

Clifford Papers : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the President's Special Counsel
(Clifford)*¹

TOP SECRET URGENT

WASHINGTON, October 11, 1948—6:36 p. m.

White 174. Referring our conversation Sunday, have discussed matter with Secretary in light of your comments and he is most anxious to be as helpful as possible. His proposal for handling and his draft aimed to do this but he says if it does not he will try again.

He has in mind discussing immediately on arrival in Paris tomorrow alternative language along line used by Mrs. Roosevelt and will wire me soonest. Meanwhile I have his authority to make no comment on question if asked press conference Wednesday provided President agrees. Please get my existing instructions cancelled and wire me urgently. Regards.

LOVETT

¹ Marshall was absent from Paris on October 9-11 for consultation with the President in Washington.

501BB Palestine/10-1148 : Telegram

*The President's Special Counsel (Clifford) to the Acting Secretary
of State (Lovett)*

TOP SECRET

ABOARD PRESIDENTIAL SPECIAL TRAIN
October 11, 1948—11:30 p. m.

Black 93. I have your White 174.¹ Have discussed the matter with the President and he directs me to inform you that your existing instructions are cancelled.² If you are asked questions on Wednesday³ you are to make no comment.

We note with great interest the plan of the Secretary to discuss alternative language on arrival in Paris. We feel it would be most helpful if he would include Ben Cohen⁴ in such discussion because of the latter's familiarity with our problems here.⁵

Will appreciate your forwarding to us as soon as possible any new language. If you prefer we can always be reached by telephone.

Best regards,

[CLARK CLIFFORD]

¹ *Supra.*

² The expression "existing instructions" possibly refers to Presidential authorization for Mr. Lovett to use the statement.

³ October 13, the date of Mr. Lovett's press conference.

⁴ Benjamin V. Cohen, Alternative Representative in the United States Delegation at the first part of the Third Session of the General Assembly at Paris.

⁵ Acting Secretary Lovett quoted this paragraph in part to Secretary Marshall in telegram Telmar 63, October 12, 1 p. m., to Paris (501BB Palestine/10-1248).

867N.51/10-1248

*Statement To Be Made by the Alternate Department of State Member to the Board of Export-Import Bank With Regard to the Israeli Loan*¹

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] October 12, 1948.

On June 2, 1948 the Provisional Government of Israel made a request for an Eximbank loan of \$100,000,000. This request was made during the first truce in Palestine, which was of only 30 days duration. The State of Israel had just been established, and its future seemed uncertain.

Since that time a number of changes have taken place in the political, military, and economic situation of Israel.

The second truce of indefinite duration was arranged and has now been in effect since July 18. While the UN observers have reported many violations of the truce on both sides, at present there is little reason to believe that the truce will not continue or be replaced by an armistice under the Bernadotte Plan. The Palestine problem is soon to come up for discussion in the General Assembly of the United Nations on the basis of Count Bernadotte's final report, which the Department believes constitutes a generally fair basis for the solution of the problem.

In the meantime, the Provisional Government of Israel has taken the following steps:

- a) it has taken firm hold of the machinery of government;
- b) it has gained and in general maintained effective control of the territory under its occupation.
- c) it has also consolidated its internal political position and appears successfully to be bringing under control the dissident elements which previously threatened internal order and security;
- d) it is making definite plans for elections for a Constituent Assembly, probably to be held in the latter part of this year.

Attention is drawn to the following statement which appears in the conclusion to Count Bernadotte's final report to the United Nations "A Jewish state called Israel exists in Palestine and there are no sound reasons for assuming that it will not continue to do so."

From a military standpoint, there is much less likelihood now than at the time the original request for the loan was made that the Arabs will undertake a large scale military attack against Israel.

The prospects for economic viability and growth of the Israeli

¹ Drafted by Messrs. Satterthwaite, Roswell H. Whitman, Acting Chief of the Division of Investment and Economic Development, and Joseph B. Knapp, Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy. A memorandum of October 14 by Mr. Whitman states that Mr. Lovett approved the statement and that it was made to the Bank's Board of Directors on October 13. The Alternate State Department Member was Garrison Norton, Assistant Secretary of State for Transportation and Communications.

economy are favorably affected by the increased prospects for a lasting political settlement. In addition the improved political conditions may be expected to result in a decrease in the drain of military expenditures on the resources of the Government.

In view of these changes in the situation of Israel the Department of State believes that the Export-Import Bank should give renewed consideration to loan applications from the Provisional Government of Israel. As an initial step in this direction, the Department suggests that the Bank invite the Provisional Government of Israel to submit new loan applications covering some selected specific projects for resettlement and economic development.

501.BB Palestine/10-1348 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET US URGENT
 NIACT

LONDON, October, 13, 1948.

4486. For Lovett's eyes only from Douglas. When I discussed with Bevin this morning the draft, particularly the last paragraph, of the statement which you intend to make regarding Palestine at your press conference this afternoon, he said that he was unhappy that it should be necessary for either US or UK to mention publicly modifications of the Bernadotte proposals since the new and forceful element behind them was the announced intention of US and UK to support these proposals in their entirety. So accustomed had the world become to seeing US and UK on opposite sides of the fence on this issue that our present agreement will be a vital factor in achieving Arab and Jewish acquiescence.

2. Bevin said, however, that if there are compelling reasons for the US mentioning modifications, to his mind the important thing is that the equilibrium of the Bernadotte proposals should not be disturbed. He and I together went over your statement and after discussion Bevin told me that he would regard its purport as being less disturbing if statement were to read as suggested in immediately preceding telegram No. 4485.¹

¹ Dated October 13; it advised that Mr. Bevin had acquiesced in the following wording of the last two paragraphs of Mr. Lovett's proposed statement at his press conference on October 13: "The two parties are, therefore, far apart in their respective views. The only hope for a solution of the Palestine issue lies in the wisdom of the United Nations.

"In our opinion, the Bernadotte plan provides a sound basis for the adjustment of their differences before the United Nations. It should not be too difficult to reach a solution even though the United Nations may find it wise to make minor modifications which do not disturb the equilibrium provided for in the Bernadotte recommendations." (501.BB Palestine/10-1348)

3. You will note that changes have been made only in the last two paragraphs to introduce the idea of equilibrium and to remove the hint it is still possible for the two sides, without the intervention of UN, to reach an agreement between themselves.

[Here follows paragraph numbered four regarding conversations between Mr. Bevin and Commonwealth Prime Ministers on Palestine.]

Sent Department as 4486; repeated Paris for Marshall's eyes only as 742.

DOUGLAS

501.BB Palestine/10-1348: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NIACT

PARIS, October 13, 1948—midnight.

Delga 319. Eyes alone for Lovett from the Secretary. Reference Douglas' 4485¹ and 4486² London on amendments to statement.

For your press conference and regarding your telephone conversation with Rusk and Telmar 63:³ I have modified Bevin's proposed last two paragraphs by striking out words "may" and "minor" in sentence commencing "it should not be et cetera" and inserting the word "essential" before word "equilibrium".

Cohen makes this proposal as substitute last paragraph: "In our opinion the Bernadotte Plan provides a sound basis for a renewed effort in the part of the UN to bring about a peaceful adjustment of differences. This should not prevent such modifications of the Bernadotte Plan as the UN finds helpful to promote a peaceful settlement which would open the way for the long term development and stability of the Near East."

Comment on Cohen's proposed paragraph: Cohen believes his more general statement would help reduce pressures building up on President. I see no difference between his and my last paragraphs as far as UN Assembly is concerned. I would accept Cohen's suggestion provided Douglas can assure us that it would not seriously interfere with joint US-UK action Palestine. Douglas please follow up and advise Lovett and me immediately. *End of comment.*

Palestine, by decision Committee I today, will be taken up for one day on Friday, while awaiting reports of Subcommittees on Atomic Energy and Disarmament. We do not expect to speak in Committee I on Friday and present likelihood is that Palestine debate would not be resumed until late next week. We, and particularly Dulles, desired to place it after Greece on the agenda but did not succeed in getting the change. Effort was to hold it until after election. Bohlen, Rusk and

¹ Dated October 13, not printed; but see footnote 1, *supra*.

² Dated October 13, *supra*.

³ Dated October 12, not printed; but see footnote 5, p. 1467.

I feel certain that if President himself makes statement, as his political advisers no doubt insist, he will inevitably carry issue direct into political campaign as Dewey will certainly respond. Issue here will be thrown into confusion and possibility of settlement at least postponed and truce imperiled.⁴

Repeated to London 105 [1058], eyes alone for the Ambassador.

MARSHALL

⁴ Acting Secretary Lovett, on October 13, informed Mr. Clifford that he had "told Rusk to use best efforts to have American Delegation let others do the talking" on October 15 (telegram White 203, Clifford Papers).

The United States Delegation at Paris decided, on October 15, that "US would not participate in any substantive debate on Palestinian problem during Committee One discussions October 15 and 16, but that explanation our position would be postponed until Palestine problem is more fully considered upon conclusion of Committee One's work on atomic energy and conventional armaments—perhaps at end of next week." (Telegram Delga 340, October 15, 5 p. m., from Paris, 501.BB Palestine/10-1548)

501.BB Palestine/10-1348: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Griffis) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

CAIRO, October 13, 1948—3 p. m.

1485. Evidence here indicates Egyptian opposition to Bernadotte Plan has greatly increased due to widely held belief that British support for plan is based principally on desire secure merger Arab Palestine and Transjordan as step in enlarging their sphere of influence and toward creation Greater Syria. Such opinion stimulated by (1) British emphasis on Bernadotte's recommendation for merging two areas rather than on his statement that disposition Arab Palestine should be left to government of Arab States; (2) recent pressure on Arab States (mytels 1439, October 3, 1442, October 4, 1445, October 5¹) against recognition Arab Government Palestine interpreted by most Arab leaders as rising less from reasons advanced than from British desire promote Transjordan and their interests.

Problem together with suggestion that British statement might be issued emphasizing Bernadotte's view concerning disposition Arab Palestine should be left to Arab States has been reviewed with British Chargé Chapman-Andrews. British Chargé inclined believe (1) destruction of AGP of overriding importance and; (2) that British emphasis on Bernadotte proposal re disposition of Arab Palestine by Arab States would encourage Arab Government's support AGP with adverse effects. He also maintained enlarged Transjordan would enhance British ability maintain security of ME.

Would appreciate comments of Department on validity of British

¹ None printed.

argument that greatly enlarged Transjordan necessary to security of ME. Unless overriding reasons of security exist it would appear that continued British insistence on enlarged Transjordan and Arab Palestine will work against Arab acquiescence Bernadotte Plan. Insistence seems particularly unnecessary in view general belief that AGP notwithstanding Egyptian and Iraqi recognition will soon collapse out of weakness and that most Arab Palestine will fall naturally into hands Abdullah.

In this connection would also appreciate Department's comments on interesting Egyptian Government in acquiring portion of Arab Palestine possible Gaza and part of Negeb as compensation for acquiescence Bernadotte Plan. Bernadotte known to have favored partition Arab Palestine among Syria, Transjordan and Lebanon (Embtel 1105, August 7²). This view also responsible for this reference plan to "frontier rectifications regarding other Arab States as may be found practicable and desirable". Nokrashy to whom Bernadotte mentioned partition vigorously repudiated such suggestion as unethical but it is now possible that both King and Nokrashy might be favorable to acquisition of portion Palestine return for acquiescence Bernadotte Plan.

GRIFFIS

²This number was not used by the Department to identify any telegram from Cairo in 1948; presumably the reference is to telegram 1103-A of the same date (see paragraph numbered 3), p. 1296.

501.BB Palestine/10-448: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 13, 1948—5 p. m.

149. For McDonald from Acting Secretary for your info only. We have given careful consideration ur 161 Oct 4 and Secy has discussed it with President. Dept has following comments on opinions Israeli official as transmitted by you.

US naturally desires friendship of Israel and wishes see Israel take definite and sincere stand at side of Western democracies. Regardless passions of moment, disadvantages of not adopting latter position must be abundantly clear to every thoughtful Israeli. US has already given ample evidence its support of Israel. At same time importance to West of friendship of Arabs as majority inhabitants of strategic ME area is obvious.

US Govt deeply concerned by threat to peace, prosperity and security ME which situation in Palestine presents and desirous see

solution worked out without use force which will as nearly as possible under existing circumstances meet desires both sides.

On Sept 1 after consulting President Secy cabled you¹ that US Govt felt Israel should have boundaries which would make it more homogeneous and well integrated than frontiers proposed Nov 29 resolution. He also stated that our thinking was that Israel might expand into rich area of Galilee and that a large portion of Negev might go to Transjordan. We thought then and still think that some small area of Negev, such as that containing principal Jewish settlements, might be retained by Israel. This matter is of course one for final decision by GA when it considers whole problem, and it is possible that GA may not accept Mediator's conclusions in their every detail.

As regards official's remark that US support of conclusions re Negev would not endear other Arab states to US, Secy stated in Paris that no plan could be proposed which would be entirely satisfactory in all respects to every interested party. Any additional Arab ill will toward US over Negev would only be part of far deeper resentment which Arab world harbors against US because of our support of Israel.

We can understand Jewish objections to any proposal which would reduce area of Israel, but gain of rich Galilee area and advantage of more homogeneous state are very important counter-balancing considerations. Jews as well as Arabs must, we believe, be prepared make sacrifices in interests security and peace in ME.

We have so far recd no evidence Transjordan is dissatisfied with Bernadotte's conclusion on Negev. We have also been informed by Brit Govt that they have no projects for air bases in Negev. There is no question, as Israeli official states, of "British forcing gift of Negev to Transjordan in order secure air bases" but rather one of UN implementing conclusion of Mediator reached in sincere desire achieve fairest possible solution Palestine problem.

Re penultimate para urtel, does Israeli official have any convincing evidence to support belief possibility successful direct negotiations between Israel and Transjordan² in view Abdullah's relations with Arab League and other Arab states?

To sum up, US support of Bernadotte conclusions was given in belief, as Secy stated in Paris, that conclusions taken together offer generally fair basis for settlement of Palestine problem. These conclusions were reached independently by Mediator, who was well-known

¹ In telegram 72, p. 1366.

² Mr. McDonald advised, on October 24, of official information that there were no current peace negotiations between the Provisional Government of Israel and Transjordan, but that Elias Sassoon was waiting in Paris for Abdullah's envoy (telegram 205 from Tel Aviv, 867N.01/10-2448).

as fair-minded and impartial, after months of discussion with Arabs and Jews. We feel that Count Bernadotte's conclusions afford a just common denominator upon which to found mutual accommodation.²

LOVETT

² This telegram was sent to Paris as Gadel 202, October 14, 4 p. m., which was repeated by the Department to London as No. 3949.

Editorial Note

Mr. Bunche's cablegram of September 30 (see page 1442) and Mr. Macdonald's message of the same date (see editorial note, page 1444) were considered by the Security Council on October 14. Mr. Bunche addressed the Council, noting the increasing tendency by the parties concerned to ignore their responsibilities under the several truce resolutions. He concluded his presentation with the view that "an expression by the Security Council, at this time, of its firm expectation that all the obligations resting on the disputing parties as a result of the Council's truce resolutions of 29 May, 15 July and 19 August would be honoured, would be very helpful indeed to the situation. . . ." (SC, *3rd yr., No. 116*, pages 14-20). The United Kingdom, thereupon, offered a draft resolution which outlined the duties of both sides regarding the truce and called on the Provisional Government of Israel to report on Count Bernadotte's assassination; for text, see *ibid.*, page 28. China associated itself as co-sponsor of the draft resolution (*ibid.*, page 37).

501BB Palestine/10-1448: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State, at Paris

TOP SECRET US URGENT LONDON, October 14, 1948—3 p. m.
NIACT

753. Re Delga 319,¹ repeated London as 1058.

1. I do not have at my disposal the substance of what was apparently Lovett's telephone conversation with Rusk, nor do I have a copy of Telmar 63.² In these respects I am, therefore, in the dark.

2. It will, I think, be difficult enough, even under the most favorable circumstances with the US and UK standing shoulder to shoulder, to obtain a $\frac{2}{3}$ vote in favor of the Bernadotte proposals in the GA. I fear that the language of Cohen's proposal would give the public impression that there is a cleavage between the US and UK, thereby

¹ Dated October 13, p. 1470.

² Dated October 12, not printed; but see footnote 5, p. 1467.

making favorable action of the GA more difficult, if not unlikely. Should the GA fail to endorse the plan, we will be in a position as critical as, if not more serious than the one in which we found ourselves many months ago.

3. While I can well understand Cohen's desire to have language along the lines of his proposal, I would not be candid with you were I to refrain from saying that it goes much farther in its implications than the proposed language agreed to by Bevin yesterday with, I can assure you, a not inconsiderable amount of effort, tact and persuasiveness.

4. I was unable to see Bevin this morning, because of the Commonwealth meeting which he had to attend. I did, however, see Wright. His very strong view was that the language of the last two paragraphs of the statement which was discussed with Bevin yesterday is dangerous enough. Even it, on the eve of GA consideration, is a public recognition by the US that amendments to the Bernadotte plan are necessary. It may therefore encourage a variety of corroding proposed modifications which may eat away at the "reasonable, equitable and working basis for a settlement" which the Bernadotte plan attempts to provide. Nevertheless, if it is absolutely essential from US point of view that such a statement be issued with the three changes which the Secretary suggests, the UK will understand.

5. We have labored patiently and tediously to undo the mistakes which both the US and UK have made in the past. We have brought together what were two widely divergent approaches to the problem. We have convinced the UK of the stability of our position, and therefore have inspired their confidence in us. Similarly, the UK, largely as a result of our efforts, has accepted partition and acknowledged the existence of Israel, thus giving us reason for reposing faith in their cooperation on the agreed line of action. To run the risk of undoing what has been so tediously and laboriously accomplished by a statement along the lines of Cohen's proposal would, I think, be taking chances with fate. I can give you assurances that the Cohen proposal would turn back the clock many months, interfere with joint US-UK action, cause a rebirth of doubts as to the stability of US policy, and hazard the outward recurrence of a serious menace to our national interests.

6. I most earnestly hope that if any statement at all is issued it will not come from the White House. I recognize, of course, that the intimate advisers of the President would much prefer that he, himself, make a pronouncement. But he himself would be the first to realize that no political position, however high—no public office, however great its prestige, is worth gambling with the vital interests of the US.

7. I would not be serving you, the President, and my country to the best of my ability were I to withhold what I realize is a blunt but considered statement of my best opinion.³

Sent Paris (for the Secretary—eyes only) as 753; repeated Department as 4503.⁴

DOUGLAS

³ Mr. Lovett did not make the proposed statement at his press conference of October 13. The only matter regarding Palestine that arose at the conference was the attitude of the United States toward the new Arab government. Mr. Lovett stated that "the United States had already recognized the State of Israel but was not in a position to recognize this Arab government. Asked if [the] United States would recognize it in the Arab section of Palestine, Mr. Lovett replied in the negative and said that we were not in a position to recognize it at all because it has not conformed yet to the normal attributes which have been stated before." (Memorandum by Mr. McDermott, News Division Files)

⁴ This telegram is printed from the text as repeated to the Department, marked "For Lovett (Eyes Only)."

867N.01/10-1448: Telegram

*The Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald)
to the Acting Secretary of State*

SECRET US URGENT

TEL AVIV, October 14, 1948—5 p. m.

179. From official Israeli sources both the Military Attaché and the Counselor are confidentially informed that the activities of Egyptian armies in south are causing major concern Israeli Army. Reports are that for last 10 days Egypt forces have been moving reinforcements and deploying troops toward Israeli positions and indications last two days point toward Egyptian offensive action near El Falujah which, according Israeli G-2 may materialize next four or five days. Israeli forces also undertaking strengthen positions. El Falujah is a key point both as regards command of supply routes to besieged Jewish Negev settlements and as regards east-west Arab communications.

Mission does not know where fault lies in present jockeying for position on southern front as between Jews and Arabs, but each side apparently blaming other. Israeli public and Army will never allow Egypt forces get in position annihilate agricultural settlements and if enemy starts offensive to push Jews out of present positions which strategically hold only eventual hope of saving settlements there is strongest probability Jews will counter-attack in force. Egypt Army activity probably related formation Gaza Government. Recognition of Gaza by Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq has placed both Israel and Transjordan in peculiar position, particularly latter. Abdullah is reported to have moved his flag as far south as Hebron and Bethle-

hem and indications are that he is watching Egypt activities very closely.¹

Solely for confidential and restricted information Department and Army, mission believes a very peculiar situation could develop if war resumed in south. Abdullah now in the middle, might stand by and let Israel Army maul Egyptian forces in order eliminate both Gaza Government and potential Egyptian menace his territory.

Jewish estimate of situation is that they can successfully defend against all six enemy forces. They cannot take offensive all fronts, but if Egypt Army forces Jews into counter-offensive they believe they can soundly defeat Egyptians, provided Abdullah holds his Legion back.

In strict confidential opinion mission this unhappy situation could open up interesting possibility future avenue of political settlement between Israel and Transjordan, although time is not yet ripe at moment owing Abdullah's delicate position vis-à-vis Arab League.

Situation becoming tense. Jews start new year with hope and high Army morale.

Sent Department 179, Department pass Jerusalem 8, Paris Gadel 1 and Department of Army.

McDONALD

¹ Saudi Arabian recognition of the Arab Palestine Government was extended on October 13 (telegram 560, October 21, from Jidda, 867N.01/10-2148).

501.BB Palestine/10-1448: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY

PARIS, October 14, 1948—10 p. m.

Delga 326. [Here follows a discussion of various aspects of the question of assistance to Arab refugees, including information that Dr. Bunche would soon present a report estimating requirements for approximately 468,000 refugees for the period January through August 1949 at \$23,500,000 and additional administrative costs at \$2,500,000.]

Following being presented members USDel, October 15, as US interim position:

1. Action on measures of assistance to Arab refugees and on provisions for their implementation should be taken in relation to general settlement of political problem of Palestine.

2. As to substance of problem of assistance USDel should take position:

a. That UN should take initiative in organizing assistance and should determine organization to administer assistance (preferably expansion of Mediator's relief organization).

b. That total amount required be determined and a recom-

mentation adopted that all governments contribute voluntarily in accordance with an operational scale of contributions to be recommended by Committee on Contributions, subcommittee (of?)¹ Committee 5 reflecting capacities of members to pay and their special interest in this particular problem.

c. That recommendation to be adopted by GA described in b above include an appeal to specialized agencies of UN, particularly FAO, WHO, IRO, and ICEF, to contribute specialized personnel, supplies, and services within limits of their constitutional provisions and financial resources.

3. Budget Bureau and Congressional leaders should be apprised of nature of problem by Acting Secretary of State and at least tacit approval obtained of program outlined in paragraph 2. Question of obtaining US supplies such as blankets and food on urgent emergency basis in advance of Congressional appropriation subject to reimbursement or replacement should be explored with Department of Defense and with Red Cross. This would require clearance with Congressional legislative and appropriation leaders of both major parties.

4. USDel should be prepared to support moving this item up on agenda of Committee 3 for debate as soon as principal governments had had time to mature their positions on basis of Acting Mediator's report on assistance to Arab refugees. This report will be presented to Committee 3 promptly after completion, perhaps by October 20-22 to enable delegates to study problem.

Following alternatives thoroughly explored and considered less desirable:

1. Include item assistance in UN budget with mandatory contributions on basis special operational scale;
2. Refer problem to IRO;
3. Include appeal to voluntary agencies for contributions; and
4. Appeal solely to private sources.

US, UK delegations will have opportunity to examine Cilento's budget in detail before presentation to Committee 3.

Department will be advised as soon as GADel has firm recommendation US position.²

MARSHALL

¹ As in the source text.

² The Delegation approved the recommended position on October 20 (Delga 110, October 20, 3 p. m., 501.BB Palestine/10-2048).

Clifford Papers

Memorandum by the Department of State to President Truman

SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 15, 1948.

Subject: Relief for Arab and Jewish Refugees in the Near East.

Reference is made to the memorandum which you approved, on August 19,¹ authorizing the Department to approach other agencies

¹ See p. 1324.

of this Government with a view to assuming some share of the international burden of relief for refugees in the Near East, and to continue efforts to secure immediate donations from American private relief organizations. Recently reports from our Missions in the Near East and from the Acting Mediator have indicated a desperate need for blankets and clothing in addition to larger quantities of food supplies. The situation is becoming daily more critical as cold weather sets in. After approaching other agencies of the Government to ascertain what assistance might be given, it appears that none of the relief supplies which are urgently required can be made available under existing legislative authority. The response to the Department's efforts to date to stimulate contributions through voluntary organizations has been wholly inadequate to meet these urgent needs.

Reports from our Missions in the Near East emphasize that the failure of the United States Government to render substantial assistance in this emergency is jeopardizing our relations with the Near Eastern states. Moreover, it is the Department's considered view that continued failure of this Government to respond to the critical needs of these refugees will be directly reflected in the attitude of the Arab states towards any political settlement of the Palestine problem.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have strongly recommended that this Government contribute to the relief of these refugees because of the importance of improving relations with the Arab states in view of their strategic importance. The Secretary of Defense concurs strongly with the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.² (Copy of letter attached)

It is understood that the question of your authority as Commander-in-Chief to direct the furnishing of material aid to foreign populations in the absence of specific statutory authorization is one which the decisions of the courts and the opinions of the Attorney General have never firmly and clearly answered. Such authority has, however, been broadly construed where the surrounding facts and circumstances were sufficient to dictate the necessity of such action in the interest of the defense and security of the United States. It is the view of the Department that the surrounding facts and circumstances warrant consideration of the exercise of such authority.

The Department of State therefore recommends that under your authority as Commander-in-Chief, the National Military Establishment be directed to release to the extent available from stocks on hand or which may be quickly obtained from other departments or agencies: 100,000 blankets; 5,000 tons of wheat; cloth or appropriate clothing for 200,000 persons; typhus vaccine, atebine and other urgently needed medical supplies; and to provide transportation facili-

² See telegram Telmar 19, September 28, to Paris, p. 1427.

ties for shipment of these supplies to the Near East. The total value of supplies and transport should not exceed \$1,500,000, to cover the period from now until the end of the year. A relief program for the period January–September 1949 is to be considered by the General Assembly. A recommendation on this subject will be submitted as soon as more information is available on the total requirements and the manner by which it is proposed to be financed.

867N.01/10-1548: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

Moscow, October 15, 1948—7 p. m.

2345. As Palestine question comes up in GA¹ there are no fresh indications Soviet attitude beyond those previously reported, which coincide with statements in joint manifesto of CPS of Near East (Damascus 634, October 7 to Department,² repeated Paris as 22 for GADel). It seems clear Soviet delegation will:

- (1) strongly support original partition resolution November 29, 1947 pressing particularly for setting up independent Arab state in non-Israel portion Palestine;
- (2) charge Anglo-American maneuvers responsible for non-application partition and continuance civil war, citing especially activities British officered Arab Legion and exclusion Soviet representatives from Truce Commission;
- (3) strongly oppose Bernadotte report as imperialistic Anglo-American sponsored scheme;
- (4) similarly oppose any proposal involving extension territories or influence Abdullah, whom they regard as British agent despite intimations to Arab diplomats here of possible dramatic *volte-face* in Soviet position (Embtel 2186, September 29) and press attack on present Israel government (Embtel 2078, September 21²), we do not really expect any major public shift. In voting against Bernadotte Plan or any variation thereof, Soviet delegation would, however, publicly disassociate itself from UN action or any responsibility in connection with application of UN decision and thus gain relative freedom of action to exploit chaotic Near-Eastern situation to maximum.

Sent Department 2345, repeated London 261, Paris for Gadel 478.

SMITH

¹ The First Committee began discussion of Count Bernadotte's progress report on October 15 (United Nations, *Official Records of the Third Session of the General Assembly, Part I, First Committee, Summary Records of Meetings, 21 September–8 December 1948*, p. 160; hereinafter identified as "GA, 3rd sess., Pt. I, First Committee, Summary Records, 1948").

² Not printed.

501.BB Palestine/10-1548: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

PARIS, October 15, 1948—11 p. m.

Delga 350. Next following telegram¹ contains text of draft Palestine resolution representing culmination numerous discussions Bunche and Beeley, taking fully into account Department and FonOff views and reflecting agreement definitive text staff level.² Beeley telegraphing text tonight London for final clearance. We plan present text to delegation early next week and for this purpose would greatly appreciate any further Department comments not later than Tuesday, sooner if possible. Suggest Department not seek top-level clearance before delegation consideration. Commentary this text follows Saturday.

MARSHALL

¹ *Infra.*

² The United States Delegation at Paris had transmitted to the Department on October 6 a draft resolution which had the concurrence of the British Delegation. On October 11 the United States Delegation forwarded to the Department a draft resolution prepared by Acting United Nations Mediator Ralph Bunche. The Department's views were transmitted to Paris on October 13. After further consultation with Bunche and the British on the same day, the United States Delegation submitted to Washington a revised draft resolution, on which the Department commented two days later. (501.BB Palestine/10-648, /10-1148, and /10-1348.)

501.BB Palestine/10-1648: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY

PARIS, October 16, 1948—1 a. m.

Delga 351. Verbatim text:

"The General Assembly,

"Having adopted on 14 May 1948 Resolution 186 (S-2) empowering a UN Mediator in Palestine to exercise certain functions including the use of his good offices to promote a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine;

"Having received and examined the progress report of the UN Mediator in Palestine (Document A/648) submitted by the late Count Folke Bernadotte;

"Having taken note of the resolution of the SC of 15 July 1948 (Document S/902) which 'orders the governments and authorities concerned, pursuant to Article 40 of the Charter of the UN, to desist from further military action,' and which also provides 'that, subject to further decision by the SC or the GA, the truce shall remain in force, in accordance with the present resolution and with that of 29 May 1948, until a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine is reached';

"And taking account of the fact that the governments and authorities concerned have accepted the order of the SC of 15 July;

"1. Expresses its deep appreciation of the progress achieved through the good offices of the late UN Mediator in promoting a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine, for which cause he sacrificed his life;

"2. Notes with satisfaction Part I of the progress report of the UN Mediator and endorses the specific conclusions contained in Part I of that report, which are attached hereto, as a basis for a peaceful settlement of the Palestine question;

"3. Establishes a conciliation commission consisting of three states members of the UN to carry out the functions assigned to it by this resolution in accordance with the provisions of the specific conclusions attached hereto and such instructions as the GA or the SC may issue. (The members of the conciliation commission shall be selected by a committee of the GA composed of representatives of China, France, the USSR, the UK, and the USA.)

"4. Declares that since the SC on July 15 has forbidden further employment of military action in Palestine, hostilities in Palestine should be considered as terminated; instructs the conciliation commission to make arrangements for the transition from the existing truce to a formal peace or armistice in Palestine, and, pending the establishment of such a formal truce or armistice, recommends to the SC that existing truce obligations and arrangements be maintained subject to consideration of any modifications thereof which the conciliation commission may propose; and authorizes the conciliation commission to make such arrangements as may be necessary to utilize the personnel and equipment of the present truce supervision organization;

"5. Instructs the conciliation commission to appoint a technical boundaries commission to assist in delimiting the frontiers in Palestine based on the specific conclusions of the UN Mediator (paragraph 4(b) of the attachment to this resolution), subject to such adjustments as may promote agreement between the Arabs and the Jews (without altering the general equilibrium of the Mediator's conclusions), and taking into account the nature of the terrain and the unity of village areas;

"6. Endorses the recommendation concerning the disposition of the territory of Palestine not included within the boundaries of the Jewish state contained in paragraph 4(c) of the Mediator's specific conclusions and instructs the conciliation commission to use its good offices in consultation with the governments of the Arab states and the Arab inhabitants of Palestine to effectuate this recommendation;

"7. Declares that the holy places and religious buildings and sites in Palestine should be protected and that free access to them should be assured and that religious freedom should be guaranteed, and instructs the conciliation commission to make arrangements for such protection, for such assurances and for such guarantees;

"8. Determines that in view of its association with three world religions, the territory of Jerusalem, as defined in the GA resolution of November 29, 1947, should be accorded special and separate treatment from the rest of Palestine and should be placed under effective

UN control with maximum feasible local autonomy for the Arab and Jewish communities; and instructs the conciliation commission (a) to take all feasible steps to facilitate the effective administration of the territory, coordinating to the fullest extent possible organs of self-government and administration of the Arab and Jewish communities of the territory of Jerusalem, (b) to report to the SC for appropriate action any attempt to interfere with its functions with respect to Jerusalem, and (c) to present to the fourth regular session of the GA detailed proposals for a permanent international regime for the territory of Jerusalem;

"9. Determines that the right of unimpeded access to Jerusalem by road, rail, or air should be fully respected by all parties and instructs the conciliation commission to report immediately to the SC for appropriate action by that organ any attempt by any party to impair such access;

"10. Declares that, in the interest of peace in the Middle East, the UN has a continuing interest in and concern for the maintenance of the frontiers to be delimited by the technical boundaries commission, and that these frontiers shall not be altered except by mutual agreement of the parties concerned;

"11. Recommends to the SC that after the frontiers have been established in accordance with this resolution, the SC consider any attempt to alter these frontiers by force as a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression;

"12. Recognizes the right of the Arab refugees to return to their homes in Jewish-controlled territory at the earliest possible date; and the right of adequate compensation for the property of those choosing not to return and for property which has been lost as a result of pillage or confiscation or of destruction not resulting from military necessity; and instructs the conciliation commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement, and economic and social rehabilitation of the Arab refugees and the payment of compensation;

"13. Decides that the conciliation commission shall assume such functions as were assigned to the UN Mediator as may be appropriately be continued and that the position of UN Mediator shall be discontinued when the conciliation commission enters upon its duties;

"14. Authorizes the conciliation commission to appoint such auxiliary bodies and to employ such technical experts, acting under its authority, as it may find necessary to the effective discharge of its functions and responsibilities under this resolution;

"15. Instructs the conciliation commission to render progress reports periodically to the SYG for transmission to the UN and to members of the UN; and a consolidated report not less than thirty days before the opening of the next regular session of the GA;

"16. Calls upon all governments and authorities concerned to cooperate with the conciliation commission and to take all possible steps to assist in the implementation of this resolution;

"17. Requests the SYG to provide the necessary staff and facilities and to make appropriate arrangements to provide the necessary funds, required in carrying out the terms of this resolution."

501.BB Palestine/10-1648: Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)¹ to
the Acting Secretary of State*

SECRET US URGENT
NIACT

PARIS, October 16, 1948—10 p. m.

Delga 366. From Rusk, Ross, Wilkins. Reference is made to Bern[adotte] report paragraph four (g) which incorporates conclusion Jerusalem should be treated separately and should be placed under effective UN control with maximum feasible local autonomy for Arab and Jewish communities, with full safeguards for protection holy places and sites and free access to them and for religious freedom.

