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SOCIAL ASPECTS OF THE EMERGENCE OF THE PALESTINIAN ARAB NATIONAL MOVEMENT

YEHOSHUA PORATH

THE STRUCTURE OF THE ELITE

Throughout the period of Ottoman rule in Palestine, the social order of the country was largely reminiscent of that in the emirate of Mount Lebanon, though without an emir. The area extending from the Hebron hills in the south to the Jezreel Valley in the north, with the exception of the urban areas, was divided up into sub-districts (*nawāhi*, singular *nāhiya*,) headed by local *shaykhs*.¹ These sub-districts preserved their identity for generations and were tied to each other in alliances based on the division into Qays and Yaman. They shared a similar way of life and society. In some, at least, there existed a special legal order based on rural custom and judgment by the *shaykhs* according to a well-developed and recognized procedure.² At least some of these sub-district *shaykhs* were the heads of Bedouin tribes; and it is probable that they acquired their status as sub-district *shaykhs* in the course of their tribe's settlement in a given territory.³ The status of the sub-district *shaykhs* was, above all, a product of their being the tax farmers (*multazimūn*) of their areas.⁴ Their function was hereditary in their families, although not always passing from father to son, and there were cases of the role's being transferred from one family of *shaykhs* to another located in a different village.⁵

The *shaykh* was required each year to obtain confirmation of his status by the Ottoman ruler, which was granted by sending the *shaykh* a cloak (*khila*). Simultaneously with this ceremony, a decision was made as to the size of the yearly tax assessed for the sub-districts in that year.⁶ The *shaykhs* had at their disposal a military force which was recruited, when necessary (usually for fighting between the Qays and Yaman camps), from the ranks of the *fellahs*.

With the restoration of Ottoman rule in Palestine in 1840, the Ottoman government began making efforts to liquidate the status and power of the *nawāḥr shaykhs*. The *khatt-i shartf* of Gülhane decreed the abolition of tax farming (*iltizām*). Though it is true that the efforts to abolish tax farming were fruitless until the end of the nineteenth century and the start of the twentieth,⁷ the nature of the *iltizām* did begin to change. When the Ottoman government first attempted to abolish the *iltizām* (1839), it soon discovered that it was powerless to introduce direct tax collection by officials. It therefore reintroduced the *iltizām* three years later,⁸ although it seems that several changes took place in the procedure. In the past, the Ottoman governor had been charged with farming out the *iltizām*. In the Palestinian *nawāḥr*, this meant giving the *shaykhs* an annual confirmation of their right to collect the taxes of their *nawāḥr*. The main innovation of the renewed *iltizām* was the entrustment of tax farming and supervision of collection to the provincial *majlis al-idāra* (administrative council). "The powers of the *Majlis al-Idāra*," wrote Gad Frumkin (who worked in the last years of Ottoman rule as a jurist in the Treasury Department of the Jerusalem Provincial Administration) "included, *inter alia*, the farming out of the tithe and other taxes, which the government does not collect directly, but rather farms out to the highest bidder, in exchange for a predetermined sum which the tax farmer pays to the Treasury. Whatever he succeeds then in collecting from the tax-payers goes into his own pocket. He collects the tithe, in kind or in cash, from the *fellahs* who have to pay it, under the supervision of gendarmes with whom he or his emissaries go to the villages."⁹

It would seem that in the areas around Jerusalem, and probably in Samaria as well, this system led gradually to the weakening of the position of the *nawāḥr shaykhs* and to their replacement as tax farmers by urban notables. Our conclusion is that the village *shaykhs* were incapable of competing for this post with the urban notables, who were wealthier, and the *shaykhs* were thus superseded as tax farmers by urban tax farmers who collected taxes directly from the *fellahs*. It should also be remembered that it was these notables who manned the *majlis al-idāra*, forming it into an instrument for the enhancement of their own status, influence, and property. As a result, towards the end of Ottoman rule, an element was created which helped to strengthen the class of urban notables at the expense of the village *shaykhs*.¹⁰ In addition, from 1840 on, the Ottoman authorities directed a vigorous campaign aimed at checking the *shaykhs*' military power, while their powers of jurisdiction were also taken from them.

Little by little, the *shaykhs* were incorporated into the Ottoman administration, becoming village *mukhtars* appointed by the government. As a result of this systematic policy, the power of the village and subdistrict *shaykhs* declined, and at the end of the nineteenth century few traces were left of their administrative powers.¹¹

Notwithstanding the *shaykhs*' decline from the point of view of administrative prerogatives, the social position of the *shaykhs* and the *nawāḥīr* survived to no small degree as units of social affiliation. At the end of 1920, Shaykh 'Abd al-Ḥamīd Abu Ghūsh was considered to be, not only the head of his family and village, but also the leader of the twenty villages of the Banī Mālik *nahiya*, and the *shaykhs* of the adjacent *nawāḥīr* saw themselves similarly.¹² Three years later, the villages in the Ramallah subdistrict were required to maintain additional police stations at their own expense (according to the Law for the Prevention of Crimes), in view of the high rate of robberies in the area. The local population organized to oppose this governmental step. Their spokesmen were the village *mukhtars*, and the organization to present their protests was based on the traditional division into subdistricts.¹³

Even in the late 1920s and early 1930s, traces of this division were still to be found. In 1929, when the Palestinian Arab Executive organized a fund-raising campaign for the Arab victims of the disturbances and wanted to expand its collection of funds to the rural areas, it did so through the village *shaykhs* and, again, according to the traditional division into subdistricts.¹⁴ Fellah participation in the al-Nabī Mūsā celebration continued, even in the 1930s, to be organized on the basis of this division, with the villagers taking part in the festivities under their particular banners.¹⁵

The preservation of the subdistricts gave the *shaykhs* who headed them political power and made them a factor in the struggle for leadership within the Palestinian Arab community.

The gradual decline in the authority of the village and subdistrict *shaykhs* did not leave a vacuum. They were replaced by the layer of urban notables (*a'yan*). Already in the eighteenth century, this group had consolidated its power and status in Ottoman society. The decline in the power of the central government, the disintegration of the *sipāhī* (Ottoman "feudal" cavalryman) system, the deterioration of the Janissaries, and the struggle between the Imperial Janissaries (those who continued to be considered "Servants of the Porte") and local Janissary units (*yarliyya*) — all had greatly weakened the authority of the central government and its representatives (the vali, governor, Arabic *wāḥīr*) in the various provinces. This course of develop-

ment made it possible for local power elements – local dynasties of rulers, Bedouin tribes, and the urban *a'yān* – to rise to greatness and attain crucial positions of influence, and sometimes even of control.¹⁶

The rise in the power of the urban *a'yān* was accelerated in the nineteenth century. With the beginning of the *Tanzimat* reform process and the Ottoman restoration in Syria, the Ottoman authorities looked for ways to enhance this layer's tie with the government and to make it partner in the efforts to further the administration. They therefore set up in the various provinces councils (probably under the influence of the precedent set by Muḥammad 'Alī's rule), which functioned alongside the governor, and in which the local *a'yān* were represented, along with the major administrative officials of the province.

However, the main result of this innovation was the opposite of what the authorities had expected. The local *a'yān* managed to subvert the council (*majlis*) into their instrument. They exerted influence over the local administration by way of the council and used it to check the vali whenever he attempted to put into effect reforms likely to challenge their position. The vali's ability to oppose the wishes of this layer was thus limited. His appointment was for one year only, while the *a'yān*, as local residents, were much better versed in the province's affairs. Without their experience and knowledge, it was highly doubtful that the vali could have found his way. This policy had been adopted in order to forestall the creation of overly powerful valis, who might become a danger to the position of the central government, but it led to just what the authorities had feared: the vali's weakness necessarily became that of the central power. The central government understood this and in 1852 attempted to correct the situation by considerably enlarging the powers of the vali; but it seems that this step was taken too late, when the strength of the local elements was already excessive.¹⁷ The power of the local *a'yān* did indeed decline slightly, but this group was nevertheless one of the important factors in the failure of the reform efforts under Aḥmad Shāfiq Midḥat, vali of the vilayet of Syria (Damascus) from 1878 to 1880.¹⁸

The influence of this class on local administration was also reinforced by the fact that it staffed many posts in that administration. Members of this class, which provided the *'ulamā'* and the various religious functionaries, were the first to receive a relatively modern education in the new schools of the empire, and thus from this layer alone, or in the main, was it possible to recruit candidates for the new administrative apparatus of the *Tanzimat* era.

The abolition of the hereditary *iltizām*, which had previously been entrusted to the subdistrict *shaykhs*, and its replacement by tax farming concessions sold to the highest bidder, contributed greatly to the strengthening of the urban *a'yān*'s status. The wealth of the *a'yān* enabled them to compete with the subdistrict *shaykhs* for the privilege of *iltizām*. But along with this economic factor, another was also at work — their status in the new Ottoman administration: The farming out of taxes was entrusted to the administrative council (*majlis al-idāra*) of the province, and there can be no doubt that the *a'yān* exploited their influence in these councils to secure *iltizāms* for themselves.¹⁹

This development is closely connected with the result of the faulty execution of the Ottoman Land Law of 1858. The fact that the application of the law was entrusted to the local administration, under the direction of the *majlis al-idāra*, nullified the legislators' intention. Instead of the state's rights on *miri* (government) land, and cultivators' rights to cultivate, being strengthened, the *a'yān* succeeded in registering large tracts of land in their names. Land, the taxes of which had been farmed out to *a'yān*, was now registered in their names. The fellahs' accumulation of heavy debts and fear of registering their rights in the government land registers only aided the urban notables.²⁰

As a result of these processes, the urban *a'yān* acquired a firm position in the civil and religious administrations of the empire, as well as much landed property. A fairly considerable percentage of senior posts in the provincial administration was in the hands of the local elite, and not a few of the members of this layer attained senior positions in the Ottoman administration outside their own area. For example: 'Abd al-Laṭīf Ṣalāḥ of Nablus served at the end of his Ottoman career as first secretary of the senate;²¹ Aḥmad Ḥilmī Pasha 'Abd al-Bāqī was the general director of the Ottoman Agricultural Bank in Syria and Iraq;²² Muṣṭafā al-Khālīdī of Jerusalem served as Beirut's chief of police, public prosecutor, and judge on the Court of Appeals;²³ 'Ārif Pasha al-Dajānī of Jerusalem filled various posts in the Ottoman administration and attained the rank of district governor (*mūtaṣarrif*);²⁴ As'ad al-Shuqayrī of Acre was a member of the Committee of *Shar'ra* Clarifications attached to the *Shaykhūlistān* in Istanbul and, during the First World War, served as *mufti* of the Fourth Army (commanded by Jemāl Pasha and which fought on the Egyptian-Palestinian front);²⁵ and Mūsā Kāzīm al-Ḥusaynī rose from rather low posts in the administration to subdistrict governor (*qā'im maqām*), district governor, and finally to governor of Yemen.²⁶ The

establishment of an Ottoman Parliament also helped the *a'yan* to strengthen their position; all the delegates to Parliament from the Palestinian districts were from this class, which thus enjoyed an additional source of political and social influence.²⁷

The hegemony of the *a'yan* is clearly revealed by an examination of social reality in the various Palestinian cities during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In Jerusalem the Ḥusaynī and Khālīdī families were prominent, with the Nashāshrībī in a process of social and economic rise, while gradually supplanting the Khālīdīs. The Khālīdīs filled in the main religious positions, and their sons traditionally held the post of chief scribe at the Muslim religious court in Jerusalem.²⁸ At the start of the twentieth century, there were among the Khālīdīs two religious dignitaries: Shaykh Khalīl al-Khālīdī, who was eventually to become president of the *Shari'a* Court of Appeals in Palestine; and Shaykh Rāghīb al-Khālīdī, founder of the Khālīdiyya Library. However, it seems that the members of this family failed to find their way into the new Ottoman administration, and their influence declined accordingly, as well as by virtue of their numerical depletion.²⁹

The Ḥusaynī family held, from the mid-nineteenth century on, the office of *mufti* of Jerusalem. In 1864 a municipality was established in Jerusalem, and members of this family served often as mayor, although from time to time a Khālīdī — and once even an 'Alamī — won this position.³⁰ In the 1880s, Salīm al-Ḥusaynī served in this position, while in the second decade of the twentieth century, his two sons, Ḥusayn Salīm al-Ḥusaynī and Mūsā Kāzīm al-Ḥusaynī, were mayors.³¹ Members of this family also attained other high positions in the administration of the Jerusalem district and as district and subdistrict governors, and even in the staff of the central government in Istanbul.³²

The position of *mufti* of Jerusalem gave this family a basis for its country-wide status. The *mufti* of Jerusalem was the central figure in the Nabī Mūsā celebrations,³³ and we have already seen that the importance of these celebrations exceeded the bounds of Jerusalem and affected the entire country. Moreover, the strong tie between the Ḥusaynī family and the Nabī Mūsā celebrations was emphasized still more by the fact that members of this family were the traditional caretakers of endowments set aside for the Nabī Mūsā mosque near Jericho.³⁴

The Nashāshrībī family, as has been mentioned, began to progress only in the last few generations. The wealthy 'Uthmān al-Nashāshrībī was elected to Parliament in 1912,³⁵ while Rāghīb al-Nashāshrībī

served as the engineer of the Jerusalem district and in 1914 was also elected to Parliament.³⁶ Members of this family also served on the district's administrative council.

It is no wonder, then, that the position of these families was so solidly entrenched, and that the governor of the district had to manage affairs according to their wishes.³⁷ In the 1850s, James Finn, the British consul, described their status thus: "It should be mentioned that a closed corporation of Arab families, not recognized by law, but influential by position, usurped all the municipal offices among them."³⁸ Fifty years later, the situation was unchanged and the governor of the Jerusalem district from 1906 to 1908 attempted to alter it. He described the status of the families in this way: "There are here influential people and notables who have attained wealth and fame through injuring the rights of the people . . . on account of the ascendancy of the Arab [Bedouin?] inhabitants, most of whom are primitive, the notables of Jerusalem have always been famous for their many rebellions against the government . . . from the time when Rauf Pasha was appointed Governor of Jerusalem he put into effect a system aimed at liquidating the domination of these parasites over the common people and showing these influential people of the province, who are called Ḥusaynī, Khālidī, Nashāshībī and Da'ūdī [Dajānī] what their limits are . . ."³⁹

In Nablus, also the capital of a district, the status of members of the local families was equally prominent. Members of these families had for generations filled important posts in the traditional army and administration of the district and the empire; but it seems that with the renovation of the empire their participation declined. It seems that this conservative city did not adjust to the new needs as quickly as Jerusalem. We find Amīn 'Abd al-Hādī, alone among the Nablusites, serving as governor of a subdistrict outside his native district.⁴⁰ Nor do we find evidence to the effect that the influence of Nablusite families on the management of their district's affairs was comparable to that which developed in Jerusalem.

The important families of Nablus were split into two factions. The origin of the split lay in the division between Qays and Yaman, but with the Egyptian conquest in the 1830s, this split took on new political significance. The Yamānī faction, headed by the 'Abd al-Hādī and Nimr families, supported Egyptian rule and served as governors under it, while the Qaysī faction, led by the Ṭūqān family, headed the rebels.⁴¹ This new identification left traces in the names of the two rival factions: the pro-Egyptian faction came to be called *Dār al-Miṣrī* and the other, *Dār al-Bey* — apparently because of the title

"Bey" that the Ṭuqān family carried. This split and these designations were preserved at least until the second decade of the twentieth century.⁴²

In the subdistrict cities of Gaza and Jaffa, the situation was no different. There, too, we see the important local offices (mayor, local *mufti*) in the hands of the leading families, and large-scale land grabs by these families stand out.⁴³ If we recall that the coastal plain was sparsely populated in the nineteenth century and pay attention to the way land registration was carried out in unclaimed desolate areas, we can easily understand this development.

