

501.BB Palestine/10-1949 : Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to
the Secretary of State*

RESTRICTED

NEW YORK, October 19, 1949—7:51 p. m.

1277. Palestine Conciliation Commission held first meeting of third session New York October 19. Delegations not present. Following highlights:

(1) Report of Azcarate—Principal Secretary Azcarate reported on his trip to Jerusalem and Arab States during recent recess. With regard to matters which PCC has instructed him take up in Near East, stated that Servoise was discussing question of blocked accounts with Egyptian and Israeli representatives and that there existed possibility for limited unblocking. Regarding possibility that Arabs resident vicinity armistice lines might be permitted work their land located in Israeli-held territory, Azcarate said that Israel and Jordan had reached agreement in principle that matter should be taken up in special committee created in Israeli-Jordan armistice agreement. Re reunion of separated families, representatives of Lebanon and Egypt had entered into contact with Israeli representatives and discussions were progressing satisfactorily. Efforts to persuade Israel accept PCC point of view re orange groves had produced completely negative results.

Israelis had informed Azcarate that reasons for movement government Ministries to Jerusalem were that Tel Aviv was too crowded and in order to give maximum economic and social life to Jerusalem. Israelis maintained that similar movement taking place in Old City, which had in effect become capital of Arab Palestine.

Azcarate informed PCC Jordan building new road to Bethlehem from Old City which will pass close to Government House. Israelis have constructed two block houses near Government House. These located in neutral zone according present line of demarcation in Government House area but under proposed new line demarcation, now being considered by Israel and Jordan, will lie in Israeli zone.

(2) PCC decided hold *pro forma* meetings with Arab and Israeli delegations in near future.

(3) PCC decided allow matter of appointment UN representative Jerusalem to die on vine by writing letter to SYG expressing regret SYG had been unable find candidate acceptable to PCC.

(4) View wide-spread misinterpretation draft Jerusalem statute, PCC instructed its legal adviser prepare explanatory study refuting main criticisms which PCC might consider releasing to press and members GA at later date.

Boisanger and Yalcin desire come Washington for consultations with Department. They consider it preferable such consultations take place with participation new US representative and hope he can be named by end of next week.

AUSTIN

867N.00/10-1749 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel*¹

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, October 20, 1949—8 p. m.

673. FYI Oct 18 McGhee informed Elath our concern over report in Jlem tel 625, Oct 17² rptd to you 127. McGhee re-emphasized our view mil phase in Pal definitely finished and no justification for further mil action any sort. McGhee said Israeli actions this type cld only serve exacerbate present situation and make settlement more difficult. Elath was requested inform Israeli Govt our views.

ACHESON

¹ This telegram was repeated to Cairo and Jerusalem.

² Not printed; it reported information from General Riley that Israeli armed forces had attacked Beit Hanun, a town on the northern tip of the Gaza strip which divided the Israeli and Egyptian zones. The Israeli-Egyptian armistice did not specifically permit or prohibit civilians in the area but Arab civilians had infiltrated during the summer to cultivate their orange groves and to harvest the now-ready crop. The attack drove out the civilians, Egyptian forces reporting 4 known dead and 19 wounded (867N.00/10-1749).

501.BB Palestine/10-2249 : Telegram

*The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations
(Jessup) to the Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET

NEW YORK, October 22, 1949—1:02 p. m.

1285. Following learned in strictest confidence October 21 from Fawzi Pasha el Mulqi.

King Abdullah and Jordan Government have decided proclaim annexation Arab Palestine by Jordan on January 1, 1950. However, if Arab states by any chance move to set up independent state in Arab Palestine in intervening period, annexation will be proclaimed before January 1. Fawzi said United Kingdom approved idea of annexation and that he certain United Kingdom would extend terms Anglo-Jordan defense treaty to new territory. Just to be on safe side Jordan would request United Kingdom give formal undertaking re extension

treaty before proclaiming annexation. If United Kingdom refused Fawzi thought Abdullah might not go ahead with plan.

Abdullah motivated by conviction Israelis will never give up any territory they now occupy and that he should take steps ensure retention that part Palestine occupied by Jordan. After annexation King plans hold elections for Jordan Parliament in which residents annexed area will participate.

Fawzi said that six months ago feeling against Abdullah in Arab Palestine was so strong, because of territory given up in Jordan-Israeli armistice agreement, that King risked being shot every time he went there. Now, however, his stock has risen to such a degree that he thinks he could even risk a plebiscite on annexation question if this were necessary. Main reason for this change, according to Fawzi, is that Arab Palestinians have come to realize that Jordan is only Arab state which can and will protect their interests.

Department please pass London as USUN 57, Amman as USUN 3, Jerusalem as USUN 6.

JESSUP

501.BB Palestine/10-1849 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Jerusalem*¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 24, 1949—7 p. m.

400. Your tel 627 Oct 18. Dept has always considered direct talks shld be encouraged particularly when it appears such talks wld lead to constructive action toward final settlement (Deptel 354 Aug 31² and Depcirgram Oct. 14, 2:15 p. m.). Dept sees no reason why MACs shld not be medium for direct discussions on wider range of subjects (you will recall Dept's proposal that Israel-Jordan MAC under Riley consider broader aspects Jlem question), but believes parties concerned must themselves make decision on this matter.

Dept does not agree that present armistice agreements automatically lapse after one year. Provisions are made in all agreements for revision or suspension by mutual consent any time or after one year in absence mutual consent conference may be convoked to review agreement but parties continue to be bound in all events by injunctions against resort to armed action of any sort. However, Dept does agree it most desirable efforts be made move beyond armistice stage.

ACHESON

¹ This telegram was repeated by airgram to London, Amman, Cairo, Beirut, and Damascus.

² This was a repeat of telegram 3126, August 30, to London, p. 1338.

501.BB Palestine/10-2449: Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to
the Secretary of State*

SECRET

NEW YORK, October 24, 1949—11:59 p. m.

Delga 138. PCC met with Arab delegates October 24 at request Egyptian delegate who had been instructed by Cairo make certain observations. Following highlights of meeting.

Abdel Moneim began by recalling that from very beginning PCC discussions Egyptian Government had insisted upon return of Palestine refugees. Egypt had acquiesced in PCC moves designed facilitate final Palestine solution, such as May 12 protocol and sending ESM to NE, but still refugees not returned.

When ESM visited Egypt Abdel Moneim made following proposals to Clapp:

1. Original inhabitants Gaza area should be permitted cultivate hinterland other side armistice lines, which not being cultivated by Israelis. Such arrangement would improve food situation Gaza area.
2. Original inhabitants that part of Gaza strip which became no man's land under Israel-Egyptian armistice agreement should be permitted return from Egyptian-occupied Gaza area.
3. The many refugees in Gaza strip who come from Beersheba region should be permitted return and cultivate lands which lying fallow.

Abdel Moneim concluded his remarks re refugees by asking PCC whether it possible consider refugee and territorial questions separately. Could Arab delegates make territorial demands without reference to disposition refugee problem? He asked for PCC guidance. PCC states that in its opinion there could be no lasting solution of one question without a solution of the other, but that progress could be made separately toward solution of each problem.

Abdel Moneim then referred to PCC letter to Arab delegates of September 2 transmitting text of draft declaration concerning Holy Places outside of Jerusalem¹ (document A/AC/25/2). He said that in opinion of Egyptian Government Arab states, which traditionally have scrupulously respected Holy Places, were not the ones to ask to sign such a declaration. When UN had decided re more important Holy Places in Jerusalem, then Egypt would abide by this decision. When PCC asked him clarify, Abdel Moneim heatedly replied that in simple terms Egyptian Government saw no reason sign declaration of this "minor aspect" Palestine problem while major issues covered in December 11 resolution remain unsolved. He thereupon orally com-

¹ See Palun 296, September 2, from Lausanne, and footnote 1, p. 1356.

mitted Egyptian Government to protect such Holy Places in Palestine as might remain under Egyptian jurisdiction and said this should be sufficient for PCC.

All other Arab delegates strongly followed same line, refusing to sign draft declaration and orally making same commitment as had Egyptian. Fawzi Pasha (Jordan) suggested that PCC submit these oral declarations to GA as commitments Arab states re Holy Places outside Jerusalem.

Comment—This new common Arab front very likely is result maneuvers Fawzi Pasha to persuade Arab delegates support King Abdullah's desire see *status quo* maintained in Jerusalem. The Department will recall that one of provisions of PCC draft declaration on Holy Places outside Jerusalem is that pending final settlement Palestine problem governments concerned would guarantee freedom of access to Holy Places in territory at present occupied under armistice agreements.

Abdel Moneim next informed PCC that upon instructions Cairo, Egyptian delegate was preparing draft declaration concerning rights of Arabs who are now or may be residents of Israeli-occupied territory. Declaration is to be based on declaration of human rights and genocide convention and will provide for formal guarantees concerning individual and property rights of Arabs in question. Egyptian delegate will submit this draft declaration to PCC with request that PCC ask Israeli delegate that arrangements be carried out for declaration to be made by Israeli Government.

PCC said would examine declaration as soon as Egyptian delegate made available.

AUSTIN

501.BB Palestine/10-2549: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 25, 1949—5 p. m.

3828. US continues favor incorporation Arab Pal in Jordan but Dept considers action premature this time (Deptel 3768 Oct 19¹). Reaction after GA (Embtel 4218 Oct 20²) Dept believes matter might be reconsidered then in light GA action re Pal and gen polit and econ developments in NE. We have discussed matter informally with

¹ Not printed; it summarized the conversation of Messrs. Wilkins and Greenhill on October 14; see p. 1426.

² Not printed; it conveyed what was described as the impression of the British Foreign Office that the United States might be "willing agree incorporation Arab Palestine in Jordan after GA." (867N.014/10-2049)

Brit Emb rep but made clear further consideration depended on developments.³

ACHESON

³ Messrs. Wilkins and Greenhill discussed the Palestine problem again on October 21. The latter stated that "Adequate arrangements should be made for the safety of the Holy Places and access to them." Later in the discussion, he said that "The United Kingdom was prepared to give general support to the Palestine Conciliation Commission's plan for the internationalization of the Jerusalem area . . . It was not anxious, however, to take the initiative or to bring pressure to bear on Israel or the Arab states with regard to the plan." He also stated that his Government would avoid discussing the incorporation of Arab Palestine into Jordan during the current session of the General Assembly but would wish such action realized at the end of the session.

Mr. Wilkins' memorandum of conversation notes that "I pointed out that the views of the Foreign Office with regard to Jerusalem were not completely clear to me. I said that if the United Kingdom Delegation confined its remarks in the General Assembly to the safety of the Holy Places and access to them, the impression might be created in the General Assembly that the United Kingdom did not generally support the internationalization of the Jerusalem area. Mr. Greenhill said this was not the British intention and that he would bring this point to London's attention."

Concerning the formal union of Arab Palestine and Jordan, Mr. Wilkins writes that "I again pointed out that it was too early to tell what action might be taken on this score as it would be necessary to await developments in the General Assembly and to consider the situation in the Near East after the end of the General Assembly before we would be in a position to determine what action could be taken" regarding the matter. (501.BB Palestine/10-2149)

501.BB Palestine(E)/10-2549 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Legation in Lebanon*¹

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, October 25, 1949—7 p. m.

642. Esmis 21. [To Clapp.]

1) On Oct 24 Dept officials discussed current thinking re ESM report and UN action in relief, resettlement and polit fields with reps UK, Fr and Turkish embs (Deptel 636 Oct 21).

2) Reps were supplied with *a*) diagram chart of UN structure² which might result from anticipated GA action; *b*) Brief analysis this chart; ² *c*) Draft GA res² which was drawn up on basis Legtel 549³ and Deptel 636 for purpose of clarifying our thinking (summary fols separate tel⁴) and *d*) draft proposal for long-term org (NESDA).²

3) Reps informed four documents were preliminary working drafts and were laid on table to coordinate joint thinking here and to keep in step with your joint thinking in Beirut.

4) Reps were requested ascertain views their govts re draft in light of reports from their reps on ESM.

¹ This telegram was repeated to Paris, London, and Ankara and to New York for the American Delegation to the Palestine Conciliation Commission.

² Not found attached.

³ Dated October 18, not printed.

⁴ See *infra*.

5) Additional mtg planned in week or ten days. Meanwhile we propose, following receipt, to incorporate views contained in document forwarded from Damascus Oct 22 (Legtel 556⁵) as well as your further views based on Deptel 636.

6) Dept understands Gardiner plans return US during first week Nov via Paris and London. Brit Emb considers itinerary essential for purposes coordination.

ACHESON

⁵ Identified also as Simes 22 and dated October 20, not printed; it stated that a draft revision of an Economic Survey Mission paper dealing with the political and refugee problems and a draft proposal for a long-term organization would be sent to the Department from Damascus on October 22 (501.BB Palestine(E)/10-2049).

501.BB Palestine(E)/10-2549 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Legation in Lebanon*¹

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, October 25, 1949—7 p. m.

643. Esmis 22. [To Clapp.] Summary important provisions preliminary working draft GA res re Pal² fols:

Preamble: GA recalling Dec 11 res and having examined reports of PCC, ESM and UNRPR.

1. *Organization:*

(A) Establishes UN Pal Comm consisting present PCC members to exercise gen policy supervision re Pal;

(B) Establishes UN Agent Gen Pal responsible direction UN activities re Pal;

(D) Decides continue UNRPR.

2. *Political:*

(A) Calls on Israel Arab states seek agreement by negots conducted with Agent Gen or directly with view final settlement outstanding questions;

(B) Instructs Agent Gen facilitate and expedite effective negots by Israel Arab states in task achieving final settlement and, as circumstances may require, make recommendations to foregoing or to GA thru PCC as necessary;

(C) Requests Agent Gen collaborate closely with UNRPR and NESDA develop effective coordination.

3. *Relief:*

(A) Takes note ESM report re need continue direct relief and develop short range employment projects;

¹ This telegram was repeated to London as No. 3834, Paris, and Ankara, and to New York for the American Delegation to the Palestine Conciliation Commission.

² Presumably the draft resolution cited in paragraph numbered two in telegram 642, *supra*.

(B) Determines on basis ESM report sum (tentatively \$32 million) required;

(C) Urges UN members make voluntary contributions;

(D) Authorizes SYG to advance up to (tentatively \$5 million) from UN working capital fund;

(G) Recommends UNRPR collaborate closely with Agent Gen and NESDA;

(J) Requests SYG call upon present operating groups continue services and, if subsequently unable continue, make other arrangements as required.

4. *Refugees:*

(A) Calls on Arab states Israel assume their full responsibility solution refugee problem and facilitate measures internatl assistance;

(B) Takes note ESM report recommending NESDA and declarations certain UN members re willingness participate and urges estab NESDA;

(C) Instructs Agent Gen collaborate closely with NESDA.

5. *Compensation:*

(A) Decides Pal Comm acting through Agent Gen shall have internatl status equivalent protecting state re refugee property losses;

(B) Calls on Israel Arab states to treat Comm as having this status;

(C) Requests Israel Arab states notify Agent Gen if they wish undertake protection any Pal refugees;

(D) Instructs Agent Gen take measures effect determination and fulfillment governmental obligations under internatl law or in equity re compensation payments, make appropriate releases and effectuate equitable distribution proceeds.

ACHESON

501.A Summaries/10-2549 : Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)
to the Secretary of State*

[Extract]

NEW YORK, October 25, 1949—11:55 p. m.

1290.

The Council agreed without formal vote Oct. 25 to a suggestion by President Austin that discussion of demilitarization of Jerusalem be postponed pending GA Committee 1 consideration of the PCC report. Fawzi (Egypt), at whose initiative the question was placed on the SC Agenda, registered his disagreement with this procedure but did not formally object.¹

AUSTIN

¹ For the proceedings of the Security Council on the demilitarization of Jerusalem at its 453rd meeting, see SC, *4th yr.*, No. 49.

501.BB Palestine/10-2049

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to the President

WASHINGTON, October 26, 1949.

The Palestine Conciliation Commission concluded the second phase of its work at Lausanne, Switzerland on September 16, 1949, and planned to reconvene in New York on October 19, 1949. Although it is not expected that the Commission will commence its formal sessions before November 10, 1949, on which date the report of the Economic Survey Mission is expected to be available, it is important that a United States Representative be in New York to participate in preliminary discussions. Mr. Paul A. Porter, who had been the United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission, submitted his resignation, effective September 15, 1949. The Department had hoped that Mr. Porter would be able to represent the United States again when the Commission reconvened but he has advised the Department that pending legal business makes it difficult for him to serve at this time.

I am submitting, therefore, for your approval, a request that Mr. Ely E. Palmer, a Career Minister in the Foreign Service, be given a recess appointment as United States Representative on the United Nations Palestine Conciliation Commission.

This appointment is made in accordance with the provisions of Section 2 (d) of Public Law 341, 81st Congress. By virtue of Mr. Palmer's status in the Foreign Service as Career Minister, he will receive no additional compensation under this appointment.

There is attached herewith a recess commission for your signature if this recommendation meets with your approval.¹

JAMES E. WEBB

¹Marginal notation by an unidentified Department officer: "Commission returned signed by President 11/3/49." According to the Department's announcement, printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, November 21, 1949, p. 785, Mr. Palmer's appointment was made by the President on November 4.

811.516 Export-Import Bank/10-2849 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel

RESTRICTED

WASHINGTON, October 28, 1949—5 p. m.

689. Board Eximbank Oct 26 authorized credit \$20 million under \$100 million to assist financing purchase US equipment materials services required for industrial projects designed to contribute indus-

trial development Israel, as may be approved from time to time by Board.¹ Int 3½%. Amortization 15 yrs.

Each project involving financing of more than \$50,000 must be presented to Board for formal approval and projects this amount or under must be submitted from time to time for Boards administrative approval.

Israel already submitted 39 industrial projects amounting abt \$11 million.

Board considered and approved financing 28 projects about \$6.1 million. Eight projects about \$2.7 million require further info and on three about \$2.2 million Israeli not completed its study.

ACHESON

¹ The Department, on October 27, sent to Tel Aviv the text of the press release issued by the Bank concerning the \$20 million credit. The release stated that this action brought to \$73,350,000 the total credit extended to Israel by the Bank (telegram 687, 811.516 Export-Import Bank/10-2749).

501.BB Palestine/10-2949 : Airgram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

JERUSALEM, October 29, 1949.

A-173. The Consulate General respectfully submits the following observations, admittedly general, regarding the future of Arab Palestine and the possibility of its annexation to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan as seen from Jerusalem.

1. King Abdullah has definitely set his heart on the annexation of Arab Palestine, the sooner the better. Arab Palestine would include the Arab held sections of Jerusalem. His determination probably has been strengthened by reports of negotiations for the union of Iraq and Syria, thus diminishing prospects for fulfilment of the "Greater Syria Plan." He is also getting old and would like to see his kingdom augmented before his death.

2. The United Kingdom supports this project and is inclined to favor immediate implementation. Although giving lip service to the internationalization of Jerusalem, the British apparently feel that only partition of the city is "practical" with the Arab section becoming part of Jordan. The British Consulate General in Jerusalem, at least, has held reservations regarding the possibility of internationalization for some time.

3. The United States has given its blessings to annexation but at a future date and as part and parcel of a final settlement of the Palestine problem. In addition, it continues to support internationalization of the entire Jerusalem area.

4. The other Arab states, particularly Egypt and Saudi Arabia, are opposed to annexation both from traditional hostility to the Hashemites and the realization that such action would further diminish any remaining prospects of their obtaining territory in Palestine.

5. Israel is also strongly opposed. Her general objection to any increase in the size and therefore the potential power of an Arab state is augmented in this case by the ingrained conviction that Jordan is only Britain in disguise and annexation would mean the return of the British by the kitchen door. Furthermore, an independent Arab Palestine would be relatively easy to control and would in all probability quickly degenerate into a vassal state, if not an actual part of Israel.

6. Should incorporation take place, particularly with the open or camouflaged sanction of the United States and/or the United Kingdom, Israel might quickly seize the opportunity and formally proclaim her sovereignty over all the areas she now controls including the Jewish sections of Jerusalem.

7. The Arabs of Palestine have been the principal victims of the events since 1947. They are depressed, disillusioned and lack any strong leader to replace the discredited old ones. A uniform characteristic is their growing contempt for the United Nations at least in so far as its activities in Palestine are concerned. The refugees have been remarkably patient and have occasioned surprisingly few disturbances; it would be still more surprising if their endurance does not break into disorders on a growing scale. Indications that the breaking point may be near are the increasing numbers who attempt to infiltrate back into Israel and the up-surge of individually organized raids across the demarcation lines. Complaints against living conditions and paucity of food are also growing.

8. Better informed refugees now realize that repatriation in the sense contemplated by the December 11, 1949 resolution of the General Assembly is out of the question and they no longer think the United Nations will enforce the resolution. However, no one dares to say so openly for the great mass of the refugees has been nourished on this illusion and a frank statement of the extent of the deception might kindle an explosion. It would certainly eliminate the chances of leadership of the person making the first announcement.

9. No love for King Abdullah is expressed in private conversation or felt for Jordan despite the King's recent "triumphal parade" through Palestine. The King is commonly considered a despotic tribesman, and the Jordan Government autocratic in the extreme—the antithesis of the type of regime for which the younger intellectuals in Palestine are allegedly striving. What Palestinians fear is complete subordination to Jordan. Imbued with contempt for the "Jordanian

Bedouin", and conscious of both the small resources of Jordan itself and the scarcity of persons qualified to direct a modern state, they believe that in any joint state Palestinians should play an equal if not leading part. Particularly alarming to them is the present political and economic discrimination. Furthermore, resentment over cession of the Triangle lands is still smouldering and has permanently shaken confidence in the trustworthiness of King Abdullah as a protector against Israel.

10. Nevertheless, a growing number of the moderate, better informed elements appear resigned to the fact that there is no alternative to union with Jordan. They recognize that a viable Arab Palestine is impossible and that such a Lilliputian state would quickly be swallowed by Israel. Under specific conditions in the formulation of which they had a prior voice, incorporation with Jordan would probably be accepted.

11. Talk of union with Israel or close economic bonds between an independent Arab Palestine and Israel is heard. But, the conditions mentioned for this are the product of wishful thinking and clearly unacceptable to Israel. On the whole there does not appear to be any genuine, widely held desire to cooperate with Israel in a realistic manner.

12. Israel's treatment of its present Arab population; its security arguments against repatriation of Arab refugees; the drastic differences between the semi-socialist communal state of Israel and the Arabs' traditional mode of existence; and the chauvinistic basically anti-"goy" atmosphere in Israel; indicate that the interests of Palestinian Arabs would be served best by incorporation into Jordan.

13. Careful consideration should be given to the manner of achieving this union to minimize initial resentment and future friction. A unilateral decree of annexation without specific protection for the rights and interests of Palestinians would provoke deep, widespread bitterness difficult to heal. It might even occasion disturbances.

14. In the present circumstances union might be approached by the selection, or preferably election, of a group of Palestinian Arabs (not mere Abdullah marionettes) to represent Palestine and draw up with Jordan representatives an agreement for union under specific and acceptable conditions. The selection might be entrusted to the various mukhtars, heads of families, municipal organizations and committees from the refugees camps. The union could take the form of a kingdom under one crown but with each side of the Jordan possessing local autonomy and controlling its internal affairs. Responsibility for defense and foreign affairs could rest in a joint body. Such an arrangement would require reduction in the arbitrary power of the King in practice if not in form, and explicit provisions against discrimination

in favor of either unit of the Kingdom. Particularly important is permitting the Palestinian Arabs a prior voice in working out the arrangements which would make them responsible for the type of government organized and, therefore, give them a greater responsibility for its successful functioning.

BURDETT

501.BB Palestine (E)/10-2549 : Telegram.

*The Secretary of State to the Legation in Lebanon*¹

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, October 31, 1949.

663. Esmis 27. For Clapp from McGhee. We have studied your informative and detailed message (Legtel 564 Oct 25²) with care and have fol further views on your numbered paras :

1. We agree agent gen with primary responsibility pol matters shld not also be charged by UN with responsibility for operations in econ field. Agent gen shld however in practice coordinate his pol activities with econ activities of UNRPR and NEDI as indicated in Deptel 636³ and 643.⁴

2. We cannot agree NEDI shld handle direct relief and work relief in addition to its long range econ functions. USG is not willing to assume responsibility for admin direct relief and work relief. Device of contractual arrangement with UN is unacceptable because it wld generally be considered we had assumed responsibility on national basis. UK, France and Turkey may certainly be expected react similarly. Congress wld certainly consider US involvement in NEDI as unacceptable if it included responsibility for relief even if trusted American were chairman and responsibility were limited by contract with UN. Furthermore we anticipate appeal for voluntary contributions for relief from UN members wld be prejudiced and fear such contributions wld not be forthcoming to full extent as UN members might assume NEDI had taken over.

UNRPR shld continue function through present operating agencies. We believe operating agencies can be persuaded continue participate in view gravity problem involved. In fact we see no other satisfactory answer to adm problem since any change from present system wld require organization and recruitment large staff for rela-

¹ This telegram was repeated to Paris, London, and Ankara and to the American Delegation of the Palestine Conciliation Commission at New York.

² Not printed; it gave Mr. Clapp's comments on Department's telegram 636 (501.BB Palestine (E)/10-2549); see footnote 3 immediately below.

³ Dated October 21, not printed; it advised that the Department agreed substantially with the content of telegram 549, October 18 (p. 1442) and offered various comments (501.BB Palestine (E)/10-1849).

⁴ Dated October 25, p. 1453.

tively short period. Experts tell us such staff is simply not available because of many international organizations operating in other areas of world.

3. We understand "NEDI" approximates "Social Club" in Arabic and believe it important title be included in interim report and suggest "NEDA" (Near East Development Agency).

4. Arguments shld prove as effective if UNRPR handles and coordinates its activities with NEDI.

5. We agree re US willingness and consider it essential your initial report contain specific long-range development program at least for central Palestine and Jordan as indicated in Deptel 636.

6. Although at outset UNRPR will have all funds, potentiality of NEDI shld gradually become apparent to NE govts as projects are developed.

Dept plans transmit further views re basic policy in next few days. [McGhee.]

ACHESON

501.MA Palestine/11-149

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to the President

WASHINGTON, November 1, 1949.

Subject: Payment of United States Contribution to United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees

1. Public Law 25, 81st Congress, a Joint Resolution of March 24, 1949, authorized the appropriation of funds not to exceed \$16,000,000 for the relief of Palestine refugees, in response to the message submitted by you to the Congress on January 27, 1949. Public Law 119, 81st Congress, appropriated to the President \$12,000,000 for the relief of Palestine refugees, and an additional \$4,000,000 for the same purpose, "to such extent as the President from time to time finds that other nations party to such United Nations agreement have met their obligations to the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees . . .".¹

2. The amount of \$13,377,930 has already been paid to the United Nations, \$1,377,930 of which was paid as a result of your finding of August 10, 1949² that other nations party to the United Nations agreement had met their obligations to the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees in the form and to the extent of contributions in the amount of \$13,377,930.

3. The Secretary General of the United Nations has now informed the Secretary of State³ that "the total contributions in cash, kind or

¹ Omission in the source text.

² See footnote 3, p. 1283.

³ Letter of October 13, not printed.

services donated by Governments other than that of the United States, as of September 15, 1949, amount to \$15,759,745." This figure exceeds by \$2,381,815 the United States contribution to date. In view of this information, he requests that the United States Government make an additional contribution of \$2,000,000 at this time, and states that he will submit a final statement in respect to the balance of the authorized United States contribution within the next two months.

4. The Department of State believes that the statement of the Secretary General is justification for a favorable finding by the President. The Department, therefore, recommends that the President find that, as of September 15, 1949, other nations party to the United Nations agreement have met their obligations to the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees in a manner and to an extent warranting a further contribution of \$2,000,000 at this time by the United States Government, and that the President authorize the payment of a contribution of \$2,000,000 as an addition to the payments of \$13,377,930 previously made. A finding in respect to the balance of the authorized United States contribution will be requested later.⁴

⁴ Sent along with Mr. Webb's memorandum were "Four Contribution Charts," which are not found attached to the Department's record copy of the memorandum. Presumably the charts were copies of those transmitted with Secretary-General Lie's letter of October 13. These comprised: (1) a recapitulation of donations by governments other than the United States for relief of Palestinian refugees (\$15,759,745 as of September 30); (2) donations in cash and kind to the UNRPR fund made by each of 27 countries, other than the United States, as of September 15. The British contribution of \$4,032,258 was the largest in this category; (3) expenditures totaling \$5,698,283 for direct care of refugees and local services by Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq, as of August 31. The Egyptian contribution of \$2,230,704 was the largest in this group; and (4) donations made by the United Kingdom, Eire, Denmark, and Sweden to the Red Cross and other voluntary organizations working with Near East refugees. As of September 15, these totaled \$595,000, the British donation of \$403,226 being the largest (501.MA Palestine/10-1549).

The Secretary of State, on November 17, authorized Ambassador Austin to inform Secretary-General Lie that "the President of the United States has considered the statement made by the Secretary General and has found that the extent to which other governments have met their obligations to the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees allows him to authorize the payment of \$2,000,000 as an additional United States contribution . . . [thus] raising the total United States' contribution to \$15,377,930." (instruction 358 to New York, 501.MA Palestine/10-1549)

867N.00/11-249 : Telegram

The Chargé in Jordan (Fritzlan) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

AMMAN, November 2, 1949—10 a.m.