Reference also made US opening statement last regular GA in which US representatives on October 11 said if new political institutions are to endure they must provide for early assumption by people themselves of responsibility for own domestic order.

US has subsequently followed policy of suggesting maintenance law and order in Palestine rests with people concerned and specifically in Jerusalem has suggested use well disciplined units Jewish and Arab military forces under UN supervision. US has also consented in principle to recruitment UN guard force through SYG for protection UN representatives in field but not for maintenance law and order in area under UN consideration.

USGADel staff believes Department should thoroughly review Palestine situation in light of unrealistic character under present conditions of (1) an international force for Jerusalem and (2) an international budget for Jerusalem administration. Such police force and budget would require US to assume major role if there is any hope of obtaining GA approval. It does not appear likely that US would be willing to make commitment lion's share this effort. Alternative is to tie city of Jerusalem and surrounding community under such international guarantees as are required to preserve special status as Holy City. For example, on assumption basic agreement between Israel and Abdullah could be obtained on other issues, it may be possible to place Jewish Jerusalem under an Israel trusteeship and Arab Jerusalem under a Transjordan trusteeship, the two to be coordinated by representatives in Jerusalem of UNTC. Trusteeship agreements would provide international guarantees of access to Jerusalem and protection of and access to holy places, etc. Such an arrangement would leave security and budgetary responsibility upon those primarily concerned and would go long way toward meeting prestige demands of both Jews and Arabs for Jerusalem.

Something along trusteeship line might be developed without

¹ Austin was the ranking officer of the Delegation in the absence of Marshall, who had just left for a 3-day trip to Athens and Rome.

formal trusteeship arrangements if that appears desirable. However, Bernadotte report seems to exclude direct annexation of Jerusalem to either Israel or Transjordan or to both as integral parts national territory.

Perhaps present session GA should indicate that it understands Bernadotte proposal to mean no integral annexation of Jerusalem to either Jewish or Arab state, maximum local autonomy, and some form international guarantees of legitimate international religious interest.

USGADel staff believes Department should give urgent and serious consideration to review Palestine problem in order that we might sound out other delegations this basis. On most informal and unofficial basis, British preliminary reaction was objection based on augmentation of TC by another four members upset of balance between administering and non-administering interests. That indicates they have no serious objection to the merits of the solution insofar as Jerusalem and Palestine alone are concerned.

On the other hand British and Bunche feel most strongly consideration detailed proposals Jerusalem this session might bog down whole Palestine problem in committee and that it would be preferable to establish principle UN control, leaving preparation detailed proposals to CC and next GA session as suggested paragraph eight, Delga 351, October 15 [16]. [Rusk, Ross, Wilkins.]

AUSTIN

501.BB Palestine/10-1648: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt

SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, October 16, 1948—11 p. m.
NIACT

1432. Dept is informed from USGADel Paris¹ that Hamilton of *NY Times* has filed story of Troutbeck's and McClintock's visit to Bernadotte on Rhodes, to appear in Sunday edition Oct 17.²

We are saying if asked that purpose of visit was to concert joint plans for relief of Arab refugees. Press will be informed for background that McClintock spent brief time in Athens to study supply situation there; consulted with Troutbeck and Bernadotte and finished his rapid survey in consultation with you, in view of fact that Dept is focusing much of its field operations on refugee problem in Embassy Cairo. McClintock later reported to Secretary in Paris. Back-

¹ In telegram Delga 354, October 16, 2 p. m., not printed.

² Delga 354 related that the purpose of the visit of Messrs. McClintock and Troutbeck to Rhodes, according to Mr. Hamilton's story, was to participate in the drafting of Count Bernadotte's report. It also noted that "Bunche prepared to say second draft [of] report, including specific conclusions, completed before McClintock, Troutbeck arrived Monday, 13th September, and report not changed as result their visit." (501.BB Palestine/10-1648)

ground info makes reference to fact that President on Aug 19 approved Dept directive to explore every means of prompt and adequate relief to Arab refugees. Trip of U.K. and U.S. reps to Rhodes in fact underscores this deep and continuing concern.

Please take similar line with press in response to inquiries.

Repeated for appropriate action to Paris as Gadel 228; London as 3984; USUN—608; Beirut 653; Tel Aviv 163; Athens 1486.

LOVETT

501.BB Palestine/10-1748: Telegram

*The Special Representative of the United States in Israel
(McDonald) to President Truman*¹

SECRET URGENT

TEL AVIV, October 17, 1948—4 p. m.

Arab refugee tragedy is rapidly reaching catastrophic proportions and should be treated as a disaster. Present and prospective relief and resettlement resources are utterly inadequate. UN administrative machine is both inappropriate and inadequate and result in gross inefficiency and wastefulness. (All adjectives used above are realistically descriptive and are written out of fifteen years of personal contact with refugee problems.)

Of approximately 400,000 refugees approaching winter with cold heavy rains will, it is estimated, kill more than 100,000 old men, women and children who are shelterless and have little or no food. Situation requires some comprehensive program and immediate action that dramatic and overwhelming calamities such as vast flood or earthquake would invoke. Nothing less will avert horrifying losses.

Mediator's administration is completely unsuited [to] energetic and competent handling emergency relief and resettlement problem. When Mediator was parenthetically given refugee responsibility, no one conceived present scope or urgency of tragedy. Mediator's administrative machinery can deal only with governments and at top level remote from refugees.

Leaving to individual governments as Mediator must, distribution of relief results, as is inevitable under present system, in waste estimated by competent technicians as high as 90%. Other 10% is often delayed weeks or months in reaching individual refugees.

No criticism is hereby intended of Acting Mediator or his associate, Sir Raphael Cilento who is directly in charge. It is not men; it is the system which is at fault.

¹ Transmitted to the Department by Tel Aviv in telegram 188 "For President and Acting Secretary."

Inescapable conclusion that responsibility for raising funds and administering relief from top to individual recipients must be transferred promptly to International Red Cross. It alone is geared to do essential work in all phases. It would, I believe welcome and accept this challenge.

Some of difficulties and possible objections to this transfer are serious but none are insuperable.

1. UN action to transfer officially responsibility from Mediator to Red Cross need not imply any reflection on Bernadotte's planning; rather it could be interpreted as carrying out his own Red Cross ideals.

2. Transfer would not involve delay because Red Cross staff already working in Arab Palestine and neighboring states.

3. Transfer would not weaken Mediator's role, on contrary would free him from embarrassing responsibility not directly related mediation.

4. Arab Governments might at first cavil at proposal have whole administration under Red Cross, but prospect saving refugees should be compelling.

5. Israeli Government and Jewish organizations, once they understood purpose of change, could not reasonably object because Arab refugee problem unsolved will reflect, justly or not upon Israel and make its future relations with Arab states more difficult.

6. Program suggested above is non-partisan, non-sectarian. Properly presented it should win support of all party leaders and hence could not be criticized as campaign move.

7. Instead of confusing or making more difficult a solution of the Palestine political problem, Red Cross handling of refugees would be sorely needed evidence of world's humanitarianism.

Though I have had no chance confer believe Basil O'Connor and Gower (latter now in Paris) of Red Cross and Herbert Hoover would approve.

Every consideration of mercy, justice and expediency call for this radical change at the earliest possible moment.

Department may care pass GADel and I personally see no objection pass Arab Capitals for comment our Missions.²

MCDONALD

² The Department sent this telegram to Arab capitals, the United States Delegation at Paris, and Jerusalem for comment in a circular telegram of October 18, 3 a. m. (501.BB Palestine/10-1848). Ambassador Griffis, on October 20, commented in part as follows: "The telegram is entirely accurate and merely confirms what I have repeatedly stated that Arab refugee problem is tragic disaster, that substantially none of the relief goods or funds have actually reached the refugees; that Mediator's administration is entirely incapable of coping with problem and that it should be promptly transferred to trained experts in relief problems." (Telegram 1503 from Cairo, 501.BB Palestine/10-2048)

501.BB Palestine/10-1848

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense
(Forrestal)*

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 18, 1948.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In his final report on Palestine the UN Mediator, the late Count Bernadotte, recommended that:

"The City of Jerusalem, which should be understood as covering the area defined in the resolution of the General Assembly of 29th November, should be treated separately and should be placed under effective United Nations control with maximum feasible local autonomy for its Arab and Jewish communities, with full safeguards for the protection of the Holy Places and sites and free access to them, and for religious freedom."

As you will recall, on September 21, 1948 the Secretary of State publicly declared that the United States considered that the conclusions contained in the final report of Count Bernadotte offered a generally fair basis for settlement of the Palestine question.

If the territory of Jerusalem is to be placed under effective United Nations control it will be necessary for the United Nations to establish an adequate police force in that area. Under present circumstances such a force can scarcely be recruited from the local inhabitants, Arab and Jew, who are divided by fierce animosity. Colonel Begley, Chief Security Officer of the United Nations Secretariat, who has had personal experience of actual conditions in Jerusalem, has indicated his firm opinion that the minimum number for an international police force in Jerusalem would be 6,000 men. Independent estimates by American military observers suggest that the absolute minimum force could not be less than 4,000 men. The recently returned American Consul General in Jerusalem, however, concurs with Colonel Begley's estimate of 6,000 men.

Two methods of supplying an international police force are open to the United Nations. One would be for interested governments to supply contingents of troops or police personnel to make up the Jerusalem security force. The other would be for the Secretary General of the United Nations to recruit a quasi-military organization from nationals of states members of the United Nations. Should the first alternative be adopted it might be possible, through proper selection of the governments concerned, to exclude Soviet or Soviet nationals but if this force were recruited by the Secretary General on the same basis as he has employed members of the Secretariat there would no doubt be a certain number of such nationals in the UN Jerusalem police force.

In light of this Government's pledged support of the Bernadotte Plan, an integral part of which is his specific recommendation for effective United Nations control of Jerusalem, and in light of the necessity in the national security interests of the United States that

conditions of peace be reestablished in Palestine at the earliest moment, the Department of State believes that this Government must in one form or another support a proposal to establish a United Nations police force in Jerusalem.

The Department of State requests your advice as to which type of international police for Jerusalem this government should support: a force made up of contingents supplied by certain governments, or a body recruited by the UN Secretary General. It is likewise requested that you indicate the opinion of the National Defense Establishment as to the employment of American citizens in the Jerusalem international police, either as private individuals recruited by the Secretary General or as members of the United States armed services detailed for this particular duty.

The conclusions of the Bernadotte report will be debated before the General Assembly of the United Nations commencing October 15. Accordingly, it would be appreciated if an answer to this request could be forthcoming within the next week.

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT A. LOVETT

Editorial Note

The Department, on October 18, sent to the Delegation at Paris a draft statute on the administration of Jerusalem. The draft was said to represent the "preliminary views of Dept as to action which may be taken this session GA. . . . Dept does not have closed views on the appropriateness of brief statute of this type as compared with more elaborate document such as that prepared by the TC."

The draft statute designated the United Nations as administering authority for Jerusalem, with the Trusteeship Council, operating under the authority of the General Assembly, exercising the functions of the administering authority. The Government of Jerusalem was to consist of a United Nations Commissioner and his appointees, a Legislative Council and a Judiciary (airgram Gadel A-8 to Paris, 501.BB Palestine/10-1848).

501.BB Palestine/10-1548: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State,
at Paris*

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 18, 1948—11 a. m.

Telmar 72. Eyes only Marshall and Rusk from Lovett. After long discussions Saturday and Sunday afternoons reference Delga 335 October 15,¹ my present understanding with President is that no statement will be made by President or State Department in clarifica-

¹ Not printed.

tion position regarding Mediator's plan. President and his advisers appeared to feel that neither of the two drafts submitted adequately meet his problem, even reinforced by Bunche statement. Complexity of matter is such that they are prepared to leave situation in its momentarily quiescent status for the time being and have so far accepted my advice that we had better say nothing than say something wrong. I am unable estimate how long this decision will stand.

In conversation Sunday afternoon President was most insistent that our Delegation use utmost efforts to have debate on Mediator's plan deferred until after elections if possible, using any parliamentary procedures available, and instructed me to request you to use every effort to avoid having U.S. Delegation drawn into the debate. When I explained difficulties this would cause it became evident that President and his advisers feel we have gratuitously taken the leading role and that we should let others carry the ball in connection with plan if we wish to make it possible for the President to avoid a public statement.

Since climax of campaign comes within next two weeks, President asked utmost cooperation in avoiding having matter thrown again into political debate here. At 9:40 Sunday night² I received following message and was directed to transmit it to you top secret basis:

"From the President to Secretary of State.

I request that no statement be made or no action be taken on the subject of Palestine by any member of our Delegation in Paris without obtaining specific authority from me and clearing the text of any statement. H.S.T."

Above was hand-delivered to my home by Clifford.

Separate cable³ gives report discussions on Arab refugees.⁴

LOVETT

² October 17.

³ *Infra*.

⁴ This telegram was repeated to Rome where a copy was turned over to Secretary Marshall on October 19. The latter was en route to Paris after his visit to Greece. Mr. Rusk, at Paris, informed Mr. Lovett on October 19 that "In Secretary's absence I showed Telmar 72 to Austin and called special instruction from White House contained therein to attention four principal delegates present in Paris. Otherwise some untoward incident might have occurred." Mr. Rusk stressed that Senator Austin at no time spoke as United States Representative but always as President of the Security Council and that "No possible exception could be taken to his conduct of meeting or his statements on any grounds contained in Telmar 72." (Telegram Delga 395)

In a memorandum of October 19 to Secretary Marshall, Mr. Rusk reported that the First Committee was ready to postpone action on the Palestine question. He concluded that "The general situation on Palestine, therefore, looks reasonably stable for the remainder of our election campaign. There will almost certainly be press stories that the United States has sought postponement; on the other hand, we can with complete accuracy point out that the majority in Committee 1 which objected to placing Palestine first on the agenda has grown even larger in favor of further postponement and that we have no choice in the matter whatever." Both Delga 395 and Mr. Rusk's memorandum are filed under 501.BB Palestine/10-1948.

501.BB Palestine/10-1848: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Delegation
at Paris*

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 18, 1948—3 p. m.

Gadel 232. Eyes only Rusk from Lovett. Discussed Arab refugee problem at White House yesterday and submitted Dept's memo¹ suggesting that President might use authority as Commander-in-Chief to direct military establishments to issue blankets, cloth, wheat, medicines, etc., to tide situation over to minor extent until UN takes over. There is serious legal question whether President's authority in peacetime permits such order for foreign relief. Matter will have to be carefully explored by Attorney General's office and White House. We estimate this will take approximately two weeks but White House has requested Attgen give it priority. President is anxious for this country as a Government to do all it properly can but does not feel he can act unless and until formal legal opinion received.

In connection with discussion in GA regarding UN program for Arab refugees, press reports state U.K.-U.S. Resolution does not provide for an appropriation of UN funds but requests governments and individuals to help and states U.S. Del wants ask Congress make special appropriation this purpose.

In light information first paragraph above, our exploration matter so far indicates no Governmental funds available from current appropriations unless President can take step under discussion. Therefore about all we can say publicly at present appears to be that this Government is giving most active and earnest consideration to methods of providing assistance in the absence of Congress, and particularly the legal problems presented by the situation.

We think there is much merit in proposal Tel Aviv message October 17² repeated Paris as Dept's circular 3 AM Oct 18.³ It may be far easier to make contribution to domestic Red Cross for International Red Cross use. Will check with Red Cross here. What are your views?

LOVETT

¹ Dated October 15, p. 1478.² See footnote 1, p. 1486.³ Not printed; but see footnote 2, p. 1487.

501.BB Palestine/10-1848: Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)
to the Acting Secretary of State*

SECRET NIACT

PARIS, October 18, 1948—11 p. m.

Delga 387. Fawzi Bey approached us urgently this afternoon on the following matter and said he considered it important enough to take

up with the Secretary or acting head of our delegation. He requested a prompt expression of our view.

Fawzi said it was clear to the Egyptian Government that the Jews had unlawfully, in violation of the truce, taken the initiative in military activity in the Negev during the past few days.¹ He explained that whether it was a convoy or not it was certainly not a convoy in the UN sense because there had been no notification of any such convoy to UN authorities and UN authorities had certainly not accompanied such convoy. He also said that the Israelis had in any event bombed Egyptian installations.²

In the circumstances, Fawzi wanted to know what action the Government of the US would take. We asked if he intended to imply unilateral action by the US. He replied that the questions for us to decide were whether we would take any action and if we were prepared to take action whether it would be unilateral or in support of SC action.

Fawzi went on to say that paper resolutions were turning out to serve very little purpose. It would not be enough for the SC merely to pass another such resolution. He recalled that the July 15 resolution provided for consideration of further action by the SC under Chapter VII in the event either party violated the truce laid down in that resolution.

It is essential for us to make at least some interim reply to Fawzi, particularly since SC is meeting Tuesday morning at urgent suggestion of Acting Mediator to consider report from him on last days events in Negev area, including his request to both parties for an immediate cease-fire.³ In this connection, Bunche has talked with Egyptian and Israeli foreign ministers here, but at late hour this afternoon they had not received replies from their governments.

We planned to say to Fawzi that we have reported his inquiry to the Department and that we feel this inquiry must be considered in the light of the Acting Mediator's report and consideration of this report by the SC.⁴

AUSTIN

¹ For cablegrams of October 15 and 16 from Acting Egyptian Foreign Minister Ibrahim Dessuky Abaza to Secretary-General Lie concerning alleged violations of the truce by Israeli forces, see SC, 3rd yr., *Supplement for October 1948*, p. 54. For the texts of the letters of October 8 and October 18 from Mr. Eban to the President of the Security Council concerning alleged violations of the truce by Arab forces, see *ibid.*, pp. 50, 63.

² Foreign Minister Abaza in discussing with an officer of the American Embassy on October 18, the alleged Egyptian refusal to permit Israeli convoys to traverse lines to beleaguered settlements in Negev, "did not deny Egyptian halting of convoy but stated that Egyptians had offered to discuss problem of re-victualing the settlements. The Jews had, however, answered by armed attack." (Telegram 1504, October 20, 10 a. m., from Cairo, 867N.01/10-2048)

³ For the text of Mr. Bunche's report of October 18, see SC, 3rd yr., *Supplement for October 1948*, p. 55.

⁴ The Department, in reply on October 19, stated: "You should tell Fawzi Bey US will of course continue to act within framework UN and will not take unilateral action re present military activity in Negev (Delga 387). Dept approves action outlined last para urtel." (Telegram Gadel 247, 501.BB Palestine/10-1848)

Editorial Note

The Security Council discussed the Palestine question on October 19. Mr. Bunche made an appeal to the Council to end the fighting that had been raging in the Negeb (SC, *3rd yr.*, No. 118, page 2).

The Syrian Representative proposed that the Council adopt the suggestions made in paragraph 18 of Mr. Bunche's report. His proposal, as amended, was adopted in two separate votes. The cease-fire section was adopted unanimously; the lettered portions were adopted by nine votes, with the Soviet Union and the Ukraine abstaining; its text read:

"The present situation in the Negeb is complicated by the fluid nature of military dispositions making the demarcation of truce lines difficult, the problem of the convoys to the Jewish settlements, as well as the problems of the dislocation of large numbers of Arabs and their inability to harvest their crops. In the circumstances, the indispensable condition to a restoration of the situation is an immediate and effective cease-fire. After the cease-fire, the following conditions might well be considered as the basis for further negotiations looking toward insurance that similar outbreaks will not again occur and that the truce will be fully observed in this area:

"(a) Withdrawal of both parties from any positions not occupied at the time of the outbreak;

"(b) Acceptance by both parties of the conditions set forth in the Central Truce Supervision Board decision No. 12 affecting convoys;

"(c) Agreement by both parties to undertake negotiations through United Nations intermediaries or directly as regards outstanding problems in the Negeb and the permanent stationing of United Nations observers throughout the area." (SC, *3rd yr.*, *Resolutions, 1948*, page 25.)

The text of the Central Truce Supervision decision in Case No. 12 is printed in SC, *3rd yr.*, *Supplement for October 1948*, page 62.

The Security Council, later the same day, adopted unanimously the United Kingdom-Chinese draft resolution; its text read:

"The Security Council,

"Having in mind the report of the Acting Mediator concerning the assassination on 17 September 1948 of the United Nations Mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte, and United Nations observer Colonel André Sérot, the report of the Acting Mediator concerning difficulties encountered in the supervision of the truce, and the report of the Truce Commission for Palestine concerning the situation in Jerusalem,

"1. Notes with concern that the Provisional Government of Israel has to date submitted no report to the Security Council or to the Acting Mediator regarding the progress of the investigation into the assassinations;

"2. Requests that Government to submit to the Security Council at an early date an account of the progress made in the investigation and to indicate therein the measures taken with regard to negligence on the part of officials or other factors affecting the crime;

"3. *Reminds* the Governments and authorities concerned that all the obligations and responsibilities of the parties set forth in its resolutions 54 (1948) of 15 July and 56 (1948) of 19 August 1948 are to be discharged fully and in good faith;

"4. *Reminds* the Acting Mediator of the desirability of an equitable distribution of the United Nations observers for the purpose of observing the truce on the territories of both parties;

"5. *Determines*, pursuant to its resolutions 54 (1948) and 56 (1948), that the Governments and authorities have the duty:

"(a) To allow duly accredited United Nations observers and other truce supervision personnel bearing proper credentials, on official notification, ready access to all places where their duties require them to go including airfields, ports, truce lines and strategic points and areas;

"(b) To facilitate the freedom of movement of truce supervision personnel and transport by simplifying procedures on United Nations aircraft now in effect, and by assurance of safe-conduct for all United Nations aircraft and other means of transport;

"(c) To co-operate fully with the truce supervision personnel in their conduct of investigations into incidents involving alleged breaches of the truce, including the making available of witnesses, testimony and other evidence on request;

"(d) To implement fully by appropriate and prompt instructions to the commanders in the field all agreements entered into through the good offices of the Mediator or his representatives;

"(e) To take all reasonable measures to ensure the safety and safe-conduct of the truce supervision personnel and the representatives of the Mediator, their aircraft and vehicles, while in territory under their control;

"(f) To make every effort to apprehend and promptly punish any and all persons within their jurisdictions guilty of any assault upon or other aggressive act against the truce supervision personnel or the representatives of the Mediator." (Resolution 59 (1948), SC, 3rd yr., *Resolutions, 1948*, page 26.)

501.BB Palestine/10-1948

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to President Truman

SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 19, 1948.

Subject: General Assembly Resolution on Palestine.

Pursuant to your directive last night I have telegraphed the Secretary of State that no action on the Palestine question now before the General Assembly shall be taken without clearance from the White House.

As indicated in the two attached telegrams from our Delegation in Paris, Nos. 351 and 367 of October 16,¹ our Delegation has devised a draft resolution which in general terms seeks to give effect to conclu-

¹ Latter not printed.

sions of the Mediator's Report on Palestine, dated September 16, 1948. This draft resolution has been discussed with the British Delegation and with the Acting Mediator for Palestine, Dr. Ralph Bunche. It is a working paper and a final decision has not been reached as to whether it should be submitted by the United States Delegation, the United Kingdom Delegation, or jointly by both Delegations. UK-US agreement on the Palestine problem is regarded in Paris as the most hopeful element in the Palestine problem at this session of the Assembly.

As will be seen from the two telegrams and in light of the Acting Mediator's statement before the First Committee on October 15,² the draft resolution does not "freeze" Count Bernadotte's conclusions. It purposely leaves the way open for negotiation with a view to such adjustments as may promote agreement between the Arabs and Jews for a pacific settlement of their differences.

The proposed resolution as indicated in Paragraph 2 of Telegram 367 is still open to drafting changes, provided they do not alter the general sense of the document.

This matter is likely to come up Wednesday, October 20.

ROBERT A. LOVETT

² See Department of State *Bulletin*, October 24, 1948, p. 517. Mr. Rusk, in a telegram of October 16 to Mr. Lovett, gave his opinion that Mr. Bunche's statement on Count Bernadotte's report "should relieve tension of those who have been afraid of rigidity in precise detail. . . . Bunche's statement as a whole gives full credit Jewish side and should steady the nerves of those who are being bombarded by partisan propaganda." (No. Delga 362, 501.BB Palestine/10-1648)

501.BB Palestine/10-1648: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Delegation at Paris

TOP SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, October 19, 1948—11 a. m.

Gadel 241. Eyes only for Rusk from McClintock. Text of draft resolution set forth Delga 351, Oct. 16, meets with general approval in Dept except for considerable reservation re Art. 8 and some thought as to possible drafting changes in Para. 5. Latter will be subject separate tel. Meanwhile Lovett (who signs this message) is sending text Delga 351 to White House for approval, since we realize from Para. 2, Delga 367,¹ that time is of the essence.

Suggestion Delga 366, Oct. 16, for Jewish and Arab trusteeships over Jerusalem is disturbing to me² and to colleagues in NEA. However Lovett, who is keenly aware budgetary, political and military difficulties inherent in establishing UN police force for Jerusalem, is attracted by your suggestion.

¹ Dated October 16, not printed.

² Mr. McClintock.

Meanwhile Dept has officially inquired National Defense Establishment its views re UN Jerusalem police force.

For time being Para. 8, Delga 351, may take care situation without prejudicing final solution. For your own consideration I desire advance view that partitioning of Jerusalem, even under UN trusteeships, in effect grants PGI what it has asked in respect of Jerusalem. Corollary will be inevitably request for a grant of land corridor from Israel to Jewish Jerusalem trusteeship. Eventual outcome, in opinion here at working level, will inevitably be that all Jerusalem will become a Jewish city with or without UN benediction.

A further consideration is whether any Arab Govt would find itself able, in view political position in Arab world, to accept trusteeship for a fragment of Jerusalem.

I realize that these comments are not very constructive but at least they snag for your scrutiny certain fishhooks in the basket. [McClintock.]

LOVETT

501.BB Palestine/10-1648: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Delegation at Paris

SECRET US URGENT
 NIACT

WASHINGTON, October 19, 1948—7 p. m.

Gadel 246. Dept has given careful consideration to Delga 351 and Delga 367, Oct. 16.¹ We have reservations re Para 5 and objections to Para 6. President has not yet approved proposals.

Present phraseology Para 5 leaves vague both powers of Conciliation Commission and subordinate Boundaries Commission. For example, who is Boundaries Comm to assist in delimiting frontiers: Conciliation Comm, or parties involved, or both? Without endeavoring to suggest specific language we do feel it necessary that this article make clear that GA gives Conciliation Comm a definite mandate to demarcate frontiers in Palestine generally along lines Mediator's recommendations, subject to adjustments now provided for present language Art. 5. We take it this is your intention, since Para. 10 Delga 351 specifically refers to delimitation of frontiers by Boundaries Comm.

Dept believes Para 6 inconsistent with position on possible territorial readjustments Palestine approved by President and sent Tel Aviv Deptel 72, Sep 1 for communication to Israeli authorities. View this Govt's belief, which was informally communicated Count Bernadotte, that area of Negev such as that containing principal Jewish settlement

¹ Latter telegram not printed.

might be retained by Israel, Dept believes essential Para 6 be modified along following lines:

"Endorses the recommendation concerning the disposition of the territory of Palestine not included within the boundaries of the Jewish State contained in paragraph 4(c) of the Mediator's specific conclusions, subject to such adjustments as may promote agreement between the Arabs and the Jews (without altering the general equilibrium of the Mediator's conclusions), and instructs"

Art 8 re Jerusalem as read in light Delga 366, Oct. 16, will require further scrutiny and separate instructions will be sent.

LOVETT

501.BB Palestine/10-2048 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET US URGENT

PARIS, October 20, 1948—2 p. m.

Delga 411. Following is text of proposed US draft resolution approved by GADel this morning (reference Delga 410, October 20¹).

"Whereas the UN Mediator for Palestine in his progress report of September 18 [16], 1948, Part III, states that 'action must be taken to determine the necessary measures of relief (to the Palestine refugees) and to provide for their implementation' and asserts that 'the choice is between saving the lives of many thousands of people now or permitting them to die;'

"Whereas the Acting Mediator in his supplemental report on October 18, 1948,² declares that 'the situation of the refugees is now critical' and that 'aid must not only be continued but very greatly increased if disaster is to be averted;'

"Whereas the alleviation of conditions of starvation and distress among the refugees of Palestine is essential to the success of the efforts of the UN to bring peace to that land; the GA

(1) Commends the governments, organizations, and individuals which have given assistance directly or in response to the Mediator's appeal;

(2) Determines upon the basis of the Acting Mediator's recommendation that the sum of \$30,000,000 will be required to provide relief for 500,000 refugees for a period of nine months from December 1, 1948 to August 31, 1949;

(3) Urges all states members of the UN to make initial or further voluntary contributions in kind or in funds to the UN in accordance with the special operational scale of contributions for this purpose attached as Annex One to this resolution;

(4) Requests the SYG to take all necessary steps to extend aid

¹ Not printed.

² United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Third Session, Supplement No. 11A.*

to the Palestine refugees in accordance with the terms of this resolution, utilizing, as appropriate, voluntary agencies, the agencies of the several governments, the specialized agencies of the UN, and such administrative organizations as may be required for this purpose;

(5) Authorizes the SYG of the UN to advance from the working capital fund immediately for the purposes stated in this resolution not to exceed \$5,000,000 to be repaid by the first cash contributions received from members for this project under the terms of this resolution;

(6) Urges the WHO, FAO, IRO, UNICEF, and other appropriate organizations and agencies, acting within the framework of the relief program herein established, promptly to contribute supplies, specialized personnel and other services permitted by their constitutions and their financial resources, to relieve the desperate plight of the Palestine refugees."

MARSHALL

501.BB Palestine/10-2048: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET URGENT

PARIS, October 20, 1948—11 p. m.

Delga 421. SC action Tuesday morning re Palestine truce can only be described as holding action. If not sufficient stop fighting, restore previous situation Negev, and prevent outbreak elsewhere seems US inescapable immediate consideration SC further action under Chapter VII probably Article 41 pursuant paragraph 4, July 15 resolution in order prevent deterioration situation Palestine below point peaceful settlement basis Bernadotte report possible. Recall we have consistently taken position both in UN and diplomatically that US would be prepared, in view July 15 Res, to take strong position in SC, support such action as may be necessary.

AUSTIN

501.BB Palestine/10-2048: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET US URGENT

PARIS, October 20, 1948—11 p. m.

Delga 424. For Lovett from Rusk. Following are comments on Department's cirtel, October 18, 3 a. m.¹ Extent and urgent character Arab refugee problem recognized. UN administrative organization has been inadequate primarily because of lack of financial resources and supplies. GADel agrees that UN relief organization could be improved by addition of staff personnel experienced in relief administration in Middle East but has no evidence that UN relief organization inappro-

¹ Not printed; but see footnote 2, p. 1487.

appropriate if supplied with funds and relief supplies and reorganized as suggested above.

Inadequacies in administrative organization of Arab governments and delays of internal transport also recognized but GADel not convinced that transfer complete responsibility to CICR for raising funds and distributing relief would solve problem because (1) CICR can only appeal to national Red Cross organizations for funds and through them to their respective governments and general publics; (2) GADel considers that contributions by governments are required as private contributions already have and would prove to be inadequate (Delga 423, October 20²); (3) governments would make contributions more readily through UN than through CICR because UN can appeal to governments on basis that assistance to refugees will facilitate Palestine settlement. Appeal based solely on humanitarian grounds would fail produce action by legislative and appropriating bodies of governments; (4) transfer responsibility to CICR likely to dry-up assistance from Arab states which have a continuing responsibility under proposed UN program.

GADel approach to problem envisages concentrating control and coordination in SYG UN with discretion in his hands utilize private and government agencies and specialized agencies of UN (paragraph 4, US draft resolution, Delga October 20). This would permit full utilization CICR. [Rusk.]

MARSHALL

² Not printed.

501.BB Palestine/10-2048: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

PARIS, October 20, 1948—11 p. m.

Delga 425. For Satterthwaite and McClintock from Kopper. Oral reply was made to Fawzi Bey today in accordance with Department's instructions (Gadel 247, October 19¹). Fawzi Bey seemed distinctly disappointed. He then made following points:

1. US reply to his urgent inquiry was not sufficient at all. It was off the mark and indicates too much complacency in sense that US seems to be waiting on SC action instead of stirring SC into action. Situation in Palestine and its environs deteriorating rapidly. Security of Arab states gravely endangered.

2. Shipment of arms should really be stopped to Jews as well as Arabs or else Arabs should be allowed to obtain arms for self-defense.

3. UK is exceeding terms of SC truce resolution by volunteering self-imposed obligation not to allow Egyptians to obtain arms stored in Egypt although belonging to UK. This not in accord with 1936

¹ For text, see footnote 4, p. 1492.

treaty. Jews continue to arm by obtaining munitions, planes, pilots. This is well known whether we admit it officially or not. Dangerous difference in armament between Jews and Arabs growing. Arabs should have enough arms to defend themselves. They are not asking for arms to drive Jews into sea, only enough to defend selves.

4. Egyptians hoped closer cooperation between UK and US might make it possible for US to indicate informally to UK that balance between Arabs and Jews should be rectified. Egyptian Ambassador London taking this up with British Government. Likewise representations being made at Cairo to British Ambassador.

5. Fawzi Bey says difficulties of US are recognized by Egyptian Government and delegation. To Arabs, however, it is not only question of difficulties but life and existence as independent nations. Economically Egypt and Arab states already severely disrupted and social structure dangerously shaken. Far-reaching repercussions may result. In meantime situation cannot serve as basis for any solid cooperation between Arab part of world and western powers.

6. Many Egyptians and Egypt delegation Paris have been exerting exceptional efforts to improve atmosphere between Egypt and western powers. What is happening in and around Palestine now can set back these efforts.

7. Time is running fast. At earliest possible moment we should start to build together for all eventualities, for peace as well as war.

8. Fawzi Bey suggested there were several ways to help :

a. British should announce that because of the serious discrepancy resulting from Israeli arming, shipments would be released to Arab countries of stocks stored in those countries. Continued arming of Israeli[s] is not a contribution toward peace and balance should be preserved. Fawzi described this as the formal legal way. It was pointed out to him that such a course would simply precipitate an armaments race since Israel would commence pressure to raise embargo.

b. US might confidentially intimate to UK that stocks should be released in order to rectify the balance. This was described as an extra legal way. It was pointed out that besides other considerations, same thing would happen here as in first alternative.

c. There should be an immediate formation of military force on behalf of UN. Formation of such a force could be organized in way in which SCTC was established so that there would be no Soviet participation. Such a force is immediately required.

d. It was suggested to Fawzi that the most effective means of correcting situation was to make the embargo really effective. Fawzi thought this was not enough since the Israeli[s] had a superfluity of arms now. The lack of balance would continue to exist.

9. Arab refugees must be given assurance of opportunity to return to their homes. Stopgap aid was not enough—people were dying every day. Each day that passes makes the plight of the refugees more critical.