The particularly solid position of the Jerusalem *a'yān* families apparently resulted from the special status of the *sanjaq* of Jerusalem. This was the result, above all, of Jerusalem's sanctity and the international interest which it aroused. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, we see the *qaḍi* of Jerusalem enjoying widespread territorial jurisdiction. There were times during this period when the *sanjaq* of Jerusalem was raised to the status of *eyalet* (province) or at least to that of a *sanjaq* independent of the governor of the province. The formal expression of this was the appointment of a district governor of high rank (*mūtaṣarrif*) as its head.⁴⁴

In the 1850s, after the Crimean War, this administrative status was made permanent. It was determined at that time that the governor of the *sanjaq* of Jerusalem was not to be subordinate to the governor of the provinces of Saida or Damascus, but would instead be directly dependent upon Istanbul — the status of the *sanjaq* would thus be equivalent to that of an *eyalet*.⁴⁵ The governor of this district would have a higher rank than that of ordinary district governors.⁴⁶ When, in accordance with the Ottoman Vilayet Law of 1864, general councils (*majālis 'umūmiyya*) were set up in the new vilayets above the administrative councils (*majālis al-idāra*) of the districts, a general council was also set up in the Jerusalem district.⁴⁷

As a result of these processes, the urban *a'yān* became the decisive power in the Arab community of Palestine, with the Jerusalemites as the central factor within it. This took place at the expense of the previous position of the rural subdistrict *shaykhs*, and to a lesser degree at the expense of the status of the *a'yān* in the Nablus and Acre districts. Among these declining elements, there were those who looked for an opportunity to express their dissatisfaction. This opportunity was given them with the establishment of British mandatory rule, when the political opposition to Zionism of the Arabs of Palestine began to be organized.

THE ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

We do not intend to deal in this article with the motives behind the rise of the Palestinian Arab national movement, but propose to stress several aspects of its social composition and organizational structure.

With the start of organized anti-Zionist action in November 1918, the group known as the "Muslim-Christian Association" (*al-Jam'iyya al-Islamiyya al-mash'iyya*) appeared in Jaffa and Jerusalem. Its leaders submitted protest petitions to the military governors of these cities on the first anniversary of the Balfour Declaration. The heads of this association were also the leaders of the important urban families and religious communities.⁴⁸

In Jerusalem two more extreme associations were founded, favoring unification with Syria under the crown of Fayṣal, the son of Ḥusayn: *al-Nādī al-'arabī* (the Arab Club) and *al-Muntadā al-adabī* (the Literary Club), the former dominated by the Ḥusaynī family and the latter by the Nashāshībīs.⁴⁹ These associations succeeded in establishing branches in other cities in the country, but after 1920 they went into decline — in the wake of the decline of the trend towards unification with Syria. The Muslim-Christian Association (hereafter: MCA) then became the central organization of the Palestinian Arab national movement and gradually spread to other cities.

The center of the organization, the Jerusalem MCA, included until the summer of 1922 most of the public figures in Jerusalem. The dismissal of 'Arif Pasha al-Dajānī from the post of president of the Executive led to his withdrawal from the Jerusalem branch, and the secretary of the Executive, Jamāl al-Ḥusaynī, became the real director of the association. The hegemony of the Jerusalem MCA in the country-wide framework can be seen by the fact that its leaders also headed the country-wide framework, the Executive met in Jerusalem, and day-to-day management of the secretariat was also entrusted to Jerusalemites. The first secretary was Ishāq Darwish; the second, Jamāl al-Ḥusaynī, with his brother Ishāq al-Ḥusaynī serving as his aide. When Jamāl al-Ḥusaynī left for India in the autumn of 1923 as a member of the delegation of the Supreme Muslim Council (hereafter: SMC), he was replaced by another Jerusalemite, Khalīl al-Sakākīnī. When Jamāl al-Ḥusaynī rose to a higher position and became one of the heads of the Executive, the post was conferred upon another Jerusalemite Ḥusaynī, Ṣafwat Yunus al-Ḥusaynī.

Another expression of Jerusalem's hegemony was the consigning of the right to represent distant areas (both geographically and politically speaking) at the country-wide congresses to Jerusalemites — although

residents of other cities also enjoyed some of these spoils. It is impossible to tell whether the residents of Tiberias, Safed, and other places promoted their representation by Ishāq Darwīsh, Jamāl al-Husaynī, Ḥasan Abū Sa'ūd, and others, or whether the latter simply exploited the fact that no delegates came from these places. Whatever the reason, the phenomenon of Jerusalem's weight in the all-country congresses having grown because of this is most significant.

The second important center of the Muslim-Christian Association, Jaffa, stood out between 1918 and 1923 because it was less affected in the early 1920s by the internal division between supporters and opponents of the Executive. During this period the Jaffa MCA succeeded in uniting within it most of the respected community leaders in Jaffa, while its power and influence on the public was almost uncontested. However, in late 1923 this united front began to crumble. At that time the Jaffa municipality consented to receive electric power from P. Rutenberg's project, thus arousing the ire of various extremist elements. The mayor, 'Āsim Bey al-Sa'ūd, was a close friend and ally of 'Umar al-Biṭār, the president of the Jaffa MCA, and the anger directed against the municipality was also aimed at 'Umar al-Biṭār. The powerful al-Dajānī family utilized this situation to attack him and to undermine his position. As a result of this conflict, the Jaffa MCA slowly disintegrated into two opposing camps, and its former status passed.⁵⁰ This development was accelerated further from 1926 on, when 'Umar al-Biṭār and 'Āsim Bey al-Sa'ūd joined the ranks of the opposition. The Jaffa newspaper *Filastīn* also switched its political loyalty from the Arab Executive (AE) to its opponents. The weakness of the supporters of the Executive was demonstrated by the June 1927 municipal elections in Jaffa, when 'Āsim Bey al-Sa'ūd and his men were victorious, and he became mayor once again.⁵¹

The reconsolidation of 1928 and the August 1929 disturbances led to a revival of the Jaffa Muslim-Christian Association. From the second half of 1929, the association there stands out by its vigorous activity, extremist positions, and the pressure it directed on the Executive to bring it to the point of extreme activity. At that time — and not by chance! — 'Abd al-Qādir al-Muzaffar was serving as secretary of the association, and the new character infused into its activities expressed the new spirit in the Palestinian national movement, which would become still more apparent some years later.⁵²

Haifa was also an important center for nationalist activity, although a united Muslim-Christian Association did not come into being there. In the last period of Ottoman rule, relations between Muslims and

Christians there had greatly worsened. The economic advancement of the latter left the Muslims behind and aroused noticeable envy.⁵³ Apparently because of this development, the active nationalists of Haifa were unwilling to set up an intercommunity organization. Instead they set up in the Hijrite year 1337 (which began on 7 October 1918), a "Muslim Association," which was active on the level of nationalist struggle, but not as an organization concerned with religious-community affairs.⁵⁴ The Christians set up a "Christian Association" about a year later, which worked parallel to the Muslim Association,⁵⁵ although already in the First Palestinian Congress in January 1919, a Christian delegate from Haifa participated. Generally speaking, the two associations worked in common: they sent protest telegrams to the government, brought the petitions of the populace to the attention of the local governor, and organized joint demonstrations, although they organized the representation of the populace at the congresses separately. This separate existence lasted throughout the lifetime of the MCA and the Executive,⁵⁶ and it seems that suprareligious nationalist frameworks came into being in Haifa only in the second half of the 1930s.

Another Muslim-Christian Association already in existence in 1919 was that of Nablus. This association, under the presidency of al-Ḥajj Ṭawfiq Ḥamād and the direction of Ḥafīz Aga Ṭuqān (who was *mu'tamid al-jam'iyya*, i.e., director of the association's affairs), was extremely active in Nablus itself, in its district, and on a country-wide scale.⁵⁷ Its strength stood out in the first congress, when it constituted a clear alternative to the country-wide center in Jerusalem – in the wake of the refusal of the Jerusalem leadership to fit into the trend of unification with Syria. In the course of the 1920s, it succeeded in grouping most of the Nablus notables around it, and, as we have seen, it was an important factor behind the failure of the elections to the legislative council. Perhaps the height of its achievements and power came in 1926, when the Nablus MCA joined the opposition in its struggle against the Ḥusaynī monopoly of power in the Supreme Muslim Council. It seems that this development caused the growth of an alternative nationalist framework in Nablus in the late 1920s – the Committee of the Arab Congress (*Lajnat al-mu'tamar al-ʿArabi*) – although the MCA continued to exist until 1921.⁵⁸

In July 1931 the Nablus MCA decided to change its name to "The Arab Patriotic Association" (*al-Jam'iyya al-'arabiyya al-waṭaniyya*)⁵⁹ – a change which was highly significant. Previously, at the fifth congress, 'Izzat Darwaza, the outstanding spokesman for the young militants, had expressed his dissatisfaction with the name "Muslim-

Christian Association." In his opinion, this name gave no expression to the new nationalist spirit and was overly anchored in the communal structure.⁶⁰ The change in name of the Nablus MCA, thus, was intended to emphasize the more militant trend which began spreading in 1931 in the wake of the great disappointment over the MacDonalD Letter (the "Black Paper", as the Arabs called it, of February of that year).

Alongside the Nablus MCA, *al-Nādī al-'arabī* continued to exist, although it was largely silent and apparently absorbed by the MCA.⁶¹ It is interesting that this structure produced in late 1927 an important initiative which was to influence the further development of the national movement in the 1930s. In December 1927 the Nablus *al-Nādī al-'arabī* turned to the various associations of Muslim youth in Palestine with a proposal to establish a country-wide framework of the associations of Muslim youth. While this body did not at first intend to deal in political affairs, its growing strength and political activation a few years later were among the important characteristics of the period. It is important to note that the initiator of this activity was once again Muḥammad 'Izzat Darwaza.⁶²

The first evidence of a Muslim-Christian Association in Gaza dates from December 1920, although Gaza sent representatives to the first congress. From then on there is more evidence concerning the active existence of the association.⁶³ As we have noted, the Gaza MCA was completely successful in stymieing the elections to the legislative council, and the opposition hardly penetrated there. In the municipal elections of 1927, the supporters of the Supreme Muslim Council and the Arab Executive won their only great victory in Gaza.

Jerusalem, Jaffa, Haifa, Nablus, and Gaza — this is the map of the MCA (although in Haifa separate community structures existed) in the first stage of organization, i.e., up till the Third Palestinian Congress in December 1920. Throughout 1921 and the first half of 1922, one could sense a pause in the spread of these associations across the country, and only in the summer of 1922 was it possible to detect renewed organizational efforts. In June 1922 an attempt was made to set up an MCA in al-Bira,⁶⁴ but it never got off paper. Slightly more successful was the attempt made at the same time in Nazareth. This town had not taken an active part in the national movement in its first stage. A delegation from Nazareth had indeed taken part in the first congress, but the town was unrepresented at the third and fourth congresses. Moreover, Nazareth did not in the least satisfy the financial demands made upon it by the Arab Executive for financing the activity of the AE and its delegations.⁶⁵ Later in the 1920s,

Nazareth was the location of several influential elements (above all the al-Fahum family) which worked hand-in-glove with the rivals of the AE. Nevertheless, an MCA was set up there, basing itself mainly on the rivals of the al-Fahum family, the Zu'bi family, and the association even sent delegates to the sixth congress in June 1923.⁶⁶

The first evidence of the existence of a nationalist association in Tiberias dates from the same time, July 1922, although there existed only a Muslim association without a parallel Christian one, such as was set up in Haifa. Tiberias was rather poorly represented at the country-wide congresses. A delegation was indeed sent to the first congress, but at later congresses the local residents forewent their right of representation (except for the instance of sending one delegate to the fourth congress) and permitted residents of other areas to claim that they were acting as representatives of Tiberias.

The Tiberias association, like the one in Nazareth, was not conspicuously active in a district which, generally speaking, stood on the sidelines of the national movement and hardly fulfilled its financial obligations. Indeed, after 1923 — the year marking the climax of the first wave of nationalist activity — it is no longer heard of.⁶⁷

Another region which was still further removed from the national movement and its Jerusalemite leaders was the city of Hebron and its surrounding villages. Representatives of this region took no part in the first three congresses (the first, third, and fourth) and contributed little to covering the expenses of the Arab Executive, so that one can actually say they took no part in the national movement in its early years.⁶⁸ In the summer of 1922, a delegation from Hebron participated for the first time in a country-wide congress (the fifth), and from that period approximately dates the first evidence of the existence of an MCA, although it was not overly active and left no impression on the city.⁶⁹

Hebron and its environs were throughout the 1920s and early 1930s an important center of opposition. Conflicts between the administrators of the local endowments and the Supreme Muslim Council over the disposal of the usufruct *awqaf* were, as we have seen, among the important causes of this situation. In the late 1920s this situation changed somewhat. The president of the SMC appointed as local *mufti* one of the opposition's leaders in Hebron, Shaykh 'Abd al-Hayy al-Khaṭīb al-Tamīmī; and in this way his family became a supporter of the SMC and the AE. However, this appointment did not do away entirely with elements opposed to the SMC and the AE.

Several *shaykhs* from the tribes of the Beersheba area (the fifth congress) joined the framework of the country-wide congresses and

the AE in 1922, but the Bedouin character of the population in this region nullified from the start any possibility of organized activity in a nationalist, country-wide spirit, or participation in the financial burden of such activity.

The situation was different in Safed. At the end of the first organizational stage of the national movement – autumn of 1920 and winter of 1921 – *al-Nadī al-'arabi* was active in this town.⁷⁰ However, it seems that this body was neither all-embracing nor particularly active. Actually, until March 1923, nationalist activity in Safed (participation in the country-wide congresses, in demonstrations, sending of protests, the boycott of the elections to the legislative council) was carried on through the social and religious leadership, headed by Shaykh As'ad Muhammad al-Hajj Yūsuf Qaddūra, *mufti* of Safed. A framework as weak as this put difficulties in the way of collecting funds, and Safed too had only a tiny share in the Arab Executive's budget – one far smaller than the quota demanded of it. In the winter of 1923, the Safed Muslim-Christian Association was established, and it survived until the late 1920s, although during the low period of 1925 to 1928 its existence was completely unnoticed, as was the case in the other parts of the country.⁷¹

Developments in Beisan were to a certain extent similar to those of Safed. In the early 1920s no nationalist organization worthy of the name existed there, and until the fifth congress, Beisan was not represented at the country-wide congresses. Nevertheless, Beisan was not off the map concerning nationalist activity. A number of individuals headed by Jubrān Iskandar Kazmā (a Greek Orthodox who had studied agronomy at Montpellier in France, son of one of the pupils of the Russian schools which had aided the Orthodox community in its struggle against Greek rule of their patriarchate) bore the burden of activity, without setting up an organized association. They succeeded in uniting most of the *shaykhs* of the region in a struggle for their rights to *jiftlik* (government) lands in their area and in large measure became their representatives. However, their power was not unlimited, and there were *shaykhs* who preferred to tie themselves to the other active elements (the opposition's National Muslim Association and the emissaries of the Zionist Executive). There is evidence from late 1924 of the establishment there of a Muslim-Christian Association, which also was to survive, without being very active, until the end of the 1920s.⁷²

The nationalist spirit which surged through the country in the wake of the 1929 riots led to the awakening of the various associations which until then had been slumbering. Several attempts were also

made at that time to widen the organizational framework. In both Ramallah and Ramleh — two towns in which the leaders of the opposition (Bulus Shihada and Shaykh Sulaymān al-Tajr al-Faruqī) had considerable influence — MCAs were set up, and the one in Ramleh even began to show signs of activity. An attempt was also made to set up a MCA in Lydda.⁷³ With the exception of the fourth congress, Ramleh was represented at all the country-wide congresses, Ramallah's representatives were absent from the first and fifth congresses, while those of Lydda took no part in the third, fifth, and sixth.