390. In recent conversations with myself and other foreign representatives King Abdullah has openly expressed desire bring about permanent peace and conclude definitive treaty Jordan and Israel. Expressed view that without restraint UN and Arab League he could easily negotiate satisfactory treaty with Israel.

These expressions taken together with developments re future status Jerusalem, regarding which he and Israel have adopted equally intransigent positions, have doubtless been partly responsible for rumors King had undertaken secret negotiations with Israel looking to eventual settlement. Abdullah's Aqaba trip added fuel to fire by suggesting to minds of some that he had gone there to contact Israeli agents.

Such negotiations were officially denied two days ago. Seems improbable these rumors have substance in fact. Were Abdullah to begin negotiations would be most difficult keep them secret and by becoming known his precarious position among Palestinians, unwilling yet compromise belief UN resolutions re boundaries and refugees should be implemented, would be greatly prejudiced at time when he seeking their support constitutional annexation Arab Palestine to Jordan. Furthermore revelation such negotiations would cause cabinet crisis alienating Palestine members whose services King strongly desires retain order give government more representative complexion.

Sent Department 390; Department pass London 95, USUN 14, Tel Aviv 59. Pouch Arab capitals, Jerusalem.

FRETZLAN

501.BB Palestine (E)/11-249 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

LONDON, November 2, 1949—5 p. m.

4389. Wright last evening emphasized following points in informing Embassy officers that telegram embodying preliminary Foreign Office reactions to Department's draft resolution on Palestine (Deptel 3834 October 25¹) had been sent British Embassy Washington for discussion Department:

1. Foreign Office doubts efficacy substituting one man agent general for present PCC. Foreign Office realizes that Department's thinking at least in part conditioned by low esteem in which PCC held by Arabs and Israelis are result past efforts. However, Foreign Office feels this element is inherent in Palestine problem and that same loss of esteem would in time attach one man agent general now attaches PCC.

2. In addition to foregoing point, Foreign Office feels it would be undesirable raise question establishing new political machinery at this session GA. Wright recalled that when British recently suggested raising question incorporate Arab Palestine into Jordan at this session GA, Department felt it would be undesirable since it would probably raise whole question of political settlement. Wright recalled Foreign Office agreed with us at that time. It now foresees same difficulty if this new question is raised.

¹ This was a repeat of telegram 643 to Beirut, p. 1453.

3. Foreign Office feels it is important that NE states themselves would take responsibility for development, which should be done through their own local development boards rather than through UN body.

4. In accordance British policy keeping Soviets out of NE, Foreign Office apprehensive creation UN body such as NEDI might open door for Soviet infiltration.

DOUGLAS

501.BB Palestine (E) / 11-249 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Legation in Lebanon

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, November 2, 1949—7 p. m.

669. Esmis 29. [To Clapp.] Dept analyzes current situation re economic development and refugee problem NE as fol:

(1) PCC created ESM for purpose examining economic situation arising from recent NE hostilities and recommending (a) means of overcoming economic dislocations; (b) reintegrating refugees into economic life of area; and (c) creating economic conditions conducive to permanent peace.

(2) Dept fully appreciates practical difficulties and political complications which have confronted you and congratulates you on ESM's progress. It seems clear, however, that Israel is unwilling to consider repatriation of refugees except in limited numbers and only in context of final political settlement with Arab states. There seems no prospect of latter at present time. Arab states are unwilling, except in case of desert-poor Jordan, formally to consider extensive resettlement of refugees or to accept resettlement in return for international assistance for economic development. In other words existing impasse does not show signs of yielding to economic approach.

(3) Proof for this conclusion may be found in increasing emphasis which ESM has been forced to place on direct relief and work relief at expense of plans for long-range development.

(4) Dept does not believe present attitude Israel re repatriation, Arab states re resettlement is one on which UNGA or individual UN members including particularly US can base constructive future planning for development. ESM program drawn up principally in terms of relief and work relief with only passing reference to development will not in our view commend itself to GA, Congress, Parliament or any other legislature. GA would be confronted with necessity of voting for further voluntary contributions with no assurance of definite date of termination of relief or of integration of refugees into economic life of area. US, as one UN member, would be faced with difficult problem of requesting Congress for direct relief and work relief appropriation, possibly approximating sixteen million for 1949, without assurance of Israeli and Arab cooperation in permanent settlement

of refugee problem. Dept cannot approach Congress on this basis.

(5) Dept is accordingly of opinion ESM, subsequently backed by US, UK, France, Turkey and other like minded UN members, shld embark on course of action outlined below. Altho concessions shld be made insofar as possible to sensibilities both parties in matters of form, recommendations shld be directed to solution basic problems without being overly influenced by opposition expected; otherwise intransigence of both sides will only be encouraged.

(A) ESM shld inform GA of results of its investigations in NE and shld make complete set of recommendations to GA on basis ESM terms of reference, ESM's own experience in NE and such technical reports as are now available to ESM, particularly those relating to central Palestine, Jordan and Syria. ESM will then be in position of having outlined problem to GA on technical economic grounds only and not based on any political factor. Recommendations may well include such matters as resumption trade, flow of oil, repatriation and resettlement, which will give this Govt basis for future diplomatic approaches on these questions.

(B) It will thereafter be possible for GA to study report and to determine what action it will recommend to Israel and Arab states and other UN members on economic grounds.

(C) Individual UN members will then have full opportunity of considering Israeli and Arab reactions to ESM report and of deciding what assistance they may be able to extend. US, UK, France and Turkey wld be able more realistically to formulate their concept of NEDA and whether it shld be advanced during or after GA.

(D) US wld have before it balanced ESM report, GA debate, Israeli and Arab reactions and UN recommendations on which constructive relief and long-range development plan cld be projected for presentation to Congress.

(6) Dept believes GA might establish organizational structure along fol lines:

(a) UN agent to have coordinating responsibility for various UN activities relating to Palestine including conciliation, relief, and economic planning and development. Latter to be carried out by agency suggested in (d) below.

(b) PCC to continue conciliation.

(c) UNRPR to continue relief.

(d) Agency to be established for economic planning and development (NEDA).

Realize you may not wish make direct proposal concerning conciliation machinery, but your recommendation cld be based on assumption of need for continuing UN conciliation activities.

Foregoing has merit of keeping all activities within UN framework and at same time of maintaining flexibility under SYG for independent or concerted action of component agencies. ESM report wld not stress connection between political and economic activities.

(7) Cordier and Bunche, with whom McGhee has discussed current Palestine situation in general terms, agree ESM and subsequently UN shld take decisive action on basic issues at this time along lines suggested.

Dept wld appreciate ESM views soonest.¹

ACHESON

¹ This telegram was repeated to London, Paris, Ankara, and New York, the last for the American Delegation to the Palestine Conciliation Commission.

Mr. Sheringham advised on November 7, that the Foreign Office was in substantial agreement with the Department's thinking as revealed in this telegram and that remaining differences were tactical and readily resolvable. The Foreign Office still had reservations concerning the UN Agent (see paragraph 6a and London's telegram 4389, November 2, p. 1462) and was of the opinion that the establishment of NEDA should be postponed until after the current session of the General Assembly in order to gauge the reactions of the General Assembly and the Middle East countries (telegram 4459, November 7, 4 p. m., from London, 501.BB Palestine (E)/11-749).

501.BB Palestine/11-349

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Wells Stabler of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs*¹

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] November 3, 1949.

Participants: Mr. Boisanger, French Representative, PCC
 Mr. Yalcin, Turkish Representative, PCC
 Dr. Azcarate, Principal Secretary, PCC
 Mr. de la Tour du Pin, French Advisor
 Mr. Benard, First Secretary, French Embassy
 Mr. Esenbel, First Secretary, Turkish Embassy
 NEA—Mr. McGhee
 UNA—Mr. Sandifer
 UNP—Mr. Bancroft
 Mr. Halderman
 ANE—Mr. Berry
 Mr. Mattison
 Mr. Wilkins
 Mr. Rockwell
 Mr. Stabler

Problem: To discuss with the French and Turkish Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission the present and future situation in connection with the Palestine problem.

Action Required: None

Action Assigned to: ANE

¹ Initialed by Mr. McGhee.

Discussion: Mr. McGhee welcomed the members of the Commission and said that he was glad to have the opportunity to exchange views with them concerning present and future developments with respect to Palestine.

Mr. Boisanger said that the principal matter of concern to the Commission was the Israeli note of October 27 and felt that the Commission should make an unequivocal reply to that note refuting the assertions made by Israel. He mentioned that the Commission had received a telegram today from the United Nations Press Representative in Jerusalem indicating that the Israeli Government had stated that the note did not mean that Israel refused further negotiations with the Commission. However, it was necessary for the Commission to make a definite reply in order that there should be no misunderstanding. Mr. McGhee said he agreed with this point of view.

Mr. McGhee then suggested it was desirable that the Commission should make continued efforts to urge the parties to undertake direct talks. He understood that the American representatives on the Commission had themselves urged these direct talks and assumed the Commission as a whole believed that such talks would be desirable. Mr. Boisanger said that he agreed that direct talks were desirable but pointed out that while the Commission should insist on direct talks, there was nothing in the December 11 Resolution which obliged the parties to undertake such talks. He felt that the Arabs because of their previous firm stand would be unwilling to enter into direct talks. He also pointed out that previous experience indicated that when the Arabs and Israelis did get together for direct talks they were not successful. Mr. Bunche and Mr. Vigier had stated that from their experience it was always necessary for a third party to be present. However, both Mr. Boisanger and Mr. Yalcin agreed that it would be most desirable to urge the parties to meet together with the Commission and the Commission intended to pursue its efforts in this connection.

Mr. McGhee said that we fully understood the difficulties involved but felt that every effort should be made along these lines.

Mr. Boisanger then referred to the statement made by the Arabs that they felt conciliation had failed and therefore wished the Commission to undertake mediation. The Commission proposed to inform the Israelis of this view and to ask whether Israel would agree to mediation. He indicated that Israel feared that the Commission might produce a new plan which might deprive them of territory which they now held. However, he believed that it was desirable to establish at least the principle of mediation and he felt that Israel, if it refused mediation in principle would be placed in a very bad moral position with respect to the United Nations. Mr. Boisanger considered that there were a number of points on which mediation could take place

without at the outset going into the more difficult questions. Mr. Yalcin wondered whether the United States Government would have the patience to bear with the mediation since this course of action would undoubtedly take a very long time.

Mr. McGhee said that he agreed that the Commission should inform the Israelis of the Arab desire for mediation and also felt that if Israel refused, it would place itself in a bad light. He suggested that there were a number of smaller matters which could be dealt with through mediation and suggested that the question of Mount Scopus might be one of them.

Mr. Sandifer indicated his belief that the Commission could undertake the mediation functions in that the Commission was empowered to conciliate which was a broader concept than mediation. It was pointed out that under the General Assembly Resolution of December 11, 1948 the Palestine Conciliation Commission had, in any event, inherited Count Bernadotte's mediation functions under the General Assembly Resolution of May 14, 1948.

Mr. McGhee then explained briefly our views on the proposed organization of United Nations functions with respect to the Palestine case and indicated our belief that it was desirable to have a United Nations coordinating agent who could ensure that the three operating groups, PCC, UNRPR, and NEDA were functioning in unison. Since all the questions involved in the Palestine problem are inter-related, it is desirable that the three groups be coordinated. Mr. McGhee emphasized that these plans are entirely tentative.

Mr. Boisanger said that he was in general agreement with the proposed organization but felt it very important that in the General Assembly no substantive questions be raised. In this connection, he felt that the PCC should remain as it is in order that its terms of reference under the December 11 Resolution would remain the same. With respect to NEDA he said that he was worried by the possibility that Russia could join the organization. Mr. Yalcin expressed the same concern. It was explained that NEDA would be formed by the participating governments and additional membership could be limited by those governments. It could be assumed, therefore, that the Governments concerned would not permit Russia to join. Mr. Yalcin pointed out that if the PCC consisted of representatives of Governments, it would not be possible for the United Nations Coordinating Agent to instruct the PCC on political matters.

Mr. McGhee said that we agreed that it was desirable to limit the debate in the General Assembly to procedural matters if possible and we felt that the proposed resolution on organization could confine the debate.

Mr. McGhee then said that we were considerably worried by the lack of security in the PCC and we had been embarrassed by the fact that everytime the United States representative made a statement, it was made available to the press. He felt that the Commission should address itself to this problem and if necessary could obtain a completely new staff. Mr. Yalcin emphasized that in any case this lack of security could not be attributed to Dr. Azcarate, Principal Secretary of the Commission. Mr. McGhee responded that he was not accusing anybody but he felt it was a matter to be dealt with.

The discussion then turned to the question of Jerusalem. Mr. McGhee informed Messrs. Boisanger and Yalcin that the United States gave its general support to the PCC proposals for an international regime in Jerusalem. However, we realized that amendments would be offered and we would be prepared to consider them in the light of their individual merits in contributing to the workability and acceptability of the plan. Mr. Boisanger and Mr. Yalcin expressed agreement with this point of view and said their delegations in New York shared the same view. Mr. Boisanger expressed the hope that it would be possible for the United States, French and Turkish delegations in New York to meet prior to the General Assembly consideration of the various Palestine problems in order to coordinate their action. Mr. McGhee said he thought this would be useful.

Mr. Boisanger hoped that it would be possible to enlist the assistance of the Chairman of Committee I in confining the discussion in Committee I to consideration of such procedural resolutions which may be presented. He expressed the view that the resolutions should not be too detailed. He said that all delegates, of course, would have to be heard but that after they made their speeches he hoped it would be possible for the Chairman of the Committee to channel further debate into consideration of the resolutions.

867N.00/11-449: Telegram

The Chargé in Jordan (Fritzlan) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

AMMAN, November 4, 1949—1 p. m.

391. RefLegtel 390¹ and Jerusalem Contel 639² re likelihood direct negotiations between King Abdullah and Israel.

Discussed question with Kirkbride who stated categorically he did not leave King's side during recent Aqaba trip and impossible King

¹ Dated November 2, p. 1461.

² Dated November 2, not printed; it advised of information that King Abdullah had established direct communication with Israel and had inquired whether Israel was prepared for a "reasonable" settlement and that Mr. Sassoon was anxious to start negotiations (790D.90G/11-249).

contacted any Israeli agent. Kirkbride states emphatically he has no reason believe King has established or intends in near future establish direct contact negotiations Israelis with view to permanent settlement.

Kirkbride agrees with me however unpredictable King may be, he fully realizes such negotiations this juncture and their revelation would be grave political blunders costing support those Palestinians now backing him who have fresh in mind unpalatable results negotiations King and Israel last winter. It doubtful King yet prepared openly abandon existing solidarity with Arab states re dealings with Israel.

Comment: Rumors direct negotiations still rife here. Doubtless based on King's oft-repeated statement re desirability early settlement. However, there is often important difference between King's expression his desires and intentions and actions actually willing undertake implement them. Most improbable King would undertake such negotiations without apprising Prime Minister.

Pouched Arab capitals, Jerusalem.

Sent Department 391, Department pass London 96, USUN 15, Tel Aviv 60.

FRTZLAN

501.BB Palestine (E)/11-549: Telegram

The Minister in Lebanon (Pinkerton) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

BEIRUT, November 5, 1949—noon.

588. Simes 28. Reference Esmis 29, November 2. Clapp conscious desirability taking firm line with Arab states and appreciated Department's full cable under reply. All concerned here hope that text interim report, which will be in your hands within a week, will go far to clarify remaining points where local appreciation of issues differs from Department's and leads to misunderstanding. ESM interim has been so drafted, in opinion of all deputies, that its recommendation regarding organization will not embarrass national delegates to GA. ESM cannot, however, subscribe to organizational planning set forth in reftel. *Inter alia* Clapp cannot and will not recommend any US contributions to relief or works if UNRPR or any organization under SYG to handle program.

Reference paragraph 1 reftel, interim and final reports read together will be fully responsive to terms reference as outlined insofar as anything can be fully responsive to terms of reference at this stage.

Department is incorrect in assumption paragraph 3 reftel. Plans for long term development of scope and nature envisaged before Clapp left US, including those involving international river development,

could yet be brought to stage where funds need be sought until engineering and related inquiries requiring two years time have been completed. However, works programs now to be recommended represent beginnings of such development in locations where international issues are not involved. Term works relief as used ESM would not be confused therefore with home industries in camps etc. as proposed by UNRPR.

Reference paragraph 4, believe that approach of ESM is "pleable" to legislatures as it will recommend conclusion of relief within 18 months time. Thereafter financing of development might be considered, taking into account then political factors. ESM remains convinced that modest beginnings development under relief financing are essential prelude to such long term activity. The basic question here is whether US considers it essential to have a part in the Near East. If so, the US cannot turn its back on a situation it is judged to be partly responsible for.

Reference paragraph 5, Clapp agrees but points out importance giving full consideration to weakness and internal difficulties local governments.

Reference paragraph 5a, please see *supra*. Existing technical data inadequate for purposes considered by Department. Other items 5a and 5b must await final report.

Reference paragraph 6, regret unable cable all data leading Clapp to differ from Department's views on economic organization. Gardiner will be able explain on arrival in Washington next week.

Sent Department 588, Department pass London 18, Paris 22, Ankara 18.

PINKERTON

Editorial Note

In a letter of November 5 to President Truman, King Abdullah of the Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan stated that he had provided instructions to Fawzi el-Mulki, the Jordanian Minister of Defense who dealt with the Palestine question before the Palestine Conciliation Commission, concerning issues which threatened Jordan's existence. He asked President Truman to exercise judgment with respect to the demands of Israel and the Arabs and to put restraints on the party whose demands were beyond the range of possibility. King Abdullah noted that he continued to have confidence in and rely upon President Truman's message of March 28 (see page 878), and that he hoped for an opportunity to meet the President. (867N.01/12-149)

With respect to the presentation of King Abdullah's communication to the Department of State in December, see Mr. Hare's memorandum of December 1, p. 1515.

867N.00/11-549 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Legation in Jordan

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, November 5, 1949—5 p. m.

198. Senator, Vice President Hebrew University, accompanied by Amb Elath, again called on McGhee Nov 2¹ to discuss Scopus situation and urge US intervention with Abdullah to carry out armistice terms and permit free access to Scopus. Elath stated Israel Govt now prepared make certain concessions to Jordan to demonstrate desire reach agreement this point and that Israeli UN Rep wld so inform SYG.

McGhee reiterated our sympathetic attitude toward Senator's objectives re resumption activities cultural and humanitarian institutions Scopus and suggested good use might be made of MAC for resolving Scopus question. MAC consists of Israeli and Jordan reps and was set up and is now functioning for questions of this kind. Furthermore submission to MAC would probably in long run be more effective than third country approach.

Pls inform FonOff re foregoing. Re Scopus, we hope Jordan Govt will be mindful of great interest in this country and elsewhere in functioning of humanitarian and cultural institutions and that it will continue approach problem in spirit of determination to resolve present impasse.²

ACHESON

¹The first visit by David W. Senator had taken place on September 26; Mr. Wilkins' memorandum of conversation of that date not printed (867N.00/9-2649)

²This telegram was repeated to Jerusalem as No. 408 and to Tel Aviv. Simultaneously, the Department sent its first two paragraphs to Tel Aviv in telegram 705, in which it instructed Ambassador McDonald to "discuss matter with FonOff and referring Dept's proposal (Deptel 375 June 17) suggest MAC wld appear most appropriate medium through which Scopus and other question[s] this nature cld be resolved." No. 705 was repeated to Jerusalem and Amman. The Department, at the same time, directed Jerusalem, in telegram 406, to inform General Riley in confidence of the substance of Nos. 198 and 705. Telegrams 198, 705, and 406 bear identical file numbers.

501.BB Palestine (E)/11-549 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

NEW YORK, November 5, 1949—6:28 p. m.

1317. For Tomlinson,¹ UNE. Cordier today received cable from Clapp saying that he was omitting from his interim report all reference to technical assistance in the Near East so that it would deal exclusively with continuing relief assistance and work relief. There

¹John D. Tomlinson, Advisor to the Office of United Nations Economic and Social Affairs.

would thus be no mention of the need for, nor possible machinery and general outlines of plans for, economic development. Clapp also said that it would not be possible for him to come to Lake Success in November, stating he could answer questions by cable. He said that Gardiner was qualified to express his views on all ESM matters.

Cordier today replied to Clapp that it was most important that he come to Lake Success to discuss ESM report with PCC, Secretariat and GA delegates. Pointed out it would not be possible or appropriate for a non-UN staff member to explain to other delegates the views of the ESM. Cordier believes it most important that Clapp should be in New York to assist in holding the Palestine debate within bounds.²

Secretariat also objected to omission from interim report of any indication of need for long-range economic development. He told Clapp it was most important that Assembly should approve the principles and broad program for TA and development in the NE. Unless this were done, all such programs would be purely national actions and would probably lead to more political difficulties in the area. Cordier argued that it was most important that development program should have GA approval in principle. Cordier did not state to Clapp, but he and Lie believe, that unless member governments are given assurance that some long-range UN economic planning is afoot UN members will be reluctant to contribute to continued relief program.

AUSTIN

² Mr. Clapp, on November 11, informed Mr. McGhee that he did not plan to return for the meeting of the General Assembly (telegram 594, identified also as Simes 29, from Beirut, 501.BB Palestine (E)/11-1149).

Editorial Note

The *First Interim Report of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East* was signed at Beirut on November 6 by Messrs. Clapp, Gokcen, Labonne, and Morton. It was transmitted to Secretary-General Lie by Hussein C. Yalcin, Chairman of the Palestine Conciliation Commission, in a letter of November 16. The letter stated that "The Conciliation Commission considers that this report constitutes a constructive approach to the Palestine refugee problem and believes that the General Assembly will wish to give urgent consideration to it. The Commission is of the opinion that the Assembly will wish to obtain additional information concerning certain of the findings and recommendations contained in the report. In this connexion, in the light of the arrangements made by the Secretary-General with the International Red Cross organizations and the American Friends Service Committee, particular reference is made to the recommenda-

tion that the number of rations issued should be reduced by one-third as of 1 January 1950."

The Interim Report commenced with a table of contents, a foreword, and a discussion of "The Problem" and of the establishment, functions, etc., of the Mission. Then followed sections on interim findings and recommendations, which read as follows:

"INTERIM FINDINGS

As a result of the Mission's studies, discussions with Governments and investigations in the field, the Mission finds that:

1. The refugees themselves are the most serious manifestation of 'economic dislocation' created by the Arab-Israeli hostilities. The refugees represent about 7 per cent of the population in the countries in which they have sought refuge. About 65 per cent of the refugees fled to Arab Palestine and Gaza, almost doubling the population. Resolution of the demoralizing, unproductive and costly problem of the refugees is the most immediate requirement 'conducive to the maintenance of peace and stability in the area.'

2. The continuing political stalemate in the relations between the Arab countries and Israel precludes any early solution of the refugee problem by means of repatriation or large scale resettlement.

3. The relief supplied by the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees (UNRPR), the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), the World Health Organization (WHO), and the many local and foreign voluntary agencies of charity operating in the Near East has averted a worse calamity. Were all direct relief to be cut off now, many refugees would face a winter of disease and starvation. Were charity alone to be provided for another year, it would be more difficult and costly to take constructive measures later. Nevertheless, the extent of direct relief provided through United Nations funds should be stringently cut within the next two months. There is no doubt that, however commendable it may be to extend international charity to the needy, rations greatly in excess of the number justifiable within the original intentions of the General Assembly of the United Nations have been and are being issued.

4. Work in place of relief cannot be provided immediately for all. One thing, however, is clear. Rather than remain objects of charity, the refugees who are idle must have an opportunity to go to work where they are now; work which would increase the productive capacity of the countries in which they have found refuge. Until such work has been found, those refugees who are idle must remain a burden upon others, the United Nations, charitable societies supported by voluntary contributions, or the countries in which the refugees now find themselves.

5. Useful, gainful employment can, however, be found for all the refugees able and willing to work. There are many potential opportunities for useful and productive work to improve and reclaim the land, increase the supply and use of water, strengthen and extend road systems and improve sanitation and shelter. Suitable employment for the refugees can be provided in many places, especially in Arab Pales-

tine and Jordan, where nearly half the refugees are located (see appendix C).

6. This and other similar work could begin as soon as funds can be found to finance it. But the resources of the Arab countries sheltering most of the refugees are inadequate to cope unaided with the present cost of emergency relief alone, much less to finance the cost of putting the refugees to work. Money for this purpose must be found from outside sources.

7. The inability of the refugees rapidly to find for themselves gainful employment in the Arab countries is but a symptom of the need for development of the unused resources of the Near East, where lack of available capital is responsible for much idle manpower. This is a task for the Near Eastern Governments to do in their own way, and in due course, with the help of competent counsel and substantial financial credits.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In the light of these findings, the Economic Survey Mission makes the following recommendations, which are explained later in the report.

1. The emergency relief for refugees made possible by voluntary contributions from Member Governments of the United Nations should be continued through the winter months, and until 1 April 1950, under the present UNRPR system; the present minimum ration should not be reduced, but the number of rations issued should be reduced by 1 January 1950 from the present rate of 940,000 to 652,000 (for an analysis of the number eligible for relief, see appendix B). This would cost 5,500,000 dollars for the three months beginning 1 January 1950. Thereafter, further reductions should take place as men become employed in gainful labour and thus become ineligible for direct relief.

2. A programme of public works, calculated to improve the productivity of the area, and such continuing relief as will be needed should be organized as an integrated operation, in co-operation with the Governments of the countries where the refugees are located. This programme should be planned and arrangements negotiated with the appropriate Near Eastern Governments to begin 1 April 1950.

No more rations should be supplied by the United Nations after 31 December 1950, unless otherwise ordered by the United Nations at the fifth session of the General Assembly, at which Near Eastern Governments concerned would have an opportunity to present appropriate proposals.

Meanwhile, the agency handling direct relief on behalf of the United Nations should be empowered to negotiate with Near Eastern Governments for the latter to take over as soon as possible, and at latest by 31 December 1950, responsibility for the maintenance of such refugees as may remain within their territories.

This programme for the nine months from April through December 1950 would require 27 million dollars, which sum would include such relief as might be needed.

The United Nations should be prepared to continue the works programme until 30 June 1951 (subject to review at the fifth session of the General Assembly).

The works programme for the six months of 1951 would require 21,200,000 dollars.

Of the total of 53,700,000 dollars for the cost of relief and works projects for the eighteen months' programme, the Mission estimates that approximately 25 percent, or 13,300,000 dollars, represents the cost of the necessary work materials, tools and equipment. The Mission considers that a considerable proportion of this sum, perhaps up to one half in certain cases, might be supplied by Governments of the countries in which the refugees are now concentrated.

This would reduce the amount required from outside sources for eighteen months from 1 January 1950 for a programme of relief and public works to approximately 48 million dollars, or an average of 2,700,000 dollars per month. This is the same as the present monthly rate of expenditure by the United Nations upon direct relief alone* (see appendix A).

3. An agency should be established to organize and, on or after 1 April 1950, direct, the programmes of relief and public works herein recommended. As a minimum requirement to the successful implementation of the relief and works programmes, the Economic Survey Mission urges that:

(a) Subject to rendering such reports of its activities and accounting for its expenditure to the General Assembly of the United Nations as may be required of it and within the policies established in its terms of reference, the agency should have full autonomy and authority to make decisions within the sphere of activities entrusted to it, including the selection of its subordinate staff and the administration of funds made available to it.

(b) The agency should be located in the Near East.

(c) The personnel and assets of the UNRPR should be turned over to the new agency on 1 April 1950, or as soon thereafter as possible, in order that the functions of direct relief may be directed by the new agency in appropriate relation to the works programme.

(d) The agency should be authorized to take counsel with such Near Eastern Governments as may so desire, concerning measures to be taken by such Governments in preparation for the time when United Nations funds for relief and works projects shall no longer be available."

The Interim Report concluded with sections entitled "Guiding Policies for Administration of Proposed Programme," "Discussion of Findings and Recommendations," and "Prospects for Employment" and four appendices entitled "Cost of Programme," "Analysis of Refugees and Relief Recipients," "Illustrative Outline of Works

*Should the United Nations decide to bring about a gradual reduction from 940,000 rations per day to 652,000 on 1 April 1950, through monthly reductions of 100,000, beginning on 1 February 1950, the cost of the alteration in schedule would amount to 1,200,000 dollars. If the United Nations should prefer to maintain the present rate of 940,000 rations per day, except as affected by work relief, throughout the calendar year 1950 and thus provide charity to many thousands who are not refugees, the cost of this alteration in schedule would amount to 7 million dollars. [Footnote in the source text.]

Projects," and "Terms of Reference of the Economic Survey Mission" (GA, 4th sess., *Ad Hoc Political Committee, Annex*, volume I, pages 16-29).

501.BB Palestine (E)/11-949

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Second Secretary of the Embassy in the United Kingdom (Root)

SECRET

[LONDON,] November 9, 1949.

Subject: The Interim Report of the Economic Survey Mission (ESM) to the Near East.