Fawzi Bey's attitude today reflects attitude expressed by Khashaba

Pasha² last night. Khashaba was quite distressed that SC had taken no real and constructive action on Palestine question yesterday. He said security of Egyptian and Arab states was menaced. Other questions such as self-determination, humanitarianism were now becoming somewhat secondary to security of Arab states in face of continued Israeli advances.

Sent Department Delga 425; repeated London 1088. Department please repeat Cairo as 81. [Kopper.]

MARSHALL

² Egyptian Foreign Minister.

Forrestal Papers

*Diary Entry for October 21, 1948, by the Secretary of Defense
(Forrestal)*

National Security Council

Mr. Forrestal referred to the State Department request for four to six thousand troops to be used as guard forces in Jerusalem in implementation of the Bernadotte Plan for Palestine. This unexpected request was an example of how the Palestine situation had drifted without any clear consequent formulation of United States policy by the NSC. Mr. Forrestal said that actually our Palestine policy had been made for "squalid political purposes" and had been largely the work of David Niles and Clark Clifford. He said that he had no objection to the Jews establishing a homeland in Palestine, but that United States policy should be based on United States national interests and not on domestic political considerations.

He hoped that some day he would be able to make his position on this issue clear.

867N.01/10-2148 : Telegram

Mr. Wells Stabler to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

AMMAN, October 21, 1948—3 p. m.

86. During talk with King this morning he said he most anxious following views be conveyed to Jews:

1. Prior May 14 he had favored partition and had informally undertaken with Jews to occupy Arab areas of Palestine only, provided Jews remained in their areas.
2. Massacre at Deir Yassin and other provocations had incited all Arabs including himself, and he had entered war with serious intent which he still holds. Arab Legion alone among Arab armies still strong.
3. However he now desires restoration peace and understanding

with Jews with whom he believes he could have close relations. He realizes Jews and Arabs can only live peacefully in separate areas with defined boundaries.

4. Palestine question now under jurisdiction and discussion UNGA and all parties must contribute to finding solution in that body.

5. In meantime he hopes Jews will appreciate his sincere desire find solution and refrain from attacking Arab Legion and areas occupied by them. Such attacks merely incite further animosity and delay settlement.

6. On his side King has given strict orders Arab Legion must respect truce and must not attack unless attacked. He believes his orders are being obeyed.

[7.] King said except for contact with Jews through Prince Abdel Majid Haidar, Transjordan Minister to London, and Sassoon of Israeli Foreign Office, he had not requested anybody previously to convey his views to Jews.

Informed King his comments would be reported to Department for whatever action it deemed fit. Indicated it doubtful US Government would consider such approach to Jews desirable, appropriate or helpful while entire question being considered by UNGA. In any event believed USA would probably not wish act as intermediary.

Would appreciate any guidance Department desires give as King will undoubtedly inquire re status matter in near future.¹

STABLER

¹The Department, on October 23, transmitted the text of telegram 86 to the Secretary of State and Mr. Rusk at Paris, adding the following comment: "We are inclined question advisability US authorities communicating above views of Abdullah to Israelis. However, we consider GADel to be in best position make final decision. Suggest that if you believe advisable convey views to Israelis this be done via Shertok in Paris and not thru authorities Tel Aviv. Pls advise in order Dept may inform Stabler." (Telegram Gadel 291, 867N.01/10-2148)

501.BB Palestine/10-2148: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET US URGENT

PARIS, October 21, 1948—5 p. m.

NIACT

Delga 432. Eyes alone for Lovett from Marshall. It may become necessary at any time, in order to comply with President's directive on postponing Palestine with which I am in full accord, to support placing Greece ahead of Palestine in Committee One.¹ If matter arises, a bitter debate will be provoked during which, if we are entirely silent, slurs and insinuations will be heaped upon us to the serious injury

¹The Cuban Representative, on October 20, had proposed to the First Committee that it modify the order in which items on the agenda were to be examined. The effect of the proposal was to defer consideration of the Palestine question. The Committee, after sharp discussion, adopted the Cuban measure by 34 votes to 11, with 10 abstentions (GA, 3rd sess. Pt. I, First Committee, Summary Records, 1948, pp. 208-217).

to our prestige and our influence in this session of the Assembly. Mrs. Roosevelt, Austin and I believe that the best way to handle it would be to make the short frank statement given below. If you agree, please obtain White House clearance immediately. Question will not arise today but we should have your reply today if possible. Although Dulles was not asked to concur, he stated to Rusk some such statement would be a very good thing here and, if decided upon, he would promptly inform Dewey.

Text of statement follows:

"Mr. Chairman: My delegation believes that Committee One should pass next to the consideration of the Greek case. This would mean further postponement of our consideration of Palestine.

"Apart from the urgency of the Greek case, we believe that we should postpone our discussion of Palestine for two reasons:

"(a). A peaceful adjustment of the situation in Palestine can be more wisely solved if the security measures adopted by the SC on October 19 are demonstrated to be effective.

"(b). We do not wish to have the GA's consideration of Palestine exposed to partisan political pressure from outside the UN.

"Until the vigorous and democratic processes of election now going on in the US are over, consideration of Palestine in the UN might be exposed to such pressure. It has been said that our interest in postponement results from partisan politics; the exact opposite is the case. My delegation desires to take partisan politics, or even the appearance of partisan politics, out of our further debate on this subject".

MARSHALL

501.BB Palestine/10-2148: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Paris

TOP SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, October 21, 1948—7 p. m.
NIACT

Telmar 86. Eyes alone for Marshall from Lovett. After careful consideration President feels that statement contained in Delga 432, October 21, would be extremely unwise and requests that reason given in paragraph (b) and last paragraph not be used under any circumstances. While he would prefer not to have paragraph (a) used, he is willing to have this argument used if considered absolutely unavoidable.

Senior advisers in Department likewise feel for quite different reasons statement as proposed would be serious mistake. We believe "reason" paragraph (b) and succeeding paragraph might be construed as open acceptance of a precedent which would be most unfortunate. With respect to paragraph (a) in its present form, we fear it may be distorted by groups here into a unilateral threat to use Chapter 7 to make security measures effective.

Our main worry is that the approach seems negative rather than positive in justification of placing the Greek or any other case on the agenda prior to Palestine. We believe the Secretary's recent trip to Greece highlights in the public imagination our concern with conditions in that country which are aggravated by the continued disregard of previous UN resolutions and in defiance of the UNSCOB. We feel that a statement on the affirmative side might improve our case.

Furthermore, if it appeared wise inject additional question, we now have the Korean civil war threatening the government established under quasi-UN auspices.

On balance, the Department recommends against the statement as proposed and suggests that we limit ourselves to affirmative arguments in the Greek case in public debate.¹

LOVETT

¹ In reply on October 22, the Secretary of State informed Mr. Lovett that "Rusk and I fail to find any affirmative arguments that would not be instantly and loudly proclaimed as insincere, especially in view of present activities in the Negeb. We think we or poor Austin must generally sit silent and grin and bear it." (Telegram Martel 73, from Paris, 501.BB Palestine/10-2248)

501.BB Palestine/10-2048 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Delegation at Paris

SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, October 21, 1948—7 p. m.
NIACT

Gadel 266. Re Delga 421, Oct 20 we feel that we must abide by our commitments under the Charter and by our statements last May and July advocating SC action if necessary under Chapter VII to prevent further hostilities in Palestine in defiance of SC in its efforts to preserve peace. We would much prefer however not to play role of protagonist or have to speak first. This telegram has been approved by the President.¹

LOVETT

¹ Marginal notation: "Cleared by President 12:40 PM, Oct. 21". The text of this telegram was sent to London as No. 4058 the following day (501.BB Palestine/10-2248).

501.BB Palestine/10-1348 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt

SECRET WASHINGTON, October 21, 1948—7 p. m.

1455. Dept considers security of ME would probably be strengthened if large part Arab Palestine were incorporated in Transjordan after satisfactory solution problem demarcation Arab-Israel frontiers reached through UN (ur 1485 Oct 13). We agree however that con-

tinued Brit insistence on merging Arab Palestine with Transjordan may have adverse effects Arab capitals.

Dept would not object to acquisition by Egypt small portion of Arab Palestine, in line with Mediator's conclusion 4-c. However, Egypt has apparently so far shown no desire to do so. We believe it preferable that matter be raised by Egypt on own initiative and independently.

Re final para reftel, while Bernadotte may have held views in Aug as reported ur 1105 [1103-A],¹ he definitely on Sep 14 rejected UK suggestion that Syria profit by partition of Arab Palestine. Bernadotte also applied same reasoning to Lebanon. Foregoing for your info only.²

LOVETT

¹ See footnote 2, p. 1472.

² This telegram was repeated to London and Paris, for GADel.

501.BB Palestine/10-2248 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Paris

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 22, 1948—5 p. m.

US URGENT NIACT

Telmar 91. Personal for Marshall and Rusk from Lovett. Re Martel 73,¹ reaction of White House so strong against action suggested in Delga 432,² with specific prohibition against paragraph (b) and most reluctant and qualified acceptance paragraph (a), there is no chance of getting decision reversed. Our Telmar 86³ was merely playing for a break in hopes Secretary's Greek trip may have disclosed facts which might help affirmative presentation.

We agree any cover plan would be transparent and can only hope Arab bloc and other countries supporting postponement may continue take the lead. Postponement appears increasingly important if problem is to be dealt with realistically on its merits and outside domestic politics.

LOVETT

¹ Dated October 22, not printed; but see the first footnote 1, p. 1504.

² Dated October 21, p. 1502.

³ Dated October 21, p. 1503.

867N.01/10-2348 : Telegram

Mr. Wells Stabler to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

AMMAN, October 23, 1948—10 a. m.

89. Careful investigation does not disclose King has ever requested Belgian Consul General¹ (Deptel 24, October 18²) to act as inter-

¹ Jean Nieuwenhuys.

² Not printed.

mediary between him and Shertok. Nor is there any evidence Nieuwenhuys has done more than talk with King on several occasions about general Palestine question. While King has freely admitted to me he not adverse to considering separate peace negotiations without other Arab states, provided acceptable plan put forward, and that he has had contact with Shertok through Prince Abdel Majid Haidar, Transjordan Minister to London, and Sassoon of Israeli Foreign Office then in Paris (mytels 47, September 3, [53?] September 17,³ 56, September 20⁴ and 86, October 21) (this contact broken off some time ago as result leak which was given publicity in Arab States), doubt whether he now engaged in such conversations and whether in any event he would choose Belgian Consul General . . . as his intermediary.

. . . . Abdullah is, of course, renowned for being frank and outspoken and it is likely he made certain comments regarding his attitude toward Jews and Palestine settlement which Belgian interpreted as King's desire he should transmit them to Shertok. It is not at all improbable Belgian did convey such comments to Jews and that during subsequent general conversations with King mentioned his talks with Shertok and other Jewish officials. However, if this is so, whole episode has made very little impression on King as he has never mentioned matter to me or British Minister Kirkbride. It seems almost certain Belgian has assumed function on his own responsibility.⁵

STABLER

³ Nos. 47 and 53 not printed.

⁴ Not printed; it reported information from King Abdullah that "month and half ago had received several communications from Shertok through Sassoon of Israeli Foreign Office, then in Paris, apparently dealing with direct peace negotiations. Had replied urging Jews to stop aggression in Jerusalem. Jews did not heed his advice and he now pessimistic that lasting solution can be found without force of arms." (501.BB Palestine/9-2048)

⁵ Mr. Stabler, on November 4, advised of information from Mr. Kirkbride that the King had told him "he had requested (Belgian Consul General . . . to talks with Israeli Delegate to GA along lines mentioned mytel 86, October 21. . . . Since it is recalled Belgian was last in Amman on October 17, it appears King was not quite accurate when he said (paragraph seven mytel 86) he had not asked any one previously to convey his views to Jews." (Telegram 104 from Amman, 867N.01/11-448)

501.BB Palestine/10-2048 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Delegation at Paris

SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, October 23, 1948—11 a. m.

Gadel 286. For Rusk from Lovett. Line reasoning advanced Delga 424, Oct. 20, seems perfectly sound if applied to long-range relief program which we all agree should preferably be UN responsibility if members UN rise to occasion and appropriate actual cash or materials in kind.

We are however confronted with immediate emergency if there are to be any refugees left alive by time UN swings into action. I have discussed matter with President and he shares our view that Red Cross best geared for prompt measures. Amcross stands ready to move immediately and we are urgently exploring legal basis which might permit President as Commander in Chief to instruct armed services to turn over needed supplies to Amcross, which in turn could arrange for distribution Middle East. There is no thought undercutting UN but merely an earnest desire to get supplies to area in adequate quantity and at earliest moment.¹

LOVETT

¹ This telegram was repeated to Cairo for Ambassador Griffis.

501.BB Palestine/10-2348 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Paris

TOP SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, October 23, 1948—1 p. m.
NIACT

Telmar 92. Eyes only for Marshall from Lovett. In a letter¹ addressed to Dean Alfange, Chairman, American Christian Palestine Committee of New York, released last night from Republican headquarters, Governor Dewey in effect repudiated Administration's Palestine policy with respect to the Bernadotte Plan. He reaffirmed his "wholehearted support of the Republican Platform and that certainly included the Palestine plank". This plank pledged "full recognition to Israel with its boundaries as sanctioned by the UN and aid in developing its economy". While the careful language "with its boundaries as sanctioned by the UN" could be used subsequently to support argument that November 29th Resolution was not specifically mentioned, entire statement is clearly aimed to support the original UN partition plan with boundaries unchanged.

Furthermore, statement obviously designed to take advantage of widely publicized criticism of President for abandoning Palestine plank in Democratic Platform and timed specifically to embarrass President during his windup trip to Chicago, New York and Brooklyn next week.

I therefore feel positive that President's reaction will be immediate and aggressive, largely because good faith of Democratic candidate has been directly challenged for breach of his platform pledge. Although President has not yet communicated with me, I anticipate unhappy weekend and propose, unless you instruct me otherwise, to urge that he content himself with reaffirmation his support of Demo-

¹ Dated October 22.

cratic platform language and stress importance of UN efforts in Paris in trying to find acceptable solution. Platform read in pertinent part: "We approve the claims of the State of Israel to the boundaries set forth in the UN Resolution of November 29 and consider that modifications thereof should be made only if fully acceptable to the State of Israel". Latter phrase is the important part at present. It is only by some such general statement that we can avoid detailed discussion in succeeding political speeches of Negeb and other problems raised by Bernadotte Plan or flat disavowal USDel September 21st statement, which I hope and believe can be avoided. Will also urge he use Bunche's exposition Bernadotte Plan if absolutely necessary.

You may wish inform Douglas so he can batten down hatches.

LOVEIT

501.BB Palestine/10-2348 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Delegation at Paris

TOP SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, October 23, 1948—1 p. m.
NIACT

Gadel 289. As indicated last sentence Gadel 192, Oct. 13,¹ we have for some time felt that certain concessions would have to be made to Israel in northern Negev. This view is consistent with line originally laid down and approved by President as set forth in Deptel 72, Sept. 1, to Tel Aviv, pursuant to which McDonald informed PGI of our view that Israel might expand into rich area of Galilee in return for relinquishing a large portion of Negev to Transjordan. It is likewise consistent with advice which McClintock gave Bernadotte as reported Cairo's 1316, Sept. 15, when he said that although Bernadotte's recommendation regarding Negev might be just there were nevertheless strong considerations favoring concessions in favor of Jews, at least to extent of a salient into Negev as far as Beersheba-Gaza Road.

According to press reports, Jews have now carved out this salient since they have taken Beersheba and are said to be astride Egyptian communications even south of Gaza.

We feel that in conversation with Arab and Israeli delegates this Govt's view should be informally emphasized that, among adjustments in Bernadotte Plan mentioned by Acting Mediator in his presentation to Committee One, should be territorial rectification in northern Negev in favor of Israel. Extreme care should be taken however to make it clear that this Govt in no way condones Jewish military operations in defiance of SC resolution which have resulted in conquest by force of arms of territory which this Govt felt could peacefully be

¹ Not printed.

conveyed to Israel.² In this regard please see Gadel 266, Oct. 21, reaffirming our position as already taken in SC, supporting Chapter VII action if Palestine truce is further breached.³

Repeated for similar informal action to Tel Aviv as 175.

Repeated for info to London as 4071, Cairo as 1471, Amman as 25.

LOVETT

² At this point in the telegram as drafted by Mr. McClintock appeared the sentence: "It is of special importance to make it very clear to Israeli representatives that further encroachments of this kind will not be tolerated." This sentence was deleted by Mr. Lovett.

³ At this point in the telegram as drafted appeared the sentence: "You are authorized to add that Gadel 266, Oct. 21, has received the approval of the President." This sentence, too, was deleted by Mr. Lovett.

Truman Papers, President's Secretary's File : Telegram

*The President's Special Counsel (Clifford) to President Truman*¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 23, 1948—1:05 p. m.

White 227. After reading statement of Dewey on Israel, I contacted Lovett and have spent most of morning with him. I explained to him that your integrity has been attacked by Dewey whose purpose is to infer that you have reneged on Democratic platform. I suggested to Lovett that by reason of Dewey's action, you had no alternative but to reaffirm your support of the Democratic platform. Lovett agrees completely. I suggested to him that you would have to give out statement clearly stating your position on Israel. Lovett agrees. He sent Marshall a cable² stating in substance that Dewey has violated bipartisan approach on Israel and that Lovett feels that President has to reaffirm his support of Democratic platform. I am working on a statement on Israel now and will have it ready to submit to you on Sunday morning.³ I consider Dewey's action a serious error on his part and the best thing that has happened to us to date. Affectionate regards.

¹ Transmitted by the White House Signal Detachment to the President at Pittsburgh. Mr. Clifford's handwritten draft of this message is in the Clifford Papers.

² Telegram Telmar 92, October 23, p. 1507.

³ For the statement by the President, see telegram Telmar 97, October 24, p. 1512.

501.BB Palestine/10-2048 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Delegation at Paris

SECRET US URGENT
NIACT

WASHINGTON, October 23, 1948—2 p. m.

Gadel 290. Reurtel Delga 411, Oct. 20, Dept's comments are following:

In first and third para preamble change ref to Palestine refugees to read "refugees in or from Palestine."

Numbered paras 2 and 5: In recommending basic sum \$30,000,000 and advance (para 5) from working capital fund, it would be desirable to insert clause placing limitation on administrative expenditure in order prevent establishment complex top-heavy administrative organization and assure maximum utilization funds for relief supplies per se. We believe \$500,000 (Delga 410, Oct 20, para 5^b¹) adequate for UN administrative functions as envisaged Deptel AmEmb Gadel 4141 Oct 22.² However, allowance would also have to be made for fiscal assistance to Red Cross (see below) to supplement their administrative and operational expenses. Therefore we suggest ceiling be placed on combined UN and Red Cross administrative expenditures and specified in para 2 after consultations Paris. If it is practical to increase proposed advance from working capital fund to seven or eight million dollars, we would prefer this to five million figure, since any US contribution to long range program which might be forthcoming could not be expected before March-April 1949.

Para. 3: After full consideration relevant arguments, we believe UK clause (Delga 423, Oct. 20³ para b) more realistic than use of operational scale of contributions and therefore more acceptable. Scale implies obligation which US Government not in position assume at moment. Furthermore we must not lose sight of hard fact that contributions this program will be determined in last analysis on basis national interests of each govt, which in fact will mean that only significant contributions will be those of the US, UK, and Arab states. We therefore believe operational scale, which involves fictitious budget and designation by UN rather than by United States Government of extent of our interests in NE is impractical.

Para 4: We concur. However, relief organization although nominally under SYG, should not be encumbered by complex machinery at Lake Success but should be established in manner to insure that it functions as autonomous administrative unit to maximum extent practicable. Dept. notes and approves that US draft places relief operation under SYG rather than Conciliation Commission. We believe that relief organization, as distinguished from problems of repatriation, resettlement, and reparations, should be kept distinct from mediation or conciliation machinery Committee I may establish.

Para. 6: We suggest that UNICEF be taken out of para and presented separately making special reference large percentage refugees

¹ Not printed; this paragraph stated that GADel considered the sum of \$500,000 for administrative expenses inadequate (501.BB Palestine/10-2048).

² The editors are unable to identify this message.

³ Not printed; it conveyed the text of the latest British draft resolution on assistance to Arab refugees. Paragraph b of the British draft read: "Urges states members of the UN to make initial and further contributions in kind or in funds sufficient to ensure that the amounts of supplies and funds required are obtained." (501.BB Palestine/10-2048)

eligible UNICEF aid and taking into account any action by UNICEF October 23.

We wish to add additional para to resolution as follows:

"Invites appropriate Red Cross agencies to continue their collaboration with the relief program and recommends that the SYG make appropriate administrative and fiscal arrangements with the International Committee Red Cross and the League of Red Cross Societies with a view to delegating thereto primary responsibility for the field operational and distribution functions of the United Nations relief program".

Dept will take up with congressional leaders as soon as practicable proposal that USDel be authorized announce before end current GA session intention this Government seek appropriation \$14,000,000-\$16,000,000 refugee relief when Congress reconvenes.

Hope to get top clearance for US to introduce resolution as amended jointly with British Delegation.⁴

LOVETT

⁴ The Department notified GADel, on October 27, that President Truman had approved the composite draft resolution set forth in Delga 411, as modified by Gadel 290, and had authorized its joint sponsorship by the United States and the United Kingdom (telegram Gadel 321, 501.BB Palestine/10-2748).

501.BB Palestine/10-2348: Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET URGENT
NIACT

PARIS, October 23, 1948—2 p. m.

Delga 462. Eyes alone for Lovett from Rusk. Political committee decided today by the narrowest of margins to defer Palestine debate for one week.¹ This is the last postponement which we can obtain without complete loss of both our self-respect and the respect of others. Prospect is that opening days of Palestine debate will concern itself with procedural matters and that it will not be necessary for us to speak before the middle or latter part of week beginning November 1. Jessup sat for us in political committee this morning and said nothing at all. However, estimate here is that we can expect a very bad press on this point.

Just informed by Dulles that Dewey is releasing letter to Dean Alfange reaffirming Republican platform on Palestine. Any help you can give to keep this from starting chain reaction would be greatly appreciated. [Rusk.]

MARSHALL

¹ This proposal by the Iranian Representative was adopted by the First Committee on October 23 by 19 votes to 16, with 14 abstentions (GA, 3rd sess., Pt. I, First Committee, Summary Records, 1948 p. 243).

501.BB Palestine/10-2348: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY

PARIS, October 23, 1948—7 p. m.

Delga 467. During informal discussion with representative USDel, Acting Mediator informed us he had just had long talk with Eban PGI in which latter had spoken in very conciliatory manner re Bernadotte Plan.

According Bunche, Eban had indicated Israel would be quite content if UN action this session should consist of UN affirmation such matters as existence Jewish state, termination hostilities and right individual Arab refugees to return to their homes and if UN would throw into hopper of proposed conciliation commission for negotiation such matters as frontiers, Haifa, Lydda and access to Jerusalem, Israelis would not in addition, resist internationalization Jerusalem nor would they open up discussion in Paris of Bernadotte Plan by requesting amendments.

Bunche attributed conciliatory approach toward increasing realization by Israelis of merit of Bunche argument that if Israelis adopted uncompromising attitude on Bernadotte Plan it appeared most unlikely $\frac{2}{3}$ vote would be obtainable at UN for Bernadotte Plan or any other scheme. Present armed truce and possibly renewal hostilities would continue Palestine. Such situation would be harmful both Arabs and Jews but particularly to Israel which needed UN settlement in order it might turn its attention to peaceful pursuits and development friendly relations with Arab states.

MARSHALL

501.BB Palestine/10-2448: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Paris*TOP SECRET URGENT
NIACT

WASHINGTON, October 24, 1948—7 p. m.

Telmar 97. Eyes only Marshall or Rusk from Lovett. As expected reaction to Dewey statement (see my Telmar 92¹) was instantaneous. After best efforts following is final draft White House statement which will appear tomorrow morning Monday papers. It represents most we could get in reference to U.N. Statement follows:

"Statement by the President

The Republican candidate for President has seen fit to release a statement with reference to Palestine. This statement is in the form of a letter dated October 22, 1948, ten days before the election.

I had hoped our foreign affairs could continue to be handled on

¹ Dated October 23, p. 1507.

non-partisan basis without being injected into the presidential campaign. The Republican candidate's statement, however, makes it necessary for me to reiterate my own position with respect to Palestine.

I stand squarely on the provisions covering Israel in the Democratic Platform.

I approved the provisions on Israel at the time they were written. I reaffirm that approval now.

So that everyone may be familiar with my position, I set out here the Democratic Platform on Israel:

'President Truman, by granting immediate recognition to Israel, led the world in extending friendship and welcome to a people who have long sought and justly deserve freedom and independence.

'We pledge full recognition to the State of Israel. We affirm our pride that the United States, under the leadership of President Truman, played a leading role in the adoption of the resolution of November 29, 1947, by the United Nations General Assembly for the creation of a Jewish state.

'We approve the claims of the State of Israel to the boundaries set forth in the United Nations' resolution of November 29 and consider that modifications thereof should be made only if fully acceptable to the State of Israel.

'We look forward to the admission of the State of Israel to the United Nations and its full participation in the international community of nations. We pledge appropriate aid to the State of Israel in developing its economy and resources.

'We favor the revision of the arms embargo to accord to the State of Israel the right of self-defense. We pledge ourselves to work for the modification of any resolution of the United Nations to the extent that it may prevent any such revision.

'We continue to support, within the framework of the United Nations, the internationalization of Jerusalem and the protection of the holy places in Palestine.'

I wish to amplify the three portions of the platform about which there have been considerable discussion.

On May 14, 1948, this country recognized the existence of the independent State of Israel. I was informed by the Honorable Eliahu Epstein that a Provisional Government had been established in Israel. This country recognized the Provisional Government as the *de facto* authority of the new State of Israel. When a permanent government is elected in Israel it will promptly be given *de jure* recognition.

The Democratic Platform states that we approve the claims of Israel to the boundaries set forth in the United Nations resolution of November 29, 1947, and consider that modifications thereof should be made only if fully acceptable to the State of Israel.

This has been and is now my position.

Proceedings are now taking place in the United Nations looking toward an amicable settlement of the conflicting positions of the parties in Palestine. In the interest of peace this work must go forward.

A plan has been submitted which provides a basis for a renewed effort to bring about a peaceful adjustment of differences. It is hoped

that by using this plan as a basis of negotiation, the conflicting claims of the parties can be settled.

With reference to the granting of a loan or loans to the State of Israel, I have directed the departments and agencies of the Executive Branch of our Government to work together in expediting the consideration of any applications for loans which may be submitted by the State of Israel.

It is my hope that such financial aid will soon be granted and that it will contribute substantially to the long-term development and stability of the Near East."

LOVETT

501.BB Palestine/10-2548: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET US URGENT
NIACT

PARIS, October 25, 1948—2 p. m.

Delga 476. Gadel 289, October 23. It is our view it would be most serious mistake at this juncture to inform any other delegations, particularly Arab and Israeli delegations, that we favor territorial rectification northern Negev in favor of Israel. Although we agree this position is necessary to final solution Palestine question we feel most strongly this or any other rectification should be worked out under auspices Conciliation Commission and by agreement between parties after, but not during, present GA session. Article 5 draft resolution (Delga 351, October 15) was worked out with greatest care with British and Bunche and has as its objective working out of "such adjustments" as contemplated by Dept.

To inform other delegations at this time before GA has even begun consideration Bernadotte plan will have following serious consequences:

(1). This action would lead almost inevitably to proposal of specific amendment to Bernadotte plan leading to other specific amendments. Once this process is started we would very quickly find ourselves in intolerable parliamentary situation in GA seriously damaging our chances of arriving at any viable solution of Palestine question at this session GA. Whether we or Israelis like it or not Bernadotte's conclusion re Negev is part of fabric of whole Bernadotte plan. To cut fabric at this vital point during GA consideration might unravel whole fabric and make it impossible get two-thirds vote adopt Bernadotte plan as a whole as basis for settlement Palestine question.

(2). Very private talk Rusk, Ross with Shertok indicates that Israeli principal concern to avoid laying down hard and fast Majdal-Faluja line not subject to alteration. Shertok was much encouraged to know we contemplate a more flexible arrangement which would make adjustment Negev a frontier possible under auspices Conciliation Commission. Subsequent conversation with Bunche, Eban indicated

Israelis not likely to seek introduction amendments Bernadotte plan (Delga 467, October 23). If we take hard and fast line and so inform other delegations we favor alteration line, say to Gaza Beersheba this will unquestionably harden Israeli position seek entire Negev as first bargaining position. This extreme position would, of course, completely destroy Bernadotte plan and we assume therefore Dept would not support it. But if Israeli representatives take and maintain such position in GA chances settlement in GA virtually nil.

(3). Negev question very sore point with Arabs, particularly Egyptians, who smarting under their current defeats northern Negev. To inform them this juncture we favor giving northern Negev to Israel would cause incalculable harm our relations Egypt and other Arab states and would undoubtedly harden their opposition to whole Bernadotte plan to such point we would again run most serious risk future obtain Arab acquiescence in Bernadotte plan.

(4). Unilateral action our part this point informing other delegations we favor giving northern Negev to Israel would constitute most serious breach our relations UK this question. Virtually certain most British will agree to in current GA is formula agreed to Article 5 draft resolution. Apart from substance procedure informing other delegations our view in any event is directly contrary understanding no important action taken either by US or UK without prior consultation the other.

(5). To take action contemplated by Dept now would also greatly stiffen Israeli intention which everyone assumes they have to retain positions won during last week's military operations in defiance SC truce and contrary to clear intent SC action October 19 that parties should withdraw to previous military positions. At same time this would also greatly strengthen Arab conviction that whole US maneuver to delay Committee One consideration Bernadotte plan had as its intention to permit time for Israelis achieve military conquest northern Negev. This factor would have most serious consequences prestige SC and US as member of SC.

Repeated to London as 1105 October 25, 2 p. m.

MARSHALL

501BB Palestine/10-2548: Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET US URGENT

PARIS, October 25, 1948—2 p. m.

Delga 477. For Lovett from Rusk. We believe discussion with Shertok along lines Gadel 291¹ would be most useful in light of conversations already held here between USGADel and Shertok on one hand and Eban and Bunche on the other (Delga 467, October 23). We therefore expect to see Shertok Tuesday afternoon or Wednesday. Also coming is longer telegram reference Gadel 289, October 23, approved by Secretary. You may wish to ask Tel Aviv to hold up action if they

¹ Dated October 23, not printed; but see the first footnote 1, p. 1502.

have not already discussed Gadel 289, October 23 with Israeli authorities.² [Rusk.]

MARSHALL

² The Department at 6 p. m., October 25, directed Tel Aviv not to discuss Gadel 289 with the Israeli authorities, pending further instructions (telegram 176, 501.BB Palestine/10-2548). The following day it similarly instructed Amman to refrain from discussion with Transjordan officials (telegram 29, 501.BB Palestine/10-2648).

Editorial Note

The Truce Supervision Headquarters, at Haifa, addressed identical notes on behalf of the Acting Mediator to the Government of Egypt and to the provisional Government of Israel, which called for withdrawal of the armed forces of both sides from positions in the Negev they had occupied at the outbreak of hostilities on October 14; for text, see SC, *3rd yr., Supplement for October 1948*, page 70. This source dates the notes October 26; yet Mr. Bunche in referring to them before the Security Council, dates them October 25 (SC, *3rd yr., No. 121*, page 23, and *No. 122*, page 3).

501.BB Palestine/10-2648 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET US URGENT
NIACT

LONDON, October 26, 1948—11 a. m.

4621. Depts 4071 October 23¹. It is my view that if at this stage GADel emphasizes to Arab and Jewish delegations that US would favor territorial rectifications in northern Negev of benefit Israel we will be playing directly into Soviet hands since it will destroy irretrievably the slim chance, already seriously jeopardized by weekend Republican and Democratic statements of achieving a settlement of Palestine problem this UNGA. Nothing would please the USSR more than to have another year of turmoil in Palestine and this is an almost certain prospect unless the US and the UK by standing shoulder to shoulder can command a $\frac{2}{3}$ majority in favor of Bernadotte's proposals.

2. As I see the situation a number of amendments will be proposed from the floor to the Bernadotte plan and it is at this time that US and UK delegations should consult together and decide upon line which the US and UK should take in concert towards each amendment. One amendment likely to be proposed by some state other than US and UK

¹ This was a repeat of telegram Gadel 289 to Paris, p. 1508.

is that Israel should receive part of the northern Negev now understood to be under Israeli Military occupation in defiance of UN truce efforts. I think we should make known our views at that time, not now.

3. It will in my view be an act disastrous to any Palestine settlement for GADel prior to UNGA consideration of Palestine to break step with the British as it would do if instructions in final paragraph Dept's 4071 October 23 are carried out, even though informally. I fail to see how GADel can even mention the Negev at this of all times without giving the appearance of condoning Israeli military aggression across UN truce lines. The UN delegates of other countries are not without worldly wisdom and their cynical reactions to such an approach by GADel would be something which I would prefer to see my country spared.

4. If Dept is determined to destroy US-UK cooperation by step such as in Dept's 4071 in all fairness I think we should so advise Bevin and UKDel before a single such approach is made. The British Government is under heavy pressure from its Ministry of Defense and members of Parliament to make some pro-Arab gesture which would help to restore faith of Arab countries in UK. This has been jeopardized by scrupulous observation of the provisions of the arms embargo by UK throughout period when, according to all the evidence, USSR through Czechoslovakia has been arming Israel. This latter, combined with other Soviet activities, should at least establish presumption in regard to her intentions and hopes to foster confusion if not more than confusion in ME. Recent fighting showed clearly military might Israel has acquired behind back SC.

5. My understanding with Bevin clearly implies that if the US takes a pro-Israeli step Britain shall be free to take pro-Arab step. If we take the step contemplated and UK considers it necessary to take pro-Arab step the process of the US and the UK working at cross purposes re Palestine instead of cooperating for Palestine settlement will begin anew—with probably greater danger to US than in the past. You will recall that to satisfy the US the UK reluctantly agreed to delay UNGA consideration of Palestine.

6. Wright said yesterday that SC meeting today will be supreme test SC authority and in this connection I was pleased to be in a position to reassure him along lines Dept's 4058, October 22.² However, if this is only a palliative it would be better for the British Govt to know at once that the US no longer values the common ground achieved with regard to the Bernadotte proposals.

7. Present plan of US and UK to support Bernadotte proposals in their entirety and to establish within them international machinery to make such adjustments as may be necessary seems to me to be by far

² Not printed; it repeated the text of telegram Gadel 266, October 21, to Paris, p. 1504.

the best solution. Among such adjustments might be arrangements for Arab part of Palestine to go to TJ and for tip of Negev to go to Israel in return for some adjustment in favor of Arabs in north. Present plan to my mind avoids breaking with British and playing into hands of USSR.