In three cities (or large towns) no MCAs were set up — Tulkarm, Jenin, and Acre; but with respect to the first two, this failing does not reflect alienation from the national movement. In Tulkarm a local organization called *al-Nadr al-waṭani* (the Patriotic Club) was set up in late 1918, and throughout the period of "Southern Syria" it was active along with the branches of *al-Nadr al-'arabi* and *al-Muntada al-adabi*.⁷⁴ Afterwards, this organization continued to be the one nationalist framework in Tulkarm and called itself *al-Nadr al-'arabi al-waṭani*. It was this organization which maintained connections with the AE and which organized local activity. In the second half of 1921, nationalist spirit in Tulkarm died down in the wake of the collective fine imposed on the town, but in 1922 nationalist activity came back to life with *al-Nadr al-'arabi al-waṭani* serving as its framework.⁷⁵ Tulkarm was represented at all the country-wide congresses from the first on.

An attempt was made in May and June 1922 to set up an MCA in Tulkarm to work as a branch of the Nablus MCA. However, this should not be seen as an effort to strengthen the ties of the nationalist circle in Tulkarm with the country-wide framework, but as an attempt on the part of Muḥammad Kamāl al-Jayūsī to come out against the leadership of *al-Nadr al-'arabi al-waṭani*, which was controlled by members of two other families: Salīm 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Ḥājj Ibrāhīm, the mayor's son, and 'Abd Allāh Samāra, the son of a large landowner.⁷⁶ The attempt failed, and the above-mentioned organization continued to act as the branch of the national movement in Tulkarm. It seems that in the latter part of 1923, the organization began to wither and gradually disappeared.⁷⁷ It should be noted that at the end of the 1920s and the beginning of the 1930s, when the thrust of the Palestinian national movement was renewed, this organization was not reestablished there. The two young leaders whom we mentioned were prominent in the efforts of their circle in Nablus and other places to bring about the radicalization of the national move-

ment, and Ṣalīm 'Abd al-Raḥmān stood out as one of the important leaders of the militant stream. It seems that the reservations shown by the men of this trend toward the old associations deterred them from reviving their local organization.

In Jenin, too, no Muslim-Christian Association was set up; no attempt was even made to establish one. Nevertheless, nationalist activity was not unknown in this region. Its notables participated in the various local and country-wide activities, and it seems that the lack of an organizational framework was not always a hindrance.⁷⁸ However, it was probably the nonexistence of such a framework that caused Jenin's lack of representation at the fourth and sixth congresses.⁷⁹

It is very likely that the reason no MCA was set up was the strongly entrenched opposition in Jenin and the surrounding villages — a position which was a result of the al-Jarrār family's having joined its ranks. The establishment of an MCA would have revealed the al-Jarrār family's aloofness to the nationalist circles — a possibility which the Jenin activists probably wanted to avert.

Acre, in which no MCA was set up either, was throughout the period (and later, too) the most important center of opposition to the Arab Executive in the north of the country. The reservations felt toward the country-wide nationalist framework could be seen in the minimal participation in the country-wide congresses. Acre had no representatives at the first and fourth congresses. At the third congress one citizen of Acre participated on a personal basis — it being stressed that no structure in Acre had authorized him to represent it at the congress. At the fifth and sixth congresses, only one delegate participated; and only at the seventh congress, which was held by virtue of agreement with the opposition, did a large and representative delegation take part.

A study of the spread of the Palestinian national movement shows clearly just how central the MCA framework was for that movement. In places where branches of the MCA were set up, political-nationalist activity was more systematic and organized. In those places, it was easier to gather funds to finance country-wide activities, and participation in the crystallization of a country-wide political framework was less problematical.

These Muslim-Christian Associations were never set up as organizations based on personal membership by the Arab inhabitants. Wherever they existed, they formed a combination of representatives from the various elements comprising the local elites. In general, one finds in each of them representatives of the important families, the

religious functionaries, and the *shaykhs* of the villages in the vicinity of the town, whenever the latter were prepared to take part in nationalist activity. Special representation was always reserved for the Christian communities on the local committees — which usually exceeded their proportionate share in the population. The MCA thus constituted a basic framework of leaders and activists who were able, whenever necessary, to manipulate the masses under their influence.

This organizational character suited the traditional social structure and the accepted status of the local elite, which drew its authority from traditional prestige factors, such as religious status — filling religious posts, belonging to the *ashraf* (people tracing their descent from the Prophet Muhammad) — possession of land property, and long-time family claims to positions in the Ottoman administration, along with a consciousness of noble origin (the village and *nawāhī shaykhs*). The elite thus needed no popular democratic confirmation of its status.

Moreover, the conversion of the MCA into the main nationalist organization further strengthened this organizational trend, at the expense of more personal concepts of membership, such as were prevalent in the militant associations of the "Southern Syria" period — *al-Nadī al-'arabī*, *al-Muntadā al-adabī*, *al-Ikhā' wa-'l-'afaf*, and *al-Fidā'iyya*.

A summing up of the many Jewish reports concerning the extent of membership in the various associations in 1919 puts their membership at approximately three thousand. A British police report of December 1920 gives a similar number,⁸⁰ although it includes all the Arab associations: philanthropic, cultural, and community organizations. Nevertheless, it seems that this estimate can be accepted, since we have seen that these organizations also took part in political activity and acted as representatives of their members on a political plane. It is not impossible that there was some overlapping of membership in the various associations, and thus the number given should be regarded as the upper limit of active membership in the various nationalist associations. In the course of the 1920s, the layer which carried the burden of nationalist activity grew somewhat and came to include a number of intellectuals who were not always from the traditionally important families, but there was no essential change in the character of membership in the MCA. This statement will be amplified when we discuss below the election and composition of the country-wide congresses.

The following event exemplifies the composition of the Muslim-Christian Association: In February 1919, at the height of the quandary prevailing in the Jerusalem MCA with regard to the orien-

tation toward Damascus, the association convened a meeting. Present were seven heads of Muslim families, five Latin notables, five Orthodox notables, and nine village *shaykhs* from the Jerusalem area. While it is unlikely that all those connected with the association were present, and the proportions of representatives of the various sectors should not be seen as constant, it is still instructive to note that this meeting saw itself as authorized to speak "on behalf of all the inhabitants."⁸¹

During the abortive attempt to set up an MCA in Tulkarm in June 1922 (see above), about 100 of the village notables took part; while in the Haifa Muslim Association, 114 participated in electing the board, out of the 160 notables from the Haifa Muslim community who had been invited to participate.⁸²

It should be noted that the participation of village *shaykhs* in the MCA framework was limited to Judea and Samaria, where rural structures with historical roots (*nawāhī*) and their own traditional leadership existed.

The boards that directed these associations were elected at meetings of the active members. These elections were not held on fixed occasions, and at times groups competing for leadership would try to convene the notables who supported them in order to elect a different leadership. In any case, there was some degree of turnover in the composition of the boards.⁸³

The organizational apparatus of these associations was very restricted. Generally speaking, there existed a board of members which met from time to time to adopt resolutions, while the everyday activity was carried on by the secretary. These bodies were voluntary and without a paid staff. Thus, only individuals with a strong financial position could have the leisure for constant activity, and the membership of these institutions was indeed drawn from the class of landowners, big merchants, and professional people (lawyers and journalists as a rule). Only in Jerusalem did the Muslim-Christian Association have a small permanent staff. The secretary of the Arab Executive acted also as secretary of the Jerusalem MCA from the time when 'Ārif Pasha al-Dajānī, the first president of the Jerusalem MCA, was dismissed from the presidency of the AE in June 1922.

With all the shortcomings of the MCA framework, it nevertheless constituted the organizational base — local and national — of the Palestinian national movement. The local associations were the medium of communication between the Jerusalem AE and the regions of the country. From it the associations received reports of its activities by way of circulars and instructions to carry out various activities

(demonstrations, cable protests, presentation of petitions, etc.), and the associations issued reports of their own activities.⁸⁴ Nevertheless, it is hard to see the various MCAs as one crystallized, country-wide framework. The nationalists were themselves aware of this and, at the fourth and fifth congresses, brought up various proposals to consolidate the associations into a hierarchical country-wide framework, in which the associations in the large cities would establish branches in the villages and towns nearby.⁸⁵ Only in Nablus was such an attempt made. The Nablus MCA and its leaders saw themselves as the leaders of the entire district and tried to further nationalist activity in Jenin, Tulkarm, and the villages of the district. However, specifically the Nablus MCA illustrates the lack of crystallization of a country-wide framework. Not infrequently this association took its own initiatives, sent emissaries to Muslim elements outside of Palestine without consulting the AE, and constituted a factor of constant pressure on the Jerusalem AE in the direction of extremist action.⁸⁶

Despite all these shortcomings, the MCA saw itself as the body representing the entire Arab population.⁸⁷ In 1918-20, the MCA was not yet the only body representative of the population. Other elements, more extremist than the MCA, were also active. Later, after these extremist organizations had expired, the MCA did not have the field to itself for long; opposition began to develop and organize. Nevertheless, the extent of the support which the AE and the MCA enjoyed was incomparably greater than that of the opposition, as can be shown by the success in blocking the elections to the legislative council. One must, however, bear in mind that we are dealing here with that part of the urban population which had political consciousness and gave thought to the question of the political and national future of the country. This part was limited, above all, to the urban educated elite, although its influence penetrated other layers, and it was capable of moving still greater masses. By virtue of this phenomenon, the MCA was able to claim that it represented the entire population.

It should also be recalled that the growing strength of the opposition in the latter 1920s deprived the MCA of its title to complete representation. The seventh congress of June 1928 was convened by agreement between the heads of the AE and the heads of the opposition, and the AE elected at it ceased to be identical with the MCA. However, up until then, the AE had been the pinnacle of a pyramid, the base of which was comprised of the MCAs and the center layers of the country-wide congresses. These institutions were the MCA's country-wide instruments of representation and the organiza-

tional basis for its attempt to appear as a country-wide representative organization.

Before the assembling of the congresses, the executive members of the local MCA, or of any other association which was active in the area as the framework for nationalist activity, would convene to elect a number of the local active members as delegates. There were never general elections. Moreover, not all the members were invariably connected to the local association convened for the elections.⁸⁸ In Jerusalem an attempt was made to convene the local notables to elect delegates to the sixth congress in June 1923, since the local MCA had been paralyzed when its president, 'Arif Pasha al-Dajānī, had joined the ranks of the opposition. Approximately one hundred and fifty notables were invited, but only some sixty showed up and chose thirty delegates to the congress. The fact stands out that this election campaign was organized by Jamāl al-Ḥusaynī, the secretary of the AE, while the local MCA was completely ignored.⁸⁹ This electoral method was also used before the seventh congress, which was in many respects the most representative of all the congresses. However, this time, in the wake of the preliminary agreement between the supporters of the AE and the Supreme Muslim Council and the opposition, it was necessary to maintain numerical equality between the two sides, and the delegates were therefore decided upon in preliminary negotiations among the notables of both camps in each spot.⁹⁰

It is no wonder, then, that from the first the British authorities had doubts about the representative character of this framework and subsequently maintained their dubious attitude. We have seen that after the convening of the third congress, the government voiced doubts as to whether the congress deserved to be considered as truly representative of the Palestinian population. In response, Mūsā Kāzīm al-Ḥusaynī remarked:

The delegates of the congress convening in Haifa [the third, December 1920] were chosen in part by the Muslim-Christian Associations and the other associations and clubs which were established in orderly fashion and which represented all the inhabitants before the American commission [King-Crane Commission] and the government in all matters; the rest were chosen by the notables and dignitaries of the country (*a'yān wa-wujahā' al-bilād*), the *shaykhs* of the town quarters and the villages and the representatives of the various communities . . . On this basis it should be clear to His Excellency the High Commissioner that the congress was elected by the people, that it represents an absolute majority of the Palestinian people, Muslims and Christians, and that it unites within it the notables and dignitaries of the country, who have always represented it.⁹¹

In these words, Mūsā Kāzīm al-Ḥusaynī revealed with complete frankness the social concept of the Palestinian aristocracy. The source of this aristocracy's authority was traditional, and not democratic, and it did not see the need to have its status confirmed by other classes. Notwithstanding this fact, it saw itself simultaneously as the representative of the entire population, since according to its conception no other form of representation could possibly develop. It should be noted that even if the masses had been asked at the time to give their opinion as to who should represent them, they would undoubtedly have authorized the representatives of the social elite, whose leadership they accepted without qualification. What is more, from 1876 on, when elections to the Ottoman parliaments began to be held, the electoral method employed had been no different in any meaningful sense from that described by Mūsā Kāzīm al-Ḥusaynī. The reasons for this lay in the property qualifications for franchise required by Ottoman electoral law and in the holding of elections in two stages.

This social concept was, of course, reflected by the composition of the delegates at the various congresses. The delegates came, generally speaking, from that same social elite which saw itself as the true representative of the people: the prestigious urban families which produced religious functionaries, officials in the administration, merchants and landowners, and the families of the village *shaykhs*. In the seventh congress there were slightly more professional people (mainly lawyers), yet most of them also came from these same aristocratic families.

As to the families of village *shaykhs*, it should be stressed that this element did not come from all parts of the country. The only rural areas represented at the congresses, and in the other political structures, were Judea and Samaria and the Carmel. The villages of the coastal plain and Galilee were completely passive and took no part in political activity — since they were relatively new villages lacking a tradition of self-organization.

The religious functionaries had no great weight at the various congresses, although some of them (Shaykh Muḥammad Murād, the *mufti* of Haifa, Shaykh Sa'īd al-Khaṭīb, the main preacher in al-Aqṣā) took part in most of the congresses. However, this phenomenon does not prove that there was little participation on their part in nationalist activity. On the contrary, religious functionaries appeared as representatives of the population when petitions and protests were presented to the authorities, during demonstrations, and at various popular assemblies. The fact that such assemblies were frequently held

in mosques and churches and that demonstrations often began or ended in them made the active participation of the religious functionaries inevitable.

The various congresses used to elect an executive to direct activity and carry out the resolutions until the convening of the next congress. This body comprised the highest echelon of the country-wide leadership. A fundamental feature of the election of these bodies at the various congresses was the desire to give representation to the various regions of the country and to that part of the Christian community which continued to take part in nationalist activity after 1920 — the Orthodox community in the main. In the Executive elected at the sixth and seventh congresses, special representation was given the Christians on a country-wide community basis; at the sixth congress the Christian delegates in the Executive were elected by their community, in addition to those Christians who were chosen to represent their towns, while at the seventh congress the Christian representatives in the Executive were elected on a community basis only. At most congresses (until the fifth and afterward), the members of the Arab Executive were elected representatives of their cities, but it was the plenary of the congress that did the electing. However, at the sixth congress the regional character of the AE's composition (alongside its community character) stood out, as the representatives of each region were responsible for electing the representative of their region in the AE.⁹² This system was clumsy and made the AE's activities more difficult. It was hard to assemble its members from everywhere in the country for sessions in Jerusalem, and not infrequently sessions were cancelled or held in the most partial fashion because members were unable to attend.

THE SOCIAL BACKGROUND OF THE INTERNAL SPLIT

This consolidation within a country-wide framework was not accomplished smoothly. Already at the First Palestinian Congress, in late January and early February 1919, the Nablusites threatened Jerusalem's hegemony and strove to take over the primacy of leadership.⁹³ Although this attempt failed, active participants in the national movement in Nablus continued to show bitterness over the monopoly that the Jerusalemites — or rather, part of the Jerusalemites — had acquired over the leadership of the Palestinian community.

Much more serious than this attempt was the constant split that accompanied the Palestinian movement — a split which expressed family and regional conflicts of interest within the urban elite (among

the Jerusalem families themselves as well as non-Jerusalem elements versus the Jerusalemites) and the rebellion of some of the rural notables against urban hegemony.

The rise of the Nashāshībī family in Jerusalem at the start of the twentieth century, and its competition with the traditionally pre-eminent families in that city (al-Ḥusaynī and al-Khalidī), made inter-family competition in this city particularly bitter. The Nashāshībī family, which had just recently risen to prominence and whose status was connected more closely than that of the other families to the Ottoman administrative apparatus, was apparently more alarmed than others over the departure of Ottoman rule.

