed solutions of these problems shld be without prejudice to the final decisions concerning the international status of Jlem which will be decided later in collaboration with the UN, but that these solutions shld be incorporated in such final decisions to the extent that they are conformable.

My Govt is now informed that this proposal has been accepted in principle by the Govt of the Hashemite Jordan Kingdom³ and that it is receiving the consideration of the Govt of Israel.

Accordingly, responding to your inquiry, I feel that my Govt has made the most appropriate intervention within its power in the circumstances. My Govt earnestly hopes that its suggestion will be accepted by both parties and that the resulting negots will lead to a satisfactory solution of these important questions."

ACHESON

² Not printed; it advised that "At yesterday's MAC meeting Israel delegate admitted creation special committee in armistice agreement mistake. Despite great hopes originally held for direct negotiations talks stalemated. Expressed desire refer all pending problems to MAC." (501.BB Palestine/6-1449)

³ The Jordanian Government on June 22 issued a press release announcing acceptance of the United States proposal on handing over the question of Jerusalem to the Mixed Armistice Commission. (telegram 260, June 23, from Amman, 501.BB Palestine/6-2349)

New York, on June 24, advised that General Riley had informed Mr. Bunche that the special committee, on June 21, had voted to transfer its functions to the Mixed Armistice Commission under the former's chairmanship (telegram 769, 501.BB Palestine/6-2249).

501.BB Palestine/7-949

*President Chaim Weizmann of Israel to President Truman*¹

REHOVOTH, ISRAEL, 24 June 1949.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The Government of Israel have communicated to me the text of the Note transmitted to them on your behalf on the 29th May, as well as their reply of June 8th. The matters

¹ Copy transmitted to Secretary Acheson by President Truman in a memorandum of July 9, with a request for a suggested reply.

raised in the Note are of such gravity that I feel impelled to address you personally on the subject. You have throughout taken such a warm and helpful interest in the affairs of our young State that I am most anxiously concerned that you, our great and good friend, should be under no misapprehension regarding our position and intentions concerning the issues now at stake. I wish, indeed, it were possible for me to talk matters over personally with you. That is always the best way of removing misunderstanding.

We have all been distressed at the slow progress made at Lausanne. It may be that the device of a Conciliation Commission, consisting not of officers of the U.N., but of delegates of three different countries, with different backgrounds and policies, was not the best way of promoting a speedy settlement. It certainly appears to have been less effective than the mediation of one man pursued in the name of the United Nations as a whole. But be that as it may, we are trying our best to work with this Commission and have submitted to them a number of proposals, to none of which we have so far received any reply from the other side. Indeed up till now the Arab States have altogether refused to sit with our delegates under the auspices of the Commission.

When our Delegation first arrived in Lausanne on April 30th, they immediately announced that they had come with full authorization to negotiate a comprehensive peace settlement with the delegates of the Arab States covering all the matters referred to in the U.N. Resolution of 11th December, 1948. They specifically stated that Israel was ready to contribute towards solving the Arab refugee problem in cooperation with the United Nations and the Arab States. A few days later they submitted to the Commission a draft preamble and two articles of a proposed peace treaty to serve as a basis for discussion. In this draft they proposed, among other things, the final liquidation of the war, the establishment of normal political and economic relations between Israel and the Arab States, mutual guarantees of the frontiers, abstention from the use of force for the settlement of disputes, and international arbitration in case such disputes could not be settled by agreement.

To this day we have not received any reply to these basic proposals.

Coming to the question of the Arab refugees, our delegation gave repeated assurances to the Commission that Israel was ready to cooperate with the U.N. and the Arab States for a solution of the refugee problem. We pledged ourselves to guarantee the civil rights of all minorities within our territory; we accepted the principle of compensation for land abandoned by the Arabs; we declared our readiness to unfreeze Arab accounts in our banks immediately on the conclusion of peace; we set up a Custodian of Absentee Property. Our delegation

informed the Commission that the Government of Israel was ready to readmit members of Arab families separated by the war.

In conformity with the General Assembly's Resolution of December 11th, relating to access to ports and means of communication our delegation has offered to create a free zone in the Haifa port for the benefit of Transjordan. Various proposals were made by our delegation for the delimitation of the frontiers of Israel with the Arab States. Our delegation also elaborated our attitude on the Jerusalem question.

All these constructive proposals have not elicited a single reply from the Arab delegations. It would, indeed, appear that these delegations did not come to Lausanne with authority to negotiate a peace settlement, but solely for the purpose of arranging for the repatriation of the Arab refugees to Israel.

Our delegations subsequently proposed the establishment of a number of sub-committees to deal with the general principles and conditions of peace, the territorial settlement, the refugee problem, the Jerusalem question, and the economic development of the Middle East, pursuant to Clause 10 of the U.N. Resolution of December 11th. We have not yet learnt the reaction of the Arab Delegations to these proposals. Finally, when members of the Commission suggested in a spirit of despondency that the Conference be suspended for a time, our delegation strongly opposed this course.

I feel sure you will agree, Mr. President, that in the light of these indisputable facts, we can hardly be charged with having failed to cooperate with the Commission. If so far nothing substantial has resulted from these talks, this is due essentially to the negative attitude of the Arab delegations and their persistent refusal to meet us under the auspices of the Commission. It is a great pity that the Commission failed to dislodge them from that negative attitude.

Permit me to add a few words on the two issues which are in the centre of the discussion: the territorial question and the refugee problem.

We have no aggressive designs against anyone and we are not looking for additional territory. But I think that no fair-minded man will deny us the right to retain that part of our ancient land which has become ours at a terrible cost of blood and treasure in the course of a war forced upon us by others. Most of the country which we hold beyond the boundaries set out on November 29th, 1947 was occupied by our forces during the second military campaign which was the result of the Arabs' defiant refusal to accept the Mediator's urgent plea for a continuation of the first truce. Bitter experience has shown that without that territory we are defenceless. Were we to give up the corridor to Jerusalem, that great city, whose people suffered so much and so heroically last year, would again be exposed to the danger of

having its water supply cut off and of being starved into submission. In exactly the same way, Western Galilee holds the key to the defence of Haifa and the Valley of Jezreel, while the Ramleh area assures the safety of Tel Aviv from such menacing attacks as were launched upon it last year. None of these areas was ever allotted to any of the Arab States with which we are now negotiating. All of them are occupied by Israel legally under armistice agreements.

The Palestine Arab State contemplated in the U.N. Resolution of 29th November 1947 has not come into being—not through any fault of ours—and there is no reason whatever why the neighbouring Arab States who invaded Palestine in flagrant defiance of their obligations under the Charter, should be appeased by territorial “compensation” at our expense. Incidentally, all these demands for compensation in the end boil down to the same old question on which you took so firm a stand last year—the Negev. It is the Negev, particularly the southern Negev, which appears again to be demanded from us. The reasons against it are just as potent as they were last year when you so strongly opposed our being deprived of that area which contains the country’s sole mineral resources and which, in addition, is our only gateway to the East. What importance attaches to our having direct access to the Red Sea has been brought home to us strikingly by Egypt’s closing of the Suez Canal to all ships—even British ships—carrying, or suspected of carrying, goods to Israel. Because of such closure we are compelled to bring vital supplies (wheat, etc.) from Australia and the Far East all the way via the Cape and Gibraltar. With the coast of Eylat in our possession and the Negev opened up by transport roads, we shall have free access to the sea routes which are vital to our existence.

Now as to the refugee problem. It is a grave issue, but it was not created by us. It was not the birth of Israel which created the Arab refugee problem, as our enemies now proclaim, but the Arab attempt to prevent that birth by armed force. These people are not refugees in the sense in which that term has been sanctified by the martyrdom of millions in Europe—they are part of an aggressor group which failed and which makes no secret of its intention to resume aggression. They left the country last year at the bidding of their leaders and military commanders and as part of the Arab strategic plan. But in spite of all this we are, for humanitarian reasons ready to contribute as far as we can towards a solution of this problem. We have, in fact, done a good deal more under this head than could, for obvious reasons, be published. Your Ambassador has been given details under this head. We have been steadily re-admitting Arab refugees during the last few months. The number of those who have returned exceeds 25,000.

We are ready to re-unite Arab families separated by the war, and we are now approaching the various Arab States through the Mixed Armistice Commissions for setting up special machinery to facilitate their return in organised form. We are prepared to re-admit more as part of a peace settlement. There are, however, two overriding considerations which limit what we can do in this sphere: we dare not again endanger our hard-won independence and security and with all the good will in the world, we cannot undertake tasks which are economically beyond our strength.

So many malicious charges have been levelled against us in connection with this Arab refugee question, that I cannot help drawing attention to the basic realities of the situation. We are a small State, nine hundred thousand Jews wedged in between forty million Arabs. We held our own last year by a terrific effort and at very heavy sacrifices, losing some of our finest youth and suffering heavy damage. The Arab States are making no secret of their intention of resuming war whenever they are ready for it. Only two days ago Faris el Khoury, the former Syrian member of the Security Council and Chairman of the Syrian Chamber, declared that the war against us "remains the corner-stone of Arab policy". Not a week passes without our being warned by authoritative Arab spokesmen of the coming "second round". The Arab States are rearming on a big scale, building up modern armament industries of their own and purchasing the most deadly modern weapons. A few weeks ago squadrons of British Vampire jet fighters were flown to the Suez Canal Zone—half an hour's air flight from our frontier—ready for instant delivery when wanted, while Egyptian pilots are being trained in their use close by. Egypt has ordered British destroyers with 4" and 6" guns and submarines, while there is hardly any secret about the French rearming the Syrians. This rearmament, Mr. President, constitutes a direct threat to the peace of the Middle East and thereby also to the peace of the world. With this open threat of war hanging over us, can we ignore the security aspect of the admission of a large Arab population who, whatever their individual feelings might be, are likely to turn against us if war restarts?

Apart from the security question, which to my mind is paramount, there is the economic difficulty. When the United Nations in November 1947 voted in favour of a Jewish State, it was motivated pre-eminently by the purpose of solving once and for all the Jewish question in Europe, to get rid of the concentration camps and of the aftermath of Hitler's holocaust. I know, Mr. President, that this purpose was uppermost in your mind when you gave us your staunch and steady support in those critical days. We are now doing exactly what

we were expected to do. We are liquidating one camp after another and have already brought over many thousands of their former inmates. Can we be expected at the same time to build up, alongside this big effort of reconstruction, a new Arab economy to absorb hundreds of thousands of Arabs? For let there be no mistake about it: the Arab economic and social structure as it was prior to last year's exodus has ceased to exist. The Arab refugee question can be solved in a big way only by a comprehensive effort of reconstruction. The crucial question is: is that effort to be undertaken in Israel, with all the political, security and economic stresses and strains arising therefrom, or in the neighbouring Arab countries where vast fertile areas are available for such resettlement and where these people can find a home in the congenial surroundings of an Arab society?

Our policy, as I stated before, is not one of absolute refusal to readmit Arabs and we may, if real peace is established, be able to do more in this respect than if the present atmosphere of latent war and hostility continues. But an all-round solution can only be found as part of a general development scheme for the benefit of the Middle East as a whole. Towards such a development scheme Israel is ready to make its contribution: I hope it will be a significant contribution. But to achieve all this there must be negotiation, agreement and peace. The most vital need at the present hour is for Arabs and Jews to enter into direct negotiations and hammer out an agreed settlement. I plead with you, Mr. President, that you may use your unique influence to induce the Arab States to face the realities of the situation and to take that decisive step.

