The June 1967 War
How It Changed Jewish, Israeli, and Middle Eastern History

Israeli Army Chief Rabbi Shlomo Goren blowing the shofar at the Kotel after Israel captured the Old City of Jerusalem on June 7, 1967 (Source: Government Press Office of Israel, David Rubinger)
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Preface and Acknowledgements

The Center for Israel Education is delighted to provide you with this learning unit, “The June 1967 War: How It Changed Jewish, Israeli and Middle Eastern History.” Since our inception in 2008, the work of CIE has focused on content, context and perspective, hence all the materials provided contain foreshadowing and analyses, without prejudice to a particular political identity or outlook.

In both the Leader’s Guide and Participant Booklet, one will find a deep historic background to the June 1967 War and an amplification of its aftermath. One should be able to judge why the June 1967 war was a transformative moment in Jewish, Israeli, and Middle Eastern history. Both the Leader’s Guide and Participant Booklet contain maps, a chronology of entwined events before, during and after the war, a timeline of Zionism from the 1880s to 2017, and an extensive bibliography with on-line references to books, articles, and most importantly excellent videos. Significant portions include active links to the CIE website and other useful and reputable websites where more information about the June 1967 War and Israel more broadly are provided.

The Leader’s Guide is designed to channel discussion and provides suggested answers to posed questions where appropriate. It rests with the leader to decide where to begin chronologically. That will vary from audience to audience, depend in great measure upon the age of the participants, and the leader’s comfort level with the material. Each leader will have to decide how much context to provide and what material participants may wish to read or view on their own. Suggested activities for engaging participants with the material are found throughout the Leader’s Guide.

The material is designed to be flexible and the leader can choose to begin the learning sessions either with the context provided at the beginning or delve right into the details of the June 1967 War itself. Wherever you choose to begin, we highly recommend that everyone read the Timeline of Zionism from the 1880s to the present, which can be found in the Appendix on page 83.

Appreciation and Thanks

Impetus for the preparation of “The June 1967 War: How It Changed Jewish, Israeli and Middle Eastern History,” emerged from a December 2015 discussion at ARZA’s New York offices and in subsequent discussions with Rabbi Joshua Weinberg about teenage and adult education. By the end of the summer 2016, CIE had agreed to provide Israel enrichment sessions in person and over the internet for students who had recently returned from the Eisendrath International Exchange NFTY High School in Israel. Nine months later, after working with these dedicated students and in additional discussions with Rabbis Judith Schindler, Joshua Weinberg, and Neal Gold, we finalized our objectives and time frame.

The unit could not have seen the light of day without the central participation of my colleagues Roni Eshel, Rabbi Ellen Nemhauser, an our devoted student interns. Three colleagues at CIE worked from the very beginning with diligence, acuity, and passion to package the story and add to its value: Rich Walter’s creativity, Eli Sperling’s research skills, and Heather Waters sharp eye contributed to this final CIE product.

Four decades of teaching the causes and results of the June 1967 War in Emory College provided me with invaluable awareness of the vast array of materials produced on this subject. Winnowing a great deal of it into shorter passages or not including some data points at all because of space was inevitable. Contracting the voices and sources of this major event and its unfinished aftermath into these pages is similar to putting tooth-paste back into the tube. All responsibility for the choices of content, how it was explained, are solely my own.

Ken Stein, Center for Israel Education
Atlanta, Georgia
March 2017
3. Thumbnails of Five Maps Related to Jewish Presence and Sovereignty in the Land of Israel

Map 1: Tribal Israel at the time of the Judges, 1200c - 1000 BCE

Map 2: David’s Kingdom 1000-970 BCE

Map 3: The Hasmonean Kingdom 167-142 BCE

Map 4: Palestine in the Sixteenth Century

Map 5: Registered Land in Jewish Possession, 1944

Continued on next page
Activity Two (continued from previous page)

A. Background for the Leader (continued from previous page):

2. After the passage of Resolution 181 by the United Nations on November 29, 1947, violence flared up between Arabs and Jews in Palestine as well as against Jews in various cities within Arab countries. Arab leaders in neighboring states, notably Syria and Iraq, ramped up rhetoric calling for action to prevent the UN resolution from being carried out, implemented Arab military recruitment and conscription measures and raised funds for impending action against a future Jewish state.