8. Palestine situation is probably as dangerous to our national interests as is Berlin. The danger of the latter has been played up in the headlines. The danger (not the situation) of the former has been ignored in the headlines. I have sometime thought that this concealment of the danger in Palestine has permitted the Soviet to play her game in the Middle East without attracting attention.

9. Foregoing drafted before I received Delga's 476 October 25 to Dept with which I concur wholeheartedly.

Sent Dept for Lovett 4621; repeated Paris for Gadel 788.

[DOUGLAS]

501.BB Palestine/10-2648: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET US URGENT
NIACT

PARIS, October 26, 1948—8 p. m.

Delga 488. Both Egyptian and Israeli Governments have accepted cease fire¹ and Case 12 decision (document S/1042) relating convoys northern Negev. Meanwhile, General Riley ordered yesterday in name Bunche parties return their previous military positions (October 14 truce line) contemplated October 19 SC action. Informed by Eban, Comay last night PGI very reluctant agree withdrawal to previous positions.² At SC meeting this morning Egyptian, Lebanese, Syrian delegates laid very heavy stress on Israeli conquest territory by force and in effect served notice they would regain own freedom action in event Israeli failure comply Riley's order. This would undoubtedly lead serious truce violations in northern Palestine and renewed fighting Negev.

Next meeting Council set for Thursday morning and Bunche ex-

¹ As of 12 noon, GMT, October 22.

² Mr. Eban gave the Israeli position on this matter in a statement before the Security Council on October 26. He noted that in its action of October 19 (see editorial note, p. 1493), the Council had set three conditions as "the basis for further negotiations looking toward insurance that similar outbreaks will not again occur and that the truce will be fully observed in this area." He then requested the Council to "observe that no distinction is made . . . between sub-paragraph (a), referring to suggested withdrawal to previous positions, and sub-paragraphs (b) and (c), referring to other questions . . . which were referred to the parties with a recommendation for direct negotiation. But, in the speech of the representative of Egypt this morning, we find that, instead of opening the negotiations on subjects recognized by the Security Council as controversial, he seeks to prejudice the outcome of these negotiations by expressing himself in favour of withdrawal and ignoring the Security Council's injunction to make these three points an immediate subject of negotiation." (SC, 3rd yr., No. 121, p. 20.)

pects have report from Riley regarding compliance his withdrawal order by that time.

UK delegate instructed introduce resolution, text in next following telegram (Delga 489, October 26³). Instructed seek joint sponsorship US, France or other appropriate Council members. We discouraged idea US joining sponsorship but British feel very strongly US support essential. We assume in light of Gadel 266, October 21, Department would prefer that we not join UK in sponsoring this resolution but that we should speak briefly in support of and vote for resolution if it comes to vote Thursday morning. Please instruct most urgently any contrary view.

Department will observe UK draft resolution is still in nature of holding and time-serving action. If after passage such resolution either party refuses comply with order for withdrawal to previous military positions such refusal would be most serious breach of truce and affront to prestige of SC which is not at present very high regarding Palestine. Minimum immediate action required in this event would be further SC resolution ordering parties return at once previous military positions as further provisional measure under article 40 (compare July 15 resolution) together with strong declaration failure comply would be cause imposition sanctions under article 41 against party failing comply or if single party not determinable because of confused situation then against both parties. Strong US support and preferably joint sponsorship resolution along foregoing lines would not only be minimum consistent our previous position in SC but also essential effective SC action and maintenance US prestige in SC particularly in view recent factors which have again seriously weakened our prestige in UN regarding Palestine. Failure such action by SC under circumstances envisaged would not only further seriously weaken prestige of SC and of US but would also most seriously impair chances GA settlement based on Bernadotte plan or Arab subsequent acquiescence therein.

It would obviously be desirable if at all possible avoid deterioration truce situation Palestine to point requiring further SC action along strong lines indicated preceding paragraph. We feel therefore that every possible step should be taken prevent such deterioration and, in addition support UK resolution referred to above, recommend strongly Department send most immediate circular telegram to Tel Aviv, Cairo, particularly, as well as Amman, Baghdad, Beirut and

³ Not printed; for the text of the joint resolution offered by the British and Chinese Representatives on October 28, see SC, *3rd yr.*, No. 122, p. 12. It proposed the Security Council's endorsement of the Acting Mediator's order to the Egyptian and Israeli Governments to withdraw to the positions they occupied on October 14 and establish a committee of the Council "to examine urgently and report to the Council on the measures which it would be appropriate to take under Article 41 of the Charter if either party or both should fail to comply with the order of the Acting Mediator"

Damascus, instructing US representatives urge strongest terms prompt compliance with orders withdraw to previous military positions. Informed by UK delegation their missions Arab capitals instructed make strong representations avoid hostilities.⁴

Repeated London as Paris 1114.

MARSHALL

⁴The Department, on October 27, informed Secretary Marshall of its "Regret owing to conditions which you will understand we do not yet find it possible to take action recommended last para. Delga 488." (Telegram Gadel 329 to Paris, 501.BB Palestine/10-2748)

501.BB Palestine/10-2548: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Delegation at Paris

TOP SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, October 27, 1948—12 noon.
NIACT

Gadel 317. We agree with logic set forth Delga 476 Oct. 25, that from tactical point of view it would seem inadvisable at this time to mention territorial rectification in northern Negev favoring Israel. Re London's 4621, Oct. 26, rptd Paris as 788, Dept has no desire break step with Brit on Palestine issue. We are keenly aware that principal hope achieving some UN arrangement on Palestine lies in arduously achieved UK-US solidarity, and that Bernadotte Plan affords broad basis for working out permanent solution.

We leave tactical handling this problem with delegation Paris, but would point out that US has been on record with PGI, as well as with UK FonOff and late Mediator, as being in favor some allocation land in northern Negev to Israel. Agree, however, that this adjustment could be worked out after Bernadotte Plan is on books.

Rptd London as 4099, Eyes Only for Amb.

LOVETT

501.BB Palestine/10-2748: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET URGENT PARIS, October 27, 1948—2 p. m.
NIACT

Martel 90. For Lovett eyes only from the Secretary. During his call this morning Bevin said the British Government was finding itself in an increasingly difficult position with the Arab States, in particular Transjordan, because of the complete embargo which Great Britain had imposed following the UN truce in Palestine and because of his understanding with the US on the sale of any munitions, arms, etc. to the Arab countries.

Bevin said that Great Britain had been instrumental in persuading the Arab States to accept the Security Council cease-fire order in the expectation that its provisions embargoing arms to the parties would be effectively honored. For this reason the British Government had gone so far as even to cancel certain pending contracts for munitions which had already been negotiated with Transjordan. It was now apparent to all that the Jews during this period had been able to violate the arms provision of the truce arrangement with impunity and had been receiving all types of arms, and in particular planes, from Czechoslovakia and elsewhere while the Arabs had been unable to obtain any munitions whatsoever. With the defeats inflicted upon the Egyptian Army and the present position of the Jewish forces, Abdullah's Arab Legion might become exposed to annihilating attacks on the part of the Jews. Bevin said he was under great pressure to let Abdullah obtain at least some arms in order to permit the Arab Legion to survive. He dwelt in some length on the importance of the Arab Legion as the only disciplined Arab force for the implementation of any Palestine partition solution. He made it quite plain that Great Britain could not stand by and see Transjordan and the Arab Legion placed in a position where it would be unable to defend itself against possible Jewish attack. He went so far as to state categorically that if the Israel forces should attack Transjordan proper at any time, the treaty of assistance with Great Britain would be immediately operative.

Cadogan, who was present, stated that the Security Council tomorrow is taking up the Palestine question and he believes that the Chinese would agree to join UK in introducing a resolution under Article 41 of Chapter 7 to induce parties to comply with provisions of truce.

Bevin agreed to withhold any decision on the arms question until the Security Council had considered this matter and until it was clear whether or not Israel would abide by the decision reached in the Council.

Bevin was fully aware of the effect upon US-UK relations of any departure from the present arms embargo in favor of Transjordan, but he made it quite plain that because of the discrimination in the manner in which the arms embargo had operated due to the successful evasion of its provisions by Israel, if matters continued as they were now the British Government would feel bound in fairness to let Abdullah acquire some munitions in England.

Under the present arrangement we would not be able to speak in support of a resolution under Article 41, but after my talk with Bevin, I believe acceptance of Security Council authority in regard to observance of truce is the only chance of preventing the British Gov-

ernment from taking the action indicated by Bevin in regard to arms for Transjordan.¹

MARSHALL

¹ Mr. Bohlen, who was present at the conversation, reported on this aspect as follows: "The Secretary told Mr. Bevin that we were fully aware of the fact that Israel was obtaining arms from Czechoslovakia and that we had been making great efforts to attempt to control this illegal traffic or at least to obtain sufficient facts to make them public but that, as Mr. Bevin could understand, it was difficult to obtain any satisfaction in Czechoslovakia at the present time. The Secretary said that we were fully aware of the dilemma in which the British Government found itself and of the great significance of this matter." (Memorandum of conversation drafted by Bohlen, October 27, 501BB Palestine/10-2748)

501BB Palestine/10-2648 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Delegation at Paris

SECRET US URGENT
NIACT

WASHINGTON, October 27, 1948—5 p. m.

Gadel 330. Assumption set forth third para. Delga 488, Oct. 26, is correct. Under authority Gadel 266, Oct. 21 you should limit your action to speaking very briefly in support of and voting for resolution whose text was transmitted as Delga 489.¹ We suggest that last para. this draft resolution might more appropriately repeat language of resolution July 15, which referred to "further action under Chapter VII" rather than specific reference to Art. 41.

LOVETT

¹ Dated October 26, not printed; but see footnote 3, p. 1519.

501BB Palestine/10-2048 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Delegation at Paris

SECRET US URGENT
NIACT

WASHINGTON, October 27, 1948—6 p. m.

Gadel 337. In our opinion, US introduction and/or sponsorship text providing for scale of contributions (Delga 494 Oct. 26¹) involves a US commitment which would make prior consultation Congressional leaders essential. Such consultation not practicable at present, and would necessitate further and unfortunate postponement Committee Three discussion.

Regardless of means presentation appeal, we believe we can expect little tangible assistance from any states except US, UK, Arabs, and possibly dominions. Therefore, since bulk of contributions under either proposal will come from same sources, we much prefer UK

¹ Not printed.

draft,² embodying only moral obligation for all Members, rather than USDel proposal which involves specifying degree of interest for every member. Dorr³ concurs foregoing and view that fictitious budget more difficult present Congress.

Re your numbered para 3, introduction resolution along US lines would almost certainly open up undesirable and prolonged political debate concerning question responsibility for creation refugee problem.

Moreover Committee 3 action might be prejudiced if draft scale contributions not submitted with draft resolution. Determination scale would involve time consuming and difficult negotiations.

Dept. feels that UK proposal (Delga 423, Oct 20 par b) would be more likely win Committee 3 support.⁴

LOVETT

² As transmitted in telegram Delga 423, October 20, 11 p. m., from Paris, not printed.

³ Goldthwaite H. Dorr of the Executive Secretariat.

⁴ The joint resolution was actually sponsored, on October 29, by Belgium and the Netherlands, as well as by the United Kingdom and the United States; for text, see United Nations, *Official Records of the Third Session of the General Assembly, Part I, Third Committee, Annexes, 1948*, p. 51.

501.BB Palestine/10-2748: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Paris

TOP SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, October 27, 1948—7 p. m.
NIACT

Telmar 116. Eyes only for Secretary from Lovett. Martel 90 today quotes Cadogan as saying that possibly Chinese and British will introduce resolution in SC tomorrow under Art. 41 to induce Jews and Arabs to comply with provisions of truce. This statement goes considerably further than draft resolution contained Delga 489, Oct. 26,¹ which contemplated merely appointing committee to consider possible action under Art. 41.

If British now plan go beyond draft resolution in Delga 489 and propose sanctions under Art. 41 tomorrow, we shall not be able support them without specific Presidential approval. We hope that USDel's efforts will be successful in keeping SC action tomorrow confined to scope of Delga 489.

Meanwhile we have informed President that Dept concurs third para. Delga 488² and believes that while not joining UK in sponsoring resolution contained in Delga 489 USDel should speak briefly in support of and vote for that resolution. These instructions were in Gadel 330.³

¹ Not printed; but see footnote 3, p. 1519.

² Dated October 26, p. 1518.

³ Dated October 27, p. 1522.

It is of the utmost importance that British be restrained from arming Transjordan, which would have immediate consequence of popular outcry here for lifting of arms embargo as now applied to Israel and which embargo, as Bevin knows, we have scrupulously observed.

LOVETT

S/S-NSC Files, Lot 63D 351

*Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense
(Forrestal)*

TOP SECRET
NSC 27/2

WASHINGTON, 29 October 1948.

As requested in your memorandum, dated 19 October 1948, dealing with the provision of a military or police force for Jerusalem, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the questions raised in the attached letter from the Acting Secretary of State¹ and have formulated the following statement of their views on the matters therein.

In a memorandum to you dated 18 August 1948² and for reasons fully discussed therein, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that it would, from the military viewpoint, be seriously prejudicial to our national security either for Soviet or Soviet-satellite armed forces to be permitted to enter Palestine or for United States armed forces to be committed there. The entry of Soviet or Soviet-satellite personnel as individuals is likewise considered objectionable by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

However, with specific reference to the questions raised in the letter from the Acting Secretary of State, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that from the military viewpoint:

a. As a matter of national security, an international police force for Jerusalem should not be made up of contingents supplied by certain governments. (They note that it might be possible, as stated in the letter from the Acting Secretary of State, to exclude Soviet forces, but commitment of United States forces would, nevertheless, be involved.)

b. That an international police force for Jerusalem recruited as individuals by the Secretary General of the United Nations is less objectionable from a U.S. security viewpoint than *a* above, since Soviet personnel that might be recruited would enter Palestine as individuals and not as Soviet troops.

c. It is considered highly undesirable that American citizens be employed in a Jerusalem international police force, either as private individuals recruited by the Secretary General or as members of the United States armed services, although their employment as private

¹ Dated October 18, p. 1488.

² For text, see Mr. Forrestal's memorandum of August 19 to the National Security Council, p. 1321.

individuals would be less prejudicial to United States security interests than the use for peace enforcement in Palestine of United States armed forces.

In order to mitigate the predominantly negative character of the above replies, the Joint Chiefs of Staff suggest the following possible alternative to the course of action referred to by Mr. Lovett. Jerusalem in the circumstances envisaged, would presumably be established as a "trust territory" as contemplated by the original United Nations General Assembly recommendation of November 1947, which, in this respect, the Bernadotte Plan merely confirms. Under the United Nations Charter, responsibility for maintenance of law and order in a "trust territory" is exercised by the "administering authority" under the supervision of the United Nations Trusteeship Council. It appears from the military viewpoint that a possible method of providing the necessary police force would be to have this force recruited and administered by the "administering authority" rather than by the Secretary General of the United Nations.³

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WILLIAM D. LEAHY

Fleet Admiral, U.S. Navy,

Chief of Staff to the

Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces

³ Copy transmitted to the Secretary of State by Secretary Forrestal in a letter of October 30, the concluding paragraph of which read as follows: "In supplement of the enclosed views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I would like to say that the issues involved in the question which you presented are of such a far-reaching character that I believe they should be the subject of consideration and decision by the National Security Council. In view of the belief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the introduction of either United States or Soviet, or Soviet-satellite forces, in Palestine is incompatible with the security interests of the United States, I believe that we should at least explore alternative methods of dealing with the problem presented. In this connection, I believe most serious consideration should be given to the proposals of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as contained in the last paragraph of their memorandum of 29 October 1948." (501.BB Palestine/10-3048)

At Secretary Forrestal's formal request of November 2, the National Security Council undertook consideration the following day of Mr. Lovett's letter of October 18, Secretary Forrestal's reply of October 30, and the memorandum of October 29 by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

501.BB Palestine/10-2948 : Telegram

*The Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald)
to the Acting Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET MOST IMMEDIATE
US URGENT NIACT

TEL AVIV, October 29, 1948—noon.

217. Press and radio announce Great Britain resolution to SC for application sanctions unless Israeli forces retire to former Negev positions. This resolution if approved will create a tragic dilemma for

Israel and US comparable that envisaged mytel 70, August 24.¹ PGI could not in my opinion yield but instead would resist sanctions. Plain fact as regards Egypt forces in Negev is (1) Egypt refused respect UN decision to open supply route to settlements and (2) the Egyptian Army has no right in opinion PGI to be in the Negev in the first place. Last night Egyptian forces evacuated Isdud, moved south to Majdal and civilians in area surrendered to Israeli which indicates Egypt realizes adjustment is inevitable. Also more important last night Ben-Gurion in State Council took conciliatory attitude which local press interprets as offer negotiate separate peace with Egypt. In other words, insofar as we can see from this point, Israeli victory has clarified situation in Negev and raised some hope of settlement. To undo all this by demand Israeli return positions under threat SC sanctions will create complete disillusionment here about UN and also US.

Moreover in considering possible decision to support sanctions, US should take account of almost certain necessity—threats will not be enough—of employing economic or more direct punitive measures before Israel, through economic or military exhaustion can be expected to surrender. The struggle that would precede such surrender might have for Israel the tragic solace of being regarded as a modern Massada while for the sanction enforcing powers, it could at best be an unpleasant and unprofitable business. Meanwhile Russia would rejoice at our discomforture and pose as Israel's sole friend.

Sent Department 217, Department pass niact Paris Gadel 11.

MCDONALD

¹ See telegram of August 24, p. 1337.

501.BB Palestine/10-2948 : Telegram

*The Israeli Foreign Minister (Shertok) to the Secretary of State, at Paris*¹

MOST IMMEDIATE

Most respectfully draw your most earnest attention to extreme gravity of situation which will arise if Security Council adopts resolution ordering withdrawal Israel Forces from positions occupied by them in Negev since mid-October. Such withdrawal would amount to act of suicide by State of Israel in respect of area concerned which State of Israel in sheer self-preservation will be unable to commit. Crushing defeat suffered by Egyptian forces in recent brief campaign was brought about by their own wanton aggressiveness, first in

¹ As transmitted by Secretary Marshall for Mr. Lovett in urgent telegram Delga 532, October 29, from Paris. The telegram states that Mr. Shertok's message was received on October 29 from Tel Aviv but does not give the date it was sent by the Israeli Foreign Minister.

invading Palestine territory, secondly in violating truce by occupying certain position with object of cutting off Israel Negev from contact with north, and finally in openly defying express injunction of UN Mediator to let our convoys pass. Egyptians are thus themselves to blame their present debacle and should not be permitted escape consequences their misguided and defiant aggression. Restoration *status quo ante* would recreate conditions which were found glaringly unjust and proved intolerable. Moreover, by adopting such resolution Security Council would in effect extend invitation to Egyptian Army to send fresh troops across Suez Canal to reoccupy positions which cannot possibly be held by remnants their existing forces.

My government sincerely trusts that it will be spared predicament of finding itself involved in conflict with Security Council as result of resolution with which it would be quite unable to comply if most vital and legitimate interests of Israel and those of eventual peace are to be preserved full. Having acted throughout merely in self-defence we are profoundly convinced that justice is on our side and that any state member of UN similarly placed would be unable to adopt different attitude.

MOSHE SHERTOK
 Minister Foreign Affairs
 Government of Israel

501.BB Palestine/10-2948 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Paris

TOP SECRET URGENT WASHINGTON, October 29, 1948—1 a. m.
 NIACT

Telmar 119. Eyes only for the Secretary from the President. Following transmitted at President's request by phone from New York:

"I am deeply concerned over reports here of action taken in Security Council on Palestine question. I hope that before this nation takes any position or any statement is made by our delegation that I be advised of such contemplated action and the implications thereof."¹

LOVETT

¹ The Clifford Papers contain a penciled copy of the President's message in the handwriting of Mr. Clifford, who has acknowledged to the editors that he was the drafter of the message. A typewritten copy of the message in the Truman Papers, President's Secretary's File, bears the following notation in the handwriting of Mr. Elsey: "this message was phoned by Mr. Clifford to Under-Secretary Lovett in Washington, about mid-night, October 28, with instructions that Lovett send it to Marshall in Paris."

Secretary Marshall, in a personal, eyes only telegram from Paris to Mr. Lovett on October 29, asked: "To what do you think President is referring? If you do not know, ask him direct for me." (Martel 95, 501.BB Palestine/10-2948)

501.BB Palestine/10-2948: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at London*¹TOP SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, October 29, 1948—3 p. m.
NIACT

4132. Eyes only for Secretary from Lovett. Shortly after eleven Thursday night Clifford called me from New York and asked me to transmit at once message for you contained in Telmar 119.²

I discussed the situation at length on the phone, referred to President's approval of action contemplated in Security Council and his personal approval of telegram of October 21 sent USDel. Consequences of further delay and vacillation on dealing with breaches of truce were emphasized and impossible situation of USDel pointed out. Sender of message to you obviously under greatest pressure and incident which caused message was late paper story that Russian move to postpone consideration for two days was defeated by tie vote with three abstentions and that US vote was deciding factor in tie. Question asked me was why, in view of previous instructions to delay, we did not take advantage this opportunity.

Security Council action this morning in appointment subcommittee and adjournment without vote has composed matter for time being and am directed express appreciation your efforts. Am told removal restrictions on normal procedures may be expected next week when silly season terminates.³

LOVETT

¹ Secretary Marshall arrived in London on October 29 and returned to Paris on November 1. For a report on his conversation with Bevin, see p. 1534.

² *Supra.*

³ This telegram was repeated to Paris as Telmar 120.

501.BB Palestine/10-2948: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NIACT PARIS, October 29, 1948—5 p. m.

Delga 533. Eyes alone for Lovett from Rusk. Our friends came to our rescue in SC today and, on basis Canadian suggestion, SC established drafting subcommittee to harmonize various suggestions made reference joint UK-China resolution.¹ That covers us over weekend and gives Israeli delegation chance to demonstrate to subcommittee members (UK, China, France, Belgium and Ukraine) that northern

¹ The United Kingdom and China, on October 29, submitted to the Security Council a revision of their joint draft resolution. Like its predecessor version, it did not call for the imposition of sanctions; for text, see SC, *3rd yr., Supplement for October 1948*, p. 72. Before acting on the revision, the Council adopted, without a formal vote the Canadian draft resolution (SC, *3rd yr., No. 123*, p. 22; for the text of the resolution, see SC, *3rd yr., Resolutions, 1948*, p. 27.)

Negev matter can be settled without major truce violation. USDel proposed to take no action this matter whatever. At no point in SC consideration UK-China resolution has USRep spoken or voted on merits. Most unlikely that matter can arise before Tuesday or Wednesday because Monday is national French holiday and UN is closed. US vote Thursday against two-day postponement was within framework our then existing instructions to support UK-China draft, and was cast in light of acute embarrassment which would have arisen had we appeared anxious to postpone, particularly in light postponement GA and clearly drawn issue on maintenance of truce on which our policy has never been thought to be equivocal. Up to moment of vote, Soviets were only delegations suggesting postponement and spotlight was squarely upon USRep. Actually, US vote made no difference since vote was 4 for 4 against with three abstentions.

You will be interested that senior secretariat officials informed us this morning that Israeli delegation was passing word around that President had instructed USDel not to support UK-China resolution almost as soon as we ourselves had received relevant telegram. All press having representatives in Paris now carrying this story which they are attributing to "unimpeachable source". USDel is saying absolutely nothing on this point.

Cadogan has rolled with our punch but is placed in difficult position which we shall try to work out with British in Paris pending such time as we know what we can do.

Sent to Department; repeated London eyes alone for the Secretary and Douglas as 1153. [Rusk.]

MARSHALL

501.BB Palestine/10-2948 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the
Acting Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET

US URGENT

LONDON, October 29, 1948—5 p. m.

NIACT

4683. 1. Foreign Office was considerably agitated and alarmed to learn from Paris by telephone this morning that US delegation SC was without instructions re Palestine case (Embassy's 4642, October 27 and Paris 1119, October 27¹ to London). Bevin, through Hector McNeil, immediately sent urgent personal message to Secretary asking him to make certain that USDel voted for Palestine resolution since US abstention would imperil outcome.

2. While mechanical delays may account for unenviable position of USDel this morning, it occurs to me that in dealing with Palestine question we may be inclined to underestimate the importance which

¹ Neither printed; the latter was sent to the Department as telegram Delga 502.

is attached by other nations to every US move in this difficult problem. Rightly or wrongly, world opinion seems to have assigned to US great responsibility for developments in Palestine.

3. It is our purpose to make UN an effective instrument to deal with problems affecting peace and security. I fail to see how we can expect SC to preserve the peace in connection with Azerbaijan and Berlin and ignore it in connection with Palestine.

Sent Department 4683, repeated Paris for Gadel 816.

DOUGLAS

867N.01/10-2948 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the
Acting Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET

LONDON, October 29, 1948—7 p. m.

4684. For Lovett's eyes only. Embassy's 2267, May 25.

1. Five months have elapsed since I met May 25 with Attlee, Bevin and representatives of British chiefs of staff including Lieutenant General Templer, Vice-Chief Imperial General Staff. I considered it wise to inquire whether the British assessment the basic factors of ME defense had in any way altered since that time. On October 28 General Templer called at Foreign Office request to bring me up to date.

2. It is apparent from what Templer had to say that the IGS, which has now had practical experience of getting along without a base in Palestine and which is watching with alarm the disintegration of UK-Arab relations as a result of UK observance of arms embargo, now places even greater emphasis than before on importance of holding the Middle East for offensive purposes in the event of war with USSR. Templer said that the idea held some months ago that ME oil is peacetime oil only has now been abandoned in favor of defending all ME oil resources and at minimum the oil resources and refineries of western Persian Gulf. (Note: Department will have learned from Navy Admiral Conolly's¹ concurring views in this connection.)

3. According Templer the USSR, quite apart from its obvious desire to possess ME oil, is expected to embark on a defensive offensive in the Middle East in the event of war because if ME is in control of US and UK, US heavy bombers can strike deep into the Caucasus—"the achilles heel of the USSR." ME is of special concern to USSR because it is only area in which the USSR thanks to steadfastness of US-UK bolstered Turkey and Iran, has not been able to set up a defense zone beyond its frontier. Thus in time of war, USSR is expected to make from outset a strong effort to deny ME to US and UK

¹ Richard L. Conolly, Commander-in-Chief of United States Naval Forces in the Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean.

as base of operations. In time of peace, however, USSR must employ its foreign policy and secret agents to accomplish the same purposes: i.e. denial to US and UK use of ME. Arab-Jewish hatred and inter-Arab state hatred, judiciously stimulated by the USSR openly and secretly, has gone far and will go further to destroy the possibility of US-UK plans for ME defense making headway.

4. Before Palestine question became active following end World War II ME was "virtually clean" of Soviet influence. Now, according to Templer, by carefully playing Palestine issue, the USSR has managed to transfer Palestine into the spearhead of its attempt to disrupt ME and make it untenable for US-UK defense purposes.

5. Following may be cited as evidence of Soviet interest and activities in ME:

(a) Establishment large Soviet mission Tel Aviv to work with other even larger Soviet missions ME, notably in Lebanon. It is expected that Communist headquarters will shift eventually from Beirut to Tel Aviv.

(b) Offer to supply troops for international regime Jerusalem.

(c) Soviet assistance to thousands of Jews from Soviet satellite states to come to Palestine (this move was extremely successful in embarrassing the UK and was factor in British decision to leave Palestine).

(d) Recent union of Jewish and Arab Communist parties in Palestine which may be useful fifth column if and when Palestine becomes battle ground in close defense of Egypt. It is significant that only effective Arab-Jewish cooperation is through Communists and this first impact of Israel on Arab political thinking may be gauge of future Israeli influence particularly if Soviet hope of capturing PGI from below is realized. Forthcoming Israeli elections in Israel will be good index of strength Communists and leftists are believed to possess in Israel.

(e) Soviet connivance in supplying arms and airplanes to Israel through Czechoslovakia (Embassy's 4660, October 28 and 4645 October 27²) thus circumventing UN arms embargo in favor of Israel and building up Arab hostility against US because it has respected UN embargo. This action has been extremely successful because while it appears to represent only central European assistance to Israel, actually its real effect has been to poison Arab-British relations (Embassy is submitting top secret despatch elaborating upon this point).

(f) Continuing Soviet support in UN for November 29, 1947 resolution with its hour-glass frontiers. Latter, if applied, would go far to perpetuate Arab-Jewish friction.

(g) Covert support for Mufti and through him for Arab irregulars. There is no absolute proof of this although presumption is strong. Mufti has at his disposal suspiciously large funds and is well-known for his propensity to take money from any source. His irresponsible followers, whether they know it or not, are most effective agents for Soviet goal of discord.

(h) USSR and US standing together on November 29 resolution was instance US-Soviet cooperation which emphasized divergence

² Neither printed.

US-UK thinking re Palestine. A similar step greatly to Soviet advantage was full Soviet recognition PGI in wake US provisional recognition.

(i) Palestine conflict has resulted in ruinously high war expenditure by Israel and Arab states and in latter's relatively large expenditure on 350,000 Arab refugees. This financial waste has already set back by years plans for ME economic and social development which might go far to immunize ME against communism.

(j) Favorable climate for revolution will be created among populations of Arab states by disappointment and resentment at failure Arab Governments and armies to crush Jews in Palestine. Arab press has presented such false picture Arab successes that there is hint this may be in part Soviet inspired.

(k) Essential Soviet design of disruption is fostered by increasing difficulties of Jewish communities in ME particularly in Egypt and Iraq. Short range, looting and killing in these would affect public order in Arab states; longer range, disappearance Jewish merchants—economic mainsprings in many Arab states—would cripple national economies.

(l) Even if present Arab Governments survive their disillusion with West (i.e. US and UK), vapid UN handling Palestine problem may cause them to look for more purposeful world power and decide this is USSR.

(m) Palestine turmoil has stopped Haifa oil dock and refinery to cost ERP and to possible benefit Rumania with which PGI is discussing oil supplies.

(n) Jewish thrust into Negev has for first time in history split Arab world; there is now no practicable land communication between Egypt and other Arab states—a feat never achieved even by Crusaders. If Arab world is to be bulwark against communism there must be some corporate sense between states as well as free communications.

6. Foregoing received from Templer and supplemented by Foreign Office and controlled source. Some of the evidence cited is conclusive and part of it rests upon intelligent surmise, the latter are largely corollaries of Palestine conflict, perhaps uncalculated by the USSR, but nonetheless effective in furthering the ends of the latter. However, taking the good and the doubtful points together the picture which emerges is clear. This picture caused me to telegraph (Paragraph 8, Embassy's 4621, October 26) as follows:

“Palestine situation is probably as dangerous to our national interests as is Berlin. The danger of the latter has been played up in the headlines. The danger (not the situation) of the former has been ignored in the headlines. I have sometimes thought that this concealment of the danger in Palestine has permitted the Soviet to play her game in the Middle East without attracting attention.”

7. You may wish to show this and my telegram of October 26³ to Dulles and Vandenberg.⁴

³ Presumably No. 4621, p. 1516.

⁴ Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg of Michigan, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

Sent Department 4684, repeated Paris 817 GADel for the Secretary (eyes only).

DOUGLAS

501.BB Palestine/10-3048 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at London

TOP SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, October 30, 1948—12 noon.
NIACT

4155. Eyes only personal for Secretary from Lovett.

1. Expert election predictions published today forecast substantial Dewey majority of electoral votes by States but considerable improvement in Truman's position in popular votes, Dewey getting about fifty percent, Truman about forty-five percent. Senate race very close with probable Republican control by very slim margin.

2. Deterioration Palestine situation, increasingly belligerent attitude Israelis, rumored further postponement Israeli elections to December and increasing British concern over condition Arab states causing us deep concern as to immediate next step in light of possible change of Administration. Platforms of both parties strongly support Israel and recent statements of Taft¹ in support Jewish claims suggest that vital matter of UN action on breaches of the truce should be made matter of agreed bipartisan policy if we are to be insured against further loss of international prestige by constant vacillation in an area in which our national security is vitally involved as is our policy of endeavoring to counter aggressive Communist moves.

3. Without some firmly agreed course of action between any succeeding Administration and our present one, I am fearful that action taken over next few days or weeks may set a pattern which, if subsequently reversed, could have disastrous consequences not only in Middle East itself but with our European associates in other vital affairs.

4. Accordingly I suggest following procedure for your consideration :

(a) Secretary discuss broad problem with Dulles Monday with particular reference to step that should be taken in SC with regard vote on UK-China Resolution with objective of recommending to President, in light his message Telmar 119,² action to be taken by USDel.

(b) Above action consistent with bipartisan policy approach which should be followed up by more formal understanding immediately after election if Republicans win. A disclosure of the serious immediate security problem and danger of long-range Russian infiltration through well-known methods are compelling reasons for unified and consistent program of action by this country.

(c) Since Congressional support would be essential, problem could

¹ Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio.

² Dated October 29, p. 1527.

be discussed with Vandenberg by me next week. He returns Washington 3 or 4 November.

(d) Matters of greatest urgency requiring full agreement appear from this distance to be action to be taken in event continued truce violations, position on frontiers—especially Negeb, status Jerusalem, Arab refugee problem, provision of UN supervisory force and makeup any UN police force.

5. I am sure you agree that our past experience with formally approved positions and instructions which are subsequently and suddenly altered or revoked is increasingly dangerous and intolerable. I can imagine what you have been through in Paris. It has been absolute hell here. As I see it, the national election itself, regardless of its outcome, gives us a new chance to review our Palestine policy, agree on a bipartisan approach and plan a consistent course of action which we can stick to honorably and resolutely.

Would much appreciate your views. Best regards.³

LOVETT

³This telegram was repeated to Paris as Telmar 124. Secretary Marshall, in reply on October 31, stated: "I agree generally with proposed course and emphatically with present extreme dangers of situation. Will see Dulles Monday on his return from Scandinavia but fear this will not give time for him to consult Dewey and get his instructions before vote on Palestine resolution." (Telegram 4690 from London, 501.BB Palestine/10-3148)

501.BB Palestine/10-3148: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

US URGENT

LONDON, October 31, 1948—2 p. m.

4689. For Lovett from the Secretary. I had a long talk yesterday noon with Bevin, Roberts and Michael Wright, Douglas participating. Much concern over exposed position of Arab Legion with very little ammunition due to strictness of British embargo. Bevin stated that if Haganah moved on either flank of Legion he would be compelled to supply Legion with ammunition. Greatest concern was over next few days. It would require ten days to provide by air lift to British fields the supply necessary.

Bevin and associates feel that Israeli forces have been heavily reinforced with arms and planes, particularly through Czechoslovakia, while Arabs have got nothing. It is believed here that Soviets have facilitated Israeli dealings in Czechoslovakia, just as they are courting Arab dissension with British.

Bevin stated he would take no action on supply of ammunition before Wednesday.