For the Ḥusaynī and Khalidī families, whose members had filled in the course of generations various posts in the urban and local religious apparatus, the coming of a British regime did not mean a loss of status. The position of the Nashāshībī family was primarily a product of the status of Rāghib al-Nashāshībī as a member of the Ottoman Parliament and chief architect of the Jerusalem province.⁹⁴ For this reason, the end of Ottoman rule could have meant the end of the family's public position. It is no wonder, then, that the heads of the Ḥusaynīs formed ties, by virtue of their public posts, with the new regime. The younger members of the family, who were prominent in the leadership of *al-Nadī al-'arabī*, also maintained good connections with the British military administration, which at that time was encouraging the Arab national movement connected with Fayṣal, Ḥusayn's son. In contrast, the members of the Nashāshībī family looked upon the imperial rival, the French, for alliance and support. It should, thus, not surprise us that the association which they set up and led in the early days of the British military administration, *al-Muntadā al-adabī*, was tied to the French. These two organizations cooperated with each other because of their common goals, but this idyllic situation ended, as we have seen, in the spring of 1920 with the dismissal of Mūsā Kāzīm al-Ḥusaynī from the Jerusalem mayoralty, and with the first awakening from the dream of a Syria united under Fayṣal's rule.

The dismissal of Mūsā Kāzīm al-Ḥusaynī from the Jerusalem mayoralty in the wake of the disturbances of April 1920,⁹⁵ the manner in which it was accomplished, and the personality of his successor certainly contributed greatly to the increased tension between the Ḥusaynī and Nashāshībī families. The appointment involved a change in the orientation of the Nashāshībīs toward the Zionists. So far the Nashāshībīs had enjoyed the support of French agents; now they turned to the British. Those individuals who called

for a policy of cooperation with the British, even after the establishment of the civilian regime and the ratification of the mandate, came from among the Nashashībīs and their followers.

As we have seen, Musā Kazim al-Ḥusaynī became the outstanding figure in the Palestinian national movement and president of its executive committee. Another rival of the Nashashībīs, al-Ḥajj Amīn al-Ḥusaynī, past president of *al-Nadr al-'arabi*, was elected president of the Supreme Muslim Council in January 1922. It would have been unusual had the personal animosity toward these individuals not turned into opposition to the bodies they headed, just as there was no hope that these bodies would not be turned into tools in the hands of their leaders against their personal rivals. In this way, then, the internal division within the Palestinian community developed, and an element opposed to the leadership and the circles supporting it appeared.

Personal and family reckonings with the heads of the Arab Executive and the SMC were not limited to the Nashashībīs. From the start of the AE's activity, various individuals who felt themselves deprived or pushed to the side lent a hand to the opponents of the AE and began to be conspicuous. This is a fairly important phenomenon, since in this manner the opposition left the bounds of narrow family conflict and comprised a larger number of elements. These individuals and their supporters claimed unceasingly that their opposition to the AE was a result of their having been thrust aside and of the exploitation of the national movement by its leaders for their private aims.⁹⁶ At least at the start, they did not advance political justifications for their opposition, but we will see that in the course of time they also crystallized political stands of their own. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the haste with which the heads of the AE accused anyone who hesitated to support them of treachery strengthened the feeling of personal bitterness and was an important factor in the appearance of the opposition.

In this context, it is worthwhile to cite several cases out of many. Shaykh Sulaymān al-Tājī al-Farūqī of Ramleh, who had been the initiator of the Palestinian Congress in December 1920 and had been elected there to the first Arab Executive, later found himself to be without any representative function. When the first delegation was selected at the following congress, he was not among its members — because of the desire to leave the post of president of the delegation free for Musā Kazim al-Ḥusaynī.⁹⁷ This learned *'alim* was not even reelected to the Executive, charged with handling the affairs of the movement during the delegation's stay in Britain. Reacting to this, he

resigned from the congress.⁹⁸ In early 1922 he still remained outside the Supreme Muslim Council and its staff. He took no part in the fifth congress in August 1922. An attempt on the part of 'Umar al-Biṭar of Jaffa to bring about his election to the AE did indeed succeed,⁹⁹ but al-Fārūqī still took no part in its activities. It is no wonder, then, that when the opposition party was set up, al-Fārūqī became one of its leaders and main supporters for many years.

A similar development occurred with respect to 'Arif Pasha al-Dajānī. He had been the first president of the Jerusalem Muslim-Christian Association. His status as leader of the national organizations had begun to deteriorate with the growth in the importance of the militant *al-Nadī al-'arabi*. Mūsā Kāzīm al-Ḥusaynī's election as president of the AE took away what was left of his importance as president of the Jerusalem MCA. When the first delegation departed, he was elected to substitute for Mūsā Kāzīm al-Ḥusaynī, who headed the delegation, in the post of president of the AE. But this was far from appeasing him for not having been chosen to the delegation. He responded by propagandizing against the utility of the delegation's activity and by putting difficulties in the way of the collection of funds for it. When a year later it was decided to send a delegation to the Hijaz, he demanded to be at its head; when this time too he failed to be elected, he came out against the decision of the AE to send it and against its policy. The AE responded by dismissing him from the post of head of the AE, and in this way he too was thrust into the ranks of the opposition.¹⁰⁰ It is not by chance that at that very time his brother, Shukrī al-Dajānī, also joined the first body of the opposition, the "National Islamic Association" (*al-Jam'iyya al-islāmiyya al-waṭaniyya*), and even stood at its head. This move undoubtedly affected the status of 'Arif Pasha as well.¹⁰¹

The split of the noted families of Nablus into two rival camps facilitated the spreading of the opposition to Nablus. The leader of the first camp was al-Ḥajj Ṭawfīq Ḥamād; of the second, Ḥaydar Bey Ṭuqān. Ḥaydar Ṭuqān had been mayor for a long period and in 1912 had been elected to the Ottoman Parliament; however, in 1914 things changed, and al-Ḥajj Ṭawfīq Ḥamād was elected in his place to Parliament.¹⁰² The causes of this are not clear, but, in any case, Ṭawfīq Ḥamād began to stand out as the main figure in Nablus and its surroundings, and when the national organizations were set up in the early 1920s (the AE and the Palestinian delegation) Ṭawfīq Ḥamād was elected to them. It is not surprising, then, that Ḥaydar Ṭuqān became the prime opponent of the AE in the Nablus area and the

pillar of the oppositional organizations there, along with his cronies and supporters.¹⁰³

There are many other cases of individuals who in the past had filled various posts in the civil or religious Ottoman administration and who, now that they were left without any national or religious function, joined the ranks of the opposition. We will note only one more, whose opposition to the Arab Executive and the Supreme Muslim Council probably had a wider significance — As'ad Shuqayr, or Shuqayrī, of Acre. This individual had filled important positions during the Ottoman period, such as delegate to Parliament, head of the Committee for Clarification of *Shari'a* Affairs in the office of *Shaykh al-Islam*, and *mufti* of the Fourth Army (the army of Syria) during the First World War. He was at that time a fierce opponent of the newly awakening Arab nationalist trend and wholeheartedly supported the integrity and unity of the Ottoman-Muslim Empire.¹⁰⁴ In this he was not, of course, an exception, but rather typical of the vast majority of community leaders who later became nationalists — like Mūsā Kāzīm al-Ḥusaynī and al-Ḥājj Ṭawfiq Ḥamād, for example. Nevertheless, the fact that he had been *mufti* of the Fourth Army under the command of Jemāl Pasha at the time the leaders of the Arab awakening were executed¹⁰⁵ gave his pro-Ottoman stance a special significance. What marked him off from many others was that, even after the disintegration of the empire and the conquest of Palestine, he did not abandon his views. At the beginning of the renewed Palestinian organizational activity, in the autumn of 1920, he not only stood apart, but even opposed this trend.¹⁰⁶ His ties with various Zionist elements were extremely close, and most important of all, he came out publicly in a large number of articles against the Arab nationalist awakening and the dismantling of the empire within which the Arabs had enjoyed complete equality and freedom.¹⁰⁷

As'ad Shuqayrī was one of the main props of the opposition in the district in the North. His Muslim training and his senior status in the past enhanced the importance of his opposing stands toward the president of the Supreme Muslim Council and his methods. The question thus arises: was there a connection between his anti-nationalist and traditional Muslim stand and the fact that he joined the less extreme of the Arab camps of Palestine, or was this no more than a personal coincidence? The answer to this rather complex question cannot be unequivocal, but it seems that the position taken by As'ad Shuqayrī was more common among the opposition than among the circles of the AE and the SMC. Side by side with Shuqayrī, one finds several additional members of the opposition who main-

tained their loyalty to the traditional Ottoman-Muslim conception even after the conquest of Palestine, e.g., Ḥaydar Bey Ṭuqān and 'Abd Allāh Mukhlis.¹⁰⁸ We saw above that this position was indeed adopted by numerous circles in the country and reached its peak in 1922, but it is instructive to note that at that time those who demanded to act toward restoring Turkish rule to Palestine came from the circles opposed to the AE. It is not surprising, then, that when the paper *al-Karmil* began (approximately at the end of 1923) to support the opposition, it renounced its anti-Ottoman approach, started extolling the days of the caliphate, and admitted that it had erred when in the past it had supported those "seekers of offices and interests in the name of racism (*unṣuriyya*),"¹⁰⁹ i.e., the Arab nationalists.

It is no wonder, then, that those personalities who were later to be the leaders and spokesmen of the opposition (Raghib al-Nashāshrī, Ya'qūb Farrāj, 'Arif Pasha al-Dajānī, and others) stood apart in the period of the national awakening in the "Southern Syria" spirit and expressed, during the early 1920s, their enmity for the Hashemites and for their activities in Syria in 1918-20.¹¹⁰

Another phenomenon which fits into this picture is the pattern of relations which formed, at the start of the 1920s, among the most conspicuous personalities of the opposition and the institutions of the Zionist movement in Palestine. We have already seen how Musā Kazīm al-Ḥusaynī maintained "special relations" with this element through H.M. Kalvarisky; and there is no doubt at all — abundant evidence exists in the files of the Zionist Executive — that the majority of the prominent personalities of the opposition benefited from Zionist financial support, made use of their help for various personal needs, and, when they came to set up their first political framework, enjoyed the active support of this element.¹¹¹

It seems, then, that alongside the personal-family factor that lay at the roots of the opposition to the Arab Executive and the Supreme Muslim Council, there was another, more abstract, factor. Generally speaking, the prominent members of the opposition were not, in the early 1920s — and certainly not before then — caught up in the new spirit of nationalism, whether Pan-Arab or Palestinian, that began at that time to penetrate the Palestinian community. The AE and the SMC gave this spirit a much clearer expression than did the circles of the opposition. The fact that the wealthiest men of the country tended to join the opposition's camp rather than that of the AE — whereas one tends to find the few Palestinian intellectuals largely in the camp of the AE — reinforces our conclusion.

In the years 1920-22, open signs of the split in the Palestinian camp gradually began to appear. Various personalities ceased participating in the Palestinian congresses, and the first organizations opposed to the Arab Executive and its methods began to appear.

The split between the two camps did not develop overnight to the point where the AE and the congresses were completely identified with one of them. Only with the establishment of the opposition party, *al-Hizb al-waṭani al-'arabi al-filasṭini* (The Palestinian Arab National party), in November 1923, did it receive full expression, with the members of the opposition deserting the AE and the associations connected with it. However, this party was not the first opposition organization. The previous existence of the National Muslim Association and the partial support given it by those who were later to found the National party bear witness to the doubts and hesitations which the members of the opposition underwent before a majority of them dared to unite within their own political organization.

Another important means utilized in establishing this association was the exploitation of Muslim bitterness against the Christians. In the Muslim community there were many who complained that the percentage of Christians in the government administration was out of all proportion to their part in the population. The AE and the MCA, on the other hand, did all they could to present a united front of Muslims and Arab Christians against Zionism. The Zionists, of course, tried to prevent the appearance of a united front: thus, the founders of the National Muslim Association resorted in their contest with the MCA to the argument that the latter organization included Christians and was in reality a tool in their hands.¹¹² In places such as Beisan, where the local branch of the MCA was headed by Christians, and in places where Muslim religious functionaries lent a hand in this sort of campaign, this approach was most fruitful.¹¹³

The other side of this approach was the desire on the part of the Muslim notables to take the places filled by Christians in the administration. One of the important factors motivating various Muslims to join the National Muslim Association was the hope that in this way they would win the support of the Zionist Executive for their efforts to attain government offices.¹¹⁴

A survey of the areas in which the association was set up says much about the causes of its establishment and the potential for opposition to the AE which existed among the Arabs of Palestine. The association first started in the North — Haifa, Acre, Nazareth, Tiberias, and Beisan — and it was there that it was strongest.¹¹⁵ It was not by chance that the northern province was an important center of opposition to the

AE. It seems that the hegemony of the Jerusalem elite was not accepted with enthusiasm in a province which in the past had never been connected to Jerusalem. The sense of all-Palestinian solidarity was not yet strong enough to compensate for the bitterness toward Jerusalem's position of hegemony. Several years later this bitterness was still more strongly expressed and, as we shall see, led additional elements to join the circles of the opposition. The fact that an important personality, Shaykh As'ad Shuqayrī, was located in Acre certainly enhanced the power of the opposition in this area. We have already noted how this individual was left without any post, and how the active members of the AE and the MCA treated him with reservation and even hostility. It is not surprising, then, that he and his supporters set up the oppositional organization in Acre and were one of the main factors responsible for turning Acre and the entire district of the north into an important center of the opposition.

Other local elements also contributed to the success of the opposition in the North. In Haifa the sense of Muslim and Christian solidarity was apparently quite weak, and even the supporters of the AE there were organized into separate Muslim and Christian associations. The appearance of a Muslim Association which did not hesitate to come out against partnership with Christians in the AE and which included an important religious functionary, Shaykh Yūnis al-Khaṭīb (past *qādi* of Mecca), therefore met with much success.¹¹⁶

In Beisan there was a combination of two factors: the ability to come out against the local MCA branch, which was headed by a Christian; and the traditional approach of Bedouin *shaykhs*, who were far removed from any sense of national solidarity with the other components of Palestinian-Arab society.¹¹⁷ In Nazareth there was a strong local family, the Fāhūms, whose rivals in the area, the Zu'br family, were inclined toward the AE and its supporters.¹¹⁸ This combination of local factors with an overall factor in the province made the North into a traditional center of opposition to the AE.

This organization succeeded in spreading to the center of the country as well — the Nablus and Jenin areas. Here the organization based itself on members of the Ṭuqān family and a branch of the 'Abd al-Hādīs, who had long opposed the leader of the rival faction in the contest for local hegemony, al-Ḥājj Tawfīq Ḥamād.¹¹⁹ However, in this area, another important factor stood out — destined to appear more powerfully several years later — the strong village families. When the Palestinian national movement was beginning to organize itself, with its leadership coming primarily from the urban elite, it often happened that members of the rural elite lent their hands to the rivals

of this leadership. Thus, in the Jenin and Tulkarm regions, we find the important rural families, Jarrār (in the villages of the Jenin subdistrict) and Abū Hanṭash (Qāqūn), leading the organizers of the opposition association.¹²⁰ A similar picture holds true for the Hebron area, where the moving spirit behind all the organizations of the opposition setup were members of the Hudayb family, the *shaykhs* of the village of Duwaima, and in the Ramleh area, the al-Khawājā family from Na'alīn.¹²¹

In Jerusalem, where the Nashāshībī family was located, the success of the National Muslim Association was relatively modest. The members of the Nashāshībī family itself did not dare in the early 1920s to come out openly against the Arab Executive and its policy – apparently preferring to accomplish this through emissaries. In any case, in the summer of 1921 Būlus Shihāda, owner of *Mir'at al-sharq* and close friend of Rāghib al-Nashāshībī, and 'Umar Ṣāliḥ al-Barghūthī of the village Dayr Ghassāna and the *shaykh* of the traditional *nāhiya* of Banī Zayd, began to busy themselves in setting up an opposition organization; they failed, however, and after some time Būlus Shihāda went back to supporting the AE, although only for a short time.¹²² Kalvarisky himself, therefore, took over the task of establishing the association, finding as his chief support members of the Dajānī family, the head of which, 'Ārif Pasha al-Dajānī, was at the time president of the AE – although he was beginning to come out against the policy of the first delegation in Britain. When the association came into being in Jerusalem in the winter of 1922, it was headed by Shukrī al-Dajānī, 'Ārif's brother, and Fa'iq al-Dajānī – there having been no success in recruiting prominent figures from other families.¹²³

In the course of 1923 it became clear that this attempt at organization had ended in failure. The causes were political and therefore not within the limits of this discussion.