Participants: Mr. Arthur Z. Gardiner, Department of State
 Mr. John F. Root, American Embassy, London
 Mr. M. R. Wright, Assistant Under-Secretary of State, Foreign Office
 Mr. Bernard Burrows, Head, Eastern Department, Foreign Office
 Mr. J. G. T. Sheringham, Eastern Department, Foreign Office
 Mr. Trefor Evans, Middle East Secretariat, Foreign Office
 Mr. E. B. Boothby, Head, Refugee Department, Foreign Office
 Mr. C. J. Edmonds, UK Representative, IRO
 Hon. H. A. A. Hankey, Assistant, Personnel Department, Foreign Office
 Miss Barbara Salt, Assistant, United Nations (Economic and Social) Department, Foreign Office

Note: Second conversation of two between Mr. Gardiner and Foreign Office officials.¹

Mr. Wright said he and his colleagues were glad for the opportunity to have this preliminary discussion with Mr. Gardiner and to learn of the ESM thinking at first hand. He noted that any decisions of conclusions with respect to the ESM proposals would await his forthcoming talks in Washington.²

Mr. Gardiner then offered to give the group some of the background to ESM's work. He said there had been two particular sets of problems. The first was a question of engineering opinion. There had been a certain divergence between the views of the TVA engineers and the British experts. The British contemplated a series of headworks in the Jordan area which would distribute, but not increase, the supply

¹ The first conversation took place the previous day; Mr. Root's memorandum of the earlier conversation is not printed.

² For documentation on these talks, see pp. 186 ff.

of water. Our experts felt that it would be more advantageous both from the point of view of costs and of results to undertake works which would increase the supply of water as well as bring it to the areas where it was most needed. They were sure that for a reasonable outlay a dam could be built at Wadi Zerqa and that in an integrated irrigation and development project at Wadi Zerqa some five thousand farm families, representing twenty-five to thirty thousand people, could be employed. The TVA experts have had extensive experience in the technique of building dams on limestone foundations and are convinced that one can be built satisfactorily at Wadi Zerqa so that no leakage will result. They were thinking in terms of a dam thirty-five meters high and so constructed as to allow for later expansion if necessary. These observations, Mr. Gardiner said, represented the best professional opinion available, and the TVA experts were ready to guarantee that the project outlined could be carried out successfully. Sir Desmond Morton himself was in accord with the American view. Mr. Gardiner added that in all probability TVA technicians could be obtained to assist in carrying out the Wadi Zerqa project.

Mr. Wright said that he would like to make his own position clear, in view of the fact that there seemed to have arisen some misunderstanding. He felt that the best advice should be taken and the best work decided upon. He wanted to emphasize this point and to repeat that the Foreign Office had no axes to grind. Mr. Gardiner replied that it seemed to be merely a case of doctors disagreeing.

The second big problem to which ESM had to apply itself had to do with the question of how to organize for the future. In deference to the views of the Department and the Foreign Office, ESM had cut a great deal out of the preliminary drafts of the interim report and had left the matter of long-term development in terms as general as possible. Clapp was determined not to recommend a nickel for relief or work relief under UNRPR or for that matter under any organization of the UN secretariat. It was simply too difficult to have a business-like operation. The ESM itself had had sufficient difficulties on that score. Clapp wanted a group of thirty-five and got eighty-four, and it was difficult to keep track of just what this entire number was doing or what purpose they served. It was disconcerting to have a meeting one day and find a report on the meeting in the *Palestine Post* the next. Clapp had a phrase for the undesirables in the ESM secretariat: "incompetent saboteurs."

ESM had in mind an agency composed of the principal contributing countries, responsive to the GA but independent and autonomous in carrying out the program of relief and work relief. ESM felt it could put to work large numbers of people within eight to ten months' time. The two principal projects recommended (Wadi Zerqa and Wadi

Quilt) would account for some 8,000 man-hours of work spread over eighteen months. Altogether ESM hoped to provide employment for 60,000 to 70,000 "breadwinners" through the work-relief projects.

[Here follow two paragraphs of technical discussion on the refugee question.]

Mr. Wright remarked that the presentation in the report was first class. He thought it was extremely encouraging that the Foreign Office, the Department and ESM seemed to be in fairly close agreement on their ideas. There were, of course, certain points in connection with the report which would have to be explored at some length in Washington. It might be useful, however, at this time, to discuss one or two of these points.

Mr. Burrows expressed concern over the political impact the cut in rations might have on the refugees themselves and on the authorities in the Arab states. The interim report emphasized that the saving realized through the recommended cut in rations could be applied to the public works program. This was no doubt desirable but what consideration had ESM given to the political repercussions of the cut in rations? He felt that this was a danger point which might be seized upon by the Arabs and that the Arab leaders might be forced into a position where they were obliged to oppose the plan as a whole. Mr. Gardiner explained there were two considerations behind ESM thinking:

(1) It was incumbent on ESM to point out that a certain number of destitute persons were receiving relief. If it was the intention to provide relief for these destitute persons as well as the refugees, then this fact should be clearly recognized by the UN.

(2) The second point in ESM's thinking was that the measure would tend to put a burden on the Arab governments, leading them to come to us with more specific proposals for work relief and development. The idea was to put the Arab states in a position of wanting to start trading with us, to take the initiative in requesting ideas and funds for development. The ESM had considered the point carefully and had decided on this particular proposal with the foregoing ideas in mind.

[Here follow two paragraphs of technical discussion on the relief and work questions involving the refugees.]

Reverting to the cut in rations, Mr. Burrows asked whether the Arab governments were aware of this proposal. Mr. Gardiner replied he thought it would be news to them. Mr. Burrows asked whether it wouldn't be desirable to prepare the Arab governments in advance. There was a danger that comment following announcement of the cut might develop in such an unfavorable way as to put the governments in an extremely difficult position and prevent them from dealing rationally with the whole report. Mr. Gardiner reminded the group that

the proposals primarily concerned only three countries—Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. Mr. Gardiner thought there would be no particular trouble with Jordan and the Lebanon. Syria would be a somewhat uncertain factor until after the elections. Our Embassy in Egypt was concerned about Egypt's reception of the proposals and Mr. Gardiner agreed that the report had little to offer in the Gaza strip.

There was a general discussion of the means by which the Arab countries might be forewarned of the ESM proposals, whether through the ESM, the PCC or our diplomatic missions. It was recognized that the report contained a certain amount of unpalatable medicine for all parties concerned, not only the Arabs, but that there was no way to avoid this entirely. It was agreed that the preparatory work which might be done among the Arab governments to avoid adverse reaction and insure a proper reception for the proposals should be carefully considered and that it was definitely a point to be taken up in the Washington talks. Mr. Burrows suggested that possibly our governments might refer in general terms to the fact that the report would soon be taken up by the GA, that while we were not familiar with the contents of the report, it was likely to contain certain unpalatable things for the respective countries concerned and that we hoped the governments as well as the press of these countries would weigh very carefully the ESM proposals in the light of the objectives we all desired. Mr. Sheringham brought up the threat to public security in the camps and elsewhere among the refugees that might result from the announcement of the cut in rations. He feared there might be riots and demonstrations and thought it might be only fair to warn the countries concerned in advance of these dangers. Mr. Boothby mentioned the possibility that the Arabs might marshal a move against the whole report in the GA.

In answer to a question about the future plans of Clapp and Morton, Mr. Gardiner explained that when the final touches had been put on the interim report, they planned to go to Tel Aviv. They intended subsequently to go to Syria but were postponing their visit until after the elections. Eventually they will make another complete circle of the Near East countries involved and will draw up another report, which will place the emphasis on future economic development. For this report they will draw heavily on the advice of their financial and economic experts.

Mr. Burrows noted the absence in the report of any statement on the numbers of refugees to be repatriated to Israel. Mr. Gardiner replied that ESM had purposely avoided this subject. He said there would be plenty of opportunity at the GA to refer to the December 11 Resolution. The facts seemed to be that Israel was going to take back very few refugees, but there was no point in saying so now or to give

the Arabs' hand away. It was, however, hard for him to see how Israel was going to take care of its own immigrants, let alone receive any large number of Arabs.

There was a general discussion on how the agency administering relief and work relief might be related to the UN. The British felt this point was especially important in view of the fact that the short-term agency might eventually develop into the group coordinating long-term developments. The British feeling was that the agency should be independent of the UN. It might be authorized and blessed by the UN and it might, as do other autonomous international organizations, report on its activities and submit its accounts to the GA. But it should not be controlled by the UN.

Mr. Gardiner said the State Department was determined that the agency would somehow have to be established within the "UN framework"—in other words, sponsored by and responsive to the GA. At the same time we were determined that it should be a business-like operation. He said the formula for its relationship to the UN remains to be worked out.

Mr. Gardiner remarked that the State Department will do its best to get our share of funds from Congress, but we certainly were not going to carry the burden alone. To get funds from Congress, there would have to be some assurances of substantial contributions from other countries. He did not know what these would be. Possibly if we subscribed half, we might expect a fifth or more from the UK. Mr. Burrows noted that this would mean a British contribution for the eighteen months at a yearly rate of \$6,000,000. Mr. Gardiner said that we also expected to get something from the French and of course something in the way of local contributions from the countries where the projects were being carried out. There would also be certain amounts available from such international organizations as UNICEF.

Mr. Burrows noted that the view seemed to be gaining ground that the agency would not be a body possessing funds for development but a group of advisers engaged in drawing up and recommending projects and in seeking money for their implementation. Mr. Gardiner said that that was our view. We were certainly not going to turn over our check book to anybody. We had in mind that the agency would have full access to such lending organizations as the Export-Import Bank, and we expected the contributors of funds to examine the record of the agency's deliberations before advancing money for a project. He reiterated that while we were concerned with somehow working "within the framework of the UN," we certainly wanted a business-like operation. We intended to "sit across the table" from the beneficiary countries, as it were.

Mr. Boothby remarked that the agency would gain no prestige for being tied to the UN, and Mr. Wright added that from their point of view any connection with the UN did not facilitate getting funds from the British Government. Mr. Gardiner said the answer remained to be seen. He emphasized Clapp's statement that he cannot and will not recommend any US contributions to relief or public works if UNRPR or any organization under the UN secretariat is to handle the program.

Mr. Wright remarked that it was important that the UK contribution be in sterling and not in a hard currency and asked Mr. Gardiner what he thought the feeling in that respect would be. Mr. Gardiner felt that a sterling contribution would be possible, for there were relief and relief-work items, cement for example, that could be bought in the sterling area. He emphasized again that a UK contribution would help to sell the idea at home.

867N.00/11-1049 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

TEL AVIV, November 10, 1949—noon.

814. In hour's talk with Comay, Israeli Foreign Office, November 9 on general matters, Ford took occasion discuss substance Deptel 705, November 5.¹ Made specific reference June 20 *aide-mémoire* (Deptel 375, June 17) and suggested MAC seemed most appropriate medium for handling Scopus and other questions this nature. Comay was noncommittal other than to say Elath had sent similar information. He added, however, that McNeil of British Government had spoken to Eban in New York re possibility making "horse trade" on several items in Article VIII Israel-Transjordan armistice agreement. Comay said Israeli Government had authorized Eban to suggest that "if requested from right quarters" Israel would be prepared give Arabs free access to Bethlehem Road and provide electricity for Old City in exchange for free access to Scopus. Comay unwilling vouchsafe any explanation of British interest other than over-all one of "getting on with job" and also said no further steps appeared to have been taken following McNeil-Eban meeting. Comay stressed that his government, in suggesting such "deal" within Article VIII, did not intend thereby to establish precedent for handling other unsettled items that article or elsewhere in armistice agreement.

Comment: While Comay reiterated that his remarks were both "informal and unofficial", Ford gathered impression he hoped sug-

¹ See footnote 2, p. 1471.

gested "trade" would be broached by neutral source (British or US) to avoid automatic refusal should it come from either Arabs or Jews. *End Comment.*²

Sent Department 814; Department pass Jerusalem 94, Amman 59.

MCDONALD

² Chargé Fritzman, on November 10, advised that the Jordanian Foreign Minister and Acting Defense Minister were generally sympathetic to a return of cultural and humanitarian activities. The Foreign Minister indicated that, in return for access to Mt. Scopus, Israel must make a substantial concession which would contribute toward a resumption of normal living conditions in Jerusalem. Both Ministers were said to have viewed the matter as an appropriate one for consideration by the Mixed Armistice Commission (telegram 395 from Amman, 867N.00/11-1049).

890.00/11-949

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Lucius D. Battle, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State

SECRET

PARIS, November 11, 1949.

Participants: Secretary Acheson
 Foreign Minister Bevin
 Ambassador Douglas
 Mr. Barclay¹
 Mr. Battle

During a conversation with the Secretary this morning, Mr. Bevin raised several questions concerning the Near East. Mr. Bevin said that he was very worried over developments in the Near East. He mentioned the emergence of new groups and new ideas in the Arab world.

He said that it was difficult for him to continue to urge Iraq and Syria not to get together in a union, when the underlying forces in that area were so strong for Arab unity. He said that he feared that Russia might start a cry for Arab unity, which would make our position more difficult. He said that he felt that the unity movement, as it gained momentum, would spread rapidly through the area.

He expressed concern over the French insistence on the *status quo*, which the French based on the 1919 settlement. Mr. Bevin said that the British had no real hold over the people in the area. He said that the situation was quite difficult and he believed would become increasingly so.

He mentioned that he had asked Mr. Wright to discuss the problem with the Department of State in Washington. Continuing, Mr. Bevin said that if he spoke to the French regarding their insistence on *status quo*, it would be regarded as a revival of old British-French jealousies.

¹ Roderick E. Barclay, Private Secretary to Mr. Bevin.

He expressed the hope that the United States could look into the matter and see if it were possible for the United States to take it up with the French.

Mr. Bevin asked if the United States had been considering these problems. In reply Mr. Acheson assured Mr. Bevin that the United States was greatly interested in these problems and mentioned that Assistant Secretary McGhee was making every effort to evolve a new approach to the area. Mr. Acheson said that the United States would continue to study and discuss these problems with the British.

Mr. Bevin mentioned that he thought it possible that Pakistan would try to set itself up as a leader of Moslem groups in that area in an effort to strengthen Pakistan's position against Nehru.

Mr. Bevin mentioned that there appeared to be some difficulty in the proposed visit of the Prime Minister of Pakistan to Russia. Mr. Acheson mentioned the fact that the President had approved the idea of issuing an invitation to the Prime Minister of Pakistan to visit the United States, at a date to be set later. He said that the Government of Pakistan was being informed that Mr. Truman was agreeable to a visit from the Prime Minister and that if the Prime Minister indicated his willingness to accept, an invitation would subsequently be issued to him.

867N.01/11-1149

The Chargé in Jordan (Fritzlan) to the Secretary of State

SECRET AIR PRIORITY

AMMAN, November 11, 1949.

No. 140

Subject: King Abdullah's Terms for Permanent Settlement With Israelis

I have the honor to report that General Riley appeared in Amman yesterday and at his request I arranged a meeting between him and King Abdullah, at which I was present.

Through the medium of Samir Pasha Rifa'i, Minister of Court, the General and the King expressed themselves as follows on various phases of the Palestine question:

1. *Demarcation of Line in Jerusalem Area*

General Riley stated he hoped the King would appoint a Jordan member to the Special Committee of the Mixed Armistice Commission considering this problem in order that minor rectifications in the Arab-Jewish line in the Jerusalem Area could be effected. His Majesty expressed himself in favor of such a step and said he would consult Ragheb Pasha Nashishibi, Governor-General of Palestine, concerning it.

2. *Direct Negotiations With View to Permanent Settlement*

General Riley told King Abdullah that there was a strong and sincere feeling among responsible Jewish leaders (such as Ben-Gurion, Sharett and Eytan) that direct negotiations should be undertaken with the King or his representatives in order to effect permanent settlement of outstanding issues between the two countries. General Riley stated that the Israeli Government was prepared to open such negotiations on twenty-four hour notice. He added that he hoped he (the General) would be instrumental in helping bring about negotiations of this character as he believed the time was ripe for talks above the level of the Mixed Armistice Commission.

The King prefaced his reply by stating that he was beginning to feel that he had no obligation to the other Arab States in his dealings with Israel. His was the only Arab State which had any extensive border with Israel and he thought he should be free to decide when and how to negotiate with the Israelis. His Majesty continued by saying that he would begin direct negotiations with the Israelis immediately if the following points were accepted as the basis of a settlement:

a. He felt it absolutely essential that Jordan have an access to the Mediterranean and he had decided that it would be most appropriate if Jordan obtained a corridor through Beersheba to Gaza. He thought, in the interests of all, Jordan should replace Egypt at Gaza and he believed he could arrange this with the Egyptians as he had persuaded them to evacuate Bethlehem and Hebron.

b. The Arab quarters at present included in the Jewish part of Jerusalem should be returned to the Arabs. It was especially inconceivable that the Hebrew University and the Hadassah Hospital should continue to function where they did. Compensation for these two places would be considered at a time when the subject of compensation of refugees generally arose for discussion.

c. In return for Israeli concessions on the above points, the King would permit the Israelis to restore and operate the potash works at the northern end of the Dead Sea. He would guarantee free passage to and from the works via Jerusalem.

In reply to the King's statement, General Riley remarked that he thought His Majesty's demands unrealistic and excessive in view of existing circumstances. Something in the direction of the King's wishes might have been worked out eight months ago but at the present time the Israeli Government would never give serious consideration to such terms. The King replied that, in any case, such was his position and he could not enter into an agreement [*argument?*] concerning its merits. He said that if the Israelis listened to his proposals and accepted them, they would derive immeasurable benefits as he would guarantee peace for them from Gaza to Lake Tiberias.

Apropos of direct negotiations with the Israelis, the King remarked that recently the Lebanese Minister to Jordan had asked him if there was any foundation to rumors that he was negotiating directly with Israeli authorities stating that, if such were the case, Lebanon wished also to be included within the scope of the talks. General Riley laughingly observed that the Lebanese were hoping and praying that Jordan would begin such direct negotiations in order that they too could break the present deadlock. To this the King replied, "They wanted us to take the lead in war and now wish us to be the first to make peace."

3. *Entry of Christian Pilgrims into Arab Palestine from Jerusalem*

General Riley raised this question in view of the expected arrival of considerable numbers of Christian pilgrims desiring to visit Jerusalem and Bethlehem during the Holy Year, saying that he had heard the Jordan Government had decided to refuse entry of such persons coming by way of Israel. (See Legation's A-172, October 24, 1949.¹) The General added that if pilgrims were permitted to enter Arab Palestine, there would be no question of their having to return to Israel and that Jordan would probably benefit considerably from an economic standpoint.

The King readily agreed that pilgrims coming from Israel should be allowed entry into Arab Palestine, but he thought they should be carefully screened to keep out Jewish agents and communists. He promised to give appropriate instructions to the Prime Minister. Assuming the Prime Minister is amenable to this change of policy, it is likely that a *modus operandi* on this question can be worked out. The Legation will not fail to bring to the Department's attention developments in this regard.

Comments: The King was genuinely pleased to see General Riley whom he greeted most affectionately. The discussions were conducted throughout in a cordial manner and there were no recriminations.

Of course, there is not the least likelihood that the Israelis will listen to the King's terms for a permanent Palestine settlement and there can be little doubt that His Majesty is aware of this. He would like very much to liquidate the whole affair, which is proving very burdensome as regards maintenance of occupation troops in Arab Palestine, and devote his energies to consolidating his domain and restoring the economic life of the country. However, the King seems to feel that the Israelis are more anxious than he is to come to terms and, therefore, he need not be in a hurry to reveal the irreducible minimum of his demands. He certainly displays great caution, determined, doubtless, to make no terms which will not contain real advantage for his

¹ Not printed.

country. Failure to obtain such advantages as a result of any negotiations would, of course, at the present juncture be a grave political blunder seriously jeopardizing his position.²

A. DAVID FRITZLAN

² Chargé Fritzlan, on November 11, summarized his discussion with the British Minister, Sir Alec Kirkbride, concerning the question of the annexation of Arab Palestine to Jordan. He then commented: "From my observations at this post, I am strongly of the opinion that there is a considerable body of enlightened and progressive Palestinians who see in annexation of Arab Palestine to Jordan the only salvation for their country. They are willing to give a large measure of cooperation to the Jordan Government and there is reason to believe that the presence of Palestinians in the Government is acting as a check on the arbitrary rule of King Abdullah. Such Palestinians undoubtedly expect eventually that a constitutional monarchy in the true sense will be established in this country and that, through force of population and relative advance in most of the arts, they will be able to exercise dominating influence in a united country." (Despatch 141 from Amman, 867N.01/11-1149)

867N.01/11-1449

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] November 14, 1949.

Participants: U—Mr. Webb

NEA—Mr. McGhee

The Egyptian Ambassador

The Saudi Arabian Ambassador

The Minister of Jordan

The Minister of Lebanon

The Minister of Syria

The Chargé d'Affaires of Iraq

The Delegate of Yemen to the United Nations

The Secretary of the Yemenite Delegation to the
United Nations

ANE—Mr. Stabler

Problem: On the basis of the decision taken by the recent Arab League Council Meeting the diplomatic representatives of the Arab states were instructed to present a joint memorandum¹ to the United States Government requesting our intervention with Israel to implement the Protocol of May 12, 1949.

Action Required: To consider the position the Department should adopt on the joint memorandum.

Action Assigned to: ANE

Discussion: The Egyptian Ambassador, acting as spokesman for the Arab representatives, expressed appreciation at being received by the Acting Secretary. He said that at the recent Arab League Council

¹ *Infra.*

Meeting the member states had considered the Palestine situation and had instructed their diplomatic representatives in Washington to present a joint memorandum to the United States Government bearing on certain aspects of the Palestine question. The Ambassador stated that the Arabs are greatly concerned, as is the United States, about the situation in Palestine. The Arab states have cooperated both with the United States and United Nations and have accepted their advice on a number of matters. They have also acquiesced in certain other matters on which the United States and United Nations have insisted. In keeping with this policy of cooperation the Arab states represented at Lausanne had agreed to sign the Protocol of May 12, 1949.

The Arab states were much concerned by the fact that Israel had shown no signs of cooperation or good will and had in fact refused further collaboration with the Palestine Conciliation Commission. He also referred to the fact that Israel had incorporated Jaffa in Tel Aviv in violation of the United Nations. Israel had also refused to implement the May 12 Protocol. The Ambassador produced a map attached to the May 12 Protocol and pointed out that implementation of the Protocol by Israel would have solved not only the territorial but the refugee aspects of the Palestine problem. He indicated the numbers of refugees which the Arab states believed could be settled in the areas which would have been allocated to the Arabs through implementation of the Protocol. The Ambassador continued that the Arab states were entirely prepared to implement the May 12 Protocol and hoped the United States would use its influence with Israel to persuade the latter to act in a spirit of good faith and cooperation in proceeding with the implementation of the Protocol.

I thanked the Ambassador for the expression of views of the Arab Governments and for the memorandum which I said would be given careful consideration in the Department. I pointed out that it was the view of this Government that the United Nations and particularly the Palestine Conciliation Commission were the proper medium through which negotiations should be conducted. I also indicated that since this was a problem directly affecting the Arabs and Israelis, it was desirable that they should take the initiative in advancing towards a settlement. I also suggested that direct talks might also be employed. I emphasized that the United States would not advance any specific solution to either party, as the parties themselves must reach a mutually satisfactory agreement. Mr. McGhee said that this was quite true and stated that it emphasized that the United States was not in a position to urge specific proposals on either party. It was up to the parties themselves to take steps to reach an agreed settlement of the problem. I said that, of course, the United States stood entirely ready to assist the parties wherever possible in their desire to achieve peace.

The main objective of the United States, and I felt sure also that of the Arab states, was the restoration of peace.

The Egyptian Ambassador said that with reference to the question of direct talks, it was extremely difficult for the Arab states to contemplate such talks in view of the fact that Israel disregarded United Nations' decisions, had refused to work further with the Palestine Conciliation Commission and has constantly presented the world with *faits accomplis*.

The Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires then read a memorandum on instructions from his Government stating that while Iraq is in complete agreement with the other members of the Arab League, it is in a special position of not having participated in the talks of the Palestine Conciliation Commission at Lausanne. The Government of Iraq would, therefore, present in the near future a similar memorandum² except for amendments necessary by reason of its special position.

I again expressed appreciation for the views which had been presented and the meeting ended.

² Dated November 14, not printed.

501.BB Palestine/11-1449

The Diplomatic Representatives of Various Arab States in the United States to the Secretary of State

MEMORANDUM

The Diplomatic Representatives of Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Syria, and the Head of the Delegation of Yemen to the General Assembly of the United Nations, acting under instructions of their Governments, have the honour to submit to the Honourable the Secretary of State of the United States of America the following:

The Governments of Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen have been persistently opposed to any solution of the Palestine question that will not insure for the inhabitants of Palestine the exercise and enjoyment of their rights and the protection of their legitimate interests in keeping with the principles of the United Nations and the right of self-determination of peoples.

In supporting the rights of the Arabs of Palestine within the framework of these principles, the Arab Governments did not lose sight of the needs of international peace and security.

This is the reason why the Arab states were firmly opposed to the partition plan which was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on November 29, 1947, being convinced that this resolution, which contradicts the above-mentioned principles, is also likely

to trouble the peace of the Middle East. Their apprehensions did not wait long to be confirmed, since, increasing their terrorist activities in March and April 1948, the Jews had forced nearly two hundred thousands among the Arab inhabitants of Palestine to abandon their homes and seek refuge mainly in the Arab countries, obliging these countries to intervene militarily in order to prevent the complete extermination of these inhabitants.

The truce which was decided by the Security Council on May 29 and July 14, 1948 and which was accepted by the Arab Governments each time on the advice and insistence of the Government of the United States in particular, has not, any more than the general armistice, eliminated the danger.

The Arab Governments are conscious that a solution should be sought for this question and especially under the present international circumstances which call for active collaboration of all peace-loving peoples.

It is in this spirit that the Arab Governments, in response to the renewed appeal of the Government of the United States of America for reaching a realistic and peaceful solution of the problem, have agreed to collaborate to this end with the Conciliation Commission that was created by the United Nations General Assembly Resolution of 11 December last.

It is equally in this spirit that the Arab Governments signed at Lausanne on May 12, 1949 the protocol adopting the territorial provisions of the partition plan with the necessary adjustments, thereby bringing their attitude into conformity with the policy of the United States in this matter—the policy which was proclaimed by the American Delegate, Mr. Jessup, in the third session of the United Nations in Paris, was reaffirmed by the President of the United States in his message to His Majesty the King of Jordan, by the American representative in the Conciliation Commission, Mr. Ethridge, to the delegates of the Arab States, and finally by the representatives of the State Department at Lausanne.

In adhering, therefore, to the policy of the United States in this matter and in affixing their signatures side by side with that of the United States representative, the Delegations of the Arab Governments have the right to believe that some sort of gentleman's agreement, providing reciprocal obligations, was concluded.

Nevertheless, no action has been initiated to put this protocol into effect until now, owing to the lack of good faith on the part of the Jews who have equally signed it.

The Arab Governments have grounds to believe that the Government of the United States would not lack the means necessary to induce the Jews to respect their signature and carry out the obligations resulting therefrom.

Considering the great concern of the United States Government for preserving peace in this particularly sensitive part of the world and its desire not to spare any efforts in the attainment of this peace, the Arab Governments would not waver in giving it their complete cooperation towards this end. But, it is necessary that the solution which was deliberately accepted by them in order to settle in an effective manner a problem liable to paralyze their action, must be implemented.

The Arab Governments have also solemnly affirmed during the last session of the Arab League, held in Cairo in October, their firm will to form a single front to the end of defending the peace against any danger from whatever source this danger originates.

They hope that the Government of the United States of America will not deny them its support in order to solve peacefully the problem which preoccupies them, permitting them in this way to join their efforts with its own efforts in the pursuit of other ends not less urgent.

Consequently, the Arab Governments trust that the United States Government will not hesitate in giving them assurances that the peaceful solution concluded by common agreement at Lausanne in the protocol of May 12, 1949 will produce its full and complete effects, and that the United States Government will endeavor by using the effective means at its disposal and by direct action with the other interested party, to expedite this solution.

WASHINGTON, November 14, 1949.

501.BB Palestine/11-1149

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Robert N. Margrave of the
Munitions Division*

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] November 14, 1949.

Participants: Mr. George Ignatieff, Counselor, Canadian Embassy
Mr. G. E. Cox, Third Secretary, Canadian Embassy
BNA—Wm. L. Wight
MD—John C. Elliott
MD—R.N. Margrave

[Here follow the two introductory paragraphs dealing with United States policy concerning exports of arms to the Near East.]

Mr. Ignatieff stated that the Canadian Government had been approached by Israeli representatives with a request for quotations on various military items (for example, 500 .50 caliber Browning machine guns, 2,500,000 rounds of .50 caliber machine gun ammunition, 18,000 rounds 37 mm. AT proximity fuze ammunition, 50 105 mm. field guns, 150 artillery weapons higher than 57 mm., etc.). He queried

whether the United States Government would consider exports of this order to be of considerable military significance with respect to the Near East. Mr. Elliott pointed out that although many unofficial rumors and "feelers" concerning Near Eastern desire for U.S. arms had come to the attention of the Munitions Division, to date exports from the U.S. to the Near East have involved no significant military items (largely sporting arms and civil aircraft parts). He added that this Government would regard proposed exports to the Near East of the nature and of the order described by Mr. Ignatieff as being of considerable military significance and, therefore, would be obliged to view such shipments with great concern.