With affectionate greetings,

Yours very sincerely,

CH. WEIZMANN

501.BB Palestine/6-2249 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 24, 1949—8 p. m.

397. Dept appreciates urtel 471, June 21, which has been read by the Pres with much interest. Dept considers points you enumerate make out conclusive case against further Israeli mil adventures from realistic point of view of Israeli self-interest. Same considerations apply to threat of force during course of negots for final settlement. US hopes such considerations appear as decisive to Israeli leadership as to outside world and that assurances we have had from Eban are solidly based upon Israeli Govt decision that Israel will resolve its differences with its neighbors through the procedures of peaceful settlement.

Sharett's statement reported penultimate para urtel 478¹ indicates necessity following situation with closest attention.

FYI ref second para urtel 478 although urgency was emphasized by Dept officer making appt Israeli Chargé was given alternative times for Rusk appt and selected time himself.

ACHESON

¹ Dated June 22, p. 1165.

501.BB Palestine/6-2449: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel

TOP SECRET

PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, June 24, 1949—8 p. m.

398. Following *Aide-Mémoire* delivered today to Israeli Chargé¹ by Deputy Under Secretary Rusk:

"The Government of the United States has received the note delivered by the Government of Israel to the United States Ambassador in Tel Aviv on June 8, 1949, in response to the note of the United States Government dated May 29, 1949. The United States Government considers that there is an identity of interest between it, the Government of Israel and the Governments of the Arab States in the early accomplishment of an equitable settlement of the Palestine question, an interest which is in fact shared by all of the Members of the United Nations. It is therefore regrettable that the Government of Israel did not respond more affirmatively with respect to the questions of Palestinian refugees and of boundaries discussed in the United States note. The United States Government will wish at an early date to discuss these questions further with the Government of Israel and other interested Governments, but in the meantime desires to make the following observations with respect to the note of the Government of Israel dated June 8, 1949.

The United States Government does not consider that there has been any misunderstanding on its part of the position taken by the Government of Israel, as stated by Israeli Representatives at Lausanne, on the disposition of the refugee problem and on the final territorial settlement in Palestine.

With regard to refugees, Israeli Representatives stated that the Israeli Government will do nothing further at the present time, although it has under consideration certain urgent measures of a limited character. This position appears to be strongly reaffirmed in the Israeli note of June 8, 1949. The Government of Israel referred in that note to its readiness to pay compensation for land abandoned, to reunite families separated by the war, and generally to make its contribution to the solution of the problem by resettlement. It does not indicate that

¹ In a memorandum of June 24, Acting Secretary Webb described his meeting of June 20 with President Truman, as follows: "I reported to the President on my talk with the Israeli representatives [on June 17] and indicated that it would be necessary for us to answer the latest Israeli note." (501.BB Palestine/6-2449)

it is ready to contribute to the problem by accepting a substantial portion of the refugees on the basis of repatriation. On the contrary, the note states, "It is inconceivable that the Government of Israel should find itself able to undertake in one and the same breath the absorption of mass Jewish immigration and the reintegration of returning Arab refugees." It is quite true that the Resolution of the General Assembly of December 11, 1948, indicated that repatriation should be permitted "at the earliest practicable date" but it can hardly be supposed that this reference to practicability was intended to subordinate repatriation to mass Jewish immigration into Israel.

With regard to the statement in the Israeli note of June 8, 1949, that the incorporation within Israel of the Gaza strip and the refugees located therein was suggested by the United States member of the Conciliation Commission, the Government of Israel will recall that Prime Minister Ben Gurion made this proposal to Mr. Mark Ethridge at Tiberias on April 18, 1949.² The United States Government has studied with interest a proposal along similar lines made by Israeli Representatives at Lausanne on May 20, 1949,³ and sees no reason why the proposal might not become the basis for discussions between the Government of Israel and other interested Governments.

The United States Government regards the solution of the refugee problem as a common responsibility of Israel and the Arab States, which neither side should be permitted to shirk. It is for this reason that it has urged Israel to accept the principle of substantial repatriation and to begin immediate repatriation on a reasonable scale, and has urged the Arab States to accept the principle of substantial resettlement of refugees outside Palestine. The United States Government is convinced that unless both sides contribute fully to the solution of this problem, there is no basis for a settlement either of the refugee problem itself or of the other principal issues remaining unsettled. The United States Government is also convinced that the assumption of responsibility for the refugees by Israel and the Arab States constitutes a necessary condition to the provision of international assistance in the permanent disposition of the refugee problem.

The Government of the United States notes that the Government of Israel maintains that it cannot accept the principle of territorial compensation, related to the 1947 partition award, since that award was based on a series of assumptions which failed to materialize. It is observed, however, that the Government of Israel places considerable emphasis upon the continuing validity of the 1947 award where such emphasis supports its own position, for example, in connection with the military occupation by Israel of the southern part of the Negev during a period of truce and in connection with the presence of Syrian troops in a portion of Palestine allotted in 1947 to Israel. In any event, the partition of 1947 is the only authoritative expression of the views of the United Nations with respect to a just territorial division of Palestine between Arabs and Jews. The General Assembly has not indicated in which respects, if any, it believes the territorial basis of that award should be modified in the light of any changes in the assumptions on which that partition was based.

² See telegram 312, April 20, from Jerusalem, p. 925.

³ See telegram 769, May 20, from Bern, p. 1036.

With regard to the statement that the United States position on the territorial question does not represent a policy of the United Nations, it must be recalled that, as a member of the United Nations Conciliation Commission, a body charged by the United Nations with promoting a final solution of the Palestine problem, the United States has the right and, indeed, the duty of advancing such positions as it believes may contribute to a just and lasting settlement. The United States Government could find no basis for such a settlement in the position taken by Israeli Representatives that Israel expects to retain all areas allocated to it by the 1947 Resolution of the General Assembly, to retain areas which it has occupied outside the 1947 partition lines, and to submit further demands as to territory in Arab Palestine in connection with the Israeli development program.

The United States Government can not accept the contention of the Government of Israel that the admission of Israel to membership in the United Nations indicated that the members of the world community considered as satisfactory the attitude of Israel with respect to the provisions of the General Assembly Resolution of December 11, 1948. Mr. Eban stated before the *Ad Hoc* Committee of the General Assembly on May 5, 1949,⁴ that it was his Government's understanding that nothing but the provisions of Article IV of the Charter were relevant in the consideration of an application for membership in the United Nations. He added that, while proposing to give the official views of the Government of Israel on the problem of Jerusalem and on the Arab refugees, he reserved Israel's opinion with regard to the relevance of extraneous issues to the question of admission to membership. The present effort of the Government of Israel to invoke support from the General Assembly for its position on such questions seems to be at variance with the basis on which it itself sought support for its admission to the United Nations. If there is any misunderstanding on this point which appears to impair the prospects of a settlement, the General Assembly can itself provide an authoritative interpretation of its action at its next regular session.

The United States Government has noted with appreciation the reference of the Government of Israel to the friendship for Israel of the Government and people of the United States. The suggestions which the United States Government has made in connection with a settlement of the Palestine problem have been motivated by deep and genuine concern for the peace and stability of the Near East, of which Israel is as much a part as are the Arab States, and by friendly interest in the future welfare of Israel. The United States Government continues in its resolve to do everything within its ability to assist the governments and peoples concerned to find a peaceful and lasting settlement of the Palestine question.

In conclusion, the United States Government wishes to emphasize its view that the military phases of the Palestine question must now be considered as terminated, and that any government which attempts to effect a particular settlement by the renewal of hostilities or the threat of hostilities would incur a grave responsibility before the community of nations. The United States Government welcomes the assurances it has received on this point from Representatives of the

⁴ See footnote 2, p. 979.

Governments directly concerned and looks forward to an early settlement which will relieve the peoples of all communities in and around Palestine of the misery and violence which has been their lot during recent years.”

Further comment will follow.⁵

ACHESON

⁵ This telegram was repeated to Bern for the American Delegation at Lausanne. Thomas E. Bromley, First Secretary of the British Embassy, called on Gordon H. Mattison, Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, on July 5 to inquire on behalf of the Foreign Office whether the United States had modified its recent approach to Israel regarding the refugee question and territorial compensation. Mr. Mattison informed Mr. Bromley that the second communication to the Israeli Government “did not represent any change in our approach to the subject. The reply had been designed to clear up certain Israeli misconceptions, as well as to reiterate our point of view.” (memorandum of conversation, by Mr. Mattison, 867N.48/7-549)

867N.01/6-2549

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Rusk)*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] June 25, 1949.

Participants: Mr. Rusk, Deputy Under Secretary of State
Mr. Uriel Heyd, Israeli Chargé d’Affairs a.i.
Mr. Mattison, NE

I handed the attached *aide-mémoire* to Mr. Heyd after orally summarizing its contents and reading verbatim the last two paragraphs for emphasis.²

I also mentioned that it looked to us as if the Lausanne Conference was going to recess for a few weeks. This Government was most anxious that the recess period be used to the utmost advantage towards developing a new approach towards the issues which are still outstanding.

In this connection we felt that the Gaza strip proposal was perhaps the key which would unlock the whole problem. For this reason we were most anxious that the Egyptians and Israelis get together and see what could be worked out. I inquired whether Mr. Eban would continue to remain in New York, in the event that it should prove advantageous for conversations to be held between the Israelis and Egyptians there. Mr. Heyd replied that Mr. Eban planned to remain in the United States until the return of Ambassador Elath. However, if it were a matter of urgency the Ambassador would return immediately.

¹ Drafted by Mr. Mattison.

² Note that telegram 398, *supra*, states that Mr. Rusk handed the *Aide-Mémoire* to the Israeli Chargé on June 24.

I stated that this would not be necessary, and explained that we had no preconceived idea as to when the conversations might take place. It was possible that the Israelis might wish to use contacts that they already had with the Egyptians. On the other hand if these were not satisfactory we were willing to help in arranging an exchange of views.

Mr. Heyd said that he would communicate with his government and inform us of its reaction.

Mr. Heyd said that there was one other matter that Mr. Sharett had asked him to take up. This was with regard to my interview with him on June 24, 1949,³ in which I had discussed reports of impending Israeli military activity. Mr. Sharett was surprised and somewhat hurt that we had given credence to such irresponsible stories. I explained that we had received reports from a number of sources including Tel Aviv which when put together made a somewhat alarming picture. As a member of the UN and the PCC we had felt it our duty to bring these to the Israeli Government's attention. We had been most gratified to hear that the reports were not true. If the resulting exchange of views had cleared the air they had served a useful purpose.

³ It is not clear whether Mr. Rusk conversed with the Israeli Chargé on both June 24 and June 25. The editors have been unable to find a relevant memorandum of conversation, dated June 24, in the Department of State files.

501.BB Palestine/6-2549 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY

JERUSALEM, June 25, 1949—noon.

