

News Division Files

Memorandum of the Press and Radio News Conference of the Secretary of State, Wednesday, September 8, 1948, at Washington

(Extract)

No. 34

Israel

Asked if any consideration was being given to *de jure* recognition of Israel, the Secretary said it was being considered very carefully and was a matter of timing. Asked if the timing was up to the State Department or the White House or both, Secretary Marshall said it was up to both, but particularly the White House, since the decision naturally was the President's. He said that the recommendation was with him. Asked if this meant that he had decided to recognize Israel but had not decided when to do it, Secretary Marshall said that it was the hope of the United States that we could find it proper to recognize the government of Israel in a *de jure* manner. He continued that final decision would have to be taken in the matter of timing because it has something to do with the elections. Asked if he were referring to the Israeli elections, the Secretary said that he believed that they have elections on October first. A correspondent said that from what had been said it would appear that the Secretary had said that he had decided to recognize Israel after the elections. Secretary Marshall replied that it was hoped that we could. He was then asked if the implication was that it was now premature to extend *de jure* recognition. The Secretary declared that he would make no more comments.

M. J. McDermott

667K.61/9-443

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Truman

SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 8, 1948.

Reference is made to my secret memorandum of August 30, 1948, relating to the *de jure* recognition of the Governments of Israel and Transjordan.

For your background guidance, I am attaching press clippings relating to my press conference on September 8¹ at which I was ques-

¹ Attached to the ribbon copy are typescript copies of two unidentified news dispatches (Truman Papers, President's Secretary's File).

tioned concerning the extension of *de jure* recognition to Israel by the United States. I became committed to a reply of the nature made by me because of my ill-advised use of the expression that the *de jure* recognition was "a matter of timing".

If you are also questioned on this subject, it is suggested that the press correspondents be informed that the question of *de jure* recognition of Israel will not be finally decided until a recommendation is received from the State Department. It might also be stated that a recommendation is not expected from the State Department until elections have been held in Israel, now scheduled to take place about October 1.

G. C. MARSHALL

Editorial Note

President Truman was asked at his press conference of September 9 whether recognition of the Government of Israel would have to wait until after the election in that country. He replied that "I have that matter under consideration now. I cannot give you a definite answer on it now." (*Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1948*, page 482.)

SSNIN.01/79-045

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State¹

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] September 8, 1948.

Participants: Secretary of State George C. Marshall
General Julius Klein and sixteen other representatives
of the Jewish War Veterans

This afternoon, shortly after 3:00 P.M., I received a delegation of seventeen representatives of the Jewish War Veterans of the United States, headed by Mr. Julius Klein, their national commander.

Klein informed me that the group had met with the President earlier in the day. He then made a statement to me of the views of the Jewish War Veterans regarding Palestine which was generally more moderate in tone than other statements I have received from similar groups. (At the close of the interview Mr. Klein presented me with a copy of the formal statement of the views of his organization on this topic).²

In my remarks I replied generally to Klein's statement and said that I approved the emphasis which had been given to the national interest in Klein's statement.

¹ Drafted by Garland C. Beall of the Division of Public Liaison.

² Not attached to file copy.

I emphasized that as Secretary of State it was my duty to approach the problem of Palestine on a realistic basis, as free as possible from the emotionalism which surrounds the issue. My duty, I pointed out, was to seek calmly a wise long-range solution which would adequately serve the interests of the United States.

I mentioned that, to some extent at least, the emotionalism of the issue had caught up the Arab peoples to such an extent that Arab leaders are not able to make concessions which otherwise they might be willing to make. I remarked, off-the-record, that in the very polite talks with diplomatic representatives of Arab nations there had been recurring reference to the use of Arab military force and that this tactic had been both unwise and ineffective. Likewise there was the suggestion of political reprisals by Jewish groups in the United States.

I also indicated that the expansionist tendencies of the U.S.S.R. in this area further complicated the already complex situation.

I discussed the terrible condition of the Arab refugees and emphasized that, regardless of where the fault lay for their plight, immediate assistance was required for the people involved and that the United States Government was helping to provide needed assistance. This problem I described as a sore in the midst of an area which we are trying to heal.

Klein said that the President had indicated that the activities of extreme Zionist groups had greatly complicated the problem of dealing with the Palestine issue, and asked if I wished to comment on this. I indicated that I had no comment to make.

I stated that the present situation in Palestine gave more promise of a satisfactory solution than at any time since the problem had arisen, and that the prospect[s] for such a solution were good. I warned that an effective solution would probably please neither the Arab nor Israel governments.

501.25 Palestine/9-144: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

TOP SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, September 8, 1948—noon.

3544. Re Deptal 2448, Sep 1 and airtel 3927 Sep 1 we are [of] opinion that, quite aside from such doubts as might exist on constitutional interpretation UN Charter as to SC powers to use Chapter VII enforcement action to establish a permanent frontier in Palestine, it would be highly unwise from political point of view for SC to entertain resolution to that effect. For your strictly private info SC enforcement action to establish final frontiers in Palestine might not find popular support in US at a given moment and would certainly meet with disapproval of JCS on strictly military grounds if enforce-

ment were contemplated which would involve use of troops. Furthermore (and this seems conclusive to us) it would be inexpedient to bring issue before Council because of almost certain Soviet opposition to any settlement on which UK and US were in agreement.

In consequence foregoing considerations we do not find ourselves able agree with suggestion para 6 year 3880 Aug 27. SC would however of course continue its responsibilities for maintenance truce in Palestine.

Likewise, on political grounds, we feel it would be inexpedient to reanimate Palestine issue in SC or GA unless there were prior acquiescence by both Arabs and Jews to a suggested settlement and one side or both required extra stimulus of SC or GA recommendation in order to convert public opinion to accept a given settlement. In such case we would have no objection appropriate UN action.

Re timetable suggested Embtel 3927 Sep 1 we agree with FO view in second para Embtel 3962 Sep 3 that timetable should be speeded up and US-UK proposals placed in hands Mediator by US and UK earliest possible moment. We consider, however, that we should await PGI reaction, which should be forthcoming shortly. We agree on immediate joint approach Bernadotte thereafter with view public announcement by him of reasonable solution. This solution would include Mediator's territorial recommendations for frontier between Israel and Transjordan. We continue believe preferable for both of us to exert extreme diplomatic pressure on both sides. Both Govts would inform PGI and Arab states their belief that recommendation Mediator was equitable and to advantage all concerned to accept. If this procedure is attended with success GA, toward end session, might be able pass quickly brief resolution recommending Mediator's suggestion to favorable consideration of parties, thus saving face Arab and Jewish leaders.

Re para 5, Embtel 3902 Sep 3, Embe reply was correct. Dept has not given up principle similar approaches by US and UK to both Arabs and Jews.

Re para 6 Embtel 3902 Sep 3. Deptels 3468 and 3469 Sep 1² may be considered replies in principle to Embtels 3880 and 3881 Aug. 27. Further replies re specific points and details will follow. Dept concurs in general with Brit ideas re Israeli frontiers. US does not favor Jewish corridor to Jerusalem on assumption some acceptable plan for Jerusalem itself can be worked out. Dept still considers Haifa as important point. US agrees that Mediator's proposal should refer specifically to Arab refugees.

Pls insure foregoing is treated with utmost discretion.

Marshall.

² Regarding the latter, see footnote 2, p. 1383.

561.86 Palestine/9-948: Telegram

*The Consul General at Jerusalem (Macdonald) to the
Secretary of State*

RESTRICTED

JERUSALEM, September 8, 1948—3 p. m.

1261. In speech over Transjordan controlled Ramallah radio on 5th Azmi Nashashibi, director station and brigadier in Arab Legion, indicated Arabs might consider direct talks with Jews under following "conditions": Jews return to areas held before November 29, return of all Arab refugees, payment by Jews for damages. Jews not attempt to dictate to Arabs. Although conditions mentioned obviously unacceptable, speech significant as further indication possible Arab willingness negotiate directly with Jews.

MACDONALD

561.86 Palestine/9-948: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the
Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET

LONDON, September 8, 1948—noon.

4083. For the Secretary. I plan to take up subject of Department's 3470, September 1¹ with Bevin personally at an early opportunity and to elicit considered British views, but I believe they are likely to be along lines of following reactions at Wright-Burrows level:

1. Announcement by PGI that its elections have been postponed from October 1 to November 15 in view Foreign Office officials may obviate dangers which they believe would be inherent in simultaneous *de jure* recognition by US of PGI and Transjordan during or before crucial period of discussion following announcement of Mediator's proposals. Officials in principle welcome US intention to recognize Transjordan, see logic of US extending *de jure* recognition to Israel (Embassy's 3878, August 27, Paragraph 5) and agree that there are advantages in simultaneous recognition both countries. In their view, however, timing of recognition in relation to action which US and UK have been discussing (Embassy's 3962 September 3) is vitally important.

2. Foreign Office officials fear US recognition of Transjordan before acquiescence of Arab States to Mediator's proposals is achieved would greatly weaken already shaky position of Transjordan in eyes of its Arab neighbors who would be quick to allege that US recognition of Transjordan is clear evidence of US-Transjordan "deal" by which former paid Transjordan with recognition for "selling out" Arab cause in Palestine. Foreign Office officials have no doubt that Arab press and public will in any case roundly denounce any proposals put forward by Mediator even though they believe that "acquiescence" of Arab States to proposals can be secured eventually. However, vigor of these denunciations would be greatly increased if local scapegoat

¹ See footnote 1 to memorandum of August 20, p. 1260.

wearing horns of perfidy were available. UN has advantage of being an intangible villain but "Rabbi" Abdullah, upon whom we will have to rely so heavily at a later stage, is already on the spot and would be in even worse case if he were to appear prior to UN action as party to "deal".

3. Officials believe it is essential that if Transjordan is to be useful in achieving a lasting settlement Abdullah must seem just as outraged as other Arab leaders with whom it is expedient that the [AeF] display every evidence of solidarity.

4. In essence view of Foreign Office officials is that timing of US *de jure* recognition of both Transjordan and PGI should be decided on basis of progress actually made with regard to Mediator's proposals.

5. Goldmann confirmed November 15 election date today.

DOUGLAS

201 RB Palestine/3-845 (Telegram)

*The Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald)
to the Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET

US URGENT

Tel Aviv, September 9, 1948—4 p. m.

NILACT

98. This message sent through Haifa; Department reply directly Tel Aviv.

On September 8 I had one hour and half meeting with Ben-Gurion and Shertok (re: Deptel 73, September 1 and 80, September 8¹) Knox and Epstein present.

Prime Minister began by stating that most important feature of US suggestions was evidence positive interest in offering assist facilitate peace settlement; however, he stated he was confused by our procedure of agreeing to "command" a program to UN Mediator and was doubtful that such step would result fruitful negotiations; he said he would preferably welcome US good offices to "mediate" directly with Arabs, or to facilitate Israel direct negotiations with Arabs.

Prime Minister, obviously showing signs near exhaustion, then commented on truce in serious and emphatic tone as follows:

1. Indefinite truce is an indirect sanction of Arabs keep their invading armies in Palestine indefinitely.

2. UN has taken no action punish serious Arab truce violations such as destruction Latrun pumping station which, except for foresight Jews in constructing independent pipe lines would have condemned 110,000 Jews in Jerusalem to death by thirst.

3. While UN observers "swarm" over Israel PGI has no evidence that Arab armies are being restrained in Arab states. On contrary PGI intelligence indicates Arab armies are massing and arms ammunition are being obtained; Prime Minister also stated parenthetically that he understands large ship with arms for Arabs now on way from Italy to Beirut.

¹ Letter not printed.

4. Indefinite truce means foreign supervision Israel for indefinite period and this deeply resented by Israel: as now interpreted truce means supervision on immigration, not only by UN but now also by USA action restraining emigrants in Germany which actions Prime Minister stated were tantamount imposition new White Paper; such restrictions immigration is "intolerable" and that, if necessary Jews will fight for right of Jews return Israel which is fundamental reason for and principle on which state was founded.

5. Prime Minister concluded comment on truce by saying indefinite truce is not the way to peace.

As regards specific suggestions Prime Minister's reactions were as follows:

1. Exchange of territory: he asked what does word "large" mean in connection Negev, stating that word when used by US is terrifying to Jews in consideration diminutive size Israel. Also he asked what is reason back of suggestion giving desert land to Transjordan which already has enormous uninhabited areas desert land; does this suggestion affect development of Dead Sea industries in which Israel has so valuable share? Also he asked what is meant by "fertile" portion of "occupied" west Galilee, stating that all of Galilee can be made fertile by Jewish effort. What change in situation has occurred since November 29, that US now wishes enlarge Arab area at expense Israel? Prime Minister's general reaction to suggested territorial exchange was thus definitely negative, but also inquisitive.

2. Jerusalem: Prime Minister observed that at least US suggestions admitted of some flexibility. Jerusalem, he stated, meant more to Jews than Paris to French or London to British. He asked, however, did our suggestion envisage Jewish corridor to Jerusalem which he declared was absolutely vital? He observed reflectively that the people of Israel had right to all of western Palestine but that personally in order get agreement with Arabs on Jerusalem he would recommend sacrifice of much that was dear to Israel for the sake of real peace with Arabs. Shertok interrupted to say that his personal opinion was that Old City might be internationalized and a portion of New City be given to Arabs under some mutually acceptable partition agreement. Prime Minister and Shertok feel this suggestion can be further examined.

3. Arab refugees: Prime Minister stated PGI willing consider constructive suggestions alleviate refugee problem, but he offered no plan. He stated he saw no possibility mass return refugees until peace settlement effected and that comprehensive solution must wait on peace. Shertok observed that problem was twofold, i.e. (a) interim international relief for refugees (he mentioned Egypt should certainly give some aid) and (b) permanent solution of resettlement majority refugees in Arab areas in which resettlement work Jews willing to assist. Shertok further stated that Israel willing consider admission now very small number individual family hardship cases but was vague on details. Prime Minister reemphasized that solution depended on firm peace so that refugees could return as friends and not enemies.

Prime Minister observed in conclusion that while US tentative suggestions were much appreciated what PGI really wanted was direct

negotiations with Arabs which he considered possible only through US good offices. He stated he wanted peace and a firm alliance with Arab states.

I made no comment on observations of Prime Minister and Shertok other than say I would transmit them to my Government.

McDONALD

501.55 Palestine/3-3745: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 9, 1948—7 p. m.

3377. Deptel 3344 Sept 3 para 4. For Ambassador Douglas. Preliminary PGI reaction may be found in Amreptel 94 Sept 7 from Tel Aviv¹ being repeated to you.

Reference Embtel 3362 Sept 3 para 4 and Embtels 3380 and 3381² we have following specific points on our replies in principle contained in Deptels 3468 and 3469 Sept 1.³

Reference para 8 Embtel 3380 we concur but believe as stated Deptel 3187 Aug 12 that in supporting present lines now held in Palestine Mediator should emphasize changes as improvement of Nov 29 along functional or practical lines.

Reference para 9 Embtel 3380 we agree municipal area Jerusalem should be fully autonomous unit under neither Arab nor Jewish sovereignty with UN Governor and token UN guard force. We do not believe line should be demarcated on ground but that existing Arab-Jewish areas should have their own district municipal administration including Arab and Jewish police units respectively. We believe UN Governor should have powers of initiative and veto and that representatives of Jews and Arabs should have seats on his Council. We doubt if Arab and Jewish district municipal administrations can be fused into one municipal authority at this time.

Reference para 10 Embtel 3380 we concur.

Reference para 11 Embtel 3380, we accept in principle idea of Haifa free port area including refinery, oil dock, and pipeline terminals. However we believe UN port commissioner and international police force would constitute undesirable and unacceptable limitation on Israeli sovereignty. We believe it would be sufficient for Israeli Govt to give guarantees re free port area, and that UN observer should be stationed Haifa for time being.

Reference para 12 Embtel 3380, we concur both sides should have access to Lydda Airport as under Nov 29 resolution.

¹ Not printed.

² Both dated August 27, pp. 1354 and 1355.

³ Regarding the latter, see footnote 2, p. 1356.

Reference para 13 Embtel 3880, we concur in necessity incorporating remainder Arab territory into adjacent area. However we believe that any frontier rectification in favor Egypt should not give latter control of coastal strip, since access to sea for new Transjordan state appears essential.

Reference para 15 Embtel 3880, we concur that solution Arab refugee problem should be incorporated in Mediator's proposed settlement.

MARSHALL

501.88 Palestine/9-1948

The Secretary of State to Mr. Robert M. McClintock

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 10, 1948.

SIR: You are directed to proceed at the earliest opportunity to Rhodes to consult with the United Nations Mediator Count Bernadotte who, pursuant to the General Assembly's Resolution of May 14, 1948, is endeavoring to arrange a peaceful adjustment of the situation of Palestine.¹

You are authorized to inform Count Bernadotte of the views of this Government with respect to such a peaceful adjustment of the situation of Palestine. In communicating this Government's views to the Mediator you will be guided by the suggestions set forth in the Department's telegram to Tel Aviv No. 72 of September 1, which was approved by the President on that date. It is understood that your conversations with Count Bernadotte will be concurrent with, but not necessarily a joint representation of, similar conversations to be had with the Mediator by representatives of the United Kingdom.

You are authorized at your discretion to visit the Mediator in other localities than Rhodes, if he cannot be found in that place. You are further authorized in your discretion to consult with the American Ambassador in Cairo.

You should report the results of your conversations with the Mediator to the American Delegation to the General Assembly of the United Nations at Paris en route to Washington.²

Sincerely yours,

G. C. MARSHALL

¹The Department, on September 9, had informed London of its anxiety "to concert with British an immediate approach to UN Mediator on possible terms of territorial settlement in Palestine, upon which our two Governments are now in general agreement" and of its "desire to have top secret conversations with Mediator as soon as possible" through Mr. McClintock (telegram 2873, 501.88 Palestine/9-1948).

²The Department, on September 10, directed Cairo as follows: "With utmost secrecy inform Bernadotte and Bancho [sic] McClintock's impending arrival and nature conversations he authorized undertake. We re-emphasize need for absolute secrecy. In response chance inquiry from outsiders, it can be said that purpose McClintock's flight Near East is to study Arab refugee problem in which Secretary has expressed deep personal interest." (Telegram 1223, 501.88 Palestine/9-1948) This communication noted also that Mr. McClintock planned to fly directly to Rhodes on September 11.

351.25 Palestine/9-1641:Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the
Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET

London, September 10, 1948—4 p. m.

4057. 1. Because at this stage it seems to me that more progress can be made by dealing with Foreign Office officials acting for him than by direct conversations on Palestine between me and Bevin whose mind is so absorbed by our mutual problems in Berlin, Department's 3544, September 8 has been discussed with Sir Orme Sargent, Michael Wright and Burrows. Following memo embodying their thoughts was handed Embassy this morning (see also my immediately following telegram).