Mr. Elliott informed Mr. Ignatieff that the Department is attempting to gather together reliable information as to the relative strengths of the various Near Eastern military establishments so that, along with information derived from consultation with the United Kingdom, Canada, Belgium, France, and Italy, this Government would have an adequate basis for considering significant military shipments to the Near East. He pointed out that the proposed consultations with these Governments (of which only that with the United Kingdom had been initiated) would result not only in a pooling of information with respect to Near Eastern arms exports on a *post facto* basis but also envisaged possible prior consultation with respect to proposed exports of considerable military significance. Mr. Ignatieff expressed the view that his Government would be pleased to consult further with this Government concerning this whole problem and hoped that Mr. Elliott would keep him informed of the progress of U.S.-U.K. discussions looking to the possibility of parallel and cooperative action concerning the central problem.¹

¹ On November 17, Mr. Elliott, who was Chief of the Munitions Division, conferred with a New York attorney, who had been asked by the Israeli Supply Mission in New York "to sound out informally the Department regarding the export to Israel of AT-6 aircraft for civil pilot training programs." Mr. Elliott suggested that "AT-6's were not the type of aircraft appropriate for a civil pilot training program" because of their high military potential and indicated that the Mission endeavor to obtain smaller aircraft (501.BB Palestine/11-1749).

711.83/10-1249 : Airgram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, November 14, 1949.

A-581. Department has read with great interest Embassy's telegram No. 943, October 12¹ reporting your conversation with King Farouk and believes this frank initial exchange of views will contribute to

¹ *Ante*, p. 223.

forming the basis for a new and improved phase of United States-Egypt relations.

While it is regretted that the King continues to place such emphasis on the Palestine question vis-à-vis US-Egypt relations the theme is well-known and it is assumed that you related to the King the efforts of this Government, in cooperation with the United Nations, to bring about a settlement of the Palestine question. The main concern of this Government is that there should be political and economic stability in the Near East area and it considers an early settlement on the Palestine question as an essential condition to that stability. In further discussions with the King you should emphasize that the self-interest of Egypt as well as of the other countries of the area can best be served by a resolution of the present impasse of the Palestine question.

The following comments and information on certain of the specific points raised by the King may be useful to you :

Training of Students—Training facilities have already been provided by the Air Force for two Egyptian officers in the field of photography and it is understood that the Army now has six Egyptian officers participating in training. Moreover, the Army and the Air Force are now considering the feasibility of providing training for an additional number of Egyptian officers and it is hoped that definite commitments can soon be made. For your information, the Department of Defense is in the process of determining training requirements under the Military Assistance Program and is, therefore, not in a position to make definite commitments at this time on training facilities for countries not included in present legislation.

While you may transmit foregoing information in general way to the Egyptian authorities, Department and Defense Department prefer that any specific information in regard to numbers or other details should be channelled through the Army or the Air Force Attaché to the Egyptian Defense authorities.

[Here follow observations on the resolution by the Security Council on August 11 which provided for the superseding of the truce arrangements, including the provisions with respect to the shipment of war materials, and a partial quotation from Senator Austin's statement of August 7 that the United States did not intend to contribute to a competitive arms race in the Near East.]

Since the adoption by the Security Council of this resolution, the United States has approved several export licenses for Egypt covering such items as bombardier training planes, spare parts and a small amount of other material. In addition, the retransfer of lend-lease gun parts valued at \$350,000 from Great Britain to Egypt has also been approved by the United States as is necessary in such cases.

The Department was encouraged to note that the King's attitude at the time of your conversation appeared favorable to the lifting of Egyptian wartime regulations for the Suez Canal. While it is regretted no further developments in this connection have occurred since that time, it is hoped that the Egyptian Government will find means at an early date whereby it can raise the restrictions on the Canal.

WEBB

890D.00/11-1549 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Legation in Syria

RESTRICTED

WASHINGTON, November 15, 1949—9 p. m.

495. From McGhee for Minister Keeley. In conversation with me Nov 5 Syrian Min stated that in his judgment Syria must "line up" openly with US against Russia and requested my advice as to what Syria shld do to demonstrate this fact and promote area economic and political stability. He stated his personal conviction time has come for positive action in settling Pal controversy and proceed with economic rehabilitation in NE.

I welcomed his approach as statesman-like and said I had been disappointed by lack of progressive Arab leadership at present critical juncture. Experience indicates continued inability Israel and Arab states to reach agreement concerning outstanding Pal and econ questions does not operate to advantage of Arabs. It seemed to me that Syria, because of mature state of political development, natural leadership and great economic potential was in unique position to assert positive leadership in breaking impasse, and shld seize its opportunity to do so.

I said I believed Syria shld do two things: Cooperate to fullest degree with the UN and particularly the ESM, and commence direct talks with Israel for a peace settlement. I recalled President's statement on appointment Gordon Clapp as Chairman ESM,¹ which reflected sincere US interest take constructive part in planning practical program rehabilitation and economic development in Near East. Here was unique opportunity for Syria obtain practical benefits through cooperation with ESM on basis of whose activities US wld be more able to assist in economic planning. Syria cld express cooperation by early creation Development Board to cooperate with ESM and US. Likewise Syria cld earn gratitude Arab posterity by taking lead in achieving peaceful settlement Pal controversy. I sincerely believed it was in highest self-interest Syria find ways and means of engaging in

¹ For the statement of August 26, see Department of State *Bulletin*, September 5, 1949, p. 333.

direct talks Israeli Govt, however unpalatable this might seem at outset. Results cld only be advantageous to Syria and Arab world since every month's delay brought new factors into situation none of which cld redound to ultimate benefit of Arabs.

Faiz Bey declared he wld submit these views his Govt and requested I ask you convey similar views both to present interim govt and to govt to be formed after the elections. You shld seek early favorable opportunity convey foregoing views to Syrian Govt unless you have comment which you wish to raise with Dept or at Istanbul meeting.² You shld particularly suggest desirability formation Syrian economic development board draw up long range development projects and cooperate with technical members ESM. [McGhee.]

WEBB

² For documentation on this subject, see pp. 165 ff.

867N.01/11-1649 : Telegram

The Chargé in Jordan (Fritzlan) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

AMMAN, November 16, 1949—10 p. m.

402. In hour conversation with King Abdullah this morning he gave me following exposé his attitude and recent actions re Palestine:

[Here follow four numbered paragraphs, broadly paralleling the report in despatch 140, November 11, page 1483, and stating in addition that the King expressed contempt for the "stalling and obstructive attitude" of the other Arab League members and observed that with the complete failure of the Palestine Conciliation Commission, he had no recourse other than to undertake direct negotiations with Israel. Of special note was the King's statement that "he had recently received 'high Jewish personality' and had discussed possible terms. (Presumably this occurred last Sunday night which King spent at Shuneh.) Abdullah stated both he and Israeli agent agreed early peace highly desirable as armistice soon expiring." The King's terms, in addition to those set forth in despatch 140, were said to include a rectification of the existing line to restore the Jerusalem-Bethlehem road to Jordan and mutual free port facilities at Haifa and Aqaba. The King also expressed the hope that the Israelis would make reasonable concessions because of their "desperate" economic situation.]

(5) Abdullah stated he very desirous visiting President Truman and US. He wished me to convey to President fact that he harbors no hatred for Jews. Believes he could convince US Jew leaders reasonableness his attitude, and perhaps he and Weizmann (if also in US) might reach agreement.

(6) King hoped during coming months Israelis would take no steps or permit incidents (e.g. boundary incidents) which would prejudice chances early settlement, and he desired me convey this sentiment to Israelis through US Government.

(7) Commenting on present negotiations at Lake Success, King remarked he was sorry to see that Jordan PCC delegate was expressing agreement with other Arab delegates against wishes and instructions Jordan Government. In reply to my query His Majesty stated this especially true re status Jerusalem and presentation joint memorandum to Department, step he considered ill advised.

Comment: King's desire early liquidation Palestine affair is natural. However, it is clear any settlement agreeable to His Majesty, whether achieved through UN or direct negotiations, must include substantial advantages for Jordan. Abdullah especially interested securing access to Mediterranean and replacing Egypt at Gaza.

King sincerely and strongly feels his position could be strengthened by visit to US. He feels policy US Government has served greatly strengthen Israelis and trips Weizmann to US has contributed largely to consolidating Israeli position.

Seems plausible that a visit by King to US, perhaps during coming spring, would serve focus US public attention on strategic importance Arab world to US and on urgent necessity providing solution such problems as fate Arab refugees. Possibly such a visit could contribute to adoption and success refugee aid program.¹

Pouched Arab capitals, Jerusalem.

Sent Department 402; Department pass London 102, Tel Aviv 63, USUN 19.

FRITZLAN

¹ New York, on November 19, reported information from the Jordanian Representative at the United Nations that he had received instructions from King Abdullah adamantly opposing the internationalization of Jerusalem regardless of the position of the other Arab Delegations and the Israelis and directing him to explore the possibility of undertaking direct negotiations with the Israelis in New York. The Jordanian Representative was said to believe there was "no possibility Abdullah obtaining his territorial objectives from Israelis and that King playing with fire in contemplating direct negotiations." (Telegram Delga 232, 867N.01/11-1949)

501.BB Palestine/11-1749

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Wells Stabler of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] November 17, 1949.

Participants: Eliahu Elath, Ambassador of Israel
 Aubrey Eban, Permanent Delegate of Israel to the UN
 NEA—Mr. McGhee
 ANE—Mr. Berry
 Mr. Wilkins
 Mr. Rockwell
 Mr. Stabler

Problem: Mr. Eban informed Mr. McGhee that Israel proposed to submit to the United Nations a separate resolution on Jerusalem which would take into account the primary interest of the United Nations in the Holy Places.

Action Required: None

Action Assigned to: ANE

Discussion: Ambassador Elath and Mr. Eban came in at their request this afternoon to inform the Department that Israel proposed to introduce an Israeli resolution on Jerusalem in the General Assembly. This resolution would take into account the primary interest of the world community in the Holy Places and would call for Israeli control of the Holy Places under United Nations supervision. It would also call for a United Nations Commissioner to be established in Jerusalem. His functions would be limited to the matter of the Holy Places. The Israeli delegation had carefully considered the Palestine Conciliation Commission draft instrument and had come to the conclusion that the various organs of United Nations Government would seriously interfere with and cut across present jurisdiction in Jewish Jerusalem. The delegation had also studied the recent clarifying statement of the Palestine Conciliation Commission and believed that statement was more closely related to the Israeli draft resolution than to the Palestine Conciliation Commission draft instrument. Mr. Eban pointed out that the situation in Jerusalem today is entirely different from that of two years ago. The United Nations had not assumed any authority in Jerusalem and as a result fighting had broken out. It now appeared that the United Nations was endeavoring to assume for itself authority which had not existed previously.

He believed that the Jerusalem question should be presented in the United Nations on the basis of determining what the interest of the United Nations is in Jerusalem. He felt that the answer would be that the primary interest of the United Nations in Jerusalem is the Holy Places. He believed that considerable sentiment existed among the delegations to the United Nations, that the United Nations should not interfere with the daily lives of the people in that area and should concern itself only with the Holy Places. While Israel could not, of course, speak for the other side, the Israeli proposal was based on the assumption that Jordan would make a similar offer.

He indicated that while other delegations would undoubtedly be willing to offer the same type of resolution, it was felt that it would be more dramatic for Israel, one of the parties most intimately concerned with the question, to present the resolution. He emphasized that Israel was anxious to avoid the injection of religious and emotional factors into the consideration of the Jerusalem question and

he hoped that the General Assembly would take into consideration the attitude of the peoples most directly concerned.

He said that he wished to inform the department of the intention of Israel to introduce this proposal and to state that the resolution was not being introduced for tactical reasons to defeat the Palestine Conciliation Commission proposal. It was being presented on the basis of assuring to the United Nations its legitimate interests in the area. He hoped there might be United States support for this view.

Mr. McGhee expressed appreciation for Mr. Eban's presentation and said that the United States, as a member of the Palestine Conciliation Commission, had participated in the drafting of the Palestine Conciliation Commission draft instrument and, therefore, gave its general support to them. We realized that there would be amendments offered and we would, of course, consider them in the light of their merits and of their contribution to achievement of agreement on a Jerusalem plan. He pointed out that our support of the Palestine Conciliation Commission draft instrument was not merely a formal one but was based on the conviction that the Palestine Conciliation Commission draft instrument offered the most reasonable basis for agreement. We had been somewhat disappointed that Israel had felt that it could not go along with the instrument but assured Mr. Eban that the views he expressed would be taken into consideration. Mr. McGhee stated that since the General Assembly had set up machinery for dealing with this question and had instructed the Palestine Conciliation Commission to submit detailed proposals for a permanent international regime in the Jerusalem area, it was up to the General Assembly to decide the question.

Mr. Rockwell pointed out that the Palestine Conciliation Commission's clarifying statement should be taken as an indication of what the drafters of the Palestine Conciliation Commission draft instrument had in mind at the time they completed their proposals. He also stated that, generally speaking, it was the Palestine Conciliation Commission's belief that the United Nations' organization of administration provided for in the draft instrument would not conflict with the jurisdiction of the administering states, except in those matters of legitimate international concern. Then, in his control over the Holy Places, the United Nations Commissioner would to a certain extent share with Israel and Jordan in administering Jerusalem.

Mr. Eban said that the Israeli view was that the Palestine Conciliation Commission draft instrument would conflict with the jurisdiction of Israel in Jewish Jerusalem and regretted that the Palestine Conciliation Commission had approached this question from the wrong starting point. By this, he meant that the Palestine Conciliation Com-

mission should have commenced with the actual situation existing in Jerusalem today taking into consideration the attitude of the people most directly affected. In this connection it was pointed out that the Palestine Conciliation Commission had, of course, followed the instructions of the General Assembly with respect to the preparation of its proposals.

501.BB Palestine/11-2149

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President

WASHINGTON, November 21, 1949.

Subject: Instructions to the United States Delegation to the General Assembly on the Jerusalem Question.

When the General Assembly takes up the Jerusalem question in a few days, it will have before it the detailed proposals for an international regime for Jerusalem prepared by the Palestine Conciliation Commission of which the United States, France and Turkey are members.

The Commission prepared these proposals pursuant to the instructions which it received from the General Assembly by the Resolution of December 11, 1948, as follows:

“Resolved that, in view of its association with three world religions, the Jerusalem area, including the present municipality of Jerusalem *plus* the surrounding villages and towns, . . .¹ should be accorded special and separate treatment from the rest of Palestine and should be placed under effective United Nations control.

“Instructs the Conciliation Commission to present to the fourth regular session of the General Assembly detailed proposals for a permanent international regime for the Jerusalem area which will provide for the maximum local autonomy for distinctive groups consistent with the special international status of the Jerusalem area;”

Israel has rejected the Commission's plan and has submitted an alternate proposal limited to United Nations supervision of the Holy Places. It now appears that the Hashemite Jordan Kingdom will also reject it on the ground that it does not favor an international regime for Jerusalem.

The Vatican has consistently advocated a stronger type of internationalization, under full United Nations control. You will recall that in correspondence with Cardinal Spellman you have assured him that this Government firmly supports the internationalization of Jerusalem and does not intend to recognize the sovereignty of any state

¹ Omissions indicated in the source text.

in the City. The Department of State has also written in the same sense to Cardinal Spellman and other personalities and groups.

Having discussed the foregoing considerations with the Delegation in New York, the following instructions are proposed:

1. The United States objective at this session of the General Assembly is to obtain approval of an international regime for the Jerusalem area which (a) will adequately recognize the status of Jerusalem as the center of three great world religions and will provide for the necessary protection of and access to the Holy Places under United Nations supervision; (b) will contribute to peace and stability in the area; (c) will be workable; and (d) will take into account the interests of the principal communities in Jerusalem and the views of Israel and Jordan.

2. As a member of the Palestine Conciliation Commission, the United States participated in the formulation of the Palestine Conciliation Commission draft instrument and should support it, subject to clarifying amendments, as a basis for General Assembly consideration.

3. During the General Assembly discussion, the United States Delegation should state that it will examine on their merits any modifications of the Palestine Conciliation Commission Instrument and any new proposals. Such amendments or new proposals should be considered by the Delegation and the Department in the light of the possibility of reaching a general agreement.

4. For purposes of handling such amendments and proposals in the General Assembly and, if possible, reconciling them, the Department believes that the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee should create a sub-committee consisting of equal representation from members supporting Christian, Moslem and Jewish views. The Palestine Conciliation Commission might be invited to attend for advice and information.

5. If in the working out of a settlement for the Jerusalem question the Assembly should be unable to agree upon detailed and definite arrangements, the United States Delegation should, after consultation with the Department, support some other form of temporary arrangements for the Jerusalem area which, pending further consideration by the General Assembly, would provide the necessary protection of and access to the Holy Places under United Nations supervision and which would offer further opportunity for reaching an agreement which would be acceptable not only to Israel and Jordan but also to the United Nations.²

DEAN ACHESON

²In a memorandum of November 21 covering his conversation with President Truman, Secretary Acheson recorded: "I went over with the President the whole history of this matter, calling his attention to all the documents, starting with the first resolution of the General Assembly and continuing up through the present recommendation of the Conciliation Commission. After considering what I said and reading the memorandum, the President approved it." (501.BB Palestine/11-2149) The President's action is also indicated by his marginal notation "Approved Nov. 21, 1949".

The Department, later the same day, telegraphed the five numbered paragraphs to the United States Mission at the United Nations as well as the fact of Presidential approval (Gadel 110 to New York, 501.BB/11-2149).

501.BB Palestine (E)/11-2349

*Working Draft Resolution Prepared in the Department of State*¹

RESTRICTED

[WASHINGTON,] November 21, 1949.

ASSISTANCE TO PALESTINE REFUGEES

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 212 (III) of November 19, 1948, and 194 (III) of December 11, 1948,

Having examined the First Interim Report of the Economic Survey Mission, A-1106,² and the Report of the Secretary General on Assistance to Palestine Refugees, A-1060,³

1. *Expresses* its appreciation to the contributing governments, to the United Nations specialized agencies, in particular UNICEF, WHO, UNESCO and IRO, to the ICRC, the League of Red Cross Societies, the American Friends Service and the numerous religious charitable and humanitarian organizations, all of which have made substantial contributions in their respective fields to the relief of the Palestine refugees;

2. *Recognizes* that continued assistance for the relief of the Palestine refugees is necessary to prevent conditions of starvation and distress among them, and that constructive measures should be undertaken at an early date to reduce the refugee problem with a view to the termination of international assistance;

3. *Considers*, on the basis of the estimate of the Economic Survey Mission, that \$33,700,000 will be required for direct relief and works programs for the period January 1 to December 31, 1950, of which \$20,200,000 is required for direct relief, and \$13,500,000 for works programs; and that \$21,200,000 will be required for works programs from January 1 to June 30, 1951, all inclusive of administrative expenses; and that direct relief should be terminated not later than December 31, 1950, unless otherwise determined by the General Assembly at its Fifth Session;⁴

¹ A memorandum of November 22 from Messrs. Sandifer and Hare to the Secretary of State notes that this draft resolution was "the result of intensive discussions in the Department during the past week and coincides with the views of Mr. Wright and his colleagues from the British Foreign Office with whom it has been discussed. The French and Turks appear to agree in principle." (501.BB Palestine (E)/11-2349)

² Not printed; regarding the report, see editorial note, p. 1472.

³ See GA, 4th sess., *Ad Hoc Political Committee, Annex*, vol. II, p. 14.

⁴ The memorandum by Messrs. Sandifer and Hare cited in footnote 1 above also stated that "400,000 refugees would be supported by the works program when it is in full swing. It is anticipated that this program would in fact lead to the permanent absorption of a substantial number of refugees in or near the areas where they are now situated although for reasons associated with Arab sensibilities, the Economic Survey Mission has not designated it as a resettlement program.

"It is anticipated that the United States would need to contribute about 50% of the cost of the program. We indicated to Mr. Wright that it might be necessary for the United Kingdom to contribute about 25%, leaving the balance to be borne by France, the beneficiary governments, and other interested governments."

4. *Establishes* the "Near East Relief and Works Agency" (NERWA):

(a) to carry out in collaboration with local governments the direct relief and works program recommended by the Economic Survey Mission;

(b) to consult with Near Eastern governments concerning measures to be taken by them preparatory to the time when international assistance for relief and works projects is no longer available;

(c) subject to approval of its Advisory Commission, to assume such other functions as the ESM may recommend in accordance with its terms of reference;

5. *Establishes* an Advisory Commission consisting of representatives of France, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States to advise and assist the Director of NERWA in the execution of the program;

6. [Alternative A] ⁵

Appoints _____ as Director of NERWA responsible to the General Assembly for the operation of the program and, in the event of his death or disability, authorizes the Advisory Commission to appoint his successor;

[Alternative B] ⁵

Requests the Secretary General to appoint the Director of NERWA on the nomination of the Advisory Commission;

The Director shall be the chief executive officer of NERWA responsible to the General Assembly for the operation of the program. He shall select and appoint his staff and shall to the extent possible utilize the facilities and assistance of the Secretary General and apply the staff rules and regulations of the United Nations. The Director shall, in consultation with the Secretary General and the Advisory Committee on Budgetary and Administrative Questions establish financial regulations for NERWA;

7. *Requests* the Director to convene the Advisory Commission at the earliest practicable date for the purpose of developing plans for the organization and administration of the program;

8. *Urges* Near Eastern countries concerned to establish local development boards to cooperate with NERWA;

9. *Continues* UNRPR as established under Resolution 212 (III) of the General Assembly until April 1, 1950, or until such date thereafter as the transfer referred to in paragraph 10 is effected, and instructs UNRPR to arrange for the gradual reduction in the number of rations from 940,000 to approximately 652,000 in accordance with the recommendation of ESM;

10. *Instructs* the Secretary General to transfer to NERWA the assets and liabilities of UNRPR by April 1, 1950, or as soon thereafter as the Director of NERWA may determine;

⁵ Brackets appear in the source text.

11. *Urges* all Members of the United Nations to make voluntary contributions in funds or in kind to insure that the amount of supplies and funds required is obtained for each period of the program as set out in paragraph 3 and states that to this end, voluntary contributions of non-Member states would also be accepted; contributions in funds may be made in currencies other than the United States dollar insofar as the program can be carried out in such currencies;

12. *Authorizes* the Secretary General, in consultation with the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions to advance immediately a sum of up to \$5,000,000 from the Working Capital Fund to finance operations pursuant to this resolution, such sum to be repaid not later than December 31, 1950, from the voluntary governmental contributions requested under paragraph 11 above;

13. *Authorizes* the Secretary General, in consultation with the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, to negotiate with IRO for an interest-free loan in an amount not to exceed the equivalent of \$2,800,000 to finance the program subject to mutually satisfactory conditions for repayment;

14. *Authorizes* the Secretary General to continue the Special Fund established under Resolution 212 (III) of the General Assembly, and to make withdrawals therefrom for the operations of UNRPR, and upon the request of the Director, for the operations of NERWA;

15. *Urges* UNICEF, IRO, WHO, UNESCO and FAO and other appropriate agencies and private groups and organizations, in consultation with the Director of NERWA, to participate in the program;

16. *Directs* NERWA to consult with the PCC in the best interests of their respective tasks;

17. *Requests* the Director of NERWA to submit quarterly reports, and such other reports as he deems necessary, to the Secretary General for transmission to the Members of the United Nations and to non-member governments which have contributed to the work of NERWA.

867N.00/11-2149 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

JERUSALEM, November 21, 1949—4 p. m.

655. Dayan on nineteenth gave following personal appreciation present Palestine situation. States is still in process taking over southern command; has established direct personal relations with Jordan and Egypt commanders in area; continues to follow activities of MACS and discuss them with Sharett.

1. Prospects favorable for direct negotiations with Jordan and Lebanon after termination GA which he expects will take no final action. Both have many open questions with Israel, particularly economic, whose solution would be mutually beneficial. King Abdullah long fed on belief Great Powers or PCC will force concessions from

Israel. Now realizes just wishful thinking and will have to make direct settlement through own efforts.

2. Abdullah's relations with other Arab states already very bad and he disappointed at outcome Arab League meeting. Agreement with Israel could hardly cause further deterioration and would permit King show his independence of action and defiance other Arab States. Abdullah has always dreamed of building personal kingdom during his lifetime and this furnishes strong inducement to reach agreement including incorporation Arab Palestine in Jordan. Abdullah one Arab leader who needs not fear popular reaction and overthrow his government. Assassination possible, but this danger always present.

3. Immediate agreement with Egypt and Syria more unlikely. Egypt commander stated could not act until after Egypt elections. Syria also would have to wait until next Syrian elections. However, problems with these two countries not serious.

4. Agreements need not take form of formal treaties. He personally would like to see establishment very close relations with Jordan which would give Israel Arab partner. Countries approximately same size; possesses many mutual problems that can only be solved through cooperation and joint enterprises. Mentioned potash works and development of Jordan Valley.

5. Abdullah entirely willing accept all refugees now in his territory so question of repatriation eliminated insofar as Jordan concerned.

6. Re boundaries, possible to make minor adjustments with Jordan to prevent owners from being cut off from lands. Abdullah has now abandoned hopes for return of Ramle and Lydda, and real corridor to sea naturally impossible. Lebanon needs boundary arrangement permitting labor in Lebanon to work their lands in Israel as during mandate.

7. Prospects best for economic agreements. Israel perfectly willing give Jordan free zone at Haifa and right transport any goods duty free across its territory using own transport and administering free zone. This would give Abdullah his own long desired outlet to sea. Arrangements could be made re-activate potash plants at both northern and southern ends of Dead Sea with produce shipped out as previously via Jerusalem. Under present conditions Israel cannot export but neither can Jordan. If no agreement made, Israel will execute plan already prepared to build new road for exports.

8. Jerusalem most difficult problem. GA will take no specific action and then Israel and Jordan can work out agreement. Could take form either of complete partition of city cutting each side off entirely from other or cooperative arrangement. Latter preferred and could include free access to Scopus in return for free use of Bethlehem Road (other

Israeli lately insisted on Israel-controlled corridor to Scopus and not merely free access). Solution of Jerusalem problem would also permit Israel "make peace with consular corps".

Sent Department 655; repeated Baghdad 72, Beirut 130, Damascus 91, Jidda 15, Tel Aviv 135, London 68. Department pass Cairo 47. Pouched Amman.

BURDETT

867N.014/11-2249 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEL AVIV, November 22, 1949—4 p. m.

839. Re Deptels 729 November 18¹ and 672, October 20.² In talk November 21 at residence with Eytan and Comay Ford and I again requested clarification recent Cabinet action re fusion Tel Aviv and Jaffa. After reiterating information given Embtel 808, November 8,³ Eytan said fusion was result of "informal Cabinet decision" and not in form of "decree," that outside minutes of Cabinet meeting as which "decision" was reached nothing in nature of written document covering fusion existed, and that his government considered move "purely municipal administrative action without political implications." He added that matter now rests with government committee appointed "to study fusion", that committee now deliberating move, and that no further step will be taken "to make permanent situation which in fact has existed for many months" until committee renders its report.

Comment: Specifically answering questions Deptel 672, (1) Israel Foreign Office officially confirms "government has decided to form single municipality of Tel Aviv and Jaffa" (Embtel 808), (2) no decree exists according to Eytan, and (3) legal aspects and implications are at present shrouded in careful double talk of which foregoing is example. *End comment.*

MCDONALD

¹ Not printed.

² Not printed; it requested official confirmation concerning the reported issuance of a cabinet decree providing for the merger of Tel Aviv and Jaffa (867N.01/10-1849).

³ Not printed; it furnished the text of a letter from the Israeli Foreign Office which confirmed that the Government had decided to form a single municipality out of the two cities. The letter also advised that certain fringe areas formerly in dispute had been incorporated into Tel Aviv earlier in 1949 and that "Since the rest of Jaffa is fully occupied by Israelis, and since its municipal services are in fact provided by Tel Aviv, as an extension of its own, the government's decision regularizes a situation actually existing." (867N.01/11-849)

501.BB Palestine (E)/11-2349

Memorandum by the Department of State to the President

SECRET

WASHINGTON, [undated].

Subject: Palestine Refugee Program

On May 23 and 26 Mr. Webb discussed with you a proposed Palestine Refugee Program.¹ At that time you agreed that the Department should proceed with the development of a program along the general lines set forth in its memorandum of May 9, 1949. On August 26, 1949, at the time of the appointment of Mr. Clapp as Chairman of the Economic Survey Mission, you issued a statement pledging the full support of this Government to this Mission and offering to give careful consideration to such assistance as we might render, under the auspices of the United Nations, in carrying out the recommendations of this Mission.

Mr. Clapp has just submitted his first report² which recommends a combined direct relief and works program at a total cost of \$54,900,000 for an eighteen months period from January 1, 1950, to June 30, 1951. The cost of direct relief would be \$20,200,000 for the year 1950 and such relief would be terminated at the end of that year. The cost of the works program would be \$13,500,000 for 1950 and \$21,200,000 for the six months ending June 30, 1951.

The report further recommends that the present United Nations relief organization (United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees) be terminated in April 1950 and that a new agency be established by the General Assembly of the United Nations to carry out both the direct relief and works programs as recommended by the Economic Survey Mission.

Mr. Clapp has indicated to the Department, but not in the report, that it is premature to embark upon a more ambitious program because: (1) the Arab Governments are not yet prepared to discuss resettlement on a large scale; (2) Israel has been unwilling to undertake repatriation of a substantial number; and (3) sufficient engineering has not yet been done to warrant the initiation of large expenditures. It is contemplated that works programs will merge into plans for longer range development.