An additional attempt to organize opposition was made in November 1923, when the Palestinian Arab National party was established. This was the organization of the circles opposed to the AE from among the urban notables, and we have already seen the social motives for their stand. We therefore move on to a discussion of another organizational attempt – that of the village *shaykhs*. We refer to the appearance of farmers' parties in the course of 1924.

What sets this phenomenon off from its predecessors is the fact that it was based on the families of village *shaykhs* and attempted to give political expression to the peasants. In previous attempts to set up oppositional organizations, this social factor had played an important

role. The bitterness of the village *shaykhs* – who in the second half of the nineteenth century had lost their social importance – toward the urban elite which had taken their places was apparently quite deep. When this urban elite gradually became identified with Palestinian-Arab nationalism – the concrete expression of which was opposition to Zionism – its rivals began to lean toward the other side. Not infrequently, they were willing to express their opposition to the urban elite by supporting Zionism or, at least, by demurring from the anti-Zionist movement. Thus, for example, in March-April 1920, a long line of village *shaykhs* in the South, the Ramleh-Jaffa area, Judea, and Galilee dissociated themselves from the strong anti-Zionist wave which was passing through the cities of Palestine at the time and signed petitions supporting Zionist immigration to the country.¹²⁴ In organizing this project, several rural *shaykhs'* families were conspicuous – e.g., the Abū Ghūsh family of Qaryat al-'Anab and 'Amwās, which enjoyed the support and encouragement of the Zionist Organization¹²⁵ – but the very fact of mass response to this initiative proves the existence of latent rural bitterness toward the urban leadership. Not by chance does one of the petitions of the village *shaykhs* from the regions of Judea, the South and Ramleh-Jaffa, end by stating that the urban political associations have no connection at all with the community outside the cities and that “in the name of the villages we are opposed to all their corrupt activities which hamper the security of the community. We accept all resolutions that the peace conference may adopt and declare that all the demonstrations which they organized were solely on their own behalf. On the other hand, every petition we present is on behalf of the country's base, its notables and its leaders.”¹²⁶

The special stand of the village *shaykhs*, who were striving to preserve their social primacy, was maintained for years and was of course supported by the Zionists.¹²⁷ However, attempts at separate self-organization were not made until the start of 1924, after the anti-Zionist wave had passed its climax and following the open appearance of other opposition elements on the political scene. This attempt to organize was not lacking in other motives, including regional and familial ones, but the combination of all these factors lent the organization a certain weight. It is worth adding that this complex of factors did not include the miserable state of the impoverished fellahs, sunk in debt to urban moneylenders. While the urban leaders of the national movement were in many cases none other than those same moneylenders, the rural self-organization with which we are now dealing based itself on the village notables and not on the

poor. In fact, this was an organizational attempt on the part of one component of the Palestinian social elite against another.¹²⁸

In the first attempt, The Association for Village Cooperation (*Jam'iyyat ta'awun al-qura*) in the Ijzim-Haifa area, the regional and familial elements are especially conspicuous. This region had in the past been the *iqta'* of the Mādī family of Ijzim, which had managed gradually to turn considerable parts of it into their private property. Even after part of the family moved to Haifa, the villages of the area continued to be under their social, economic, and political mastery.

Mu'in al-Mādī, as we have seen, maintained more moderate positions than the official line during the time he was a member of the first delegation to Britain and afterwards supported participation in the elections for the legislative council. He did not join *al-Hizb al-waṭani* when it was set up, but in 1924 he began giving a political-factional expression to his traditional leadership in the area. The Mādī family was strong enough to do without Zionist aid in setting up its organization, and, therefore, the platform it adopted was in the common anti-Zionist spirit.¹²⁹ However, the establishment of the other rural organizations bore a different character.

In early 1924 there began to form in the Nazareth, Nablus-Jenin, and Hebron regions organizations calling themselves *Hizb al-zurra'* (Party of the Farmers). Generally speaking, they were headed by village *shaykhs* who were influential in their districts, such as Fāris al-Mas'ūd of Burqa and 'Abd al-Laṭīf Abu Hanṭash from Qāqūn (the Jenin-Tulkarm area) and Mūsā Hdayb (Duwāima, near Hebron), while contacts were maintained with urban oppositional elements, such as the Fāḥūm family in Nazareth and the Ṭuqān family in Nablus.¹³⁰ These men were aided in organizing their groups by the Zionist Executive and H.M. Kalvarisky, and the Zionists covered the party's expenses — although at first Col. F. Kisch was unenthusiastic over the renewed organization of Arab opposition parties by Jewish initiative and assistance.¹³¹ These associations were opposed to the Arab Executive and its methods and political line; they leaned toward cooperation with the government, and even with the Zionists.

The Zionists appraised this party as a fairly serious element which had gained a larger measure of support than *al-Hizb al-waṭani*, the party of the urban opposition elements, although the open stand taken by the party in the Hebron area in favor of the British Mandate had reduced its influence to the supporters of the Hdayb family of Dāwā'imā only.¹³² However, this party's complete dependence upon the Zionists led in 1927 — when the source of Zionist support dwindled in the wake of the deepening crisis surrounding Zionist

activity in Palestine — to its weakening and eventual disintegration.¹³³ This failure is of great significance when one recalls that it was precisely in that year that the power of the opposition reached a climax unparalleled in the past and, indeed, never to be repeated.

The rising strength of the opponents of the Arab Executive was not merely expressed by the setting up of markedly oppositional parties. Of no lesser importance was the fact that during 1924-25 splits formed in two of the most important Muslim-Christian Associations — in Nablus and Jaffa.¹³⁴ On the surface, the opposition camp was not all of one color, and in particular there were differences of opinion over the degree of open support to be shown the mandate. On occasion, the members of *al-Hizb al-ziraʿi* were even denounced by other elements of the opposition for their support of the mandate and their ties with the Zionist Executive.¹³⁵ Nevertheless, a common front of all the members of this camp gradually crystallized. During the negotiations in late 1924 over the possibility of reaching an agreement between the AE and its rivals, all the factors of the opposition appeared together in united fashion and were represented by a single delegation.¹³⁶ This unity took form in the midst of the struggle which all the factors of the opposition were carrying on against the Supreme Muslim Council, and it was this struggle that brought them the support of circles which had previously supported the AE and gave them a large degree of influence which they were not to have in later years.

The success of the opposition in 1925-27 can be seen in its electoral success in the SMC balloting between December 1925 and January 1926, and in its crushing victory in the municipal elections in the spring of 1927. This success was achieved by virtue of the fact that several circles previously connected with the AE now joined the ranks of the opposition. The nepotistic appointments made by al-Ḥajj Amīn al-Ḥusaynī, the president of the SMC, and by its other members; the exploitation of endowment funds for purposes other than the ones intended; and the conversion of the SMC as a whole into an instrument in the hands of its president, his family, and his political allies, the men of the Arab Executive — all these led men who had formerly belonged to the AE and supported the SMC to join the ranks of the opposition. Thus, for example, during the process of the disintegration of the Jaffa MCA, which began in late 1923, when the municipality agreed to let the Rutenberg electric project into its territory, its president, ʿUmar al-Biṭār, joined the camp of the opposition and thus enabled it to penetrate Jaffa, previously the citadel of AE supporters.¹³⁷

It seems that many members of the Nablus MCA, the mainstay of the Palestinian national movement, were disgusted with the methods of al-Ḥājj Amīn al-Ḥusaynī and 'Abd al-Laṭīf Ṣalāḥ, the representative of the Nablus district in the SMC. In April 1924 they wanted to hold a separate procession during the Nabī Mūsā festivities – understanding as they did that the Jerusalem al-Ḥusaynī family was exploiting their participation in the festivities for the purpose of strengthening its status and prestige; the following year they started coming out against the AE, refrained from sending their banners to the Nabī Mūsā procession, and hardly took part in the festivities.¹³⁸ 'Abd al-Laṭīf Ṣalāḥ perceived that the support of the nationalist circles of Nablus was slipping away from him. He therefore set up a new association under the name *Ḥizb al-ahālī* in competition with the Nablus MCA; it acted in the main to safeguard its founder's status. This development helped thrust the local MCA with its leaders, al-Ḥājj Ṭawfīq Ḥamād, Amīn al-Tamīmī and Ḥāfiẓ Ṭuqān, into the ranks of the opponents of al-Ḥājj Amīn al-Ḥusaynī.¹³⁹

It seems that the passing of the Nablus MCA into the ranks of the opposition was facilitated by a fairly deep-rooted development. Beginning in late 1922, one senses the growing detachment of its president, al-Ḥājj Ṭawfīq Ḥamād, from the ranks of leadership. He was not elected to the second delegation, which departed at that time for Geneva, and, probably because of this, took no part in the Sixth Palestinian Congress in June 1923. Some time later he announced his withdrawal from political activity, justifying this by declaring that the nation knew not how to value those who worked and sacrificed on its behalf. In the opinion of *Mir'at al-sharq*, he secretly lent a hand to the new organization, *Ḥizb al-ahālī*, which was fighting the Nablus MCA.¹⁴⁰

In Hebron too, the opposition to the Supreme Muslim Council began to grow stronger. Behind this lay the ire of the local notables over the SMC's taking over Hebronite endowments and spending their usufruct not in accordance with the original conditions of endowment.¹⁴¹

It should be noted that this struggle was supported by several personalities who had previously supported the Arab Executive and its ways and who were later to return to this position, such as 'Izzat Darwaza of Nablus, Ḥamdi al-Ḥusaynī of Gaza (who at the time was beginning a career of political activity in a left-wing nationalist spirit), and the paper *Filasṭīn*.¹⁴²

The highpoint of the opposition's rise in power came in June 1928 with the convening of the Seventh Palestinian Congress. The congress

was jointly convened by the AE and the opposition organizations, and the strength of the opposition at the congress and in the Executive elected there was equivalent to the strength of the AE, the supporters of the Supreme Muslim Council, and the Jerusalem al-Ḥusaynī family.¹⁴³

THE SOCIAL BACKGROUND OF THE RADICALIZATION

The balance of power created from 1925 to 1928 between supporters of the AE and members of the opposition began to erode in the late 1920s. One of the important results of the strengthening of the opposition between 1925 and 1928 was the fact that, at the seventh congress in June 1928, the relative strength of the Jerusalemites was far less than at previous congresses.¹⁴⁴ In this manner, the part played by residents of other regions of the country in the Palestinian movement and in its leadership organizations (the Arab Executive) increased.

No less important was the fact that at this congress a new generation – which was later to leave its mark on the Palestinian movement – began to find itself.¹⁴⁵ It was better educated and included individuals who did not come from the traditional aristocratic families, though it was far from homogeneous. Some leaned toward radical pan-Arab ideology, secular in its symbolism, while others based their nationalism on Islam. The former (‘Awnī ‘Abd al-Ḥādī, Ḥamdī al-Ḥusaynī, and others) founded in 1932 the *Istiqlāl* (Independence) party, while the latter (‘Izzat Darwaza, ‘Abd al-Qādir al-Ḥusaynī) heralded the militant Muslim trend which brought about the 1936-39 revolt.

The *Istiqlāl* party was a first attempt at setting up a modern political organization grounded in a clear-cut nationalist ideology (an independent and united Arab state as an expression of the unity of the Arab people) and in personal affiliation.

Its founders were relatively young, of European education, and engaged in the liberal professions: lawyers, journalists, doctors, etc. Its active members did not spring from the aristocratic families: if there were such in its ranks, they were individuals who had cut themselves off from their family base (e.g., Ḥamdī al-Ḥusaynī and ‘Awnī ‘Abd al-Ḥādī). However, notwithstanding its importance, this party did not survive for long.¹⁴⁶ The family-community-regional nature of Palestinian politics was too strong, and it more or less disappeared after a few years of activity – although several of its leaders continued to stand out in the midst of the Palestinian community by virtue of

their character and talent. The split between pro-Hashemites and pro-Saudis, which divided the camp of the pan-Arabists in the 1930s, also contributed to its disintegration.

From the point of view of influence and actual results, the second trend, the Islamic, was more significant.

In the first years of its activity, the Palestinian Arab national movement managed to acquire the image of a joint Muslim-Christian movement, although even then there were Muslims who saw this only as a strategem.¹⁴⁷ However, cracks gradually appeared in this facade. The first signs could already be detected in the early 1920s: Christians leaned more toward cooperation with the government. When the Kemalist Turks triumphed over the Greeks, the Muslims of Palestine rejoiced, while the Christians experienced a wave of solidarity with their suffering coreligionists. Attacks on Christians in Syria during the 1925 revolt aroused fears among the Christians about what awaited them if independence were attained. The influence of the Supreme Muslim Council grew stronger in Palestine, and the Arab Executive came to be identified with it, while the Christians tended to support the opposition to this body.¹⁴⁸ In 1926-28 the Zionist movement weakened, and Jewish settlement in Palestine looked moribund. At this time the Muslims began to express their misgivings with respect to the Christians and to organize themselves in special frameworks.

In the spring of 1928, a world congress of Christian missionaries convened in Jerusalem. The Muslim community feared this congress might become a launching pad for intensive missionary activity in its midst. They therefore raised an outcry against the congress, and some of them failed to distinguish between the foreign missionary element and the local, indigenous, and Arabic-speaking Christians.¹⁴⁹

In the same period, early 1928, the country-wide structure of Young Muslims' Associations was established.¹⁵⁰ These associations were set up in the course of 1927 throughout the country, and their organization into a united country-wide framework lent them added importance. It seems that the very setting up of this body points to a strengthening of the sense of communal identity. It occurred at a time of crisis in Zionism when, apparently, the urge to demonstrate Muslim-Christian unity had weakened greatly. It is almost certain that a desire to compete with the parallel Christian structures and with the missionary activity was also at work. However, this organization gradually took on an anti-Christian character, as it was combined with another question which then preoccupied the Muslim community to a considerable degree.

From the start of British rule, the Christians had enjoyed an important place in the administration. By virtue of their greater education and knowledge of foreign languages, Christians found far more places in government service than their proportionate share of the population warranted.¹⁵¹ There was from the start latent bitterness among the Muslims because of this, although during the first years of British rule it was hard for the Muslims to express this. In those years, all was being done to demonstrate Muslim-Christian solidarity, and even to have brought the matter up would have been interpreted as an admission of the importance of community identities and of the existence of conflicts of interests between the two communities. In the mid-1920s, with the weakening of this solidarity, many Muslims began to allow themselves to express their feelings on this point. It is safe to assume that, as a result of the work of the government's educational network, the number of educated Muslim youths grew larger, so that there was more pressure on government offices. Complaints began to appear in the press about discrimination against Muslims with respect to government offices and preferment of Christians.¹⁵² This topic gradually became a public issue of primary importance, agitating spirits and affecting relations between the two communities.¹⁵³ Various elements began to organize themselves, to present petitions, and to send delegations to the government with a demand to do justice to the Muslims in this area, while the Arab Executive was requested to organize country-wide activity.¹⁵⁴

Meanwhile, the August 1929 disturbances broke out and contributed greatly to the strengthening of Muslim sentiment and the Muslim character of the Palestinian movement. The disturbances broke out against a background of a religious conflict in which the Christians were not involved, and in their wake the religious head of the Palestinian Muslims, al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni, became the most prominent leader of the Arabs of Palestine, and the Muslim coloring of their movement was strengthened.

Subsequently, the organization of the Associations of Muslim Youth adopted the government jobs issue as its own and began to be one of the most important elements active toward enlarging the proportion of Muslims in government service. At the fourth congress, in the summer of 1932, much attention was given to this question, and it occupied an important place in the resolutions.¹⁵⁵ In less public meetings, the heads of the organization did not hesitate to state explicitly that "the Christians are robbing the Muslims of their rights to [government] offices."¹⁵⁶ *Al-Jami'a al-Islamiyya*, the paper of

Shaykh Sulaymān al-Tājir al-Fārūqī, which held to a radical pan-Islamic position, dealt with this issue with a ferocity bordering on open incitement against the Christians.