2. (*Memo begins*):

Foreign Office has carefully considered Department's views in September 8 telegram¹ and is glad to note that there is now a large measure of agreement. Only important outstanding point of difference seems to be that Department only envisages reference to UN on basis of some measure of acquiescence by two parties, whereas Foreign Office, while very much hoping that such acquiescence will be reached at early stage, fears that it is far more probable that weight of UN would have to be put behind recommendations before any signs of acquiescence will be made. Foreign Office bases this view largely on experience of second truce, since on that occasion intense diplomatic pressure failed to secure agreement of Arabs, but immediately SC had endorsed truce recommendation Arab opposition was overcome. Foreign Office feels it is unfortunately most likely that same process will happen possibly with both sides in case of recommendations now to be made by Mediator.

3. Reference in paragraph 3 Depreflet to UN action in order to convert public opinion suggests, however, to Foreign Office that Department may in fact be willing to contemplate UN action even if signs of acquiescence are limited to private statements from responsible people on either side to effect that acquiescence will be secured provided UN action is taken.

4. Foreign Office also points out that if as is presumed, Mediator makes his report to SC or Secretary General, it may be difficult to prevent matter being raised by some member state in either SC or UNGA. They also feel that if after Mediator has made his recommendation and US-UK diplomatic pressure has been applied, there is no progress, it will then certainly be necessary for Mediator to report his failure to SC or UNGA.

5. In general, Foreign Office feels that need for definite progress is becoming so urgent that earlier and agreed stages of programme should be immediately put into effect without spending any more time on US-UK discussion of later stages. Foreign Office view on later stages remains as stated above and Foreign Office hopes Department will in due course come to accept same view, but it does not press for any commitment on this at present. Foreign Office therefore proposes

¹ Presumably No. 3544, p. 1381.

that contact should be immediately made with Mediator by British and US representatives who would convey to him US-UK views. Mediator would be urged to make recommendations on these lines and to send copies to Secretary General of UN, Arab Governments and Jewish authorities, who would be asked not to give publicity to proposals for time being. British and US representatives would thereupon use strongest possible diplomatic pressure on Arab and Jewish authorities to persuade them to acquiesce in a settlement on lines recommended by Mediator. Both parties would be warned that truce resolution is still in force and would remain in force during implementation of Mediator's recommendations and that USG and HMG would make every effort to ensure that breach of truce was effectively dealt with under powers of SC. At subsequent date to be agreed, proposals would be published and public statements made by US and UK endorsing them.

6. Foreign Office suggests that approaches to Arab and Jewish authorities should be parallel rather than joint.

7. If Department agrees to proceed as above, Foreign Office proposes that British Consul [at] Rhodes should be instructed to make detailed arrangements with Mediator for meeting with UK and US representatives at mutually convenient place which Foreign Office suggests might be Cairo in order to avoid undesirable publicity of visit by special British and American representatives to Rhodes. (*Memo ends*).

8. Re paragraph 3 above, please advise on this point.

9. Paragraph 6 above is intended to clear up possible confusion (Department's 3544, September 8, paragraph 4). Foreign Office assumes Department does not envisage US and UK representatives calling on Mediator and officials of states together. Please confirm.

10. Re British Consul arranging meeting with Mediator (paragraph 7 above) see my 4058.²

11. Action which resulted in British memo quoted above was taken prior receipt Department's 3573, September 9³ which constitutes Department's reply to number of points raised in memo. To keep things in sequence reply to Department's 3573 is embodied in my 4058.

DOUGLAS

² *Infra*.

³ Not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 1387.

561.55 Palestine/9-1048: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the
Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET US URGENT

London, September 10, 1948—5 p. m.

4058: For Lovett from Douglas. Following reply to Department's 3573, September 9¹ should be read in connection with my 4057, Sep-

¹ Not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 1387.

tumber 10 which was prepared prior receipt Department's reference telegram.

1. Foreign Office is gratified by Department's desire to approach Mediator as quickly as possible and believes it would be most helpful, as do I, to have McClintock come here for consultation. Foreign Office points out that this need not involve undue delay.

2. Latest Foreign Office information re Mediator's movements is that he was due to return to Rhodes today to start work on his report. As Foreign Office suggested in paragraph 7 Embassy's reference telegram, FonOff believes that British Consul [at] Rhodes should arrange at earliest possible moment for Mediator to meet with McClintock and British representative at mutually convenient place. Foreign Office agrees that Cairo probably most desirable spot and hopes for early US reply so that steps can be taken with Mediator. Foreign Office will entrust its top secret conversations with Mediator to either Troutbeck or Dow depending on which is most convenient. If meeting Cairo, it would be Troutbeck.²

3. Foreign Office considers it essential that US and UK representatives say substantially same things to Mediator but are opposed to handing Mediator any agreed document; Foreign Office is preparing for discussion with McClintock brief from which British representative will speak. Text brief will be telegraphed if completed before McClintock arrives.

[Here follows paragraph numbered 4 dealing with flight arrangements for Mr. McClintock.]

DOUGLAS

² Sir John M. Troutbeck, Head of the British Middle East Office at Cairo.

Editorial Note

The Clifford Papers contain the ribbon copy of a "Memorandum to Secretary Marshall", dated September 11, 1948, which deals primarily with the question of extending *de jure* recognition to the government of Israel. The memorandum bears no indication of authorship. Included also in the Clifford Papers are four undated sheets of notes in the handwriting of Mr. Clifford which are an outline of the memorandum and are at times quoted in it. Three of the four sheets are stamped "Pres[idential] Party", indicating that they were prepared on the Presidential yacht, the *Williamsburg*. Matthew Connelly's Appointment Book indicates that Mr. Clifford was aboard the *Williamsburg* from September 10 to 12.

Mr. Clifford has acknowledged to the Historical Office that he prepared the memorandum dated September 11 aboard the *Williamsburg*.

The Clifford Papers do not document whether or not he discussed the paper with President Truman, and Mr. Clifford did not later recall having discussed the paper with the President. (Memorandum of conversation, June 20, 1974, by William M. Franklin, 501.BB Palestine/3-2248)

The Secretary's messages of August 30 and September 8 to President Truman and the President's statement of September 9 (see editorial note, page 1389) suggest that the question of *de jure* recognition of Israel was very much in the thoughts of the White House and the Department of State at this time. Any immediate action to extend such recognition seems to have been ruled out, however, when the Israeli Government announced the postponement of its elections from October 1 to mid-November (the *New York Times*, September 9, 1948, page 11). The editors are of the belief that the memorandum prepared by Mr. Clifford was not actually sent to Secretary Marshall. It reads as follows:

"Sept. 11, 1948

"Memorandum to Secretary Marshall:

"1. As you well know, since becoming President I have consistently favored the establishment of an independent state for Jews in the Middle East. This country has taken a position of leadership in the establishment of such an independent state, and I think it should continue to take such leadership.

"2. It is my belief that strong American support of the new state of Israel will hasten the ultimate settlement of the problem of the Middle East, and will contribute toward the attainment of world peace.

"3. We are engaged now in extending economic aid and moral support to the nations of Western Europe, in order to stem the spread of Communism. I consider it necessary, at this time, to lend our same support and extend economic aid to Israel for the same reason.

"4. There is ample precedent in international law for the extension of *de jure* recognition to Israel. This is illustrated by the fact that fourteen nations have extended *de jure* recognition to Israel since it became an independent state on May 15, 1948. It is my opinion that *de jure* recognition by the United States will hasten the recognition of Israel by other nations, and this will have a stabilizing effect in the Middle East.

"5. In view of the above, it is my wish that the following course of action be taken:

"1. Extend *de jure* recognition to Israel at once.

"2. Make loan to Israel just as soon as details can be completed.

"3. Take active steps to assist Israel in gaining admission to the United Nations.

"I am preparing now a release announcing the *de jure* recognition of Israel. I shall submit it to you for suggestions. Kindly keep me advised of progress made in granting the loan, and in the admission of Israel to the United Nations."

401.23 Palestine/9-1048: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

TOP SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, September 11, 1948—1 p. m.

3404. For Ambassador. Department believes we are now in general agreement with British as their thinking is revealed in your 4067 Sept 10. Re paras 2 and 3 your telegram, Dept's position is one of persistent hope that Palestine dispute may be kept out of UN debate at this juncture. However, British are correct in assuming in para 3 that it may be necessary to have UN GA or possibly SC give blessing to any suggested settlement in order to enable leaders on both sides to carry their public opinion to acquiesce in such settlement.

Our 2692 [3528] Sept 10² will have answered para 5. Re para 6 we agree that approaches to Arabs and Jews should be parallel rather than joint. Your para 9: We have no objection if US and UK representatives call on Mediator together but we prefer that representations be parallel and not identical.

MARSHALL

¹ Not printed.

501.23 Palestine/9-1248: Telegram

The Consul General at Jerusalem (Macdonald) to the Secretary of State

JERUSALEM, September 12, 1948.

1274. Press reports Eban made following statements yesterday re Jerusalem during speech in Tel Aviv and held out prospect United Nations would accede Jewish request for Jerusalem: some delegates who supported internationalization Jerusalem November 29 now admit project dead. They acknowledge United Nations shown itself unable handle situation. United Nations rule in Jerusalem without force impossible and United States refusal provide troops for demilitarization proved impossible raise force for international Jerusalem.

Israel delegation will endeavor show indefinite truce intolerable.

MACDONALD

502K.01/9-1248: Telegram

The Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald) to President Truman¹

TOP SECRET URGENT TEL AVIV, September 12, 1948—7 p. m.

In your letter July 21,² Mr. President, among other points you in-

¹ Transmitted to the Department by Tel Aviv in telegram 104 for "personal attention President and Secretary."

² The text of the letter is incorporated in Mr. Lovett's memorandum of conversation of July 21, p. 1332.

structed me to report to you on "appropriate time for full recognition" PGI. That time has, I believe, now come.

After more than four weeks intensive study here and further to my telegram to you (70, August 24²) that indefinite truce cannot lead to peace without positive action to clarify situation, I am convinced that full recognition by the US now of PGI would accomplish four major US objectives:

1. Strengthen PGI moderates who want if humanly possible avoid renewal warfare.
2. Give Arab moderates, especially Abdullah (who knew past months decision battlefield was gravely adverse and who fear renewed warfare might result personal and national debacle), additional reason accelerate move towards settlement.
3. Remove major obstacle to peace negotiations by demonstrating to Arab intransigents fact that Israel's existence cannot longer be denied or ignored.
4. Encourage British relax its non-recognition policy.

Unless US makes up own mind as in original recognition without waiting on British corresponding or related action, I see delay dangerous and possibly fatal to peace hopes. British present procrastination is continuation of His Majesty's Government's non-cooperation policy since UNSCOP partition recommendation and reflects same stubborn miscalculation of basic elements in this area. Judged by present results, British experts—except General D'Arcy and General Gort who warned that Jews would defeat Arabs—gravely misled their government and are still doing so. Hence, to wait on British is to invite failure.

Grounds justifying full recognition are found in PGI's—(a) plans early election constituent assembly, (b) its control of state, (c) its repeated public and official expressed willingness negotiate peace settlement with Arabs.

In urging full recognition now I am aware of possible repercussions in Arab countries, including possible danger to Americans. However, I believe that clear statement to Arab governments given in advance through neighboring missions that such US action be not unfriendly but acceptance of Israel as *fait accompli*; and notification that US expects fullest protection its citizens would remove or greatly minimize danger. Furthermore, in this connection I wish observe that several other nations have accorded full recognition Israel without suffering danger or damage their missions or citizens in Arab countries.

I have also kept in mind fact that there are important unanswered questions about PGI's attitude towards (a) Jerusalem, (b) November 29 frontiers, (c) Arab refugees. Despite these questions, I am convinced that *de jure* recognition in advance UN assembly would in-

² See footnote 1, p. 1387.

crease chances satisfactory settlement these and related issues during peace negotiations.

Bernadotte and staff's urgent recommendation peace effort at UN and their conviction that otherwise truce must lead to war within few weeks (refmytel 101, September 10⁴) are additional reasons immediate full recognition. There can be no fruitful peace negotiations until Arab states see that Israel is definitely established.

Although legal differences between *de facto* and *de jure* recognition are regarded by some distinguished lawyers as slight, it would be difficult exaggerate practical value US decision full recognition advance UN Assembly.

Mr. President, your and Secretary's action May 15 [14]⁴ was highest statesmanship because it courageously set constructive example. Completion now of what you both then began might be decisive for peace in Palestine and Middle East.

Department please reply direct to Tel Aviv.

McDONALD

⁴ Not printed.

⁵ See Secretary Marshall's letter of May 14 to Mr. Epstein, p. 222.

501.20 Palestine/9-1448: Telegram

*The Charge in the United Kingdom (Bliss) to the
Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET

London, September 14, 1948—7 p. m.

4111. 1. Visit here of Jessup and Ross has been timely and helpful regarding Palestine. Meetings took place in Foreign Office September 13 and 14. Conclusions of informal and cordial conversations follow.

2. It was apparent from outset that on British side proposals which have been discussed between US and UK have been largely formulated at political level with only general consultation with Jebb's UN Department. Wright and his subordinates readily agreed time had come to work out tactics and Jebb attended both meetings. On many points of procedure latter's views were closer to those of Jessup and Ross than to those of other Foreign Office officers.

3. It was agreed that definite road ahead reference UN strategy would not be charted even tentatively without some indication Mediator's reactions to talks with McClintock and Troutbeck, future plans, et cetera. It was further agreed that any plan of campaign which might be developed between US and UK would have to take into account likelihood sudden changes being necessitated by unexpected leaks, violation of truce, et cetera. Consequently, it was agreed that Foreign Office officials would remain in close contact with

GADed in Paris as well as with Embassy. Beesley will depart for Paris September 19 or 20.

4. While no definite conclusions were reached considerable exchange tentative thinking took place reference timing of publication of Mediator's proposals. In view postponing major debate on Palestine for some weeks Jessup and Ross expressed thought that it might be wise for Mediator to begin by converting lines of truce into "lines of armistice" upon which SC report would be forthcoming. At later stage Mediator would make recommendations for Jerusalem, Haifa, Lydda, [garble] and recommend to UNGA that lines of armistice (with some modification, in particular elimination of Jerusalem corridor) should become permanent frontiers. General discussion, however, produced alternative idea that Mediator might pave way for his proposals, and at same time achieve a degree of delay calculated to keep Palestine out of UNGA until November, by sending SecGen in very near future factual report (Paragraph 1, Embtel 4076 September 12¹) in which Mediator would indicate that he planned to present to UNGA within a few weeks new proposals for a final settlement of Palestine problem. It was agreed that in intervening 3 or 4 weeks before Mediator publishes his proposals, Mediator would make details known to Arab and Jewish leaders with request that they be kept secret, and towards end period US and UK could quietly apply diplomatic pressure to Arabs and Jews. If between now and October 15 rumors of these proposals became public they would still be in nature of rumors and as such, perhaps would be less likely to bring down an avalanche of pressure upon US and UK from Arabs and Jews. It was further agreed that if this idea of timing was found reasonable in light of reports from McClintock and Troutbeck regarding their conversations with Mediator, US and UK should lose no time in putting their views regarding timing in this sense.

5. Americans expressed grave doubts that international contingents could be secured to assist UN governor Jerusalem (Paragraph 9 Embassy's 3880 August 27). Jobb reported this point and conclusion reached after some discussion was that probably best plan would be for governor to have personal force of about 200 UN guards which would be the nucleus of a Jerusalem international police force to which PGI and TJ would be called upon in UNGA resolution to contribute contingents for service in the Arab and Jewish municipalities. It was thought that even though neither PGI nor TJ would possess sovereign rights in Jerusalem they would by this means be given definite responsibility for maintaining law and order in Jewish and Arab municipalities.

¹ Not printed.

6. Full agreement was reached that Arab acquiescence to existence of Israel would be hastened if it were apparent to Arabs that Israeli frontiers would be subject to special guarantee. Wright said that British obligations under treaties with Egypt and TJ would automatically be extended to cover any areas added to Egypt and TJ. Consequently, a one-sided extra guarantee would exist. Americans suggested and Foreign Office agreed that some guarantee of a more general character was desirable. The suggestion which was finally found apt was that there should be resolution on this subject recommending that, until frontiers were recognized by agreement between the parties concerned, lines drawn by Mediator should be considered to be an international frontier, and that any violation of it should be treated by SC as breach of peace.

7. Foreign Office, Embassy and USGADel, Paris would appreciate early comments Department regarding substance Paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 above.

8. Jessup and Ross returned to Paris today.¹

Sent Department 4111, repeated Paris for Jessup and Gadel 604.

Bliss

¹ A further account of the conversations with the British officials was sent to Mr. Rattenhewald by Mr. Ross in his letter of September 15 from Paris, not printed (SSFN.91/9-1548).

SSC.22 Palestine/9-1448 / Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 15, 1948—8 p. m.

3461. Embtel 4111, Sept 14. Our tactical course in immediate future will be determined as soon as we have McClintock's and Troutbeck's reports re Mediator's views.

Meanwhile reply para 4 reftel we believe our action should be based on procedure outlined Deptal 3544, Sept 8. We hope it will be possible keep Palestine question out GA or SC but anticipate it will be raised by some Member or Bernadotte may wish report to SC or UN Members under GA resolution May 14. In any event we anticipate US-UK views or Mediator's suggestions will become known at early date as envisaged para 2 Embtel 3462 Sept 3. Consequently Bernadotte's over-all suggestions might well be included as conclusions in his report either to members GA or to SC. It is hoped Bernadotte will give us advance notice content his report so US-UK can begin quiet diplomatic preparation with Arabs and Jews. We doubt Mediator's conclusions should be divided into separate reports as this would tend

confuse issue. We also doubt factual report by Mediator at present stage would suffice. We do not think Mediator's conclusions can be kept secret for 3- or 4-week period mentioned. It accordingly seems preferable make Mediator's conclusions public and endeavor mobilize world opinion to persuade acceptance by parties.

Ref para 5, we concur.

Ref para 6 we do not agree special guarantee re frontier should be provided by UN (Brit for their part could, however, extend treaty obligations in agreement with Egypt and Transjordan). We do not agree, furthermore, that UN could give general guarantee in form of resolution recommending Mediator's lines as international frontier and violation of such lines as breach of peace. We have consistently taken position (ref Austin's Feb. 24 statement) that political recommendations GA or SC could not be put into effect by force. However it may be possible for Bernadotte draw truce line which might eventually become frontier on which parties could agree.²

MARSHALL

² This telegram was repeated as 3000 to Paris for Messrs. Jessup and Ross.

1415B Palestine/9-1848: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Griffie) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

US URGENT

Cairo, September 15, 1948—10 p. m.

NIACI

1315. For Lovett and Rusk from McClintock. Mediator's report on Palestine directed to SYG for information of all UN members will be flown to Paris tomorrow. It contains three sections which will be published separately as parts of one document: (1) The mediation report (2) Effects to maintain truce and (3) Assistance to refugees. Depending on time for translation and printing it is expected report will be made public around September 22. (Bernadotte flies to Beirut and Damascus tomorrow thence Baghdad returning Rhodes 18. He plans to fly to Paris 21st.)

Following is verbatim text of Bernadotte's conclusions to part one setting forth his proposals for a political settlement:

[Here follow Count Bernadotte's conclusions to part one of his report; for text, see page 1401.]

Sent Department as 1315; repeated Paris for Jessup as 85; Paris-pass to London Niaci with request that Foreign Office be provided copy foregoing text. [McClintock.]