The Department has given careful consideration to Mr. Clapp's report and has prepared a draft resolution³ which supports his recommendations (Tab A). The proposed organizational arrangement gives full recognition to the interest and concern of the United Nations in

¹ See Acting Secretary Webb's memoranda of those dates, pp. 1042 and 1056.

² See editorial note, p. 1472.

³ Not found attached. Presumably, it was the draft of November 21, p. 1500.

the Palestine problem and at the same time provides a role for the United States, the United Kingdom, and France which reflects the preponderant financial responsibility which they must assume.

This draft resolution has been presented to the Bureau of the Budget, who have cleared it subject to clearance by the National Advisory Council. Time does not permit National Advisory Council clearance, and the Department desires, if you concur, to take action in the General Assembly without such clearance.

Had time permitted the Department would have preferred comprehensive consultation with Congressional leaders.

Recommendation

It is recommended:

1. That the United States Delegation to the General Assembly be authorized to introduce or support a resolution along the lines of the attached draft without, at this time, publicly indicating the amount which the United States might contribute;

2. That the Department be authorized to consult with other delegations regarding the amounts which they may be prepared to contribute on the understanding that the United States contribution to be requested from Congress would not exceed 50 percent of the cost as determined by the General Assembly;

3. That Congressional leaders be consulted to the extent possible by the Department of State⁴ on the proposed course of action.⁵

⁴ Marginal notation by Acting Secretary Webb: "This program approved by phone call to the President Nov. 23, 1949, 4:05 p. m."

⁵ Thus, on December 2, a group of Department officers discussed the matter with Judge John Kee, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House (memorandum of conversation, by Arthur Z. Gardiner, 501.BB Palestine(E)/12-249).

890.20/11-2349

*Draft Defensive Security Pact Among the States of the Arab League,
Prepared by the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs¹*

SECRET

[CAIRO?, undated.]

Pursuant to the principles and objectives of the Arab League Pact and the Charter of the United Nations, and

In accordance with the sincere desire of cementing and strengthening the ties existing among the States of the Arab League, and the true wishes of those States to maintain their independence and to preserve stability and tranquility in their countries with the maintenance of their common inheritance, and

¹ Furnished to Ambassador Childs on the initiative of King Ibn Saud; translated at the Embassy and transmitted by Jidda in despatch 233, November 23.

In compliance with the desire of the Arab State nations to unite together for common defense in order to maintain peace and security,

The States who are members of this Pact have come to the following Agreement:

ARTICLE I

The contracting states guarantee hereby that in order not to expose international peace and security to danger, all these states should settle their international disputes through peaceful ways in accordance with the Charters of the Arab League and the United Nations. These states also should not, in their international relations, compel themselves to use the force or threaten to use it in any way which is inconsistent with the principles of the Arab League and the United Nations.

ARTICLE II

To realize the objectives of this Pact in a most effective way, the contracting states should, in unity or separately, take effective continuous action through their special means and through cooperation among themselves to maintain and strengthen their forces as a single state and as a whole unity to stand against any military aggression.

ARTICLE III

The contracting states should, upon request from any of them, enter into consultation when the safety, the independence or the security of any one of them is in danger.²

ARTICLE IV

The contracting states agree that any military aggression against any one of them or against all of them is to be considered as directed against all of them. If such aggression has taken place each of them should, in accordance with its legal right to defend itself separately or as a whole group according to the text of Article 6 of the Arab League Pact and Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, help the state or states attacked. Each one of them must take immediately, separately or in cooperation with the contracting states, all necessary steps

² In a memorandum of November 9 to Mr. Hare, Burton Y. Berry, Director of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs, stated that "Egypt, in an attempt to block recent moves towards Iraqi-Syrian federation, proposed the drafting of a collective security pact which provided for the armed participation of all Arab States in the event of an attack upon any member. Agreement in principle was reached, and such a pact is now being drafted for consideration by the League Council at a subsequent meeting. It is open to question whether the pact, even if signed and ratified, will ever become more than a paper agreement." (890B.00/11-949). Mr. Berry's memorandum also gave his view that the meeting of the Arab League Council from October 22 to 29, at which the proposed pact was introduced, "appears to have been an attempt to prop up the tottering structure of the Arab League."

For documentation on the proposed Iraqi-Syrian federation, see pp. 180 ff.

including the use of armed force to establish order and peace. The Arab League and the Security Council should be notified immediately of every such military aggression, or any threat for using force and the steps which may be taken.

ARTICLE V

The contracting states should announce that their international effective commitments, either among themselves or among them and any other state are not in contradiction with the text of this Pact, and that all of them guarantee that they will not conclude any international agreement which in any way contravenes this Pact.

ARTICLE VI

The Arab League Council is in charge of all affairs relative to the execution of this Pact. The said Council has the right to appoint a special committee of the Chiefs of Staff of the contracting states and this committee will recommend the necessary defensive steps to be taken.

ARTICLE VII

Ten years after putting this Pact into effect, each one of the contracting states may have the right to withdraw from the Pact one year from the date of announcing its desire to withdraw, to the Secretary General of the Arab League. The Secretary General of the Arab League will convey such announcement to the other contracting states.

ARTICLE VIII

This Pact and its supplementary documents must be ratified by each of the contracting states in accordance with each one's constitutional procedures. Such ratification will be kept with the Secretariat General of the Arab League. This Pact is considered effective 15 days after its ratification, or after delivery to the Secretary General of at least four ratification documents of four states.

867N.00/11-2349 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

CAIRO, November 23, 1949—1 p. m.

1094. Mytel 1060 November 14.¹ Hassan Youssef told me last night that Shirine gave him Sassoon's letter which he gave to the King. The King said that he saw no object in dealing with Sassoon, for three

¹ Not printed; it advised that General Riley had brought a secret letter from Mr. Sassoon "to Ismail Shirine King's brother-in-law proposing meeting at El Auja between representatives of the two parties to explore possibility reaching general agreement between Egypt and Israel." (767N.83/11-1449)

reasons: First, he does not know with what authority Sassoon speaks; second, Sassoon is leaving soon for Ankara as Israel representative; third, it is better in any event to wait for the Department's reply to the recent Arab note.²

In connection with the third point I told Hassan Youssef to tell the King that in my opinion the Arab suggestions were unrealistic and anything but helpful at this juncture. He replied, "in that case what shall we do? Would it be possible to proceed on the basis of the existing demarcation lines between Israel and the Arabs?" He added quickly, "of course we could not admit to the other Arab states that we are talking of this, but if your people thought well of it I think we might get somewhere." He added also that this was only his own suggestion.

I said, "I can tell the State Department you suggested it".

Sent Department 1094, repeated Athens 33 for McGhee.

CAFFERY

² Of November 14, p. 1488.

Editorial Note

The General Assembly, at its Fourth Session, dealt with (1) the question of a permanent international regime for the Jerusalem area and the protection of the Holy Places and (2) the question of assistance to Palestinian refugees.

The *Ad Hoc* Political Committee of the Assembly devoted 13 meetings to the first of these matters, from November 24 to 29 and from December 5 to 7. The Committee's proceedings during the earlier of these periods are printed in United Nations, *Official Records of the Fourth Session of the General Assembly, Ad Hoc Political Committee, Summary Records of Meetings, 27 September-7 December 1949* (hereinafter identified as GA, *4th sess., Ad Hoc Political Committee*), pages 246-306.

Several proposals were offered to the Committee and on November 29, general debate concluded, whereupon Subcommittee 1 was appointed to examine the proposals (*ibid.*, page 305).

867N.01/11-2449: Telegram

The Chargé in Israel (Ford) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY

TEL AVIV, November 24, 1949—1 p. m.

842. Eytan called me to Foreign Office November 23 to announce in "strictest confidence" that King Abdullah had "informally invited" Government of Israel to enter into negotiations for final peace treaty

and that Israel had "formally accepted" invitation November 21. Eytan said Jordan reply expected momentarily and that while it was anticipated initial talks would be "largely exploratory" in character his government was determined enter "wholeheartedly" into discussions and hoped achieve "early favorable results." Eytan then referred to Israel Government note October 28 to PCC saying gist this note was "direct negotiations" and that present Jordan offer appeared to be "first fruits" October note and also "vindication" Israel's long-held belief in efficacy direct negotiations.

Eytan then stressed his government's hope that "we may be left alone to negotiate with Jordan in our own fashion" and that no "third party influence or interference will be brought to bear" in forthcoming negotiations. He said insofar as he knew only USG through Ambassador Elath had been apprised new development¹ and was uncertain whether King had informed British. He urged entire matter be kept secret for present.

Comment: Eytan not normally demonstrative, restrained with difficulty his elation. From his manner there would appear to be no doubt about Jordan offer. Incidentally he regretted "good news" had not been available for Ambassador McDonald prior his departure early morning November 23 for Istanbul. *End comment.*²

Sent Department 842, repeated Jerusalem 96, London 139, Department pass Amman 60, Istanbul for Ambassador McDonald unnumbered.

FORD

¹ Ambassador Elath had informed Mr. Hare of the new development on November 22. The Ambassador had indicated that "it might also be necessary at some stage to call upon the United States Government to facilitate the progress of the [Israeli-Jordanian] talks"; and had expressed the hope that "we would be willing to use our influence should it be required to bring about agreement."

Mr. Hare, in reply, had "thanked the Ambassador for this information and said that as he well knew the United States Government had favored direct talks and that our principal objective on this question was the restoration of peace and stability in the area. We should, of course, welcome any free negotiations which would achieve this objective." (memorandum of conversation by Mr. Stabler, 867N.01/11-2249)

² Chargé Ford, on November 28, reported information from a British source that Messrs. Shiloah and Sassoon had left the previous afternoon to hold the first direct peace talks with Jordanian representatives that same night. The source had also provided information from Minister Kirkbride that the initiative for the talks had come from the Israelis rather than from King Abdullah (telegram 846 from Tel Aviv, 867N.01/11-2849).

Editorial Note

A conference of American Chiefs of Mission in Near Eastern countries was held at Istanbul from November 26 to 29. The agreed conclusions (see page 168) embodied a ninth item entitled "Current

Israeli-Jordan Peace Negotiations and Annexation of Arab Palestine to Jordan."

501.BB Palestine(E)/11-2649: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Istanbul

SECRET

WASHINGTON, November 26, 1949—2 p. m.

338. For McGhee.

1. Brit informed Dept USGADel late this week they support ESM report and genl lines US draft res. Brit desired, however, to re-examine (a) structure proposed agency (UN director and Advisory Comm) as against possibility utilizing IRO and (b) if IRO not considered suitable, of creation of donors commite to direct relief and public works program either in addition to or in substitution for Advisory Comm.

Brit also stated their support ESM report shld not be considered commitment to specific financial contribution as they not ready at this time to indicate extent Brit contribution.

Nov 25 Wright and Hare agreed (a) proposed agency preferable to IRO since latter associated by Arabs with Jewish immigration, since IRO in process winding up its affairs, and because it not constituted handle proposed ESM program; (b) that comite of donors wld be cumbersome and complicating either as addition to or substitute for Advisory Comm, that if changes required it wld be preferable increase membership Advisory Comm by one or two states such as Denmark. Genl question wld, however, be kept open pending further talks in NY between US, UK, Fr and Turk in light developments at UN.

Dept stated it understood Brit position re commitment at this stage re specific financial contribution and observe US similar position.

In view possibility genl *Ad Hoc* Polit Comite debate re Jlem may conclude early next week and need for coordination on ESM res in NY, further discussions will be concentrated NY. Meanwhile, Dept will continue work with UK, Fr and Turk here.

2. During early part debate *Ad Hoc* Polit Comite Nov 25 Israel rejected PCC statute grounds plan wld impose internationalization against local right self-determination. Egypt rejected statute since plan wld mean partition and ultimate annexation. Syria acceded to demands for internationalization, indicating willingness study PCC statute. UK and Canada believe statute represents desirable and practical solution. Brazil agreed support PCC plan. Nicaragua thought it might serve basis for discussion. New Zealand favors real internationalization Jlem area. View Abdullah's insistence, Jordan expected deliver statement opposing internatl regime. Chile said PCC plan rests on false juridical position and GA shld limit self to holy places. If a

subcomité unable agree on a Jlem res, Bolivia believes PCC plan shld be accepted as compromise. Netherlands, doubting agreement re Jlem possible this session believes GA shld decide on principle internationalization, and send commissioner for holy places pending final action.

3. Iran Govt reliably reported to have handed expulsion orders 36 Iraqi Jews two Iraqi Christians. To AmEmb query Iran Govt stated order not confined Iraqi Jews but apply all Iraqi subjects, in accordance decree Council Mins passed Oct 5 in Shah's presence. Govt states relations with Iraq strained owing recent Iraqi restrictions on Iranian cits in Iraq, allegedly affecting large Iran population Kerbala, and recent expulsion number Iranians. Dept's instructions Tehran being repted you separately.

WEBB

867N.01/11-2949: Telegram

The Vice Consul at Jerusalem (Roberts) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

JERUSALEM, November 29, 1949—4 p. m.

666. French Consul General Neuville today intimated King Abdullah and Ben-Gurion holding secret meetings either in Jerusalem area or in South but actual location talks unknown. General Riley discounts meetings on basis King's statement that although ready to treat would wait outcome of UN Assembly.

Same source inferred Arabs and Jews negotiating exchange of Mt. Scopus and Sheik Jarrah quarter for Arab quarters in South Jerusalem. Riley believes this report may stem from his account of recent conversations with King.

Sent Department 666; repeated Tel Aviv 136; Department pass Amman 79, Istanbul unnumbered.

ROBERTS

767N.901/11-3049

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Wells Stabler of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] November 30, 1949.

Subject: Jordan-Israel Talks

Participants: Mr. Greenhill—British Embassy
Mr. Wilkins—ANE
Mr. Stabler—ANE

Discussion:

Mr. Greenhill read telegrams from the British Minister in Tel Aviv and the British Minister in Amman concerning the Jordan-Israel talks.

The British Minister in Tel Aviv reported a conversation with the Israeli Prime Minister. Mr. Ben Gurion indicated that Messrs. Shiloah and Sassoon met with the Jordan representatives on November 27. The talks were preliminary in nature, but Mr. Ben Gurion indicated he thought that agreement could be reached on all points except the question of the Negeb. Mr. Ben Gurion said that he was under the impression that Jordan had raised the question of the Negeb at the request of the British Government. The British Minister replied that he understood Jordan was acting under its own initiative in this case, and according to the Minister, Mr. Ben Gurion received his statement with satisfaction.

British Minister Kirkbride in Amman reported that the talks had taken place on the 27th at the King's winter quarters at Shuneh. The King had greeted the Israeli representatives but had not taken part in the discussions. Samir Rifai Pasha¹ had acted as the Jordan delegate.

It was agreed at the outset that the talks were of an exploratory nature and that it was desirable to take up the principal points or urgent matters first. Samir Pasha said that Jordan considered access to the Mediterranean of vital importance. The Israelis agreed in principle, but discussions as to how it could be implemented were left to another meeting. The Israelis then asked Samir Pasha whether Egypt would be willing to give up the Gaza Strip to Jordan. Samir Pasha replied that this is a question which would have to be taken up at the appropriate time between Jordan and Egypt and did not seem a proper subject for discussion with the Israelis.

The conversation then turned to the subject of the Negeb and Samir Pasha said that Jordan considered it should have a common frontier with Egypt and that the Arab States should be connected by land. Jordan believed that Israel should give up part of the Negeb in return for which Jordan would assure to Israel free access to Aqaba. Jordan would also request a free zone in Haifa. Sassoon pointed out that this question would raise considerable difficulties as the Negeb was the only land area in which Israel could expand.

It was decided that no decisions need be reached at the present meeting and that the questions would be left until another meeting.

The conversation then turned to Jerusalem and both Jordan and Israel agreed that they were opposed to the internationalization of Jerusalem. The Israelis pointed out that there were two matters in Jerusalem which were of secondary importance and which could be settled later if the main questions were resolved. These points were access to Scopus and the return of Arab quarters. It appeared that Israel was prepared to give up the Arab quarters.

¹ Jordanian Minister of Court.

The Israelis then said that they had one question to ask and certain information to give. The question was whether if Jordan should annex Arab Palestine, the Anglo-Jordan Treaty would extend to Arab Palestine. Samir Pasha replied that it would, whereupon the Israelis indicated that they would have further to say on that. The Israelis then informed Samir Pasha that the United States Government had been informed of the intention to proceed with these direct talks and that it had encouraged Israel to reach agreement with Jordan. The Israelis also indicated that the British were aware of these talks. They expressed the hope that even if it was impossible to keep secret the fact that the conversations were proceeding, there would be a high degree of security regarding their substance.

It was agreed that another meeting would take place on Thursday, December 1.

Kirkbride commented that the King appeared to be over-optimistic as always.

Editorial Note

The *Ad Hoc* Political Committee began general debate on the question of assistance to Palestinian refugees on November 30. France, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States had submitted a joint draft resolution on the matter on November 29; for the text, see GA, 4th sess., *Ad Hoc Political Committee, Annex*, volume I, page 53. The representatives of these same nations, on December 1, introduced a revised draft resolution, which proposed that the General Assembly establish a Near East Relief and Works Agency "(a) to carry out in collaboration with local Governments the direct relief and works programmes as recommended by the Economic Survey Mission; [and] (b) to consult with the interested Near Eastern Governments concerning measures to be taken by them preparatory to the time when international assistance for relief and works projects is no longer available." The text of this measure is printed *ibid.*, page 55. For John C. Ross' statement giving the support of the United States to the draft resolution, see GA, 4th sess., *Ad Hoc Political Committee*, page 308.

The *Ad Hoc* Political Committee continued general debate on the refugee question until December 2, at which time it adopted the joint draft resolution as amended, by a vote of 48 to none, with 6 abstentions. The proceedings of the Committee from November 30 to December 2 are printed *ibid.*, pages 307-330.

867N.01/12-149

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Hare) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] December 1, 1949.

Subject: Your Appointment With the Jordan Minister of Defense on Tuesday, December 6, 1949, at 3:00 p. m.

Discussion

The Jordan Minister of Defense, Fawzi Pasha el Mulki, now in the United States as Jordan delegate to the Palestine Conciliation Commission, is calling on you on Tuesday, December 6, 1949, at 3:00 p. m., to present a letter addressed to the President by King Abdullah of Jordan.¹ A translation of the letter is attached for your information. (Tab A).²

Fawzi Pasha originally requested an interview with the President, but it could not be arranged because of the President's schedule. The President suggested that you receive Fawzi Pasha in his behalf.

It is understood that Fawzi Pasha will discuss briefly his country's attitude on the Palestine question, including the problem of Jerusalem.

Recommendations

1. It is recommended that you accept the letter on behalf of the President and express appreciation for Fawzi Pasha's visit. You may wish to inform him that the letter will be brought to the President's attention at an early date.

2. It is recommended that you take the following line with respect to the matters which Fawzi Pasha proposes to discuss:

(a) *Jerusalem*

King Abdullah opposes the internationalization of Jerusalem on the grounds that it would prejudice the security of Jordan. He believes that if Arab Jerusalem were demilitarized a gap would be created in Jordan's defense lines and both Jordan and Arab Palestine would be exposed to possible Israel aggression. Consequently, Fawzi Pasha, acting as Jordan spokesman, has informed the United Nations that his Government considers that Arab Jerusalem should remain under Jordan control. Jordan has, however, guaranteed free access to and protection of the Holy Places.

You may wish to point out to Fawzi Pasha that the United States continues to support the principle of internationalization and express

¹ Dated November 5; see editorial note, p. 1470; a note by Mr. Brown of the Executive Secretariat indicates that King Abdullah's communication was left with the Secretary by Fawzi Pasha on December 12.

² Not printed.

the hope that Jordan will cooperate with the United Nations in respect to the Jerusalem question.

(b) *Palestine Settlement*

Fawzi Pasha will probably refer to the President's message of March 28, 1949, to the King (Tab B),³ and outline the present views of Jordan regarding a final settlement. In this connection, direct negotiations are presently proceeding between Jordan and Israel and it may be that Fawzi Pasha will express the hope that the United States will continue to give sympathetic understanding to the desire of Jordan to reach a settlement.

You might point out that the United States believes that it is in the best interests of the parties themselves to settle this question as quickly as possible. We hope they will work either through the United Nations or directly to achieve this end. It is suggested that you also indicate that the United States Government stands ready to assist the parties, both as a member of the Palestine Conciliation Commission and in such other ways as may seem desirable, in reaching a final settlement.

³ Not printed.

800.00 Summaries/12-149 : Circular telegram

*The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices*¹

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, December 1, 1949—3 a. m.

Emb Cairo reports Min War issued secret instructions in effect lifting restrictions on passage shipping through Suez Canal and on normal operating schedules US ships Medit area, except those carrying war materials, incl fuels (infotel). Emb says instr beginning be carried out all Egypt ports. Eg customs official Alexandria informed ConGen ships carrying non-mil cargo to or from Israel can pass thru Suez Canal and Eg ports without restriction molestation, provided ships bound from Eg for Israel first call at another port.

ACHESON

¹ At Tel Aviv, Arab capitals (except Cairo), London, Paris, and Jerusalem.

867N.00/12-149 : Telegram

The Chargé in Israel (Ford) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEL AVIV, December 1, 1949—1 p. m.

850. Embtel 846, November 28.¹ Shiloah, Israeli Foreign Office, spent half-hour my home evening November 30 discussing Israeli-

¹ Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 1510.

Jordan secret talks. He confirmed he and Sassoon had begun talks night November 27 at Abdullah's winter palace Shuneh; that King had spent first ten minutes with them talking "genial generalities" and that thereafter he had delegated matters to Samir Pasha Rifai with his blessings and retired. Shiloah said subsequent 45 minutes discussions conducted with "friendly cordiality," Samir and Sassoon being "old friends with much in common."

Shiloah said neither King nor Samir brought up "old Jaffa-Lydda-Ramle story" but concentrated solely on Jordan's need for outlet to Mediterranean which, in Jordan's eyes, meant "entire Negev in interests in both Jewish and Arab world contiguity." Samir felt present Jewish wedge driven into Arab world must be removed in order justify to other Arab states any concession Jordan might now make looking to final peace settlement.

Jewish delegation's reply, according Shiloah, was to effect Israel fully realized importance to Jordan of Mediterranean outlet and was prepared make "any reasonable offer" but not at cost of entire Negev. Shiloah argued that if Arabs wished avoid "inevitable Jewish expansionism" in future, they must not cramp Jewish state now. Israel delegates said some other solution short of Negev "must and could be found" and suggestion of Hebron-Gaza corridor was reportedly then put forward. Shiloah said he pointed out such an arrangement would necessitate agreement with Egypt but that this was matter for peaceful settlement between Jordan and Egypt. "We might be willing concede corridor if Egypt willing concede western terminal."

Shiloah said talk terminated more or less on this note, that he and Sassoon were then dinner guests of King who was in "jovial reminiscing mood," and that second secret meeting with same participants at same place was called for night December 1. He said he unable say yes or no to overall success first meeting but stressed its friendly atmosphere. He said he believes King wants peace "with or without Negev" and that if tonight's or any future talks break down solely because of Negev, it would indicate to him that King was not acting solely for himself but for "third party."

Comment: Shiloah rarely brings himself to utterance word "Britain" but that is of course his "third party." In several recent talks with British Minister here he has repeatedly said insofar as he knows British Government is keeping hands off present trend of events, that his government "doesn't care who holds the Negev as long as it is not the Russians," and that while so-called Gaza corridor would be no sacrifice for Israeli if Arabs prepared swallow it to save face, he believed his government would applaud if only in interests getting on with job.

I stressed to Shiloah after last night's talk keen interest my Government in progress present negotiations; pointed out he and Sassoon had assumed grave and delicate burden, the success or failure of which could have far-reaching consequences, and hoped he would keep me current on developments. *End Comment.*

Sent Department 850; repeated London 140; Jerusalem 98; Department pass Amman 62.

FORD

Editorial Note

Subcommittee 1 made its report on the Jerusalem area to the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee on December 2. The report included a draft resolution which called on the General Assembly to restate its intention to place the area under a permanent international regime, which would make appropriate guarantees for the protection of the Holy Places, as originally set forth by the General Assembly in its resolution of November 29, 1947 (see footnote 1 to telegram 1271, *Foreign Relations*, 1947, volume V, page 1291).

The draft resolution, accordingly, called for the establishment of the area as a *corpus separatum* and designated the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations to discharge the responsibilities of the Administering Authority. The draft resolution, moreover, called on the Trusteeship Council to complete preparation of the Statute of Jerusalem and to proceed with its implementation.

The Subcommittee's report is printed in GA, *4th sess., Ad Hoc Political Committee, Annex*, volume I, page 57.

867N.01/12-549

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Wells Stabler of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] December 5, 1949.

Subject: Israel-Jordan Talks

Participants: Mr. Greenhill—British Embassy
Mr. Stabler

Discussion:

Mr. Greenhill read a telegram from the British Minister in Amman regarding the progress of the Israel-Jordan talks. The Israeli representatives, Messrs. Sassoon and Shiloah, and Samir Rifai Pasha had met for the second time at Shuneh on December 1.

The Israeli representative informed the Jordan representative that Israel had come to the conclusion that it could not cede any territory as part of a settlement with Jordan. Samir Pasha replied that this view was irreconcilable with the earlier recognition by Israel of the necessity for Jordan to have access to the sea. It was necessary for Jordan to receive this access through territory over which Jordan had sovereignty. The Israelis said that this was very difficult and there were many points involved. Samir Pasha replied that in this event there appeared to be no necessity for proceeding further with the talks. Samir Pasha commented to the British Minister that the "visitors had been taken aback" by his statement.

The Israeli representatives then asked what scheme for settlement Jordan had in mind. Samir Pasha replied by asking whether the Israeli claim to the Negeb was based solely on its need for a reserve of land capable of development. The Israel representatives replied in the affirmative. Samir Pasha then suggested that in view of this, Jordan suggested a partition of the Negeb. Israel would take the northern part which was capable of cultivation while Jordan would take the southern part which could not be cultivated in any way. Thus Jordan would not only have access to the sea but also a common frontier with Egypt. The Israelis commented that this question could not be dealt with solely on the basis of the cultivatability of the land and that other factors entered into the situation. There then ensued a long argument which led to no conclusion.

The Israelis then said that they had three points which they wanted to discuss.

With respect to Jerusalem both Israel and Jordan were opposed to internationalization and thought that partition was the best solution. The Israelis asked whether Samir Pasha could give any views on partition to which Samir Pasha replied that he could not at this time. The Israelis then said that it was necessary for them to gratify certain religious elements in Israel. Consequently it was necessary for Israel* to have free access to the Wailing Wall. Samir Pasha said that he would bear this in mind.

The Israelis said that they wished to recommence work at the Potash Works in the Dead Sea and at the Hydroelectric Station at Nahariyim. Samir Pasha replied that Jordan was not prepared to accept this except as part of a general settlement.

The Israelis brought up the question of the Anglo-Jordan Treaty and asked if it were possible for the United Kingdom to keep its bases east of Jordan. While they had no real objection to British bases West

*to reoccupy the Jewish quarters in the old city and [Footnote in the source text; presumably Mr. Stabler intended that these words be inserted in the text.]

of the Jordan, there was a psychological factor in Israel which had to be borne in mind. It would be easier for Israel to recognize greater Jordan if the British did not return to Palestine. Samir Pasha had nothing to say on this point. The Israelis then said that they assumed that Jordan insistence regarding the Negeb was the result of British strategical requirements. Samir Pasha denied this and said that to show the veracity of his denial he would offer an alternative to the Negeb. Jordan would accept a piece of territory from Hebron through Faluja to Majdal and another from Jenin through Nazareth to Acre. The latter strip would be a substitution of a common frontier with Lebanon for one with Egypt.

Samir Pasha requested the Israelis to return to Tel Aviv and obtain a straight answer on the question of access to the sea and cession of territory. The answer would show whether there was any use of meeting again. The Israelis promised that they would send a message concerning these points on or about December 4.

Samir Pasha commented to the British Minister that the Israelis appear determined not to break off the talks at that meeting and had been considerably shaken when Samir Pasha had suggested that in view of the Israel attitude on the cession of territory, no useful purpose would be served by continuing the talks. While the Israelis had been fairly adamant regarding the cession of territory, particularly in connection with the common frontier with Lebanon, there had been a number of hints that their position was not necessarily final. Samir Pasha said that the meeting had been conducted in a cordial atmosphere.

Editorial Note

The *Ad Hoc* Political Committee began consideration of the report of Subcommittee 1 (see editorial note, page 1518) on December 5. Mr. Ross stated that the United States remained convinced that the proposals of the Palestine Conciliation Commission were the best basis for a solution of the Jerusalem problem. He expressed regret that the recommendations of Subcommittee 1 did not constitute an improvement over those of the Conciliation Commission. He averred that the Trusteeship Council would have the virtually impossible task of putting into operation a new political system which failed to take into consideration the realities of the situation. The Trusteeship Council did not have at its disposal the force that might prove necessary in order to impose a regime on the population of the Jerusalem area which was obviously incompatible with its aspirations (GA, 4th sess., *Ad Hoc Political Committee*, page 343).

867N.00/12-549 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEL AVIV, December 5, 1949—1 p. m.

859. Ford and I December 4 during hour with Ben-Gurion and earlier hour and half with Eytan and Comay canvassed: (1) Istanbul conference,¹ (2) Israel position re Jerusalem, (3) re Egypt, (4) re Jordan, (5) Communism, (6) re ESM, (7) re Point IV, (8) US policy Near East.