3. On December 8, 1947, members of the Arab League met in Cairo and devised a plan to establish an Arab volunteer army to fight against Jews in Palestine. Many of the Arab leaders were wary of Transjordan King Abdullah’s desire to annex Palestine. The Mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al Husayni, the political leader of the Arabs in Palestine, sought to appoint the leader of this force, but the Arab leaders were as wary of him as they were of Abdullah.

As a result, Fauzi al-Qawuqji, a former leader in the 1936-1939 Arab Rebellion was appointed to head what would be called the Arab Liberation army (ALA). The tension over who would control a future Palestine, especially between the Mufti and Abdullah as well as the other Arab states was symptomatic of the fragmented and dysfunctional nature of Arab opposition to the Zionist movement.

The ALA entered Palestine in January 1948 made up of irregular soldiers from several Arab countries. The ALA targeted Haganah forces and focused on controlling access to Jewish villages in order to isolate them from larger Jewish population centers. Despite initial setbacks, including a siege of Jerusalem, the Haganah, with newly acquired arms from Czechoslovakia and support from the Irgun and Lehi, began to have success against the ALA in early April 1948.

4. Even as he was declaring Israel’s independence on May 14, 1948, David Ben-Gurion was aware of the impending attack that the new country faced.

“In the midst of wanton aggression, we yet call upon the Arab inhabitants of the State of Israel to return to the ways of peace and play their part in the development of the State, with full and equal citizenship and the representation in all its bodies and institutions, provisional or permanent.

We offer peace and amity to all the neighboring states and their peoples, and invite them to cooperate with the independent Jewish nation for the common good of all. The State of Israel is ready to contribute its full share to the peaceful progress and development of the Middle East.” (Israel’s Declaration of Independence)

Continued on next page
Lead Up to the June 1967 War

**Learning Objectives:** Participants will learn about the immediate path to the June 1967 War, how diplomacy failed, and why Israel struck preemptively.

**Note to Leader:** We are providing multiple ways for you to present this material to the participants, including an interactive activity, primary source readings and a detailed timeline. Some of the information will be repeated in each format.

### Activity One (recommended time for this activity 20 minutes)

**A. Background for the Leader:**

1. The previous three sections have focused on the long-range causes of the June 1967 War in the context of the broader Arab-Israel conflict. This final component will offer participants a detailed glimpse into the chain of events that led directly to war.

2. For an Israeli perspective of the events leading to the June 1967 War, a suggested reading before or during this session is *Foreign Minister Abba Eban’s recollections in the 1968 Israel Yearbook* reprinted with permission on the CIE website.

**B. The Players (Countries)**

1. Begin by asking participants: what were the key factors that led to the June 1967 War? List participant responses on a board or flip-chart. This could also be done in small groups with each group sharing their responses.

   *Possible answers:* Arab leaders consistently make bold statements about the need to end the Jewish state; tension on Syrian-Israeli border; erroneous Russian claim that Israelis were massing on the Syrian border; Nasser asking for UNEF withdrawal; Nasser occupying Sinai with Egyptian military; Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol’s reaction that Israel will reply if attacked; Israel mobilizing its citizen army; Nasser blockading Sharm al-Shaykh to Eilat; Nasser speaking often and directly of destroying Israel; effort to break blockade with international action fails to materialize; Arab leaders come to Cairo or pledge military support for Nasser’s position against Israel; Israeli’s sense that a noose around the country’s neck is tightening; Egypt chooses not to attack Israel; Israel decides to preemptively strike.

2. After there has been some discussion and participants have shared what they think were the primary causes, place the following country names around the room either on chart paper or other large poster board - one for each country.

   - Egypt
   - Israel
   - Syria
   - Jordan
   - Soviet Union
   - United States

*Continued on next page*
Activity One (continued from previous page)

3. Using both the responses from the opening discussion as well as adding new responses, have participants walk around the room and add information to each country’s outlook pertaining to the lead up to the war. As an alternative, you can print out the answers provided below on small strips and direct participants to match them up with the appropriate country or countries.