GRIFFIE

SOLE Palestine/9-1548: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Griffis) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

US URGENT

CAIRO, September 15, 1948—midnight.

NIACF

1316. For Lovett and Rusk from McClintock. Sir John Troutbeck, representing UK, and I arrived Rhodes 18th, he from Cairo, I from Athens. We found Bernadotte had already prepared first draft of his report on Palestine dealing with mediation, truce and refugees. (Cairo's 1315, September 15, provides text of Mediator's recommendations for a political settlement.)

1. Substance.

Department will note general similarity of Bernadotte's conclusions with US and UK views. Our conversations were devoted more to perfection of Bernadotte's first draft of the conclusions than to matters of substance in which all three were in agreement. Neither Troutbeck nor I went over body of Bernadotte's report, attention being concentrated solely on conclusion to Part 1. Troutbeck had detailed brief from Foreign Office while I was guided by terms of Department's 72, September 1, to Tel Aviv and Secretary's instructions of September 10.

Principal matter of substance upon which views of Bernadotte and UK were at variance with our own was whether Israel should be given even a token salient into Neger, such as our suggestion for a projection of Israeli territory south to Beersheba-Gaza Road. British proposed southern frontier terminate at latitude of Majdal and found firm support from Mediator. Bernadotte said the responsibility was to propose terms founded on strict justice. If Jews were to receive all of rich Galilee in return for giving up Neger to Arabs to whom it would ever remain a worthless desert, Jews should not in his opinion have any salient to that area. Bernadotte was also swayed by information that there are mixed councils in Tel Aviv, Shertok and the more moderate leaders tending to feel that Neger for Galilee is a good bargain, while Weizmann and Ben-Gurion looked with mystical tenacity toward holding Neger and Galilee too.

I told Bernadotte that I would recommend that Department support his proposals in their entirety, including his suggestion of Majdal-Faluja line as southern boundary of Israel. I made it clear, however, that this recommendation was in no way binding on US Government, that Neger was a question of much political importance to Jews, and that it might eventually be a political good judgment to give Israel a token holding in that area. (I think, however, that from point of impartial equity that Bernadotte is right.)

On internationalization of Jerusalem, UK instructions were to advocate a UN governor and provision for an international police force. I suggested that language be less specific, leaving choice open between complete UN control and responsibility or merely supervisory functions, at same time making clear that US at this stage did not contemplate contributing to an international police force. Bernadotte had been favoring a request to French Government for loan of several battalions of foreign legion for Jerusalem police duty but it was pointed out that Arabs, and particularly Azzam Pasha, would be affronted by presence of legionnaires who had fought their brethren in Morocco. Bunche and Begley favored using proposed UN guard for Jerusalem police, Begley putting minimum number at 6,000.

As for additional comment on Bernadotte's conclusions, which seem self-explanatory, it might be said that I questioned phrase in 4(b) whereby in absence of agreement between Arabs and Jews frontiers "should be established by UN," but it was pointed out this language came from November 29th resolution which we supported.

On Haifa refinery UK advocated in addition to free port a UN port commissioner with an international police force and special guarantee for transit of sealed trains and flow of oil to and from Iraq. It was, however, possible to agree on present language in 4(c).

Trotter's instructions indicated that Foreign Office still clings to belief SC can lay down a frontier in Palestine under threat that any violation of that frontier would constitute a breach of peace calling for use of Chapter VII sanctions. It was agreed with Mediator's approval that what was essential was that resort to force should not be attempted by either Arabs or Jews, and that SC responsibility was confined to keeping peace, not to establishing a frontier by compulsion. Further talks with British on this point of charter interpretation would be useful. As will be seen issue does not arise in Mediator's conclusions.

2. Procedure.

Two days were devoted to discussion of substance of what may eventually be called "the Bernadotte plan." Third meeting with Mediator this morning dealt with tactics and timing.

Bernadotte from outset of conversations insisted that it was imperative to bring Palestine situation before GA at earliest possible moment. His conversations with Arab and Jewish leaders on returning from Stockholm had convinced him that failure of GA to deal with his recommendations promptly would cause situation in Palestine greatly to deteriorate, possibly irretrievably. He based this judgment on following considerations:

(a) Arab Governments following last Arab League Council meeting were sending Foreign Ministers and Prime Ministers to Paris. These leaders were in need of rapid UN action in order to channel public opinion at home to accept a solution which they now admit to be essential even though maintaining their bluster about "never" recognizing a Jewish state and "never" dealing with the Jews.

(b) Israel may not be long restrained from taking matters into its own hands if G.A. seems to regard Palestine situation as not urgent. Severe economic strain of maintaining men under arms during truce makes Jews restive to get some return on this investment in manpower. Mediator felt PGI would use G.A. inaction as pretext for action by Israel.

I told Bernadotte we had hoped his influence, abetted by UK and US diplomatic pressure, would have sufficed for parties to reach a measure of acquiescence without incurring risk of further bitter and perhaps inconclusive debate in G.A. If his judgment was correct and matter should immediately be placed on agenda, I urged in strongest terms that political recommendations of Mediator be dealt with in committee I with all possible expedition. No sub-committee to drag out proceeding should be formed, and "the Bernadotte plan" should be rushed through if possible almost by acclamation. Mediator's recommendation on refugee problem should be dealt within committee III. Bernadotte concurred with these views.

When asked how Palestine issue should be placed on agenda, I said US had already had its share of the limelight. Bernadotte and his advisors favored having some friendly delegation such as France, Canada or New Zealand place a specific item on agenda phrased, "further consideration of situation of Palestine. Consideration of the Mediator's report." An alternative would be to ask SYG to place matter on agenda.

As for sponsorship of an eventual resolution embodying the "Bernadotte plan" it was obvious that Mediator felt support of UK and US would be a determining factor. Troutbeck explained he had no instructions covering this point. I said I was in similar position, but offered personal comment that it would seem odd for US and UK, who were prepared to give fullest diplomatic support to "Bernadotte plan" not to give equal support once it was before G.A.

It was agreed that Banche would draft a resolution setting forth essence of Mediator's recommendations which he will make available. My overall impression of conversations is that Bernadotte, who has taken an immense amount of first-hand testimony, has come from last minute talks with leaders on both sides, and who is sternly determined to advocate only a solution based on equal justice to both sides, feels that now is the optimum moment: that if not "now" it is "never," and that the General Assembly must seize the opportunity.

Sent Department as 1318; repeated Paris for USUN as 84, London as 97. [McClintock.]

GURRUS

*Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator in Palestine*¹

[Extracts]

[PART ONE] VIII. CONCLUSIONS [regarding the Mediation Effort]

1. Since I presented my written suggestions to the Arab and Jewish authorities on 27 June, I have made no formal submission to either party of further suggestions or proposals for a definitive settlement. Since that date, however, I have held many oral discussions in the Arab capitals and Tel-Aviv, in the course of which various ideas on settlement have been freely exchanged. As regards my original suggestions, I hold to the opinion that they offered a general framework within which a reasonable and workable settlement might have been reached, had the two parties concerned been willing to discuss them. They were flatly rejected, however, by both parties. Since they were put forth on the explicit condition that they were purely tentative, were designed primarily to elicit views and counter-suggestions from each party, and, in any event, could be implemented only if agreed upon by both parties, I have never since pressed them. With respect to one basic concept in my suggestions, it has become increasingly clear to me that, however desirable a political and economic union might be in Palestine, the time is certainly not now propitious for the effectuation of any such scheme.

2. I do not consider it to be within my province to recommend to the Members of the United Nations a proposed course of action on the Palestine question. That is a responsibility of the Members acting through the appropriate organs. In my role as United Nations

¹ Reprinted from United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Third Session, Supplement No. 11* (A/648), pp. 17 ff., 43 ff., and 52 ff.; signed by Count Bernadotte on September 19 at Rhodes; and transmitted to Secretary-General Lie by the Mediator in a letter of the same date. The transmitting letter stated in part: "I understand that the question of Palestine has not yet been placed on the General Assembly's agenda. . . . Two matters require the most prompt action, namely, certain decisions relating vitally to the peaceful settlement of the Palestine question, and humanitarian measures to relieve the desperate condition of more than three hundred thousand Arab refugees. . . . I would emphasize that an extremely crucial stage has been reached in the Palestine question, and it is this conviction which alone prompts me to be as bold as to suggest that steps should be taken to bring the urgency of the matter to the attention of the General Assembly. . . ." The full text of the letter is printed in United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Third Session, Part I, Plenary Meetings, Annexes to the Summary Records of Meetings, 1948* (hereinafter identified as GA, 3rd sess., Pt. I, Annexes), p. 152.

Mediator, however, it was inevitable that I should accumulate information and draw conclusions from my experience which might well be of assistance to Members of the United Nations in charting the future course of United Nations action on Palestine. I consider it my duty, therefore, to acquaint the Members of the United Nations, through the medium of this report, with certain of the conclusions on means of peaceful adjustment which have evolved from my frequent consultations with Arab and Jewish authorities over the past three and one-half months and from my personal appraisal of the present Palestinian scene. I do not suggest that these conclusions would provide the basis for a proposal which would readily win the willing approval of both parties. I have not, in the course of my intensive efforts to achieve agreement between Arabs and Jews, been able to devise any such formula. I am convinced, however, that it is possible at this stage to formulate a proposal which, if firmly approved and strongly backed by the General Assembly, would not be forcibly resisted by either side, confident as I am, of course, that the Security Council stands firm in its resolution of 15 July that military action shall not be employed by either party in the Palestine dispute. It cannot be ignored that the vast difference between now and last November is that a war has been started and stopped and that in the intervening months decisive events have occurred.

SEVEN BASIC PREMISES

3. The following seven basic premises form the basis for my conclusions:

Return to peace

(a) Peace must return to Palestine and every feasible measure should be taken to ensure that hostilities will not be resumed and that harmonious relations between Arab and Jew will ultimately be restored.

The Jewish State

(b) A Jewish State called Israel exists in Palestine and there are no sound reasons for assuming that it will not continue to do so.

Boundary determination

(c) The boundaries of this new State must finally be fixed either by formal agreement between the parties concerned or failing that, by the United Nations.

Continuous frontiers

(d) Adherence to the principle of geographical homogeneity and integration, which should be the major objective of the boundary arrangements, should apply equally to Arab and Jewish territories,

whose frontiers should not, therefore, be rigidly controlled by the territorial arrangements envisaged in the resolution of 29 November.

Rights of repatriation

(e) The right of innocent people, uprooted from their homes by the present terror and ravages of war, to return to their homes, should be affirmed and made effective, with assurance of adequate compensation for the property of those who may choose not to return.

Jerusalem

(f) The City of Jerusalem, because of its religious and international significance and the complexity of interests involved, should be accorded special and separate treatment.

International responsibility

(g) International responsibility should be expressed where desirable and necessary in the form of international guarantees, as a means of allaying existing fears, and particularly with regard to boundaries and human rights.

SPECIFIC CONCLUSIONS

4. The following conclusions, broadly outlined, would, in my view, considering all the circumstances, provide a reasonable, equitable and workable basis for settlement:

(a) Since the Security Council, under pain of Chapter VIII sanctions, has forbidden further employment of military action in Palestine as a means of settling the dispute, hostilities should be pronounced formally ended either by mutual agreement of the parties or, failing that, by the United Nations. The existing indefinite truce should be superseded by a formal peace, or at the minimum, an armistice which would involve either complete withdrawal and demobilization of armed forces or their wide separation by creation of broad demilitarized zones under United Nations supervision.

(b) The frontiers between the Arab and Jewish territories, in the absence of agreement between Arabs and Jews, should be established by the United Nations and delimited by a technical boundaries commission appointed by and responsible to the United Nations, with the following revisions in the boundaries broadly defined in the resolution of the General Assembly of 29 November in order to make them more equitable, workable and consistent with existing realities in Palestine.

(i) The area known as the Negev, south of a line running from the sea near Majdal east-southeast to Faluja (both of which places would be in Arab territory), should be defined as Arab territory;

(ii) The frontier should run from Faluja north northeast to Ramleh and Lydda (both of which places would be in Arab territory),

the frontier at Lydda then following the line established in the General Assembly resolution of 29 November;

(iii) Galilee should be defined as Jewish territory.

(c) The disposition of the territory of Palestine not included within the boundaries of the Jewish State should be left to the Governments of the Arab States in full consultation with the Arab inhabitants of Palestine, with the recommendation, however, that in view of the historical connexion and common interests of Transjordan and Palestine, there would be compelling reasons for merging the Arab territory of Palestine with the territory of Transjordan, subject to such frontier rectifications regarding other Arab States as may be found practicable and desirable.

(d) The United Nations, by declaration or other appropriate means, should undertake to provide special assurance that the boundaries between the Arab and Jewish territories shall be respected and maintained, subject only to such modifications as may be mutually agreed upon by the parties concerned.

(e) The port of Haifa, including the oil refineries and terminals, and without prejudice to their inclusion in the sovereign territory of the Jewish State or the administration of the city of Haifa, should be declared a free port, with assurances of free access for interested Arab countries and an undertaking on their part to place no obstacle in the way of oil deliveries by pipeline to the Haifa refineries, whose distribution would continue on the basis of the historical pattern.

(f) The airport of Lydda should be declared a free airport with assurance of access to it and employment of its facilities for Jerusalem and interested Arab countries.

(g) The City of Jerusalem, which should be understood as covering the area defined in the resolution of the General Assembly of 29 November, should be treated separately and should be placed under effective United Nations control with maximum feasible local autonomy for its Arab and Jewish communities, with full safeguards for the protection of the Holy Places and sites and free access to them, and for religious freedom.

(A) The right of unimpeded access to Jerusalem, by road, rail or air, should be fully respected by all parties.

(i) The right of the Arab refugees to return to their homes in Jewish-controlled territory at the earliest possible date should be affirmed by the United Nations, and their repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation, and payment of adequate compensation for the property of those choosing not to return, should be supervised and assisted by the United Nations conciliation commission described in paragraph (k) below.

(j) The political, economic, social and religious rights of all Arabs in the Jewish territory of Palestine and of all Jews in the Arab terri-

tory of Palestine should be fully guaranteed and respected by the authorities. The conciliation commission provided for in the following paragraph should supervise the observance of this guarantee. It should also lend its good offices, on the invitation of the parties, to any efforts toward exchanges of populations with a view to eliminating troublesome minority problems, and on the basis of adequate compensation for property owned.

(k) In view of the special nature of the Palestine problem and the dangerous complexities of Arab-Jewish relationships, the United Nations should establish a Palestine conciliation commission. This commission, which should be appointed for a limited period, should be responsible to the United Nations and act under its authority. The commission, assisted by such United Nations personnel as may prove necessary, should undertake:

(i) To employ its good offices to make such recommendations to the parties or to the United Nations, and to take such other steps as may be appropriate, with a view to ensuring the continuation of the peaceful adjustment of the situation in Palestine;

(ii) Such measures as it might consider appropriate in fostering the cultivation of friendly relations between Arabs and Jews;

(iii) To supervise the observance of such boundary, road, railroad, free port, free airport, minority rights and other arrangements as may be decided upon by the United Nations;

(iv) To report promptly to the United Nations any development in Palestine likely to alter the arrangements approved by the United Nations in the Palestine settlement or to threaten the peace of the area.

[PART THREE] VI. CONCLUSIONS [regarding Assistance to Refugees]

1. Conclusions which may be derived from the experience to date are summarized as follows:

(a) As a result of the conflict in Palestine there are approximately 300,000 Arab refugees and 7,000 Jewish refugees requiring aid in that country and adjacent States.

(b) Large numbers of these are infants, children, pregnant women and nursing mothers. Their condition is one of destitution and they are "vulnerable groups" in the medical and social sense.

(c) The destruction of their property and the loss of their assets will render most of them a charge upon the communities in which they have sought refuge for a minimum period of one year (through this winter and until the end of the 1949 harvest).

(d) The Arab inhabitants of Palestine are not citizens or subjects of Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Transjordan, the States which are at present providing them with a refuge and the basic necessities of life. As residents of Palestine, a former mandated territory for which the international community has a continuing responsibility

until a final settlement is achieved, these Arab refugees understandably look to the United Nations for effective assistance.

(e) The temporary alleviation of their condition, which is all that my disaster relief programme can promise them now is quite inadequate to meet any continuing need, unless the resources in supplies and personnel available are greatly increased. Such increased resources might indirectly be of permanent value in establishing social services in the countries concerned, or greatly improving existing services. This applies particularly to general social administrative organizations, maternal and child care services, the training of social workers, and the improvement of food economies.

(f) The refugees, on return to their homes, are entitled to adequate safeguards for their personal security, normal facilities for employment, and adequate opportunities to develop within the community without racial, religious or social discrimination.

(g) So long as large numbers of the refugees remain in distress, I believe that responsibility for their relief should be assumed by the United Nations in conjunction with the neighbouring Arab States, the Provisional Government of Israel, the specialized agencies, and also all the voluntary bodies or organizations of a humanitarian and non-political character.

2. In concluding this part of my report, I must emphasize again the desperate urgency of this problem. The choice is between saving the lives of many thousands of people now or permitting them to die. The situation of the majority of these hapless refugees is already tragic; and to prevent them from being overwhelmed by further disaster and to make possible their ultimate rehabilitation, it is my earnest hope that the international community will give all necessary support to make the measures I have outlined fully effective. I believe that for the international community to accept its share of responsibility for the refugees of Palestine is one of the minimum conditions for the success of its efforts to bring peace to that land.

F. BERNADOTTE

541.55 Palestine/6-1848: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Jerusalem

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, September 16, 1948—7 p. m.

IS URGENT

908. Following message should be delivered to Count Bernadotte soon as possible:

US Govt refers to its previous exchange of views with Mediator concerning implementation of ban on war material prescribed by the

SC resolutions of May 29 and July 15, 1948, and particularly to four questions presented by this Govt to Mediator on July 16 and his answers thereto.

In accordance with desire of Mediator as expressed in his answer to question 3 the UK and US Govts have continued to discuss definition of "war material" within meaning of SC resolutions. In view of indefinite continuation of Palestine truce further consideration has been given in these discussions to outright ban on aircraft parts and replacements for Middle East civil airlines as recommended by the Mediator in his answer to question 1. As result of these discussions, it is view both Govts that such an inflexible policy, if continued indefinitely, could result in serious impairment of civil air transport and communications of states concerned. In fact, serious curtailment of air commerce in certain areas of Middle East is now imminent due to failure of airlines to obtain certain essential maintenance equipment. Such a result, it is felt, was not contemplated by UNSC action. Consequently, US recommends that Mediator consider following proposal:

(1) That all civil airlines in Middle East be permitted to obtain abroad civil aircraft parts and replacements essential to maintenance of services which they operated as of date of commencement of present truce (July 15). This should also include airlines and air services in this area established since July 15 which the Mediator determines to be eligible.

(2) That sales or exports of such parts and replacements be reported promptly to Mediator by Govt of country from which export is made.

(3) That Mediator take note of quantities of such items supplied and notify all Govts concerned whenever he deems quantities are exceeding those necessary for maintenance existing services.

(4) That all requests for aircraft parts and replacements for airlines or services not included in (1) above be referred to Mediator by Govt of exporting country before export is permitted. It is understood UK Govt will also forward a recommendation on this subject to the Mediator.