1. Istanbul: I gave orally substance of agreed statement and also made five points McGhee and I drafted as basis my arguments here. (See my "main talk" memorandum in Department's summary of Istanbul conference.)

Prime Minister showed keenest interest throughout, interjecting observations frequently and at conclusion my résumé commented follows:

2. Jerusalem: In impassioned demand for "true reason" international community "intransigence" re Jews continued occupancy and rule of new Jerusalem, Prime Minister observed bitterly "Christianity still cannot accept nor tolerate fact that Jewish state now exists and that its traditional capital is Jerusalem". Declaring that Israel would make any desired promise re safeguarding and guaranteeing free access to "places sacred to all mankind" he added "such promises hold good today and will be observed twenty or hundred years hence". He concluded gravely "it would take an army to get Jews out of Jerusalem; and the only army I see willing to occupy Jerusalem is Russia's".

3. Egypt: Prime Minister eagerly seized on my suggestion re possible direct talks Egypt. "Peace with Egypt would mean peace and stability throughout entire Middle East" he declared and was obviously desirous such direct talks soonest. He had, however, no face-saving device to suggest. On contrary, he said "Gaza is now wanted by Abdullah and hence is not bargaining point between Egypt and Israel".

4. Jordan: Prime Minister confirmed secret talks now in progress (Embtels 846, November 28² and 850 December 1) and seemed sanguine of outcome. Nonetheless, he emphatically subordinated effect Jordan peace to far more important need for Egypt peace. Eytan had previously enlarged on latest talks with Abdullah December 1, saying Negev no longer paramount issue and that talks now hinging primarily on Gaza and "free passage" or corridor. Other issues including partition Jerusalem, Latrun, Scopus-Bethlehem roads, potash concession and free port Haifa, he implied were manageable.

In answer my question re extension British treaty in event Jordan absorbs Arab Palestine, Prime Minister indicated as had younger colleagues gravity this issue. Prime Minister said "that's something we shall have to discuss with British".

¹ For documentation on the conference of Near Eastern Chiefs of Mission held at Istanbul from November 26 to 29, see pp. 165 ff.

² Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 1510.

[5.] Communism: Aside from his Jerusalem outburst, Prime Minister emphatically decried communism's chances in Israel. "For three thousand years we Jews have refused accept regimentation and have repeatedly fought it at risk national extermination. Today we are still Jews and still fight regimentation". Re reported Vatican fear communism in Jerusalem, Prime Minister emphatically said: "Rome will be Communist before Jerusalem".

6. ESM: Prime Minister significantly made no comment on my relaying of Clapp's judgment that continued unrestricted immigration to Israel would result in economic collapse.

7. Point IV: Prime Minister interested but non-committal this program other than to grunt at my disclosure that only 5 million dollars allocated entire Near East.

8. US policy Near East: Commenting on my statement that "after Istanbul I understand more clearly full implications new policy Near East", Prime Minister said with evident conviction and pleasure: "US must in its own interests work out with or without Britain, American Near East policy; we think we can see it beginning to take shape".

Comment: Throughout the two and half hours of our two talks formalities were dispensed with and our exchanges were forthright.
End comment.

Sent Department 859, repeated London 141, Jerusalem 99, Baghdad 52, Beirut 77, Damascus 57. Department pass Amman 63, Cairo 72, Jidda 32.³

McDONALD

³ Ambassador McDonald, the following day, sent a message to Clark Clifford, suggesting that he read telegram 859 (telegram 865, 867N.00/12-649).

501.BB Palestine/12-649

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] December 6, 1949.

Subject: Voting in the UN on Jerusalem

The Secretary called Mr. Connelly at Key West this afternoon to report on the situation which would take place this afternoon in the United Nations on Jerusalem. He was doing this not to bother the President or to get any decision from him, but to explain what might seem a course by the United States delegation contrary to the President's clear instructions. The Secretary said that he did not think that the proposed course was contrary to the instructions but thought that perhaps early press reports might look as though it were.

The Secretary said that his clear basic instructions from the President on this question of Jerusalem were that the United States should stick with the Palestine Conciliation Report unless and until something better comes along. If an agreement could be worked out between

the Jews, some of the Arabs, and some of the Christian countries, the United States would be for that, but for the present, it is clear that we should not abandon the Committee Report in which we participated.

However, a subcommittee had been created which had made a report in the Committee of the whole. In this report, some of the South American countries and some of the Arab countries not involved directly, want to go back to the idea of a separate state for Jerusalem. The Secretary said that that had not been possible last year and it would not be possible now since neither the Jews nor Transjordan would accept it. However, the proposal has a majority of two. The Secretary said that we would vote against this.

The Swedes and the Dutch have brought up a proposal which may have a good deal of merit. Their proposal is to work out something along the lines of the PCC report, but less formal and less complicated. The United States position on this will be that we are not going to vote for that in the Committee but if, between the time it leaves the Committee and reaches the floor of the United Nations, the delegates could get together on this or some modification, the United States might be inclined to go along. At this point, however, if we voted for it, we would have everyone down on us; if we voted for the subcommittee report we would have the Jews down on us. The Secretary pointed out that we are now for the first time in the fairly good position when we can say to the Vatican and the Jews that they should get together and talk to each other, but that we were not going to coerce them.

S11.22767N/12-649

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Wells Stabler of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] December 6, 1949.

Subject: Training of Israeli Officers

Participants: NEA—Mr. Hare
 Mr. Greenhill—British Embassy
 ANE—Mr. Wilkins
 ANE—Mr. Stabler

Discussion:

Mr. Greenhill came in today on instructions from the Foreign Office to inquire regarding our attitude on the training of Israeli officers. Mr. Greenhill said that some time ago the Israeli Government had approached the British Government with the request that Israeli officers be trained in England. The British Government had replied that since

the Israeli Prime Minister had stated that Israeli officers were to be trained in the East as well as in the West, it could not agree to train any Israeli officers. Apparently this response had annoyed the Israeli Government, and it had recently again approached the British Government on the same subject, indicating that both the United States and France had agreed to train Israeli officers. The British Government was interested to know the attitude of the United States.

Mr. Hare said that while the arms embargo was in effect we accepted neither Israeli nor Arab officers for training. However, since the lifting of the arms embargo, we were prepared to consider requests. The Defense Department, in which the responsibility for these matters lies, is reviewing its training facilities in the light of the obligations of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program. We assumed that when the Mutual Defense Assistance requirements have been met, the Defense Department might be able to provide limited training facilities for the Israelis and the Arabs. Mr. Hare pointed out that it was necessary for us to maintain a balance between Israeli and Arab officers, particularly if the latter desired training facilities.

Mr. Stabler indicated that the question of security also entered into this question and that the fact that Israel would send its officers both to the East and to the West would undoubtedly be taken into consideration. Mr. Stabler also mentioned that we had received requests from Israel for training facilities for a large group of officers. He referred to recent newspaper articles reporting that the Israel Government was annoyed that its requests had been ignored. The Defense Department subsequently issued a statement that Israel's request had been acknowledged and was under consideration.

Mr. Greenhill expressed appreciation for this information, which he said he would forward to London. He said that the British Government in considering this question had to bear in mind not only the question of security, but also the fact that bad blood existed between the British Army and the Israelis.

501.BB Palestine/12-749

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State*¹

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] December 7, 1949.

Participants: The Secretary
 Deputy Under Secretary Rusk
 Mr. Moshe Sharett, Israeli Foreign Minister
 Mr. Eliahu Elath, Israeli Ambassador
 Mr. Wilkins—ANE

¹ Drafted by Mr. Wilkins.

Problem: Current developments at the UN regarding Palestine.

Action required: None

Action assigned to: ANE

Mr. Sharett called on me this afternoon for the purpose of paying his respects during his current visit to the United States to attend the present session of the General Assembly and for the purpose of making known Israeli views on certain aspects of the Palestine problem.

Mr. Sharett informed me that it was a great relief for him to leave the present nightmare at Lake Success for the calm of Washington. He indicated that an "unholy alliance" of Arab states, Latin American states, the USSR and its satellites had brought about, in subcommittee of the *ad hoc* political committee, the adoption of an amended Australian resolution providing for rigid internationalization in the Jerusalem area. Mr. Sharett said that the ghost of November 29, 1947² was "stalking the scene" and that many representatives in the United Nations were bowing down before it.

I asked Mr. Sharett if any progress had been made in recently reported conversations between representatives of Israel and representatives of the Vatican in Rome. Mr. Sharett said he could tell me confidentially that while it should be understood that the Vatican did not approve of present Israel proposals regarding Jerusalem, a message had been sent to him to the effect that he continue his present line and that conversations could be continued later. Mr. Sharett said that this message meant the Vatican was not displeased with the manner in which the Israeli Government was conducting its relations with Catholic representatives within Israel and that, as the Vatican did not expect any action at the present session of the General Assembly, representatives of Israel and the Vatican could continue their current talks thereafter. Mr. Sharett believed that the Vatican was divided regarding the question of full internationalization for the Jerusalem area, but that it would maintain its present position of support for full internationalization pending action by the GA.

I asked Mr. Sharett what the views of the Israeli Government were with respect to Jerusalem. He informed me that his Government considered an agreement between the United Nations and Israel with respect to the Holy Places through the medium of a UN commissioner appeared to be adequate and said that arrangements of this character would make it possible for Israel and Jordan to take care of the practical affairs of everyday life in Jerusalem.

I observed that when I had last seen Mr. Sharett in the spring of this year³ I had pointed out to him that we envisaged, in the light

²The date of the resolution by the General Assembly which called for the partition of Palestine and the establishment of Jerusalem as a *corpus separatum*.

³See Secretary Acheson's memorandum of conversation of April 5, p. 890.

of the General Assembly resolution of December 11, 1948, a practical arrangement for the Jerusalem area under the general supervision of the United Nations in which the authorities of the adjoining states would have responsibility for administration. I remarked that he had previously indicated that we were in general agreement and that his present views were at some variance with his former position.

I asked Mr. Sharett what he thought of the Swedish-Netherlands proposal⁴ regarding the Jerusalem area. Mr. Sharett replied that its concept appeared acceptable but that it contained a number of serious faults, including suspension of laws and regulations by the UN commissioner, the character of the Consular Court, and the prohibition on the establishment of national administrative agencies within Jerusalem. He also indicated that Israel had a number of other reservations and amendments to this proposal.

I asked Mr. Sharett what action he thought the United Nations might take regarding Jerusalem. Mr. Sharett replied that he thought the United Nations should restrict itself to a reaffirmation of its previously stated principles regarding the Holy Places, to a request to the parties concerned that they make arrangements with the United Nations regarding the Holy Places and to a call upon the parties that they cooperate with the United Nations in the reestablishment of peace in Jerusalem.

Mr. Sharett told me that, at Jordan's request, Israeli representatives had been holding a series of exploratory talks with King Abdullah and his representatives and that, while he could not report any substantial progress, his Government was hopeful of the outcome. He said that this optimism was based on the present position of both governments in Israel and Jordan and that Israel was prepared to offer agreement to the incorporation of Arab Palestine in Jordan in return for peace from Abdullah. He said that no serious question of territory existed between Israel and Jordan and that Abdullah, desiring a port in the Mediterranean, was anxious to obtain the Gaza strip from Egypt and subsequently access, by means of road or strip, from Israel. Transfer of the Gaza strip was a matter solely between Jordan and Egypt. Israel would not be in a position to offer Jordan a territorial strip which would cut Israel in two but would be in a position to offer Abdullah free access from Jordan to Gaza.

I asked Mr. Sharett if Israel and Jordan had discussed the refugee question. Mr. Sharett said their representatives had not.

Mr. Sharett concluded by informing me that Israel was seriously apprehensive regarding frequent Arab announcements of a "second

⁴ The text of the draft resolution submitted by the Netherlands and Sweden on December 5 is printed in GA, 4th sess., *Ad Hoc Political Committee, Annex*, vol. 1, p. 60.

round" with Israel and regarding Arab rearmament through shipments of British jets and tanks. He said that Israel would appreciate my authorizing shipments of military supplies from the United States through the granting of export licenses. I said that I was not informed on this subject and that we would study it. Ambassador Elath said he would supply us with additional details regarding this matter.⁵

⁵ Mr. Hare had sent a memorandum to the Secretary of State on December 7, prior to the latter's meeting with Mr. Sharett, to brief him on the Israeli and United States positions on various important questions. The memorandum ventured into two questions which were not brought up directly during the Acheson-Sharett conversation, as follows:

"F. *Iraqi Jews*—Israel has expressed official concern to the United States Government over the alleged persecution of Iraqi Jews and has conducted a strenuous campaign, both in the United States and elsewhere, on this subject.

"It is the well-established policy of the United States Government to urge that minorities of whatever faith in Near Eastern countries be treated in a manner compatible with the objectives of the United Nations with respect to human rights and fundamental freedoms. This question has been discussed by the American Embassy in Baghdad with many members of the Jewish community in Iraq, with American and European residents of Baghdad and Basra and with Christian and Moslem Iraqis of varying shades of political opinion. Our Embassy reports that despite certain difficulties experienced by the Jewish community in Iraq, factual evidence does not support the conclusion that Iraqis of the Jewish faith are being subjected to a campaign of genocide or of general persecution. Our Embassy is continuing to discuss this matter with the Iraqi Government and we hope that Israel and Iraq will bear in mind the need for approaching such questions in a moderate manner in order to avoid aggravating the situation.

"G. *Arab Collective Security Pact and Israel's Relations with the Arab States*—Israel has expressed concern regarding the proposed Arab Collective Security Pact and has emphasized the dangers of such a Pact unless the Arab states cease to talk about preparations for a 'second round' war with Israel. Mr. Sharett has informed our Ambassador in Tel Aviv that United States or United Kingdom support for such a Pact prior to peace between Israel and the Arab States would strengthen Arab intransigence and delay the achievement of such peace.

"We understand a committee of the Arab League is presently drafting a text of this Pact. We have not yet been informed of its full content. We have not, however, received any preliminary information, which would indicate that this Pact is preliminary to a resumption of hostilities by the Arab States against Israel." (867N.01/12-749)

Editorial Note

The *Ad Hoc* Political Committee made its report to the General Assembly on December 7; for its text, see United Nations, *Official Records of the Fourth Session of the General Assembly, Plenary Meetings of the General Assembly, Annex to the Summary Records of Meetings, 1949* (hereinafter identified as GA, 4th sess., Plenary, Annex), page 35. The report included two draft resolutions adopted by the Committee for consideration by the General Assembly. One concerned the questions of an international regime for the Jerusalem area and of the protection of the Holy Places, the Committee adopting the recommendations of Subcommittee 1 by a vote of 35 to 13, with 11 abstentions.

The second draft resolution dealt with the question of assistance to the Palestine refugees, which the Committee adopted by 48 votes to none, with 6 abstentions. For the texts of the two draft resolutions, see GA, *4th Sess., Plenary, Annex*, pages 38 and 39. For the proceedings of the Committee from December 5 to 7, see GA, *4th sess., Ad Hoc Political Committee*, pages 339-368.

867N.00/12-749 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEL AVIV, December 7, 1949—2 p. m.

869. In 80-minute talk with Shiloah at his request Dec. 6 my house, he observed as follows:

(1) Jordan talks with Abdullah's intermittent participation are continuing in "favorable atmosphere." Central problem now is King's insistence on Gaza outlet and control of corridor. Israel agreeable "free passage" and now searching for formula to satisfy Jordan without sacrificing Israeli sovereignty or dividing country. When Israel suggested possible Egyptian objection Jordan control Gaza, King replied: "Adjustment is possible with Cairo as family affair." Shiloah said next meeting, probably December 8, is expected to be "crucial", and possibly last before opening formal negotiations.

(2) Egypt, Shiloah said, is "dear my heart". He echoed Prime Minister's eagerness for early start negotiations (Embtel 859, December 5) and said Riley was recently agent to carry letter from Sassoon to Sherine, Farouk's brother-in-law, and in confidence also of [to?] Egyptian Army and Foreign Office. No answer yet received this Israeli bid for negotiations. Shiloah "fears no progress unless US takes initiative bringing two countries together." In Jordan talks, Israel had "made it perfectly plain that nothing would be agreed to which might further alienate Egypt." He explained "Though Israel more intertwined with Jordan, peace with Egypt much more important."

(3) Jerusalem was discussed briefly. In passing Shiloah made disquieting statement: "We shall, of course, expect part of old city in any final partition." He anticipated no insurmountable obstacle to territorial adjustment in Jerusalem.

(4) Anglo-Jordan treaty's extension to cis-Jordan¹ would be "matter of grave concern" and Israel would "almost certainly insist that certain clauses, e.g., right to establish bases and maintain troops, be abrogated." He echoed Prime Minister's insistence this would require high level discussion with British.

¹ Presumably, on this side of the Jordan, i.e., the West Bank.

(5) Shiloah asked if "Arab rearming and threats of second round" had caused concern at Istanbul. On my negative reply, he commented that Israel must regard seriously such rearming, especially that of Egypt with scores of tanks and some jet planes. He expressed fear that Arabs would interpret western shipment of supplies as approval of threats of second round. My assurances that US is convinced UK has no such purpose seemed not to satisfy Shiloah.

Sent Department 869; repeated London 142, Jerusalem 100, Baghdad 53, Beirut 78, Damascus 58, Jidda 33; Department pass Amman 64, Cairo 73, Karachi for McGhee.

McDONALD

Editorial Note

The General Assembly, at a brief meeting on December 8, adopted the draft resolution dealing with the question of assisting the Palestinian refugees that had been proposed by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee. The resolution was adopted by a vote of 47-0, with 6 abstentions (United Nations, *Official Records of the Fourth Session of the General Assembly, Plenary Meetings of the General Assembly, Summary Records of Meetings 20 September-10 December 1949* (hereinafter identified as GA, *4th sess., Plenary*), page 571).

The resolution was based on the First Interim Report of the Economic Survey Mission. It recognized that "continued assistance for the relief of the Palestine refugees is necessary to prevent conditions of starvation and distress among them and to further conditions of peace and stability, and that constructive measures should be undertaken at an early date with a view to the termination of international assistance for relief."

The resolution also considered that "the equivalent of approximately \$33,700,000 will be required for direct relief and works programmes for the period 1 January to 31 December 1950 of which the equivalent of \$20,200,000 is required for direct relief and \$13,500,000 for works programmes; that the equivalent of approximately \$21,200,000 will be required for works programmes from 1 January to 30 June 1951, all inclusive of administrative expenses; and that direct relief should be terminated not later than 31 December 1950 unless otherwise determined by the General Assembly at its fifth regular session."

The resolution established the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to carry out the direct relief and works programs recommended by the Economic Survey Mission and to consult with Near Eastern Governments concern-

ing measures to be taken by them preparatory to the time when relief and works projects would cease.

The resolution also dealt with such matters as the Office of Director of the Agency, an Advisory Commission, and the financing of the activities of the Agency. It closed with an instruction to the Palestine Conciliation Commission to transmit the final report of the Economic Survey Mission. The full text of the resolution (No. 302 (IV)) is printed in United Nations, *Official Records of the Fourth Session of the General Assembly, Resolutions, 20 September-10 December 1949* (hereinafter identified as GA, *4th sess., Resolutions*), page 23.

Editorial Note

The General Assembly, in two meetings on December 9, considered that part of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee report concerned with establishing an international regime for the Jerusalem area and with protecting the Holy Places; the proceedings of these meetings are printed in GA, *4th sess., Plenary*, pages 572-607.

Mr. Ross expressed again the opposition of the United States to the draft resolution adopted by the Committee and reiterated support for the proposals of the Palestine Conciliation Commission (*ibid.*, page 578). British Representative Cadogan also spoke in opposition to the Committee measure, while Soviet Representative Tsarapkin spoke in favor of it (*ibid.*, pages 573 and 589).

The General Assembly, later the same day, adopted the resolution proposed by the Committee by a vote of 38-14, with 7 abstentions. The United States and the United Kingdom were recorded in opposition (*ibid.*, page 607); for the text of resolution, see *infra*.

*Resolution 303 (IV) Adopted by the General Assembly on December 9, 1949*¹

The General Assembly,

Having regard to its resolutions 181 (II) of 29 November 1947 and 194 (III) of 11 December 1948,

Having studied the reports of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine set up under the latter resolution,

I. *Decides*

In relation to Jerusalem,

¹ Reprinted from GA, *4th sess., Resolutions*, p. 25.

Believing that the principles underlying its previous resolutions concerning this matter, and in particular its resolution of 29 November 1947, represent a just and equitable settlement of the question,

1. To restate, therefore, its intention that Jerusalem should be placed under a permanent international regime, which should envisage appropriate guarantees for the protection of the Holy Places, both within and outside Jerusalem, and to confirm specifically the following provisions of General Assembly resolution 181 (II): (1) the City of Jerusalem shall be established as a *corpus separatum* under a special international regime and shall be administered by the United Nations; (2) the Trusteeship Council shall be designated to discharge the responsibilities of the Administering Authority . . . ;² and (3) the City of Jerusalem shall include the present municipality of Jerusalem plus the surrounding villages and towns, the most eastern of which shall be Abu Dis; the most southern, Bethlehem; the most western, Ein Karim (including also the built-up area of Motsa); and the most northern, Shu'fat, as indicated on the attached sketch-map;

2. To request for this purpose that the Trusteeship Council at its next session, whether special or regular, complete the preparation of the Statute of Jerusalem, omitting the new inapplicable provisions, such as articles 32 and 39, and, without prejudice to the fundamental principles of the international regime for Jerusalem set forth in General Assembly resolution 181 (II) introducing therein amendments in the direction of its greater democratization, approve the Statute, and proceed immediately with its implementation. The Trusteeship Council shall not allow any actions taken by any interested Government or Governments to divert it from adopting and implementing the Statute of Jerusalem;

II. *Calls upon* the States concerned to make formal undertakings, at an early date and in the light of their obligations as Members of the United Nations, that they will approach these matters with good will and be guided by the terms of the present resolution.

² Omission indicated in the source text.

501.BB Palestine/12-949: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel

RESTRICTED NIACT WASHINGTON, December 9, 1949—9 p. m.

755. Reference adoption amended Australian resolution regarding Jerusalem by General Assembly. Please take all possible steps in your discretion to urge upon Israeli Govt and its officials importance of preventing any statements or action which would inflame situation in Near East, particularly in view current Israeli-Jordan talks and possible further Israeli conversations with Vatican.

Sent Tel Aviv; repeated Amman for similar action except reference conversation with Vatican; repeated Jerusalem and USUN for info.

ACHESON

501.BB Palestine/12-1149: Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NIACT

TEL AVIV, December 11, 1949—1 p. m.

878. Immediately following receipt Department niact 755, December 9, Ford and I had Shiloah my residence for hour December 10 and were at office Eytan 45 minutes December 11.

In reply to Department message Eytan quoted Ben-Gurion as standing on today's statement: "Israel's position on question of Jerusalem found clear and final expression in statements by the government and all parties in Knesset on December 5. Jerusalem is an inseparable part of Israel and her eternal capital. No UN vote can alter this historic fact." Ben-Gurion feels "nothing more now need be said." There will be "special meeting government" this p. m.¹

Eytan said Israel immediately after UN vote stopped all further transfer property to Russians under Knesset authority August 24. "Bulk of property" not transferred and "no more will be transferred."

Eytan implied Israel not required take any action re UN decision until Trusteeship Council drafted and its implementation is begun. At point implementation "Israel may refuse access Jewish Jerusalem to TC representatives or merely refuse cooperation." No decision these policies yet taken. Eytan expects and hopes that meanwhile Russia will press its advantage and make such demands in TC for participation government Jerusalem as will antagonize Western Powers and prevent agreement. He said "Moscow and Vatican each hopes cheat the other. Their alliance cannot last."

Eytan was more optimistic than Shiloah about effects UN decision on Israel-Jordan talks. Next meeting will be December 13. Shiloah was pessimistic any agreement now except possibly on Jerusalem roads to Scopus and Bethlehem. Shiloah doubts Transjordan has or can secure consent Egypt transfer to Transjordan Gaza and strip. As to transit Transjordan to Gaza, Israel now offers road under Transjordan jurisdiction on model of US agreement Panama jurisdiction

¹ In his statement before the Knesset on December 5, the Israeli Prime Minister stated in part: "We cannot today regard the decision of November 29, 1947, as being possessed of any further moral force since the United Nations did not succeed in implementing its own decisions. In our view, the decision of November 29 about Jerusalem is null and void." The following day, the Knesset ratified unanimously the Prime Minister's statement. (Despatch 304, December 12, from Tel Aviv, 501.BB Palestine/12-1249)

over road through Canal Zone. Eytan feels Abdullah more anxious than his advisers avoid break Israel talks.

Comment: Whole Israel shocked and pro-Russian sections stunned by success Russian-Vatican-Moslem combination. Russian cynicism is bitter pill for all, but especially for Leftists. Ben-Gurion and Cabinet now see absurdity Sharett's policy insisting on balancing Russian "friendship" with that of US. I pressed this point cruelly with Eytan and intend do same with Ben-Gurion and Weizmann urging them speak and act accordingly. In particular I called Eytan's attention to inexcusable anti-American despatches in *Palestine Post* which I believe enjoys directly or indirectly government subsidies thus putting it in different category from independent and party newspapers. *End comment.*

MCDONALD

767N.90i/12-1249 : Telegram

The Chargé in Jordan (Fritzlan) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

AMMAN, December 12, 1949—7 p. m.

418. Saturday p. m. I had long audience King Abdullah at Shuneh during which following discussed.

1. Istanbul Conference: Conveyed substance recapitulation conference conclusions to King who expressed pleasure US adopted strict impartial attitude vis-à-vis Israelis and Arabs and that US approved direct talks and willing encourage both sides settle differences this manner.

2. Jerusalem: King bitterly resentful regarding GA action re Jerusalem and especially critical attitude Arab States. Asked me convey US Government appreciation US opposition amended Austrian [*Australian*] resolution, protested he had many times declared he would not leave Jerusalem and he intended abide by these declarations. Derived some comfort from his belief internationalization will not be carried out.

3. ESM report: Abdullah very pleased GA adopted ESM report without dissent and obviously expects much benefit from RWRA.

4. Jordan-Israel negotiations: King fairly hopeful success. Raised question US moral support "reasonable" Jordan claims. I replied US did not wish become involved in negotiation as we believe durable settlement obtainable only through direct negotiations two parties concerned without intervention. King replied he understood our position but hoped if opportunity arose US would support any Jordan claims it considered reasonable (particularly concerned re outlet to Mediterranean) added he had recently detected more conciliatory Israel attitude attributing this to possible suggestions made by Secretary Acheson to Sharett during recent meeting.

After audience with His Majesty I had long talk with Samir Pasha Rifai re progress negotiations with Israelis. He said crucial point was

manner arranging Jordan access to Mediterranean. Official Jordan position still demands south Negev across which road could be built connect Tafilah at SE end Dead Sea with Gaza.

Samir stated Israelis proposed corridor Hebron to Gaza under Jordan "jurisdiction". To this he replied allegedly that only alternative to south Negev which could be considered would be Hebron-Gaza corridor with full Jordan sovereignty but giving Israel transit rights at specific points. In addition Jordan would demand return certain land Tulkarm area as well as Israeli relinquishment all Arab quarters Jerusalem.

Samir added Israelis put forward claim for land west of Dead Sea to permit Israeli road link between potash works both ends Dead Sea. They also expressed concern possible establishment British bases Arab Palestine as having bad psychological effect.

December 8 talks were inconclusive and it seems next discussions, date not fixed, will be decisive. I have feeling neither King nor Samir will wish continue negotiations unless basic question access to sea can be solved satisfactorily.

Re obtaining Gaza from Egyptians Samir believes this will not be difficult as Egypt would like to be rid of refugees among whom Egyptian administration has been very unpopular. He feels this question can be resolved in time without great difficulty.

Re British bases in Palestine, Samir seemed feel some satisfaction might be given Israelis as from military viewpoint present bases would afford adequate protection. However, Jordan would never consider restriction British treaty of alliance to east bank Jordan River.

Sent Department 418, Department pass London 107, USUN 23, Tel Aviv 65, Jerusalem 147. Pouched Arab capitals.

FITZLAN

501.BB Palestine/12-1249 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

NIACT

TEL AVIV, December 12, 1949—9 p. m.

PRIORITY

880. Eytan called me to Foreign Office 6:30 p. m., December 12 expecting hand me advance copy Prime Minister's "policy statement" on Jerusalem, first scheduled for delivery 8 p. m. Knesset session. However, unexplained last minute cancellation and speech now set December 13 Knesset.

Eytan unable give me advance copy, but said BG had "made definite point" avoiding any "inflammatory statements" in preparing speech, while at same time stressing Israel's "rights" in Jerusalem and main-

taining position heretofore held that Jewish Jerusalem "must remain sovereignty Israel." Speech's main purpose, said Eytan, is enable government set "moderate and positive lead" for country, thereby avoiding extremist groups gaining advantage and public feeling "going astray after strange gods." Eytan said speech, broadly speaking, will announce "continuation of action" rather than suggest any new action.

Comment: I gather Israel proposes continue *status quo ante vis-à-vis* Jerusalem, e.g., town planning, maintenance certain government offices there, new construction, etc. and simply ignore existence GA resolution. *End comment.*

Sent Department 880. Department pass London 145, Jerusalem 101, Amman 65, Baghdad 55, Beirut 81, Damascus 60, Cairo 75, Jidda 35.