Possible answers:

**Egypt:**
- Egypt dominant yet irksome to fellow Arabs – Nasser wanted to restore his fading leadership in Arab world following breakup of UAR (The United Arab Republic - Syria/Egypt) in 1961
- Army is exhausted from five year war in Yemen
- Nasser believed Soviet claim that Israel was massing troops on Syrian border
- Nasser sought to elevate Egyptian prestige after embarrassment of 1956
- Nasser wanted to avoid another major confrontation with Israel unless he could win
- Army leaders assured Nasser that Egypt could defeat Israel

**Israel:**
- Wanted to stop terrorist incursions emanating from Syria, Jordan and the Gaza Strip
- Increased escalation and confrontation with Syria over demilitarized zones, especially Jordan River tributaries
- Viewed removal of UNEF forces and closing of Straits of Tiran as a major provocation
- Preferred to use diplomacy to resolve tension
- Sensed an enormous amount of dread/uncertainty— it began to lose faith in Eshkol’s leadership

**Syria:**
- Disagreed with Israel over the demilitarized zones and water resources leading to ongoing cross the border attacks and infiltrations into Israel
- Supported Fatah, founded in 1959 as a militant Palestinian liberation organization, and allowed attacks to be launched against Israel from Syrian and Jordanian territory
- Cooled relations with Egypt after the Ba’ath party took over in 1963 and more radical element seized power in 1966
- Believed (false) intelligence given by USSR in May 1967 that Israel was massing troops on Syrian border

**Jordan:**
- Resented Nasser for inciting Palestinians in Jordan against his regime in 1966
- Sensed political pressure to join Syria and Egypt or risk losing legitimacy from his people
- Placed army under Egyptian command
- Allowed Iraqi troops into Jordan
- Taunted Nasser for hiding behind UNEF troops
Lead Up to the June 1967 War

Activity One (continued from previous page)

Soviet Union:
- Concerned about instability in Syria and wanted to prevent another coup; Syrian Ba’ath party was USSR’s loyal client in region
- Wanted Egypt to help protect its interest in Syria and pushed for signing of a joint defense pact between Egypt and Syria in November 1966
- Passed on false information to Nasser in mid-May 1967 that Israel was massing troops on the Syrian border
- Told Egypt it would provide whatever military supplies were needed

United States:
- Wanted to avoid direct involvement due to growing commitment in Vietnam
- Tried to gain international support to break Egypt’s blockade of Straits of Tiran but found no willing partners
- Avoided any political action that would create an escalation or direct confrontation with USSR
- Warned Israel to delay using force, not to prompt a war

Prime Minister Levi Eshkol (left) visits army units in the Negev with Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin (center) and Yigal Allon on May 25, 1967

Source: Government Press Office of Israel
Doctrine of Pre-Emption

**Learning Objectives:** Participants will learn about a doctrine of pre-emption, examine its application in the June War, and analyze how Israel has applied it at other times throughout its history.

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Given Israel's historical background, and that of Jewish history that predated the state, should Israelis ever discard the concept or idea of pre-emption and say it is not valid for a Jewish state?
Activity One (continued from previous page)

4. Discuss: What lessons from the 1956 War, in terms of national sovereignty, did Israel apply in the lead up to the June 1967 War?

Possible answers: national security and interests supersede international pressure; Israel’s choice in 1967 focused on protecting the territorial integrity of the country, its economic capacity, its sovereignty, and its citizenry; Israel chose to go to war against Egypt and then later Jordan and Syria, all aimed to one degree or other at improving the country’s strategic condition, if for no other reason, than to debilitate or destroy the Egyptian military capacity.

Doctrine of Pre-Emption

Learning Objectives: Participants will learn about a doctrine of pre-emption, examine its application in the June War, and analyze how Israel has applied it at other times throughout its history.

Note to Leader: Sovereign self-determination provides to citizens the rights to choose policies, political leaders, and when to allow outsiders to shape or influence sovereign decision making. As such, it empowers leaders to have prerogative to determine issues that are exclusively sovereign in nature to the state, including when to take action in foreign or domestic affairs.

Activity One (recommended time for this activity 20 minutes)

1. Discuss: Did Israel have the sovereign right or prerogative to preemptively attack Egypt on June 5, 1967?

2. Divide participants into groups. Have each group list the pros and cons for pre-emption using the Pros and Cons of Pre-emption Table on page 44 in the participant booklet.