It is requested that Mediator advise US Govt as soon as possible whether he accepts above proposal. If not, Mediator is strongly urged to prescribe such other procedure as may meet the exigencies of situation.

If above proposal is approved, US Govt would require as basis for consideration of requests under (1) above certification from interested Middle East Govt that items were for approved purposes.

US Govt is concerned that control measures taken by it in cooperation with Mediator are not being observed by other states and that in some cases material denied from US sources is being obtained elsewhere. It is suggested that this situation, in some measure, could be remedied if the Mediator would communicate the revised lists of war material, when available, and the procedures affecting transfer of

marginal items, to all states, including both members of UN and non-members. Perhaps this could be accomplished most effectively through official communication of SYG of UN.¹

MARSHALL

¹ This telegram was repeated to Cairo as 1290 and to Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Jidda, London, Paris, and Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, on September 18, reported that "General Riley and Bunche agree to proposals contained in Depex 908" (telegram 1214, 501.88 Palestine/9-18-48). The Presidential Embargo on the sale of spare parts to airlines in the Middle East was lifted on September 20 (letter of October 8 from the Embassy in Egypt to the Acting United Nations Mediator; copy transmitted to the Department by Cairo in despatch 844 the same day, 501.88 Palestine/10-8-48).

501.88 Palestine/9-17-48: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Special Representatives of the United States in Israel (McDonald)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 17, 1948—1 p. m.

100. For McDonald. We have had question *de jure* recognition Govt of Israel under study for several months. On several occasions, I have discussed question with President and have also discussed urtel 104 Sept 12¹ with President.

No question has arisen *re de jure* recognition of State of Israel as state. Our recognition of State on May 14² was full and complete. Present question is conversion of *de facto* recognition of provisional govt to *de jure* recognition of permanent govt. In our opinion *de jure* recognition should be extended to a permanent govt which is based on will of people, which is in fact in control of country, and which is prepared to carry out its international obligations. Israeli authorities themselves decided to postpone their elections and themselves have designated their present govt as "Provisional".

We do not agree immediate *de jure* recognition would strengthen PGI moderates. Such recognition would prejudge success their efforts and would, in effect, sanction a regime before it had been established. We consider prospect *de jure* recognition should stimulate and aid PGI moderates in retaining effective control of permanent govt.

As there has been no basic change in the governmental status of Israel since its proclamation on May 15, we consider immediate extension *de jure* recognition would subject us to charge that our recognition had been based on domestic political considerations in US rather than on development of governmental processes in Israel.

We consider premature *de jure* recognition would inflame Arab world and would make it difficult for Arab states to make those concessions for which Bernadotte has been striving in his efforts to obtain

¹ See footnote 1 to telegram to President Truman, p. 1392.

² Washington Times.

equitable solution of Palestine question. We might expect, in addition, that Moslem states in UN would be strongly affected by premature step favoring Israel and that US and other Western powers would thereby have additional and increased difficulties with other important problems before UN.

We refer also to crucial situation in Berlin. Because of current developments there we do not believe we should take any unnecessary step such as premature recognition which would aggravate unrest throughout Moslem world at this critical juncture.

We cannot too emphatically stress importance we attach to present efforts Mediator to secure peaceful adjustment Palestine situation under GA resolution May 14. We believe that we now have most favorable opportunity to persuade both parties in Palestine situation to co-operate with Mediator in his truce and mediation efforts. If these are successful many of other problems relating Palestine may be expected quickly to be solved.

In light foregoing we believe interests US and Israel would be best served by withholding for time being *de jure* recognition PGI.

MARSHALL

SO. 55 Palestine/9-1748: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
NIACT

US URGENT

London, September 17, 1948—5 p. m.

4133. Personal for eyes Secretary and Lovett only.

1. Believing as I do that work which has been done here and in Washington with British Government on what should constitute a fair and equitable solution of the thorny and even dangerous problem of Palestine is no small achievement, I draft this message with deepest sense of its importance; for it represents what can be the keystone of the arch which we have been building. When one reviews the situation in its historic perspective, the progress that has been made, however tedious, is not far short of being a miracle.

2. Bevin sent for me urgently this morning to discuss Palestine. He referred briefly to the likelihood that Mediator's report may be published as early as September 20 and said that in those circumstances (he does not believe publication Mediator's report can be postponed as suggested Department's 3464, September 16¹) it appeared to him that best plan for US and UK at this time would be to issue statements, supporting Mediator's proposals as fair and equitable basis for settlement along lines which he imagined Department contemplated

¹ Not printed.

last August (penultimate paragraph, Department's 3205, August 13 and Embassy's 4146, September 16^{*}). He said that he had read Mediator's conclusions (Cairo's 1315, September 16, to Department) and that while they contained a number of features which His Majesty's Government would have preferred to see handled differently, in main he was satisfied with proposals as a whole as being substantially in accord with US and UK thinking. He felt that proposals would stand or fall as a whole and that although British Government's views might differ on particular points these views should be sacrificed to general good and solid US-UK front. He therefore accepts plan in its entirety, foregoes any effort to amend it, believes it should not be modified in any respect and that efforts to amend should be resisted. He believes that there would be little left of plan if amending process should once be begun.

3. Bevin then handed me draft statement quoted my immediately following telegram (Embassy's 4154, September 17^{*}). He said that it had been drafted with great trepidation because if this made it will "once and for all put His Majesty's Government flatly on record as favoring partition as a permanent solution for Palestine and thus burn His Majesty's Government's boats with Arabs." However, US and UK have moved together so far forward in this vital matter that he feels time has come for him to ask British Cabinet approval to burn any boats necessary.

4. Bevin has in mind following course of action which is based on premise that Mediator's report will be published September 20.

5. Bevin will put statement quoted my 4154 to British Cabinet this afternoon. He will bring Cabinet up to date with regard to exchanges of views which have taken place since meeting August 26 (Embassy's 3879, August 27). He feels fairly certain British Cabinet will approve this statement for inclusion in foreign affairs debate September 22, at which Bevin personally will speak, provided United States Government will make comparable statement September 20th or 21st.

6. Bevin said alternatives to US making statement first were simultaneous statements or UK speaking first. Simultaneous statements would in his view strengthen idea that Bernadotte plan is "deal" between US and UK. If UK were to speak first, and be echoed by later US statement, this would strengthen idea which Zionists have been propagating that US foreign policy is formulated in Whitehall. Moreover, if Bevin made his statement first and US statement were delayed or were to suggest amendments to Bernadotte plan, all we have tried to accomplish in recent weeks would have been to no avail since US and UK would again appear before world as entertaining separate points of view re Palestine settlement. Finally, if Bevin

^{*} No. 4146 not printed.

^{*} Not printed.

should speak first and we were to give qualified approval or to suggest modifications, His Majesty's Government's remaining influence with Arab states, so vital at this moment, would vanish like snow under a desert sun.

7. In accordance with foregoing, it is Bevin's hope that US reply as to whether or not we will issue a statement can be delivered to him tomorrow September 18th if possible or at latest on afternoon of September 19th when he departs for Paris. (He will return for debate September 22.) Actual release statement Washington will depend upon release date of Mediator's report. If latter occurs September 20, he hopes that Department's statement would be issued September 21. In this event he would ask Mayhew to say in Parliament September 21 that a full statement would be made by Bevin in foreign affairs debate September 22. This action would be quite appropriate because there is keen desire both sides of the House for statement and early settlement. If Secretary General should release report September 21, this would be too late for debate September 22, but Department could make release September 22 and Bevin would stay additional day to make his statement September 23.

8. Bevin pointed out that his own draft statement (Embassy's 4154) has been cast in form he would use in debate September 22. He did not think US statement, if we agreed to make one, need be as complicated. The two essential points which he hopes US will cover are:

(a) That Bernadotte plan in opinion United States Government offers a fair and equitable basis for a settlement, and

(b) That USG will give its fullest support to Bernadotte plan as whole.

9. To my mind, statements by US and UK of the kind and in the sequence suggested by Bevin represent our best and perhaps only effective course in present circumstances. Statements would fix the positions of US and UK firmly behind Bernadotte plan as a whole. Working on this basis shoulder to shoulder with UK is best devised, it seems to me, to influence both Arabs and Israelis to acquiesce. If we should become the prey of Zionist forces, which will cause the UK to become the protector of the Arabs, this will only prolong that dangerous sore in Palestine and possibly spread the area of infection. I believe the reasons which Bevin has advanced in paragraph 4 above for US making its statement first are valid. They are in accord with my knowledge of the political situation here. (This I have since confirmed from authoritative Conservative sources.)

10. For what my judgment is worth, I recommend with all the force at my disposal that we make the statement suggested above in the circumstances indicated. I believe that this, coupled with the British statement, will be an effective double blow which may go far to achieve

a permanent and workable settlement of what has been a potentially, if not actually, serious threat to our national interest.

11. I hope that security aspects of this message will be observed with utmost care (see also caution in final paragraph my reference telegram).

DOUGLAS

201.85 Palestine/9-1748: Telegram

The Consul General at Jerusalem (Macdonald) to the Secretary of State

URGENT

JERUSALEM, September 17, 1948.

1206. Please pass United Nations Paris for Secretary General from Bunch, Jerusalem, 17 September.

Following for information Security Council.

Count Folke Bernadotte, United Nations Mediator on Palestine, brutally assassinated by Jewish assailants of unknown identity, in planned, cold blooded attack in the new city of Jerusalem at 1405 GMT today, Friday, 17 September. Mediator, in Jerusalem on official tour, was en route from Government House to YMCA in a convoy of three cars, two of which were flying United Nations flags and one a Red Cross flag. Party accompanied by an official liaison officer of the Jewish forces. In the Katamon quarter of new city, well within Jewish lines, all three cars were stopped at a road block in which was parked an Israeli Army type jeep filled with men in Jewish Army uniforms all of whom got out but the driver. Two of these men, apparently recognizing the Mediator's car approached it, stood by the window and fired at point blank range. Count Bernadotte and Colonel Andre P. Seret, French Air Forces, United Nations Observer, sitting beside him in rear of car, were both hit several times, Colonel Seret being killed instantly, and Count Bernadotte having lost consciousness almost immediately, dying within a few minutes of his arrival at Hadassah Hospital, where he was driven by UN Secretariat Officer Frank Bagley, who was driver of Mediator's car at time of attack and who suffered only powder burns. General Aage Lundstroom, Chief of Staff of Truce Supervision, also seated in rear of car, miraculously escaped injury. Commander William R. Cox, United States Navy, United Nations Observer, seated in front of car also uninjured.

Dr. Bernard Joseph, Military Governor of Jerusalem and Colonel Dayan, Military Commander of Israeli forces in Jerusalem immediately expressed deep regret and concern and stated their intention to hunt down assailants.

Situation in Jerusalem tense. Consulting with Truce Commission and senior observers concerning future arrangements affecting observer personnel in Jerusalem who are in constant danger.

General Lundstroom, as personal representative of Mediator and his chief of staff, carrying on with direction truce supervision work in consultation with Truce Commission and General William E. Riley, United States Marines, senior United Nations Observer.

All members of Observer Corps and United Nations Secretariat staff deeply shocked at sudden loss of their leader in this work whose high

integrity, tirelessness, devotion to his mission and great personal courage were inspiration to us all.

Signed Buncha.¹

MACDONALD

¹ For the statement by the Secretary of State on the assassination of Count Bernadotte and the preliminary report from the Consul General at Jerusalem on the assassination, both released September 17, see Department of State Bulletin, September 28, 1948, p. 349.

The Consul General, on September 18, informed the Department of the "general assumption of UN observer group, this office and Jewish military authorities, that assassins were of terrorist group, I.H.Y., commonly known as Stern Gang." (Telegram 1208 from Jerusalem, 501.00 Palestine/9-1848)

Mr. Ben-Gurion read to Special Representative McDonald, during the evening of September 18, the orders he had given to the military commander of Jerusalem to arrest all Stern members and to seize their bases and arms. He advised also that he would present to the cabinet meeting that evening an ordinance outlawing the organization. Within 24 hours of the assassination, Israeli forces arrested 40 Stern members in Tel Aviv and 100 in Jerusalem (telegram 122, September 18, midnight, from Tel Aviv, 507N.01/9-1848).

Acting United Nations Secretary-General Sobolev called the Secretary of State on September 18 that he had instructed Mr. Buncha to assume full authority over the Palestine Mission pending a decision by the General Assembly or the Security Council (unnumbered telegram from Paris, 501.00 Palestine/9-1848).

501.00 Palestine/9-1748: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 18, 1948—2 p. m.

3690. For Ambassador Douglas.

(1) We agree (para 2 Embtel 4153, Sept. 17) Bernadotte report may be published as early as Sept. 20.

(2) Secretary will make decision in Paris (para 6). Confidentially our present inclination is to make statement there before British.

(3) Sec plans leave Washington early afternoon Sept. 19, arriving in Paris Sept. 20.

(4) We are preparing US statement (para 8) which Sec will probably take with him for discussion with GADel Paris following arrival.

Sent London, repeated Paris for Jessup and McClintock in reply Delgs 59, Sept. 18.¹

MARSHALL

¹ Not printed; Mr. McClintock, in this message to Messrs. Lovett and Bueh, recommended strongly that there be no ten-day delay in publishing the Bernadotte report and concluded: "Bernadotte's death will give maximum weight to recommendations in his report. I feel that if report is issued promptly, there will still be sufficient time for diplomatic preparation, particularly since British already contemplate swift action." (501.00/9-1948)

Editorial Note

On September 19, some two days after the assassination of Count Bernadotte, Special Representative McDonald sent a letter to Presi-

dent Truman which stated that "no matter what happens in the next days or weeks, I do hope that you will discourage any possible move to weaken this Mission or to withdraw its head as a form of sanctions or as evidence of U.S. displeasure." The President replied on October 4 that "I heartily approve the course you have pursued and are pursuing and shall, as you recommend, discourage any move to weaken the Mission or to withdraw its head as a form of sanctions." The full texts of the two messages are printed in Mr. McDonald's *My Mission in Israel*, pages 81-82.

601.88 Palestine/9-2448: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly, at Paris*¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 20, 1948—3 p. m.

Gadel 25. [For Jessup.] Dept. view that unless direct pecuniary loss sustained by UN on account murder Bernadotte, inappropriate for UN demand indemnity PGI Delga 85, Sep 18.² Punitive damages not generally favored in international law even as between states. Matter propriety apology UN left your discretion.

LOVETT

¹ The first part of the Third Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly opened at Paris on September 21, 1948, and lasted until December 12. The United States Delegation was headed by Secretary Marshall until his departure for Washington on November 21. With respect to the membership of the U.S. Delegation, see vol. 4, Part 1, pp. 9-20 and Department of State Bulletin, September 12, 1948, p. 330.

² Not printed. It suggested that if it were "fully established that PGI failed to use means at disposal to prevent murder or to punish murderers, it would be responsible to make apology and pay indemnity to UN" (601.88 Palestine/9-2448). A further exchange of telegrams on this subject (Delga 90, September 23, from Paris, and Gadel 49, September 24, in reply, 601.88 Palestine/9-2348) is not printed.

601.88 Palestine/9-2448: Telegram

The Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

URGENT

Tel. Aviv, September 20, 1948—6 p. m.

NIACF

128. Foreign Minister informed me at 4 p. m. that at noon today PGI issued 24-hour ultimatum to IZL forces in Jerusalem to unconditionally surrender their arms and enlist unreservedly in Israeli Army, or be attacked by military force.³ Ultimatum expires 12 noon,

³ Consul General Macdonald, on September 22, reported that Irgun Zvai Leumi forces in Jerusalem had agreed, the previous day, to disband and that its members had begun reporting to the Israeli army for duty. He noted also that in the State of Israel, i.e., outside of Jerusalem, the IZL had joined the Israeli army in July (telegram 1221 from Jerusalem, 8678.01/9-2248).

September 21. Foreign Minister states only factor which will affect government decision to force compliance ultimatum is if Arabs attack before noon tomorrow.

This most important decision revealed after I had expressed to Foreign Minister contents Depairtel September 19, 4 p. m.¹ concerning which Foreign Minister reiterated assurances that PGI would not take military action violation truce and would only defend itself if Arabs attack. As for prevention further violence, Foreign Minister recounted current strenuous actions being taken against Stern Gang and said operations proceeding successfully so far with government more hopeful of finding leading conspirators and assassins. Am promised English text already approved Cabinet decree against terrorist organizations within few hours and will telegraph soonest.²

McDONALD

¹Not printed; it requested diplomatic officers at Arab capitals, Tel Aviv, and Jerusalem to inform appropriate officials "that we consider UN task which Count Bernadotte so effectively commenced should be vigorously pursued. We attach greatest importance to maintenance present truce and continuation of mediation. We are confident Arab and Jewish leaders will take every precaution to prevent further violence and will, particularly, refrain from any military step contrary to terms of SC truce." (501.BB Palestine/9-1948)

²In a message sent via air pouch courier on September 24 to Mr. Clifford, who was aboard the President's Special Train, Acting Secretary Lovett stated in part: "In general Israel appears to be making a determined effort to control terrorist organizations, Irgun and Stern gangs. Some success with former but Stern leaders not yet caught and important figures already gone underground. Safety of American personnel is doubtful, Israeli Government giving McDonald, Tel Aviv, strong police guard as protection against assassin groups. Consul MacDonald, Jerusalem, is reported to have received warnings and we are concerned his safety. He has requested additional Marine guards for Consulate and military establishments are considering matter." (Clifford Papers)

501.BB Palestine/9-2148: Circular telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices¹

WASHINGTON, September 21, 1948.

SecState released following statement on Palestine in Paris at 4 p. m. Paris time (11 a. m. EDT), Tuesday, Sept 21: ²

"The US considers that the conclusions contained in the final report of Count Bernadotte³ offer a generally fair basis for settlement of the Palestine question. My government is of the opinion that the conclusions are sound and strongly urges the parties and the General Assembly to accept them in their entirety as the best possible basis for bringing peace to a distracted land.

"No plan could be proposed which would be entirely satisfactory in

¹At Arab capitals, Tel Aviv, and Jerusalem.

²Mr. Lovett, in a memorandum of September 21 to the White House Message Center for the attention of Mr. Clifford, sent the text of the Secretary's statement and advised of the date, time, and place of release (501.BB Palestine/9-2148).

³Released on September 20.

all respects to every interested party. The UN has endeavored to achieve a solution by peaceful adjustment and entrusted the task to its Mediator, Count Bernadotte. He energetically, courageously and with a spirit of complete fairness, we feel, canvassed all the possibilities and proposed as his last contribution towards a world of peace a sound basis for settlement. He gave his life to this effort.

"The complexities of the problem and the violent emotions which have been engendered are such that the details of any plan could be debated endlessly. As a matter of fact, the debate on this question has been carried on for years in almost every kind of public forum. It is our sincere hope that the parties concerned will realize that their best interests and the interests of the world community will be served by accepting in a spirit of fair compromise the judgment of Count Bernadotte."

LORETT

NO FILE: UN (F)/A/24

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Henry S. Villard of the Advisory Staff of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly

CONFIDENTIAL

[PARIS,] September 22, 1948.