444. Riley states Israel interpreting Bunche's latest proposal re Syrian armistice to mean Israeli administration control of demilitarized area on border. All military forces to be excluded but since mixed administration not practical and area located on Israel side of border Israel authorities together with local Arab police will be responsible for administration.¹

¹ New York, the previous day, had advised that "Regarding Israeli efforts to secure from Bunche an interpretation that Israelis should have full civil authority and sovereignty over areas of demilitarized zone assigned to them, Bunche is taking stiff line that this type of legalistic argument and delay is unwarranted. He is sending Vigier a reaffirmation that his compromise proposal should be accepted by both parties as it stands. It provides for a gradual restoration of civilian life in the demilitarized zone under the general supervision of the chairman of MAC. Policing to be done by locally recruited personnel who shall be of the nationality of the settlements concerned. All questions of sovereignty or of the law which should prevail in the areas should be left for the peace settlement. In respect to law needed for police action, Israeli law should apply to their settlements and Arab law in the Arab villages." (telegram 771, 501.BB Palestine/6-2449)

Riley feels above will be completely unacceptable to Zaim who accepted Bunche proposal on understanding demilitarized area would be completely separate from both Israel and Syria with ultimate responsibility for zone resting with UN. Riley asserts this was Bunche's intention.

In view above Israeli stand, confirmed by conversation last night with Sharett, Riley sees little chance successful conclusion armistice. Believes question must be referred to SC. Pointed out Israel rejected plan for exchange territory and now in effect rejecting proposal for demilitarized neutral zone. Only other possible suggestion before reference to SC is accord to effect that since both sides not able agree on changes present truce lines should become armistice lines pending final peace treaty. He sees no chance Israel accepting this since Israel working on premise armistice lines will in practice be final peace lines.

Sent Department, repeated Geneva 41 for USDel PCC, Damascus 45.

BURDETT

501.MA Palestine/6-2549: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

SECRET PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, June 25, 1949—2 p. m.

2198. USG convinced that only means breaking Israeli-Arab impasse re refugees in order meet common US-UK objectives that question and carry forward contemplated procedure for solution refugee problem is through exploitation Gaza strip proposal. During period PCC recess, we propose exercise strongest diplomatic pressure effort create more cooperative attitude both sides.

We have informed Israeli Government that we regard its proposal assume responsibility refugees and residents Gaza strip in return for cession thereof as significant admission its ability accept substantial number refugees, and that we believe this proposal shld serve as basis for discussion between states concerned.

You will recall that proposal flatly rejected by Arabs when transmitted them by PCC. On June 10 UnSecy during conversation with Egyptian Amb¹ asked latter his Govt's position on Israeli proposal. Amb replied that Egyptian Govt regards offer as "cheap barter", and stated first step is to permit those refugees so desiring return their homes. He had no suggestion, however, re disposition remainder. He further stated Egypt wld wish make proposals re frontier rectification designed secure strategically defensible frontier for purposes Eryp-

¹ See telegram 573, June 11, to Cairo, p. 1115.

tian and Israeli security. Amb said such proposals wld not involve large amount territory.

On June 11 AmEmb Cairo acting on instructions requested views Egyptian auths re Israeli offer,² emphasizing concern USG re refugees that area, which has no econ potential for future settlement. Emb asked Egypt's plans re disposition those not wishing return Israel, since latter might be considerable number, and requested Egyptian views re frontier in light Amb's ref to strategic rectification, in order US might explore possibility exchange of Gaza strip for frontier rectification further south.

Khashaba Pasha informed Chargé he had requested military opinion from Brit Amb Cairo as to frontier line which Egypt cld most satisfactorily defend with own resources, and was advised that Gaza-Beersheba-Dead Sea line shld be adopted. In response specific query from Chargé, FonMin stated Egypt wld therefore not be willing cede Gaza strip to Israel even if Israel shld agree relieve Egypt of refugee burden that area.

While USG wld be prepared support frontier rectification favor Egypt, in accordance Pres' formula re territorial compensation, present Egyptian proposal is of course not politically feasible and wld defeat purpose providing for disposition Gaza refugees.

We propose take strong line with Egyptians, based on overriding consideration of getting constructive action re refugees. USG urgently requests firmest UK support these representations and hopes UK will make utmost effort disabuse Egypt of its unrealistic attitude towards frontier rectification of character described foregoing. Deptel to Cairo this question being repeated you separately.

Pls discuss foregoing urgently with FonOff, rpt reply to Cairo and Bern for USDel.³

ACHESON

² See footnote 2, p. 1116.

³ This telegram was repeated to Cairo and to Bern for the American Delegation at Lausanne. In reply, on June 28, London advised of information from Michael Wright that the "UK would instruct British Ambassador to mention to Egyptian Government US representations and to say that on territorial aspects these representations UK did not wish to give Egypt advice one way or other. However, refugees constitute problem utmost gravity and UK believes that if Egypt desires to keep Gaza strip it would be in very difficult position before world opinion if it refused keep refugees Gaza area. . . . Foreign Office inclined to think that it would be better for Egypt to keep Gaza strip and its refugees and for Israel to take another 150,000 refugees from elsewhere." (telegram 2501, 501.MA Palestine/6-2849)

867N.01/6-1449: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt*¹

SECRET PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, June 25, 1949—2 p. m.

626. Pls seek immediate interview FonMin to resume subject discussed urtel 578, June 14² and convey to him orally Dept's views along fol lines:

USG notes with profound disappointment negative attitude Egypt re cooperation refugee problem. Up to present, and despite urgency of refugees' plight, no concrete or constructive proposals for solution refugee problem have been forthcoming from any of Arab states. On its part, Egypt has consistently demanded repatriation of refugees while admitting that substantial proportion will not desire return Israel, and only proposal of Egypt re disposition latter category has been that states other than Egypt assume responsibility therefor. Consistently negative approach of Egypt typified by attitude UnSecy Hassouna Pasha (Cairo A-690, June 16³), who informed AmEmb Cairo that PCC subcommittees, designed to give simultaneous study to refugees and other outstanding issues, were unacceptable to Egyptian Govt. Arab states shld give most serious attention to consequences during recent years of their steadfast refusal accept realities situation re Pal.

Fol considerations shld be of direct concern to Egyptian Govt:

(1) UNRPR program funds will run out within few months; (2) UN most unlikely take further action to extend assistance to refugees without evidence tangible progress towards solution refugee problem prior opening autumn session GA; (3) in absence such action, entire financial and admin burden relief and rehabilitation all refugees and resident population in areas under Arab military occupation will devolve upon respective occupying authorities as soon as UNRPR terminates, as well as full onus formulating and executing plans for their permanent disposition.

USG regards problem of refugees as joint responsibility of Israel and Arab states, and, as member PCC, cannot agree that either side should shirk responsibility. This fact of more than academic interest to Egypt, which as occupying power in southwest Pal, bears full responsibility for 230,000 refugees and 80,000 residents that area. USG, motivated by sincere desire find means resolving this problem, requested info re Egypt's plans for permanent disposition these people. No such info has been forthcoming.

¹ This telegram was repeated to London and to Bern for the American Delegation at Lausanne.

² Not printed, but see footnote 4, p. 1117.

³ Not printed.

Israeli proposal re Gaza strip constitutes Israeli commitment to assume full responsibility for refugees and residents that area, and as such shld be given most serious and constructive consideration by Egyptian Govt. Proposal shld serve as basis urgent discussion between states concerned, through direct or indirect negots. USG prepared lend all possible assistance facilitate such negots. Repeat reply to Bern for USDel Lausanne.

ACHESON

501.BB Palestine/6-2549: Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY

JERUSALEM, June 25, 1949—4 p. m.

445. Last night together with Riley met Sharett at reception and he outlined Israel reply to Department proposal re Jerusalem. After thorough discussion with Riley following comments submitted on different points:

1. Israel not willing accept proposition threat to peace exists in Jerusalem. Both Riley and Consulate General feel definite threat to peace existed but danger diminished for moment by action of Department. Believe preferable play down this aspect now and Department might reply glad draw conclusion from Israel note that Israel has no intention disturbing peace in Jerusalem. If necessary cite evidence threat to peace could mention movement of troops by both sides into Government House zone, failure both sides reduce forces Jerusalem in accordance with armistice, flat statement by Dayan to Consulate General that if not able obtain Scopus by negotiation would take it by force (would prefer Department not quote Dayan).

2. Israel feels special committee should not be superseded. No objection perceived to special committee remaining in being to handle minor matters by direct negotiation such as harvest in triangle. Riley also plans establish subcommittee of MAC to deal with armistice questions leaving MAC free consider Jerusalem problem.

3. Sharett stated willing instruct Israel delegation at next special committee meeting propose or support if proposed by Jordan reference to MAC of questions in article 8 of armistice agreement. I inquired whether would also include elimination of Arab and Israel zones which was essential part Department proposal. He stated Israel not prepared discuss territorial changes Jerusalem until questions in article 8 successfully settled. Felt ample room for agreement existed in article 8. Argued broadening terms of reference would only enable Arabs dodge fulfilling armistice and carrying out agreement already reached in principle at Rhodes. Said armistice lines now settled and should not move on to questions of permanent lines until all armistice problems solved.

Consulate General believes discussion of territorial changes as well as other Jerusalem problems in addition to those mentioned specifically in article 8 indispensable part Department proposal. Change proposed by Sharett strikes at foundation of plan. Problems mentioned article 8 are of prime importance to Israel but of relatively little interest to Arabs. Acquiescence in Sharett views would have effect of US supporting Israel demands without Arabs receiving adequate return. Arabs could only conclude US indirectly exerting pressure for further concessions to Israel.

Consulate General has considered proposal as opening way to real and permanent settlement of many practical problems affecting Jerusalem including principally limits of two zones and freedom of access. Such agreement would not conflict with international status plans and would be based on premise of demilitarized and neutral city. Riley agrees with this conception. However, he feels also MAC might be able make progress on article 8 questions alone although this not desirable.

Strongly recommend Department insist on consideration of territorial changes. Department might reply along following lines: Since agreement apparently not possible on narrow range of problems in article 8 hoped by broadening questions for consideration possible reach accord. Because certain matters apparently not soluble under armistice conditions suggested move forward towards permanent peace. Plan will permit overall discussion of Jerusalem problem in interest of establishing lasting arrangements and permitting return of normal life to maximum extent possible for both Jews and Arabs. Department feels that working on premise Jerusalem area will be permanently demilitarized zone two parties by direct negotiation under UN chairmanship can make progress toward solution in permanent manner of many practical problems affecting Jerusalem. Such agreement could be incorporated in plan of PCC for international status of city. Both parties have stated armistice agreements including demarcation lines only temporary and changes eventually necessary affecting daily life of people will cause much less dislocation now than in future.

As previously reported Israel has approached armistice agreements with intent that they shall constitute in practice permanent arrangements especially as to boundaries. This explains attitude on Syrian armistice. Riley shares this view. Once Israel obtains satisfaction on questions in article 8 of Jordan armistice will have all it wants and be content allow armistice agreement remain in effect indefinitely. Would just sit back and refuse any territorial changes as is doing at Lausanne

despite efforts of US. Final position taken by Israel on territorial question Jerusalem will certainly indicate attitude towards territorial shifts as whole. In view Dayan statements to Consulate General that willing discuss territorial changes Jerusalem, still believe possible induce Israel negotiate on whole Jerusalem question including specifically delimitation of zones. If Israel acceptance limited to article 8, feel Department should consider reply rejection proposal.

Sent Department 445, repeated Geneva 42 for USDel PCC, Amman 42, Tel Aviv 66.

BURDETT

501.BB Palestine/6-2549 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEL AVIV, June 25, 1949—8 p. m.