Several young Muslims organized themselves in a special body, the Preparatory Committee of Young Educated Muslims, to fight for their rights. In November 1932 these men convened a country-wide congress in Jaffa and established the Committee of Young Educated Muslims. At their congress they came out fiercely against the Christians, although 'Abd al-Qādir al-Ḥusaynī, the son of Mūsā Kāzīm, tried — apparently under his father's influence — to calm the agitated spirits.¹⁵⁷

In the wake of these developments, the Christians began to organize themselves in the opposite direction, and there were fears that there would be a public and violent split between the two communities.¹⁵⁸ Still earlier, on 9 September 1932, the Arab Executive had discussed, on its own initiative, the bitter controversy between the two communities and decided to request the government not to employ foreigners, in order to leave room for local residents, "and to maintain a proportionate balance in parcelling out offices."¹⁵⁹ It should be noted that this resolution was proposed by 'Isā al-'Isā, a Christian from Jaffa, and it should be seen as a temporary measure taken in light of heavy Muslim pressure. However, this resolution apparently did nothing to cool tempers. On 28 September 1932 the AE again discussed the factional spirit prevailing in the country and met with 'Abd al-Qādir al-Ḥusaynī, the representative of the Preparatory Committee of Young Educated Muslims. In the discussion, the need to put an immediate end to the danger of factionalism and to refrain from attacking the Christians was stressed. However, while the Christian members demanded that the topic be dealt with, that anything which could affect "the good atmosphere which exists among the children of the single homeland" (the words of 'Isā Bandak, a Greek Orthodox from Bethlehem) be condemned and that the Association of Young Muslims of Jaffa, the "root of the evil" (in the words of Alfred Roq, a Greek Catholic of Jaffa) be restrained, the Muslim members expressed support for the Preparatory Committee and argued that it was not acting against the Christians, but simply in favor of Muslim rights (in the words of Ḥashim al-Jayūsī and 'Izzat Darwaza).¹⁶⁰

In light of these differences of opinion, the Arab Executive was unable to reach any conclusion and had to leave it to its office to issue a manifesto on this matter.¹⁶¹ However, by this time the activity of the AE and its office was in decline. The AE did not convene again

until a year had passed, and the office too convened only once (19 May 1933)¹⁶² before October 1933. As a result, this institution, which was considered the leadership organization of the Palestinian national movement, was unable to deal with this serious question.

It should be noted that on a lower, everyday level, things were no less wearisome. We have seen that fairly successful anti-Christian propaganda accompanied the establishment of the National Muslim Associations in 1921. In various places in Palestine, an anti-Christian spirit continued to exist and, from time to time, received forceful expression.¹⁶³ Personal conflicts over land deals, or acts of kidnapping or murder, in which members of different communities were involved, sometimes took on factional significance and were seen by the Christians as indicative of the true attitude of the Muslims toward them.¹⁶⁴ In 1924, when the mayor of Nazareth died, the struggle over the appointment of his successor turned into a conflict between Muslims and Christians in this city.¹⁶⁵

In the summer of 1930 a Christian journalist, Jamil al-Bahrī, head of the Organization of Christian Youth in Haifa, was murdered. This murder was directly tied to a conflict between the Christians and Muslims of Haifa over ownership of the old cemetery area.¹⁶⁶ The murder greatly agitated spirits and affected relations between the communities. The Arab Executive decided to act and did all it could to keep the murder case a personal affair. A high-ranking delegation was sent to Haifa,¹⁶⁷ but the Christians were still left with a weight of bitterness; some of them presented the British government with petitions, in which they disavowed any connection with the national movement and the Muslims.¹⁶⁸

As a result of all this, tension between the different communities grew more intense in the early 1930s.¹⁶⁹ The HC was able to write: "Christian Arab leaders, moreover, have admitted to me that in establishing close political relations with the Muslims the Christians have not been uninfluenced by fear of the treatment they might suffer at the hands of the Muslim Majority in certain eventualities."¹⁷⁰

In the summer of 1931, two conventions were held in Nablus to discuss the future of the country. This was an expression of the feeling that the traditional leadership and the Arab Executive were powerless to change British policy. MacDonald's letter to Weizmann in February 1931 ("the Black Paper," as the Arabs called it) and the sale of land to Jews by members of the Arab Executive were proofs that the old way had to be abandoned. The circles present at the conventions which refused to accept the authority of the AE included the pan-Arabist element (which had established the Istiqlāl) and the circles of Muslim

youth influenced by al-Hājj Amīn al-Husaynī. At these conventions several Muslim religious functionaries and others brought up the idea — for the first time in public — of resorting to arms in order to prevent the fulfillment of Zionism.¹⁷¹

The first attempt to realize this idea also came from these circles and was connected with the figure of 'Izz al-Dīn al-Qassām of Haifa. This man, a religious functionary born in Latakia in Syria, fled to Palestine after Fayṣal's defeat and began to function as the *imām* of one of the mosques in Haifa. He stood out by his preaching for the purification of Islam, for leading a modest life in the spirit of the Hanbalite school of law, and for preserving the Arab character of Palestine. In the late 1920s he established and headed the Young Men's Muslim Association in Haifa. In the years 1931 to 1935 he set up a terrorist band in the north of the country, which was active against Jewish settlements and based itself on members of the Young Men's Muslim Association of Haifa and Tzippori. In November 1935 a British military unit managed to surround his band near Ya'bed, and he and several of his men were killed. The survivors escaped and reorganized themselves in the Samarian hills; it was they who began the revolt in April 1936.

This affair has another aspect. What information we possess about the men around 'Izz al-Dīn al-Qassām indicates that they came from a class which until then had taken no part in nationalist political activity — villagers who for various reasons had left their villages and moved to the cities. The prosperity of 1933-35 drew many villagers to the cities, where they were able to earn far more than in their native villages. Uprooted from their native society, they were not absorbed by new urban structures. 'Izz al-Dīn al-Qassām's organization provided them with the framework they so badly needed and with Muslim identity symbols with which they were familiar. It should be noted that a similar, though less important, phenomenon occurred in Hebron as well.¹⁷²

This lower-class participation in the national movement took on new dimensions during the 1936-39 revolt. Although, in the early stages of the revolt, the leadership and major activity was located in the cities (the general strike), the fellahs gradually joined it and became the decisive factor in it. The fighting bands were almost entirely composed of fellahs, and during the height of the revolt, in the autumn of 1938, these bands entered the Arab cities, gained control over them, and established their hegemony for a short period. The urban leadership was out of sight (some were exiled, some fled, and some went into hiding because of the murderous interneḳine

struggle); if the fellah bands had been organized under a consolidated leadership, they could have effected a far-reaching change in the political structure of the Palestine Arabs. However, they were not united, and even at the height of their power they were unable to create a single framework.

Moreover, the strengthening of the position of the fellah bands was not without a negative aspect with regard to future organization of fellahs for independent activity. The victory of the bands was attained simultaneously with a fierce internecine struggle. Old conflicts in the villages found new expression in the struggle between different bands. Elements which had wearied of the revolt began to organize counter-bands ("peace gangs"), which began struggling against the guerrillas' control of the villages. The "peace gangs" became a real power supported by the authorities, and a violent and vicious struggle broke out between them and the guerrilla bands. In many villages, bloody, hate-filled scores against the bands developed because of their extortions, forced recruitments, and murders of collaborators. Thus, the victory of the fellah bands in the fall of 1938 held within it the seeds of future controversies and divisions.¹⁷³

In addition to all this, the British began to take firm action at this time. It seems that in the autumn of 1938 the British decided to suppress the Palestinian Arab revolt at all costs — and quickly. Troops were concentrated in the country and began a systematic campaign to liquidate the rebels' nests in the hills. Villages which aided the rebels, or in the vicinity of which acts of sabotage had been committed, were hit with stiff collective punishments, houses were demolished, arrests made, and not a few men sentenced to death and hanged.¹⁷⁴

As a result of this combination of internal controversy and military suppression, the revolt gradually died out in early 1939. Politically, it was not without fruit: in May 1939 the Malcolm MacDonald White Paper was published, to no small degree as a result of the rebellion.¹⁷⁵ However, it seems that internally the revolt had serious consequences. The fellahs were not again able to work as a force organized within its own framework, and it is unlikely that they were inclined to participate in wider frameworks led by others. The internal controversies were exacerbated still further. Toward the end of World War II, when it was clear that the political future of Palestine was soon to be determined, various elements among the Palestinian Arabs tried to reestablish the Arab Higher Committee as a framework for organization and political representation. However, the internal split was stronger and the attempt failed. All hopes then focused on the newly-formed Arab League, which after several abortive attempts did indeed

succeed in June 1946 in appointing an Arab Higher Committee to speak for the Arabs of Palestine. The League, naturally enough, relied on the old political leadership, the heads of the large families and the notables.¹⁷⁶ The newer forces, the Istiqlālists, Mūsā al-'Alamī, and others like him, who tried to act on the basis of nationalist ideology and their personal authority, were in large measure thrust aside. The Husaynī family's hegemony was reinstated by the League without its being weakened seriously by any internal force. A new political force, unwilling to make peace with this situation, did in fact crop up – the League for National Liberation. This organization demanded that democratic elections to the Supreme Arab Committee be held and the masses enlisted in the nationalist struggle, but because it was communist, it failed to influence the community at large – although it succeeded in organizing – in a rather formidable fashion – a considerable portion of the young workers' class and the new intelligentsia.¹⁷⁷

The Arab Higher Committee was unable to depart from its original nature as “a club for the notables from the important families.” Its attempts to organize the urban youth and the fellahs in military organizations for war against the Jews did not have serious consequences. The organized force was not very large, and its efficacy was smaller yet.¹⁷⁸

Since “salvation” failed to come from the armies of the Arab states, the 1948 war ended in defeat for the Palestinian Arabs – a large part of whom became refugees.

The new situation completely changed the nature of political activity among the Palestinian Arabs. A minority became Israeli citizens; a large part (including the refugees) received Jordanian citizenship; in the Gaza Strip a considerable community of refugees was concentrated in one large camp area, which became a hotbed of militant nationalist feeling; a considerable part of the refugee population in Syria moved in the course of time to Lebanon, where they could more easily find employment.

This reality led to important changes. The Jordanian government worked toward weakening the power of the Husaynī family and its supporters, who were its sworn enemies. Members of this family did not, generally speaking, achieve public office, did not serve in the Jordanian parliaments or governments, and seemed to have been completely eliminated from political life. On the other hand, its Nashāshībī rivals were nurtured and rose to power. These elements had aided King 'Abd Allāh in annexing the West Bank to his kingdom and were therefore generously rewarded. Rāghib al-Nashāshībī and the members of his family, as well as members of the Khalīdī family,

reached respected positions in the Jordanian administration. Hebron and Nablus, where many respected anti-Husaynī families were concentrated, were rewarded by economic support for their development efforts, while "Husaynī" Jerusalem suffered discrimination.

However, from the beginning of Jordanian rule, a relatively new element — which was to have no mean influence on the further development of the Palestinian factor — stands out. From the early days of Jordanian rule on the West Bank, young intellectuals tended to organize themselves in opposition frameworks in the form of cultural clubs or the Ba'th party. These intellectuals, who did not necessarily spring from the noted families ('Abd Allāh Rimāwī, Kamāl Naṣir, etc.) adopted a militant pan-Arab ideology and opposed with all their might the pro-Western Hashemite regime which they suspected of being relatively moderate toward Israel.

Other young men, similar to the others in education and in not belonging to the old aristocracy, were behind another political and organizational attempt to remove the shame of 1948 — the Arab Nationalists Organization (*al-Qawmiyyūn al-'arab*). This organization was established in the early 1950s by Palestinian students at the American University of Beirut with the aim of achieving Arab unity which would lead to the destruction of Israel. Its slogan was "Unity, Freedom, and Revenge."¹⁷⁹ In the late fifties this organization put its trust in 'Abd. al-Nāṣir and became in large measure an instrument of the Nasserist regime. However, in the sixties the organization began to free itself more and more of the belief that Arab unity would be the Palestinians' salvation. Instead of this, the organization turned to the left — farther left even than the Nasserist regime — and adopted the view (in 1966) that the Palestinians had to free their land by their own efforts in a war of popular liberation.¹⁸⁰

A similar process characterizes the birth of *al-Fath*. This organization also sprang from the Palestinian student and intellectual circles in Egypt and Kuwait. While it took its first organizational steps in 1956, it reached major proportions only in the sixties.¹⁸¹ It is hardly a coincidence that it began its military activities in January 1965. The Arab world was then beginning to free itself of the belief that the process of Arab unity was in the ascendant. The United Arab Republic had broken up; the Egyptian intervention in Yemen had been exposed in all its impotence; the common Arab effort (the summit policy) had failed to keep Israel from diverting the Jordan waters. The beginning of *al-Fath*'s activity was also motivated, it seems, by the recognition that "if I am not for myself, who will be for me?"

In this way a clear distinction was formed with regard to the class of leadership between the Palestinian community which had remained on its land and its segments which had become refugees. On the West Bank (and to a lesser degree in Israel), leadership remained in the hands of the important families who had a tradition of leadership and the prestige of property, while among the refugees traditional prestige and vanished property ceased to have any influence over the composition of the leadership; their place was taken by modern education, readiness for political struggle, and the ability to organize and make sacrifices.

NOTES

1 A detailed list of these *nawāhī* and the *shaykh* families who ruled them can be found in Muḥammad 'Izzat Darwaza, *Al-'arab wa'l-'urūba taḥta 'l-taghalub al-'uthmānī* (Damascus, 1959), pt. 2, pp. 132-291; Ihsān al-Nimr, *Ta'rikh jabal nāblus wa'l-balqā'* (Nablus, 1961), pt. 2 pp. 183-6, 404-27; R.A. Stewart Macalister and E.W.G. Masterman, "Occasional Papers on the Modern Inhabitants of Palestine," *Palestine Exploration Fund Quarterly Statement* (1905): 352-6; (1906): 35-7 (hereafter cited as *PEFQS*); J. Finn, *Stirring Times* (London, 1878), 1: 226-43. See also U. Heyd, *Ottoman Documents on Palestine 1552-1615* (London, 1960), pp.67, 96; M. Ma'oz, *Ottoman Reform in Syria and Palestine, 1840-1861* (London, 1968), pp. 113-22.

2 Mrs. Finn, "The Fellaheen of Palestine," *PEFQS* (1879): 38-40.

3 Heyd, p.99, n.10.

4 Darwaza, pt. 2, p. 141.

5 Mrs. Finn, "The Fellaheen of Palestine," p.38.

6 Macalister and Masterman, pp. 334, 345-6.

7 George E. Post, "Essays on the Sects and Nationalities of Syria and Palestine," *PEFQS* (1891): 106-7; S. Bergheim, "Land Tenure in Palestine," *PEFQS* (1894): 197-8.

8 G. Baer, "The Evolution of Private Landownership in Egypt and the Fertile Crescent," in *The Economic History of the Middle East, 1800-1914*, ed. C. Issawi (Chicago, 1966), p. 82.

9 Gad Frumkin, *Derekh shofet biyerushalayim* (Tel Aviv, 1954), p. 110 (my emphasis, Y.P.). On Gad Frumkin's position in the administration of the Jerusalem district, see this volume, p.187.

10 Ihsān al-Nimr (pt. 2, pp. 261-2) states this unequivocally. And of 'Umar Ṣāliḥ, "Traces of Feudal System in Palestine," *Journal of Palestine Oriental Society* (hereafter cited as *JPOS*) 9 (1929): 70.