Possible answers:

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<td>Pro</td>
<td>Con</td>
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<tr>
<td>element of surprise</td>
<td>alienate international community key allies, especially United States; risks of going alone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fight the war on the opponent’s territories</td>
<td>absorbing the first blow meant fighting on Israel territory</td>
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<tr>
<td>need to respond to Nasser’s closure of the Straits of Tiran- a cause for war- or risk appearing weak to your enemies</td>
<td>doesn’t allow for diplomacy to run a successful course</td>
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<tr>
<td>prevent an enemy attack on vital interests such as the Dimona nuclear reactor</td>
<td>allows enemy forces time to organize more hostile actions</td>
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Doctrine of Pre-Emption

Activity One (continued from previous page)

5. Ask participants: List other examples where Israel has applied pre-emption.
   
   Possible answers:
   - June 1981, Israel attacked and destroyed an Iraqi nuclear reactor
   - June 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon in response to guerrilla attacks from Southern Lebanon
   - October 1985, Israel attacked the PLO headquarters in Tunis
   - After 2000, Israel engaged in military actions against Hamas and Hizbollah
   - August 2005, the Sharon government withdrew unilaterally from the Gaza Strip
   - September 2007, Israel secretly destroyed a reactor at Al Kibar, a Syrian military facility thought to be a nuclear site

6. In October 1973, with another war with Egypt looming as a strong possibility, Prime Minister Golda Meir did not preemptively attack, concerned very much about whether the Nixon administration would withhold weapons resupply if it did. Instead, Egypt and Syria attacked Israel first on October 6, 1973.

7. Discuss: Is there any reason why an Israeli government does not have the sovereign right to attack a neighbor or other country that is considered a threat to the very existence of the state?

Tying it Together: National Sovereignty and the Doctrine of Pre-emption

At its essence, Zionism’s purpose was to found a modern state so that a Jewish majority could determine their own future and have a safe haven from persecution. When the political movement was created in 1897, a majority of Jews worldwide were living in undemocratic societies in Europe. The leadership of the movement stressed that Jews had the same right to pursue their destiny and secure their future as did other peoples.

In the debate over Palestine’s future at the United Nations in November 1947, Soviet Foreign Minister Andre Gromyko stated, “The time has come to help these people, not by word, but by deeds.” Gromyko accepted the right of Jews for self-determination, stating that the inability of Western European States to protect their Jewish citizens, “explains the aspirations of the Jews to establish their own state. It would be unjust not to take this into consideration and to deny the right of the Jewish people to realize this aspiration... to the Jewish people, particularly in view of all it has undergone during the Second World War.”

Since declaring independence in 1948, Israel has applied the concept of national self-determination to refuse to accept dictated diplomatic outcomes that are not achieved through direct negotiations. Israel generally opposes all political plans for resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict that when proposed by others, deny Israel the prerogative to choose the contents and procedure in a negotiating plan.
UN Resolution 242 and “Land for Peace”

Learning Objectives: Participants will learn how the international diplomatic response to the June 1967 War was intentionally ambiguous and shaped future diplomacy to end the conflict.

Note to Leader: The framework for Israeli-Arab negotiations which developed after the June 1967 war was one in which land was to be exchanged for security, or land exchanged for peace. This framework eventually became the basis of Egyptian-Israeli, Jordanian-Israeli and PLO-Israeli negotiations.

Activity One (recommended time for this activity 30-40 minutes)

A. Background for the Leader

1. With its victory in the June 1967 War, Israel’s territorial possessions increased threefold, from approximately 8,000 square miles to approximately 38,000 square miles. Israel now controlled:
   - Gaza Strip (Egypt)
   - Golan Heights (Syria)
   - Sinai Peninsula (Egypt)
   - West Bank and East Jerusalem (Jordan)

2. One million Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza came under Israeli control.

3. Enormous national euphoria at success generated a sense of superiority and invincibility. It evolves a concept that Israelis are militarily superior to Arab armies. This adds to hubris, and preparedness prior to the October 1973 War.
Activity One (continued from previous page)

4. Like the 1948 War, the June 1967 War did not end with formal peace treaties. Like the end of the 1948 War, Arab states and their leaders refused to accept Israel as a reality.

5. With its victory and new territories, Israel achieved “strategic depth” – land as value for defense.

6. For the Arab states, Israel was now occupying “national” lands. This changed the conflict to focus on Arab parochial national interests; Arab states began to consider the liberation of ‘national’ land over the liberation of Palestinian land (Israel’s demise).