489. ReDeptel 375 June 17 and Embtel 478 June 22. Formal reply to *aide-mémoire* handed Ford June 24 by Herlitz of Israel Foreign Office. Note reiterates Israeli Government's inability subscribe view of USG that present situation Jerusalem constitutes threat peace Palestine "unless State Department is in possession reliable information indicating intention on part Government Transjordan to resort to offensive military action that area." However, Government Israel "welcomes method proposed by USG for settlement certain points at issue between it and Government Transjordan" and while preferring that any items discussed under new proposal be limited to those specified in Article 8 of armistice agreement and no others, "has instructed its representatives on special committee to propose, or to support proposal that items as specified should be referred to MAC to meet under chairmanship General Riley". Note finally expresses hope that implementation new proposal will not mean final abolishment special committee which government Israel believes "should continue to exist and meet for discussion and settlement such problems as both parties may agree upon in accordance former practice".

In delivering note Herlitz stressed his [*her*] government's hope that (1) Riley "and no one else" would act as chairman all meetings MAC under new proposal, (2) That only those items named Article 8 be handled and any such item or items already acted upon by special Committee not again be revived, and (3) that special committee not be terminated.

Copies of note being airmailed.

Sent Department 489, repeated Jerusalem 54, Amman 15.

MCDONALD

501.BB Palestine/6-2749

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to the President

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 27, 1949.

There are attached herewith in accordance with your request of June 16, copies of cables covering talks held between Mr. Mark Ethridge, United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission, and Israeli Prime Minister David Ben Gurion.¹

¹The copies enclosed were telegrams from Jerusalem, as follows: Nos. 274, 275, and 277, April 9; 291, April 13; 308, April 19; and 312, April 20. All of these messages are printed in this compilation, except for No. 308; regarding No. 308, see footnote 1, p. 923.

501.MA Palestine/6-2749: Circular telegram

*The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices*¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 27, 1949—9 a. m.

In discussing Arab refugee problem with Govt to which accredited, you shld take fol genl line:

You shld bring to Govt's attention substance Depcirtel May 27, 1 a. m.² (Unpal 114) which USDel PCC has discussed informally with Israeli and Arab delegations Lausanne. Conditions under which such assistance wld be forthcoming shld be carefully emphasized.

You shld then state that USG deeply disappointed re failure Israelis and Arabs to adopt constructive approach to refugees. You shld emphasize that onus of responsibility resolving refugee question lies squarely on both Israelis and Arabs, and that USG is under no mandate from UN to lend its material resources to solve problem of Israeli-Arab making. USG notes with disappointment that neither Israelis nor Arabs have shown any inclination meet conditions on which US offer assistance was based. In event conditions met at future date, USG wld be prepared at that time consider question of assistance to Israel and Arab states. However, you shld emphasize implications such delay, since US support of refugee settlement program conditional upon UN action and sponsorship. Such program wld necessitate time-consuming and laborious preparation by PCC prior to presentation to GA this autumn. Under present circumstances, PCC not in position initiate preparation such program in absence

¹ At Amman, Baghdad, Cairo, Jidda, Damascus, and Beirut.

² Not printed; it repeated to Arab capitals the text of telegram 674, identified also as Unpal 114, May 23, to Bern, p. 1047.

necessary political cooperation. Therefore any additional delay will mean increasing difficulty if not impossibility obtaining UN action this year.

You shld stress problem of impending termination UNRPR program, and inquire what plans Arab states contemplate for continuation relief to refugees under their custodianship.

You may inform Govt that Israeli auths have received similar representations.³

ACHESON

³ Chargé Stabler discussed the content of this circular telegram with King Abdullah on the morning of June 29. He pointed out that while Jordan had willingly accepted the principle of resettlement "in private conversations with US and other representatives, its attitude appeared quite different when acting in conjunction with other Arab States. Emphasized US Government is continuing exert pressure on Israel to give early indication how many refugees it will repatriate but suggested that immediate action by Arab States regarding resettlement those refugees unwilling or unable return would in no way diminish pressure on Israel or chances for repatriation. Also indicated that if some positive action not taken soon Arab States would find themselves with no outside relief assistance whatsoever and expressed belief Arab States totally unable handle problem on their own.

"King said he agreed with this analysis and suggested that steps be taken now by US and other interested countries in making survey of resettlement possibilities in Jordan and Arab Palestine with view to drawing up plans for such resettlement. He indicated he entirely prepared move forward on this basis at once if financial assistance for carrying out projects assured and felt that 'if you begin with me and others see what is being done, they will soon follow'." (telegram 267, June 29, 7 p. m., from Amman, 501.BB Palestine/6-2949)

501.BB Palestine/6-2749 : Telegram

Mr. Raymond A. Hare to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

LAUSANNE, June 27, 1949—3 p. m.

Palun 234. [Here follows the first paragraph dealing with answers to questions from Syria given by the Palestine Conciliation Commission at its meeting with Arab delegates on June 25.]

2. Essence Arab argument regarding territorial views ran as follows: Arab delegates would be willing further to discuss territorial matters if Israeli delegation returned to protocol of May 12 by basing its proposals upon it and if PCC undertook to pass judgment on Israeli and presumably Arab proposals in connection therewith.

Arabs argued Jews have done nothing to implement protocol. Paragraph 11 GA resolution December 11 reference refugees could not be subject of negotiation as it was GA imperative. Jewish territorial proposals under May 12 protocol were not "adjustments" but annexations. Arabs consider such proposals as inclusion western Galilee or Gaza as violation of protocol. Arabs also consider that Jewish agreement take Gaza refugees if Gaza strip is ceded to Israel as contrary

GA resolution December 11. Arabs will not make such rash proposals but have complied with protocol as shown by their memos of May 18 and May 21. Arabs have already approached territorial question in their May 21 memo. PCC has duty deciding whether Arab proposal is within terms of protocol.

Arabs added regarding resettlement they were prepared to examine as soon as they knew how many refugees did not wish to return on basis completely free choice. Lebanese delegate specifically stated such refugees would find Arab countries ready to take them. Foregoing represents highlights of three-hour meeting. Summary record being pouched.

HARE

501.BB Palestine/6-2749 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel

SECRET PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, June 27, 1949—7 p. m.

405. Dept concurs views expressed ConGen Jlem in Sharett interview reported Jlem Tel 445, Jun 25, rptd Tel Aviv as 66.

If official reply not yet received, or if unsatisfactory on points indicated reftel, pls reiterate views to appropriate officials. Our reference to Jlem constituting threat to peace was not an accusation but rather a statement of concern entertained by USG. Same statement concern made in presenting proposal TJ Govt. Concern seemed legitimate especially in view troop movements neutral zone. As result various consultations USG glad to have assurances such concern not warranted.

Restriction terms reference MAC to questions in Art 8 would frustrate one of main objectives in making US proposal. On basis our info previous negots re this art we feel they must be given broader base if agreement to be reached. Emphasize that Art 8 calls for negotiated agreement and this can only be done in negots between parties.

Re demarcation Arab-Jewish zones, this subject has special position in relation armistice on one hand and final peace on other. PCC given task formulating detailed proposals for Jlem at fall session GA. Most appropriate such proposals should include permanent demarcation lines and other arrangements now under discussion in Jlem. Opportunity to achieve final settlement Jlem is perhaps best prospect for progress this year and shld be seized by parties concerned. Furthermore agreement questions residence Arab-Jewish inhabitants respective zones will become more difficult the longer negots are delayed.

Pls use arguments above and those in reftel in manner to indicate strong view USG that proposal entirely fair and equitable and ur-

gently desirable shld be accepted as means settling Jlem case and definite progress toward permanent peace in Palestine.¹

ACHESON

¹ This telegram was repeated to Jerusalem and Amman and to Bern for the American Delegation at Lausanne. Ambassador McDonald read excerpts of telegram 405 to Mr. Shiloah on July 1, "stressing USG insistence on broader base formal Jerusalem settlement." These views were reiterated to Miss Herlitz by Mr. Ford on July 5 (telegram 524, July 9, 2 p. m., from Tel Aviv, 501.BB Palestine/7-949).

867N.48/6-2749: Telegram

The Chargé in Egypt (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

CAIRO, June 27, 1949—8 p. m.

628. Following receipt Deptel 626, June 25, 2 p. m. requested interview with Foreign Minister just returned from Alexandria. Khashaba Pasha received me noon 27th. I read over to him statements attributed to him mytel 578 June 14¹ all of which he confirmed. Thereafter I orally rendered to him in French US Government's views on lack of constructive attitude by Egypt and other Arab states in cooperating towards solution refugee problem. On my mention of Egypt's "negative attitude" Khashaba Pasha interrupted and inquired with asperity if Egypt's steady insistence on positive implementation of numerous UN resolutions could be called negative. Egypt had, in accordance with UN resolutions, insisted on right of refugees desiring to return to their homes to do so. Those who did not desire to return to their homes in Palestine (and by homes he meant their houses and lands) should be compensated by Israel. Such persons should be admitted to the Arab states and the Arab states, Egypt included, would confer together as to distribution such refugees who had opted for resettlement. As for Egyptian refusal to accept proposed PCC's subcommittees Foreign Minister stated that these subcommittees were Israeli devices designed to confuse humanitarian with territorial problems and perhaps indefinitely to delay former category which would not admit of delay. The human, that is, refugee problem, must be settled first since questions relating to demarkation of frontiers might drag on for years.

Foreign Minister, who frequently interrupted me in a rather agitated fashion (due perhaps to unaccustomed fast this first day of Ramadan), listened to my exposition regarding financial difficulties which would in all probability, arise in absence of immediate constructive thinking on the Arab part during current recess of PCC.

However, on my mention that in opinion US Government the refugee problem was a joint responsibility of Arab states and Israel, min-

¹ Not printed, but see footnote 4, p. 1117.

ister became annoyed and inquired if the Arabs did not have a right to defend themselves against aggression.

Israeli proposal of assuming responsibility for Gaza strip refugees and inhabitants in return for Gaza-Rafa coastal area amounted to their insistence on being paid for fulfilling a prior obligation imposed upon them by UN. Moreover, the Israelis had made no promise to permit the return of the refugees to their hearthstones, orchards and fields. For such refugees to be turned off in all probability into the desert of the Negev adjoining the Gaza strip to re-create such life as they could in that barren soil was not repatriation in the sense understood by Egypt. However, in conclusion Minister stated Egypt would not refuse to give serious consideration to any plan designed as humanitarian measure and susceptible of bringing stability to an area or situation. He desired, though, in order to enable his government to give thorough study to views presented by US Government, to receive written communication embodying such views.

Does Department authorize my summarizing its views in form of memorandum or other informal communication which I might send Minister under cover of personal letter?

Khashaba Pasha informed me of his prospective return this afternoon to Alexandria where Prime Minister has already preceded him. He will return Cairo Monday, July 4, to attend dinner which he will offer in honor Secretary Treasury Snyder.

It would be desirable to have for communication to him at that time any further views Department may desire to express.

It would seem that at least initial reaction of Foreign Minister to Department's suggestion of utilization of Israeli proposal as basis for discussion is far from favorable.

Sent Department; repeated Bern, USDel Lausanne.

PATERSON

501.BB Palestine/6-2849: Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

TEL AVIV, June 28, 1949—noon.