11 Ma'oz, pp. 117, 120-2; Macalister, *PEFQS* (1906): 46-50; Bargūthī, *JPOS* (1929): 79.

12 Report by Beshwer, assistant to the official in charge of public security, 18 Jan. 1921, Israel State Archives (hereafter cited as ISA), Chief Secretary Files

(hereafter cited as CS), 157; a petition of about 150 notables to the governor of Jerusalem with respect to the appointment of the *mufī* of Jerusalem, 21 March 1921, *ibid.*, 245.

13 Protest petition of the *mukhtārs* of the Banī-Zayd al-Shimāliyya, *nāhiya* to the chief secretary, 14 July 1923, *ibid.*, 158.

14 Protocol of the session of the Committee for the Collection of Donations from the Villages, 25 Nov. 1929, ISA, Arab Executive Committee Files (hereafter cited as AB), 3098.

15 A.H. Cohen, "Seder Hatahalukhot biymai Nabi Musa, 22.4.32-29.4.32," Zionist Archives (hereafter cited as ZA), S/25, 3070.

16 A. Hourani, "The Fertile Crescent in the 18th Century," *A Vision of History* (Beirut, 1961), pp. 35-70; *idem*, "Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables," in *Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East*, ed. W.R. Polk and R.L. Chambers (Chicago, 1968), pp. 41-68.

17 Ma'oz, pp. 34-8; 87-107.

18 S. Shamir, "The Modernization of Syria: Problems and Solutions in the Early Period of Abdulhamid," in Polk and Chambers, pp. 351-82.

19 Frumkin, p. 110; Ihsān al-Nimr, pt. 2, p. 262.

20 See the sources quoted in f.n. 19 and also M. Asaf, *Hitorerut ha'aravim be'eretz yisrael uvrihatam* (Tel Aviv, 1967), p. 37; Baer, pp. 80-90; Paul J. Klat, "The Origins of Land Ownership in Syria," *Middle East Economic Papers* (1958): 51-66. Lists of large landowners in Palestine in the years 1918-20, in which the number of urban notables stands out, are found in ZA S/25, 7433. Cf. A. Granovsky, *Hamishtar haqarq'i be'eretz yisrael* (Tel Aviv, 1949), pp. 34-7; 50-62; 68-70.

21 Biographical sketch in ZA, S/25, 4022.

22 A.H. Cohen, "Meora'ot November bitzfon ha'aretz," 1 Dec. 1935; ZA, S/25, 4224.

23 Ibrāhīm al-Sayyid 'Isā al-Miṣrī, *Majma' al-āthār al-'arabiyya* (Damascus, 1936), p. 124.

24 *Mir'āt al-sharq*, 12 May 1927.

25 See the cover of the pamphlet by As'ad al-Shuqayrī, *Al-risāla al-marfū'a ilā aṣhāb al-jalāla wa'l-sumūw mulūk al-muslimīn wa-umarā'him wa-ūli al-ḥall wa'l-'aqd* (Acre, 1936).

26 *Al-Jāmi'a al-'arabiyya*, 26 March 1934; Frumkin, p. 283.

27 A list of the candidates who ran in the 1912 elections in the Jerusalem district appears in *Filasṭīn*, 10 Feb. 1912. The results of the elections appear in the issue of 4 May 1912.

28 Ihsān al-Nimr, pt. 2, p. 405.

29 Frumkin, p. 282.

30 *Ibid.*, p. 283, Geoffrey Furlonge, *Palestine Is My Country - The Story of Musa Alami* (London, 1969), p. 29.

31 Asher Druyanov, *Ketavim letoldot hibat Tzion*, pt. 1 (Odessa, 5679), p. 770; *Filasṭīn*, 31 Jan. 1912; Frumkin, p. 283.

32 Druyanov, pp. 769-70; Frumkin, p. 104.

- 33 Ihsān al-Nimr, pt. 2, p. 330; Tawfiq Cana'an, "Muhammedan Saints and Sanctuaries in Palestine," *JPOS* (1926), pp. 117ff.
- 34 'Abd Allāh Mukhlis and Ya'qūb Abū al-Hudā to the High Commissioner (HC), 25 Oct. 1923, ISA, CS, 189; *Mir'at al-sharq*, 7 June 1924.
- 35 *Filastīn*, 8 May 1912.
- 36 Frumkin, pp. 102, 285.
- 37 Druyanov, pt. 1, p. 770. On other officeholders in the local administration from the local aristocracy, see document no. 13 from 1908, ISA, 'Alī Akram Bey Archive (governor of the Jerusalem *sanjaq* in the years 1906-8).
- 38 J. Finn, p. 180. Cf. also p. 181.
- 39 Letter from 'Alī Akram, governor of the Jerusalem district, to the Ministry of Interior, document no. 11, ISA, 'Alī Akram Bey Archive.
- 40 *Filastīn*, 10 Feb. 1912.
- 41 For details, see Ihsān al-Nimr, pt. 2 pp. 417-26.
- 42 On the basis of the reports in ZA, L/4, IV, 276.
- 43 The families of Abū Khadrā, Shuwā, and Bīḥār of Gaza and Jaffa are conspicuous in the lists of large landowners in Palestine at the end of the second decade of the twentieth century. The lists are found in ZA, S/25, 7433.
- 44 Y. Ben-Zvi, *Eretz-Yisrael veyishuva biymai hashilton haothmani* (Jerusalem, 1962), p.99.
- 45 Ma'oz, pp. 33; 122.
- 46 *Ibid.* A regular district governor was a pasha of one or two *ḥūghs* (horse-tails), whereas the rank of the governor of the Jerusalem district was a pasha of three *ḥūghs* with the title *mushīr*.
- 47 *Filastīn*, 28 May 1913.
- 48 On the basis of the material in ISA, CS, 140; Foreign Office (hereafter cited as FO), 371, 3385, and 3386.
- 49 Along with the many services listed in my *Tzmikhat hat'nu'a haleumit ha'arvit - hapalestina'it*, pp. 84ff; cf. *Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939*, 1st series, 4: 361-4.
- 50 HC to the colonial secretary (secret dispatch) 14 Dec. 1923, CO 733/52; Clayton to the same (secret dispatch) 17 July 1924, CO 733/71. ZE Press Bureau, communiqué no. 427, 11 Aug. 1924, ZA, S/25, 517.
- 51 *Al-Karmil*, 5 June 1927 and 19 June 1927.
- 52 For details about MCA in those days, see ISA, AE, 1787.
- 53 A. Carmel, *Haifa*, pp. 175-6, 181.
- 54 Aḥmad al-Imām to the AE, 1 Oct. 1922, ISA, AE, 1773.
- 55 A cable of protest by the Muslim and Christian Associations of Haifa to General Bols, March 1920, ISA, CS, 30.
- 56 Report on a meeting of a delegation of these two associations with Lord Milner, ISA, AE, 1772; these two associations to the AE, 28 Feb. 1922; *ibid.*, 3046; same to M.K. al-Ḥusaynī, 22 March 1921; *ibid.*, 1058; Aḥmad al-Imām to the AE, 14 August 1930; *ibid.*, 1780.
- 57 See Nablus petitions in ISA, CS, 140. On the activities of this association and its position, see ISA, AE, 1072.

- 58 Cable by *Lajnat al-mu'tamar al-'arabī* (Committee of Arab Congress) to AE, 7 Oct. 1929; *ibid.*, 1780; report of the financial committee, 27 Jan. 1930; *ibid.*, 1524; see also the mailing list of the AE, 11 June 1931; *ibid.*, 3595.
- 59 *Al-Jāmi'a al-'arabiyya*, 15 July 1931.
- 60 Report on the fifth congress, ISA, CS, 168.
- 61 See a letter of 'Izzat Darwaza (of 1921), ISA, AE, 1773. In 1925 one of the appeals of the Nablus MCA to the AE was written on the official paper of *al-Nādī al-'arabī* (see Ḥāfiẓ Ṭūqān to AE, no. 2, 6 June 1925; *ibid.*, 1825; *al-Nādī al-'arabī* cable to the AE, 25 March 1925; *ibid.*, 3605).
- 62 'Izzat Darwaza, secretary of *al-Nādī al-'arabī* in Nablus, to Jamāl al-Ḥusaynī, 23 Dec. 1927 and 10 Jan. 1928; *ibid.*, 2700.
- 63 CID report, 23 Dec. 1920, ISA, CS, 156. On the activities of the association in 1921, see ISA, AE, 1058. On the later periods, see letter of nomination of the Gaza delegates to the sixth congress, 15 June 1923; *ibid.*, 3596; Gaza MCA to the AE, 17 Dec. 1924; *ibid.*, 1825; cable of Gaza MCA to AE, 25 March 1925; *ibid.*, 3605.
- 64 'Isā Shafārah and 'Abd Allāh al-Jawdah to the AE president, 15 June 1922; *ibid.*, 1773.
- 65 See the financial reports for 1921, *ibid.*, 1713.
- 66 Jubrān Iskandar Kazmā to Jamāl al-Ḥusaynī, 4 July 1922; *ibid.*, 3785; letter of nomination of Nazareth delegates to the sixth congress, 14 June 1923, *ibid.*, 3596.
- 67 Muslim Association to the AE, July 1922, *ibid.*, 1057; *al-Karmil*, 1 Nov. 1922; letter of nomination of Tiberias delegates to the sixth congress, 15 June 1923, ISA, AE, 3596. On the financial aspect see f.n. 65.
- 68 See f.n. 65. HC to the colonial secretary, confidential dispatch, 6 Oct. 1922, CO 733/26.
- 69 'Ilyān Abū Gharbiyya, secretary of Hebron MCA, to the AE, 11 Oct. 1922, ISA, AE, 1773.
- 70 Safed Protest, 12 March 1920, ISA, CS, 30. See also the list of the association in March 1921, *ibid.*, AE, 1058.
- 71 As'ad al-Ḥājj Yūsuf (Qaddūra) to AE, 21 March 1923, *ibid.*, 1541; letter of nomination of Safed delegates to the sixth congress, *ibid.*, 3596; cable by Safed MCA to the HC 29 Nov 1923, ISA, CS, 172. As'ad al-Ḥājj Yūsuf to the AE president, 5 Jan. 1924, ISA, AE 3589; cable by Safed MCA to the AE, 23 March 1925, *ibid.*, 3605; same to the same, 16 Oct. 1929, *ibid.*, 2482.
- 72 Yūsuf Zamariq to M.K. al-Ḥusaynī, 19 Dec. 1924, *ibid.*, 1825; cable by Jeisan MCA to the AE, 25 March 1925, *ibid.*, 3605; same to the same, 20 Sept. 1929, *ibid.*, 1715.
- 73 For Ramallah, see Salīm Salāma to the AE president, *ibid.*, 1716; for amleh, cable by Ramleh MCA to the AE, 16 Oct. 1929, *ibid.*, 1780; protocol of the AE Bureau session, 11 Feb. 1930, *ibid.*, 3797; report of the financial committee, 27 Jan. 1930, *ibid.*, 1542; cable by Ramleh MCA, 12 Nov. 1930, *ibid.*, 122. For Lydda, see *ibid.*, 1782.
- 74 See 'Abd Allāh Samāra to the AE, 11 Oct. 1922, *ibid.*, 1773. ZA, L/4, 276

- IV. Haganah Archive, Shneerson Papers, nos. 5, 6. *Do'ar ha-yōm*, 9 Dec. 1919.
- 75 ISA, AE, 1059. Tulkarm petition concerning the muftī of Jerusalem, April 1921, ISA, CS, 245; Tulkarm petition to the Foreign Secretary, May 1921, *ibid.*, 224. Salīm [‘Abd al-Rahmān] al-Hājj Ibrāhīm to the AE, 23 June 1921, ISA, AE, 1773.
- 76 ‘Abd Allāh Samāra to the AE, 30 May 1922, *ibid.*, 1059; Muḥammad Kamāl al-Jayūsī to the AE, 26 Feb. 1922, *ibid.*; *mukhtārs* of Tulkarm subdistrict to the AE, 26 June 1922, *ibid.*, C.F. Reading, the governor of Tulkarm, to Tulkarm mayor, 19 June 1922, ISA, CS, 158.
- 77 *Al-Karmil*, 29 Aug. 1923.
- 78 ISA, AE, 1061; *al-Karmil* 16 Dec. 1922.
- 79 Cable by ‘Abd al-Qādir Yūsuf ‘Abd al-Hādi and Nāfi ‘Abūshī to M.K. al-Ḥusaynī, ISA, AE, 1058.
- 80 CID report, 23 Dec. 1920, ISA, CS, 156.
- 81 Jerusalem MCA to the governor, 10 Feb. 1919, *ibid.*
- 82 *Al-Karmil*, 22 April 1928.
- 83 Salīm al-Hājj Ibrāhīm to AE, 23 June 1921, ISA, AE, 1773; Ḥumaydān Kātiba Badr to M.K. al-Ḥusaynī, 13 Oct. 1925, *ibid.*, 3591; Salīm Ḥijāzī to same, *ibid.*, Ṭālib Marāqa to the same, 17 Oct. 1925, *ibid.*; Ḥasan Sidqī al-Dajānī to the delegates of the sixth congress, 20 June 1923, *ibid.*, 1771.
- 84 See *ibid.*, 1057, 1058, 1059, 1061, 1072, 1525, 1722, 1773, 1782, 1787, 1810, 2482, 3591, and 3785.
- 85 See the various proposals in *ibid.*, 1771.
- 86 See *ibid.*, 1072 and the AE report to the sixth congress, 16 June 1923, *ibid.*, 1026.
- 87 Memorandum to the League of Nations, 1922, *ibid.*, 1810; AE announcement regarding “The Palestinian Administration and the Alleged Establishment of an Advisory Council,” 15 Aug. 1923, *ibid.*, 2425.
- 88 The various notices of the societies on the election of their delegates in *ibid.*, 1072, 3596, and 3714.
- 89 Ḥasan Ṣidqī al-Dajānī to the sixth congress, 20 June 1923, *ibid.*, 1771. Jamāl al-Ḥusaynī’s note on the election of Jerusalem delegates to the sixth congress, *ibid.*, 3596. Report on the sixth congress, 25 June 1923, ISA, CS, 171.
- 90 Ḥamdī al-Ḥusaynī, pp. 7 ff; *al-Karmil*, 11 March 1928.
- 91 M.K. al-Ḥusaynī to Deedes (end of 1920), ISA, CS, 244.
- 92 See *al-Karmil*, 19 Dec. 1920. Report on the fourth congress, 21 June 1921, CO 733/13. Cox to the Assistant Chief Secretary for Political Affairs ACS (P), 25 Aug. 1922, ISA, CS, 168. Letters of election of the AE members, ISA, AE, 3596. Ḥamdī al-Ḥusaynī, p. 15.
- 93 See the material in ISA, CS, 156.
- 94 Frumkin, pp. 282-6.
- 95 R. Storrs, *Memories* (New York, 1937), p. 351.
- 96 See *al-Karmil*, 23 Jan. 1924.
- 97 *Ibid.*, 19 Sept. 1926.
- 98 Report on the fourth congress, 21 June 1923, CO 733/13.