McDONALD

501.BB Palestine/11-1449

The Secretary of State to the Egyptian Ambassador (Rahim)

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of Egypt and has the honor to refer to the Joint Note of November 14, 1949, which was presented to Acting Secretary Webb by the Diplomatic Representatives of the Governments of Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Syria and by the Head of the Delegation of Yemen to the General Assembly of the United Nations, submitting certain observations regarding the question of Palestine.

The United States Government appreciates this expression of views and considers them as indicative of the desire of the Governments of the Arab States to reach an early and peaceful settlement of the Palestine problem. The views expressed in the Joint Note have been given close consideration by this Government.

The United States Government considers that the United Nations, which has been seized with the Palestine problem since the matter was first referred to that body in 1947, is the proper medium through which a solution of the question should be sought. The General Assembly of the United Nations created the Palestine Conciliation Commission for the purpose of assisting the parties to seek agreement by negotiations conducted either with the Commission or directly. It is the hope of this Government that the parties concerned will continue to collaborate with the United Nations in its important task of bringing about a peaceful settlement of all outstanding issues.

It is for this reason that the United States Government considers that questions relating to the Protocol of May 12, 1949, signed under the auspices of the Palestine Conciliation Commission by Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria on the one hand and by Israel on the

other, should more appropriately be discussed with the Conciliation Commission.

One of the principal objectives of the United States with respect to the Palestine problem is the restoration of peace and stability in the Near Eastern area. The United States Government is convinced that it is in the best interest of the parties themselves that they should take the initiative in advancing from the armistice stage to that of permanent peace and that they should employ all means at their disposal, including direct negotiations, to achieve this end.

The United States Government stands ready to assist the Arab States and Israel, both as a member of the Palestine Conciliation Commission and in such other ways as may seem desirable, in achieving a final settlement of the Palestine question.¹

WASHINGTON, December 13, 1949.

¹ Separate notes were sent to the diplomatic representatives of Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Syria on December 13. The same day the Department directed New York to convey orally to the Head of the Delegation of Yemen to the United Nations the substance of the notes. The Department explained that it was not desired to communicate in writing with the Head of the Yemeni Delegation since the United States did not maintain diplomatic relations with the present Government of Yemen. (instruction 383 to New York, 501.BB Palestine/11-1449) Mr. Ross carried out the instruction on December 20 (memorandum of conversation by Mr. Stabler, December 20, 501.BB Palestine/12-2649).

501.BB Palestine/2-1349

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Rusk)*¹

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] December 13, 1949.

Participants: Mr. Aubrey Eban, Israeli Representative to the UN
 Dr. Moshe Keren, Counselor, Embassy of Israel
 Mr. Rusk, Deputy Under Secretary
 Mr. Wilkins, ANE

Problem: Implementation of the General Assembly Resolution of December 9 regarding Jerusalem.

Action Required: To consider the Israeli view.

Action Assigned to: ANE

Mr. Eban, accompanied by Dr. Keren, called on me this afternoon, at their request, for the purpose of discussing the Jerusalem question in the light of the adoption by the General Assembly on December 9 of a resolution instructing the Trusteeship Council to revise its statute for Jerusalem and to implement it.

¹ Drafted by Mr. Wilkins.

Mr. Eban said he was glad the "nightmare" of General Assembly consideration of the Palestine question was over and that he appreciated the harmony which had existed between the Israeli delegation and the US delegation in the Assembly concerning the Jerusalem question.

I interjected that I appreciated Mr. Eban's remark but observed that although we were agreed on opposition to the amended Australian resolution regarding Jerusalem, we had not been in agreement concerning the type of resolution which we felt the General Assembly should pass.

Mr. Eban said that this was correct but, now that the General Assembly had adopted the Resolution of December 9, he wished to discuss it from the point of view of immediate repercussions and future action.

Mr. Eban said that the immediate repercussions of the adoption of the General Assembly Resolution had been as expected in Israel. The people of Israel and the people of Jerusalem did not believe that Jerusalem could or should be separated from Israel. Mr. Eban anticipated that the Israeli Parliament would discuss the matter in detail and added that a resolution proclaiming Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and a motion of no confidence in the Government would probably be introduced. Mr. Eban remarked that because of the public reaction in Israel and the proposed discussions and resolutions in the Parliament the Prime Minister would probably be required to reassure the Israelis regarding the Government's intentions.

I asked Mr. Eban exactly what was the juridical status of Jerusalem. He said it was exactly the same this week as it had been last week. There was no change in the juridical status of Jerusalem, nor was one intended.

Mr. Eban continued by remarking that the General Assembly Resolution of December 9 cut across the existing patterns of authority of Israel and Jordan in Jerusalem, that it cut across the existing armistice agreement between Israel and Jordan as far as Jerusalem is concerned, and that it cut across current talks between Israel and Jordan with respect to a settlement of the Palestine question, including the particular question of Jerusalem. Mr. Eban stated that it would be Israeli policy to bring about a "reversal" of the GA's resolution of December 9.

With respect to the Israeli-Jordan conversations, Mr. Eban believed that a successful outcome might be forthcoming in a matter of hours, perhaps a few days, and that, in general, the General Assembly Resolution had probably accelerated a successful outcome to these talks, whereas it had probably made further Israeli talks with the Vatican impossible.

I asked Mr. Eban whether it would not be helpful if Israeli representatives continued to explore the Jerusalem question with the Vatican. He said that the Vatican was probably "elated" with the passage of the General Assembly Resolution of December 9, which the Vatican had not anticipated, and that he was not optimistic regarding further talks at this stage.

I pointed out that a successful settlement of the Jerusalem question involved not only agreement between Israel and Jordan but also between Israel, Jordan and other religious interests, including particularly the Vatican. I added that in order to achieve such agreement all of those interested would undoubtedly be required to compromise their official positions. I urged upon Mr. Eban the importance of endeavoring, in so far as the Israelis could, the continuation of further talks with the Vatican.

I remarked, with regard to the General Assembly Resolution of December 9, that it posed a number of legal questions and that it raised the question of implementation. I recalled that the Trusteeship Council was under instructions from the General Assembly and observed that the Assembly's action, in so far as the members of the United Nations were concerned, had the status of a recommendation as had the Assembly Resolution of November 29, 1947. I remarked, regarding implementation, that the UN had no forces at its disposal and again expressed the hope that all of the parties interested in Jerusalem, both Israel and Jordan, as well as Catholic interests, would endeavor to work out together a settlement of the question. I said that the US as a member of the UN on the Trusteeship Council would work constructively in the Council.

501.BB Palestine/12-1349 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the
United Nations*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, December 13, 1949—12 noon.

641. US rep on TC¹ shld be guided by fol considerations at TC mtg Dec 13 when question of Jerusalem arises.

1. Although US voted against res adopted by GA, TC is under direction of GA and shld make bona fide effort to carry out clear intention of Assembly. US as member of TC will discharge its responsibilities in attempting to carry out GA res but US member should avoid leadership in discussions. At same time because of our opposition to Jerusalem res in GA we shld be careful that our position in TC does not undermine or give appearance of undermining GA's decision.

¹ Ambassador Francis B. Sayre.

2. First task confronting TC is review and modification of statute of Jerusalem in accordance with para I (2) of GA res. This para refers to need for amendments in statute in direction of its greater democratization. Inherent in such problem is also need to consider element of workability and acceptance. Although Dept does not believe that TC shld initially take steps toward implementation of statute, Dept does believe that elements of workability and acceptance shld be taken into account in modifications of the statute.

3. In opening statement US Rep shld say that views of US on Jerusalem have been stated in Assembly but US believes that, under instructions from Assembly, TC must proceed to draw up draft statute for Jerusalem and US will cooperate to this end.

4. In light of fact that GA res was only adopted on Dec 9 Dept believes that all govts interested in question and particularly members of TC may need some time now to consider problem further and to have opportunity to study views expressed in GA. US would favor therefore adherence to present schedule of TC so that initial work on problem does not commence until latter part of Jan.

5. Although US Del shld not take any initiative on question of place of TC meeting if subject is reopened in TC, US should support holding winter meeting of TC in NY rather than Geneva.

6. If question of participation of Israel and Jordan in work of TC arises, US Del shld support invitation to them to participate without vote but US shld not at this stage initiate invitation to them since their presence might precipitate the issue of their compliance or non-compliance with GA res.

7. If move is made in TC to establish a subcommittee to work on statute US Del shld support subcommittee of the whole rather than smaller subcommittee. If despite our position smaller subcommittee is established US shld seek to avoid membership on such committee but shld not press this to point where it might appear that US is unwilling to assist TC in drafting statute.²

ACHESON

² The Department sent the text of this telegram to London on December 16 and authorized communication of its substance to the British Foreign Office (telegram 4505, 867N.01/12-1649).

Editorial Note

The Trusteeship Council, on December 13, began consideration of its responsibilities under the General Assembly's resolution of December 9. Ambassador Sayre enunciated the views of the United States the same day, guided by the considerations set forth in telegram 641, *supra*. A summary of his statement is recorded in United Nations,

Official Records of the Trusteeship Council, Second Special Session, page 37.

The Council, on December 19, gave consideration to a Mexican draft resolution (*ibid.*, page 68), which proposed that the President of the Council be entrusted with the preparation of a working paper on the Statute of Jerusalem, to be submitted to the Council at the beginning of its sixth regular session on January 19, 1950. The draft resolution, as amended, was adopted by the Council by 11 votes to none, with 1 abstention (*ibid.*, page 69).

Then on December 20, the Council considered a draft resolution (*ibid.*, page 81), which expressed its concern at the removal to Jerusalem of various ministries and departments of the Government of Israel. Such action was said "likely to render more difficult the implementation of the Statute of Jerusalem." The draft resolution also called on the President of the Council "To invite the Government of Israel to submit a written statement on the matters covered by this resolution." The measure, as amended, was adopted by 5 votes to none, with 7 abstentions (*ibid.*, page 84).

The texts of the two resolutions as adopted by the Trusteeship Council, numbered 113 (S-2) and 114 (S-2), are printed in United Nations, *Official Records of the Trusteeship Council, Second Special Session, 8 December-20 December 1949, Resolutions*, page 2.

767N.901/12-1349 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, December 13, 1949—7 p. m.

4948. Furlonge, who has now replaced Burrows as head of Eastern Department, Foreign Office, said today that two recent telegrams from Kirkbride report December 8 meeting between Israel and Jordan was very stormy. Principal bone of contention continued to be Jordan's demand for access to Mediterranean. Israelis offered to give Jordan "jurisdiction" over corridor, but took strong stand could not alienate Israeli sovereignty over any territory. In presenting jurisdiction proposal, Israelis cited US-Panamanian agreement giving US right of access to Colon. Jordan turned offer down flatly. Israel reported to have argued could not give Jordan sovereignty over corridor, thereby splitting country in half, to which Jordan reported to have replied there was no question of splitting country in half, since Jordan desired southern Negev as well. Talks then adjourned *sine die*.

2. Prior to foregoing deadlock, parties discussed question of Jerusalem and there was agreement in principal regarding re-drawing

present line to meet points re access Hebrew University, Wailing Wall, et cetera. Israel also requested cession of area containing power station on Yarmuk River, to which Jordan replied it had not entered into talks to discuss disposal of Jordan territory.

3. Towards end of session, Abdullah reported to have come into room and stated that there could be no peace settlement unless Israel prepared make some concessions. He must be able show territorial concessions in order justify his action with other Arab states. If such concessions not forthcoming, he would prefer see present armistice arrangements continuing in effect.

4. Decision as to next meeting left to Israel.

5. Furlong clearly gloomy on prospects any settlement between two parties as result these conversations.

Department pass Amman as London's 10.

Sent Department 4948, repeated Tel Aviv 79.

HOLMES

Editorial Note

The Fifth Progress Report of the Palestine Conciliation Commission, dated December 14, reviewed its operations from September 16 to December 9. The report reviewed the problem of Jerusalem and the Holy Places, the refugee question and the territorial question. It concluded, in part, that "the Commission considers that it has received from the General Assembly in explicit terms the powers and obligations to undertake in the present circumstances a procedure of mediation and in consequence, to submit compromise proposals to the parties concerned. . . . Therefore the Commission hopes to undertake this task with the interested parties and thereby bring to a successful conclusion the mission entrusted to it by the General Assembly." The full text of the Fifth Progress Report is printed in United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, Annexes*, page 9.

867N.01/12-1449 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY

TEL AVIV, December 14, 1949—11 a. m.

885. Comment on Embtel 882 December 13:¹ Eytan's prognostications given me December 12 (Embtel 880²) that Prime Minister's speech would contain "no inflammatory statements" hardly borne out

¹ Not printed; it gave the text of the statement made by Prime Minister Ben-Gurion to the Knesset on December 13 (867N.01/12-1349).

² Dated December 12, p. 1534.

in such remarks as these: "Decision is utterly incapable of implementation if only for the determined unalterable opposition of the inhabitants of Jerusalem themselves"; and "We are continuing with the transfer of the government to Jerusalem and hope to complete it as soon as possible"; and "There is nothing now to prevent Knesset from returning to Jerusalem. We propose that you take a decision to this effect".

These statements obviously made (1) to forestall more drastic demands by government's violently outspoken rightwing critics such as Herut and (2) to confound Communists and leftist Mapam elements supporting or apologizing for USSR stand on internationalization. Ben-Gurion evidently confident of instant favorable reaction of Israel to his bold directive.

Embassy observer present during speech and subsequent Knesset debate reports proceedings generally quiet and orderly with only applause coming final announcement by speaker that "after Hanukka recess" Knesset meetings will be held Jerusalem. *End comment.*

Sent Department 885, repeated Baghdad 47, Beirut 83, Damascus 62, Jerusalem 103, Jidda 37. Department pass Amman 68, Cairo 77, London 147.

McDONALD

867N.00/12-1449 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

CAIRO, December 14, 1949—7 p. m.

1152. Hassan Youssef Pasha said yesterday further in connection with the Sassoon-Cherine matter that in any case the approach on the Sassoon-Cherine level is not the proper level. He said "Why don't you make yourselves go-between between Israel and Egypt? Only you could persuade the Israelis to put forth items which might form basis of settlement. In effect there is really only one outstanding issue: boundary adjustment. If settlement of the refugees becomes a *fait accompli* and if agreement can be reached on territorial adjustments, peace can be made."

He said also that he doubts sincerity of Israel concerning taking care of refugees there if Israel obtains control of Gaza area. "If Egypt," he continued, "could obtain in lieu of Gaza area the section which includes Beersheba and extending to Dead Sea, Egypt might settle those refugees there."

He said conversations are under way to renew armistice but could give no details. He reaffirmed that Egypt had no desire to renew hostilities. "However, if Israel resumes hostilities Egypt will be obliged to do as well as she can."

CAFFERY

501.BB Palestine/12-1549

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Stuart W. Rockwell of the
Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs*

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] December 15, 1949.

Participants: Dr. Moshe Keren, Israeli Embassy
Miss Esther Herlitz, Israeli Ministry of Foreign
Affairs
Mr. Hare, NEA
Mr. Wilkins, ANE
Mr. Rockwell, ANE

Problem: Attitude to be adopted re Israeli desire that Trusteeship Council not take certain steps in connection with Jerusalem case.

Discussion: Dr. Keren and Miss Herlitz called at their request at the instance of Mr. Eban. They said that Mr. Eban had heard that the Trusteeship Council was considering two matters: 1) The extension of an invitation to the Israeli Government to designate representatives to take part in the discussions in the Council on the preparation of a statute setting up an international regime for Jerusalem. 2) A draft resolution proposed by the French representative on the Council condemning Israel for recently taking action concerning Jerusalem in opposition to the provisions of the General Assembly resolution of December 9, 1949.

Re 1), Dr. Keren said that the Israeli Government hoped that no such invitation would be extended since Israel would be unable to participate in discussions looking toward the establishment of a regime to which it was firmly opposed. An invitation to participate would have to be refused, with resulting embarrassment both for the Trusteeship Council and Israel. Mr. Hare said that he thought it was customary for the Council to issue invitations to the interested parties to attend sessions of the Council when matters of interest to them were being discussed and that it might be difficult for the Council to make an exception in this case. He recalled that in the Somaliland case the Council had issued an invitation to Ethiopia despite the latter's attitude on the matter. Mr. Hare could give no assurances as to what the US attitude in this instance would be, but we would keep the Israeli position in mind.

Re 2), Dr. Keren said that if the Council passed a condemnatory resolution public opinion in his country, already inflamed against the UN because of the December 9 resolution, would become even more bitter. Such a resolution would make it more difficult to obtain in a calm and dispassionate atmosphere a new and more realistic UN decision on Jerusalem. He very much hoped it would be possible to avoid bringing a resolution of this nature to vote in the Council.

Mr. Hare said that we had heard that the French representative had introduced a draft resolution, but that he had not seen the text. We did not as yet know what the attitude of our Government on this matter would be, but he wished to point out that a majority decision on Jerusalem had been taken by the United Nations and that the Trusteeship Council had been given certain specific instructions by the General Assembly. The United States was a loyal member of the United Nations and of the Trusteeship Council, and was naturally going to play its part when the Council considered the course of action to take. Dr. Keren said that of course he understood this.

Mr. Hare stated that there have recently been strong actions taken and statements made in Israel concerning Jerusalem, and that it was natural that these should provoke a reaction in the Trusteeship Council. The United States Government was concerned by moves taken in Israel likely to prejudice or complicate the work of the Trusteeship Council in the task assigned it by the General Assembly.

Both Dr. Keren and Miss Herlitz maintained that what had recently happened in Israel was merely a further development in the process of moving Government offices to Jerusalem which had been going on for some time. They said that despite strong pressure in the Cabinet to do so, the Government had refused to proclaim Jerusalem the capital of Israel. Certain statements had been made to appease public opinion, but in reality the situation was more or less the same as before.

Mr. Hare could not agree with this, and said that he thought that the recent events in Israel could not really be described as unimportant further steps in a gradual process. Much stronger things had been done and said in the past few days.

Dr. Keren then returned to the importance of public opinion in Israel, and said that no democratic government, in the face of a decision such as the one just taken by the General Assembly, could refuse to act as the people desired. We pointed out that as far as Jerusalem was concerned Israel had to reckon as well with world opinion.

When questioned as to where the capital of Israel actually was at the present moment, Dr. Keren said that Israel really would not have a capital until a constitution had been adopted. The provisional capital was at Tel Aviv, but both Tel Aviv and Jerusalem had the necessary attributes for a capital, particularly now that Government offices had been located in Jerusalem.

Dr. Keren then reiterated the hope that the Trusteeship Council would pass no resolution condemning Israel. Mr. Hare said again that he could give no assurances as to what the US attitude on the question would be, as we had not had time to study the matter thoroughly.

767N.901/12-1549 : Telegram

The Chargé in Jordan (Fritzlan) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY

AMMAN, December 15, 1949—10 a. m.

421. Legtel 418 December 12. Yesterday evening I had hour and half talk with Samir Pasha Rifai re results fourth meeting with Israelis held Shuneh Tuesday¹ nite presence King.

Following questions listed for discussion and trend talks as follows according Samir:

1. Territorial settlement including Jordan access Mediterranean.
2. Jerusalem.
3. Tulkarm triangle (approved for separate discussion after Israeli opposition).
4. Israeli road link along west shore Dead Sea connecting potash works.
5. Application British treaty Arab Palestine.
6. Present and future treaty obligations both parties (this inserted request Israel and aimed Jordan obligations under AL charter).

First question passed over on insistence Israelis (desiring doubtless test extent Jordan concessions before revealing their hand access to sea) but on Samir's condition it be discussed before meeting ended as it was crucial question.

Re Jerusalem, Israelis demanded change line afford them contiguity of territory with Jew quarter and Wailing Wall in old city and with Mt. Scopus institutions. Samir recognized reasonableness former and King readily assented but Samir stated Jordan could not consider latter but would be willing guarantee free access. This of course predicated on conclusion general agreement which would change line giving Jordan Nablus, St Pauls and Bethlehem roads and territory east and would provide compensation for certain Arab quarters. Such arrangement seemed in general satisfactory to Israelis.

Re Tulkarm, Samir claimed return fertile triangle area absolutely necessary. This land had been held by Jordan and had been given up at armistice negotiations result of ignorance and stupidity.

Re question Israeli road link between potash works King gave immediate assent to Israeli demand. At this point Samir insisted on returning to discussion of question Jordan access to sea rather than taking up two questions re treaties.

After some discussion between Shiloah and Sassoon latter made dramatic statement effect that as evidence good faith part Israelis, and in appreciation King's conciliatory attitude, Ben Gurion had decided in face serious opposition especially from military that Israel should

¹ December 13.

give Jordan direct corridor from Hebron to Gaza (later amended to corridor from Hebron to Gaza via Beit Jibrin) with full sovereignty subject to three reservations: (a) there should be no military installations or bases in corridor; (b) Israelis should have free passage across it at least three places; (c) British treaty of guarantee not to apply corridor.

When King heard this proposal he expressed much pleasure and appeared believe agreement virtually reached. However, Samir replied proposal not acceptable. He had demanded South Negev and had indicated he would consider as alternative reasonable corridor with full Jordan sovereignty over it. He stated there were two reasonable and acceptable alternatives. One was Israeli relinquishment Western Galilee and suitable corridor to it, and other was corridor from Hebron to Majdal (slightly north Gaza) via Beit Jibrin and Faluja. He added Majdal only possible area which could be considered as point access in south because: (a) South coast very hilly with exception Majdal area and consequently Majdal offered only feasible site for port; (b) there existed road connection between Hebron and Majdal while no such link with Gaza; and (c) while Jordan hopeful eventually taking over Gaza from Egypt, this problematical.

Israelis replied they had no authority offer corridor to Majdal but agreed confer further with government.

Re Israeli reservations offer of corridor to Gaza Samir stated: (a) If Jordan agreed not establish military bases or installations in corridor it would ask Israel to give similar commitment re area both sides corridor to extent corridor width; (b) Jordan agreed in principle Israeli free passage at certain points across corridor but could not now commit itself to number of points. Question British treaty application to corridor not discussed but Samir believes injection this factor by Israelis indicative absence complete good faith.

Two remaining treaty questions deferred to later meeting.

Israeli delegates departed with intention requesting new instructions for possible future discussions for which date not set.

Comment: Apparent Israelis attempting obtain Jordan agreement on separate [apparent omission] in hope deferring central question Jordan access to sea. To counter such tendency Samir is making clear his refusal consider any aspects settlement except as integral part overall settlement, and agreement given on any particular question presumes reaching general agreement. I have strong feeling that neither Samir nor Prime Minister would be parties to agreement which did not embrace following as minimum: (1) corridor Hebron-Majdal with Jordan sovereignty over it; (2) Jerusalem line as giving Jordan Nablus, St Pauls and Bethlehem roads and territory east; and (3) return of Jordan Tulkarm triangle.

It is extremely doubtful that any Jordan government would agree to less. In general Samir seemed hopeful talks would succeed. Question of their continuation will depend upon Israelis.²

Sent Department 421. Department pass London 108, USUN 24, Jerusalem 148, Tel Aviv 66.

FRTZLAN

² The Israeli version of the talks with the Jordanians on December 13 was conveyed to Ambassador McDonald by Mr. Shiloah the following day. The Ambassador's account, as transmitted to the Department on December 15, was a brief one, going into detail only in connection with King Abdullah's request for Majdal and Ascalon as his "sea exit" instead of Gaza. No direct mention was made in the Ambassador's account of the Israeli proposal to give Jordan a direct corridor to the Mediterranean (telegram 893 from Tel Aviv, 767N.901/12-1549).

501.BB Palestine/12-1749

Memorandum by the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Hare) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] December 17, 1949.

Subject: Message to Israeli Government Concerning Jerusalem.

Discussion:

You will recall that we had anticipated that at your Press Conference on December 14 you would be asked concerning the attitude of this Government on the move to transfer the Israeli Government from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in opposition to the General Assembly Resolution of December 9. We had suggested that you might wish to state that in the opinion of the United States Government it would be most unfortunate if any of the parties interested in Jerusalem took action which would prejudice or complicate the settlement of the Jerusalem question. However, none of the correspondents present asked this question, and the Israeli Government has so far not received any official indication of our reaction to Prime Minister Ben Gurion's declaration in the Knesset on December 13 urging the Knesset to move to Jerusalem or to the subsequent removal of the Prime Minister's office from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.

Neither the General Assembly Resolution of November 29, 1947, nor the draft statute for Jerusalem prepared by the Trusteeship Council in the Spring of 1948 specifically prohibited the establishment of the capital of Israel in Jerusalem. The General Assembly Resolution of December 9, 1949, again does not contain any such specific prohibition. Arrangements for the transfer of the capital to Jerusalem might eventually be worked out with the United Nations in the Trusteeship Council, but unilateral establishment of the capital in Jerusalem at

this particular time will undoubtedly be construed as contrary to the spirit of the Resolution of December 9 and as open opposition by Israel to the United Nations.

Following the General Assembly's adoption of its Resolution of December 9, the Department instructed its representative in Tel Aviv to urge upon the Israelis the importance of preventing any statements or action which would inflame the situation in the Near East, particularly in view of current Israeli conversations with Jordan and the Vatican¹ (Tab A). This message apparently had little effect on the Israeli Government.

Under the circumstances, it is considered desirable that the Israeli Government be informed of our attitude on the latest developments concerning Jerusalem, and the attached telegram has been drafted. (Tab B)

Recommendations:

It is recommended that you sign the attached telegram.²

[Here follows the concurrence of the Office of the Special Assistant for Press Relations.]

¹ See telegram 755, December 9, p. 1531.

² See telegram 768, December 20, to Tel Aviv, p. 1555.

Editorial Note

The final report of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East was signed at Paris on December 18 by Chairman Clapp and the three Deputy Chairmen. The document was in two parts, the latter in the nature of a technical supplement. The two parts were released by the Palestine Conciliation Commission on December 28 under United Nations control No. AAC 25/6. The report's conclusions and proposals comprise the following:

"The approach to economic development in the Middle East proposed by the Economic Survey Mission thus includes the following elements:

1. *Recognition* by the Governments of Middle Eastern countries, by the United Nations and by the Member Governments which desire to proffer friendly assistance to the Middle East:

(i) That peace and stability cannot be achieved in the Middle East until the masses of its peoples are able to enjoy a higher standard of living than at present;

(ii) That the path to a higher standard of living for the population of the Middle East is a long one;

(iii) That, through the efforts of Middle Eastern peoples and Governments themselves, a higher standard of living can only be achieved through the development of the natural resources of

Middle Eastern countries which, to begin with, should be reflected in an improved and modernized agriculture, without which substantial industrial opportunity is denied them;

(iv) That the obstacles to economic development leave few opportunities, if any, for the immediate prosecution of large-scale schemes or the fruitful application of large long-term credits for productive, self-liquidating developments;

(v) That the proposed public works programme to provide temporary employment for Palestine refugees, as recommended in the Economic Survey Mission's Interim Report (adopted and approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations, by resolution 302 (IV) dated 8 December 1949), by mobilizing a great body of man-power, now idle, will improve the productivity of the countries where the refugees now reside and can be the start of larger developments;

(vi) That several of the Governments of the countries most directly affected by the recent hostilities between Arabs and Israelis need an opportunity to learn, by doing, the art and skill of planning, organizing and carrying out a development project, conceived on a small enough scale to be within the competence of those Governments, important enough to affect the country's economy favourably, and comprising a sufficient variety of problems and technical requirements to afford overall training in a broad field, while being simple enough to assure success;

(vii) That the process by which the greater resources of the international community and the individual aid of friendly Governments are made available to the Middle Eastern countries must respect the sovereignty while strengthening the competence and independence of the country receiving assistance.

2. *Prosecution* of the programme of work relief for refugees to be inaugurated by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (established by the resolution of the General Assembly dated 8 December 1949) in such a manner as to shift more and more responsibility for the execution of the programmes on to the shoulders of the individual Governments and to ensure that these programmes for temporary employment include those projects which can add to the productivity of national and regional economies and lay the basis for subsequent larger developments offering a permanent livelihood to more people in the years to come.

3. *Establishment* by each of the Middle Eastern Governments of a national Development Board, fully contained within the sovereign jurisdiction of its governmental administration, charged with responsibility for planning balanced, overall development, defining and recommending individual projects, and providing for their execution, with the help of such technical and financial assistance from the international community or friendly Governments as each Middle Eastern Government concerned may seek.

4. (a) *Prosecution* by the Government of Lebanon of a pilot demonstration project to achieve a complete survey, field investigation and technical report, preparatory to the ultimate development of the Litani River as a unit;

(b) *Encouragement and technical assistance* by the international community, or individual friendly Governments, to the Republic of Lebanon in the definition and prosecution of the Litani investigation with an assurance that, should the Government of Lebanon find itself unable wholly to finance this investigation from internal resources, a request for external financial aid would receive careful and friendly consideration.

5. (a) *Prosecution* by the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan of a pilot demonstration project on the watersheds and stream bed of the Wadi Zerqa, and a pilot demonstration project on the watershed and stream bed of the Wadi Qilt, which will achieve the full and unified development and use of the waters of these wadis flowing into the Jordan River from the east and west respectively; by building storage dams, to stabilize the downstream flow of the wadis and thereby increase the year-round water supply, reduce the damage of floods and add to the areas under irrigation and cultivation; by using the development of these wadis as an opportunity to employ Arab refugees and as an encouragement for them to establish themselves as permanent and productive residents on the lands they thus bring into use; and by using these pilot demonstration projects as a special opportunity to provide technical and administrative experience in the overall planning and actual execution of public works.