495. ReDeptel June 25 [24], number 398. Following repeated readings of text I asked Herlitz of Foreign Office to residence. Ford also present. For more than hour June 27, we informally discussed main points text.

Then Herlitz read and paraphrased portions of Israeli Chargé's report on conference with Rusk June 25.¹ Chargé stressed friendliness of Department's reply and Rusk's verbal recommendation of bilateral

¹ See Mr. Rusk's memorandum, p. 1177.

negotiations between Israel and Egypt, possibly on basis Gaza plan and later with other Arab states individually. Chargé said Rusk suggested "probable necessity territorial compensation" to Egypt. Herlitz interpreted Rusk's words as meaning "southern tip Negev". (To this I made no comment.) Egypt considered by Rusk as key to deadlock. Chargé added Rusk also suggested "territorial compensation to other Arab states" (or as singular state) in subsequent negotiations.

My questions to Department are: "Is above summary Rusk accurate and does his suggestion cancel earlier Department's discouragement of bilateral negotiations between single Arab state and Israel?" (Deptel 330, June 1).²

Related subject: Taking advantage of friendliness of Department's reply to Israel, Deptel 398, June 25 [24], I brought conversation to refugees and said to Herlitz substantially: "No amount friendship for Israel can hide fact that it has, re refugee repatriation, been poor in promise and poorer in performance. Recognizing all difficulties, there are no justifications Israel's relative inaction. Impossible exaggerate human tragedy if Israel persists failure cooperate. If Israel in good faith proposed absorb the more than 200,000 refugees Gaza strip, it must have envisioned ways to do this. Hence, no logic in Israel's argument it unable repatriate more than few tens of thousands (as also stressed to Foreign Office by Kopper³ on his recent visit). Unacceptable everywhere except in Jewish circles, will be argument that ingathering of exiles makes repatriation Arabs impossible. Israel self-interest requires refugee cooperation asked by Department." (*Close paraphrase my refugee remarks.*)

I shall press these views with Weizmann at lunch today⁴ and later with Ben Gurion and Sharett.

Meantime, please wire details US and UN emergency refugee relief financial proposals reported Leopoldville radio night June 27.

New subject: Will continue to press on Israeli officials points Deptel 397, June 24.

Sent Department 495; repeated Bern 7 (for USDel PCC).

MCDONALD

² Not printed, but see footnote 1 to telegram 72, June 1, p. 1082.

³ Samuel K. C. Kopper, Special Assistant to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs.

⁴ Ambassador McDonald lunched with President Weizmann at Rehovoth on June 28 and urged the views of the United States on the refugee question. President Weizmann was said to have replied in substance that "your people don't understand these refugees are our enemies and potential fifth column. Don't your people read repeated threats from Arab capitals renewal war?" When asked how he reconciled his position with the Israeli offer to take the Gaza strip, he replied "That would be more than we ought to do but it certainly is utmost that is possible." (telegram 498, June 29, 1 p. m., from Tel Aviv, 501.BB Palestine/6-2949)

867N.01/6-2849 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt*¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 28, 1949—7 p. m.

635. You are authorized present substance Deptel 626, June 25, to FonMin as *aide-mémoire*, adding fol additional considerations:

USG firmly convinced Gaza strip proposal forms basis important contribution to final settlement Palestine problem as well as constructive approach to solution grave humanitarian problem of refugees, and notes with appreciation FonMin's assurances (urtel 628, June 27) that Egypt prepared give serious consideration to any plan designed as humanitarian measure and susceptible of bringing stability to area.

USG is not unmindful of considerations prompting FonMin's concern re disposition and future well being of refugees in Gaza strip (urtel para 4) if Israel shld assume responsibility such refugees. If Egypt so desires, USG is prepared seek fullest info from Israeli Govt re specific plans underlying Israeli proposal, including future status refugees as Israeli cits. USG is also prepared advocate establishment appropriate international supervision to insure necessary guarantees welfare refugees are observed.

USG recalls with deep appreciation that Egypt, by its constructive action as first state to conclude armistice agreement, gave necessary impetus to conclusion of hostilities in NE. We are deeply hopeful that Egypt, recognizing earnest desire Near Eastern peoples and international community for restoration peace and stability Near East, is now prepared give similar stimulus to final settlement outstanding issues by entering into early discussions with Israel re Gaza proposal. USG reiterates that, if so requested, it stands ready to facilitate such discussions by all means at its disposal.

Rpt reply to London and to Bern for USDel Lausanne.

ACHESON

¹ This telegram was repeated to London as No. 2223 and to Bern for the American Delegation at Lausanne.

501.MA Palestine/6-2549 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in London

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 30, 1949—7 p. m.

2259. Pls seek early opportunity call upon Bevin and review questions outlined Deptel 2198, June 25 and 2223, June 28.¹ You shld then make representations along fol lines:

¹ This was a repeat of 635 to Cairo, *supra*.

USG disturbed by UK attitude concerning Gaza strip and refugees therein as set forth urtel 2501,² June 28 and puzzled re basis FonOff belief that Egypt might be prepared assume responsibility for refugees in Gaza strip, view population pressure in Egypt and steadfast refusal Egyptian authorities, in response approaches by US reps both Washington and Cairo, to consider acceptance even token number. In this connection, UK will recall that Egyptian auths recently took steps remove into Gaza strip some 10,000 refugees who were being maintained in Egyptian territory.

Egypt thus appears excluded as settlement area. Moreover, UK will recall that US-UK refugee working papers give no indication Gaza strip has economic potential for settlement any significant portion of refugees now in area. In addition resident population of 80,000, who are for most part on relief at present time, Dept estimates number refugees in Gaza strip at minimum of 230,000, not 150,000 as UK appears to believe (last para urtel).

In view of foregoing, USG finds it difficult believe Egypt has any plans involving either total or partial Egyptian responsibility for disposition Gaza refugees or that Egypt capable formulating such plans in foreseeable future.

USG recognizes that strategic considerations involved in UK thinking this question. In opinion USG, however, any strategic advantages which might be obtained from permanent retention Gaza strip plus present occupants by Egypt wld appear to be outweighed by administrative burden and enormous financial requirements involved in maintenance refugees on permanent basis, particularly since nature of area precludes execution of self-sustaining settlement projects.

US is prepared support politically feasible modification Egyptian frontier in return for cession Gaza strip with all present occupants to Israel. In interests Egyptian-Israeli security, and equally in interests US-UK security, however, USG is convinced that speedy solution of refugee problem, establishment final Palestine settlement, and encouragement of *modus vivendi* between Israel and Arab states constitute firmer basis for strategic security of all states concerned than cld be achieved through exploitation minor military advantages of Gaza strip.

US has made and continues to make strongest representations to Israel urging quantitative acceptance substantial number refugees without territorial acquisition. No result has so far been obtained, and only hopeful development presaging repatriation of large numbers of refugees has been Israeli offer concerning Gaza strip. View facts that agreement between Israel and Egypt on Gaza strip and refugees would probably pave way for Israeli-Egyptian final settle-

² Not printed, but see footnote 3, p. 1180.

ment and thereby constitute decisive step towards overall Palestine settlement; that funds for UNRPR program are rapidly being exhausted; and that possibility getting UN action on constructive refugee program this autumn along lines contemplated by US-UK becoming increasingly remote, USG firmly convinced that Gaza proposal shld become basis for discussion between Egypt and Israel. USG hopes UK will agree that solution of grave and potentially explosive question of refugees is of overriding importance to US-UK strategic interests in NE area, and therefore reiterates its urgent request for firm UK support of US representations to Egypt.

ACHESON

501.BB Palestine/7-149: Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

JERUSALEM, July 1, 1949—2 p. m.

451. US proposals for negotiations in MAC on Jerusalem problems discussed yesterday with Dayan. From his comments believe Sharett rejected plan for following reasons:

1. Would constitute admittance by Israel that agreement not possible on questions in article 8 of armistice; that Jordan no longer bound to carry out article 8 if agreement not also reached on broader questions mentioned in US proposal. Would thus nullify section of armistice which Israel feels grants it important right.

2. Known position of US on territorial settlement. Discussion of delimitation of zones would only mean Israel giving territory and receiving very little in return.

3. Might indirectly involve acquiescence in international regime for Jerusalem to which Israel firmly opposed.

Dayan suggested Sharett might consider direct talks on permanent Jerusalem agreement between Israel and Jordan under chairmanship of third party outside of terms of reference and machinery of armistice. He added such talks might consider whole question of peace treaty with Jordan since very difficult reach settlement on Jerusalem when boundary line and other points regarding remainder of Palestine not determined. In these talks permanent arrangements regarding Latrun, Scopus, and other questions mentioned in article 8 could be reached but without affecting agreement already reached in principle for duration of armistice.

Above approach might accomplish most objectives US proposals but might well conflict with work of PCC, develop into direct peace talks between Israel and Jordan and even if acceptable to Jordan encounter opposition from other Arab states.

Sent Dept 451, repeated Geneva 44, Amman 43, Tel Aviv 69.

BURDETT

867N.01/7-149 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kohler) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

Moscow, July 1, 1949—3 p. m.

1661. 1. It seems to us in retrospect that Soviet support for internationalization Jerusalem under TC nothing more than formalistic gesture which had to be made in order not jeopardize adoption and implementation overall partition plan embodied GA resolution November 29, 1947 (Jerusalem's numbers 437 and 440 to Department).¹

2. Soviet supported this resolution because it believed creation weak independent state or states in Palestine would further its basic objective of eradicating Anglo-American influence in area and substitution therefor of Soviet Communist influence. Internationalization Jerusalem under TC not entirely compatible with this objective but certainly better from Soviet viewpoint than British control.

3. While western orientation present Israeli Government not pleasing to Soviet Government, such reports as Beirut's 282 June 10² point toward concentration Communist Middle East effort in Israel and hence to conclusion that Soviets nevertheless consider Israel as "soft" for penetration purposes.

4. As probability establishment separate Arab state in Palestine begins recede, alternative dispositions Palestine area outside present Israel-held territory would appear to be either incorporation within Israel or within Jordan.

5. Incorporation within Israel would obviously better suit Soviet objectives: in view relative strength parties concerned it also appears more likely outcome.

6. Under these circumstances we may anticipate Soviet shift away from previous emphasis on carrying out November 29 GA resolution, including plan for internationalization Jerusalem. New line may be clothed in phraseology reminiscent of original Soviet preference for unified bi-national state in Palestine and thus have certain appeal to Palestine Arabs. (Communist propaganda line with Arab refugees reported Beirut's 282 points this direction.)

7. Fact that Soviet press has been completely silent on Palestine issue for some time may also indicate stage being set for new Soviet approach Palestine.

¹ Both dated June 23; neither printed; the former cited an editorial in a Communist newspaper in Jerusalem, which denounced the internationalization of Jerusalem as a device "to enable US gain control over Israel" and asserted that even international control over the Holy Places "would result in complete control by American rulers over all Jerusalem." Mr. Burdett concluded that "Strong opposition by Communist paper to any form internationalization Jerusalem may indicate change in USSR attitude this question." (867N.01/6-2349)

² Not printed.

Sent Department 1661, repeated London 160, Jerusalem 1, Tel Aviv 7, Arab capitals unnumbered.

KOHLER

867N.01/7-149: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 1, 1949—8 p. m.