I made guarded statement of the case to the effect that American decision could not be made until final character of resolution re truce was determined and I had received instructions from Washington. At last meeting of seniors of US delegation in Paris Friday morning

Mrs. Roosevelt and Cohen took very emphatic stand. Rusk reported to me later he could find no agreement with Cohen except on basis of 100 percent acceptance of Cohen's view.

I see by morning papers here that special committee of Security Council is proposing adoption of truce resolution apparently as originally drafted, with Ukraine opposing, possibly prophetic of Soviet veto. I am assuming instructions from Washington will meet me in Paris.

I fear this matter will lead to fatal results so far as possibility of Palestine solution is concerned and almost equally serious results re Berlin issue.

Sent Department, repeated Paris as 822 for Rusk and Carter.

MARSHALL

501.BB Palestine/10-3148: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at London

TOP SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, October 31, 1948—5 p. m.
NIACT

4158. Eyes only personal for Secretary from Lovett. On receipt your message 4689 from London¹ communicated with President in St. Louis. He instructs me to send you following reply with his request that utmost precautions be taken to maintain its personal and top secret character:

"(1) President again directs every effort be made to avoid taking position on Palestine prior to Wednesday.² If by any chance it appears certain vote would have to be taken on Monday or Tuesday he directs USDel to abstain. (2) On Wednesday or thereafter proceed on understanding of American position previously taken as regards truce in May and July resolutions."

Any other matters relating Palestine should be reported and cleared until present restrictions removed.

As to point (2) in directive above in view Rusk's report Roosevelt Cohen position suggest you may wish refer alternatives back for clearance in spite general authority above to avoid subsequent possible disavowal. I carefully explained the grave circumstances which may follow in Palestine, Berlin and other critical situations when reporting your apprehension and again when above message phoned me. Feeling was expressed that friendly countries should "bear with us for twenty-four hours".

Note: If Secretary has left for Paris please forward this telegram to him.

LOVETT

¹ *Supra.*

² November 3.

501.BB Palestine/11-148 : Telegram

*The Special Representative of the United States in Israel
(McDonald) to the President's Special Counsel (Clifford)*

TOP SECRET URGENT TEL AVIV, November 1, 1948—4 p. m.

222. Personal attention Clark Clifford. In light present Paris discussion possible UN sanctions in Palestine, I beg you to ask President reread my letter to him September 19 especially last paragraph and his letter to me October 4.¹ I cannot overemphasize that my judgment now is identical with mine September 19. In answer to possible objection that I am unjustifiably anticipating crisis I would reply that advance consideration is vital in order avoid possibility hasty decision withdraw head mission as a preliminary sanction.

Perhaps President will wish discuss my viewpoint with Acting Secretary.

MCDONALD

¹ Copies not found in Department of State files; for texts, see McDonald, *My Mission to Israel, 1948-1951* (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1951), pp. 81, 82. Mr. McDonald's letter, after referring to Count Bernadotte's assassination, expressed the hope that President Truman would "discourage any possible move to weaken this Mission or to withdraw its head as a form of sanctions or as evidence of U.S. displeasure." The President, in his reply, stated that he would "discourage any move to weaken the Mission or to withdraw its head as a form of sanctions."

501.BB Palestine/11-148 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Acting
Secretary of State*TOP SECRET US URGENT LONDON, November 1, 1948—9 p. m.
NIACT

4707. For Lovett (eyes only) from Douglas.

1. For the Secretary.¹ This will confirm in writing what I told you orally of my conversation with Michael Wright this morning in regard to Palestine. (a) Wright said that the SC sub-Committee, appointed for the purpose of drafting a resolution in regard to Palestine, will complete its work and submit its draft to the Security Council tomorrow afternoon, November 2; (b) That the SC will meet on Wednesday to consider this draft; (c) That it would be an obvious and transparent sham to postpone beyond Wednesday a meeting of the SC for the above purpose.

2. Wright expressed great concern about the operations of the Israeli Armed Forces and their success in driving the Arab forces out of Galilee. He said that it might be necessary for the British to consider now delivery of ammunition and arms to the Arab forces which,

¹ At Paris.

because of the meticulous observance by the British of the arms embargo, had reduced the Arab forces and the Arab Legion to a state of almost complete impotence. (See previous telegrams on this subject.)

3. In reply to a question I told Wright that no commitment could be made about the prospects of US-UK concerted support of the resolution which the SC will consider, but that he could be assured that if the British were at the present moment to send arms to the Arabs, they would be running the very great risk of destroying all hope of concerted US-UK support. Particularly would this probably be the case were news of any such action on the part of the British to be given public currency.

4. Wright then said that the British would do nothing during the next 48 hours unless Israeli forces should attack the Arab Legion, when they would have to reconsider and would consult US.

5. Wright reaffirmed British position, with which I concur heartily, that there can be no answer to the Palestinian problem with all of its manifold consequences in the Middle East and elsewhere, unless the US and UK stand firmly together in regard to: (a) The resolution covering the truce, et cetera, on which the SC will act on Wednesday; and (b) The Bernadotte proposals on which the GA will commence consideration during the course of the next week or so.

6. Wright indicated that the position taken by Ukraine on the subcommittee might be prophetic of a Soviet veto of the resolution in the SC on Wednesday.

7. In the event that the UK-US stand together on the truce resolution and that there is no Soviet veto, Wright expressed the hope that should the Israeli refuse to abide by the terms of the SC resolution, we would not support admission of Israeli to the UN and would not extend *de jure* recognition.

8. Wright asked whether any consideration had been given by the US to any course of action should the Soviet veto the SC resolution. He expressed his personal view that the first obvious step would be for the US-UK to stand firmly behind the Bernadotte proposals in the Assembly.

9. Should the Israeli not abide by the terms of the resolution in regard to the truce, even though vetoed by the Soviet while being supported by all the other members, Wright expressed again, personally, the hope that we would maintain our arms embargo, that we would not support the admission of Israeli to the UN, and that we would not, in these circumstances, extend *de jure* recognition. While he could not state formal British position, he thought it not unlikely, under these circumstances, particularly if the Israeli indicated any preparation for further aggressive action, that Britain might have to honor its treaty obligations to furnish ammunition to Transjordan and the Arab Legion. HMG would, of course, consult with US.

10. In view of Parodi's implied change of position in regard to the resolution for the SC, particularly that portion of it dealing with consideration of the imposition of sanctions, Wright wondered whether any member of the American Delegation had been directly or indirectly bringing pressure to bear on French Government.²

Sent Department as 4707; repeated Paris for Secretary as 830.

DOUGLAS

²The Secretary commented on this paragraph on November 2, stating that "No member USDel has been directly or indirectly bringing pressure on French. USDel has taken no part at all in work of sub-committee and has refused to comment even when sub-committee members ask for our views. . . . After all, it must be recalled that the French too have their Zionist pressures." (Telegram Delga 568 from Paris, 501.BB Palestine /11-248)

501.BB Palestine/11-148 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

PARIS, November 1, 1948—10 p. m.

Delga 559. Following is draft resolution on Palestine as prepared in SC subcommittee as USGADel obtained it informally from UK source:

"The Security Council

Having decided on the fifteenth July that subject to further decision by the SC or the GA the truce shall remain in force in accordance with the resolution of that date and with that of 29 May 1948 until a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine is reached;

Having decided on the 19 August that no party is permitted to violate the truce on the ground that it is undertaking reprisals or retaliations against the other party, and that no party is entitled to gain military or political advantage through violation of the truce; and

Having decided on the 29 May that, if the truce was subsequently repudiated or violated by either party or by both the situation in Palestine would be reconsidered with a view to action under Chapter VII of the Charter;

Endorses the request communicated to the Government of Egypt and the Provisional Government of Israel by the acting mediator on the 26 October (S/1058)¹ following upon the Council's resolution of the 19 October 1948; and

(This next paragraph is unofficial translation from agreed French text.) Calls upon the interested governments: (1) To withdraw those of their forces which have advanced beyond the positions held on October 14, the acting mediator being authorized to establish provisional lines beyond which no movement of troops shall take place; (2) to establish, through negotiations conducted directly between the parties, or failing that, through intermediaries in the service of the United Nations, permanent truce lines and such neutral or demili-

¹ See editorial note, p. 1516.

tarized zones as may appear advantageous, in order to ensure henceforth the full observance of the truce in that area. Failing an agreement, the permanent lines and neutral zones shall be established by decision of the acting mediator; and

(Following not translation) Appoints a committee of the Council, consisting of the five permanent members together with Belgium and Colombia, to examine urgently and report to the Council on the measures which it would be appropriate to take under Article 41 of the Charter if either party or both should fail to observe the conditions prescribed in the two sub-paragraphs of paragraph five of this resolution with whatever time limits the acting mediator may think it desirable to fix."

Subcommittee will meet Tuesday afternoon to approve its report to the SC.² In view of plenary session GA on Wednesday now appears unlikely SC will meet before Thursday morning.

Delga 559 to Department, repeated London as Paris telegram 1166.

MARSHALL

² For text of report to the Council on November 2, see SC, 3rd yr., *Supplement for November 1948*, p. 1.

501.BB Palestine/11-248

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to President Truman

SECRET

WASHINGTON, November 2, 1948.

The U.S. Delegation in Paris has been advised that the Security Council Subcommittee, formed to make recommendations in connection with the recent breaches of the truce in Palestine, has prepared a resolution which it will probably approve Tuesday afternoon, the vote being taken by the Security Council probably on Wednesday or Thursday.

A copy of the draft resolution has been received by telegram¹ and is attached. In accordance with your instructions, the U.S. Delegation requests most urgently that instructions be given them prior to Wednesday morning 9:00 o'clock Paris time (3:00 a. m. Wednesday E.S.T.) as to the position to be taken in the vote on the attached resolution.

While there is a good chance the Security Council may not meet on this subject Wednesday because there is a plenary session of the General Assembly on that date, there is always a possibility that a special session may be called and, in any event, the resolution will most certainly come up for a vote on Thursday.

The Subcommittee which prepared the resolution consists of Belgium, France, China, the United Kingdom, and Ukraine. We are advised that the vote in the Subcommittee was 4 to 1, with the Ukraine

¹ No. Delga 559, *supra*.

voting against it. It is possible that the vote may foreshadow a U.S.S.R. veto in the Security Council although the U.S.S.R. was one of the countries most insistent on "putting teeth into the UN truce order".

This Government supported the May 29 resolution setting up the original truce and was one of the sponsors of the July 15 resolution continuing the truce. We also actively supported the August 19 resolution. On October 21 the President approved instructions to the Delegation to continue to support the truce resolutions by affirmative vote.

As a result of postponements and reference of the matter to the above-mentioned Subcommittee, it has not been necessary to take a formal position until the present instance. The Department feels that we should continue to support the Security Council's efforts to maintain the truce in the light of the deteriorating situation and the possibility that continued military action will be considered by the British as so serious a breach of the truce as to compel them to resume their treaty obligations toward Transjordan involving the delivery of arms and ammunition for Abdullah's troops. These shipments have been effectively stopped under the truce.

May I have your instructions as early as possible today so that I may pass them on to Paris promptly?

ROBERT A. LOVETT

501.BB Palestine/11-148: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Paris

TOP SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, November 2, 1948—5 p. m.
NIACT

Telmar 130. Eyes only for Secretary from Lovett.

1. Copy of Delga 559 was supplied White House this morning with a memorandum to President requesting instructions in confirmation directive contained in eyes only personal message to you in London Niac 4158¹ Sunday night.

2. This step necessitated by headline story *New York Star* of "serious rift in US Del to UN" reporting that Mrs. Roosevelt, Cohen and Dulles opposed any step looking toward imposition of sanctions. My apprehension on point two of directive was covered in fourth paragraph my personal message Sunday night.

3. President's position remains basically unchanged but since vote on matter will occur after American election results are known (this should be about midnight tonight Washington time) President feels consequences any major disunity in delegation along party lines might have most serious results. Therefore he instructs me forward

¹ Dated October 31, p. 1535.

to you following message: "President authorizes support of subcommittee resolution Delga 559 as being consistent with US position in support of truce and of May 29, July 15 and August 19 resolutions, provided that, in event Dewey elected, Dulles agrees and supports this action. If Dulles disagrees he should be asked for his proposals, which should be promptly referred to Washington before US Del takes action."

LOVETT

Editorial Note

General Riley, on November 3, sent a report to Mr. Bunche giving his comments on problems facing the UN observers in supervising the truce in Palestine. He asserted that the truce supervision "has lost whatever authority and moral force it may have had at one time. Its decisions and directives . . . are flouted by the parties to the truce whenever it is in their interests to do so. It now operates almost solely to report violations of the truce, which grow more numerous and open each day, and which reports have less and less significance." Enforcement of the truce, he advised, "has ceased to exist. Observers find themselves absolutely powerless to stop violations of the truce, even when they are on the spot where the violations are about to occur, or are occurring." The observers are "limited almost entirely to issuing threats and requests to Arab forces to refrain from various courses of action that would give the Jews a pretext for taking offensive action, as in the Negev and Galilee."

General Riley summed up the attitude of the parties with the statement that "they ignore, obstruct, or circumvent the mission except when it can serve their own interests. This attitude is most pronounced in the Jews. . . . Willful and premeditated violations of the truce by the Jews are now routine. Emboldened by their recent successes in military operations and evading UN retaliatory action, they obviously intend to ignore the truce mission in carrying out their plans and policies." General Riley observed that the Arab forces, as a general rule, "have endeavored to comply with the cease fire. Violations of [on?] their part have usually consisted of retaliatory actions, which they have had very good reasons for taking." He also noted a recent increase in Iraqi and Transjordan operations in the central sector and an accompanying trend to take matters into their own hands.

In evaluating the capabilities of the parties, General Riley concluded that "The Jews are now far superior to all other forces combined in their offensive military strength. . . . If the Jews so desire, they could undoubtedly clear all of Palestine of Arab forces in a relatively short time."

General Riley concluded his report with the opinion that "it is time to reexamine our present setup as regards the number of observers, both officers and enlisted men, with view to reduction in their numbers to meet future needs." (Delga 660, November 9, noon, from Paris, 501.BB Palestine/11-948)

867N.01/11-348 : Telegram

The Minister in Syria (Keeley) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

DAMASCUS, November 3, 1948—8 p. m.

684. Rene Servoise, Mediator's political representative Syria and Lebanon, gives following confidential account of recent Galilee fighting:

~~Whether or~~ not with provocation Qawuqji's irregulars began local attack on Al Manara in far northern salient upper Galilee about 10 days ago which resulted in minor Arab successes. Israeli magnified incident out of all proportion and used it as pretext to launch general offensive in western Galilee which cleared extensive triangular area behind agreed truce lines from apex near Nazareth, some 30 kilometers within Palestine, to south Lebanese frontier. Jews feinted along western flank and then attacked in force westward along road from Safwd to Lebanese frontier achieving singular success, splitting Qawuqji forces and trapping large numbers which are now attempting slip through Jewish lines to Inqax reorganization center near Beit Jubail in Lebanon. Servoise states Israeli disregarded Lebanese frontier and continued their advance into Lebanon in several places to hold strong "tactical frontier".

He states some 25,000 additional refugees have been forced out of Galilee and declares all his pleas for Red Cross or UN disaster help receive same answer; "sorry, without money or supplies we can do nothing".

Servoise asserts Galilee situation basically similar Negeb in that in both cases Jews seized small pretext to launch major offensive. He has so informed Bunche and recommended that SC consider Galilee situation concurrently with Negeb, especially as regards provisions for return to original truce lines. However, Servoise does not believe Jews will withdraw regardless of SC action and seems very pessimistic over UN SC unwillingness or inability take decisive measures to stop truce violations.

Source above information must be protected.

Sent Department 684, Department pass Paris 43 for GADel, Cairo 85 and London 25. Repeated Beirut 57, Jerusalem 50. Pouched other Arab capitals, Ankara.

KEELEY

501.BB Palestine/11-348: Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Acting Secretary of State*TOP SECRET URGENT
NIACT

PARIS, November 3, 1948—11 p. m.

Delga 591. Eyes alone for Lovett from Rusk. Secretary met this evening with Austin, Dulles, Mrs. Roosevelt, Jessup, Cohen, Bohlen, Gross and staff to discuss US position in SC Thursday afternoon. Staff here, after careful study Subcommittee Draft Resolution¹ and assessment general situation with other delegations and attitude of parties recommended to Secretary that we make effort to obtain three changes:

First, to change word "endorses" at beginning fourth paragraph to read "takes note of". This change would remove inconsistency between present fourth and fifth paragraphs, since preciseness of Acting Mediator's request would constitute serious limitation upon flexibility intended for him in fifth paragraph.

Second, to add following language after words "interested governments" in fifth paragraph: "Without prejudice to their rights, claims or position with regard to a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine or to the position which members of the Security Council may wish to take in the General Assembly on such peaceful adjustment". Purpose this change to separate issue of truce from final settlement and to resist charge that we are trying to frame final settlement under guise truce enforcement. Eban told us today McNeil told him that UK was pressing resolution in direct connection final disposal Negeb. If true, this would seriously embarrass us because we are dealing with matter as straight truce matter.

Third, as an alternative last paragraph: "Appoints a Committee of the Council, consisting of the five permanent members together with Belgium and Colombia to advise the Acting Mediator with regard to his responsibilities under this resolution, and in the event that either party or both should fail to comply with the preceding paragraph of this resolution, to study as a matter of urgency and to report to the council on further measures it would be appropriate to take under Chapter VII of the Charter". This change would provide some safeguard on very wide discretion given Mediator in previous paragraph, would not require such committee to undertake immediate study of sanctions, and would use general term Chapter VII rather than Article 41.²

Group named first paragraph agreed changes suggested by staff would greatly improve resolution from our point of view and, although

¹ See telegram Delga 559, p. 1538.

² For statement by Mr. Jessup before the Security Council on November 4, offering these amendments, see SC, 3rd yr., No. 124, p. 2.

one or two might have had reservations, no serious divergence now appears likely within USDel here.

No need to remind you that considerable differences between present resolution, particularly if our changes are accepted, and original text gives us opportunity to offset prospective charge that another reversal has occurred if we support truce resolution. Number of Israel objections have now been met and issue is narrowed down to simple question truce observance on which our attitude has never been in doubt.

In private conversation this evening, Bunche remarked that he could usually tell from attitude of Eban what success Eban was having from US. He added that Eban had been conciliatory today, from which he gathered that we had been firm with Eban on truce observance. We had, in fact, insisted strongly with Eban this morning that truce was vital and that SC could not compromise on such fundamental issue.

Secretary indicated to group that he considered our instructions permitted us to seek amendments of the nature indicated so long as the integrity of basic truce was not endangered. We have not been able as yet to learn attitude of sponsors of resolution toward our suggested changes, but will forward this as soon as possible. [Rusk.]

MARSHALL

501.BB Palestine/11-448

Mr. Aubrey S. Eban to the Secretary of State, at Paris

Aut. 04-10

PARIS, 4th November, 1948.

04-41

SIR: I have the honour to present the compliments and respects of Mr. Moshe Shertok, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Israel, and to convey the following information on his behalf:

1. Approaches of a serious and welcome character are being made by responsible Egyptian circles for negotiations with Israeli authorities on the adjustment of the immediate situation in the Negev, and on a possible permanent settlement between the two Governments in that area.¹ The incentive for these negotiations was the failure of the Egyptians to maintain their obstruction of Jewish communications, and the defeat of their armies in these fruitless attempts. These negotiation prospects would be gravely impaired by any premature action by the Security Council in upsetting the existing situation.² They would, on the other hand, be greatly enhanced by Security Council

¹ Mr. Epstein, presumably on November 3, gave information of a similar character to Mr. Lovett, who suggested that Epstein "pass this info on to his delegation Paris in order that latter might inform members SC this development." (Telegram Gadel 381, November 3, 4 p. m., to Paris, 501.BB Palestine/11-148)

² According to Mr. Epstein, the Provisional Government was "terribly concerned lest vote on subcommittee report (Gadel 381) interfere."

action summoning both parties to negotiate directly or through the Mediator on current outstanding questions. This latter course has been publicly recommended by the Mediator.

Details of the approaches to which I refer above have been conveyed to Mr. Dean Rusk, who has also conveyed to the Government of Israel an important approach by the Government of Transjordan, which also, in Mr. Shertok's view, arises out of the new position in the Negev.

2. In his recent telegram to you Mr. Shertok placed primary emphasis on the inability of Israeli forces to withdraw from positions which they now hold in the Negev territory of Israel, and also on the circumstances which operate against the return of Egyptian troops to the positions which they previously held as a result of their unauthorised invasion of Palestine territory last May. Mr. Shertok now asks me to state that, even if a return of Egyptian troops is not intended, the objections of the Government of Israel to a Jewish withdrawal from the positions now held would remain unaffected. The Government of Israel is not able to give up Israeli territory, regardless of whether it be re-occupied by the enemy or "neutralised". It regards the "neutral zone" proposal as calculated to prejudice the territorial issue against Israel, and as constituting an inadmissible confusion of two questions. The Security Council is primarily concerned with the cessation of hostilities, a result which has already actually been achieved. It should not take action which would prejudice the discussion of the territorial dispositions raised in the Mediator's Report now before the Assembly.³

3. Mr. Shertok wishes to add that he has information from United Kingdom sources that the object of any withdrawal of Israeli troops is conceived by the sponsors of the Draft Resolution as being quite frankly to secure the detachment from Israel of the greater part of its territory without its consent. Such a withdrawal would gravely prejudice Israel's political position.⁴

I have [etc.]

AUBREY S. EBAN

*Representative of the Provisional
Government of Israel at the United Nations*

³ Mr. Epstein, in discussion with Department officers on November 4, "adduced argument for Israel remaining in military occupation of northern Negev on grounds that, if forced to withdraw, Arabs would be encouraged to further action and in any case would feel their hands so strengthened as to make possibility of negotiations very slight. Epstein deplored US support of SC res. on grounds it might jeopardize prospect of negotiation and said his govt was content with res. of Oct. 19. We [the Department officers] reviewed our position under resolutions of May 29, July 15 and Aug. 19, stressing that Govt. of Israel could have been under no illusion as to meaning of language in these resolutions." (Telegram Gadel 412, November 5, 7 p. m., to Paris, 501.BB Palestine/11-548)

⁴ Mr. Rusk acknowledged Mr. Eban's letter on November 8. Cairo, on November 4, expressed great doubt that the Egyptians had approached the Israelis regarding peace negotiations (telegram 1569, 501.BB Palestine/11-448). The following day, however, Cairo advised that an Arab League official had informed the Embassy that a secret delegation had been sent to the Israelis for such negotiations (telegram 1573, 501.BB Palestine/11-548).

*Resolution 61 (1948) Adopted by the Security Council on November 4, 1948*¹

The Security Council,

Having decided on 15 July 1948 that, subject to further decision by the Security Council or the General Assembly, the truce shall remain in force in accordance with resolution 54 (1948) of that date and with resolution 50 (1948) of 29 May 1948 until a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine is reached,

Having decided on 19 August that no party is permitted to violate the truce on the ground that it is undertaking reprisals or retaliations against the other party, and that no party is entitled to gain military or political advantage through violation of the truce,

Having decided on 29 May that, if the truce was subsequently repudiated or violated by either party or by both, the situation in Palestine could be reconsidered with a view to action under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

Takes note of the request communicated to the Government of Egypt and the Provisional Government of Israel by the Acting Mediator on 26 October following upon the decisions adopted by the Security Council on 19 October 1948;

Calls upon the interested Governments, without prejudice to their rights, claims or positions with regard to a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine or to the position which the Members of the United Nations may wish to take in the General Assembly on such peaceful adjustment:

(1) To withdraw those of their forces which have advanced beyond the positions held on 14 October, the Acting Mediator being authorized to establish provisional lines beyond which no movement of troops shall take place;

(2) To establish, through negotiations conducted directly between the parties, or, failing that, through the intermediaries in the service of the United Nations, permanent truce lines and such neutral or demilitarized zones as may appear advantageous, in order to ensure henceforth the full observance of the truce in that area. Failing an agreement, the permanent lines and neutral zones shall be established by decision of the Acting Mediator;

Appoints a committee of the Council, consisting of the five permanent members together with Belgium and Colombia, to give such advice as the Acting Mediator may require with regard to his responsibilities under this resolution and, in the event that either party or both should

¹ Reprinted from SC, 3rd yr., *Resolutions, 1948*, p. 28. The Council adopted the resolution by nine votes to one (the Ukraine), with the Soviet Union abstaining. For the official record of the voting, during which the United States amendments were accepted, see SC, 3rd yr., No. 124, pp. 38-43.

The Committee of the Security Council on the Palestinian Question held its first meeting on November 10.

fail to comply with sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) of the preceding paragraph of this resolution within whatever time limits the Acting Mediator may think it desirable to fix, to study as a matter of urgency and to report to the Council on further measures it would be appropriate to take under Chapter VII of the Charter.

501.BB Palestine/10-3048

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Forrestal)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, November 4, 1948.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Thank you for your letter of October 30, 1948,¹ transmitting a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the question of an international police force for Jerusalem. Your letter suggests that the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff be the subject of consideration and decision by the National Security Council; and recommends that the most serious consideration be given to the last paragraph of the Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum, which indicates that possibly the necessary police force for Jerusalem could be recruited and administered by the "administering authority" of the Jerusalem enclave.

Under the trusteeship system of the United Nations, or the special international program envisaged in the November 29, 1947 resolution of the General Assembly, or the more generalized proposal of the Bernadotte plan, the "administering authority" for the Jerusalem enclave might be either the United Nations itself or one or more governments which would be appointed by the General Assembly as the "administering authority". In the former case the recruitment of an international police force for Jerusalem would, in all practical effect, be the same as recruitment of individuals by the Secretary General of the United Nations. If a specific government or governments were charged with responsibility as "administering authority" for Jerusalem presumably their nationals only would make up the security force.

In light of the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that neither United States, nor Soviet, nor Soviet satellite forces, should be introduced into Palestine, it would appear to follow that the Joint Chiefs of Staff contemplate that the "administering authority" for Jerusalem be either the United Nations itself or some government a member of the United Nations, which is not either the United States, the Soviet Union, or a satellite of the USSR. This Department is not aware of any government which would be prepared to undertake the onerous and expensive obligations of administering the Jerusalem enclave unless it might be the Provisional Government of Israel, which would

¹ Not printed, but see footnote 3, p. 1525.

be bitterly opposed by Arab States, or possibly some Arab government, which would be opposed by Israel.

On analysis, therefore, it would seem that the "administering authority" for Jerusalem would probably not be a single government or governments but, if so voted by the General Assembly, would be the United Nations itself. In this case, recruitment of the Jerusalem security force would be practically the same as that described in Paragraph (b) of the Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum.

Meanwhile, I concur in your view that this problem should be reviewed as a matter of urgency by the National Security Council.

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT A. LOVETT

501.BB Palestine/11-448 : Telegram

Mr. Wells Stabler to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

AMMAN, November 4, 1948—9 a. m.

103. King made following comments this morning:

1. Gratified by reelection President who, through previous experience, knows Arabs and their problems.

2. Many delegations of Palestine Arabs have come and are coming to him but not at his suggestion or that of Transjordan Government (Jerusalem's 1451, November 2 to Department¹) to request him take lead either in fighting or, failing that, making peace and said he did not wish open direct negotiations with Jews at this stage in view attitude other Arab states and fact that Palestine question being considered by UN. If he could "finish" with Egypt, Syria and Lebanon he would then be free to do what he considered best.

3. Mentioned telegram from Sassoon and government's reply (mytel 102, November 1²) and said he understood food supplies were being permitted passage to Jewish police on Mt. Scopus. Did not seem concerned by Jerusalem situation and believed there was understanding between Jews and Arab Legion re Mt. Scopus. Reiterated his desire for peaceful settlement.

Department pass Jerusalem as 64.

STABLER

¹ Not printed.

² Not printed; it reported that Elias Sassoon of the Israeli Delegation at Paris had sent a "hardly conciliatory" telegram in English to the Transjordanian Prime Minister on October 29. The telegram claimed that despite an agreement worked out under United Nations auspices, the Arab Legion was preventing food supplies from reaching the Jewish police on Mount Scopus and that the Jewish personnel there were nearing famine. The Transjordanian Government had replied on October 31 that the agreement remained in force and that the Arab Legion was under standing orders to observe it. Mr. Stabler observed that Mr. Sassoon's message was the first open and direct communication by the Jews to Transjordanian authorities. (501.BB Palestine/11-148)

Truman Papers, President's Secretary's File

*The President of the Provisional Government of Israel (Weizmann)
to President Truman*

[REHOVOTH,] 5th November, 1948.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT, Permit me to extend to you most hearty congratulations and good wishes on your re-election. We in this country have been watching the progress of the Presidential contest with bated breath and I am sure that I am speaking the mind of the bulk of my people when I say that we feel deeply thankful that the people of the United States have given you the opportunity of shaping the policies of your country and the affairs of humanity at large during the next critical four years. We interpret their vote as an emphatic endorsement of the policy of peace, security and ordered progress in world affairs for which you have stood since you assumed your high office and for the continued prosecution of which men and women in every part of the globe pray with all their hearts. May you be granted health and strength to carry out your noble purpose.

We have special cause to be gratified at your re-election because we are mindful of the enlightened help which you gave to our cause in these years of our struggle. We particularly remember your unflinching advocacy of the admission of Jewish refugees to Palestine, your determined stand against the attempts to deflect you from your course, your staunch support of our admission to statehood at Lake Success, and your recognition of the fact of its establishment within an hour of our proclamation of independence. We pray that your assistance and guidance may be extended to us also in the coming years. We have succeeded in the past twelve months in defending our independence against enemies from every quarter—north, south and east, as in Biblical times—and in setting up the framework of our State. Enemy armies are still on the borders of our country, maintained there, I regret to say, by the vacillating attitude of the United Nations which have imposed a truce that is becoming ever more, not a forerunner of peace, but an instrument of war. Our essential aim is peace and reconstruction. While the eyes of the world have been turned on to the battlefields in the south and the north, we have succeeded in liquidating one refugee camp after another in Europe and bringing the chance of a new life to thousands of ruined men and women whom the world has all but forgotten. We have brought over 62,000 since we attained independence. To develop this great effort at human rehabilitation we need, above all, three things: first peace; second recognition; and third financial and economic support for the execution of those large projects of agricultural and industrial development which are essential for the absorption of newcomers and the economic progress of the country.

The most important requirement at this moment is that this unreal

and untenable truce be brought to an end and be supplanted by a speedy and enduring peace. Over two months ago we asked the Mediator to call both sides to the conference table, but the other side rejected our offer. We have no aggressive designs against anyone and we are at any moment ready to negotiate a peace settlement. Our enemies have failed in their efforts to beat us by brute force although they outnumbered us by 20 to 1. They are now endeavouring through the medium of the Security Council to undermine the decision taken by the General Assembly last November and to deprive us of the undeveloped areas of the Negev which offer space for new homes for many thousands of our uprooted people, and which will remain a desert land if they are annexed by the neighbouring Arab States, as is evidently intended. This is the real purpose behind the Security Council's Resolution introduced by Great Britain which to my deep regret was supported by the American Delegation. We have no choice but to oppose this design which would destroy last November's decision of the General Assembly and would reduce us to a state of permanent insecurity and vulnerability.

I pray with all my heart that you, Mr. President, may use your high authority to put an end to these hostile manoeuvres. We have successfully withstood the onslaught of the Arab States, who were sent against us by the British, almost like a pack of hired assassins. I am saying this with deep pain because I have throughout my life been deeply attached to Great Britain and have suffered for that attachment. But the evidence unfortunately all points in this direction, and even as I write we are receiving constant reports of Great Britain rearming the Arabs to enable them to re-start hostilities against us. Having failed in her efforts to wipe out our young commonwealth, she now appears bent on detaching the Negev from our State. I feel emboldened to ask for your intervention in this matter, remembering the deep sympathy and understanding which you displayed when I had the privilege of stating to you our case on the Negev and displaying to you maps showing its potentialities for settlement. It was with a deep feeling of elation that I left you on that day and it is this which now encourages me to plead for your intervention to prevent this part of the country, which was allotted to us last November, from being detached from our State. Sheer necessity compels us to cling to the Negev. Our pioneers have done yeoman work in opening up this semi-arid country; they have built pipe lines through the desert, set up agricultural settlements, planted gardens and orchards in what was for many centuries a barren land. They will not give up this land unless they are bodily removed from it.

I venture to hope that clear and firm instructions be issued on this vital matter to the American Delegation in Paris which has of late, apparently, not received directives corresponding to the views which,

I know, you hold on the subject. I would further plead that you may find it possible to direct the competent authorities to enable us to secure that long-term financial assistance which is urgently needed of the execution of the great scheme of reconstruction which I had the privilege of submitting to you in the Summer.

With every good wish,¹

Sincerely yours,

CH. WEIZMANN

¹ President Truman sent this letter to Mr. Niles on November 22 under cover of a memorandum which read: "Attached is a letter from President Weizmann of Israel. I wish you would analyze it and suggest an answer." (Truman Papers, President's Secretary's File)

501.BB Palestine/11-548

*Memorandum by Mr. Robert M. McClintock to the Acting Secretary of State (Lovett)*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] November 5, 1948.

Subject: Future Course on Palestine

The Security Council has passed its tenth resolution seeking to enforce a truce in Palestine by exhortation. It is to be doubted whether this resolution, unaided by diplomatic action, will be successful in securing a withdrawal of Israeli forces from the northern Negev, to say nothing of a withdrawal of their forces from the frontiers of Lebanon.

The First Committee of the Assembly will next week undoubtedly commence its scrutiny of the Bernadotte Plan. Since the British Minister of State, Hector McNeil, has, according to a telegram received by Mr. Epstein from Mr. Eban, told the Israeli Representative in Paris that the Security Council resolution passed last night was designed by the British for its political effect and for the purpose of carrying out the Bernadotte Plan, the Provisional Government of Israel will most certainly have an additional motive to disregard the Security Council's order. We shall thus find ourselves, on the one hand, debating the Bernadotte Plan in the Assembly and, on the other, making increasingly futile gestures in the Security Council with regard to effective maintenance of the truce, unless pursuant to yesterday's resolution we join with other governments in getting down to brass tacks on applying Chapter VII sanctions, which in this case would most probably run against Israel. Please see in this connection General

¹ In a separate transmitting memorandum of November 5, Mr. McClintock noted that "The attached memorandum has been gone over by Mr. Satterthwaite and has received his general concurrence. If any or all of the suggestions set forth in the memorandum meet with your approval, NEA and UNA will be glad to develop a memorandum for the White House which could be submitted to the President for his reactions." At this point, Mr. Lovett wrote a marginal notation, reading: "Better see me."