B. Exercise I

1. Divide participants into groups of 3 to 4. Assign each group one of the following (You can have multiple groups doing the same topic, but make sure that at you have at least one group for each of the five geographic areas, even if it means fewer people in each group):

   • Jerusalem
   • Gaza
   • Golan
   • Sinai
   • West Bank

2. Working in their groups, ask participants to discuss the following with regard to their assigned territory: What choices did Israel have regarding the territory in the aftermath of the June 1967 War? Note: Having a map of Israel and its neighbors available will be helpful for the participants.

   Possible answers:

   Jerusalem - annex the conquered part of the city to create a unified municipal boundary; negotiate with Jordan on returning part or all of the conquered sections; destroy the Muslim holy places in retaliation for the damage done to Jewish sites after the 1948 War; construct a Third Temple; negotiate with Palestinian leaders about sharing or other mixed use of the city; encourage Jewish settlement in newly acquired neighborhoods.

   Gaza - annex the territory; negotiate with Egypt to return it to them; grant Israeli citizenship to the Palestinians living there; negotiate with Palestinian leaders for creation of a Palestinian enclave or autonomous region; develop Jewish settlement; expel the Palestinians living there; negotiate with the UN to create a demilitarized zone or have UNEF troops placed there.

   Golan - annex the territory; negotiate with Syria to return it to them; grant Israeli citizenship to the population living there; develop Jewish settlement; expel the population living there; negotiate with the UN to create a demilitarized zone or have UNEF troops placed there.

   Sinai - annex the territory; negotiate with Egypt to return it to them; grant Israeli citizenship to the people living there; create a special Arab/Palestinian enclave there to resettle Arabs moved from other areas; develop Jewish settlement; negotiate with the UN to create a demilitarized zone or have UNEF troops placed there; create economic partnerships with local Bedouin for purpose of developing infrastructure; develop Sinai oil resources for Israeli benefit.

   Continued on the next page
UN Resolution 242 and “Land for Peace”

Activity One (continued from previous page)

West Bank - annex the territory; negotiate with Jordan to return it to them; grant Israeli citizenship to the Palestinians living there; negotiate with Palestinian leaders for creation of a Palestinian enclave or autonomous region; develop Jewish settlement; expel the Palestinians living there; negotiate with the UN to create a demilitarized zone or have UNEF troops placed there.

Have participants share their answers.

3. Once all the possible choices have been shared, ask the participants to craft a basic framework/statement from the Israeli cabinet on what the next steps will be. This can either be done as a whole class or in committees/small groups.

4. Once participants have crafted their own proposals, direct them to the CIE website to read about the Israeli cabinet and government decisions which took place on June 18 and 19, 1967. (The final proposal put forth by the Cabinet, Cabinet Resolution 563, can be found on page 53 in the participant booklet and is provided on the following page).

5. Additionally, you may want to have them read, Prime Minister Eshkol’s address to the Knesset on June 12, 1967.

6. Participants should keep in mind the following:
   • As the Cabinet was deliberating, Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin addressed the UN General Assembly on June 19th (lines 2-85) in a speech that admonished Israel as being the aggressor and demanded that Israel:

     “should immediately withdraw from the shores of the Suez Canal and from all the Arab territories they have seized. Only the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from the captured territories can change the situation by bringing about a relaxation of tension and creating conditions for peace in the Middle East. Is it not clear that unless this is done and the forces of the Israeli invaders are removed from the territory of Arab States, there can be no hope of settling other unsolved problems in the Middle East?”

   • A CIA assessment of Kosygin’s speech made on June 20, 1967, noted that:

     “Kosygin made it clear that the chief Soviet aim is to bring pressure on Israel to withdraw its troops from captured Arab territory. From the Soviet point of view, a good outcome in the General Assembly would be a simple resolution calling for such a withdrawal. The Soviet resolution goes well beyond this, probably in the hope that the Assembly will, by way of compromise, deliver an acceptable half-loaf.”

   • Whether or not the June 18 and 19 proposals were ever delivered to Egypt or Syria, it is clear that they were discussed with the United States.

8. Discuss: According to the documents, what was Israel prepared to do in June 1967?

   Possible answers: negotiate with Egypt and Syria over the return of territory for peace as long as conditions were met that addressed Israel’s security needs.
The Territories Captured in the June 1967 War

Activity Three (recommended time for this activity 45 minutes)

A. Background to Settlements

1. As the previous activity showed, in the years following the June 1967 War, there emerged a variety of opinions as to what Israel should do with the recently acquired territories. This debate continues today.