659. Deptel 626 June 25 and Deptel 635 June 28. On June 24 Dept informally advised Israeli Emb USG anxious for Israelis and Egyptians to get together and discuss Gaza strip proposal. Dept also stated USG willing to facilitate such exchange of views either in New York or elsewhere.

Israeli Chargé July 1 informed Dept he had received message from Sharett stating Israeli Govt desirous begin proposed discussions with Egypt and anxious for assistance USG in bringing about conversation. Israeli Govt would prefer discussions take place Lake Success but willing consider any other arrangement agreeable to Egypt.

Dept realizes Emb has not yet received reply to *Aide-Mémoire* submitted per Deptel 635 June 18 [28]. If favorable reply received Dept desires Emb immediately approach FonOff and state discussions with Israelis have resulted in suggestion that informal discussions be held Lake Success between reps Egypt and Israel. You shld inquire whether Egypt Govt agreeable foregoing and repeat US offer to facilitate such discussions by all means at its disposal.

Dept instructing Emb London¹ request Brit FonOff instruct Brit Emb Cairo concert with US Emb and strongly support US representations re Israeli-Egyptian discussions Lake Success if Egyptian Govt reply US *Aide-Mémoire* favorable.²

ACHESON

¹ In telegram 2300, July 1, 8 p. m., not printed.

² This telegram was repeated to New York. Chargé Patterson's *Aide-Mémoire*, dated June 30, was presented to the Egyptian Foreign Minister on July 2 (telegrams 642, July 5, and 713, July 26, both from Cairo, 867N.01/7-549, 501.MA Palestine/7-2649). The Chargé conversed on the matter early in July with Under Secretary Hassouna. The latter was said to have "reacted vigorously my allegation that Israeli proposal concerning Gaza has been sole constructive measure advocated in respect of long-term aspect of refugee problem, stating that Arabs had expressed constructive views Lausanne as he intimated Ethridge and Hare both knew. He added that it was really for PCC to advance solutions to refugee problem. Hassouna was also hotly antagonistic to Israeli desire take possession additional territory as represented by Gaza-Rafa strip and expressed surprise that USG could regard such measure as constructive proposal. He evidently regarded it as an indication of Israeli predatory intent and, indeed, stated that as long as Israelis felt they could obtain American support, they would never accept any proposition from any quarter." (telegram 649, July 7, from Cairo, 867N.01/7-749)

501.BB Palestine/7-149: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 1, 1949—8 p. m.

420. Ur 495 June 28. Rusk in talk with Israeli Chargé discussed territorial compensation to interested Arab states in accordance President's formula which well known to you.

Suggestion re Israeli-Egyptian talks applied specifically to Gaza strip proposal. Rusk foresaw such talks might lead to broader discussions with Egypt and possibly conversations with other Arab states.

Dept would not discourage bilateral negotiations freely entered into by Israel and Arab states according terms GA res Dec 11 and unaccompanied by attempts coercion. Dept's suggestion Abdullah subject Deptel 330 June 1¹ made view circumstances surrounding previous bilateral Israeli-Jordan talks resulting Israeli occupation additional area triangle, necessity give maximum support PCC at crucial moment, and possibility Israel and Jordan might reach agreement re Jerusalem which would exclude international and Christian interest that city.

Dept hopes you will not allow Israeli officials evaluation of tenor of US reply to give them impression that US Govt does not attach most grave importance to points made in US notes. What was Herlitz reply to your remarks re refugees?

Dept has no info re "US and UN emergency refugee relief financial proposals". Broadcast may have been based upon SYG Lie's urgent appeal to UN members for more contributions UNRPR.²

ACHESON

¹ Not printed, but see footnote 1 to telegram 72, June 1, p. 1082.

² Ambassador McDonald replied on July 5 that he was grateful for the clarification of the Department's position regarding bilateral negotiations. He advised further that "Government here has repeatedly insisted it has never used threats in Israel-Transjordan negotiations. Israel officials do not misinterpret Deptel 379, June 18 as weakening of USG position President's note May 28. I stress every opportunity that USG attaches 'most grave importance to points made in US note' and leave no room for doubt. Re Dept's question Deptel 420 Herlitz's reply my refugee remarks (Embtel 495, June 28), she remained silent." (telegram 513 from Tel Aviv, 501.BB Palestine/7-549) Telegram 379 is not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 1156.

867N.01/7-349 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

TEL AVIV, July 3, 1949—3 p. m.

511. Shiloah of Foreign Office, who returned Tel Aviv June 30, was at residence my request two hours July 1. Ford also present. Re Washington impressions Shiloah said:

Was gravely troubled and perplexed by "widespread and deep suspicion in USG of Israel's purposes". US and Israel have same basic purposes in Middle East—(1) stability, (2) peace, (3) prosperous and secure Israel and Arab states. Third objective impossible without achievement of first and second. USG and Israel differ only about means, yet their relations poisoned by USG's suspicion of Israel. Arab states are openly rearming, pledging renewal of war and refusing discuss terms of peace, but Israel alone is charged by USG as potential aggressor. Cause of this discrimination must be found and eradicated. Obviously prevailing suspicion not primarily matter of USG personalities. What can Israel do to end USG suspicions? (*Close Shiloah's main statement*)

In reply I admitted frankly fact and gave list reasons USG fears of Israel's purposes. I stressed that Israel's failure yield on issues refugees or frontiers and its evident superior military strength were basic causes. Ford pleaded eloquently that Israel make large and definite refugee offer.

Replying Shiloah said pressure on Israel for refugee offer was "easy way" for us and if granted would solve nothing, but only prepare way for another similar demand on Israel later. He then repeated his personal suggestion made "towards end" of conference in office Assistant Secretary June 18 that a small committee immediately draft general but comprehensive plan refugee settlement.¹

Re Department Gaza suggestion (Deptel 399 June 24 [25]) Shiloah expressed warm appreciation and said Israel will press bilateral negotiations. He fears failure however "unless Cairo ceases feel that USG on theory territorial compensation, supports transfer southern tip Negev to Egypt".

Comment: Shiloah's anxiety reflects grave concern of government here and its resentment at "injustice of USG's suspicions". Department's willingness sponsor Israel-Egyptian negotiations is, I think, most helpful move in long time. Its success would loosen key log in both refugee and territorial jam. *End comment.*

MCDONALD

¹ Mr. Shiloah at this point was referring, presumably, to the meeting with Acting Secretary Webb on June 17. Mr. Webb's memorandum of that conversation did not include Mr. Shiloah's suggestion as set forth in this paragraph.

501.BB Palestine/7-549

*Memorandum by the Acting Director of the Office of United Nations Affairs (Sandifer) to Mr. James W. Barco*¹

RESTRICTED

[WASHINGTON,] July 5, 1949.

The working paper of May 18, 1949 entitled "Preliminary Draft, International Regime for the Jerusalem Area" has been examined by officers of UNA, L, and NEA, who have collaborated in the following comments and suggestions which are transmitted for your assistance. Please give us your reaction to these suggestions and keep us informed as to the views of your French and Turkish colleagues on such of the points as you may take up with them.

It is suggested that the working paper might be given a title such as "Instrument Establishing an International Regime for the Jerusalem Area". This would make it possible to refer to the document as an "Instrument" rather than a "Plan" as is now done.

Article 3. Powers of government in the two zones shall be exercised by the competent local authorities in their respective zones except as otherwise provided in the present Instrument.

Comment: It is believed preferable to eliminate the phrase "exclusive competence" found in the working paper in favor of the expression "except as otherwise provided", which is a more accurate description of the division of powers set forth in the Instrument.

Article 4. It is suggested that the proposed United Nations representative be given the title of "Commissioner" instead of "Administrator".

After the first paragraph of Article 4, the following might be inserted:

"The Commissioner shall report annually to the General Assembly. He shall also make special reports to the appropriate United Nations organ whenever he deems it necessary."

Article 5. Delete the last sentence and substitute the following phrase as the last clause of the preceding sentence: "and three by the responsible authorities of the two zones acting jointly or, in event of their failure to agree, by the Commissioner."

Comment: This suggestion is in line with the suggestion in Jerusalem telegram 412, June 13, the reasons for which are regarded as completely valid.

Article 6. On behalf of the United Nations, the Commissioner shall ensure the protection of and free access to the Holy Places, in accordance with the terms of Articles 12 to 14 of the present Instrument.

¹ Mr. Barco was formally attached to the Division of United Nations Political Affairs; at this time, he was on detail to the American Delegation at Lausanne. The memorandum of July 5 was sent to him, in care of the Consulate at Geneva, with a letter of July 14 by Mr. Sandifer, who by that time had become Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (501.BB Palestine/7-1449).

Article 6 bis. Similarly on behalf of the United Nations, the Commissioner shall supervise:

(a) the permanent demilitarization and neutralization of the area, in accordance with the terms of Article 15 of the present Instrument; and

(b) the protection of human rights and of the rights of distinctive groups, in accordance with the terms of Article 17 of the present Instrument.

Comment: We consider that the word "supervise" is a more accurate expression of the function of the Commissioner under paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 6 of the working paper.

Article 7. The Commissioner, assisted by the Administrative Council, shall promote, facilitate, and participate in:

(a) coordination of measures for the maintenance of public order;

(b) operation of the main services of common interest to the Jerusalem area;

(c) equitable allocation of the contributions of each zone toward expenditures in the common interest; and

(d) planning and execution, on an area-wide basis, of such matters of municipal concern as regional planning, the development of transport and communications, and the construction and operation of public utilities.

Comment: It is believed that the expression "promote, facilitate, and participate in" more accurately describes the role of the Commissioner than the term "ensure"—an obligation which might also be beyond his power to carry out.

Article 8. Delete.

Comment: The part of Article 8 which is desirable to retain is here moved to Article 7, resulting in the deletion of Article 8.

Article 9. There shall be established an International Tribunal for Jerusalem composed of three judges to be appointed by the President of the International Court of Justice. Each judge shall hold office for a term of _____ years from the date of his appointment and until a successor shall have been appointed, unless his post on the Tribunal shall earlier have become vacant. The President of the International Court of Justice shall determine when a vacancy has been created through resignation, disability, or death. A judge may be removed for cause by the General Assembly of the United Nations, thereby creating a vacancy. A judge may be appointed for successive terms. In the initial appointments, one judge shall be appointed for _____ years, the second for _____ years, and the third for _____ years. The judges of the International Tribunal shall not be residents of Jerusalem or nationals of the State of Israel or an Arab State. The Tribunal shall sit in Jerusalem. It shall prescribe its own rules of procedure. The Tribunal shall designate one of its number to serve as president for such period as the Tribunal may determine. The judges shall receive uniform salary, and allowances, in amounts to be determined by the General Assembly.

The International Tribunal for Jerusalem shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine cases between the responsible authorities of the Jewish and Arab zones and between the United Nations Commissioner and the responsible authorities of either zone involving claims that laws, ordinances, regulations, administrative acts or court decisions applying to the area of Jerusalem are incompatible with the present Instrument.

Alternative text for preceding paragraph:

[The International Tribunal for Jerusalem shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine cases between the responsible authorities of the Jewish and Arab zones and between the United Nations Commissioner and the responsible authorities of either zone concerning the interpretation or application of the present Instrument.]²

The Tribunal shall also have jurisdiction to review, in its discretion, final decisions of the Mixed Tribunal for Jerusalem provided for in Article 10 of the present Instrument.