Participants: Amir Faisal, Chief of Saudi Arabian Delegation
Henry S. Villard, U.S. Delegation

In conversation today with members of the Saudi Arabian Delegation, I was told by Amir Faisal that his Delegation was strongly opposed to accepting any part of the Bernadotte Report. Amir Faisal said that he would fight against the report to the end, in which he would be fully supported by the other Arab states.

The Saudi Arabians consider the report to be a "prejudiced one" favoring the Provisional Government of Israel. I asked Amir Faisal if he considered Count Bernadotte to have been a prejudiced person. Faisal replied that while he did not know Bernadotte personally, he regarded the UN solution for Palestine as altogether prejudiced and that the present proposal would never be acquiesced in by the Arab nations.

While personally friendly, Amir Faisal spoke with bitterness about the Palestine problem. He said that as long as the State of Israel existed the Palestine problem would never be solved. He attempted to draw a parallel between the illegal government of "Free Greece" under General Markos, and the Provisional Government of Israel, and charged the United States with inconsistency in opposing the former while supporting the latter.

The Saudi Arabian Delegation made it clear that as far as they and the other Arab Delegations were concerned, the Bernadotte Report would not be accepted and could only be "imposed upon" them.

501.82 Palestine/9-2248 : Telegram

The Chargé in Lebanon (Kuniholm) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

Beirut, September 22, 1948—10 a. m.

47B. Re Depcirtel September 19, 4 p. m. Since President and Prime Minister are absent from Beirut I transmitted message to Foreign Minister, who said he would relay it to President.

Frangé paid tribute to Bernadotte as impartial and honest mediator, who tried to perform an impossible and hopeless task.

He repeated what he has stated on frequent occasions, that Arabs would never recognize state of Israel. Jews, he said, would be boycotted by Arab states; any state which engaged in trade with Israel, furthermore, would also be boycotted by Arab states. When I observed that such a boycott could be as dangerous to Arabs as to Jews, and almost impossible to enforce, he replied that ways would be found to make it effective.

Frangé assured me that Lebanese Army would never attack Jews unless attacked first.

KUNIHOLM

506.04 Summaries/9-2248 : Circular telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 22, 1948—2 p. m.

Please urgently bring to attention Head of State, PriMin or FonMin Sec's statement Sept 21 re Bernadotte's conclusions for settlement Palestine question (cirtel Sept 21).

In so doing you should stress this Govt's deep concern over dangers inherent in present Palestine situation. This Govt considers that acceptance of Bernadotte's conclusions would provide Arab and Jewish leaders with statesmanlike opportunity of making major contribution to NE peace and thereby to world peace. We believe such acceptance would serve best interests of all NE countries. It would permit resumption of stable conditions under which NE peoples may again devote their energies and resources to constructive purposes. Rejection of reasonable settlement, on other hand, which would prolong present disturbed conditions in NE would undoubtedly have further detrimental effect on wellbeing of NE peoples and on stability and security of whole NE. This Govt accordingly urges that favorable consideration be given by all NE States to Bernadotte's final report to UN.

For your info only, we realize that acquiescence rather than acceptance conclusions may be most we can hope for. We feel, however, it would be tactical mistake to urge less than acceptance.

Lowery

¹ At Arab capitals, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, London, and Paris, the last for the information of the Delegation to the General Assembly.

Editorial Note

On September 22 London reported on a telegram sent by the Foreign Office to British missions at Arab capitals, in which they were instructed to hand to the governments to which they were accredited a copy of the statement that Mr. Bevin was to make before the House of Commons that day. The telegram informed the missions that the British Government would push firmly for acceptance by the United Nations of Count Bernadotte's recommendations in their entirety; it also instructed them, together with their American counterparts, to persuade the Arab Governments not to oppose implementation of those recommendations. It noted further that active acceptance of the recommendations and recognition of the position of the other party were unnecessary; what was required was acquiescence (telegram 4223, 501.BB Palestine/9-2248).

For that portion of the text of Mr. Bevin's statement dealing with Palestine, see *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, volume 454, column 808.

225.21/9-2248: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Griffis) to the Acting Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

Cairo, September 22, 1948—noon.

1573. Replying Deptel 1290, September 17, 8 p. m.,¹ under authority military proclamations five and thirteen, Egyptian Government is seizing all cargo destined to or en route from Palestine. Increasingly rigorous inspections of passengers and baggage and cargo inevitable. Fuel, food, water and other supplies are being denied to vessels calling Palestine.

Government now proposes to deny entry into Egyptian ports to any vessel repeatedly calling Palestine. Extremely likely that passengers of military age (probably including women) en route Palestine will be removed from vessels and interned. Strong likelihood that vessels themselves if allowed to call at Alexandria may be interned if repeatedly carrying military age personnel or cargo for Palestine. No new decrees or regulations issued covering these proposals which are administrative decisions under above military proclamations. Copies of all decrees have been sent Department. All Arab League countries reportedly determined adopt similar restrictions.

¹ Not printed: It stated that since it was not clear what positive action the Egyptian Government planned to take against American ships trading with Israeli ports and since the Department had not found technical legal grounds on which to base a protest, the Department requested Cairo's "considered views as to character probable Egypt action and any suggestions which you feel would be effective in formulation of protest." (225.21/9-1348)

Agent of American Export Lines has strongly promised line temporarily to eliminate Palestinian ports from schedule.

It is not believed that any further protest is advisable or would be effective at this time, since more onerous of these measures determined upon since Egyptian Government's receipt of memo and verbal communication contents Deptel 1210.² Embassy believes that only close adherence to Egyptian Government emergency regulations will prevent serious embarrassment US flag vessels this area. Might be possible to have Palestine-bound passengers unmolested Alexandria if UN certification as to their non-military status were obtained prior embarkation from US and possibly American consular certificates for those embarking at intermediate ports. Re Deptel 1242 and 1259,³ American citizen M. S. Zia, passenger to Alexandria last trip *Marine Corp* reports large group Jewish passengers for Haifa made no secret military status, conducted commando tactics practice on deck daily, insisted bulletins and announcements be made in Hebrew, and paid \$6,500 charges for excess baggage which took seven hours to unload at Haifa, including some 75 or 80 US Army type trunks so heavy took two men to lift.

CHARRIS

² Dated September 2, not printed; it stated that "any actions on part either party to present controversy in Palestine which would impede normal" movements of passengers and cargoes "would be viewed most seriously by this Govt." (SMLBB Palestine/9-2445)

³ Dated September 9 and September 10, respectively, neither printed.

SMLBB Palestine/9-2445: Telegram

Mr. Wells Stabler to the Secretary of State

SECRET

AMMAN, September 24, 1948—5 p. m.

61. Since for reasons given by King (mytel 62, September 24¹) it may be difficult for Transjordan to accept Bernadotte's conclusions, am convinced no problem will be encountered in obtaining Transjordan's acquiescence to them if they are adopted by UN and imposed by resolution.

King's well-known reluctance pursue war, his past and present reasonable attitude toward Jews, his desire annex Arab parts Palestine, his Greater Syria scheme, and his close alliance with British are all calculated make his position among Arab states difficult, if not

¹ Not printed: the reasons given by the King were that "he is surrounded by hostile elements in Syria, Lebanon, Egypt and to certain degree in Iraq. . . . Arab hostile elements are seeking destroy him and Transjordan and criticize every step he makes which they consider not in concert with Arab League decisions. Therefore as an Arab leader he is obliged concur in and adopt decisions made by majority other Arab leaders." (SMLBB Palestine/9-2445)

dangerous. So far strength of Arab Legion has been deterrent to any overt conspiracy. King realizes therefore that any forthright acceptance Mediator's conclusions would make his position untenable and that in storm such acceptance would cause, he might lose all he had struggled for. No doubt exists that King generally favors Bernadotte's conclusions (with possible exception matters as Jaffa and Jerusalem) since he is one of principal beneficiaries. Accordingly, Transjordan will be among first, if not first, to urge acquiescence by Arab states to UN imposed solution based on Mediator's conclusions.

Although realize matter under active consideration, feel US recognition this country, even if *de facto*, at this time would contribute to solution Palestine problem by placing Transjordan on equal footing with Israel before UN and by giving it needed support for taking major lead in any debate by Arab League concerning acceptance or acquiescence Bernadotte's conclusions.

Department pass Jerusalem 46, Tel Aviv 2.

STANLEY

Truman Papers, President's Secretary's File : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to President Truman*¹

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, September 24, 1948—7:46 p. m.

Memorandum for the President.

White 97. A reliable newspaper correspondent has told us in confidence that the American Zionist Emergency Council (Dr. Silver's organization) has endeavored to plant on [in?] his paper the story that Bernadotte's Report relating to Palestine was written in the State Department, that it was taken to Bernadotte by a State Department official after coordination with the British, and that Bernadotte used it with a few minor changes.

There is no truth in this story. It is true that representatives of the Department had many opportunities to exchange views with Bernadotte, that we were aware of his thinking, and that he was aware of ours, as were the British and the Israelis.

We had no part in the preparation of Bernadotte's Report. We had not seen the complete Report prior to its publication by the UN in Paris. We were, however, confidentially informed of the conclusions relating to the future of Palestine as contained in Part 1 of the Report shortly prior to the publication.

ROBERT A. LOVETT

¹ Transmitted by the White House Signal Detachment to the President, who was aboard the Presidential train in California and Arizona.

201.223 Palestine/3-2448: Telegram

The Minister in Syria (Keeley) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET URGENT

DAMASCUS, September 24, 1948—11 p. m.

618. Whereas my instructions (Depeirtel September 22, 2 p. m.) limit me to urging "acceptance" Bernadotte conclusions, Bevin's instructions (London's 4221 to Department September 22, 7 p. m.¹) to British Chargé Dundas pointed out cardinal point of plan is that neither party is called upon to make any active sign of acceptance or to recognize position of other party and charged him in collaboration with his US colleague "who will receive similar instructions" to seek "acquiescence" of Syrian Government [apparent omission] at his discretion in initial interviews, in subsequent conversations and in publicity guidance suggested arguments given him in great detail. "Only essential" said Bevin "is that our persuasions should be successful".

After consultation with me and before receipt of my instructions (Loptel 417, September 24, 11 p. m.), Dundas made to Barazi plea for "acquiescence" on ground that however imperfect Bernadotte's conclusions might be they were considered by HMG as best proposal likely to get universal support. Dundas and I are in agreement that Arab weakness in both political and military sphere is such as to give them no reasonably acceptable alternative. He plans support my arguments in this sense with President, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister and I propose generally to support his arguments as suggested by Bevin to extent applicable to our somewhat different situation.

Since Barazi has frequently expressed Syrian Government's grave doubts re value of UN guarantee of any recommended Palestine frontiers, because Syrians sincerely doubt Israel's peaceful intentions and fear its aggressive designs, they might well be more amenable to reason in this crucial point and hence more willing acquiesce in imposition of Bernadotte conclusions if American Government were on record at least as approving British position. I therefore respectfully recommend out of depth my conviction and that of my staff concerning its desirability and timeliness that US show some awareness of Arab fears of announced Zionist pretensions and offer something as *quid pro quo* for Arab acquiescence. Specifically I request Department's authority make, at moment which may seem to us here most opportune for promotion of Syrian acquiescence in plan, a statement along following lines:

"British assurances that unprovoked Israeli violation of Arab

¹ Not printed.

frontiers would be considered in effect 'act of war' against Britain and would put into operation various Anglo-Arab treaties under Article 31 of Charter is made with knowledge and full approval American Government. Furthermore, US Government, which fully understands that alleged Zionist ambitions are source of grave concern to Syrian Government, desires emphasize that, while for constitutional reasons it cannot give pledge similar to British assurances it is bound by UN Charter in concert with other UN members 'to take effective collective measures for the suppression of acts of aggression.'

In interest not only of influencing Syrians to "go along" with implementation of Bernadotte plan but in concern for future of American interests in this area, I urge above message or some show of sympathy with disagreeableness of bitter pill Syrians are being asked to swallow in acquiescing in perpetuation in Palestine of Zionist state which they honestly feel will be perpetual threat to their national security. Even words alone, a few understanding ones, mean far more in eastern psychology than in occidental. Let us not lose this opportunity honestly to fortify our position for the future.¹

Pouched Arab capitals, Athens, Ankara.

Sent Department; Department pass Paris 19 for USUNDel and London 7.

KERLEY

¹The Department, in reply on September 30, expressed its appreciation of the reasoning underlying the penultimate paragraph but regretted it was unable "at present" to authorize Mr. Kerley to make a statement along the lines suggested (telegram 377, SOLIBS Palestine/9-23-48).

SOLIBS Palestine/9-23-48: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Griffis) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

CAIRO, September 25, 1948—noon.

1392. Azzam Pasha, AL Secretary General in informal conversation with Secretary Ireland, arranged obtain Azzam's reaction Bernadotte report said flatly that report was not acceptable to Arabs. He particularly found objectionable:

1. The assignment to Israel of Galilee containing overwhelming majority of Arabs. Return of Negub could not be compensation since population there also overwhelmingly Arab;
2. Failure make Haifa with 100,000 Arabs and 60,000 Jews an international city as he had understood had been intention of Bernadotte;
3. Assignment to Jews of Jaffa, a purely Arab city with a population of 100,000;

4. Failure assign Jerusalem to Arabs. If such failure was based on presence of 100,000 Jews at Jerusalem, he must point to reverse situation at Jaffa and Haifa. Jews could not have it both ways.

Even more important was failure recognize Arab objections to Jewish state with Arab majority. If it were said that since May 15 Arab majority no longer exists, he must point out that flight of Arabs had been due entirely to Jewish terrorism.

When asked whether guarantee of international frontiers would not constitute gain for Arabs, he responded that guarantee of frontiers of state not recognized by Arabs in first instance was of no interest. In any case UN guarantees mean nothing. Zionists were defying UN now and would continue to do so.

He then reiterated familiar themes concerning partition and attitudes of King Abdullah, US and Great Britain. He could understand how ambition swayed Abdullah as tool of British but still could not understand attitude of Great Britain or US. Both maintained they backed report in interest of peace and out of friendship for Arabs. In regard to former both US and Great Britain were actually making it impossible achieve permanent peace in ME, since all who were familiar with realities in plan knew peace would be impossible under Bernadotte's plan.

Azzam said British Ministers Troutbeck and Clayton had just talked with him for more than two hours, urging acceptance Bernadotte plan. He had answered Arabs could not accept plan, they could not acquiesce.

In conclusion and in same mood, he repeated to Ireland that Arabs would continue resist. If US and Great Britain and UN wished to impose plan on Arabs let them send men, planes and battleships. In no other way could Bernadotte's plan be enforced. Similar line pursued by Azzam in statement to press.

Sent Department as 1892, repeated London as 105.

Department please pass to Paris for USUN.

Paraphrased to Arab capitals.

GARRIS

DD FORM: USIP/1/A/C/1/3

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Henry S. Villard of the Advisory Staff of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly

SECRET

[Paris,] September 26, 1948.

Participants: Mahmoud Fawzi Bey, Egyptian Delegation
Henry S. Villard, United States Delegation

I took Fawzi Bey to lunch in the country yesterday and spent the better part of the afternoon discussing Palestine. Fawzi Bey's attitude

seemed essentially reasonable, in contrast to the aggressiveness of the Saudi Arabian Delegation, and I gathered the impression that his main preoccupation was that of saving face for the Arab states in a settlement of the Palestine problem.

Fawzi Bey said that if the General Assembly attempted to push through a solution based on an all-out acceptance of the Bernadotte recommendations, the Arab Delegations would refuse to have anything to do with the matter and would regard the solution as one imposed upon them. There would thus be no real solution of the problem, since the Arabs could not acquiesce flatly in the Bernadotte Report. The main objective should be, rather, to achieve a solution on the basis of conciliation and negotiation. To accept the Bernadotte Report hastily, merely because everyone was tired of Palestine and wanted to dispose of the subject quickly, would be a fatal mistake, for this is a crucial moment in the history of the Palestine question. If the Assembly voted a solution in which the Arabs could not acquiesce, the struggle would go on for years.

Fawzi Bey outlined his views as to the most acceptable procedure from the Arab point of view:

1. There should be a general discussion of the Bernadotte proposals in Committee I, carefully steered by the Chairman in order to avoid pressure for an immediate decision.

2. At the proper moment a very small sub-committee should be appointed of carefully chosen nations to work for a negotiated settlement on the basis of the Bernadotte proposals, under the leadership of one or more "neutral" states. Possibly Belgium might qualify in this respect, with the addition perhaps of certain states which had abstained on the partition vote, together with one which had voted for and one which had voted against partition.

3. The role of such a sub-committee would be to conciliate opposing viewpoints on the Arab and Jewish sides and to bring forth a solution which both sides could accept under the urging of other members of the General Assembly.

It was pointed out by Fawzi Bey that both parties to the controversy have extremists in their midst and have publicly assumed positions from which they cannot officially retreat. Nevertheless, the possibility remains of finding a middle ground on which agreement could be reached without serious loss of face, particularly in the light of over-all General Assembly opinion. The best way of finding this ground would be outside of formal debates in the Assembly or in the heat of Committee I proceedings.

I asked Fawzi Bey what he regarded as the main objection to the

Bernadotte proposals from the Arab viewpoint. In the order of their importance he said they were as follows:

(a) *Boundary line for Israel*. The main difficulty would be in drawing a line so as to incorporate as many Arabs as possible in Arab territory and as many Jews as possible in Jewish territory. The Arabs object to giving Galilee to Israel. I asked Fawzi Bey whether, in all the past attempts to draw a boundary, a line satisfactory to both parties had ever been suggested. Admitting that it had not, he nevertheless thought that some agreement could yet be reached. In this connection he noted that Galilee and the port of Jaffa had previously been assigned to the Arabs, whereas now these areas were to be given to Israel.

(b) *Status of Jerusalem*. Fawzi Bey found the Bernadotte suggestion in this respect too vague, but said he was open-minded. Exactly what plan was in mind? The administering authority for the city must be very carefully selected in Arab opinion because of the danger of infiltration by the Jews and gradual taking over of the administration by them.

(c) *Haifa and Lydda*. Specific details of the free port status of these places would have to be worked out and agreed upon.

(d) *Conciliation commission*. The Arabs were doubtful of the efficacy and usefulness of this body. Again, Jewish infiltration and influence were feared by the Arabs.

Fawzi Bey made it clear that in the Arab view, the primary basis for a settlement would be the return of Arab refugees to their homes in Israel. It was essential that these people should be permitted to return to live where they have previously taken root, and monetary compensation would not serve as a substitute. He seemed to feel that in general the Bernadotte recommendations were satisfactory in this respect.

It was significant that during our entire conversation, Fawzi Bey made no objection to the existence of the State of Israel. He observed that the idea of a unitary state for Palestine was now outmoded, nor would the Arabs desire such a solution. A settlement would have to be reached "on the basis of present facts". While the Arabs could not of course officially accept the existence of Israel, I had the feeling that Fawzi Bey's entire objective is to achieve a settlement on the basis of negotiation in regard to the points enumerated above, and that if this can be done quietly the Arabs would be prepared to take a conciliatory line.