2. In this activity, we will look at the origins of two movements that have often divided Israeli society over the past fifty years.

3. Ask participants to read the quote from Yossi Klein-Halevi regarding the mood in Israel in the summer of 1967 on page 67 of the participant booklet, it is presented below.

4. Discuss:
   • What do you think Klein-Halevi means when he says, “There were those who believed that peace had finally come, and with it the end of the Jews’ exile from humanity.”

   Possible answers: With Israel again winning on the battlefield and holding territory, the Arab States would come to Israel offering peace in return for land; new territory gave Israel much needed strategic depth; Israel’s victory would leverage acceptance among the nations of the world; coming a quarter-century after the Holocaust, Israel’s victory had reversed the image and standing of Jews in the world; By exercising its right to a pre-emptive attack, Israel expressed its sovereignty

5. Klein-Halevi’s quote encapsulates the view that Israel’s victory in June 1967 had resonance for all segments of Israeli society. For those on the left, Israel had the leverage and territory to entice the Arab states to make peace. For those on the right, Israel had the land to fully realize the Zionist dream of a Jewish state in the historic land of Israel. For religious Jews, the unification of Jerusalem and the historic territories of Judea and Samaria offered the prospect of the arrival of the Messiah.

Continued on the next page
• 1948-1952 – 800,000 Jews from Arab lands immigrate and settle in Israel, after undergoing significant duress at hands of many Arab leaders who believed all Jews were supportive of the new Zionist state. The organizational precursor of AIPAC, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee established. Jordan poised to sign an agreement with Israel in 1951, however, it was aborted when Jordanian King Abdullah is assassinated in Jerusalem.

• 1950s -1970s - American Jews not keen about Israeli leaders insisting that Jews should immigrate to Israel. US unsuccessfully seeks to slow down Israel's nuclear quest. Israel suffers difficult economic times due to Arab boycott and strains caused by absorbing tens of thousands of Jewish immigrants.

• 1956 - Suez War fought; Israel sweeps across Sinai in five days, with collusion but not physical assistance of France and Great Britain. Arab states believe that such an Israel success could not have come without British assistance.

• 1957 - Eisenhower cajoles Israeli withdrawal from Sinai while UN offers placement of international emergency force in Sinai to protect Israeli shipping rights; Secretary of State Dulles angry at Israel but also realizes Israel needs US protection with arms, and calls Israel a strategic asset as USSR influence in Middle East grows.

• Late 1950s - US begins to provide limited arms to Israel, in part because Arab states further align with USSR; US still uneasy about Israel's quest for nuclear capacity.
Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser: Speech to Arab Trade Unionists
(May 26, 1967)
http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Yearbook1/Pages/7%20Statement%20by%20President%20Nasser%20to%20Arab%20Trade%20Unio.aspx

For several years, many people have raised doubts about our intentions towards Palestine. But talk is easy and action is difficult, very difficult. We emerged wounded from the 1956 battle. Britain, Israel and France attacked us then. We sustained heavy losses in 1956. Later, union was achieved. The 1961 secession occurred when we had only just got completely together and had barely begun to stand firmly on our feet…

We were waiting for the day when we would be fully prepared and confident of being able to adopt strong measures if we were to enter the battle with Israel. I say nothing aimlessly. One day two years ago, I stood up to say that we have no plan to liberate Palestine and that revolutionary action is our only course to liberate Palestine. I spoke at the summit conferences. The summit conferences were meant to prepare the Arab states to defend themselves.

Recently we felt we are strong enough, that if we were to enter a battle with Israel, with God’s help, we could triumph. On this basis, we decided to take actual steps.

A great deal has been said in the past about the UN Emergency Force (UNEF). Many people blamed us for the UNEF’s presence. We were not strong enough. Should we have listened to them, or rather built and trained our Army while UNEF still existed? I said once that we could tell the UNEF to leave within half an hour. Once we were fully prepared we could ask UNEF to leave. And this is what actually happened.

The same thing happened with regard to Sharm al Shaykh. We were also attacked on this scored by some Arabs. Taking Sharm al Shaykh meant confrontation with Israel. Taking such action also meant that we were ready to enter a general war with Israel. It was not a separate operation. Therefore we had to take this fact into consideration when moving to Sharm al Shaykh. The present operation was mounted on this basis.