Decisions of the Tribunal shall be binding on the parties.

The International Tribunal may issue such orders within its competence as it deems necessary to the effective exercise of its jurisdiction.

Comment: As indicated in Unpal 88, May 2, we favor making the decisions of the Tribunal legally binding in all cases. On this basis the distinctions made in paragraph 3 of Article 9 of the working paper become unnecessary. Also it seems that paragraph 2 of this Article would include paragraph 1, which may therefore be eliminated.

An alternate text is submitted above for paragraph 2 embodying the usual language used in treaties for conferring compulsory jurisdiction over the subject matter. Such language would be desirable on general principles, but there is doubt whether in this case it might give an appearance of rigidity which would be objectionable to the parties.

The paragraph concerning the review of decisions of mixed courts is suggested because it is felt that such cases, even though the parties are individuals or corporations, might involve the interpretation of the basic Instrument for Jerusalem.

Article 10. The following introductory paragraph for this article is suggested:

“There shall be established a Mixed Tribunal for Jerusalem composed of three judges. Each Judge shall hold office for a term of _____ years from the date of his appointment and until a successor shall have been appointed, unless his post on the Tribunal shall earlier have become vacant through resignation, disability, or death. A judge may be appointed for successive terms. One judge shall be appointed by the responsible authorities of the Jewish and Arab zones respectively. The third judge, who shall serve as president of the Tribunal, shall be appointed by the President of the International Tribunal for Jerusalem; this third judge shall not be a resident of Jerusalem or a national of the State of Israel or an Arab State. The Mixed Tribunal shall sit in Jerusalem. It shall prescribe its own rules of procedure. The

² Brackets appear in the source text.

judges shall receive uniform salary, and allowances, in amounts to be determined by the General Assembly."

This would be followed by the present second paragraph of the working paper, with the insertion of the word "all" before "the parties" in the second line.

The following additional paragraph for Article 10 is also suggested :

"The Mixed Tribunal may issue such orders in Jerusalem as it deems necessary for the effective exercise of its jurisdiction. The decisions and orders of the Mixed Tribunal shall be executed by the appropriate authorities of the zone in which such decision or order applies."

Article 11 bis. The salaries, allowances, and administrative expenses of the United Nations Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioner, the International Tribunal for Jerusalem, the Mixed Tribunal for Jerusalem, and the staff of the Administrator, including guards and administrative personnel, shall be included in the annual budget adopted by the General Assembly and shall be paid by the United Nations.

Comment: This text would replace the last paragraph of present Article 11.

Article 12. As to the first paragraph, it might be desirable to specify that guards may also be stationed on the routes specified by the Administrator to give immediate access to the Holy Places.

With regard to paragraph 2 on taxation, we would consider that the corresponding clause, (Article 56, paragraph 6) of the Trusteeship Council draft Statute, would be preferable. This clause was based almost textually on the General Assembly Resolution of November 29, 1947 and had wide acceptance among United Nations members, including France.

Article 13. The Commissioner shall undertake to secure for ministers of religion and pilgrims free circulation throughout Jerusalem. He shall have power to negotiate and conclude with the States concerned arrangements to facilitate the travel of ministers of religion and pilgrims to and from Jerusalem.

Article 15. It is suggested that the second paragraph begin as follows:

"The responsible authorities of the two zones shall make declarations to the General Assembly guaranteeing the demilitarized character of their respective zones . . ." ³

The third paragraph might read :

"Any violation of the provisions contained in these assurances or any attempt to alter the international regime by force shall, unless settled by negotiations or pursuant to a decision of the Tribunal, be reported by the Commissioner to the Secretary General, who shall bring the matter to the attention of the Security Council."

In the fourth paragraph we suggest that "two parties" be replaced by "responsible authorities" and that the following be added to the end

³ Omission in the source text.

of the paragraph: "unless temporarily authorized by the United Nations Commissioner."

Article 16. We suggest the deletion of the phrase "be called upon to."

Article 17. Our comments on this article have already been telegraphed to you.

Article 18. We suggest that this should be deleted.

Article 19. A possible alternative to this article would be a provision that Jerusalem shall not be the capital of either of the adjacent states.

We also have in mind the possibility of using the International Tribunal in certain matters outside the Jerusalem area. In particular we have in mind the possibility that the parties might be called upon to give undertakings that they will not impose undue restrictions on the entry and free movement of persons desiring to visit the Holy Places in Palestine. It appears possible to give the International Tribunal jurisdiction to determine whether visa regulations and other measures are unduly restrictive of such free access.

867N.01/7-549: Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY

TEL AVIV, July 5, 1949—noon.

512. From reliable private American, whom I trust completely but am pledged not name, I am told that President Weizmann is calling conference with Ben Gurion and Sharett July 6 to urge that Israel offer unqualified¹ non-aggression pacts to Arab States.

I would appreciate Department's reaction this idea and its advice.²

MCDONALD

¹ As originally received in the Department, telegram 512, at this point, read "qualified". The correction was made on July 8.

² The Department replied on July 5, stating that it would be "pleased see non-aggression pacts freely entered into between Arab States and Israel. However, Dept unable give to proposal ur 512 July 5 the full consideration necessary without further details. For instance, what is meant by 'qualified'? Does Weizmann envisage non-aggression pacts as forming part of overall peace settlement, or wld he plan make proposal before and separately? Difficult see how Israel cld hope Arab States wld take favorable action on proposal unless it connected with final settlement." (telegram 423, 867N.01/7-549)

867N.48/7-149

The Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Johnson)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 6, 1949.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The receipt is acknowledged of your letter dated June 14, 1949, in which you analyze the probable effects of the Arab refugee problem upon United States military and strategic

interests in the Near East, in response to the Department's request for such an appreciation. This appreciation, as well as the intelligence estimate prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency which you transmitted as an enclosure, are of considerable value to the Department. The Department is transmitting your letter together with its enclosure to the President ¹ for his information.

You are doubtless aware that the President recently made a decision to recommend to the Congress that this Government, within the framework of the United Nations, support a program for the repatriation and resettlement of the Palestinian refugees with United States financial and technical assistance. Such assistance would be conditional upon (1) formulation by the Palestine Conciliation Commission or the United Nations of a plan which has a reasonable chance of implementation at a reasonable cost; (2) full acceptance by Israel and the Arab states of the responsibilities involved and their active cooperation in the execution of an agreed plan; and (3) appropriate assistance from international and other sources.

If these conditions are fulfilled, the execution of such a program of repatriation and resettlement would have important effects in meeting the objectives of the National Military Establishment in the Near East.

You are assured that the position of the National Military Establishment will be given the fullest consideration in the further development of this Government's policy toward the Arab refugee problem.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN ACHESON

¹ With Secretary Acheson's memorandum of July 7, not printed.

501.BB Palestine/7-649 : Airgram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

JERUSALEM, July 6, 1949.

A-94. The following general observations, admittedly of a speculative nature, are respectfully submitted regarding the current situation in Palestine:

1—The favorable opportunity for settlement of the present phase of the Palestine problem existing at the time of the signature of the first armistice agreement has now passed. Willingness on the part of the Arabs to end, at least for the time being, the fight over Palestine has been replaced by a general hardening of attitude and reaffirmation of their early conviction that it is impossible to do business with the Jews. The turning point and one of the principal causes of this change was the harsh terms exacted by Israel in the "Triangle." Thus Israel

has missed an opportunity to start on the long and difficult road towards achieving at least a working relationship with the Arabs upon which her future depends.

2—Arab efforts are now turning to relatively long range plans for the time when it will be possible to resume the war against Israel. Recognition of their past weaknesses and readiness to actually work for that future date rather than rely on talk is growing. The Arab Legion program for training Palestinians has met with good response and recruits are now drilling at numerous villages. The Arabs have no immediate intention of resuming hostilities, but the movement is towards a day in the future when a successful war will be possible instead of a day in the future when real cooperation with Israel will be possible. Although Arab disunity is still great, each state is apparently working separately towards the same objective.

3—The immediate desire of the Arab refugees is to return to their original homes regardless of the government in control. Morale is low, they see little hope in the future, and the meagre personal possessions which were salvaged have been expended. The Palestinians consider themselves the victims not only of the UN and Israel but of the failure of the other Arab States to live up to their boasts.

4—Despondency, misery, lack of hope and faith, and destruction of former standards of values, make the refugees an ideal field for the growth of communism. Having lost everything, the rosy, although vacuous, pictures of a Communist society are a strong temptation.

5—Recent reports of US pressure on Israel have raised to a high pitch Arab expectations that Israel will be forced to conform to the often stated US policy both with respect to territories and refugees. Non-fulfillment of these hopes will bring a correspondingly bitter reaction.

6—The State of Israel has no intention of allowing the return of any appreciable number of refugees except, perhaps, in return for additional territory. By this date there is much truth in the Israel contention that their return is physically impossible. Arab houses and villages, including those in areas not given Israel by the partition decision, have been occupied to a large extent by new immigrants. Others have been deliberately destroyed. There is practically no room left. Arab quarters in Jerusalem, until recently a military zone, are now almost full and new immigrants are pouring in steadily.

7—Despite Israel's declarations, the state is financially unable to pay compensation for Arab property taken over. Great difficulty is experienced even in financing current Jewish immigration and settlement. Barring outside loans or gifts, the funds are not on hand.

8—The UN and particularly the US thus find themselves in the

position of indirectly supporting and financing Jewish immigration and settlement. By feeding and settling Arab refugees deprived of property and means of livelihood, the UN and US are enabling Israel to use the same property and means of livelihood for new immigrants.

9—Failure of the UN in the past to protect the rights and interests of the Palestinian Arabs by forcing Israel to comply with the various UN Resolutions is largely responsible for the present situation. The policies which Israel has been permitted to follow have placed her in a position where a reversal is almost impossible.

10—The State of Israel has no intention of consenting to any reduction in territory now held except for minor rectifications with full compensation. Israel conducted the armistice negotiations with the intent that the boundaries fixed should be minimum frontiers of the new state and not temporary armistice lines.

11—Israel has three additional immediate demands. If it proves impossible to satisfy them by negotiation, the employment of force is not unlikely. These are: withdrawal of Syrian forces to the former Palestine boundary; elimination of the Latrun salient; free access to, and additional territory on, Mount Scopus.

12—Israel eventually intends to obtain all of Palestine, but barring unexpected opportunities or internal crises will accomplish this objective gradually and without the use of force in the immediate future.

13—Israel is convinced of its ability to “induce” the United States to abandon its present insistence on repatriation of refugees and territorial changes. From experience in the past, officials state confidently “you will change your mind,” and the press cites instances of the effectiveness of organized Jewish propaganda in the US.

14—Under the present circumstances the UN and US are confronted with two broad choices:

a—Employ the necessary punitive measures against Israel to force her to consent to a reduction in territory and repatriation of refugees. At this late stage strong measures are required which will have a severe effect on the State of Israel economically and politically.

b—Admit that the US and UN are unable or unwilling to take the required measures; and therefore that US policy on boundaries and refugees cannot be carried out. This will require plans to liquidate the Palestine problem, formed on the premise that the refugees will not return and that no territorial changes will occur.

15—Delay in making the necessary determination will only make it more difficult either to force the necessary reversal on Israel or to develop resettlement plans for the refugees and to conclude at least *de facto* peace treaties.