Finally, I asked Fawzi Bey what he thought the Russians would do. He replied that he had no information on this score, but that he felt sure the Soviet Union would play the game to serve their own interests—which would be to prevent any workable arrangements between the Arabs and the Jews.

601.88 Palestine/9-2243: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Jerusalem

SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 27, 1948—5 p. m.

959. Dept has informally emphasized (urtel 1323 Sept 22¹) to Israeli rep here urgent necessity demilitarization Jerusalem.²

LOVETT

¹ Not printed.² Telegram 959 was repeated to Tel Aviv.

601.88 Palestine/9-2443: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to Mr. Wells Stabler, at Amman

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 27, 1948—9 p. m.

15. Dept appreciates reasoning penultimate para urtel 63, Sept 24 but considers that in light many important factors involved in over-all picture, particularly urgent necessity acquiescence Arab states and Israel in Bernadotte's conclusions and successful outcome GA discussions Bernadotte report, any kind of recognition of Transjordan by US at this particular moment would be premature and prejudicial. However in conversations with Transjordan Govt officials you are authorized state in strictest confidence that formal recognition Transjordan is under active consideration by this Govt and that acquiescence by Transjordan in Bernadotte conclusions and degree of cooperation offered by Transjordan in implementing actions and decisions of UN re Palestine will be an important factor in determining this Govt's final attitude on recognition.¹

LOVETT

¹ This telegram was repeated to Jerusalem as No. 232.

601.88/9-2843: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

SECRET

US URGENT

WASHINGTON, September 28, 1948—3 p.m.

3790. Louis [Lewis] Jones from McClintock. Confirm to Wright my remarks to him Sep 23 concerning desire Dept that, in light existing circumstances, top priority be accorded treatment Palestine problem Paris GA. [McClintock.]

LOVETT

501.55 Palestine/9-2848: Telegram

Mr. Wells Stabler to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET US URGENT AMMAN, September 28, 1948—4 p. m.

46. Am grateful to Department for guidance contained its 15, September 27 and shall take early opportunity convey to King and Transjordan Government officials substance last sentence.

Before doing so, however, will Department wish consider also authorizing me assure King and Transjordan Government officials that same yardstick being applied in connection *de jure* recognition Israel? Recent statement by Secretary would appear indicate US Government is contemplating *de jure* recognition of Israel within next days. Such development could only have most disillusioning effect to King's and Transjordan Government's belief in USA sincerity and impartiality, particularly in light of US Government's present attitude on formal recognition Transjordan as expressed in refitel.¹

Department pass Jerusalem 49.

STABLER

¹ In reply, on September 30, the Department informed Mr. Stabler that it "regrets unable at present authorize you give King and Transjordan Government officials assurance subject refitel 46." It also left to his discretion whether he would tell those officials that acquiescence in Count Bernadotte's conclusions and cooperation in implementing actions on Palestine by the United Nations would help determine the United States Government's final attitude on recognition of Transjordan (telegram 17 to Amman, 501.55 Palestine/9-2848). Mr. Stabler informed the Prime Minister on October 2 and the King on October 3 that the United States was giving active consideration to formal recognition of Transjordan. Both expressed great satisfaction, the King expressing his hope that he would be able to visit the United States when the question was resolved. Mr. Stabler did not make use of the authorization given to him, as set forth in the second sentence in this footnote (telegram 72, October 3, 9 a. m., from Amman, 504.55 Palestine/10-348).

501X.45/9-2848: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Paris

SECRET WASHINGTON, September 28, 1948—6 p. m.

Telmar 19. For the Secretary: Following memorandum from Joint Chiefs of Staff dated Sept 22 transmitted to Dept by Secretary Defense:¹

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff have on frequent occasions pointed out the critical strategic importance of the Near East area and the necessity, from a military standpoint, of maintaining the Arab world oriented toward the United States and the United Kingdom.

"The present distress of some 300,000 Arab refugees from Palestine and the inability of the Arab nations to provide for their urgent needs

¹ On September 23.

present an opportunity for the United States to strengthen the friendship of the Arab people for the people of the United States and to enhance the prestige of the United States, both of which have suffered as the result of recent events in connection with the Palestine situation.

"Therefore the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that, as a measure to strengthen our military position, the United States should emulate the actions of the United Kingdom by the early provision of general assistance to the Arab refugees from Palestine. Signed William D. Leahy."¹

Mr. Forrestal in the transmitting letter forwarding the JCS views stated that "only purpose of this letter is to advise you of the considered views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the urgency of taking definitive action and of my concurrence therein".²

LOVETT

¹ Fleet Admiral, United States Navy, and Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Armed Forces.

² Acting Secretary Lovett, in his reply of September 29 to Mr. Forrestal, stated that "the Department is deeply conscious of the urgency of the Near Eastern refugee problem and of its military and political implications, and is making every effort, in cooperation with representatives of the Secretary of the Navy, and with other agencies of the Government, to find means of extending assistance to the Near Eastern refugees." (967N.44,9-2948)

A marginal notation by Mr. Hummel on Mr. Forrestal's letter of September 28, made on September 29, states that he "notified Mr. Ohio of Mr. Forrestal's office of Mr. Lovett's view that such JCS decision should be made known to President."

901.22 Palestine/9-2948: Telegram

*The Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald)
to the Secretary of State*

SECRET

US URGENT

TEL AVIV, September 28, 1948—9 p. m.

NLSCT

151. Reference Depcirtel September 22, 8 [27] p. m., and further Mistel 148, September 27.¹ Foreign Minister goes Paris tonight prepared acknowledge Bernadotte's report as basis of discussion and in spirit of hope for reasonable settlement, but prepared by Cabinet instructions to fight for claims that PGI consider legitimate. Among these will be principally the vital problem of the Negev, and some not unfavorable solution of Jerusalem.

As regards exchange Galilee for Negev, Bernadotte's proposal considered unacceptable by PGI because:

1. Reduces Israel's net area by nine million dunums, leaving state with but five million dunum total.
2. Deprives Jews access Dead Sea.
3. Cuts off any hope Jewish trade route to Orient through Gulf Aqaba.

PGI argument is that Negev is only large unpopulated area afford-

¹ Latter not printed.

ing hope settlement Jewish refugees and allowing absorption natural population increase for many years. To give up Negev means reducing Israel to miniature state which would constitute area of population pressure and breed future conflict; gain of Galilee is not compensatory in that Galilee is relatively small and already heavily populated. The loss of the 22 Jewish settlements in Negev, which are still holding out against tremendous odds, is a politico-military factor which public and army will simply not permit PGI to ignore.

With reference to Jerusalem, Foreign Minister was instructed in secret session Cabinet to take stand:

1. That internationalization of total city, although theoretically possible, is very improbable of effective implementation, basically impracticable, will be source of constant difficulty owing natural topographical and racial complications and create terrific economic problem in that Jerusalem has no economic basis survival cut off from Israel.

2. To request that Jewish-held part of Jerusalem be incorporated in Israel as well as a corridor roughly of same area scope as present Jewish military corridor. In order accomplish (2), Jews might agree to partition of new city Jerusalem between Arabs and Jews and might suggest internationalization of old city within walls.

My personal opinion is that PGI delegation Paris will do utmost prove that loss of Negev is fatal blow to Israel's future and the argument is patent.

Apart from above, but as general consideration, I note press here making much ado about British desire have air bases in Negev by agreement with Transjordan. Although without any information on subject, it is not impossible imagine Israel considering give British same airbase rights if Jews can retain Negev.¹

Further, in my own mind I raise question of possibility, improbable as it may seem at moment, of Abdullah and Jews coming some sort of arrangement, under which both would agree re-stake Arab territory of Palestine roughly as shown in November 29 partition (leaving most of Negev and Jaffa to Israel) and straightening out weird frontiers configuration, followed by bilateral agreement or regional pact of economic cooperation and mutual military alliance to defend both states against outside aggression. Such an alliance would, in my opinion, afford only effective native military force in entire Middle East area south of Turkey.

Department pass Paris information GADel.

McDONALD

¹Mr. Burrows of the British Foreign Office "categorically" informed an Embassy officer on October 1 that "British Government has no special ideas re air base or bases in Negev, although if territory went to Transjordan and thus came within area of Anglo-Transjordan treaty British military would naturally consider Negev on its merits from point of view UK strategic needs." (Telegram 4457, October 4, 1 p. m., from London, 501.HB Palestine, 10-448)

SSR:EE Palestine/2-2242

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] September 29, 1948.

Mr. Clark M. Clifford called me at 4:30 from Tulsa¹ and said that the President was deeply concerned by an apparent over-emphasis by the Secretary on the necessity for accepting the Bernadotte Plan in its entirety. He said that the pressure from the Jewish groups on the President was mounting and that it was as bad as the time of the trusteeship suggestion. The line of attack was that the position taken in Paris by this Government was contrary to that of the Democratic National Platform.

The President first had instructed Clifford to send a telegram to the Secretary in Paris.² I told Clifford that the consequences of a telegram indicating a reversal of the President's clear approval of a program discussed with him by the Secretary on September 1 and formally signed by the President on that date³ would put the Secretary in an intolerable position and, because of the agreements made with other countries in the light of the agreed policy, would label this country as violating its agreements and as completely untrustworthy in international matters. The consequences could be absolutely disastrous to us in the United Nations and elsewhere.

After prolonged argument, Clifford agreed to use his best efforts to have this approach to the matter cancelled when I read to him the memorandum⁴ specifically approved by the President on September 1

¹ Mr. Clifford was aboard the Presidential train.

² The Clifford Papers contain a draft message from President Truman to Secretary Marshall at Paris in the President's handwriting. The editors are of the opinion that this message was intended to be the "telegram to the Secretary in Paris". It reads as follows:

"Your statement that the Bernadotte report should be used as a basis for negotiation in the settlement of the Palestine question requires clarification.

"The government of the United States is on record as having endorsed the action of the United Nations General Assembly of November 1947 as to boundaries. As President I have so stated officially. The Democratic Platform endorsed the findings of the General Assembly.

"I shall have to state that my position as to boundaries has not changed.

"You should know that my statement will be made on October first."

At the end of the draft telegram is a note that the message was to be sent immediately, with a copy to Acting Secretary Lovett at Washington.

Mr. McClintock's memorandum of September 30, p. 1437, which gives a further account of the Clifford-Lovett telephone conversation, states that the draft telegram was not sent.

³ See Footnote 2, p. 1393.

⁴ The memorandum of August 31, p. 1393.

which set out in detail the possibility of a swap of Western Galilee for portions of the Negev. I also called his attention to the fact that a message sent to the President through the White House Signal Center¹ and dispatched at 4:18 p. m. on September 18 telling the President of the Secretary's proposed statement and asking for instructions if the President were not in agreement produced no reply to date. At 4:30 on Monday evening, September 20, the White House Signal Center was checked with and again on Tuesday morning the 21st. No reply had been received in any form.

Clifford said this was all news to him and that he would take the matter up promptly.

The conversation was interrupted and some time later Clifford told me that an alternative suggestion had been made that the President reply to a telegram from Rabbi Wise, apparently in connection with the Jewish New Year but timed for release during the period of registration in New York. The telegram seemed reasonable except for a sentence which read, "It seems to me that the Bernadotte Plan might well serve as a basis of negotiation for such a settlement." I pointed out that this was an obvious weakening of the position taken by the Government in Paris and in reliance on which Bevin made his subsequent public statement before the House of Commons. Clifford agreed to take the matter up with the President and to call me back at the next stop.

At 6:10 p. m. a telecon message came in suggesting alternate language to replace the sentence quoted above. The new language read: "It seems to me that the Bernadotte Plan offers a basis for continuing efforts to secure a just settlement." As this approximated the statements made in Paris, it seemed acceptable to me. Before replying, however, I communicated with Satterthwaite and checked with others in the Department, who said that they saw no objection to this language. Accordingly, at about 7:00 p. m. I replied to Clifford's message via the Signal Center at the White House stating that the new language was acceptable.

It was my understanding that the President proposes to release his wire to Wise Thursday or Friday in an effort to offset the full-page advertising campaign of the American Zionist Emergency Council directed against the Bernadotte Plan.

Attached is the reply given me by telephone which the President expects to send to Rabbi Wise.

ROBERT A. LOVETT

¹ Copy not found in Department of State files.

[ANEX]

Proposed Telegram by President Truman to Rabbi Stephen S. Wise

In answer to your telegram, there is no question but that my action on May 14, 1948, constituted an unconditional recognition of the State of Israel. In addition, at that time, a provisional government had been established and *de facto* recognition was given the provisional government. When a permanent government is established, I have no reason to doubt but that it will promptly be given *de jure* recognition.

I sincerely hope it will be possible to find a peaceful settlement of the distressed conditions in Palestine which can be accepted with honor by all the interested parties. It seems to me that the Bernadotte Plan offers a basis for continuing efforts to secure a just settlement. Already substantial progress toward peace has been achieved and, with these more stabilized conditions, this Government is now in a position to give further consideration to making loans immediately available for productive projects within the State of Israel.*

* There is no record in the files of the Department of State of the proposed telegram having been sent. A copy in the Clifford Papers contains the word "elects" instead of "established" in the penultimate sentence of the first paragraph.

MLER Palestine/9-2845:Telegram

The Charge in the Soviet Union (Kohler) to the Acting Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

Moscow, September 29, 1948—7 p. m.

2186. Arab colleague tells me during recent talk, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Zorin informed him while Soviet Government had supported GA partition resolution of November 29, Soviet position was subject review since this plan was not being carried out. Strong implication to source was that dramatic Soviet reversal might be expected if present GA session should attempt solution other than reaffirmation original resolution.¹

Sent Department 2186, pass Damascus 3, London 245, Paris for Gadel 412, Jerusalem 18, Tel Aviv 7.

Kohler

¹ Messrs. Wright and Barrows of the British Foreign Office "commented that such a reversal must be very tempting to the Kremlin since Arabs have never been so susceptible to Communist blandishments and have never been so friendless. Both believe that if USSR should turn against PGR, as USSR might very easily, stock of USSR in Arab state[s] would immediately soar." (Telegram 4201, October 4, 2 p. m., from London, MLER Palestine/10-445)

SOLLE Palestine/9-2948

*Draft Telegram to the Diplomatic Offices in the Arab Capitals*¹

SECRET US URGENT

WASHINGTON, undated.

Pursuant to Depcirtel Sept 22 instructing you to inform Govts to which accredited of this Govt's full support of conclusions Bernadotte Plan in its entirety, please call at once on Prime Minister or Foreign Minister in your discretion and make following points:

1. Arab Govts will undoubtedly have received Bernadotte's report and have given it careful study. US Govt has likewise scrutinized Mediator's report and his conclusions with utmost care and as indicated by Secretary of State feels that his proposals afford a workable basis for peaceful adjustment of Palestine situation.

2. In view of special weight which attaches in Arab world to issues of personal honor and integrity, Govt to which you are accredited will undoubtedly be interested to know that Dept has received from source of unimpeachable authority info that Count Bernadotte only two days before his tragic death felt that his proposals regarding "peaceful adjustment of situation of Palestine" were eminently reasonable and just to both sides. You may add that Dept places this info in hands of interested Govts as statement of historical record and because US is convinced that Mediator has produced a plan for Palestine which is based upon principles of right and justice.

3. Scrutinizing Bernadotte Plan from Arab point of view it will at once be seen that his conclusions under Para. 4 (d) are particularly designed to allay Arab fears that Jewish state, once having achieved lodgment on Palestine coast, may encroach on Arab world.

The assurance by UN that boundaries between Arab and Jewish territories as recommended by Mediator shall be respected and maintained can in the opinion of this Govt be made effective, provided Arab Govts and PGI can even tacitly acquiesce in recommendations of Bernadotte as reinforced by decision of GA. Under UN charter not only shall all members of UN settle their international disputes by peaceful means and shall refrain in their international relations from threat or use of force against territorial integrity or political independence of any State (Art. 2, Para. 3 and 4), but the organization shall ensure that States which are not members of UN act in accordance with these principles. There is therefore a Charter obligation to respect territorial integrity of existing States. If new frontier in Palestine can be demarcated on GA recommendation and with acquiescence of the parties this frontier will automatically be pro-

¹ Drafted on September 29 by Mr. McClintock for Mr. Lovett's signature. This message and the one, infra, were not sent; see last paragraph of Mr. McClintock's memorandum of September 30, p. 1437.

tested by Charter articles cited above. Furthermore this Govt has many times made clear its unequivocal view that SC has responsibility to prevent recourse to force to settle international differences. US in future will insist in SC that any recourse to hostilities from either side in Palestine situation be opposed if necessary by action under Chapter VII.

In addition to fixing of new boundaries pursuant to UN action there are other possible guarantees of new frontier which will be apparent to Arab Govts such as UK treaties of guarantee and the possibility of diplomatic action on part of friendly govts which would make clear that these powers regarded new frontiers in Palestine as having been established in interest of world peace and—it is profoundly hoped—with acquiescence of the states concerned.

4. In light of fact that Bernadotte Plan contemplates "freezing" of Israeli frontier principal Arab worry over unlimited Jewish immigration to Palestine would seem to have no basis provided Arab states as we hope will concur in application of Bernadotte Plan. It should be apparent to farseeing Arab statesmen that there is a finite limit to Israeli territory under Bernadotte's recommendations and that more than a limited amount of new inhabitants cannot be established on such a limited territory.

5. Arab Govts will be quick to note also special assurance in Bernadotte Plan regarding right of refugees to return to their homes or to receive adequate compensation for property lost in event they opt to remain elsewhere. Arab Govts will also, we presume, have noted statement in Secretary's speech to GA Sept 28¹ regarding not only repatriation of refugees but also his reference to economic aid to Jews and Arabs to restore and strengthen their economic well-being.

6. In the long run as history has shown, Arab statesmen are realists. You should in most friendly way quote to them Bernadotte's words in Sect. II, Para. 9, of Mediator's report, Part I. This section is entitled "Basic Factors in the Palestine Situation." The para opens with sentence "It is fruitless to conjecture whether Arabs or Jews might have won a decisive victory in Palestine had international intervention not brought the fighting to a halt . . ." Had the war continued it would most likely have ended in a stalemate, which in itself would amount to a Jewish victory. But the UN had firmly determined that the war could not go on and that the Palestine dispute must be settled by peaceful means. And that is the Arab dilemma. The Jewish State, established under the cloak of UN authority, can be eliminated only by force. The UN, however, has decreed that force must not be employed. Therefore the Arab States must resign themselves to the pres-

¹ For the full text of Secretary Marshall's address, see Department of State Bulletin, October 3, 1948, p. 432.

² As in the source text.

ence of the Jewish State or pursue the reckless course of defying the UN and thereby incurring liabilities the full burden and danger of which cannot be calculated in advance."

You should add that logic of this statement seems irrefutable and that facts altho they may be accepted with most poignant regret by Arab leaders must speak for themselves. Since this Govt in company with other Govts is determined that force shall not be used to achieve a solution of Palestine problem and will use its utmost endeavors in SC and elsewhere to ensure this end, Arab govts would be well advised to seek course of statesmanship and accept or at least acquiesce in Bernadotte Plan. You should make clear that in offering this counsel US has no other motivation than to act as steadfast friend of Arab world.