(b) *Financial and technical assistance* to the Jordan Government by the international community, through the funds to be made available by the Member Governments of the United Nations for the refugee works relief programme, in order to begin these projects; together with an assurance that later requests for credits or grants with which to complete these pilot projects will receive careful and sympathetic consideration by the United Nations or by individual friendly Governments, prior to the conclusion of the refugee works programme.

6. (a) *Prosecution* by the Syrian Government of a pilot demonstration project on the Orontes River in the Ghab Swamps, to reclaim, by drainage and other devices, potentially fertile lands now useless and uninhabitable, and to provide homes and other facilities needed for the people who will be required to populate and till the land thus reclaimed.

(b) *Encouragement and technical assistance* by the international community, or individual friendly Governments, to Syria in the planning and execution of this project by the Syrian Government, with an assurance that, should the Syrian Government find itself unable wholly to finance this development from internal resources, a request for external financial aid would receive careful and friendly consideration.

7. *Creation of a fund*, not to exceed \$10 million, by the Governments which, by action of the General Assembly, are called upon to appoint their representatives to form the Advisory Commission of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees; this fund to be available to the Advisory Commission, until expended, for allocation to Middle Eastern Governments as grants, reimbursable or otherwise as may be determined, for the purpose of facilitating research, technical studies and investigations in agriculture, engineering and other modern scientific aids to development, and assisting in the

completion of pilot demonstration projects approved by the Advisory Commission, upon application made by the Middle Eastern Government concerned.

8. *Preparation* by the Governments of the Middle Eastern countries concerned, in consultation with the Advisory Commission of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees and in connection with the functions of that body as laid down in paragraph 7 (b) of the resolution of the General Assembly of 8 December 1949, of plans and recommendations for the further development of the economic and natural resources of the Middle East, with particular reference to those involving economic arrangements between two or more of the countries concerned.

This approach to the economic development of the Middle East and the policies and actions set forth herein are recommended for the early and careful consideration of the United Nations and the Governments whose active implementation of this approach will bring the Middle East into a hopeful and significant era of economic, social and political advance." (pages 12-13)

867N.002/12-1849 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

JERUSALEM, December 18, 1949.

695. Today's *Post* reports regular weekly Cabinet meeting will be held first time in Jerusalem December 20. Also reports repairs being completed on building for Ministries of Trade and Industry, Agriculture, Health, Police while Ministry of Foreign Affairs will not move for some time and Defense to remain in Tel Aviv. Claim some thousand accommodations being readied for government workers in Jerusalem.

BURDETT

501.BB Palestine/12-2049

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President

WASHINGTON, December 20, 1949.

In the Fourth Session of the General Assembly, just concluded, the position of the United States in the Jerusalem question was to support the proposals for an international regime for the Jerusalem area presented by the United Nations Palestine Conciliation Commission, of which the United States is a member. The Commission formulated these proposals in accordance with the instructions given to it by the General Assembly in 1948, which called for the establishment of a permanent international regime with maximum local autonomy.

With the exception of certain matters specifically reserved to the authority of the United Nations, the Commission's proposals would have delegated all normal powers of Government in the Jerusalem area to the responsible authorities of the Arab and Jewish zones, i.e., the Governments of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. The principal functions reserved to the international administration were the control of the Holy Places, the supervision of the demilitarization of the area, and the protection of human rights in Jerusalem. A joint Council was provided to facilitate the operation of the City as a whole and an international tribunal to determine disputes arising under the Statute.

The proposals of the Conciliation Commission represented a middle ground between the two extreme positions, which were:

1. That Jerusalem should be a *corpus separatum* under a special international regime, separate from the surrounding area, and under full United Nations administration. This was the solution previously adopted by the General Assembly in its resolution of November 29, 1947. This solution could not be implemented due to the outbreak of fighting in Palestine and to the fact that the General Assembly recommendation of 1947 that there should be a Jewish and an Arab state in Palestine with economic union was never put into effect.

2. That the two sides of the city be under the sovereignty and authority respectively of Israel and Jordan. Israel favored an international regime limited to the Holy Places while Jordan was only prepared to give to the United Nations full guarantees for the protection of and free access to the Holy Places.

In the General Assembly this year Australia introduced a resolution incorporating the first of these extreme positions—i.e., the principle of full internationalization under complete United Nations control. This resolution immediately attracted the votes of the Catholic countries, (strongly urged by the Vatican), of the Arab States (except Jordan), and of the Soviet bloc. With minor modifications, it was adopted by 39 votes to 14, with 5 abstentions. The United States, United Kingdom and other states opposed the resolution on the grounds that it was unrealistic as it could not be implemented by the United Nations against the wishes of Israel and Jordan without the use of substantial forces. The United States delegation also pointed out that to set up a new City-State in Palestine would cost the United Nations large sums of money even on the assumption of willing cooperation by Israel and Jordan.

The United States delegation, while making clear its support of an international regime for Jerusalem, voted against the Australian resolution for reasons above stated and continued to support the proposal of the Palestine Conciliation Commission which in its view represented a sound basis for a solution, giving substantial recognition

to the legitimate desires of Israel and Jordan and of the international community. We also emphasized that, although we would consider carefully any proposed amendments to the Palestine Conciliation Commission plan, we could not see our way clear to change our position except in favor of one which represented general agreement.

It seems certain that the Arab States supported the Australian resolution out of a desire to oppose Israel and that the Soviet group did so largely in order to block the extension to Arab Palestine of the control of King Abdullah of Jordan, regarded by the Russians as a tool of Great Britain, and to curry favor with the other Arab States. The Vatican, which has important religious interests in Jerusalem, doubtless realized that the Australian resolution could not be implemented, but probably supported it in order to achieve a better bargaining position in respect of Jerusalem.

The General Assembly resolution of December 9, 1949 reaffirmed the principle of the 1947 resolution that Jerusalem should be established as a *corpus separatum* under a special international regime administered by the United Nations. The Trusteeship Council was directed at its next meeting to complete the preparation of the draft Statute for the City, which it had drawn up in compliance with the 1947 resolution, to approve the Statute, and to proceed immediately with its implementation without permitting any actions taken by any Government to divert it from this task.

Israel has reacted to the General Assembly resolution of December 9, 1949 by taking the following action in the direction of moving the Israeli capital to Jerusalem, while refraining from a formal proclamation to that effect:

1. A statement by the Prime Minister that Jerusalem always had been and always would be the capital of Israel;
2. A statement by the Prime Minister that the movement of the Government to Jerusalem was under way, and would be accelerated;
3. Decisions to move the Parliament and the Office of the Prime Minister to Jerusalem.

Jordan has made strong official statements opposing the December 9 resolution.

The United Nations Trusteeship Council has already begun to consider the task of carrying out the General Assembly resolution and will continue its work in Geneva on January 19, 1950. The United States representative, Ambassador Francis B. Sayre, has been instructed that although we opposed the resolution in the General Assembly, we believe that the Trusteeship Council should make a bona fide effort to comply with its instructions from the General Assembly, but that the United States should avoid for the present taking a position of leadership.

In connection with the Israeli action in respect of moving the Government to Jerusalem, the French and Belgian delegations have introduced a resolution expressing concern and stating that such action is likely to render more difficult the implementation of the Statute. Ambassador Sayre has been instructed to abstain unless the resolution is revised to delete the reference to "implementation" of the Statute.

Conclusions

1. Our underlying objective is to achieve a solution of the Jerusalem problem which will meet with a considerable degree of concurrence by the world community and be acceptable to the two nations which are most directly involved.

2. We do not believe that this objective can be achieved under the terms of the General Assembly resolution because neither Israel nor Jordan will ever willingly agree to the establishment of Jerusalem as a *corpus separatum* divorced from their respective control.

3. However, as a member of the Trusteeship Council the United States should not give the impression that it is obstructing the Council's work in carrying forward a General Assembly resolution adopted by a majority of the United Nations, and we should be willing to make a bona fide effort in the first phase of the Trusteeship Council's work, namely, the drafting of a statute for Jerusalem. But the United States should not support action in the Trusteeship Council looking toward the imposed implementation of the Statute for Jerusalem against the wishes of the parties.

4. When the statute is completed there will then be an opportunity available to the Trusteeship Council, in light of the comments of the interested parties, to consider whether it should take steps to implement the statute. If at that stage the Governments of Israel and Jordan express strong opposition to the Statute as drafted, the United States should make it clear that on the basis of these reactions it would be impractical to attempt to enforce such a solution on the parties, and that to impose on unwilling parties a recommendation of the General Assembly would not contribute to a viable solution of the problem.

5. To assist affirmatively in the settlement of the problem, the United States should privately encourage informal conversations between Israel and Jordan and the Vatican, but the United States should not take any part in such conversations. We might suggest that a single individual, such as Dr. Ralph Bunche, but not a representative of the United States, conduct quiet consultations with the parties and with the Vatican with a view to exploring the possibilities of an agreed solution.

The Trusteeship Council has asked its President (Garreau of France) to prepare a first draft of a new statute for consideration by the Council on January 19; he will be assisted in this task by Dr. Ralph Bunche.

6. It may be necessary in accordance with United Nations procedures for the General Assembly to consider the Jerusalem question at a special session in the spring of 1950 either as a consequence of the Trusteeship Council's inability to proceed with implementation of the statute or of agreement arrived at between the parties.

7. We continue to believe, as we did as a member of the Palestine Conciliation Commission, that a reasonable solution should contain certain underlying principles, such as protection of and free access to the Holy Places under appropriate United Nations auspices, progressive demilitarization of the Jerusalem area, administration by Israel and Jordan of their respective parts of the City, and the maintenance of human rights and freedoms. However, it is our view that any solution agreed upon by the Christian world and by Israel and Jordan could be supported by us.¹

DEAN ACHESON

¹ Mr. Rusk sent a copy of this memorandum to Senator Austin in New York with a letter of December 21. The letter noted that "The President indicated his approval of what we had done and were doing on this matter, but since he had not had an opportunity to study the memorandum carefully, we do not believe that we should conclude that he intended his approval as a specific instruction to you." Mr. Rusk stated he was sure that the memorandum "will be the basis for more specific instructions as they become necessary." (501.BB Palestine/12-2149)

501.BB Palestine/12-1749: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel*¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, December 20, 1949—1 p. m.

768. Pls convey fol to FonOff immed. US Govt has noted PriMin Ben Gurion's statement concerning Jerusalem in Knesset on Dec 13 and subsequent reports of removal of PriMin's office to Jerusalem.

As a friendly govt which has followed with interest and sympathy course of Israel's development, US Govt desires to inform Israeli Govt that it considers particularly unfortunate any step or course of action on part of Israel likely to prejudice or complicate settlement of Jerusalem question, especially at moment when problem of Jerusalem is being studied by Trusteeship Council in accordance with terms of Res of UNGA of Dec 9, 1949.

ACHESON

¹ This telegram was repeated to Jerusalem and New York.

867N.01/12-2249 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary
of State*

SECRET

LONDON, December 22, 1949—6 p. m.

5079. Embtel 5062 December 20.¹ Furlongé, Eastern Department FonOff, said today that UK study of extension UK-Jordan treaty to Arab Palestine was occasioned by recent Israeli inquiry whether treaty would automatically apply to any territory which Jordan might gain as result peace negotiations. Israelis intimated they would be less happy about reaching agreement if treaty were extended such territory.

Last evening FonOff instructed British Minister Tel Aviv to inform Israeli Government that question extension to any area acquired by Jordan is matter which concerns only UK and Jordan. He was instructed add, however, that UK has no intention establishing any bases in territory so acquired in time of peace, but that what UK might do in case of war or threat of war was another question which UK could not express its intention at present time.

British Minister Amman was instructed inform Jordan Government of foregoing message, but to add for Jordan's own confidential information that it is firm intention of UK to apply treaty to any areas acquired by Jordan as soon as they have been incorporated within their state.

Asked if foregoing applied to any corridor which Jordan might acquire, Furlongé replied affirmatively.

When we recalled that he had told us December 19 that FonOff studying certain points on which it contemplated Jordan might ask its advice, Furlongé replied treaty was principal item. He reiterated it is desire UK to maintain hands off attitude toward Jordan-Israeli talks. However FonOff has also given Kirkbride some comments "mostly of technical nature" on question of corridor for his guidance in case he is asked by Jordan. Asked if establishment of corridor would pose any particular problems for UK, Furlongé replied in negative but stated FonOff did not think corridors were ever completely satisfactory arrangements.

Sent Department 5079; repeated Tel Aviv 84, Baghdad 118, Cairo 159, Jidda 66, Beirut 46, Damascus 77.

HOLMES

¹ Not printed.

501.BB Palestine(E)/12-2349

The Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Johnson)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, December 23, 1949.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The Department of State is preparing for presentation to the next session of Congress proposed legislation for United States participation in the United Nations program for relief, work relief and economic development among the Palestinian refugees in the Near East. This program will follow recommendations made by the Economic Survey Mission under the United Nations in its first interim report to the Palestine Conciliation Commission. On the basis of this report the General Assembly of the United Nations unanimously adopted a resolution on December 8, 1949 which provides for the implementation of the recommendations of the Mission. For your ready reference we enclose a copy of the interim report and of the General Assembly resolution.

The cost of the proposed program is \$54,900,000 for an 18 months' period ending June 30, 1951 and, in view of attendant circumstances, the Department considers that a reasonable share of the total cost to be borne by the United States is 50 per cent. Therefore the Congress will be requested to appropriate \$27,500,000 for contribution to the program, and for expenses incident to United States participation. The object of the program is the restoration of economic conditions conducive to the maintenance of peace and stability in the Near East area affected by the recent hostilities in Palestine. The Department is convinced that the course of action proposed by the Economic Survey Mission and approved by the General Assembly is necessary to achieve this end and that this course is prudent and wise. Strategic considerations underlying United States policy in the area were raised in a letter from Secretary Forrestal to the Department dated September 23, 1948 in which he transmitted a memorandum on the subject from the Joint Chiefs of Staff,¹ and you referred again to this subject in a letter to me dated June 14, 1949 in which you emphasized the importance, to our long range interests, of solving the problem of the refugees and of other major differences between Israel and its neighboring Arab States.

Recent discussions have been held in an interagency group regarding the proposals of the Economic Survey Mission and the General Assembly resolution, and the Department of Defense has been represented at these discussions by Captain R. F. Pryce, U.S.N., who is therefore familiar with most recent developments.

¹ Regarding these papers, see telegram Telmar 19, September 28, 1948, to Paris, *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. v, Part 2, p. 1427.

The program must be ready for presentation to Congress early in January, and if a complete case is to be presented, it will be necessary for the Department of Defense to testify as to the strategic importance of maintaining stability in the areas affected. I hope that the Department of Defense will participate in the presentation.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN ACHESON

883.00/12-2349 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

CAIRO, December 23, 1949—3 p. m.

1166. The King's principal advisers after much recent discussion among themselves have decided to propose next week to the King that Egypt propose a definite boundary solution for peace with Israel. They have decided also to propose that this step be taken in the near future without waiting for the results of the election.¹

Repeat to McGhee.

CAFFERY

¹ This telegram was made a subject of a circular telegram sent December 27, 2 a. m., to London, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Amman, and New York. (800.00 Summaries/12-2749) Ambassador McDonald, in reply on December 31, 11 p. m., stated that "It would be helpful here if Caffery could elaborate Cairo's attitude. I am sure Israel would welcome Egypt if approached directly or through US Government or otherwise. Sharett told me December 31 Israel had responded favorably to recent information Egyptian suggestions in MAC that those exchanges be broadened to include political issues. To date no Egyptian reply to Israel's willingness broaden MAC." (telegram 924, from Tel Aviv, 867N.01/12-3149)

767N.901/12-2749 : Telegram

The Chargé in Jordan (Fritzlan) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

AMMAN, December 27, 1949—10 a. m.

431. I saw Samir Pasha Sunday morning, received following re meeting between him and Shiloah and Sassoon last Friday: Outset Samir asked Israelis what formula they devised satisfy Jordan's claim access Mediterranean. Shiloah said after much consideration Israeli Government had decided could not give up [apparent garble] but would give Jordan sea front of about 3 km. just north Israel-Egypt line and possibly 3 additional km. if present no-man's land on front divided between Israelis and Egyptians. Israelis would allow Jordan full sovereignty over corridor Hebron to this coast point width to be 50 to 100 meters. However, should Jordan later obtain Gaza strip

from Egypt (Israel would support Jordan's claim) Jordan must return coastal area obtained from Israel. Shiloah admitted this point access sea consisted rough country covered with sand dunes and would be little if any economic value though satisfying Jordan's political ambitions.

To this proposal Samir replied Jordan access to sea was of importance purely from economic standpoint and Israeli offer therefore worthless. Also he could not think of corridor in terms of meters. Jordan must obtain substantial amount territory to justify peace settlement with Israelis to Arab world. Added he saw no point continuing negotiations unless Israel recognized validity these arguments. Finally he put Israelis on defensive by implying they had divulged to press such content recent talks which he thought were highly secret.

At this point King Abdullah injected conciliatory note and, Samir thinks, would likely have gone far accept Israeli proposal but for ill-considered remark by Sassoon that even if Israel made peace with Jordan they would have maintain large military forces view potential threat other Arab states. He added Israel could make substantial concessions Jordan only as part general settlement with all Arab states. Hearing this King became indignant expressing surprise that so little importance should be attached to agreement with Jordan.

Upshot of meeting was decision negotiations should continue though Samir expressed belief time had come inform Jordan Government progress talks and let Prime Minister decide if adequate basis existed for initiation formal discussions or whether matter should be dropped. Tentatively agreed after King returns from Baghdad and Samir from Tehran (proceeding Tehran tomorrow extend invitation to Shah visit Amman) Samir should discuss situation with Ben-Gurion in Jerusalem.

Comment: Samir anxious force issue access to sea and it seems clear Israelis must go much farther than they have accommodate Jordan if Samir will agree continue talks. He seemed tired and discouraged and somewhat indifferent outcome discussions. His meeting with Ben-Gurion should decide whether formal negotiations are begun or whether discussions are discontinued.

Following conversation with Samir I received substantially same account latest Jordan-Israel meeting from British Minister Kirkbride who has generally refrained from expressing his view re what Jordan should get out of peace settlement.

Sent Department 431; Department pass London 117, USUN 29, Tel Aviv 68, Jerusalem 150, Cairo 55; pouched Arab capitals.

FRTZLAN

767N.901/12-2749 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

JERUSALEM, December 27, 1949—4 p. m.

703. After stating he is following Israel-Jordan discussions closely, Colonel Dayan on twenty-fifth commented:

(1) Although agreement in principle obtained on all points raised, negotiations now reached impasse. King ready conclude peace on basis present position two parties but not able find Prime Minister willing sign agreement. Difficulty not any specific issue but fundamental question of willingness conclude treaty with Jews. No Jordanian leader except King willing incur public odium involved such action.

(2) If present opportunity to conclude agreement missed, considerable period may elapse before chance arises again. Current unstable situation Syria likely revive greater Syria and Fertile Crescent plans and cause King postpone any action re Israel. King's sudden visit Baghdad indicates his preoccupation Syrian problem. Syrian internal troubles may spread to other Arab states leading to wide area and long period turmoil. Israel-Jordan agreement now would contribute to stability whole area. Also negotiations will prove more difficult after election new Jordan parliament with large percentage Palestinians.

(3) Inquired (Dayan spoke entirely personally and informally) whether US prepared urge both sides conclude peace. I replied basic US objective is area peace and stability and US thinks direct negotiations best approach to settlement but not willing specify conditions to either party. Dayan stated was not suggesting US supporting specific terms but fundamental question concluding peace with Israel. I inquired whether he thought conclusion peace would cause internal difficulties in Jordan. He reiterated peace will produce stability not contrary.

(4) I stressed importance to Israel of peace with Arab state and asked if Israel not able advance proposals more favorable to Jordan and strengthen King's position. Dayan claimed Israel now made maximum possible concessions; gone much further than first anticipated; terms especially Jordan sovereignty over corridor certain to shape country.

(5) Made following incidental statements: Samir Pasha Rifai expected become next Jordan Prime Minister. Corridor to Mediterranean Sea as envisaged by Israel limited to road and narrow stretch on either side. Israel considered corridor exchange for Jewish quarter old city. If Jordan preferred territory other than corridor and willing accept free zone in Haifa, Israel prepared negotiate this basis. Because pressure orthodox opinion Israel must have Jewish quarter old city

and corridor linking it to Jewish sections appears only possible arrangement.

Sent Department 703, repeated Tel Aviv 140, Baghdad 76, Beirut 36, Damascus 97, Jidda 19, London 71; Department pass Amman 80, Cairo 53.

BURDETT

867N.01/12-2949: Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEL AVIV, December 29, 1949—1 p. m.

918. At my request, Shiloah was at residence an hour December 28. Ford and Herlitz present.

Shiloah said last Israel-Jordan meeting December 23 had been "sticky" because Samir had reverted to "completely unacceptable demands for cession Negev or of corridor so wide as to divide Israel."

Shiloah guesses Samir's earlier lesser demands may have been maneuver with intention finally demand Negev. If this be explanation, Shiloah "favors suspending negotiations." He asked [*suggested?*] that Jordan's stiffening might be result Samir's desire wait on developments in Syria.

Again Shiloah discerned "no UK adverse" influence in talks unless perhaps before beginning of series talks UK had insisted on "secure land bridge from sea to Persian Gulf."

Re Syria, Shiloah reiterated with great emphasis his conviction Abdullah and Iraq are studying union moves which would "upset whole Middle East precarious balance. Egypt and Saudi Arabia would react strongly and Israel could not be expected remain quiescent." In answer my question whether Israel's objections would be less if union were won "peacefully and through will of peoples," Shiloah replied, "there is no possibility Syrian-Iraqi and Jordan peoples would be allowed express selves on union. In any case, Israel would regard union as dangerous to Israel's security and as challenge to Middle East peace."

Comment: Ford and I agree that in above Shiloah is expressing firm views of his government based on sincere concern lest union jeopardize Israel's hopes move gradually towards peace through bilateral negotiations. *End comment.*

Sent Department 918, repeated Baghdad 62, Beirut 92, Damascus 67, Jerusalem 109, Jidda 42, London 156; Department pass Amman 73, Cairo 84.

McDONALD

867N.01/12-2949 : Telegram

The Chargé in Jordan (Fritzlan) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

AMMAN, December 29, 1949—1 p. m.

434. Following are Legation's comments Jerusalem telegram 703 December 27 to Department :

1. King Abdullah's role re Jordan Israel talks has shown him extremely conciliatory, but firm in belief Jordan must obtain substantial territorial concessions before he could justify agreement his people and Arab world. Has been especially insistent over access sea. Legation's information does not indicate King willing sign agreement basis present position two parties. However desirous he was reach agreement before last meeting December 23, Sassoon's blunder (Legtel 431 December 27) seems have stiffened his attitude. Undoubtedly Samir more exacting in attitude than King and Prime Minister even more than Samir. However, case of Samir, and probably Prime Minister as well, there is little difficulty re principle concluding peace with Israelis but rather over specific content of any peace settlement and there is no reason believe Samir has modified position outlined recent Legtels. King, of course, is well aware reluctance Samir and Prime Minister conclude treaty except on favorable terms and will be guided by this knowledge.

2. Legation agrees Dayan recent events Syria serving divert King's attention to some extent from settlement with Israel and if present opportunity conclude peace not grasped chance may not soon recur. Also negotiations would undoubtedly prove more difficult after Jordan Parliament elections.

3. For some time Samir Pasha has been only serious contender for Prime Minister job and it is widely held he will be offered post before long. This possibility would be much greater if he instrumental obtaining satisfactory agreement with Israel. However, privately Samir has intimated preference retain his comfortable post as Minister of Court which gives him strong position with King and enables him engage in and keep *au courant* of Palace intrigue, rather than assume heavy responsibilities Prime Ministership.

Sent Department 434, pouched Arab capitals. Department pass London 119, Jerusalem 151, USUN 30, Tel Aviv 69.

FRITZLAN

501.BB Palestine/12-2949 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

LONDON, December 29, 1949—7 p. m.

5149. At Wright's request, Evans, head NE Secretariat Foreign Office, today gave us following information re UK contribution to NERWA. Figures mentioned have been approved by Chancellor Exchequer.

1. UK prepared contribute 2,250,000 pounds, of which 1,000,000 pounds would be comprised of UK loan to Jordan.

2. Remaining 1,250,000 pounds would be subject following conditions: (a) up to maximum of 1,250,000 pounds, UK would match one-quarter of total contributions of other governments than US. (In other words, governments other than US would have contribute 5,000,000 pounds for UK to make maximum contribution.) (b) 750,000 pounds would be earmarked for expenditure on projects which will provide for resettlement.

3. Foreign Office hopes condition (a) will spur other governments to make maximum contributions.

4. Foreign Office feels condition (b) will strengthen hand of NERWA so that funds will not be wasted on hopeless areas such as Gaza.

5. Evans stated foregoing, when figured on percentage basis, compares favorably with UK contribution to UNRPR.

6. Bevin will take opportunity at Colombo conference to urge other dominion governments to make maximum possible contributions to NERWA.

We recalled that while in Wright conversations Washington, it had been recognized that either government authorized discuss specific figures, nevertheless proportions of 50 percent US, 25 percent UK and 15 percent France had been mentioned. Evans confirmed this but said he would also recall that at same time Wright had mentioned Chancellor had authorized only 500,000 pounds as UK contribution. Present figure represents increase of 750,000 over that figure and while UK wishes it could be more, he agreed that was not possible.

HOLMES

Editorial Note

The White House, on December 30, released a statement by President Truman concerning the completion by Gordon R. Clapp of his

task as Chairman of the Economic Survey Mission to the Middle East. At one point the President stated: "In accord with my previously expressed intention to give careful consideration to such assistance as we might appropriately render in carrying out the recommendations of the survey mission, legislation is now in preparation for presentation to the Congress requesting authorization for this government to assume its share in the cost of the program proposed by the United Nations for the Near East."

The full text of the President's statement is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, January 9, 1950, page 55.

867N.01/12-3049 : Telegram

*President Truman to King Abdullah Ibn el Hussein of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan*¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, December 30, 1949—6 p. m.

YOUR MAJESTY: I have received the letter² which Your Majesty was good enough to send me through His Excellency Fawzi Pasha el Mulki. I very much appreciate this expression of Your Majesty's views on a problem with which the United States Government has so long been concerned.

Your Majesty may be sure that this Government will continue to give the closest attention to the Palestine question, in the constant hope that an equitable settlement may be achieved.

It is my belief that the cause of peace in the Near East would be greatly furthered if the states most directly concerned in the Palestine dispute should find it possible to agree among themselves upon the basic elements for a just settlement.

I send to Your Majesty the warm expression of my personal esteem and my best and most cordial wishes for the continued prosperity of Your Majesty and of the Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan in the forthcoming year.

HARRY S. TRUMAN

¹ Sent to Amman in telegram 216, which instructed that the message be transmitted to the King. The message was drafted in the Department of State and sent to President Truman by Secretary Acheson, with his memorandum of December 29. The memorandum stated, in part, that "I believe that it is desirable to avoid any commitment in replying to King Abdullah, but that in the interests of a Palestine settlement it would be helpful to give indirect encouragement to the King to continue the secret talks now going on between Jordan and Israel. The attached reply has been drafted with these points in mind." President Truman, in a marginal notation on December 30, approved the proposed reply (867N.01/12-3049).

² Dated November 5; see editorial note, p. 1470.

867N.01/12-3149 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY

TEL AVIV, December 31, 1949—1 p. m.

922. At his request Foreign Minister talked to me his office 45 minutes December 30 with Eytan and Shiloah present.

Summarizing his recent conversations with Secretary Acheson,¹ Sharett said he wished give Department formal statement on Jordan-Israel talks as follows:

Despite promising beginning of earlier talks impasse reached December 23 over "width of corridor." Israel prepared grant under Jordan jurisdiction or possible sovereignty width sufficient for auto and railroads but will not cede width of 40 to 50 kilometers² because such demand suggests purpose different from securing free access to sea. Wider corridor could be used for "intensive settlement and as possible base for military operations." Israel "went as far as it dares politically and perhaps farther than is safe strategically in offering Jordan jurisdiction or sovereignty over narrower corridor."

Sharett expressed hope that King would revert to earlier conciliatory attitude and that USG would find it possible to indicate to King its hope that "prospects of agreement not be ruined by demand beyond guaranteed freedom of access, and that meantime adventures in Syria not be permitted to inflame ME."

Comment: Sharett obviously desires conclude peace Jordan but I am sure cabinet dare not yield on wider corridor. *End comment.*

Sent Department 922, repeated Baghdad 63, Beirut 93, Damascus 68, Jerusalem 110, Jidda 43, London 157, Department pass Amman 74, Cairo 85.

MCDONALD

¹ See memorandum of December 7 by Secretary Acheson, p. 1524.

² At 10 p. m. on December 31, Tel Aviv telegraphed a correction of its telegram 922, as follows: "Jordan in December 23 talks with Israel did insist corridor be 'kilometers wide' but did not specify number of kilometers. Sharett my house December 31 said 'Jordan might have meant 10 or 15 kilometers but did not name figure.'" (telegram 923, 867N.01/12-3149)