- 99 'Umar al-Biṭār to the fifth congress, 15 Aug. 1922, ISA, AE, 1711; al-Fārūqī's cable to the same, 20 Aug. 1922, *ibid.*, 1058.
- 100 Kāmil al-Budayrī to the AE, 2 June 1922, *ibid.*, 1773; protocol of the AE session held on 26 June 1922, *ibid.*, 1058. 'Ārif Pasha al-Dajānī's announcement that he had resigned from his position in the AE owing to his objection to its methods was published in *Mir'at al-sharq*, 1 July 1922. For the AE letter on his dismissal, his reaction, and the notice to the government, see ISA, AE, 1773. 'Ārif al-Dajānī's nephew and close assistant, Ḥāsan Sidqī al-Dajānī then wrote an article denying the right of the AE to decide upon sending a delegation to Hejaz (see *Bayt al-maqdis*, 10 June 1922, and 21 June 1922).
- 101 Eder to the secretary of the ZE in London, 17 July 1922, ZA, Z/4, 1053. ZE in Jerusalem to Eder, 16 Aug. 1922, ZA, S/25, 4377.
- 102 See reports in ZA, L/4, Z76IV, *Filasṭīn*, 10 Feb. 1912, 17 April 1912. *Mir'at al-sharq*, 7 Feb. 1924. D. Miller to Eder, 9 June 1922, ZA, S/25, 4380.
- 103 AĒ Bureau, "The 35th Newsletter," 24 March 1922, ISA, AE, 1722; Ḥāfiz Ṭūqān to Jamāl al-Ḥusaynī 9 Oct. 1921, *ibid.*, 1072; last source in previous note.
- 104 On his jobs, see Khālīdī, *Ahl al-'ilm*, p. 39, and As'ad Shuqayrī, *al-Risāla al-marfū'a* on the internal part of the cover. On his political views, see Tawfīq Barū, pp. 507-8, 543.
- 105 *Al-Karmil*, 22 Oct. 1924.
- 106 *Ibid.*, 31 Oct. 1920.
- 107 *Ibid.*, 25 Oct. 1924.
- 108 Document no. 15A (August 1920), ISA, CS, 33; *Mir'at al-sharq*, 4 Aug. 1927.
- 109 *Al-Karmil*, 8 Aug. 1926. See also *ibid.*, 17 May 1930 and 10 Aug. 1930.
- 110 For 'Ārif al-Dajānī and Ya'qūb Farrāj and the stand of the Jerusalem MCA which they headed, see my doctoral dissertation, *Zmichat Hatnuach Haleumit Haravit Hapalestinait 1918-1929* (Jerusalem, 1971). The English version, *Growth of the Palestinian Arab National Movement*, is being published in London (summer 1973). On Rāghīb al-Nashāshībī, see *Al-Jāmi'a al-'arabiyya*, 29 Nov. 1932 and *Mir'at al-sharq* 21 April 1927. See the articles by Ḥusnī 'Abd al-Hadī (a prominent opposition leader from Nablus) in *Bayt al-maqdis*, 7 July 1920, 17 July 1920, 24 July 1920, 31 July 1920; 7 Aug. 1920, 12 May 1921; *al-Karmil*, 22 Aug. 1931, tells about a group of Palestinians who clashed with Faysal during his rule in Damascus. All these Palestinians became supporters of the opposition later on. See also *Mir'at al-sharq* 27 Feb. 1924.
- 111 The files of the political department of the Zionist Executive prove this.
- 112 Memorandum to Eder, 5 May 1920, ZA, Z/4, 2800 II. *Filasṭīn*, 26 Nov. 1921. Kalvarisky to the political department of the Zionist Executive, 24 March 1923, ZA, S/25, 4379; report on the meeting of the members of the "National Muslim Association" with Dr. Eder, 3 April 1922, *ibid.*, 4380. Jubrān Iskandar Kazmā to the AE, 24 Aug. 1921, ISA, AE, 3785; same to same, 12 Sept. 1921, *ibid.*
- 113 Same to Jamāl al-Ḥusaynī, 24 Aug. 1921, *ibid.*; same to same, 29 Nov.

- 1921, *ibid.*; same to same 20 Feb. 1922, *ibid.*; Farīd Fakhr al-Dīn to same, 30 July 1923, *ibid.*, 1057.
- 114 Conversations between members of the "National Muslim Association" and Dr. Eder, 30 March 1922 and 3 April 1922, ZA, S/25, 4380.
- 115 AE Bureau, "The 2nd Newsletter," 10 Aug. 1921, ISA, AE, 1722.
- 116 CID report, signed by E.H. Howard, 16 Aug. 1923, ISA, CS, 158.
- 117 See note no. 113. See also Jubrān Iskandar Kazmā to Jamāl al-Ḥusaynī, 13 April 1922, ISA, AE, 3785; same to the AE president, 7 July 1921, *ibid.*, 1058.
- 118 Same to Jamāl al-Ḥusaynī, 4 July 1922, *ibid.*, 3785.
- 119 See note no. 116. See also Ḥāfiẓ Tūqān to Jamāl al-Ḥusaynī (no date), *ibid.*, 1072.
- 120 Nāfi' 'Abūshī to the same, 17 Aug. 1921, *ibid.*, 1061; AE Bureau, "The 5th Newsletter," 28 Aug. 1921, *ibid.*, 1722.
- 121 For details on this family, see ISA, CS 151. A list of the active members of the National Muslim Association all over the country can be found in ZA, S/25, 6310.
- 122 AE Bureau, "The 3rd Newsletter," 10 Aug. 1921, ISA, AE, 1722; "The 4th Newsletter," 18 Oct. 1921, *ibid.*; "The 36th Newsletter," 30 March, 1922, *ibid.*
- 123 "The 21st Newsletter," 16 Dec. 1921, *ibid.*; "The 42nd Newsletter," 19 May 1922, *ibid.*; "The 47th Newsletter," 14 July 1922, *ibid.*
- 124 The petitions are kept in ISA, CS, 30. Communiqué of the Zionist Commission Press Bureau, no. 325, 1 June 1920, ZA, Z/4, 1454; report no. 37, 17 April 1920, *ibid.*, 2800 II; report no. 41, 21 April 1920, *ibid.*; report from Haifa, 24 May 1920, *ibid.*
- 125 Secret memorandum to Eder, 5 May 1920, *ibid.* See also *al-Quds al-sharīf*, 29 July 1920.
- 126 Petitions and letters signed by 'Abd al-Ḥamīd Abū Ghūsh and others, of March-April 1920, ISA, CS, 30.
- 127 See, for example, Nāfi' 'Abūshī to the AE, 17 Aug. 1921, ISA, AE, 1061; same to same, 4 Jan. 1922, *ibid.*
- 128 Cox to ACS (P), 25 Aug. 1922, ISA, CS, 168.
- 129 Mir'āt al-Sharq, 9 July 1924; *al-Karmil*, 19 July 1924. On the activities of this organization against the SMC and its part in the negotiations held at the end of 1924 between the rival factions, see Mahmūd al-Māḍī to the HC, 11 Sept. 1924, ISA, CS, 189. "Resolutions of the Reconciliation Committee," ISA, AE, 1825; *al-Karmil*, 15 Sept. 1925.
- 130 Cox to the ACS (P), 17 Jan. 1924, ISA, CS, 173. See also the various petitions in *ibid.*, 189; Darwaza, pt. 3, p. 41; *Mir'āt al-sharq*, 1 Dec. 1923.
- 131 See his claim in his book; p. 89, but the huge amount of letters, reports, and summaries included in ZA, S/25, 517, 518, and 665 proves our argument.
- 132 F. Kisch, "The Political Development of the Arabs in Palestine," 6 June 1925; ZA, S/25, 517; Kalvarisky, "Remarques sur la situation politique," 9 Oct. 1924, *ibid.*, 518; same to Kisch, 27 June 1926, *ibid.*, 665; Clayton to Colonial Secretary, 17 July 1924, CO 733/71.
- 133 Memorandum by Mr. Hason, 1927, ZA, S/25., 517.

- 134 A leaflet signed by Jamāl al-Ḥusaynī, "The Policy of Imperialism -- Divide and Rule," ISA, AE, 1825; Ḥāfiẓ Ṭūqān to AE, no. 2, 6 May 1925, *ibid.*; *Filasṭīn*, 29 Jan. 1926.
- 135 *Mir'āt al-sharq*, 14 June 1924.
- 136 On this issue, see ISA, AE, 1825.
- 137 See opposition petition to the Colonial Secretary, ISA, CS, 189 and *al-Karmil*, 9 May 1925. On the dissolution of this branch, see ZE Press Bureau communiqué (according to *Mir'āt al-sharq*, 12 July 1924, and *Lisān al-'arab*, 16 July 1924), no. 427, 11 Aug. 1924, ZA, S/25, 517. HC to Colonial Secretary, secret dispatch, 14 Dec. 1923, CO 733/52; Clayton to the same, secret dispatch, 17 July 1924, CO 733/71.
- 138 HC to the colonial secretary, secret dispatch, 23 May 1924, CO 733/68; Clayton to the Colonial Secretary, secret dispatch, 24 Oct. 1924, CO 733/74; HC to the same, secret dispatch CO 733/93.
- 139 *Al-Karmil*, 25 Feb. 1925; *Mir'āt al-sharq*, 1 Feb. 1925, 25 Aug. 1927; *Filasṭīn*, 2 Oct. 1925, 29 Jan. 1926; leaflet signed by Jamāl al-Ḥusaynī, "The Policy of Imperialism," ISA, AE, 1825; Ḥāfiẓ Ṭūqān to the AE, no. 2, 6 May 1925, *ibid.*
- 140 *Mir'āt al-sharq*, 23 June 1923, 1 Feb. 1925. It is not surprising, therefore, that Colonel F. Kisch discerned this process already at the beginning of 1924. See his book, p. 92.
- 141 *Mir'āt al-sharq*, 2 Dec. 1925, 5 Dec. 1925.
- 142 *Filasṭīn*, 8 Dec. 1925, 29 Dec. 1926; *al-Karmil*, 23 Dec. 1925, 31 Jan. 1926, 14 Feb. 1926; see also Darwaza, pt. 3, pp. 50-1.
- 143 On this congress, the preparations for it, its composition, and character, see my doctoral dissertation, pp. 292-5.
- 144 Detailed lists of participants in the above-mentioned congresses appear in the supplement to my doctoral dissertation.
- 145 On this congress, see *Al-Jāmi'a al-'arabiyya*, 21 June 1928; *Sawt al-sha'b*, 23 June 1928; Ḥamdī al-Ḥusaynī, *Kalīma ilā al-sha'b al-'arabī al-filasṭīnī ḥawla 'l-mu'tamar al-'arabī al-filasṭīnī al sābī'*; 'Izzat Darwaza, *Ḥawla 'l-haraka al-'arabiyya al-ḥadītha* (Sidon, 1950), 3: 54.
- 146 Y. Shimonī, *Arvei Eretz-Yisrael* (Tel Aviv, 1947), pp. 288-9.
- 147 See ZA, S/25, 3405.
- 148 See my doctoral dissertation, ch. 8.
- 149 *Al-Jāmi'a al-'arabiyya*, the series of articles which began to be published on 22 March 1928. See also *ibid.*, 7 May 1928, 21 July 1932, 15 Aug. 1933. Protocol of AE session, 9 Sept. 1932, ISA, AE, 3797.
- 150 *Al-Jāmi'a al-'arabiyya*, 26 April 1928.
- 151 Frumkin noted (p. 324) that in 1918, when the courts of law were reopened, no young Muslims who knew how to write English could be found.
- 152 *Al-Ittihād al-'arabī*, 27 June 1925; *Mir'āt al-sharq*, 10 Oct. 1925.
- 153 *Al-Karmil*, 6 Feb. 1928, 13 Feb. 1928, and 1 April 1928; *Al-Jāmi'a al-'arabiyya*, 7 May 1928.
- 154 'Abd al-Qādir al-Muẓaffar to the AE, 27 Dec. 1930, ISA, AE, 2700.

- 155 *Al-Jāmi'a al-'arabiyya*, 21 July 1932.
- 156 Protocol of AE session, 9 Sept. 1932, ISA, AE, 3797.
- 157 Report on the congress, 7 Nov. 1932, ZA, S/25, 4122.
- 158 Report from 4 Nov. 1932, *ibid.*
- 159 Protocol of AE session, 9 Sept. 1932, ISA, AE, 3797.
- 160 Protocol of the AE session, 28 Oct. 1932, *ibid.*
- 161 *Ibid.*
- 162 According to the book of protocols, *ibid.*
- 163 Farīd Fakhr al-Dīn to Jamāl al-Ḥusaynī, 30 July 1932, *ibid.*, 1057. HC to the Colonial Secretary, secret dispatch, 14 Dec. 1923, CO 733/52. Eder to the secretary of the ZE in London, 17 July 1922, ZA, Z/4, 1053.
- 164 Fu'ād Shaṭāra to M.K. al-Ḥusaynī, 18 Aug. 1924, ISA, AE, 3520; Youngmen's Association of Bīr-Zayt to the same, 18 Aug. 1924, *ibid.*; Da'ūd Maja'id to the same, 21 Aug. 1922, *ibid.*; *al-Karmil*, 15 June 1921; D. Miller to Eder, 9 May 1922, S/25, 4380.
- 165 *Al-Karmil*, 20 Feb. 1924.
- 166 *Al-Karmil*, 10 Aug. 1930.
- 167 Protocol of AE session, 26 Sept. 1930, ISA, AE, 3797. Protocol of AE Bureau session, 9 Sept. 1930, *ibid.*
- 168 Reactions of Christians from various places in the country who objected to these petitions, *ibid.*, 1052.
- 169 See, for example, *al-Jāmi'a al-'arabiyya*, 4 Sept. 1932, 13 Aug. 1933.
- 170 J. Chancellor to the Colonial Secretary, confidential dispatch, 15 Aug. 1931, CO 733/202.
- 171 *Al-Jāmi'a al-'arabiyya* and *Mir'at al-sharq*, 23 Sept. 1931; ZA, S/25, 4108.
- 172 See the material in ZA, S/25, 4224, Ṣubḥī Yāsīn, *al-Thawra al-'arabiyya al-kubrā fī Filasṭīn* (Cairo n.d.), and Yuval Arnon, "Felahim bamered ha'aravi be'eretz Yisrael, 1936-1939," (M.A. Diss., The Hebrew University, 1970), pp. 4-5.
- 173 This description is based on the above-cited work by Yuval Arnon and on *Te'udot udmuyot – miginzel haknufiot ha-'arvot* (Hamagen Haivri, 1944).
- 174 See Yehuda Slotzki, *Sefer toldot hahaganah* (Tel Aviv, 1963), 2: 759-78.
- 175 See Y. Bauer, *Diplomatiah umahteret bamdiniyut hatzionit 1939-1945* (Merhavia, 1963), pp. 11-61.
- 176 See Y. Shimoni, *Arvei Eretz-Yisrael* (Tel Aviv, 1946), pp. 315-28.
- 177 See Y. Porath, "Haligah leshihurur leumi – tequmatah, mahutah, vehitparqutah (1943-1948)," *Hamizrah Hehadash* (The New East) 14 (1964): 354-66.
- 178 Y. Shimoni, "Ha'aravim Liqrat Milhemet Yisrael-'Arav," *Hamizrah Hehadash* 22 (1962): 206-7.
- 179 On the establishment and development of this organization, see Michael Suleiman, *Political Parties in Lebanon* (New York, 1967), pp. 155-72.
- 180 For the turn to the left of this organization and the turning point it underwent, see *Limadhā munazzamāt al-ishtirākīyyīn al-lubnāniyyīn* (Beirut, 1970).
- 181 On this organization, see Ehud Ya'ari, *Fath* (Tel Aviv, 1970).

REGIME AND OPPOSITION IN JORDAN SINCE 1949*

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INTRODUCTION

Jordan is no self-evident entity like Egypt, or even like Syria or Iraq. Yet the state, created by Churchill and the Sharif 'Abd Allah for their common convenience, has by now existed for two generations -- time enough to set a socio-political pattern. One should, therefore, regard with caution the easy commonplace that Jordan is "artificial"; that its *raison d'être* is self-perpetuation in the interest of the king and a handful of his supporters, protected by a "Bedouin army"; and that this interest is opposed to the interest and wishes of the majority of the population, and the more progressive and better educated majority at that.

This concept is clearly too dependent on subjective values to be proved or disproved at present with the historian's tools. This study moves on a different plane; it examines its theme inductively, by analyzing the role and the background of the main actors at certain turning points over the last twenty-one years.

In detail the method will be as follows:

a. The "image of Jordan" will be delineated as it has imprinted itself over the years on a consensus of well-wishers, ill-wishers, and detached observers alike.

b. The "population of Jordan" will be briefly described in terms of objectively determinable sectors which have played a significant role in the political history of the country.

c. The "politically active public" will be classified in terms of its attitude toward the "image of Jordan": the "establishment" -- those persons or groups who have been active and effective in maintaining and advancing the "image"; and "anti-establishment elements" -- those who endeavored to supplant it.

* This paper is published as originally composed late in 1970; the author believes it to be essentially up-to-date in early 1973.