Sent for action to Cairo as ———, Damascus as ———, Beirut as ———, Baghdad as ———, Jidda as ———, Wells Stabler, Philadelphia Hotel, Amman, as ———.

Sent for info to Paris as Gadel ———, London ———, Jerusalem ———.

SECRET Palestine/9-3044

*Draft Telegram to the Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald)*¹

SECRET US URGENT
KLAT

WASHINGTON, [undated.]

Please call on Ben Gurion and leave memorandum in following terms:

"1. The US Govt, which as events have shown, has proved a sincere friend of PGI, desires in spirit of friendly counsel to urge that PGI accept or acquiesce in conclusions of Bernadotte Plan in their entirety. US Govt is gratified to be informed by its Representative in Tel Aviv (your 131, Sept 28) that Israeli Foreign Minister departed for Paris prepared to acknowledge Bernadotte's report as basis for discussion and in spirit of hope for a reasonable settlement.

"2. Although conclusions of Mediator may not in all respects meet with Jewish desires this Govt is convinced after careful analysis of Bernadotte's recommendations that his plan affords a common denominator for present acquiescence as between Israel and Arab States and eventual formal acceptance of a peaceful and permanent solution of Palestine problem.

"3. This Govt is fully cognizant of value attached by PGI to the Negev but cannot agree that relinquishment of this desert area is in fact a basic loss to the new Jewish State. Territorial proposals of the dead Mediator were not based on the number of square miles accruing to one side or the other but on terms of real value. Mediator's proposals were motivated by Count Bernadotte's firm determination to

¹ Drafted on September 30 by Mr. McCluskey for Mr. Lovett's signature. This message was not sent.

accord even-handed justice to both Jews and Arabs. While admittedly neither side will receive under Bernadotte plan all that it desires, Jewish statesmen must realize that in any viable political settlement concessions must be made by both sides. To US Govt it would accordingly seem to be the course of wisdom for PGI to accept or acquiesce in Bernadotte's territorial recommendations, confident that once a basis for peaceful development has thus been established Jewish State will achieve its additional objectives such as a trade route to the Orient or peaceful commercial access to the Dead Sea by only sure means to make possible attainment of these goals: friendly agreement between neighboring peoples, both Arab and Jewish, founded on mutual accommodation and interest. In consequence, this Govt believes that, taking Bernadotte plan as a whole, Israel stands materially to benefit.

"4. As for pretensions of PGI to extension of its authority to include the greater part of Jerusalem, US Govt is convinced that recommendations of Mediator which are in effect identical to those recommended by UN GA in its resolution of Nov 29, 1947, afford most equitable settlement of Jerusalem problem. This Govt, while sympathetic to views of both Arab and Jewish Govts regarding their respective communities in the Holy City, nevertheless must look to worldwide interest in preservation of Jerusalem and its ready access to persons of all three religious faiths who regard Jerusalem as a central and symbolic point. Accordingly this gov't does not believe that PGI should control part of Jerusalem or that it should have a corridor to that city. Conclusions in Bernadotte Plan specifically providing for right of unimpaired access to Jerusalem by rail, road and air would seem in our opinion to obviate any need for a Jewish corridor.

"5. PGI should be prompt to recognize advantages to it of Bernadotte's conclusion in 4(d) which provides for special assurances that new frontiers of Israel shall remain inviolate. These assurances should be of particular value to the small Jewish State as affording a bulwark against possible pressure from the vast Arab world. This gov't believes that under UN charter not only shall all members of UN settle their international disputes by peaceful means and shall refrain in their international relations from threat or use of force against territorial integrity or political independence of any State (Art. 2, Para. 3 and 4), but the organization shall ensure that States which are not members of UN act in accordance with these principles. There is therefore a Charter obligation to respect territorial integrity of existing States. If new frontier in Palestine can be demarcated on GA recommendation and with acquiescence of the parties this frontier will automatically be protected by Charter articles cited above. Furthermore this Govt has many times made clear its unequivocal view that SC has responsibility to prevent recourse to force to settle international differences. US in future will insist in SC that any recourse to hostilities from either side in Palestine situation be opposed if necessary by action under Chapter VII.

"6. Although we are cognizant of fact that PGI would prefer direct peace negotiations with Arab Govts, Arab experts of PGI will undoubtedly have themselves informed their Govt that under present

emotional stress it is most unlikely that Arab leaders will agree to enter into such negotiations. Accordingly it seems to us that Bernadotte plan with backing of UN Assembly and SC affords a ready instrument for achieving those conditions of peace and tacit agreement which are indispensable to peaceful development of Jewish State."

You should in your contacts with them leave no doubt in minds of any responsible statesmen in Israel that US Govt and people believe that Mediator has left a legacy to the world of a workable solution of Palestine problem. In consequence this govt has a duty to use its utmost endeavor as member of UN and as loyal friend of Israel to see that Bernadotte plan is placed into effect.

Sent Tel Aviv for action as ———, repeated for info to Paris for Gidel as ———, London as ———, Cairo as ———.

SOLEB Palestine/9-1948

Memorandum for the Files by Mr. Robert M. McClintock

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON.] September 30, 1948.

Mr. Lovett received a call during luncheon yesterday from Mr. Clark Clifford, who was on the Presidential train somewhere in Oklahoma. Mr. Clifford said that the President had ordered him to send a telegram to the Secretary of State in Paris, completely disavowing the statement made by the Secretary on September 21 in support of the Bernadotte Plan. Mr. Clifford said that on his own responsibility he had held up this telegram in order to consult with Mr. Lovett but that he could not delay sending the message beyond three hours. He arranged to call Mr. Lovett from Tulsa at 4:30 yesterday afternoon to get the Acting Secretary's reactions.

Mr. Lovett conferred with Messrs. Kennan, Satterthwaite, Rockwell and myself. We were unanimous in the opinion that the President should under no circumstances disavow the Secretary of State. Not only had the President been fully informed by Mr. Lovett of the text of the proposed statement which the Secretary would make supporting the Bernadotte Plan, but the plan itself was in essence almost identical with the Department's suggestions for territorial changes in Palestine which had been explicitly approved by President Truman on September 1 in his own handwriting. A telegram from Tel Aviv, dated September 28, indicated that even the Jewish Foreign Minister was going to Paris prepared to accept the Bernadotte Plan as a basis for negotiation. The President should be told that the Marshall state-

ment in support of the Bernadotte Plan had been made after consultation with the British Foreign Secretary, who had indicated his willingness to make a statement on Palestine favoring the Bernadotte report in the House of Commons with the explicit understanding that the Secretary would have issued a prior statement likewise in support of the Bernadotte Plan. In addition, the President should be told that after the Marshall statement of September 21 the Department had made official representations to six Arab governments and to the Provisional Government of Israel in terms of the Secretary's statement.¹ Accordingly, for the President now to disavow what the Secretary said would impugn the integrity of the United States and would have far-reaching repercussions on our foreign policy not only with respect to the Palestine problem but in every other matter where the pledged word of the United States might henceforth be regarded as valueless.

Mr. Lovett said that he would urge these considerations on the President or Mr. Clifford. He thought it prudent, however, in the event that the President should insist on sending some message to General Marshall to have a draft text which would possibly serve to meet the President's domestic political requirements by showing that not every detail of the Bernadotte Plan need be placed into effect but at the same time not disavowing this Government's support of the plan. Such a statement was prepared but not used.

Mr. Lovett spent an hour and a half on the telephone yesterday afternoon with Mr. Clifford, who had established himself in the freight yards at Tulsa, where the conversation was punctuated by the whistles of on-coming trains. There was a later telecon-conversation with the President at 7 p. m. As the outcome of this strenuous telecommunication debate the President was dissuaded from his original intention and compromised on a draft message which he might send to Rabbi Stephen S. Wise.² The text of this message, which is unobjectionable from the Department's point of view, is appended to this memorandum.

As the result of this episode it was agreed this morning in consultation with Mr. Lovett and Mr. Satterthwaite that the Department would withhold its contemplated representations to the Arab Governments and Israel at least until the President has returned to Washington this weekend. Since Mr. Truman plans to make a speaking tour of New York next week at a time when the Jewish vote will be brought most urgently to his attention, it would seem that the climactic is yet to be reached.

ROBERT MCCLINTOCK

¹ See circular telegram of September 22, p. 1417.

² Not found attached; but presumably the draft telegram, p. 1422.

500.100 Palestine/8-2048

Mr. Robert M. McClintock to Mr. Dean Rusk, at Paris

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 30, 1948.

DEAR DEAN: Since the decision of Committee I to debate the atomic energy and Soviet disarmament proposals before taking up Palestine, it seems apparent that several weeks, if not a month, will go by before the Bernadotte Plan is discussed in the Political Committee.¹

Meanwhile, the pressures are building up at home. The American Zionist Emergency Council is running full-page ads in the metropolitan papers, decrying the Secretary's support of Bernadotte's conclusions and calling on the President to stick rigidly to his party platform. It declares:

"We approve the claims of the State of Israel to the boundaries set forth in the United Nations Resolution of November 29 and consider that modification thereof should be made only if fully acceptable to the State of Israel."

Needless to say, this special pleading has resulted in some strenuous moments in the Department of State. I do not know what the outcome will be but so far Mr. Lovett has done a magnificent job in keeping the train on the track.

I do want to suggest for your consideration the probability that we shall have to adjust our sights at least to the point of agreeing that the territorial recommendations of the Mediator be modified in favor of Israel to the extent of giving the Jewish State a salient into the Negev which would include most, if not all of the Jewish settlements in that area. Such a salient would not extend further than the Gaza-Beerseba Road and would in fact put us in precise accord with the proposed territorial settlement which was approved by the President on September 1. I do not suggest that you take any action on this information but wanted you to have it in advance for background in your conversations in Paris. As you know, I was very careful to warn Bernadotte that our government would probably have to modify its views regarding the Negev salient and I took a similar line while in London in my conversations with Michael Wright. I am sending a copy of this letter to Louis [Lewis] Jones in London for his most private information.

Cheers,

ROB MCCLINTOCK

¹ The General Assembly, on September 24, had referred Count Bernadotte's progress report as a whole to the First Committee and part three, concerning the refugee problem, to the Third Committee (United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly*, 3rd session, Part I, *Plenary Meetings, Summary Records*, 23 September-22 December 1948, hereinafter identified as "G.A., 3rd sess., Pt. I, *Plenary*", p. 110).

NO FILE: US(F)/A/C.I/52

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. William L. Cargo

SECRET

[Paris,] September 30, 1948.

Subject: Palestine—Future of Jerusalem

Participants: Sir Hugh Dow, British Commissioner in Jerusalem
Mr. Harold Bealey, United Kingdom Delegation
Mr. Morgan Mann, United Kingdom Delegation
Mr. Dean Rusk, United States Delegation
Mr. John C. Roes, United States Delegation
Mr. Fraser Wilkins, United States Delegation
Mr. Samuel K. C. Kopper, United States Delegation
Mr. William L. Cargo, United States Delegation

As proposed by Mr. Bealey the previous evening, Sir Hugh Dow, British Commissioner in Jerusalem, came with Mr. Bealey and Mr. Mann, to give us his own information and his views about the present situation in Jerusalem in relationship to the Bernadotte Report. A general discussion of the future status of Jerusalem ensued.

Sir Hugh stated the view that the Arab and Jewish communities in Jerusalem were now entirely separated and strongly divided. In point of fact, he added that there was a physical no-man's land between the two areas. It was his misfortune, he observed, to live in that no-man's land. In his opinion, Jerusalem was beyond the point where effective United Nations control could be established. Alluding to the fairly common suggestion that a United Nations authority should provide for the carrying out of "necessary common services", he remarked that there were no "necessary common services". The two communities lived essentially separate existences.

Sir Hugh felt that any realistic planning must start with the assumption that there would be in effect two separate municipalities with defined frontiers. He personally saw no objection to placing these separate areas under the respective sovereignty of the Jewish State and the State which would arise from or control the Arab area.¹

In response to a question, Sir Hugh observed that United Nations control in Jerusalem might have been possible if it had been vigorously sought through the agency of the Mediator at the time of the first truce. He felt that the Mediator's first suggestion for government of Jerusalem by the Arabs, as well as subsequent events, had made this now impossible. Expressly he believed that a force of 10,000 troops would be needed to maintain law and order in Jerusalem. The Irgun, he

¹ On September 8, Embassy London had brought to the attention of the Department Sir Hugh's views regarding the division of Jerusalem into separate municipalities under the sovereignty of Arab and Jewish states and his belief that once the concept of Jerusalem as an international enclave were abandoned, there was no strong reason for external control of the Arab and Jewish municipalities (telegram 4044, 8278.00/9-8-48).

pointed out, was extremely powerful in Jerusalem and maintained its existence separate from the Hagannah. In reply to a further question, Sir Hugh expressed the view that the two communities in Jerusalem would provide revenue only for their own administrations and would not pay the expense of a United Nations administrative staff.

On the question of a land corridor for the state of Israel between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, Sir Hugh regarded this as unnecessary. He characterized it as a "plan for war and not for peace". He also pointed out that a land corridor under the sovereignty of one state not only connects two areas, but inevitably divides a third.

Mr. Beesley observed that outright sovereignty by the state of Israel and an Arab state over respective portions of Jerusalem was not compatible with the conclusions of the Bernadotte Report, which both the United States and the United Kingdom had endorsed. There was general assent to this comment.

Attention was turned to the question of the ultimate status of the City of Jerusalem. Mr. Rusk asked Sir Hugh's opinion of the possibility of Jerusalem becoming a condominium under the joint control of the State of Israel and the Arab State. Sir Hugh expressed the definite opinion that this was not feasible because the two parties would not sit down together in a common council. The situation which must be contemplated, he felt, involved a practical separation of the two communities. Mr. Rusk asked what role the United Nations might play if sovereignty were held by the two states over portions of Jerusalem. Sir Hugh's reply was that would depend upon the personality of the United Nations agent involved; he felt that the need was for a real municipal expert to be sent on behalf of the United Nations.

Mr. Rusk suggested that it might be feasible to work out arrangements whereby the state of Israel would become the administering authority of the Jewish part of Jerusalem under the terms of a trusteeship agreement, and the Arab State the administering authority of the Arab portion of Jerusalem. In the ensuing discussion it was observed that such a device offered attractive possibilities in that the terms of trusteeship could include guarantees for the Holy Places and that the Trusteeship Council could watch over the interests of the international community in Jerusalem through the examination of reports and petitions and the making of periodic visits in accordance with its usual procedures. Mr. Beesley stated the view that the United Kingdom Government, at an appropriate time, would be willing to give serious consideration to this possibility. He said, however, that they would not be willing to consider any departure from the Bernadotte Report at this Assembly since they had already endorsed it and particularly that they would not like to take any action which would suggest Jewish sovereignty over the Jewish portion of the City. It was indicated to Mr. Beesley that the discussion of trusteeship had not been

with a view to the possibilities of such a proposal at the present session of the General Assembly. Sir Hugh inquired whether the trusteeship suggestion just made was not the sort of thing which might be suggested to the next session of the General Assembly by a United Nations Commissioner for Jerusalem, if provided for by the present session and appropriately empowered to make proposals concerning the future discharge of United Nations responsibilities toward Jerusalem. It was agreed that this was the case.

WILLIAM L. CARBO

*The Acting United Nations Mediator (Bunche) to the Secretary-General:*¹

Rome, 30 September 1948.

1. The assassinations of Count Bernadotte and Colonel Serot have thrown a tragic light on an increasingly serious situation in Palestine as regards the authority, prestige and even the safety of the personnel engaged in the truce supervision work.

2. During the truce ordered by the Security Council in its resolution of 15 July 1948, there has been a disturbing tendency on the part of both Arabs and Jews to withhold co-operation from the Truce Supervision Organization and to place obstacles in the way of its effective operation.

[Here follow paragraphs numbered 3, which gave illustration of practices and attitudes greatly hampering the truce supervisors, and 4, which gave evidences of disregard for the authority of the United Nations, its personnel and property.]

5. The current attitudes of both parties toward the truce supervision involve a serious tendency to disregard the provisions of the resolution of the Security Council of 29 May and 15 July. The resolution of 29 May "Calls upon all concerned to give the greatest possible assistance to the United Nations Mediator" while the resolution of 15 July "Calls upon all Governments and authorities concerned to continue to co-operate with the Mediator with a view to the maintenance of peace in Palestine in conformity with the resolution adopted by the Security Council on 29 May 1948".

6. There can be little doubt that appropriate action by the Security Council at this time would be helpful to the effort to ensure the mainte-

¹ Reprinted from SC, 3rd pr., *Supplement for October 1948*, p. 40.

nance and the effective supervision of the truce in Palestine. In this regard it might well be called to the attention of the disputing parties that the Security Council resolutions of 13 July and 19 August remain firm, and that all of the obligations on the parties therein set forth with regard to the maintenance of peace in Palestine are to be fully discharged.

7. In particular it would seem desirable to give special emphasis to the following obligations and liabilities of the parties with regard to the Truce Supervision: (a) The obligation to allow duly accredited United Nations observers and other Truce Supervision personnel bearing proper credentials, on official notification from Central Truce Supervision Board, ready access to all places where their duties require them to go including airfields, ports, truce lines and strategic points and areas; (b) The obligation to facilitate the freedom of movement of Truce Supervision personnel and transport by alleviation of burdensome flight clearance restrictions on United Nations aircraft now in effect, and by assurance of safe conduct for all United Nations aircraft and other means of transport; (c) The obligation to co-operate fully with the Truce Supervision personnel in their conduct of investigations into incidents involving alleged breaches of the truce, including the making available of witnesses, testimony and other evidence on request; (d) The obligation to implement fully by appropriate and prompt instructions to the commanders in the field all agreements entered into through the good offices of the Mediator or his representatives; (e) The obligation of each party to take all reasonable measures to ensure the safety and safeconduct of the Truce Supervision personnel and the representatives of the Mediator, their aircraft and vehicles, while in territory under its control; (f) The liability of each party for any assault upon or other aggressive act against the Truce Supervision personnel or the representatives of the Mediator in territory under its control, including the obligation to make every effort to apprehend and promptly punish the guilty.

8. Since the question of reparations for injuries incurred in the service of the United Nations is now under consideration by the General Assembly it has not been included among the obligations and liabilities suggested in the preceding paragraph.³

³The Department, on October 6, authorized the American Delegation at the United Nations to inform its colleagues on the Security Council that the United States as a member of the Palestine Truce Commission supported the recommendations set forth in paragraphs 4 and 7 of Dr. Bunche's communication of

Footnote continued on following page.

Editorial Note

John J. Macdonald, as Chairman of the Palestine Truce Commission, sent a cablegram to the President of the Security Council on September 30, which reported that a deliberate Jewish campaign to discredit the Truce Commission and Acting Mediator Bunche was apparently developing along the lines of the attack launched against Count Bernadotte. For the text of the cablegram, see SC, 3rd yr., *Supplement for October 1948*, page 48.

An Israeli spokesman, the following day, described this message as a "figment of the imagination" and alleged the Truce Commission seemed to be "trying to discredit the Jewish authorities." He also denounced the "persistent unfriendly attitude" of the Commission in its decisions and statements. (Telegram 1365, October 6, from Jerusalem, 501.BB Palestine/10-648.)