Riley's top secret despatch to the Chief of Naval Operations, of November 4, attached.²

The damage to United States prestige in the United Nations, given this set of circumstances, is only rivaled by the greater damage to the prestige and the effectiveness of the United Nations itself which will shortly, in my opinion, have reached a new nadir of impotence unless immediate steps are taken to redress the situation.

It would seem necessary urgently to review United States policy toward Palestine and to ascertain what are the President's desires. At the moment we have a Presidential directive of October 21, reaffirmed as according to Telmar 130, November 2, to stand firm by our pronouncements in the Security Council. We have a Presidentially approved position with regard to the territorial settlement, as contained in Department's telegram 72 of September 1, to Tel Aviv. This position is in general agreement with the territorial recommendations of the Bernadotte Plan, except for the northern Negev. We also have the Secretary's statement of September 21, supporting the Bernadotte conclusions in their entirety.

Finally, we have the President's speech at Madison Square Garden of October 28, in which he says that Israel should be "large enough, free enough, and strong enough to make its people self-supporting and secure".³

I believe the Department could fairly recommend to the President, in light of the foregoing documents, that our Delegation follow a course in Paris designed to secure most of the considerations in the Bernadotte Plan, with the important modification that Israel should be permitted to expand its southern frontiers into that portion of the northern Negev where most of the twenty-three Jewish settlements are situated. However, in order to retain at least some "face" for the Security Council it would seem essential that Israel make at least a token withdrawal of its forces in the northern Negev pursuant to the Security Council's resolution of yesterday. A convenient formula for achieving a political settlement along these lines, in my opinion, would be for Israel to withdraw its troops more or less to the position held on October 14, in return for assurances that the Egyptian forces will remain where they are as of today. The disputed territory in the northern Negev would become a United Nations No-Man's Land, to borrow Dr. Bunche's phrase, and be held open for the eventual return to Israeli sovereignty when recommended by the General Assembly.

I should like to stress once more the belief that too little reliance has been placed upon diplomacy in the recent phase of the Palestine problem. The Jews have repeatedly indicated their desire for direct

² Not found attached.

³ For relevant portion of this speech, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1948* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 913.

negotiations and there is increasing evidence that conversations have taken place in Paris, if not elsewhere, to that end between representatives of Israel and certain of the Arab governments. I think that the United States and Great Britain could do much by diplomatic representations to suggest to the parties the need for getting together on some common-sense settlement. Ambassador Griffis' telegram No. 1567, November 4,⁴ lends emphasis to this point. We have certain diplomatic tools which have thus far gone unused as, for example, the question of *de jure* recognition and effective support of Israel's application for membership in the United Nations, and the Specialized Agencies.

Accordingly, it would seem useful also to recommend to the President for his approval that the Department undertake friendly diplomatic action with the Representatives of Israel, both here and in Paris and Tel Aviv, to explore the grounds of a lasting settlement. Similar representations could also be made in certain of the Arab capitals.

Meanwhile, I think it would be useful if an effort were made in London to regain some of the ground which has been lost mutually between the British and American positions. The current British talk of commencing to rearm the Arabs is mischievous and will have an effect contrary from that hoped for by Messrs. McNeil and Bevin.

⁴ Not printed; it conveyed the Ambassador's strongly held opinion that "this is psychological moment to bring to and hold before UN firmly resolved plan for Palestine partition jointly approved by UK and US. No matter what plan for such partition and settlement is agreed upon by top levels it should now be forced through by any means possible. . . . world interests, American interests and Near East interests particularly can best be served by forcing early decision if possible." (501.BB Palestine/11-448)

501.BB Palestine/11-548: Telegram

*The Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald)
to the Acting Secretary of State*¹

TOP SECRET US URGENT TEL AVIV, November 5, 1948—1 p. m.
NIACT

237. Press accounts here are not entirely clear as to precise effects of SC resolution of November 4 re Negev withdrawal and study of sanctions.

However, in this development my opinion (in which mission staff concurs) is that it opens up the possibility envisaged in my warning

¹ The expression "for personal attention President and Acting Secretary" was omitted from this telegram because of an oversight of the code clerk at Tel Aviv (telegram 239, November 7, noon, from Tel Aviv, 501.BB Palestine/11-748). Telegram 237 was delivered to the White House at 4 p. m. Eastern Standard Time on November 6 (telegram 203, November 6, 3 p. m., to Tel Aviv, 501.BB Palestine/11-548).

telegrams Nos. 70, August 24² and 217, October 29.³ Our analysis present situation follows:

1. It is wholly unrealistic politically and militarily imagine Israel will return to October 14 line in Negev thus re-delivering fate of settlements (located in area included Israel by November 29 partition) to mercy invading Egyptian forces which did everything possible destroy settlements during five months warfare notwithstanding UN supervision. Furthermore, in view serious depletion Egyptian Army in Negev, Egypt would have to send new forces to occupy restored portions. Press reports of Bunche statement concerning extreme tension in Negev not corroborated by personal partial inspection by military attaché and general belief here. On contrary, Egyptians voluntarily withdrew from Isdud and Majdal. Faluja pocket relatively quiet except one unsuccessful attempt break out after Israelis evacuated Egyptian wounded at latter's request.

2. While Sino-UK resolution, as amended by US, may be interpreted as delaying action regards sanctions, the power to set date restoration Negev positions risks heavy blow to UN prestige unless US and other powers prepared implement enforcement. As stated referenced telegrams this would, we believe, precipitate conflict between West and Israel. This would give opportunity USSR supply aid sufficient render economic sanctions ineffective.

3. Meantime passage of resolution has increased tension here. If Israel believes sanctions are inevitable she may try, before sanctions could become effective, destroy the Iraqi Army which as per Mistel unnumbered, October 29 (MAI 9)⁴ and Bunche's statement of November 4, is giving ample provocations. Military attaché thinks Israel capable defeating Iraqi, as both north and south fronts now quiet. Such anticipatory military action is highly possible unless Israel has positive assurance veto by Soviets of proposed sanctions. This reliance would, from US viewpoint, make Israel dangerously indebted to USSR. The danger I fear most is that in its understandable desire to keep in step with Britain—despite HMG's record of a decade of mistakes and humiliations in this area and the British Foreign Minister's personal inclination blame President Truman for HMG's failures in Palestine since Anglo-American Committee report—the Department may yield to Bevin's intransigency. To do that would delay peace, weaken the US's influence and gratuitously enlarge the influence of the USSR in this strategic area.

Please inform Army CSGID.

MCDONALD

² See telegram of August 24, p. 1337.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 1525.

⁴ The editors have been unable to identify this paper.

501.BB Palestine/11-648

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to President Truman

SECRET

WASHINGTON, November 6, 1948.

Reference is made to the Department's memorandum of October 26, 1948,¹ concerning the draft resolution for aid to Palestinian refugees

¹ Copy not found in Department of State files.

which you approved for introduction by the United States Delegation to the General Assembly jointly with the United Kingdom Delegation. This resolution, slightly amended and sponsored also by Belgium and the Netherlands, is now under discussion in the General Assembly. While the resolution does not commit the United States Government at this stage, it is essential that our Delegation be in a position to announce the amount of the contribution which this Government intends to propose to Congress, in order to stimulate contributions from other governments and to obtain a \$5,000,000 advance from the United Nations Working Capital Fund for immediate relief purposes. The total estimated relief requirements presented by the Acting Mediator to the General Assembly amount to \$32,000,000. Because of the critical importance of the Near East to our national security, it is our belief that the United States should contribute fifty per cent of the requirements as determined by the General Assembly.

It is therefore recommended that the United States Delegation to the General Assembly be authorized to announce the intention of this Government to seek an appropriation from Congress of approximately \$16,000,000, provided that the amount of the United States contribution is not more than fifty per cent of the estimated requirements as determined by the General Assembly.

If you approve this course of action, the Department will undertake informal consultation with Congressional leaders.²

ROBERT A. LOVETT

² Approved by President Truman in a marginal notation on November 6.

501.BB Palestine/11-648 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET NIACT

PARIS, November 6, 1948—6:50 p. m.

Delga 634. Verbatim text Palestine resolution drafted by Bunche for possible use in SC follows:

"The SC

"Having decided on 15 July, 1948 that subject to further decision by the SC or the GA, the truce in Palestine shall remain in force in accordance with the resolution of that date and with that of 29 May, 1948, until a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine is reached;

"Recognizing that in the nature of the case the truce, though of indeterminate duration, must be considered as a first stage in the effort to restore peace to Palestine, and that the transition from truce to the termination of the war is an indispensable condition to an ultimate peaceful settlement of the basic political issues;

"Having in mind the conditions which thus far have obstructed all

efforts to induce the parties to settle their differences by voluntary negotiation;

"*Desirous* of facilitating the transition from truce to permanent peace in Palestine at the earliest possible date; and

"*Taking into account* the resolution of 15 July, 1948 which determined that the situation in Palestine constitutes a threat to the peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter;

"*Calls upon* the parties directly involved in the conflict in Palestine, in order to eliminate this threat to the peace, to undertake immediately to enter into negotiations, either directly or through the acting United Nations mediator on Palestine, with a view to,

"*a.* The settlement of all outstanding problems of the truce in all sectors of Palestine;

"*b.* The attainment of an armistice involving either withdrawal and demobilization of armed forces engaged in the Palestine conflict or their wide separation by creation of broad demilitarized zones under UN supervision; and

"Requests the parties and the acting UN mediator on Palestine to submit to this council frequent reports on the progress of the negotiations."¹

Repeated London as 1205.

MARSHALL

¹ The United States Delegation, on November 6, recommended supporting and voting for the Bunche draft resolution (telegram Delga 632 from Paris, 501.BB Palestine/11-648). The Department, the following day, authorized United States support for the Bunche draft but directed the Delegation not to introduce and not to cosponsor the measure. These directives were "cleared [with] Key West", (Telegram Gadel 420 to Paris, 501.BB Palestine/11-748).

Mr. Bunche submitted a revised draft of his proposed resolution to the Security Council on November 9; for text, see *SC 3rd yr., No. 124*, p. 62. The following day, the Soviet Representative submitted amendments whose major proposal was "The establishment of a formal peace involving such ultimate withdrawal and reduction of these forces as will ensure the restoration of Palestine to peacetime conditions." (*Ibid.*, p. 64)

501.BB Palestine/11-948: Telegram

Mr. Wells Stabler to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

AMMAN, November 9, 1948—9 a. m.

112. Notwithstanding rumors persisting in Jew Jerusalem that direct negotiations now in progress between Israeli and Transjordan representatives (Jerusalem's 1459, November 6 to Department¹) and information reported in Jerusalem's 1461, November 4 [6] to Department,² no evidence is available Amman to substantiate such reports. Reports seemingly have all originated from Jewish sources and it is

¹ Not printed.

² Not printed; it reported information that the entourage of the Acting Mediator at Paris "suspects existence secret agreement between Arab Legion and Jewish forces which will prevent resumption hostilities Jerusalem." (501.BB Palestine/11-648)

possible Jews are either engaged in creating "war of nerves" between Arab states or are sounding.

2. It is increasingly apparent, however, that official and public opinion, in Transjordan and Arab Legion occupied areas of Palestine is orienting itself toward [an end of?] hostilities and reaching settlement of some sort, through direct negotiations if necessary. Developments in this direction may well manifest themselves in near future.

3. Numbers of delegations of Palestine Arabs, residents of towns as well as refugees, have approached King in past weeks requesting, and some even demanding, that he undertake negotiations. While probably idle threats, several delegations have said that if King would not negotiate with Jews, they would.

4. Within past few days King has commenced to speak more openly and publicly than before of negotiations and settlement. His previous remarks on subject were for official consumption only.

5. In view of King's present outlook, Prime Minister has told His Majesty that if latter does place himself on public record at this stage as favoring negotiations, government will be obliged resign. However, Prime Minister said government not adverse to principles itself and suggested that, as evidence its attitude, he (Prime Minister) send telegram to Prince Abdel Majid Haidar, Transjordan Minister to London and observer to UNGA, requesting him to renew contacts with Jews in Paris. (It is understood that such message has in fact been despatched.)

During Cabinet meeting at Palace on November 5, Prime Minister told King that should His Majesty desire now or later to initiate negotiations, government would voluntarily resign and give its support to another government willing and ready to undertake task. Because of policy which his government has advocated and pursued during its tenure of office (i.e. no open break with Arab League), Prime Minister said present government not able assume functions of negotiator. (It is reliably reported that King is thinking of Fella Pasha Medadba, Justice Minister, possible Prime Minister "Negotiator" government). Attitude of government is significant change as three weeks ago it would not have given even tacit consent to such principle.

6. While all signs point to possibility of negotiations, direct or indirect within relatively short time, must be pointed out that up to present nobody has displayed degree of moral courage sufficient to "take the plunge" in making initial overtures to Jews or to bear up under odium which would undoubtedly be heaped upon him by Arab extremist elements, which, while willing to profit by benefits derived, would be equally delighted to have "scapegoat".

Department pass Jerusalem, 68 Gadel 10, and Arab capitals.

STABLER

501.BB Palestine/11-948: Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

JERUSALEM, November 9, 1948—3 p. m.

1468. French Consul General Neuville and I, representing Truce Commission, yesterday visited Arab Jerusalem. Discussed alleged Jewish Arab talks, military position Arabs and demilitarized Jerusalem. Abdullah El Tel, military governor Arab Jerusalem stated flatly no military accord exists between Arab Legion and Jewish military forces Jerusalem. Consul General believes statement and although without information military governor felt informal political talks between either Transjordan or Egypt and PGI possible. He asserted Palestine Arabs discouraged and asking King Abdullah settle issue any way sees fit. Willingness admit possibility talks reflects extent Arab disillusionment. British Consul General stated had no information re Arab talks with Jews and that conversations with Egypt more likely at present than with Abdullah.

Rumors direct negotiations still appear prominently in local Jewish press. Apparently encouraged by PGI perhaps to sow further dissension among Arab states. Reliable American correspondent states good source informs dispute in progress within Israeli Government over whether initiate talks with Transjordan or Egypt. Mapam favors Egypt claiming Abdullah British puppet and Egypt only independent Arab nation. Mapai favor Abdullah since considered more reliable and realistic. Consul General unable find evidence Jerusalem for believing other than informal talks now in progress between Jews and either Abdullah or Egypt probably at Paris. All Arab rulers reluctant make first open move for fear being branded traitor. All seeking face saving device which talks through United Nations might provide.

Abdullah El Tel described Arab military situation as "desperate". Although maintained Arab Legion would fight fiercely if attacked, admitted little chance success. Stated had hoped Egyptians would at least hold their positions but just ran (Jewish press today reports Egyptians evacuating Gaza). Claimed Iraqis did well in battle Jenin but doubt can withstand Jewish assault. Startling change evident in Arab attitude from cockiness displayed before Negev offensive to present willingness face facts, admit own military impotence and seek end conflict.

Arab eagerly inquired when Truce Commission would present plan for demilitarization Jerusalem. Even described demilitarization as "only hope". Dislike provisions permitting Jews retain normally Arab quarters now held but acceptance proposals as whole most likely.

From information available here Consul General feels recent Jewish offensives changed conflict from one between Arabs and Jews to one between United Nations and Jews. Arabs tacitly admit and Consul

General fully concurs Jews can do what they wish militarily. Question becomes what will United Nations allow and what measures will use enforce decisions. Arabs realize clearly dependence on United Nations and hope for some face saving exit. Solution must take account necessity salvaging United Nations as well as Arab prestige.

Sent Department 1468; Department pass Paris for Gadel 7, Cairo 135; repeated Baghdad 25, Beirut 93, Damascus 44; pouched Jidda, Amman.

BURDETT

501.BB Palestine/11-948: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET US URGENT
 NIACT

PARIS, November 9, 1948—6 p. m.

Delga 661. Two-hour conference last night, Jessup, Ross with Pearson, McNaughton (Canada), McNeil, Beeley (UK) on SC phase Palestine question failed produce agreement on text of resolution along lines Bunche draft.

Pearson apparently strongly favors Bunche approach but not willing take initiative in absence agreement between US and UK. Pearson favors Bunche draft because he feels November 4 resolution probably a mistake for reasons (a) very doubtful whether SC would follow through and apply sanctions if Jews refuse withdraw from present Negev positions; and (b) if SC failed to apply sanctions in such event, whatever authority remains to SC would be completely lost and Jews would probably feel free take over all of Palestine. He favors Bunche resolution because he feels this gives Jews a way out of dilemma they are in and might induce them to do what they could not do in face of SC order.

McNeil argued very strongly in favor of pending UK resolution and indicated UK felt it essential to extend scope November 4 resolution, in particular to situation in northern Galilee (with Israeli forces still on Lebanese territory). While admitting difficulty Israelis complying any SC withdrawal order because of public opinion and political difficulties at home, UK felt strongly SC must maintain its authority and apply sanctions in event Israeli refusal to withdraw from advanced positions in Negev and northern Galilee. He indicated UK Government firmly committed assist Arabs in event failure SC to apply sanctions in circumstances indicated. Beeley showed us this morning Foreign Office telegram instructing UKDel to "strongly oppose any further consideration Bunche resolution". Two principal arguments against Bunche resolution in Foreign Office view are (a) passage this resolution would confuse peaceful settlement efforts of GA and by drawing "negotiation red herring" across trail might well

ruin chances of effective GA action on Bernadotte Plan, and (b) resolution along Bunche lines would appear to supplant and in any case would definitely weaken effect November 4 resolution. Foreign Office telegram was, however, despatched before UKDel here had cabled report last night's discussion.

Conversation with Parodi this morning indicates he also feels November 4 resolution a mistake and that he strongly favors SC action along lines Bunche resolution. He stated he cannot understand at all objectives UK policy and feels may lead to disaster.

If present situation continues, Council will be in stalemate without possibility majority votes in favor either UK resolution or Bunche resolution. On other hand we feel that it is possible to modify Bunche resolution in such way as to meet UK objections fairly without losing main purpose.

We will, therefore, continue strongly urging UK acceptance compromise text.

Sent Dept Delga 661, repeated London as Paris 1214.

MARSHALL

501.BB Palestine/11-948 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Griffis) to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

CAIRO, November 9, 1948—8 p. m.

1585. For Lovett. Against background of (1) my conviction that King Farouk is sole effective source of Egyptian policy today; (2) my belief that HM's influence and prestige are such as to induce other Arab states to follow Egypt's lead; (3) the assumption that UN will either fail to adopt effective measures to bring about settlement in Palestine or will delay taking action until Israelis have completely conquered Negeb, thereby forcing us to abandon our announced support of Bernadotte plan, if we have not already done so, and probably causing collapse Egyptian Government with disastrous impact on stability Middle East, the following thoughts are presented on which I would like the Department's comments.

King Farouk is apparently aware of implications present situation Negeb and may be seeking way out possibly along line direct negotiations. (Embtel 1584, November 9 and Delga telegram 640, November 6).¹ I might further influence King's inclination toward direct

¹ Neither printed.

negotiations by suggesting to His Majesty that US being always eager for peace would look with favor on his entrance into final peace negotiations with Israel and would appreciate instructions being sent his delegation at UN that he was prepared to take this step. His delegation might also be instructed to advise SC or GA. Should King indicate desire for part of Negeb I might also indicate limited US support. I might additionally suggest that US would then promptly agree to negotiate a treaty which would include the exchange of students, et cetera, between the two countries (Fulbright plan); the sending to Egypt from US of such engineering, agricultural and commercial commissions as be desired to aid in Egypt's problems; the existing goodwill Egypt-American treaty of 1929 would be strengthened and extended, the Department would be prepared to recommend to the Tariff Commission a further increase in the cotton quota, et cetera. Facilities might also be granted for training selected Egyptian officers in US Army and air schools, eagerly sought by King Farouk.

I understand perfectly that no military guarantees could be involved and that the proposed treaty would constitute primarily a smokescreen behind which Egypt could negotiate with Israel. HM could, however, combine with his statement of recognition of Israel a statement relative to UN pressure and initiate a tremendous amount of propaganda to what he had accomplished as a result of his negotiations with the US.

The keynote of these suggestions lies in my belief that Egypt desires an authoritative mandate which involves the US rather than the UN. At the same time UN would not be by-passed as HM's entire approach to the matter would be through it.

In this connection Mohamed Ali, uncle of the King, and heir to the throne, stated to me in conversation Saturday that only three things would be required by Egypt to bring settlement Palestine: (1) internationalization of Jerusalem; (2) ejection from Palestine of terrorists and what he described as "Russian Jews"; and (3) guarantee of new borders by US and England.

Please note that practically every high official in government with whom I have discussed Palestine settlement in last ten weeks has referred to this type of guarantee and feeling of impotency of UN guarantee. My answers have been invariably that UN guarantee as good or better than any other as if UN fails we all fail. However, all Egyptians desperately desire US trade-mark.

GRIFFIS

501.BB Palestine/11-1048

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] November 10, 1948.

Participants: Mr. Lovett
Mr. Eliahu Epstein, Chief of Israeli Mission
Mr. Michael Comay, Israeli Representative at United Nations
Mr. Rockwell

Mr. Epstein had requested an appointment to present Mr. Comay. The latter said that the principal reason he had come to the United States was to acquaint Israeli officials in this country with developments in the United Nations.

Mr. Comay stated that the Israeli Government, while in general welcoming Dr. Bunche's proposal looking toward the establishment of an armistice in Palestine, was seriously disturbed by Bunche's suggestion regarding the establishment of demilitarized neutral zones. The Provisional Government of Israel felt that this was most unsatisfactory in that such demilitarized zones would be difficult to control and would be subject to entry by irregular forces which would imperil the Jewish settlements. The Provisional Government of Israel would, instead, prefer the demarcation of a line between the Israeli and Egyptian forces.

I pointed out to Mr. Comay that the Bunche resolution does not mention how large the demilitarized zones would be and stated that in my opinion it was essential, if an armistice were to be discussed, that the opposing armies be separated by a neutral zone rather than be face-to-face across a line of demarcation.

Mr. Comay then went on to say that the Israeli Government was also very much disturbed by the Security Council resolution of November 4 calling for withdrawal of forces which had advanced in the Negev beyond the positions held on October 14. The Provisional Government of Israel, said Mr. Comay, was convinced that the British were using this resolution as a means of achieving their ends as regards the final political settlement in Palestine and not merely as a measure in connection with truce violations. Mr. McNeil's statement to Major Eban proved this.

Mr. Comay then produced a cable from Shertok setting forth the points he had just made.

I inquired whether the Provisional Government of Israel's desire not to withdraw from the newly gained positions had anything to do with the forthcoming Israeli elections. Mr. Epstein admitted that domestic political factors were indeed involved, and that the Provisional Government of Israel would be embarrassed politically by such a withdrawal. He said that the extremists were still an important

and dangerous element in Israel and that it was essential they be kept in control. If the Israeli forces should be withdrawn from the new lines in the Negev, apparently under United States and United Kingdom pressure in the United Nations, it would strengthen the hand of those in Israel who claim that the only friend that Israel has is the USSR.

I then went on to mention to Messrs. Comay and Epstein that this Government had given its support to the retention by Israel of the territory allotted to it under the November 29 Security Council resolution, and that this territory included the Negev but did not include Western Galilee or Jaffa, now occupied by the Jews. I said that if the Israelis intended to claim Western Galilee and Jaffa as well as the Negev, their claims to the November 29 territory could not then be justified on the grounds of right and justice. I said that it seemed to me that if Israel desired to retain the Negev she would have to give up Western Galilee. I added that in my opinion, the Provisional Government of Israel was now called upon to show the highest degree of moral courage and statesmanship. The situation in the United Nations as regards Palestine was reaching an impasse and a way had to be found to satisfy, insofar as possible, the claims of all parties without impairing the authority of the United Nations. I said that I would hate to see the matter come to sanctions, but that the United Nations could not continue to be disregarded. I was sure, I added, that a solution could be achieved through negotiation either directly between the parties or through the United Nations, but that it would be necessary for both sides to make some concessions. The United Nations had been and could still be very useful to Israel, and it would make a most unfortunate impression if Israel in the triumph of its military victories, should adopt an uncompromising attitude.

Mr. Comay said that the Provisional Government of Israel regarded the territory allotted to Israel by the November 29 resolution as belonging to Israel by right, and considered that the territory militarily occupied outside of this area could be a matter for discussion. I said that one could discuss all one wanted to, but the fact was that the retention by Israel of Western Galilee as well as the territory allotted to Israel under the November 29 resolution could not be justified on the grounds of right and justice. Mr. Epstein said that the position I had described was entirely correct, and that the Provisional Government of Israel wished to abide by decisions of the United Nations.

Mr. Epstein then said that the Israelis were convinced that it would be possible to work things out by direct negotiations with the Arabs but that the Arabs were encouraged not to negotiate by such United Nations steps as the November 4 resolution and by the machinations of the British.

ROBERT A. LOVETT

867N.01/11-1048: Telegram

Mr. Wells Stabler to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

AMMAN, November 10, 1948—9 a. m.

113. During conversation evening November 9 with Abdel Moneim Bey Rifai, former Under Secretary Foreign Office and presently King's confidant, following obtained:

1. On November 3 King sent special message to Farouk informing him of desire many Palestine Arabs to end war and reach settlement and of his belief that matter should be seriously considered. Abdullah added he, however, unable take such step alone and wished consult his colleagues. No reply yet received and HM much disappointed. Message believed ill advised and premature as it provides weapon against Transjordan if Egypt and other states choose use it as such.

2. Transjordan delegation to Cairo meeting Arab League Political Committee (mytel 107, November 6¹) had received instructions to explore, without committing itself, attitude Arab delegates towards settlement. Delegation has instead followed lead other Arab states and is reconsidering question unified command Arab armies. On November 7 King received telegram from delegation requesting him send Cairo two senior Arab Legion officers. King apparently annoyed by disobedience his instructions but nonetheless has sent officers.

3. Likely that Political Committee will decide on appointment Egyptian general as supreme commander Arab armies, although Egypt has lost all right that position. Also probable that commander will order Arab Legion to advance in support other armies. However, Legion unable take offensive and order will be disregarded. In such event, Transjordan will again be called "traitor" and will once more take blame for Arab failure.

4. Although Prime Minister willing resign in order new government may commence negotiations, King feels nothing will be achieved such resignation unless all Arab governments resign at same time.

5. King has sent his private secretary, Abdel Ghani Bey Karmi, to Paris and London with instructions to Prince Abdel Majid Haidar re contact with Jews and outline King's views on possible settlement. Latter includes Jaffa, Lydda, Ramale, parts Beisan area and most Negev for Arabs.²

6. When Belgian Consul General met with King October 17 Abdel Moneim Bey acting as interpreter. Initiative re talks with Jews in

¹ Not printed.

² Mr. Stabler, in telegram 114, November 11, reported that the King had sent Abdel Ghani Bey Karmi to Paris and London at the request of the Israelis and that this effort was quite distinct from that involving the message sent to Prince Abdel Majid Haidar as set forth in paragraph numbered 5 of telegram 112, November 9, p. 1556 (867N.01/11-1148).

Paris was taken by Belgian and not by King. Views to be presented were along lines mytel 86, October 21.

Department pass Gadel 11.

STABLER

501.BB Palestine/11-1048 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Paris

TOP SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, November 10, 1948—noon.
NIACT

Telmar 148. Eyes only for the Secretary from Lovett.

1. President discussed our Palestine policy over weekend with Douglas and Lovett. For your information Douglas urged strategic advantage to US of providing Transjordan with a port on the Mediterranean. Douglas also gave considered opinion that (a) British were serious in their talk of rearming Transjordan and Egypt if warfare in violation of truce continued; and (b) that Bevin was now prepared to concede part of northern Negev to Israel.

2. President has established our basic Palestine policy along terms of Democratic Party platform as reaffirmed his statement Oct 24 as follows: "We approve the claim of the State of Israel to the boundaries set forth in the United Nations resolution of Nov 29 and consider that modifications thereof should be made only if fully acceptable to the State of Israel." This position would mean that US would not support a claim by Israel to Jaffa and western Galilee now in its military occupation, the cession of which latter territory to Israel was recommended by Count Bernadotte. It thus seems possible that Israel, as was recommended by Mediator, might well consider relinquishing part of Negev to Arab States as *quid pro quo* for retaining Jaffa and western Galilee. Effect of this would boil down to territorial suggestions to PGI approved by President after discussion with Secretary of State on September 1, as set forth in Deptel 72 that date to Tel Aviv.¹ These suggestions read as follows:

"The United States feels that the new State of Israel should have boundaries which will make it more homogeneous and well integrated than the hourglass frontiers drawn on the map of the November 29 resolution. Perhaps some solution can be worked out as part of any settlement with Transjordan which would materially simplify boundary problem. Specifically, it would appear to us that Israel might expand into the rich area of Galilee, which it now holds in military occupation, in return for relinquishing a large portion of the Negev to Transjordan. This would leave the new State with materially improved frontiers and considerably enriched in terms of natural resources by acquisition of Galilee in return for the desert Negev."

¹ *Ante*, p. 1366.

The President feels that inducement to the parties to negotiate a settlement of the boundary problem will be strengthened by our standing firm on the November 29 boundaries except as modifications may be agreed between parties. If there is no agreement, then the US position will be that the Israelis should relinquish Galilee and Jaffa and the Egyptians should relinquish the Israeli portion of Negev.

3. In light of foregoing basic policy, Delegation should review draft resolution transmitted Delga 351, Oct. 16,² which would have given effect to original Bernadotte Plan. We feel that events have overtaken many aspects of original plan and solution of boundary matters on practical basis in present circumstances is urgently needed. We recall also that President in his statement of Oct 24 said that in UN "a plan has been submitted which provides a basis for a renewed effort to bring about a peaceful adjustment of differences. It is hoped that, by using this plan as a basis of negotiation, the conflicting aims of the parties can be settled".

Problem is therefore to combine fundamental position which President has consistently taken on Palestine—the territorial dispositions of the Nov 29 resolution—with Secretary's general recommendation of Sept 21 on the Bernadotte Plan and with conditions as they exist today. Fortunately we are able to continue to subscribe to all the seven basic premises in the Bernadotte Plan and all his specific conclusions, with the exception of his recommendations regarding the boundaries of Israel. Even on this point, as the record makes clear, Dept expressed reservations with respect to Bernadotte's recommendations on the Negev.

We feel a convenient starting point would be to revert to Bunche's statement before Committee One on Oct 15, when he recapitulated Bernadotte's seven basic premises and stressed that Bernadotte regarded his conclusions as designed principally to afford a basis for negotiation between the parties.

The Govt of Israel has for some time proclaimed its desire to achieve peace in Palestine by direct negotiation. There is now an opportunity for such negotiation. From this Govt's point of view, base line is territorial recommendations of Nov 29 resolution modified by negotiation between the parties if they so desire. Since point at issue is how boundaries of Israel are to be defined by mutual agreement, Israelis and Arabs have choice between Nov 29 boundaries, which will be regarded as having disadvantageous elements from both Jewish and Arab point of view, or some new negotiated frontier.

In plain language, the President's position is that if Israel wishes to retain that part of Negev granted it under Nov 29 resolution, it will have to take the rest of Nov 29 settlement which means giving up western Galilee and Jaffa. We feel that there is room for a mutually

² *Ante*, p. 1481.

advantageous arrangement—Israel to retain western Galilee and Jaffa in return for relinquishing part of Negev to Arab States, presumably Transjordan and Egypt.

We feel that it would be contrary to the President's wishes if US Del came up with a plan of its own at this stage. He feels that our efforts should be directed toward having the two parties settle the matter or stick to the Nov 29 boundaries.

4. For your most secret information, if negotiations are undertaken, our feeling here is that our views on Negev outlined in Deptel 72, Sept 1, to Tel Aviv were then a more equitable and, because of recent developments, are now a more practical, solution. We are inclined to feel that the southern Israeli border, in trade for western Galilee and Jaffa, might be either a line running (a) from Gaza through Beer-sheba and thence southeasterly to Dead Sea, or (b) if necessary to expand area still further, that portion of the Negev allotted to Israel under the Nov 29 resolution lying north of the thirty-first parallel. Since the Nov 29 resolution provided a port for the Arabs on the Mediterranean, we feel this principle should be retained and either (a) or (b) above would seem to accomplish this objective. We think the thirty-first parallel as the negotiated southern frontier of Israel will be found to be the simplest.

5. This telegram has been personally approved by the President.³

LOVETT

³ Mr. Lovett transmitted the text of this telegram in draft form to the White House Signal Center, with a memorandum of November 9, which requested that the telegram be sent to Clark Clifford for the President's approval or comments (501.BB Palestine/11-948). The Acting Secretary, on November 10, suggested to Secretary Marshall that he might wish to send Ambassador Douglas the contents of Telmar 148 (telegram Telmar 151, 501.BB Palestine/11-1048). For the Ambassador's account of the meeting with the President, said to have taken place on November 6, see telegram 4849, November 12, from London, p. 1570. It was not until November 24 that the Department sent excerpts of Telmar 148 for background information to Paris, Moscow, Rome, Ankara, Arab capitals, Tel Aviv, and Jerusalem (telegram 441 to Damascus, 501.BB Palestine/11-2448).

501.BB Palestine/11-1048: Telegram

*The Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald)
to the Acting Secretary of State*

SECRET URGENT
NIACT

TEL AVIV, November 10, 1948—5 p. m.

247. For personal attention President and Acting Secretary. Although necessarily out of touch with details Paris developments Arab refugees, I am fearful following three separate long conferences yesterday with Mohn, Bunche's political adviser; Wolfe, legal adviser ICRC; and Descoedres of UNICEF; that stark mass tragedy will outrun UN Arab refugee efforts.

Diminishing prestige whole Mediator's organization among both Arabs and Jews lessens more than proportionately usefulness Cilento and his scant refugee organization. Moreover, now indisputably clear—as should have been months ago—that Mediator's political role weakens his refugee work. Hence, I hope report of possible UN transfer whole refugee task to Red Cross societies is authentic. Continued failure provide adequate organization and resources would gravely injure authority UN and also hurt position US. British statement yesterday House of Commons shows HMG's concern lest it share odium failure.

I strongly urge that :

1. UN delegation be asked to do utmost speed UN decisions and,
2. A prompt public Presidential appeal be made for essential funds in cooperation with American Red Cross.

I am completely skeptical UN blanket financial appeal to member states whose responses would be slow and inadequate.

Without sensitiveness if again disapproved I repeat earlier suggestion that in role of "refugee expert" I be asked to testify publicly before third committee on urgency governmental and public response comparable to catastrophic need. Such appearance American special representative Israel would help answer Arab criticism that US is disproportionately interested Jews welfare and would not be open to charge of political propaganda.

In view of importance of refugee problem to all countries in Middle East, I also suggest for consideration Department conference on Rhodes (or other neutral ground) of chiefs of mission under chairmanship Griffis to exchange views and analyze what can be done with benefit to whole area.¹

McDONALD

¹ Acting Secretary Lovett discussed the suggestions in telegram 247 "with Key West" and, on November 12, he directed Mr. McDonald to fly to Paris for consultation with Secretary Marshall (telegram 211 to Tel Aviv). The same day, he requested Ambassador Griffis to fly immediately to Washington, with a brief stop at Paris to discuss the question of Arab refugee relief with the Secretary (telegram 1557 to Cairo). Both telegrams are filed under 501.BB Palestine/11-1048.