BURDETT

501.BB Palestine/7-649: Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEL AVIV, July 6, 1949—3:46 p. m.

516. In hour talk yesterday and Foreign Office, Herlitz told Ford Israeli Government had sent July 1 request via PCC¹ to representatives of Egypt, Lebanon and Transjordan for names Arab dependents (wives, children) now those three countries of "breadwinners" now in Israel in order immediate steps may be taken reunite these divided families in Israel. She not prepared hazard number possible repatriates under this plan but felt would be "less than 25,000 persons."

Re Jerusalem proposal (Deptel 375, June 17) Herlitz said Dayan was told by Burdett July 2 that proposal transfer certain functions SP Commission to MAC "had been withdrawn by USG" and asked confirmation this report in view Israeli agreement support proposal. Please advise present status this development.²

Sent Department 526; repeated Jerusalem 57; Amman 17.

MCDONALD

¹The request was actually made through the Mixed Armistice Commission. The correction was requested by Tel Aviv in its despatch 178, July 8 (501.BB Palestine/7-849).

²The Department's reply on July 7 stated that "USG has not withdrawn proposal re MAC. Dept has assumed Riley investigating possibility setting up new arrangement view acceptance proposal by Jordan and willingness Israel go along despite reservations. Dept desires Emb press points made Deptel 405 June 27." (telegram 433, 501.BB Palestine/7-649)

867N.48/7-649: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Legation in Jordan

RESTRICTED

WASHINGTON, July 6, 1949—6 p. m.

93. In meeting with Haikal July 6 McGhee expressed appreciation for cooperative attitude shown by Jordan re refugees but pointed out any int. assistance in solving refugee problem depended upon agreement Israelis and Arabs accept their responsibilities re repatriation and resettlement. Said he thought public announcement by Jordan of readiness accept some refugees might be helpful in leading other Arab states agree accept own responsibilities. Inquired whether Haikal thought his Govt willing make such statement.

Haikal said wld consult Amman but believed Govt wld be agreeable make public statement accepting for resettlement a number of refugees "who did not desire return to homes in Israeli-occupied areas", with proviso re int. assistance.

In conversations this matter with auths you shld stress necessity that all parties accept responsibilities re refugees in order provide basis for any possible int. aid within framework UN. Wld be difficult, for example, establish int. refugee program on basis cooperation only one country such as Jordan. You shld inform auths that US believes public statement by Jordan wld be helpful in inducing other Arab states cooperate, but leave no doubt in their minds that while statement wld be deeply appreciated by US, it wld only be first steps and that int. refugee program can not be established without cooperation Israel and Arab states and without prior survey resettlement and repatriation possibilities in Arab states and Israel. State US continues press Israel re repatriation.

In conversations with auths you shld emphasize points made Dep-
circlet June 27.¹

ACHESON

¹ The formal reply to the Chargé's representations were embodied in a Jordanian Foreign Office note of July 19. The note stated that Jordan supported the right of the refugees to return to their country in accordance with United Nations decisions and that the Government would cooperate concerning those refugees who did not wish to return, providing financial assistance were forthcoming (telegram 285, July 20, 9 a. m., from Amman, 50LBB Palestine/7-2049). Mr. Stabler concluded his telegram with the observation that "No mention is made in note of public statement. It is clear from various talks with Foreign Minister and others that Jordan Government does not feel it can make such statement at this stage."

867N.01/7-349: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 6, 1949—8 p. m.

430. Fol Dept's comments ur 411 [511] July 3 for your use with Shiloah and other Israeli officials who may take similar line:

US as anxious as is Israel for peace, prosperity and stability NE, but can not agree that this can be achieved on Israeli premises regarding territory and refugees.

On basis investigations its reps abroad US Govt does not believe Arab states preparing resume conflict. Any public statement to contrary designed for internal consumption within Arab states can be matched by corresponding Israeli public statements.

US Govt has pointed out to Israeli Govt on numerous occasions steps latter might take to facilitate arrival peace NE and continued full US support of Israel.

US Govt can not agree that repatriation substantial number refugees wld "solve nothing." In opinion US Govt such move wld be major step on road to peace.

US Govt also rejects apparent implication Shiloah that solution refugees problem is responsibility of US. Clear that primary responsibility lies with Israel and Arab states, which shld discharge this responsibility through repatriation and resettlement, respectively.

ACHESON

501.BB Palestine/7-749

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and African Affairs (Hare)*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 7, 1949.

Participants: Mr. Aubrey Eban, Israeli Representative to the U.N.
Mr. Uriel Heyd, Israeli Chargé D'Affaires a.i.
Mr. George C. McGhee, Assistant Secretary, NEA¹
Mr. Raymond Hare, Deputy Assistant Secretary, NEA

In the course of a luncheon conversation on July 7 Mr. Eban inquired whether the Department had heard anything from the Egyptians regarding the possibility of conversations in New York on the Gaza strip question. He said that he had intended leaving this weekend for a short trip to Tel Aviv but that he would naturally defer his departure in case there was a prospect of the holding of conversations at an early date. Mr. McGhee said that we had not heard from the Egyptians as yet but that we expected to do so any time now and that we would, of course, inform the Israeli Embassy as soon as we received word.

Discussing the substantive side of the Gaza strip proposal, Mr. Eban said that from the economic standpoint this area was of little interest to Israel; its acquisition would merely result in Israel obtaining several miles of additional coastline. The situation was quite different, however, when viewed from the standpoint of security. Gaza was only a short distance from Tel Aviv itself and as long as it remained in the hands of a country with the military potential of Egypt it could not but constitute a perpetual threat to Israel. It was true that the return of any sizeable number of Arab refugees would also constitute a threat to Israeli security but in the case of the Gaza strip it seemed abundantly clear that the risk of accepting responsibility for the refugees there was far overshadowed by the danger of that area remaining in Egyptian possession.

¹ Messrs. McGhee and Hare become Assistant Secretary of State and Deputy Assistant Secretary on June 24 and July 6, respectively.

Mr. McGhee observed that, as Mr. Eban doubtless knew, we had seen promising possibilities in the Gaza strip idea as a step toward Palestine settlement² but that unfortunately the proposal had been made in such a way as to produce the effect of being a straight barter of refugees against territory. Mr. Eban said that he too felt that the presentation of this matter may have left something to be desired. In further discussion on this subject Mr. McGhee observed that although direct discussion on the Gaza proposal was favored as a practical measure he assumed that such negotiations would have to be integrated in due course into other negotiations, particularly with reference to Transjordan. Mr. Eban indicated that such would doubtless be the case.

Turning to the general question of refugees Mr. Eban said that he was concerned lest Israel should make a gesture in that direction only to have it refused by the Arabs on the basis of inadequacy and thus leave Israel "out on a limb". He expressed doubt in the circumstances whether it was advisable for Israel to make such a move. Mr. McGhee said that he viewed the matter from an entirely different point of view. Presuming that the gesture made by Israel was indeed serious, it would constitute a positive and much needed step in the direction of peace. It could, for example, be made contingent on acceptance of the remainder by the Arab States. It was, of course, obvious that Israel would not be able to take back all of the refugees but a move which would indicate that it was willing to make a real effort to contribute to a solution would create an entirely different and more promising atmosphere. Mr. McGhee went on to emphasize the gravity of the situation which would arise as a result of failure to take constructive action on the refugee question in the very near future. He said that as a result of consultations with officials of the United Nations and of his own personal knowledge of Congressional attitude he was certain that little could be done by way of obtaining further funds on a straight relief basis. Relief could only be obtained if promise were given of some constructive program for the liquidation of the problem. It would be an extremely serious matter for both Israel and the Arab States if it should become apparent that failure to take action on this important question was the direct result of a lack of their willingness to assume responsibilities which they jointly shared. Mr. Eban appeared to be particularly impressed by this argument and said that he would make a point of stressing it on his return to Tel Aviv.

² The Department, on July 8, instructed the American Delegation at Lausanne to inform the French and Turkish Delegations of the Gaza strip proposals made by the United States (telegram Unpal 181, 501.BB Palestine/7-849).

501.BB Palestine/5-3149

The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Connally)

WASHINGTON, July 8, 1949.

DEAR SENATOR CONNALLY: In accordance with the request of your Committee, dated May 31,¹ for the Department's comments on S.J. Res. 98 proposing to establish the Near East Survey Commission, the Department has made a careful study of the proposal and does not recommend enactment of this measure.

The Department is in full agreement with the objectives of this resolution, which are directed towards promoting the economic development and the general welfare of the Near East, and appreciates the recognition accorded by the resolution to the special importance of this area of the world.

The Department is convinced that the objectives of the resolution should be sought through a United Nations framework, and that the United States should avoid the implication of assumption of direct responsibility for development needs of the Near East. Such an implication would unquestionably be drawn out of the creation of the proposed Commission, even though the resolution directs that the work of the Commission be coordinated with UN activities. The United Nations, through the Palestine Conciliation Commission and the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees, has already assumed responsibility for and is actively seeking solution to many of the problems of the Near East which are included in the objectives of the resolution.

The Department attributes great significance to the activities of the Palestine Conciliation Commission, in which the United States is one of the three participating governments. Pursuant to its task of promoting final settlement of all problems outstanding between Israel and the Arab states, the Conciliation Commission has been charged by the United Nations with the repatriation, resettlement, and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees from the Palestine hostilities, and has been instructed to seek arrangements which will facilitate the economic development of the area.

The Conciliation Commission is undertaking, in close cooperation with the United States Government and its other participating members, to formulate plans for the accomplishment of the above purposes. Such plans, which are parallel in their objectives with those outlined in Section 6 of the Joint Resolution, are well under way, on the basis

¹ Not printed.

of previously prepared, comprehensive surveys of the Near East. It is understood, moreover, that the Conciliation Commission plans to establish an economic survey group, composed of high ranking administrators and highly competent technical specialists, who will coordinate on a regional basis the existing surveys of the Near East, with a view to accomplishing the repatriation and resettlement of refugees and contributing to the economic development of the entire area. Under its terms of reference, the economic survey group will be required to examine the economic situation in countries affected by the recent hostilities, and to make recommendations which will enable the governments concerned to further such measures and development programs as are required to overcome economic dislocations created by the hostilities; it will be required to reintegrate refugees into the economic life of the area on a self-sustaining basis within a minimum period of time, and to promote economic conditions conducive to the maintenance of peace and stability in the area.

Furthermore, the technical assistance and investment guarantee program which has been submitted to the Congress by the President would enable this Government to participate in the economic development of this area. In developing a preliminary budget for the technical assistance program particular attention was given to the Near East as an area in special need of this type of assistance as an essential element in its economic development.

Under these circumstances, the Department welcomes the interest which has inspired the Joint Resolution under reference. It believes, however, that the purposes of the resolution will be better served by cooperative action such as that contemplated through the Conciliation Commission. Such coordinated effort would insure against duplication and would bring to the problem the facilities and support of other interested governments and international organizations which is essential to solution of the economic and related problems of the area.

In view of the great interest of the United States in the establishment of a firm and lasting peace in the Near East through the efforts of the United Nations, the Department of State hopes that the Congress will give maximum support to measures recommended by the United Nations and its organs to this end.

In view of the request from your Committee for a report at this time, we have not awaited Bureau of the Budget clearance.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:

ERNEST A. GROSS
Assistant Secretary