With regard to military plans, there is complete co-ordination of military action between us and Syria. We will operate as one army fighting a single battle for the sake of a common objective—the objective of the Arab nation.

The problem today is not just Israel, but also those behind it. If Israel embarks on an aggression against Syria or Egypt the battle against Israel will be a general one and not confined to one spot on the Syrian or Egyptian borders. The battle will be a general one and our basic objective will be to destroy Israel. I probably could not have said such things five or even three years ago. If I had said such things and had been unable to carry them out my words would have been empty and worthless.

Today, some 11 years after 1956, I say such things because I am confident. I know what we have here in Egypt and what Syria has. I also know that other states—Iraq, for instance, has sent its troops to Syria; Algeria will send troops; Kuwait also will send troops. They will send armoured and infantry units. This is Arab power. This is the true resurrection of the Arab nation, which at
one time was probably in despair. Today people must know the reality of the Arab world. What is Israel? Israel today is the United States. The United States is the chief defender of Israel. As for Britain, I consider it America’s lackey. Britain does not have an independent policy. Wilson always follows Johnson’s steps and says what he wants him to say. All Western countries take Israel’s view….

The Soviet Union’s attitude was great and splendid. It supported the Arabs and the Arab nation. It went to the extent of stating that, together with the Arabs and the Arab nation, it would resist any interference or aggression.

Prime Minister Levi Eshkol’s Radio Address to the Nation  
(28 May 1967)

http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Yearbook1/Pages/12%20Broadcast%20to%20the%20Nation%20by%20Prime%20Minister%20Eshko.aspx

Thumbnail Text

Dear citizens:

The government today met to discuss the situation. At the conclusion of the discussions the following resolutions were accepted:

1. The danger to Israel owing to the concentration of the Egyptian army in Sinai and following the blockade of Israeli shipping in the Red Sea is in full force. In view of this danger, as long as it exists, the need remains to continue our military alert. The government received a report on the measure of preparedness that had been taken, and it concludes, that the IDF is properly deployed to defend the security of Israel. The government notes with satisfaction the indomitable spirit of the nation and of the Israel Defense forces, which are an expression and a guarantee of the strength of the state.

2. The government of Israel maintains that the closure of the straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping is equivalent to an act of aggression against Israel. We shall defend ourselves against it when necessary based on the right of self-defense that is reserved to every state.

3. The government heard a report of the Foreign Minister concerning his discussions with the President of France, the Prime Minister of Britain and the President of the United States. It heard of contacts with many other states, including the Soviet Union, and on the growing willingness in the international arena to act without delay for rapid removal of the blockade that Egypt has imposed in the straits of Tiran. There is no doubt that the mobilization of the IDF and its readiness for every test were and are a crucial factor in motivating world diplomatic activity.

The government has specified guidelines for continuation of the diplomatic activity in the world arena, with the aim of pressing international powers to take steps to secure international freedom of navigation in the straits of Tiran.

Likewise, directions of activity were specified for removing the military concentrations from Israel's southern border and for action to secure our sovereign rights, for our border security and for prevention of aggression, so that we shall not have to act for our defense using our military forces.

The government has concluded and announces, that the power of the IDF is sufficient to overcome any aggressor and to secure the sovereign rights of Israel.
Tomorrow I shall have an opportunity to clarify the stance of the government in my speech before the plenum of the Knesset.
UN Security Council Resolution 242, an Outline for Peace
(22 November 1967)

The Security Council, Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East; Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security; Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter;
1. Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:
   a. Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;
   b. Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;
2. Affirms further the necessity:
   a. For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;
   b. For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;
   c. For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;
3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist with efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this Resolution;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.

Adopted unanimously at the 1382nd meeting.
The June 1967 War: How It Changed Jewish, Israeli and Middle Eastern History

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- Focuses on Hebrew beyond religious practice, the significance of the language, and how it became essential to national identity
- Includes excerpts from rare source documents and key works of Hebrew literature

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- Explores the foundations of Judaism, Jewish peoplehood, and Zionism from the Bible to 1897

A Call to Action: Volunteering and Israel's State Building
- Examines why public service and social values in Jewish culture were essential to the Jewish state's establishment

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