501.BB Palestine/11-1048 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET URGENT

PARIS, November 10, 1948—6 p. m.

Delga 685. For Satterthwaite from Kopper. During past 5 days in separate conversations with Riad Solh (Lebanon), El-Rawi (Iraqi), Fawzi Bey (Egypt), Faisal (Saudi Arabia), and Amir Abdul Majid Haidar (Transjordan), several points of interest and importance have emerged.

There are indications that the Arabs believe they would have great difficulty at home if Bernadotte plan were formally approved and adopted in detail by GA. On other hand should Bernadotte plan fail to carry Arabs would also have difficulties. Consequently most Arab leaders here believe that SC should first establish firm truce lines. Along with this methods should be worked out for peaceful settlement in GA. Riad Solh and El-Rawi last night accepted privately idea by which GA would establish commission with firm terms of reference, including mention of previous GA action and Bernadotte plan, to work out peaceful settlement. Both Riad Solh and El-Rawi recognized settlement would have to be worked out with full knowledge that Israel exists as a state. Likewise they have said period during which settlement would be worked out would not be used for preparing for renewal of warfare. When asked whether other Arab states would accept commission concept Riad Solh and El-Rawi expressed opinion they would.

[Here follow additional views of various Arab leaders at Paris.]
Fairly obvious Arab leaders here realize their weak position.

Sent Department Delga 685, repeated London as 1224. [Kopper.]
MARSHALL

501.BB Palestine/11-1148: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Legation in Lebanon

SECRET

WASHINGTON, November 11, 1948—4 p. m.

712. While Dept appreciates concern Leb Govt over reported occupation by Israeli forces area in southern Lebanon, it does not feel it would be appropriate intervene with Israeli Govt this matter.

If you discuss subject further with Leb Govt suggest you point out that incursion into its territory by external forces would appear be issue which should more appropriately be pursued through facilities UN, of which Leb member, rather than by approach this Govt. (Legtel 573 Nov 6¹).

We suggest appropriate action might be taken by SC if reports are indeed true that Israeli forces are now on Lebanese territory. You may inform President Khouri that Acting Mediator's draft resolution currently under consideration by SC should go far to satisfy Lebanese complaint. This resolution contemplates separation armed forces and creation broad demilitarized zones under UN supervision and, if carried into effect, would surely result in withdrawal Israeli forces to

¹ Not printed; it reported that President Khoury had informally asked Minister Pinkerton "to invite US Government's attention to continued occupation Jewish forces of number of villages and considerable area in south Lebanon. While no formal request was made for intervention it was clear he hoped US Government could influence Israeli Government to withdraw to Palestine frontier" (767N.90E15/11-648).

safe distance from Lebanese frontier. You may add to President that this Govt supports draft resolution.

For your info Dept has heard no indication attitude Leb Govt re possible approach SC this matter. While course action is for sole determination by Leb, Dept would be interested your appraisal its thinking and reasons apparent hesitation.²

LOVETT

²This telegram was repeated to Paris and London. Subsequently, the Lebanese President expressed to Minister Pinkerton his view that any request made by Lebanon for intervention by the United States be considered unofficial, because he did not wish to be placed in a position of entering formal negotiations concerning any phase of the Palestine problem (telegram 603, November 26, noon, from Beirut, 867N.01/11-2648).

501.BB Palestine/11-1248: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET US URGENT LONDON, November 12, 1948—7 p. m.
NIACT

4849. Personal for Lovett (eyes only) from Douglas (no distribution). Re Telmar 148,¹ repeated to me as Paris 1239.

1. Solely for the purpose of elaborating Paragraph One of Telmar 148: At meeting with President Saturday afternoon, November 6, with Lovett and Douglas, after comments on the election, Palestine was discussed.

President referred to the phrase "in its entirety" which appeared in the statement of September 21 in regard to the Bernadotte plan. Douglas took the responsibility for this language which the President said had caused him a great deal of trouble in the campaign. Douglas then recited the reasons why it was his considered opinion that unless US-UK stood together, it would be almost impossible, if not in fact impossible, to obtain a $\frac{2}{3}$ vote in the GA for any settlement of the Palestinian question, and why, therefore, although the US wanted certain modifications of the Bernadotte proposals on the one hand, and the UK sought modifications on the other hand, it was important that neither the US nor the UK give any public indication of offering amendments to the Bernadotte plan. Briefly, the reason for the latter was that if either US or UK gave any public indication of: (a) Either a difference between themselves; or (b) an intention to offer amendments "the flood gates would be open to amendments from all sources, and there would be little if anything left of the cheese when the rats got through." (This is a mixed metaphor.) Accordingly, the US-UK resolution, although it endorsed the Bernadotte proposal, provided international machinery under which the modifications which the US

¹ Dated November 10, p. 1565.

sought on the one hand, and the UK desired on the other, could be had without publicly harming the chances of obtaining $\frac{2}{3}$ vote for Bernadotte proposals in the GA.

Douglas said the British understood clearly that the US desired that "tip of the Negev north of the Beersheba-Gaza road in which Jews had settled and made investments be included in the Israel state," and that Bevin would agree to this if there were some compensation in the north, i.e. in Galilee. On the other hand, the British desired that the Arab part of the divided Palestine be associated with Transjordan. Douglas stated further that the British were insistent that Transjordan, for strategic and other reasons, have a seaport with undisputed access to it on the Mediterranean.

Douglas and Lovett reminded the President of the extraordinary extent to which the British had modified their policy; whereas twelve months ago they were unwilling to accept partition, they are now prepared to approve it, etc. This far-reaching shift of British policy had been accomplished in order to maintain US-UK solidarity without which it was his considered opinion there would be no lasting settlement of the issue in the Middle East.

Douglas then proceeded to explain the seriousness of the existing situation. Notwithstanding the provisions of British treaty with Transjordan and other Arab states, HMG had meticulously observed the arms embargo and, insofar as Douglas knew, had shipped no arms, ammunition or materials of war of any sort to any Arab state, not even to British military installations at Amman and in Iraq. The British had on several occasions raised the question as to whether, in view of the developing seriousness of the war in the Middle East, they should in their own defense move ammunition and reinforcements to these installations, but had refrained from doing so in each case, because on our advice it was thought that such a step might be distorted to mean that they were reinforcing the Arabs.

Douglas explained that, as the President knew, the Israeli forces had received large quantities of arms and ammunition indirectly from the Soviet through Czechoslovakia; that her air force was now of substantial size. As a result of British observance of embargo on one hand and shipments from Czechoslovakia to Israel on the other, Arab Legion had been reduced to a position of relative impotence with no more than 2,000 rounds 25-pounder ammunition, while the Israeli forces had greatly increased in military power. Should the Israeli forces attack the Arab Legion, HMG would doubtless feel it necessary to observe her treaty obligation with Transjordan and to supply the Arab Legion with ammunition and equipment. Moreover, should the Israeli forces drive the Arab Legion across the Transjordan frontier, an event most likely to happen in view of the comparative impotence of the Arab Legion, HMG would feel bound, under the terms of her

treaty obligations, to use her own military forces in the defense of Transjordan. As a result the UK would be at war in the Middle East against the Israeli state. The consequences stretching beyond this would probably be a real division between the US and UK with far-reaching results.

The President replied in effect that this must not be allowed to happen.

Douglas then said that in his opinion the most effective way of preventing the serious consequences referred to above would be for the SC to give both sides clear notice that if the truce were not observed, serious results to the violator of the truce would ensue.

2. See my immediately following telegram² for first blush comments, which you should perhaps have because of my intimate knowledge of British views. In this connection, I have neither revealed nor discussed substance of Telmar 148 with British or anyone else.

Sent Department as 4849, repeated Paris personal for the Secretary eyes only as 868.

DOUGLAS

²The reference is to telegram 4851, p. 1573.

867N.01/11-1248: Telegram

Mr. Franklin C. Gowen¹ to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

VATICAN CITY, November 12, 1948—7 p. m.

62. My Amvat 60² November 3. Tardini, Vatican Acting Secretary of State received me this morning to give me in strict confidence Pope's views on Jerusalem. He said:

1. Vatican in view position taken respectively by Arabs and Jews in Palestine considers internationalization Jerusalem and outskirts most appropriate solution in present circumstances to ensure peace, order, tranquility in Palestine.

2. Vatican maintains rights traditionally enjoyed by Catholics in Palestine must be fully respected and protected, especially with regard holy places.

3. Vatican has no particular preference with regard any specific manner whereby Jerusalem and environs would be placed under international control provided such control would effectively protect Catholic interests.

4. Vatican has become aware proposed charter or constitution for Jerusalem drafted by Trusteeship Council and submitted to President UNO General Assembly by Secretary General in letter dated New York April 21 last.

[Here follow remainder of this and the next paragraph, giving details.]

¹ Foreign Service Officer at Vatican City.

² Not printed.

6. After first World War and when Great Britain assumed Palestine mandate British Government gave solemn official assurance she would maintain *status quo* regarding rights traditionally enjoyed various religious communities and denominations in Palestine. Vatican has consistently maintained necessity keep this *status quo*, arranged exert force to ensure and maintain full respect protection all rights acquired and enjoyed by Catholics in Palestine, especially rights concerning holy places.

Tardini emphasized his opinion not only Latin America but Christendom at large would heartily welcome placing Jerusalem and environs under international control and likewise, with international guarantees giving free access to holy places throughout Palestine and thus ensure full freedom worship all denominations and security existence moral and physical conditions of life conducive to spiritual and material well-being all concerned.

GOWEN

501.BB Palestine/11-1248: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the
Acting Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET US URGENT LONDON, November 12, 1948—8 p. m.
NIACT

4851. Personal for Lovett (eyes only) from Douglas. No distribution. Herewith are my first blush comments on Telmar 148:¹

1. I had understood in Washington that our basic position in regard to the settlement of the Palestinian issue rested on the Democratic Party platform of 1948; that Israeli could not have its cake and eat it too; that if it insisted upon Galilee, it could not have all of the Negev; that if it got a part of the Negev, adjustments would have to be made in the north; that the US was not disposed to impose a settlement on either side.

I had understood, perhaps erroneously, that this position did not preclude our supporting the resolution in the GA which provided for international machinery empowered to make adjustments in line with the above in regard to frontiers.

I also understood that in regard to the truce, it was our view that we should follow the general line of the Bunche proposal with the question of sanctions somewhat clouded.

2. I, of course, have not revealed or discussed Telmar 148 with the British, and have disclosed its contents to no one, but it strikes me at first blush that while it fits the above general framework, the emphasis which it places on certain features and the restraint which it imposes on GADel in connection with other aspects are such that it may

¹ Dated November 10, p. 1565.

seriously disrupt US-UK solidarity which is so important both in the SC and in the GA. I do not mean by this to suggest that we buy the whole British position. This, in any event, would be impossible, for the facts are that the British, because of their extensive shift of policy have in effect bought a large part of the US position.

3. Elaborating on paragraph 2 above, the following observations occur to me:

(a) The southern frontier of Israel, indicated in paragraph 4, when seen on the map goes far beyond the idea of "adjustments" in the Negev in return for compensation for the Arabs in the north. I do not believe that the UK will buy this one for many reasons.

(b) Telmar 148 appears to be a new "plan" for a Palestine settlement since it appears to abandon the principle of US-UK seeking acquiescence by the contending parties to Bernadotte proposals as a basis for settlement by refusing to foster cause of one or the other party. For example, does "fully acceptable to the State of Israel" mean that this criterion must be observed at outset of hoped-for negotiations under Bernadotte aegis, or does it mean that this criterion can be treated elastically to be reflected in the terms of the final negotiated settlement.

(c) While UK would be willing to see "adjustments" in the Negev in the circumstances I have outlined, I am certain that if the Jews should maintain their claim to the hourglass frontiers of November 29 (electing to give up Galilee) the UK on grounds of what it believes to be US-UK strategic interests, would resist all the Negev going to Israel.

(d) Idea inherent in final paragraph of section 3 of Telmar 148, that if Jews and Arabs fail to negotiate a settlement of boundary problem, is US belief that Israel should relinquish Galilee and Jaffa and Egyptians relinquish Israeli part of Negev. Here, it seems to me, is the crux of the problem. Are we prepared, if necessary, to take measures against PGI to expel it from Galilee and Jaffa? If we are not prepared to do so; i.e., apply sanctions under Chapter 7, it seems to me the US position is somewhat unrealistic, since the Jews already hold Galilee and most important part of the Negev by conquest.

4. I am leaving Sunday, 14th, for Paris to discuss situation with the Secretary.

Sent Department (for Lovett eyes only) as 4851; repeated Paris (personal for Secretary eyes only) as 869, no distribution.

DOUGLAS

501.BB Palestine/11-1248: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET URGENT
NIACT

PARIS, November 12, 1948—10 p. m.

Delga 717. In telephone conversation with Jessup today Douglas indicated desire for latest information concerning US-UK agreement

on Palestine and on probability truce will now be observed by Israelis. Following review is, therefore, for information London as well as Department.

We continue attach greatest importance reconciling any divergence views US-UK on question truce observance. November 4 resolution, which passed by vote 9-1-1 as amended by US, reflected virtual identity US-UK views. Psychological impact this resolution has served very useful purpose maintaining authority SC. Work of committee established by resolution and of Mediator in his consultations with parties give every reasonable hope compliance withdrawal beyond demarcation lines both sides which will effectively separate respective armed forces while at same time saving face both sides. Committee should finish work Saturday. Thereafter Bunche informs me few days will be needed initiate plan.

Meanwhile, we feel November 4 resolution represents furthest Council should attempt go in direction truce "enforcement". To crowd beyond this point would ignore practical realities. These are, on one side, every evidence that "truce" both practically and psychologically has served its purpose and it is essential, therefore, to push forward to new constructive phase. Bunche and Riley, who are in best position to know, feel this very strongly. General Riley in particular feels that "truce" as such cannot last longer than two weeks. On other hand, all evidence we have indicates parties finally tired of fighting, want to compass differences and get on with business of final settlement.

For these reasons we feel British, having achieved November 4 objective, are now making mistake wanting push further along same road which in our opinion strongly shared other members SC, such as Canada, France, could only lead disaster because psychological atmosphere of tension, rigidity positions, state near-war would not only be continued but further stimulated.

This might readily upset steady progress settlement Negev question and lead to defiance Mediator and SC. This in turn would immediately raise question whether SC should apply sanctions which we are convinced SC would not do.

This is so because (1) USSR might veto but would probably abstain; (2) under present circumstances we cannot envisage as practical reality US voting in favor any SC resolution calling imposition sanctions against Israel; (3) we are virtually certain France would not support. Others would probably abstain and we doubt whether UK at best could get more than three or four votes total (UK, Syria, possibly China, possibly Belgium). Failure of SC to impose sanctions in unhappy event it is confronted with necessity examining this question would (a) cancel psychological effect already gained and present restraining effect November 4 resolution; (b) generally damage prestige and authority of SC probably beyond any possibility of

repair; (c) destroy possibility GA contributing solution Palestine question; and (d) greatly increase risk that expansionist pressures within Israel would lead to new adventures.

In event SC failed apply sanctions British position, in light considerations advanced above, presumably would be arm Arabs in conformity treaty commitments. Result would be three-cornered arms race between UK, US, USSR to supply respective sides in long-continuing struggle which would set back common US-UK objectives in Middle East for years. The US, UK, Israel, the Arab states and UN would all lose; the USSR would be only one to gain and they would gain very substantially.

In the event, which we consider unlikely, US and France vote in favor of, and a sanctions resolution passes the Council, the ultimate result will be same but reached by slightly different route. We do not feel USSR would vote in favor sanctions and they would feel no obligation whatsoever, legal, moral or otherwise, to withhold arms from Israel. Effect of this would be to throw Israel into Soviet camp rather than holding them in Western orbit.

In view of foregoing we have been trying capitalize strong sentiment Council (e.g. France, Canada) favor new approach along lines Bunche armistice idea. We drafted last night short punchy resolution (text new [next] following telegram¹), establishing armistice but at same time reaffirming truce while parties with aid acting Mediator work out details armistice. This armistice phase will not, as we see it, impede straightening out Negev situation as contemplated November 4 but will actually facilitate Jewish cooperation with acting Mediator in Negev and will clear decks prompt consideration Committee One of permanent settlement. We are convinced rapid progress with this program is surest guarantee against new Israeli military operations. Consequently we earnestly hope British will recede from their present rigid position which we feel blind alley with disaster lurking at end, and that they will find it possible support our brief resolution.

Canadians pressing for soonest meeting SC and working on UK to meet our views with which they agree. Canadians think McNeil was persuaded in our joint evening conference on November 9 (see Delga 661²—London 1214) but was slapped down by London.

In addition to UK and Canada we gave copy our short resolution on personal basis to Eban this morning making clear this paper had no delegation our [or] US Government standing. Eban has since consulted Shertok and first reaction indicates our resolution basically acceptable to Israel subject, however, to drafting changes we believe can be worked out.

¹ No. 718, not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 1582.

² Dated November 9, p. 1559.

Sent Department Delga 717, repeated London as 1250 for the Ambassador.

MARSHALL

USUN Files

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State¹

CONFIDENTIAL

[PARIS,] November 13, 1948.

Participants: The Secretary
Mr. Shertok, Israeli Foreign Minister
Mr. Eban, Israeli Representative at United Nations
Mr. Wilkins, United States Delegation

Mr. Shertok called on me this afternoon at his request to discuss the Palestine question.

Mr. Shertok told me he wanted to discuss two aspects of the question at the present time:

- 1) *The Security Council Resolution of November 4 and its relation to a proposed Security Council resolution providing for the establishment of an armistice in Palestine and for the commencement of negotiations leading to final settlement of the Palestine question*

Mr. Shertok said that his government attached the greatest importance to immediate negotiations and that it felt that if the Security Council called upon Israel and the Arab States to commence negotiations directly or through a United Nations representative, armistice demarcation lines could be established at an early date. Mr. Shertok did not think that the principle of broad demilitarized or neutral zones should be followed, although it might be necessary to have narrow "no man's land" strips. In particular, Mr. Shertok objected to the November 4 Security Council resolution as it related to the Negev in that it would prevent administrative and military control of Israeli Negev by Tel Aviv. Mr. Shertok said that his government felt that the November 4 Resolution should be superseded by the proposed Security Council resolution providing for the establishment of an armistice in Palestine and for the commencement of negotiations leading to a final settlement of the Palestine question.

- 2) *Admission of Israel to the United Nations*

Mr. Shertok said that their lack of membership in the United Nations at the present time was of considerable disadvantage to them. He said that, for example, it prevented them from dealing on a basis of equality with the six Arab States both in the United Nations and in Palestine. He said that it prevented them from having a vote on

¹ Drafted by Mr. Wilkins.

important matters affecting Israel. He said that if they were not admitted at this session of the General Assembly, Israel would not be able to become a United Nations member for another year. He said that so far the Provisional Government of Israel had been recognized by eighteen countries, that these included the United States and Russia and the Soviet satellite states but did not include any of the Western European states. Mr. Shertok was of the opinion that the admission of Israel into the United Nations would not make it necessary for other members of the United Nations to recognize it immediately unless they wished to do so, but that the fact of Israel's admission would have the international effect of establishing Israel's status and thus prove a stabilizing factor in the Near East.

Mr. Shertok said that he wished to speak very frankly and confidentially to me, as he had instructed Mr. Epstein in Washington to communicate with Mr. Lovett, with regard to Israel's general foreign relations with the United States and the U.S.S.R. Mr. Shertok said it had been his Government's endeavor to steer a middle course, that, if it became necessary, there was no doubt where Israel's tone [*sic*] sympathies lay but that Israel was having increasing difficulty in proving to its people, in view of the position which we had taken on various aspects of the Palestine question, that the United States desired friendly or as friendly relations with Israel as did the U.S.S.R. Mr. Shertok pointed out, for example, that the U.S.S.R. had a full Minister whereas the United States had only a Special Representative at Tel Aviv. Mr. Shertok said there was no doubt that the U.S.S.R. was friendly towards Israel, as revealed by the Soviet position in the United Nations and elsewhere; consequently, many Israelis now say: "Why should we not go along with the Russians who are friendly towards us?"

Mr. Shertok seemed to feel that American support for their position regarding negotiations and an armistice as well as for Israel's immediate admission to the United Nations would counterbalance the sympathy of the Israeli people for Soviet Russia.

Mr. Shertok said he understood I was perturbed regarding recent reports that Israel was obtaining men and munitions from the Soviet Union. Mr. Shertok said he wished to assure me categorically that no men or munitions had been received from the Soviet Union, but that men had come from all parts of the world to help Israel and that munitions had been purchased and received from Czechoslovakia, France and Switzerland.

I told Mr. Shertok it was our main purpose to bring about agreement between the Arabs and the Jews in Palestine and that we were not necessarily concerned as to what the agreement was as long as it did

not involve conquest by war. I re-emphasized this point several times during my conversation. I said that if Israel openly flouted or defied the United Nations or the Security Council, it seemed clear it would be unable to gain admission to the United Nations, and that such other matters as loans and *de jure* recognition would, of course, be affected.

I said that we had been endeavoring for a long time to make it possible for the Arabs and Jews to agree. I said that thus far we had been successful in bringing the Arabs and, I might add, the British along with us, in the steps which the United Nations had taken. I said that I was convinced the Arabs greatly feared that Israel might not be content with its present position in Palestine, and that it might endeavor to branch out and would actually take steps in this direction. I said that reports of Israeli arms purchases in Czechoslovakia and their receipt increased Arab fears in this respect. I expressed the opinion that we were closer to an agreement between the Arabs and the Jews at the present time than we ever had been and said to Mr. Shertok, in brief, "Don't overplay your hand."

I also added that I had not seen any of the Israeli representatives in Paris since my last conversation with Mr. Shertok in October, and that I had not done so because I had learned from experience that what was said in confidence was immediately thereafter known in New York. I said that I understood the long historical background in Israel's struggle, but that my attitude was that we should now deal with each other in the normal fashion as Foreign Secretaries each representing his own Government.

Mr. Shertok thanked me for the frank expression of my views. Mr. Shertok said that he wished to be equally frank and to state he was convinced the British were seeking through the November 4 Resolution to accomplish in the Negev what they had been unable to do in any other way. He said that they wished to prevent its control by Israel and that the November 4 Resolution was not a truce resolution but a political resolution for this purpose. Mr. Shertok added that his Government had two choices: 1) to cooperate in the implementation of the November 4 Resolution through the present plan of the Acting Mediator, or, 2) to oppose it by refusing to withdraw Israeli armed forces from recently occupied areas in the Negev. Mr. Shertok said that he did not know what position his Government would take, but he personally was inclined to the latter.

Mr. Shertok added that Israel had definite evidence that the British were now supplying the Arabs with men and arms. I told him I had heard reports to this effect, had investigated them and was convinced that the British were not supplying the Arabs with men and arms.

I emphasized again the importance of an agreement between the

Arabs and Jews and strongly stressed that we now had a real opportunity of reaching it.²

² Secretary Marshall transmitted the text of this memorandum of conversation to the Department on November 18 (Delga 825, 501.BB Palestine/11-1848).

Editorial Note

Mr. Bunche, through his representatives at Tel Aviv and Cairo, transmitted to the Provisional Government of Israel and the Government of Egypt identical communications of November 13, establishing provisional demarcation lines for Israeli and Egyptian forces in the Negeb. This action, taken pursuant to the Security Council resolution of November 4, fixed November 19 as the effective date. The communications stated that "As soon as the provisional demarcation lines have been put into effect, my good offices and those of the Chief of Staff and the entire truce supervision personnel will be fully at the disposal of both parties to assist them in undertaking the negotiations envisaged in the resolution for the establishment of the permanent truce lines and such neutral or demilitarized zones as may appear advantageous."

The communications were made public by the United Nations in press release PAL/381, November 13. Paris transmitted them to the Department on November 16 (Delga 783, 501.BB Palestine/11-1648).

501.BB Palestine/11-1348: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald)

SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, November 13, 1948—1 p. m.

216. Dept had received several reports indicating number Amer citizens and aircraft of Amer and Panamanian registry involved in movement fighter aircraft and arms from Czech to Israel in violation SC resolutions May 29 and July 15 and contravention US Govt Policy on arms shipments to Near East. (Urtel 243 Nov 8.¹) Planes overflying Austria refused respond international signals to land given by US Air Forces. Rather than accede Air Force request for authorization to shoot down planes Dept on basis affidavits from Amer citizens involved instructed Emb Praha end July request assistance Czech Govt in stopping use Czech airfields by Amer aircraft using Amer crews and bearing Amer markings and engaged in clandestine operations. Czech Govt also requested assist Emb take up passports personnel such crews. Foregoing action believed in accord SC resolutions May 29 and July 15 as well as US Govt Policy on this matter.

LOVETT

¹ Not printed.

501.BB Palestine/11-1348 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Delegation at Paris

SECRET

WASHINGTON, November 13, 1948—2 p. m.

Gadel 473. 1. President approved proposed Congressional appropriation of \$16,000,000 US contribution Palestinian refugees. Congressional leaders being consulted. Will inform soonest when announcement can be made.

[Here follows discussion of possible appointees to the position of administrator of Palestinian refugee relief operations.]

LOVETT

501.BB Palestine/11-1448

*The Israeli Foreign Minister (Shertok) to the Secretary of State, at Paris*Aut. 04-10
04-41

PARIS, 14th November, 1948.

DEAR MR. MARSHALL: In our conversation yesterday you thought that I was unduly critical of the British in suggesting that their prime interest as sponsors of the November 4th resolution of the Security Council lay, not in their concern for the stability of the truce regime, but in their desire to achieve a definite territorial settlement, namely the exclusion of the Negev from the territory of Israel. You felt sure that the two issues were being kept separate.

After we left, I learnt from Mr. Eban that, in a recent conversation with him, Mr. Hector McNeil freely argued that the adoption of the November 4th resolution was essential to secure the implementation of the Bernadotte Report. Mr. Eban reported at the time the gist of that interview to members of your Delegation. Mr. McNeil's statement came as a clear admission of the British political and territorial interest behind the sponsorship of a resolution designed, on the face of it, to stabilise the truce. My apprehensions as to the real motives of the British attitude thus appear to be fully justified.

It came to my knowledge only after our interview that the Security Council sub-committee had in the meantime decided, by majority, to endorse the Acting Mediator's plan for the withdrawal of the forces in the Negev. If you would bear in mind what I put before you in my two cabled messages, and what I submitted yesterday orally, I am sure you will appreciate the utter gravity of the issue which has now been created. Conflict with the Security Council, or for that matter with any organ of the United Nations, is the very last thing we would wish to see ourselves involved in, but when avoidance of conflict entails the sacrifice of most fundamental national interests, I fear that we are left with no choice.

I take this opportunity of most earnestly repeating the plea that the Security Council should now concentrate on the resolution enjoining an armistice and the initiation of peace talks, and that this over-all resolution be taken to supersede and render superfluous the *ad hoc* arrangement proposed for the Negev. Insistence upon the latter can only reduce, and may even wreck, the chances of success of the former, whereas more forbearance on the minor issue, now that a fresh start is being made to tackle the problem in its major aspect, must enhance the effectiveness of the new approach.

I feel deeply alarmed by the apparent determination to pursue the November 4th line to the bitter end, and would venture to express the hope that, under your enlightened leadership, and in the interests of all concerned, the United Nations and we may be spared this unnecessary ordeal.

Yours very sincerely,

M. SHERTOK

501.BB Palestine/11-1448 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET US URGENT
NIACT

PARIS, November 14, 1948—9 p. m.

Delga 746. Verbatim text revised draft SC resolution on Palestine follows:¹

"The SC

Reaffirming its previous resolutions concerning the establishment and implementation of the truce in Palestine and [recalling] in particular, its resolution of 15 July 1948 which determined that the situation in Palestine constitutes a threat to the peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter;

¹ This draft, providing for an armistice in Palestine, was the third text sent to the Department in as many days. Secretary Marshall, on November 2, had transmitted the first of these (Delga 718, 501.BB Palestine/11-1248). The following day, he sent a revised draft, developed during consultation with the British and Canadian Delegations (Delga 740). In commenting on the revised draft, the Secretary wrote: "Department should note that inclusion of reference to November 4 resolution in second paragraph of new draft will probably not be very satisfactory to Israel. British, however, wanted stronger reference to November 4 in the first paragraph. We believe it essential to reach agreement with British re this matter and we believe it essential in order to reach such agreement to admit some reference to November 4. British have receded about 80-90 percent from their original position (a) of not being willing to consider the Bunche armistice approach at all and (b) of insisting on extending scope of November 4 resolution, including sanctions aspect, to other sectors of Palestine, in particular northern Galilee. On other hand new draft gives Israel 80-90 percent what they want, most important of all being (a) SC recognition of armistice concept replacing truce as transition to permanent peace, (b) SC endorsement of principle of direct negotiation, and (c) elimination from Paragraph 3, Subparagraph (b) of preceding draft of language relating to 'broad demilitarized zones.'" (Delga 739) Delga 739 and 740 are filed under 501.BB Palestine/11-1348.

Taking note that the GA is continuing its consideration of the future government of Palestine in response to the request of the SC of 7 April 1946 [1948];

Without prejudice to the action of the Acting Mediator regarding the implementation of the resolution of the SC of 4 November 1948 in regard to which he has consulted with the Committee of the Council appointed by that resolution;

Decides that, in order to eliminate the threat to the peace in Palestine and to facilitate the transition from the present truce to permanent peace in Palestine, an armistice shall be immediately established in all sectors of Palestine;

Calls upon the parties directly involved in the conflict in Palestine, as a further provisional measure under Article 40 of the Charter, to enter into negotiations immediately, either directly or through the Acting Mediator on Palestine, with a view to the immediate establishment of the armistice including:

(a) The delineation of permanent armistice demarcation lines beyond which the armed forces of the respective parties shall not move;

(b) Such withdrawal and reduction of their armed forces as will ensure the maintenance of the armistice during the transition to permanent peace in Palestine.”²

Sent Department Delga 746, repeated London as 1263.

MARSHALL

² This draft resolution was agreed to by spokesmen for the United States, United Kingdom, and Canadian Delegations on November 14. The United States Delegation informed the Department of its view that “we are free under present instructions to support and vote for this revised text.” (Delga 745 from Paris, 501.BB Palestine/11-1448)

The Department, in reply on November 14, stated: “Your Delgas 739 and 740 November 13 were sent to President at sea for his instructions which are not yet forthcoming. Meanwhile we have received your 745 and 746 November 14 and concur that under instructions set forth in Gadel 420 you may support and vote for, but not sponsor, revised draft resolution whose text is contained in Delga 746.” (Gadel 475 to Paris, 501.BB Palestine/11-1448). Regarding Gadel 420, see footnote 1 to telegram Delga 634, p. 1556.

With minor changes, the draft resolution in Delga 746 was submitted to the Security Council on November 15 by the Canadian, French, and Belgian Representatives (SC, 3rd yr., No. 125, p. 4). For the statement by Mr. Jessup the same day on the draft resolution, see *ibid.*, p. 25.

501.BB Palestine/11-1348: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Paris

SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, November 14, 1948—11 p. m.
NIACT

Gadel 476. Urtels Delgas 739 and 740¹ were sent last night to President for instructions which have not yet been received. Mean-

¹ Both dated November 13; neither printed, but see footnotes 1 and 2, *supra*.

while I have talked with Clifford by telephone and we agree that:

1. Language in second paragraph² Delga 740 with reference to SC resolution of November 4 is equivocal.
2. As a matter of practice within realm of possibility, sanctions applied by SC in instant case are out of question.
3. We can not place ourselves in position of "being against peace".

Accordingly, on constructive side, we feel that utmost emphasis should be placed on getting both parties to war in Palestine to negotiate armistice and eventual peace. If you make it clear that draft resolution contained in Delga 746³ is but a step to this paramount end, I feel that, under authorization in Gadel 420 November 7⁴ you are free to vote for that draft resolution. (This telegram is commentary on Gadel 475⁵ which precedes.)

Attitude toward Soviet amendments to Bunche's draft resolution (Delga 634⁶) has not yet been cleared with President and if these amendments come to vote you should abstain.

LOVETT

² This paragraph read: "Decides that, in order to eliminate this threat to the peace and to facilitate the transition from the present truce, without prejudice to its application under the resolution of 4 November, to permanent peace in Palestine, an armistice shall be immediately established in all sectors of Palestine". (501.BB Palestine/11-1348)

³ *Supra*.

⁴ Not printed; but see footnote 1 to telegram Delga 634, p. 1556.

⁵ Dated November 14, not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 1583.

⁶ Dated November 6, p. 1555.

501.BB Palestine/11-1548

Memorandum by Mr. Robert M. McClintock to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] November 15, 1948.

In light of this afternoon's press reports of Shertok's statement before Committee I of the General Assembly,¹ Mr. Satterthwaite and I agree that it might be useful to repeat to the President Ambassador Douglas' Niact 4851, November 12 attached. Both the press reports and this telegram relate to your description of the President's feeling

¹ Mr. Shertok, in a statement before the Committee on November 15, announced that "The Mediator's proposal concerning the Negeb was in itself a sufficient reason why the Government of Israel could not consider the [Bernadotte] report even a basis for discussion." He stated also that Israel would not give up any part of the Negeb, that it claimed permanent inclusion in Israel of modern Jewish Jerusalem and of the territory linking Jerusalem with the coast and that all of the Galilee should be part of Israel. The text of Mr. Shertok's statement is printed in GA, 3rd sess., Pt. I, First Committee, Summary Records, 1948, p. 640.

Ahmad Shukairy, Vice President of the delegation of the Arab Higher Committee at the United Nations, the following day, also rejected Count Bernadotte's proposals as a basis for settling the Palestine problem (*ibid.*, p. 647).

that if he was to keep his contract the Israeli would have to keep theirs.²

² Marginal notation by Mr. Lovett: "Discussed substance with Clifford 5:45 Nov. 15th. No need to send."

501.BB Palestine/11-1548: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NIACT

PARIS, November 15, 1948—noon.

Martel 134. Personal eyes only for Lovett. Douglas came from London to see me this afternoon and reported as follows:

Begin Douglas Report.

1. Prime Minister Attlee sent Douglas word November 12 that he would like to see him on a matter of grave importance at Chequers November 13. Douglas, accompanied by Lewis Jones, kept this appointment and found that Attlee had asked Lord Tedder and Michael Wright to be on hand for talk which lasted for three-quarters of an hour.

2. Attlee opened by stating that British Government is gravely perturbed about Palestine and sees situation there as presenting dangers as great and immediate to world peace and to Anglo-American cooperation as Berlin or any other present problem.

3. Only hope, said Attlee, lies in close Anglo-American cooperation. If this cannot be achieved over Palestine it will become much more difficult to achieve in other fields. Moreover, Palestine question contains seeds of possible impairment, if not impotence, of UN and of serious Anglo-American divergence. It is, therefore, essential that US and UK should maintain common ground.

4. Palestine problem has two aspects: (a) preservation of the truce, and (b) nature of a permanent settlement. Without preservation of truce there can be no settlement.

5. Re truce British Government has scrupulously observed conditions of truce and has refrained from delivering arms to Arab countries in spite of their treaty obligations to do so. However, truce has not been observed by Israel, which in breach of truce has built up a considerable modern fighting force largely with material from Czechoslovakia. Fact that truce has operated to advantage of one party has stretched relations of British Government with Arab countries almost to breaking point.

6. Attlee said that under SC resolution of November 4 Acting Mediator is about to fix a time limit for withdrawal of forces from their present positions so as to maintain principle that neither side benefits from breaches of truce. British Government considers this

issue is crucial. If Jews refuse to comply and SC is unwilling or unable to take any action under chapter seven, way will be open for further unlimited breaches of truce by either side. When Arabs broke truce British Government publicly stated that it was willing to take part in application of measures against Arab countries under chapter seven and voted accordingly. Arab governments bowed to authority of SC. If Jews refuse to comply, same issue arises, but in respect to other party.

7. Speaking with great feeling Attlee said that in this matter British Government believes future of UN itself is at stake. Failure of League of Nations to take action on a similar issue was beginning of its downfall. Same is likely to be true with UN. Apart from specific issue, it seems to British Government essential that UK and US should do their utmost to secure action by SC if Israel flaunts [*flouts*] its authority. Among possible first steps would be strengthening arms embargo on party which fails to comply and lifting of arms embargo on other party; denial of loans; severance of financial and commercial relations, and of communications; and possibly at a later stage, blockade.

8. Meanwhile, said Attlee, British chiefs of staff have advised British Cabinet that, as a result of recent Jewish advances, security of Transjordan, who is Britain's ally, is threatened. Consequently, British Govt is bound to consider what action it should take if Jews, in further violation of truce, were to attack TJ forces which have never entered any part of Palestine which, under November 29 UNGA resolution, would have gone to Jews. If Jews attack TJ territory as they have already attacked Lebanon (Jewish forces are now in occupation of sixteen Lebanese villages) British Govt would be obliged to give armed assistance to its ally. Same would apply in case of Egypt, but British treaty with TJ does not specify that assistance should only be given when TJ territory is attacked. British Govt would, therefore, be in grave dilemma. Objections to assistance by British armed forces to TJ forces in Palestine are obvious and serious, and British Govt has no desire to find itself embarked on this course. If, on other hand, British stand aside and allow TJ forces to be driven back across Jordan, their assistance may come too late, and the blow to value placed by other countries on any treaty of alliance with UK may be irreparable. It might be, said Attlee, that whole British and perhaps western position in Middle East might be lost. The more British Govt considers this dilemma, the less it likes it. It concludes that every possible step should be taken to avoid dilemma arising, always bearing

in mind that at some point (e.g. TJ frontier) HMG would be obliged in any case to intervene with armed forces.

9. Attlee said it is hope of British Govt that if SC shows that either party which defies its authority will have measures taken against it, the dilemma will never arise.

10. Attlee then turned to what he described as an "immediate question" and said the British Govt has to consider not only threat to Transjordan but threat to safety of UK airfield at Amman, remembering that Jewish forces have already crossed Lebanese frontier and in an earlier stage of operations bombed Amman. UK airfield Amman is virtually defenseless at present. Consequently, British Govt has decided that reinforcements should be sent to UK airfield Amman (at present garrisoned by 150 men of the RAF regiment (training) with six armoured cars but without any AA defense). These reinforcements will be confined to RAF personnel, some light anti-aircraft equipment and necessary supplies, including some 30/50 tons of ammunition which could be held available at Amman under RAF guard for despatch to Arab Legion in event this is ordered as result Israeli attack.

11. Attlee said British Cabinet has also decided that if Jews refuse to comply with orders of Acting Mediator, it is intended to send UK detachment to Aqaba to forestall any possibility that Jews might attempt to occupy Aqaba.

12. Douglas reports that Attlee asked him in spirit of US-UK cooperation to advise me without delay of British Cabinet decision described paragraph 10 above since, as Tedder confirmed, British military are most anxious to begin airlift reinforcement Amman November 15 or 16. Douglas promised to deliver message to me and to report to Attlee any comments I might wish to make. Attlee said he would welcome these.

13. Speaking generally of arms embargo, Attlee said British Govt has scrupulously refrained from supplying any arms to Arab countries and are not proposing to do so now, but if Jews refuse to comply with SC, a new situation will have arisen. British Govt feels that in event non-compliance Jews SC should agree that arms embargo as a general measure should be lifted in respect of other party. In any case it would be very difficult for British Govt to continue to withhold arms which it is bound under its treaties to deliver.

14. Re permanent settlement to be worked out in UNGA Attlee said both US and UK have publicly supported Bernadotte proposals. He

hoped UK would soon receive comments of US on draft resolutions which it is proposed US and UK jointly should introduce in UNGA in support of Bernadotte proposals, and that US and UK would soon agree on their tactics in matter towards other delegations. In British view Bernadotte proposals are not only those of Mediator, but are only common ground for a settlement on which UK and US have been able to agree. Attlee said "we are most anxious to make our area of agreement as solid as possible".

15. After Attlee had finished Douglas reports that he took up with him following points.

16. Re desire for close US and UK cooperation in connection with both truce and final settlement (paragraph 3 above) Douglas assured Attlee that US is also anxious that this be maintained. Flexibility on both sides would contribute to this. Re truce (paragraph 6 above) Douglas presented forcefully my thoughts as embodied in Delga 717 and 618 [718], November 12¹ (repeated London as 1259 and 1251) with omission those parts inappropriate for discussion with UK. It was clear from replies of Attlee and Wright that while British Govt is somewhat skeptical as to its effectiveness UK would welcome conversion truce into armistice provided new resolution mentions November 4 resolution. UK feels that omission this reference would vitiate "psychological impact" mentioned paragraph 2 Delga 717. Douglas informs me Delga 739, November 12 [13]² accurately reflects highest level British thinking in this connection and, comparing resolution text in Delga 718 with text Delga 740³ Douglas is surprised and gratified at distance UK has gone to maintain common front with us.

17. Re immediate reinforcement RAF airfield Amman (paragraph 10 above) replying to Douglas questions Tedder confirmed solemnly that UK had sent no military equipment—not even necessary spare and maintenance parts to Arabs since imposition of embargo and stressed fact that present movement would be only from one UK military base in Egypt to another UK military in TJ. Tedder and Wright said that UK entertains no doubts re its legal rights in this connection. Attlee said UK action in advising me in advance and affording me an opportunity to express my views before movement begins is to be faithful to general spirit of US-UK cooperation in common problems. Douglas stressed fact that reinforcement steps could probably only be kept secret for few days and asked whether UK proposed to inform Mediator and have UN observer check fact ammunition flown in remains in RAF stores under RAF guard thus protecting UK against any charge that it is rearming Arabs. Tedder

¹ Latter not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 1582.

² Not printed; but see *ibid.*

³ Dated November 13, not printed; but see *ibid.*

said there was no military objection to this being done. Wright said consideration is being given to parliamentary question on subject but presentation problem would be discussed November 14 with Hector McNeil. Douglas urged importance of presentation problem.

18. Re compliance by Jews with November 4 resolution (paragraph 13 above) Wright inquired whether US is exerting its great influence on PGI to this end. He said UK pressure on Arabs is unremitting and pointed out that if Jews do comply the serious contingencies mentioned by Prime Minister would never arise.

19. Re US comments on US-UK draft resolution (paragraph 14 above) Attlee added that UK can hardly put pressure on Arabs along any lines (see London's 4818, November 10 to Dept⁴ until it has a ready answer to inevitable Arab question "does US agree with UK on settlement you are recommending?" *End Douglas Report.*

20. I wish to comment immediately to British Govt on specific point of reinforcing British military units and installations in Arab states. An important factor in problem is that early advent of rains will make it difficult or impossible to postpone reinforcement to a later date if reinforcement is to become necessary. Please notify me immediately whether you see any objection to my commenting as follows:

"I have considered carefully the considerations advanced by the British Govt on the subject of Palestine which Ambassador Douglas discussed fully with me today. The United States recognized that the British Govt must insure the security of its own armed forces and military installations. We assume, however, that in assessing the nature of the threat to such armed forces and installations in the Arab states, the British Govt will take into account the attitude of Israel toward the effort of the Security Council to maintain a truce and establish an armistice in Palestine."⁵

Sent Dept as Martel 134 from Marshall, repeated London 1264 eyes only for Douglas.

MARSHALL

⁴ Not printed.

⁵ Mr. Lovett's reply on November 15 stated that he saw "no objection your comments to British Government as outlined. You may wish consider clarifying drafting third and last sentence, particularly 'attitude of Israel toward the effort, etc.'"

"Assume this would be personal and secret communication from you to Attlee not to be released by British in support their contemplated action, which may be widely misunderstood here unless most carefully handled by them." (Telmar 159 to Paris, 501.BB Palestine/11-1548)

Ambassador Douglas delivered Secretary Marshall's message to Prime Minister Attlee on the morning of November 17 and concluded that, unless the situation deteriorated seriously, the British would not send reinforcements to Amman before the Israeli reply to the Acting Mediator (telegram 884, November 17, 7 p. m., from London to the Secretary, at Paris, 501.BB Palestine/11-1748).

USUN Files

*Memorandum by the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas)
to the Secretary of State, at Paris*

TOP SECRET

[PARIS,] November 15, 1948.

Subject: Conversation with Michael Wright on Palestine

1. Michael Wright had spent Sunday¹ with Mr. Bevin and had come over at Bevin's request in regard to Palestine and particularly the report which I transmitted to you last night and this morning.²

2. (a) As regards the immediate issue, i.e., the movement of anti-aircraft equipment, ammunition and reinforcements to the U.K. air establishment at Amman, I explained to Wright that you were not now in a position to make any comment.

(b) Speaking very personally not on behalf of my Government and not as a reflection of your views, I explained to him why it seemed to me preferable for the British to postpone this step probably for at least another 24 hours when we might have a clearer view of Israeli's attitude toward the Security Council resolution and the Bunche proposals.

3. After some discussion, I suggested to Wright that he cable London informing the Prime Minister:

(a) that I was returning to London tomorrow afternoon and that I would personally transmit your comments;

(b) that in talks here with the representatives of Israeli it was indicated that they would probably accept the Security Council's actions; and

(c) that it was my very personal view that it would be better for the British to postpone their contemplated steps to reinforce their installation at Amman until I arrive in London tomorrow afternoon.

This Wright is doing.

4. Wright said that Mr. Bevin had asked him to reiterate his assurances that the U.K. had no desire whatsoever to throttle Palestine; that at the appropriate moment, if the Israelis behaved appropriately, the U.K. was prepared to extend de jure recognition and to take all the steps necessary for a full recognition of and friendliness toward the state of Israel. If, however, the Israelis failed to comply with the Security Council, Mr. Bevin felt that the arms embargo imposed on the Arab states should be lifted and no loans should be extended to the Israeli Government and that financial sanctions should be employed. In this connection, he said the imports to Israeli were now being financed by the U.K. through the release of sterling for this purpose.

Wright was also asked by Bevin to repeat:

(a) that he attached great importance to internationalization of Jerusalem; and

¹ November 14.

² See Martel 134, *supra*.

(b) that he was deeply concerned with the dilemma in which the U.K. would find itself if the Israeli mounted a strong attack against the Arab Legion. Wright said that it was Mr. Bevin's strong inclination in this event not to stand aside and see the Arab Legion swept away.

5. Wright suggested that when I return to London tomorrow afternoon and meet with either the Prime Minister or Sir Orme Sargent (acting for Mr. Bevin and Mr. McNeil in their absence), they would seek information on the following points:

(a) Have we put as strong pressure on the Israeli to comply with the Security Council as the British have over the course of the last many months been putting on the Arabs?

(b) Have we explained to the Israeli the folly of any further violation of the truce which they may commit?

(c) What are our views on the Bernadotte proposals and have we advised the Israelis to accept them?

(d) What is our position in regard to the imposition of sanctions if the Israelis flout the authority of the Security Council?

6. Wright repeated the British anxiety over U.S.-U.K. cooperation and he implied that they were very apprehensive that the great progress which has been made toward establishing a common line of action might be dissipated at a very critical moment.

While I did not comment on any of the points mentioned in paragraph 5 above, I did impress upon Wright that very great progress toward a U.S.-U.K. concerted position had been made and that we should not be discouraged because at this particular moment the situation did not seem to be wholly clear; that we could really only assess the far reaching events which we had both achieved by clinging to a perspective of the ground we had covered over the course of the last 12 months.³

LEWIS W. DOUGLAS

³The memorandum bears the following endorsement in Marshall's handwriting: "I discussed this with Douglas. GCM"

501.BB Palestine/11-1648

*Report by the National Security Council on Provision of a Police Force for Jerusalem*¹

TOP SECRET
NSC 27/3

[WASHINGTON,] November 16, 1948.

The Problem

1. To determine the type of United Nations police force for Jerusalem which the United States could accept if Jerusalem is placed under United Nations control.

¹For the background on this paper, see footnote 3, p. 1525, and Mr. Lovett's letter of November 4 to Secretary Forrestal, p. 1547.

Analysis

2. The Palestine resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on November 29, 1947, recommended with respect to Jerusalem that:

a. The city should be placed under a special international regime to be administered by the United Nations.

b. The Trusteeship Council should discharge the responsibilities of "administering authority".

c. A governor of the city, appointed by the Trusteeship Council, should organize a police force, the members of which should be recruited outside Palestine.

3. In his final report on Palestine, the United Nations Mediator, the late Count Bernadotte, recommended that:

"The City of Jerusalem which should be understood as covering the area defined in the resolution of the General Assembly of 29th November, should be treated separately and should be placed under effective United Nations control with maximum feasible local autonomy for its Arab and Jewish communities, with full safeguards for the protection of the Holy Places and sites and free access to them, and for religious freedom."

4. The present session of the United Nations General Assembly, which is now considering the problem of Palestine, may recommend for Jerusalem an international regime under UN control. The Department of State is of the opinion that this Government must in one form or another support a proposal to establish a United Nations police force in Jerusalem.

5. It is estimated that a police force of from 4,000 to 6,000 men, initially recruited outside Palestine, will be required if the territory of Jerusalem is to be placed under effective international control. Two general methods of supplying such a police force are open to the United Nations:

a. The force might be composed of contingents of troops or police personnel supplied by interested governments.

b. The force might be a quasi-military organization composed of persons recruited as individuals. Such recruitment might be effected by:

(1) The Secretary-General of the United Nations.

(2) The proposed "administering authority" for Jerusalem. (Under the United Nations resolution the Trusteeship Council was recommended as the "administering authority".)

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion from the military point of view that:

a. As a matter of national security, an international police force for Jerusalem should not be made up of contingents supplied by certain governments.

b. An international police force for Jerusalem recruited as individuals by the Secretary-General of the United Nations is less objectionable from a U.S. security viewpoint than *a* above, since Soviet personnel that might be recruited would enter Palestine as individuals and not as Soviet troops.

c. It is considered highly undesirable that American citizens be employed in a Jerusalem international police force, either as private individuals recruited by the Secretary-General or as members of the United States armed service, although their employment as private individuals would be less prejudicial to United States security interests than the use for peace enforcement in Palestine of United States armed forces.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have also suggested that, from the military viewpoint, a possible method of providing the necessary police force would be to have this force recruited and administered by the "administering authority" rather than by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

7. Should there be adopted the alternative of forming the Jerusalem police force from contingents supplied by governments, it might be possible, through proper selection of such governments, to exclude Soviet forces. But it would be extremely difficult to exclude also both United States and satellite forces, unless one or a few "neutral" governments were chosen as "administering authority" and sole suppliers of contingents. It is unlikely that any countries acceptable to the United States could be induced to assume this responsibility.

8. Serious difficulties could be anticipated if individual recruitment of members of a Jerusalem police force were decided upon. For obvious reasons, a force initially composed only of Arabs and Jews would be unsatisfactory. Should the force be recruited by the United Nations on the same basis as that on which the Secretary-General has employed members of the UN Secretariat, there would no doubt be a number of Soviet and satellite nationals in the force. Should a different basis be proposed, such as recruitment restricted to nationals of selected "neutral" countries, applicants in sufficient numbers might not be forthcoming. In any case the problems of enlistment, command, language, training, equipment, and budgetary support, if they could be satisfactorily solved at all, would involve long delays in the face of the immediate need for a police force in Jerusalem.

Conclusions

9. There appears to be no practicable way of providing a UN police force for Jerusalem which would meet the requirements of UN administration of Jerusalem and which would also be consistent with the security interests of the United States.

10. In the event the present session of the UN General Assembly recommends establishment of a UN police force for Jerusalem as part

of a plan for UN control of the city, a police force constituted as follows would be least objectionable to the United States:

a. The police force should consist of persons recruited as individuals, and not of contingents supplied by governments.

b. The members of the force should be recruited and controlled by the governor of Jerusalem (or by whatever agency is designated to exercise local administrative authority on behalf of the United Nations).

c. Recruitment of members of the police force should so far as practicable exclude nationals of the United States, the USSR, and the Soviet satellites and would, in so far as points *a* and *b* are concerned, be in general harmony with the pertinent provisions of the resolution passed on November 29, 1947 by the General Assembly of the United Nations.

11. In any event the United States should not accept any proposal for a Jerusalem police force which calls for the provision of armed force contingents by any of the following: the United States, the USSR, or the Soviet satellites.²

² President Truman approved the conclusions contained in NSC 27/3 on November 24 (memorandum of November 24 from Sidney W. Souers, Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, to the Secretary of State, 501.BB Palestine/11-1648).

501.BB Palestine/11-1648: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

PARIS, November 16, 1948—noon.

Delga 761. Eyes alone for Lovett from Rusk. Subsequent telegram¹ will contain outline position paper on Palestine unanimously approved by delegation this morning, including all delegates and alternates except Austin who is still in hospital. Paper was presented to delegation to obtain basis for staff work and not as a specific action paper. Later telegram will contain revised text of resolution for GA. Fundamental purpose of paper was to cement delegation and prevent explosion and on this point paper has served most useful purpose. Staff recommended to Secretary this morning that we should transmit outline position paper and resolution for clearance in Washington with the request that we then be given normal latitude in meeting parliamentary situations arising in Assembly. We wish to ensure particularly that statements can be made in Committee One if necessary without prior verbatim clearance. Clearance position paper and resolution will be appreciated as soon as possible after receipt of each in Washington.² [Rusk.]

MARSHALL

¹ *Infra.*

² Marginal notation by Mr. Lovett: "Phoned Key West 5:20 Nov 16th."

501.BB Palestine/11-1548 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET URGENT
NIACT

PARIS, November 15 [16], 1948—noon.

Delga 762. There follows statement of "principles applicable to the US position on the Palestine question before the General Assembly" which USDel this morning agreed, in accordance with policy approved by President should serve as guidance in conduct and development US position on Palestine. Revised draft resolution being prepared and will follow soonest.

Verbatim Text

"1. General.

The security and other national interests of the US require a peaceful solution of the Palestine problem which holds the greatest possibility of a friendly relation between Israel and the Arab countries of the N.E. and between those countries and the US.

2. Independence of the state of Israel.

The US has recognized and supports Israel as an independent state. Although the GA resolution of November 29, 1947 contained substantial limitations upon Israel in such arrangements as economic union, the US considers that Israel should now be dealt with as a full-fledged member of the community of nations. It follows that Israel should be entitled to the normal attributes of independent states; it should now, for example, have full control over immigration into its territory; its economic arrangements with neighboring areas should be on the basis of treaty or other agreement.

The GA should not adopt a new resolution delimiting boundaries in Palestine. It should, however, call upon the Arab states and Israel to enter negotiations for the establishment of a territorial settlement in Palestine. To assist in such negotiations the Assembly should appoint a conciliation commission which should on behalf of the UN exert every influence to bring about a final settlement of all questions outstanding between the parties.

3. Boundaries.

It may be admitted that the provisions of the GA resolution of November 29, 1947, regarding the economic union of the whole of Palestine are not at present feasible and that in view of the unfeasibility of an economic union for all of Palestine the area reserved for an Arab state might more appropriately be joined to one or more of the neighboring Arab states. It may further be admitted that in view of those and other circumstances other territorial adjustments in the GA resolution of November 29, 1947 may well be appropriate.

Therefore the GA should recommend that negotiations be conducted either directly or through the conciliation commission with a

view to a territorial settlement on the following general basis, without excluding any settlement mutually acceptable to the parties:

1. Acceptance by parties of elements common to the GA resolution of November 29 and the conclusions contained in section VIII, paragraph 4 of the report of the UN Mediator.

2. With respect to other matters, consultation by the conciliation commission with the parties to determine to which the recommendations of the GA resolution of November 29, 1947 afford a basis for an agreed settlement and as to matters not so settled the extent to which the conclusions contained in section VIII, paragraph 4 of the UN mediator's report can constitute such a basis.

4. Disposition of Arab Palestine.

Although the GA resolution of November 29, 1947 envisaged an Arab state of Palestine in economic union with Israel, it is now evident that Arab Palestine standing alone could not constitute a viable independent state.

It is desirable, therefore, that Arab Palestine be transferred to one or more of the neighboring Arab states through the process of negotiation conducted by a UN conciliation commission, taking into account the wishes of the inhabitants of Arab Palestine.

5. Jerusalem.

The territory of Jerusalem, as defined in the GA resolution of November 29, 1947, should be [receive?] special and separate treatment from the rest of Palestine and should be placed under effective UN control with maximum feasible local autonomy for Arab and Jewish communities. Although Jerusalem should not be annexed outright in whole or in part either to Israel or to any Arab state, the eventual solution of the problem of governing Jerusalem should take fully into account the interest and the resources of both Israel and such Arab authority as is established in the area surrounding Jerusalem. The GA should not attempt in its present session to establish a final government for Jerusalem but should ask a UN conciliation commission to arrange with local authorities for its interim administration and to present to the fourth regular session of the GA detailed proposals for a permanent international regime.

6. Holy places.

The holy places and religious buildings and sites in Palestine should be protected and free access to them assured in accordance with existing rights and historical practice. Arrangements to this end should be under effective UN supervision. The UN conciliation commission in presenting to the fourth regular session of the GA its detailed proposals regarding the territory of Jerusalem should include recommendations concerning the holy places in that territory. With regard to the holy places in the rest of Palestine, the commission should consult with the political authorities of the areas concerned with a view to securing appropriate formal guarantees as to the protection of the holy places and access to them. These undertakings should be presented to the GA for approval.

7. Freedom of Movement.

A UN conciliation commission should bear in mind the negotiations for a final settlement for Palestine that the peace, stability and economic development and well-being of the entire area require broad agreement with respect to the movement of persons and trade throughout the region. Particular attention should be given to the need for providing access to ports, airfields and railways which are essential to the economic life of the area.

8. UN conciliation commission.

The GA at its current session should give maximum encouragement to negotiation efforts between the parties, for the evolution of a Palestine political settlement. The GA should constitute at its present session a UN conciliation commission to bring about a final settlement of the Palestine question. The US should be a member of this commission. Although it would be desirable to include the UK, the US should not insist upon such inclusion if both the UK and Israel have fundamental objections thereto. No member of the eastern European bloc should be included in the commission. A logical solution would be to ask the three governments now constituting the truce commission (US, France and Belgium) to accept responsibility of constituting the UN conciliation commission.

9. Settlement by peaceful means.

The US and the Assembly should insist by all practicable means that the war in Palestine is over and that the parties should now, with the cooperation of the UN, proceed to work out a final settlement by peaceful means. Specifically, no party is entitled or should be permitted to exploit military capability as an instrument of pressure during the course of negotiations. The GA should leave to the SC the task of bringing about an armistice at as early a date as possible".

Repeated London as 1269.

MARSHALL

Editorial Note

The Security Council, on November 16, considered the draft resolution prepared by the Acting Mediator and the modifications prepared by the Soviet Union (see Delga 634, November 6, and footnote 1, page 1556). The draft resolution, as modified, was not adopted, each of the paragraphs receiving but two affirmative votes (SC, *3rd yr.*, No. 126, pages 51-53).

The Council then considered the draft resolution submitted by the Canadian, French, and Belgian Delegations (see footnote 2, page 1583). The first three paragraphs were adopted by 8 votes, with three abstentions. Paragraphs 4 and 5 were adopted by 8 votes to 1 (Syria), with two abstentions. The resolution (No. 62) is printed in SC, *3rd yr.*, *Resolutions, 1948*, page 29.

867N.01/11-1648: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald)

RESTRICTED

WASHINGTON, November 16, 1948—4 p. m.

219. US Press Nov 14 carried Nov 13 UP despatch from Tel Aviv quoting "informed sources" as stating that President had notified UK he no longer felt bound follow joint US-UK policy on Palestine. Despatch also stated President told Brit he would propose formation a conciliation committee to work out final Palestine peace and warned that US would not support UN sanctions against Israel if latter refused withdraw troops from Southern Negev.

Response to queries you are authorized state that no such approach to Brit has been made by President and that there is no truth above report.¹

LOVETT

¹ This telegram was repeated to Arab capitals, London, Paris, and Jerusalem.

501.BB Palestine/11-1748

Memorandum by Mr. Robert M. McClintock to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] November 17, 1948.

I have read the position paper unanimously adopted by our Delegation in Paris on Palestine with much misgiving. This paper is reproduced in Delga 762, November 15 [16]. According to Delga 761, November 16, the fundamental purpose of the paper was to "cement Delegation and prevent explosion and on this point the paper has served most useful purpose". However, later in Delga 761 Mr. Rusk asks that clearance be given to the paper, together with general instructions permitting freedom of statement in Committee 1 without prior verbatim clearance. I understand from Mr. Humelsine that Delga 761 and Delga 762 were despatched last night to the President at Key West.

According to the statement of the Israeli Foreign Minister before Committee 1 on October [November] 15, Israel:

1. Refuses to relinquish the Negev,
2. Will never accept loss of "its share in the Dead Sea",
3. Is uncompromisingly opposed being debarred from the Gulf Aqaba,
4. Claims "permanent inclusion in Israel of modern Jerusalem", and
5. Claims all of Galilee.

Mr. Shertok concluded his sixty-five minute speech by saying that the United Nations should call on aggressors to end war and negotiate

peace. He said the Conciliation Commission proposed by the Mediator should be a Good Offices Commission entrusted with the task of prevailing on the parties to meet each other for peace negotiations.¹

I submit that Mr. Shertok's conclusions seem to be almost identically paraphrased in Paragraph 3 of the Delegation's working paper, which reads as follows:

"The General Assembly should not adopt a new resolution delimiting boundaries in Palestine. It should, however, call upon the Arab states and Israel to enter negotiations for the establishment of a territorial settlement in Palestine. To assist in such negotiations the Assembly should appoint a conciliation commission which should on behalf of the United Nations exert every influence to bring about a final settlement of all questions outstanding between the parties."

I further submit that the working paper, although it may have prevented an explosion in our Delegation in Paris, by no means meets the requirements of Telmar 148, November 10, which set forth the President's instructions on how the Delegation should deal with the Palestine problem in the General Assembly.

The President's instructions requested the Delegation to seek to combine the President's fundamental position on Palestine—the territorial dispositions of the November 29 resolution—with the Secretary's general recommendation of the Bernadotte Plan on September 21. The President's telegram said:

"Fortunately we are able to continue to subscribe to all the seven basic premises in the Bernadotte Plan and all his specific conclusions, with the exception of his recommendations regarding the boundaries of Israel."

It would appear that the working paper should at least provide for mention of the fact that this Government supports all seven of Count Bernadotte's basic premises. A statement to this effect in the preamble of whatever resolution is placed before the Assembly would go far to redress our position with respect to the Secretary's statement of September 21.

As for the specific operational clauses of the working paper, the first one calls for acceptance by the parties of elements common to the General Assembly's resolution of November 29, 1947 and the conclusions of the Bernadotte Report. Unfortunately, the only element of these two documents which is in common is the single recommendation in both with regard to the internationalization of Jerusalem. Accordingly Paragraph 1 would seem to be of little practical effect.

The real heart of the Delegation's working paper is Paragraph 2, which leaves to the Conciliation Commission consultation with the parties to determine to what extent the recommendations of the resolution of November 29 afford a basis for an agreed settlement, and,

¹ For Mr. Shertok's statement of November 15, see GA, 3rd sess., Pt. I, First Committee, Summary Records, 1948, p. 640.

as to matters not so settled, to what extent Count Bernadotte's conclusions can constitute such a basis.

Mr. Shertok said on November 15 that the Provisional Government of Israel could not consider the Bernadotte Report as even a basis for discussion. On the other hand, the Arab Governments have on innumerable occasions stated that they would never consider the resolution of November 29, 1947 as a basis for discussion. The Representatives of three Arab governments said yesterday in Paris they would not consider the Bernadotte Plan as such a basis either. Here, again, therefore, it would seem that the principal operating paragraph of the Assembly's working paper will have little practical effect.

I have a lively fear that the working paper, which is obviously the lowest common denominator which could win agreement among the strong personalities composing our Delegation, will certainly not prove a useful guide for our action in the Assembly, nor does it entirely conform to the directive established in Telmar 148.

I also submit for your consideration the fact that of the five points cited by Mr. Shertok, as listed above, two principal points—the claim to Jewish Jerusalem and to Western Galilee—directly challenge the logic approved by the President in Telmar 148.

However, if the President now approves this working paper he will in effect, in my opinion, have nullified much of the position taken on November 10, and our Delegation will find itself as a matter of practice recommending to the Assembly precisely what Mr. Shertok asked for in the conclusion to his speech of November 15. I recall that the President said to you that "If the Jews hold me to my contract, they will have to keep theirs".

As for Jerusalem, although the working paper provides that the Conciliation Commission shall present detailed proposals for a permanent international regime to the next session of the General Assembly and, meanwhile, that the city should not be annexed in whole or in part either to Israel or any Arab state, it leaves the interim administration of the city to an arrangement between the Commission and local authorities, which, in effect, would continue the present partition of the town and without any guarantees of free access to it.

Meanwhile, the United States Representative on the Security Council joined with other members of the Committee established by the resolution of November 4 in advising the Acting Mediator to call for the withdrawal of Israeli and Egyptian troops, pursuant to that resolution. Dr. Bunche has now established provisional demarcation lines "in full consultation with the Committee" and has set November 19 as the effective date for the establishment of these lines. It is a matter

for interesting speculation as to what action our Delegation will take in the event that the parties refuse to heed the call of the Acting Mediator. A possible guide may be found in the concluding paragraph of the working paper contained in Delga 762, which is entitled "Settlement by Peaceful Means". This paragraph reads as follows:

"The United States and the Assembly should insist by all practicable means that the war in Palestine is over and that the parties should now, with the cooperation of the United Nations, proceed to work out a final settlement by peaceful means. Specifically, no party is entitled or should be permitted to exploit military capability as an instrument of pressure during the course of negotiations. The General Assembly should leave to the Security Council the task of bringing about an armistice at as early a date as possible."

To sum up, I feel that if the President does approve the working paper he should at least suggest that our resolution endeavor to incorporate more of the ideas expressed in Telmar 148. This could be accomplished by the preamble referring to the November 29 resolution and the Bernadotte Plan, with the operative part of the resolution recommending a territorial settlement to the parties, to be worked out invoking the good offices of the Conciliation Commission.

Editorial Note

In November 1948, Israel made two requests of the Department for American technical assistance. On the 17th the Israeli Mission requested that two Israeli police officers be trained in the United States in modern methods of criminal investigation and on the 23rd the Mission requested an American survey of the civil aviation requirements of Israel (letters of Uriel Heyd to Stuart W. Rockwell, 811.22767N/11-1748 and 867N.796A/2348).

The Secretary of State, in a letter of January 25, 1949, informed Mr. Epstein that the Secretary of Commerce would endeavor to procure suitable personnel for the latter request and suggested the assignment of two technicians from the Civil Aeronautics Administration on a reimbursable basis (867N.796A/1-1449).

The Department, on January 27, 1949, regretted its inability to comply with the earlier request. It was explained that "due to the large number of applications from law enforcement officers within the United States it has been necessary to adopt a policy of not accepting representatives of foreign governments at the National Academy of the Federal Bureau of Investigation". (Letter from Mr. Satterthwaite to Mr. Heyd, 811.2276N/12-2748).

501.BB Palestine/11-1748: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State, at Paris

TOP SECRET

LONDON, November 17, 1948—7 p. m.

887. I have had lengthy conversations since returning from Paris with Sir Orme Sargent, Christopher Mayhew (Foreign Office Parliamentary Secretary), Michael Wright and Bernard Burrows. Lewis Jones has also had extensive talks and I feel we are now in a position to give fairly clear picture of reaction of Foreign Office officials to "principles applicable to US position on Palestine question before UNGA" set forth in Paris telegram 1269, November 15 to London.¹ Please note that views reported below without my comments are those held personally by Foreign Office experts named: They do not constitute official UK policy although latter will obviously be influenced by expert thinking.

2. Consensus opinion among officials is that Arabs would acquiesce to UN decision along lines Bernadotte plan provided UN would assume responsibility for drawing up a definite settlement including fairly definite indication regarding frontiers. This, officials feel, would give Arab leaders some reasonable explanation vis-à-vis their own people and, according British information on such a basis (i.e. original Bernadotte plan acquiescence principle) Arab acquiescence is just around the corner. British believe their efforts to persuade Arabs regarding merits Bernadotte plan are beginning to bear fruit.

3. British officials whom I have seen believe that prospects for Israeli-Arab negotiations have grown much worse following recent Israeli military successes because at outset such negotiations (either directly or under aegis conciliation commission) Jews will have behind them such military capability that it will amount to Arabs being called upon by UNGA to negotiate under duress. Expressing his personal view, Sir Orme Sargent said that in present circumstances to enjoin negotiations, however convenient this might be, would be tantamount to piously holding the ring and telling two contestants, between whom military equilibrium has been destroyed by preponderance Israeli arms, to thrash out their problems in their own way. He expressed belief that such an action would amount to cowardly avoidance of responsibility. Sir Orme fears that on the horizon lies another Munich which would be repeated if, after Arabs and Jews fail to negotiate an agreement, the powers were to come to the UK and ask UK to tell Abdullah that if he should refuse to settle with Israel, the UK-Transjordan treaty would no longer be operative. To sell Abdullah down the river for the sake of spurious peace, easy consciences, and

¹ This was a repeat of Delga 762, p. 1595.