Footnote continued from preceding page.

September 30. The Department also directed the Delegation to "inform French and Belgian colleagues SC this govt's attitude" and to furnish the text of Dr. Bunche's communication to American Missions at the Arab capitals and at Tel Aviv, with a "statement Dept supports Bunche's recommendations and requests US Reps these capitals should occasion arise make our view plainly known govt to which accredited." (Gadol 121 to Paris, 501.BB Palestine/10-345)

Truman Papers, President's Secretary's File

The Secretary of Defense (Forrestal) to President Truman

SECRET

WASHINGTON, 1 October 1948.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I think you may be interested in the enclosed copy of a memorandum¹ which I recently received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the matter of providing relief for Arab refugees. I believe this memorandum summarizes very succinctly the importance, from the standpoint of national security, of taking all possible measures to assist these individuals.

I have brought this memorandum to the attention of the Secretary of State, with the request that he institute such measures for the relief of these refugees as might be practicable.²

Respectfully yours,

JAMES FORRESTAL

¹ Dated September 22; text contained in Telegram 19, p. 1427.

² President Truman replied to Forrestal on October 4 in a memorandum which read as follows:

"Your note of the 2nd, enclosing me a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Arab refugee situation has been discussed with the Secretary of State and I sincerely hope that some means can be found for meeting this situation." (Truman Papers, President's Secretary's File)

SOLER Palestine/39-143

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Satterthwaite)*¹

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] October 1, 1948.

Subject: Developments concerning the Bernadotte Report and the situation in Palestine.

Participants: Mr. T. E. Bromley, First Secretary of the British Embassy

NEA—Mr. Satterthwaite

UNA—Mr. McClintock

NE—Mr. Rockwell

Mr. Bromley called to state that the British Embassy had been instructed to convey to the State Department the sense of a telegram which the Foreign Office had sent to Mr. Bevin in Paris and which Mr. Bevin would take up with Secretary Marshall. The Foreign Office desired to inform the State Department of its concern over the delay in the discussion of the Bernadotte report in the General Assembly,² and to emphasize its conviction as regards the necessity of maintaining the Anglo-American unity which had now, after so many difficulties, been established as regards the Palestine question. The Foreign Office was apprehensive concerning the pressure of interests in this country seeking an alteration of the stand taken by the United States Government in this regard.

Mr. Satterthwaite stated that the Department of State was thoroughly in agreement with the Foreign Office as regards the necessity of maintaining a united front on this vital question.

Mr. Bromley then stated that the Foreign Office had again instructed the British Embassy to sound out the Department as regards the possibility of the Department's instructing its representatives in the Arab states to impress upon Arab leaders the United States Government's firm conviction that the most logical disposition of Arab Palestine would be its incorporation in Transjordan. Mr. Bromley said that the Foreign Office was concerned lest Arab leaders gain the impression that there was lack of unity between the United States and Great Britain on this question.

We told Mr. Bromley that Secretary Marshall had publicly expressed this Government's support of the Bernadotte plan in its entirety, and that the Department was in complete agreement that the most logical disposition of Arab Palestine would be its incorporation

¹ Drafted by Stuart W. Rockwell of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs.

² "High officials of the British Foreign Office deemed the delay a 'major setback', fearing that the delay greatly increased the danger of a serious breach of the truce by the Jews. They also expressed the fervent hope that the United States would exercise all of its influence to restrain the Israelis from embarking on military adventures (telegram 4844, October 1, 3 p. m., from London, SOLER Palestine/39-143).

in Transjordan. However, we did not believe it would be helpful to the achievement of this conclusion of the Mediator's to have the United States Government make a specific approach to Arab leaders as desired by the Foreign Office. Rather, we felt that such course of action might dispose the other Arab leaders against Transjordan. In our opinion it was a question of timing, and the present moment was not opportune to make such a representation. We repeated that so far we had had no evidence from the field that Arab leaders believed there was any lack of unity between the United States and Great Britain on this issue.

Mr. Bromley then said that the Foreign Office hoped that the American Government would express to Arab statesmen its approval of British assurances that the various Anglo-Arab treaties would come into effect in the event of Jewish violation of frontiers established by the United Nations in Palestine. Mr. Satterthwaite said that this question had already been brought to the attention of the Department and was under discussion.

J[OSEPH] C. S[ATTERTHWAITE]

101.128 Palestine/10-148: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET URGENT

PARIS, October 1, 1948—noon.

Martel 21. Personal and Eyes only for Lovett from the Secretary. Please deliver following message to President:

Dulles¹ received a message from Dewey² Wednesday requesting him to meet Dewey on his return to New York and bring him up to date on developments here. He leaves Sunday for quick turn around.

Dulles referred this morning to reported article in *New York Post* that there was a split between the two of us on Palestine, observing that this was probably inspired to force a statement out of Dulles or Dewey.

I am very grateful to you for resisting what I imagine are great pressures to qualify the stand I have taken. Over here I am receiving strong if not violent Jewish demands, particularly from Congressional Jews and at same time equal pressures in formal public statements from Arab delegates in convention on other side of the question. The Jewish attacks are gradually resulting in modifying the Arab resistance to the Bernadotte Plan as they are not now so convinced that I am taking a purely pro-Jewish stand. The opposite, and I trust equal reactions may cancel each other to the long sought solution.

MARSHALL

¹ John Foster Dulles, Member of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly and a senior spokesman for the Republican Party on foreign policy.

² Gov. Thomas E. Dewey, nominee of the Republican Party for President of the United States.

887N.01/10-248: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Griffie) to the Acting Secretary of State (Lovett)

Cairo, [undated.]

[Received October 2, 1948—12:53 p. m.]

Unnumbered. From Ahmad Hilmi Pasha, Premier and Acting Foreign Secretary. In virtue of the natural right of the people of Palestine for self-determination which principle is supported by the Charters of the League of Nations, the United Nations and others and in view of the termination of the British mandate over Palestine which had prevented the Arabs from exercising their independence, the Arabs of Palestine, who are the owners of the country and its indigenous inhabitants and who constitute the great majority of its legal population, have solemnly resolved to declare Palestine in its entirety and within its boundaries as established before the termination of the British mandate an independent state and constituted a government under the name of the All Palestine Government deriving its authority from a representative council based on democratic principles and aiming to safeguard the rights of minorities and foreigners, protect the holy places and guarantee freedom of worship to all communities, I wish to take this opportunity to express to Your Excellency the earnest desire of the All Palestine Government to establish relations of cordiality and cooperation with your country.¹ [Ahmad Hilmi Pasha.]

[Guerris]

¹ Mr. Burrows informed an Embassy officer of information from Amman that the Arab Palestine Government had been established at Gama under Egyptian auspices, that word had been sent to supporters of the Mufti to rally to Gama, and that arms had been distributed to anti-Hashemite elements (telegram 4812, September 28, 6 p. m., from London, 887N.01/9-2948). London, on October 7, advised the Department that the British Government had no intention of recognizing "this so-called government" (telegram 4823, 887N.01/10-748).

Earlier, Jamal Husseini, Foreign Minister designate in the new government, informed Mr. Stabler that the government had been formed "so that Palestine Arabs would have legal position vis-à-vis Arab League and as evidence Palestine Arabs determination continue fight against Jews" (telegram 65, September 28, 1 p. m., from Amman, 887N.01/9-2948).

According to Lebanese Foreign Minister Frangieh, the "Gama Government was set up as opposition to Abdullah. . . popular reaction is that other Arabs wish to thwart Abdullah's ambitions for federation of Arab regions with Transjordan (and) consequent tacit recognition of Israel." (Telegram 488, October 1, 3 p. m., 887N.01/10-148)

881.00 Palestine/10-248: Circular telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices**

SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 2, 1948—1 a. m.

Please seek opportunity in informal conversations with Govt leaders to express US Govt's attitude re "Arab Palestine Govt" along following lines.

* At Arab capitals, London, Paris (for GAdel), and Tel Aviv.

In spirit of friendly counsel US Govt considers establishment of "Arab Palestine Govt" under present circumstances prejudicial to successful solution Palestine problem as well as to best interests Arab States and Arab inhabitants Palestine. "Govt" apparently being set up without prior consultation wishes Arab Palestinians. Also appears dominated by Mufti, an adventurer, whose reprehensible wartime activities in association with our enemies cannot be forgotten or forgiven by US. Best interests Arab States being prejudiced by published indications that Arab unity disturbed by formation of "Govt". Moreover by claiming speak for all Palestine "Govt" affords ready pretext to Jewish revisionists make similar claims for right [of] PGI control all Palestine.

If asked re US attitude on future of Arab Palestine you should recall to questioners that US Govt has announced its support of all Bernadotte's conclusions.

LOVETT

201.00 Palestine/16-345: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY

PARIS, October 2, 1948—3 p. m.

Delga 190. Eyes alone for Lovett from Rusk. Since Secretary is away from Paris today and tomorrow, I am sending brief summary of conversation with Dulles on Palestine. Dulles had absented himself from delegation meetings on Palestine question because of lack of bipartisan approach. In view of presence both Democratic and Republican candidates New York this coming week, I believe you should have following memorandum despite fact contents have not yet been discussed with Secretary.

My memorandum to Secretary starts:

"I had further talk with Dulles about bipartisan implications of Palestine question.

I told him I recognized that leaders of two parties had not succeeded in getting together on Palestine question on bipartisan basis. Nevertheless, it would be mistake for other delegations or our own US public opinion to conclude there were major differences between two parties on subject. On all of fundamentals, two parties were in agreement. Examples of such agreement are: Existence of Israel as independent state, early and full recognition of new government of Israel, admission of Israel to UN, economic assistance, and peaceful settlement Jewish-Arab difficulties through UN.

The apparent differences between two parties have arisen (1) because administration has been specifically responsible for conduct of negotiations and for elaboration of details of policy, and (2) Jews have succeeded in playing one party leadership off against the other in contest for votes—votes which obviously cannot be delivered to both parties.

Speaking as a non-political civil servant, I told Dulles I thought the leadership of two parties had unnecessarily exposed themselves to Jewish pressure by failure to arrive at bipartisan agreement.

Dulles then indicated that early this year Dewey had expressed willingness arrive at bipartisan policy but efforts bring Democratic Party along had been unavailing. He specifically mentioned Forrestal's efforts in this connection. I then told Dulles that if position we have now taken in this Assembly on Palestine is undermined by bitter political rivalry and controversy in US, effect will be to subject US once more to contempt, acrimony and ridicule. I told him I was speaking only individually but that I knew every possible effort was being made to hold our present policy to lines of Bernadotte report. Obviously no one could give any assurances about what might happen on Democratic side during campaign, but I hoped very much that if Democratic policy made it possible to do so, Republicans would use greatest restraint and do everything they could not to upset situation.

Dulles said he understood complexities of situation and that, although he, too, was in no position to offer any commitment, he would do everything he could to influence Republican side toward moderation. He further expressed hope that matter might be settled before election. During conversation, he dropped useful idea that since Republicans felt quite confident, it might be possible for them to take broader view on this specific issue than they might be able to do if contest for votes were very close and bitter.

I do not believe there is much chance to get formal bipartisan agreement on Palestine before election. I do think, however, that if Department is able to hold the line on Bernadotte report and to persuade Democratic leaders not to start fresh round of new bids for Jewish support, there is good chance that Republicans will take moderate view and assist in keeping matter from flaring up once again."

[Rusk]
MARSHALL

6678.01/10-448

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State¹

TOP SECRET

[PARIS,] October 4, 1948.

Participants: The Secretary
Ambassador Caffery
Mr. Bohlen and
Mr. Ernest Bevin
Mr. Frank Roberts

Subject: - Palestine

Mr. Bevin said he wished to discuss the suggestion which had been received from the American Delegation that Great Britain should go

¹ Drafted by Mr. Bohlen.

on the Conciliation Commission. He said he did not see how Great Britain could be represented on this Commission. He emphasized, however, that they were doing all that they could to induce a more reasonable frame of mind on the part of the Arabs and that he personally had seen the Egyptians and other Arab representatives here to that end.

The Secretary inquired what Mr. Bevin's idea of the functions of this Commission and, in particular, the United States position therein should be. He mentioned that he was under attack by Jewish groups in the United States for his support of the Bernadotte plan, but that on the other hand the Arabs regarded his position as completely pro-Jewish. He wondered whether it would be helpful in Mr. Bevin's opinion to have the United States represented on this Commission and in particular its effect upon the Arabs. Mr. Bevin said that he did not think the Arabs would have any objection to the United States remaining on the Conciliation Commission since together with Belgium and France they had formed the Truce Commission. The Secretary said he had not reached a definite conclusion on this point and he understood the British feelings about their participation on the Commission. Mr. Bevin said that British participation would be greatly misunderstood in England and would be viewed as an attempt on his part to get back into the Palestine situation through the back door; the Jews would not welcome it and the Arabs would misunderstand it.

The Secretary said that since the matter would not come up for some time in the Assembly he would like to think it over. Mr. Bevin said that he thought the continuance of the Truce Commission would raise no new problems of membership and that in general he felt there was a reasonable chance to get Arab acquiescence in the Bernadotte plan. They would of course fight it, but he felt in the end they would acquiesce.

[Here follow remaining two paragraphs, dealing with the British Consul General at Haifa.]

DS1.135 Palestine/73-445: Telegram

*The Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald)
to the Secretary of State*

SECRET US URGENT NIACT TEL AVIV, October 4, 1948—8 p. m.

161. Personal for President and Acting Secretary. A well-informed and influential Israeli official, during strictly personal confidential

conversation with Knox, expressed following opinion regarding Bernadotte proposal give Negev to Transjordan:

1. The US has firm friend in State of Israel, which is oriented toward the West politically and culturally, and which, up until now, is deeply grateful for US support.

2. The Arab states, weak, vacillating, and of dubious friendship toward the West and the US, as evidenced in World War II, have already been offended by the US support of the November 29 partition, and what has been done cannot now be undone.

3. US support of British proposal to give Negev to Transjordan would be no solution to anything and can have only following results:

(a) It would not endear the other Arab states to the US.

(b) It would create a miniature State of Israel, which would inevitably become embittered toward the US.

4. Thus, by forcing transfer of Negev, the US would gain no further friends in Middle East and lose one friend.

Furthermore, Transjordan would not be grateful to US for our support of what is considered to be a British gift of Negev to Abdullah. Abdullah has neither the population, capital, skill, nor desire to utilize the Negev and his position would be merely that of "holding" it for British.

Another factor enters the picture at this point. If British force gift of Negev to Transjordan in order secure air bases that region for use in event East-West clash, it will do so at cost of creating an embittered and hostile State of Israel directly adjacent. This doesn't seem make much sense.

By British and US support of Negev feature Bernadotte report, an extremely difficult situation has been created. This has virtually destroyed any hope of Israel Transjordan direct reasonable settlement because Abdullah now can sit back and await developments; he will hardly be disposed settle for less than the proposals in Bernadotte report. The Jews once again see themselves in hopeless position of having their minimum position being considered maximum, and being whittled down from minimum.

In listening to above arguments of Jews there is, of course, no reaction indicated on part of Knox or myself. We do not know exactly what special reasons motivate US policy and in any event must firmly support that policy whatever it may be, or wherever it may lead. However, our confidential opinion is that although adoption of Negev Bernadotte proposals might serve British strategic interest, it would disproportionately entangle this situation and sow dangerous seeds of bitterness.

Sent Department 161. Department pass Paris 7 for GADel.

McDONALD

SILSB Palestine/10-248

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State¹

SECRET

[Paris,] October 5, 1948.

Subject: Palestine—The Bernadotte Report

Participants: The Secretary

Mr. Moshe Shertok—Minister for Foreign Affairs of
the Provisional Government of IsraelMr. Aubrey Eben—Representative of the PGI to the
United Nations

Mr. Fraser Wilkins—U.S. Delegation

Mr. Shertok called on me this morning at his request.

Mr. Shertok said that a great deal had happened during the past five months and it was now clear that the State of Israel had been able to establish its government and to defend itself against its enemies. He believed the Arab States which had invaded Palestine after May 15 were convinced that the State of Israel was established and that the Jews could not be pushed into the sea.

Mr. Shertok continued that the Jews have recently received two blows: one was the Bernadotte Report and the other was our support of Count Bernadotte's specific conclusions.

Mr. Shertok said that their principal objection to the Bernadotte Report lay in the assignment of the Negev to the Arabs for three reasons:

1. *Loss of a desert area which the Jews could develop for the absorption of immigrants.* Israel planned to irrigate the Negev and to develop it agriculturally. Israel had, for example, already established approximately thirty settlements in the Negev. The Negev was the potential land reserve of Israel. The Arabs, if they had it, would never develop it as has been the case for centuries.

2. *Loss of access to and utilization of the Dead Sea.* The General Assembly November 29th Resolution had specifically provided for Jewish access to the Dead Sea and for control of approximately one-quarter of it at its southern end. Count Bernadotte's Report now took this source of mineral wealth away from them. It was important that the Palestine Potash Company, which was a Jewish enterprise, remain in Jewish territory. Israel ought to have the opportunity of making use of the Dead Sea as a vital factor in its own economy and as a factor in developing economic relations with the Arab States.

3. *Loss of access to the Gulf of Aqaba.* The General Assembly November 29th Resolution by giving Israel all of the Negev gave them access to the Gulf of Aqaba and thereby to the Red Sea. The waters

¹ Drafted by Fraser Wilkins.

of the Gulf were well stocked with fish. Israel planned to develop a fishing industry there. Israel planned rail and highway communications between the southern end of the Dead Sea and the Gulf. Mr. Shertok stressed the latter point as of importance because they wished to avoid, if possible, Suez Canal toll charges and feared "Egyptian surprises" (presumably Egyptian interference with Israeli shipping) which would make it necessary for Israel to have a port on the Red Sea in addition to ports on the eastern Mediterranean.

I asked Mr. Shertok for his views regarding Galilee. Mr. Shertok said that although the General Assembly November 29th Resolution had not assigned Western Galilee to Israel, they had subsequently won it by force of arms. They still needed all of Galilee for reasons of defense. Galilee alone would not be adequate for the settlement of immigrants to Israel.

Mr. Shertok pointed out that the Arabs frequently argued that a Jewish State which followed a policy of unrestricted immigration would soon press for additional territory. Mr. Shertok believed, on the other hand, that if the Negev were lost to them Galilee would not be adequate to absorb immigration into Israel. Mr. Shertok also added that the Arabs frequently argued that a Jewish Negev would be a wedge driven between the Arab States. Mr. Shertok was of the opinion, however, that a Jewish Negev might be considered as a link in a chain including a Jewish State and the Arab States following a settlement of the Palestine question and the development of friendly political and economic relations.

Mr. Shertok concluded by stressing the small size of Israel under the General Assembly November 29th Resolution, the further reduction in size under the Bernadotte Report, and the necessity for Israel's having adequate area in which to live and grow.

I said that I agreed with Mr. Shertok's view that the Arab leaders now seemed to be taking a more realistic approach toward the Palestine case, but observed that the reaction on the other side had been as I expected. I pointed out that the Arab leaders were now confronted by the problem of bringing the Arab peoples to accept the realities of the present situation. I said that I had been criticized by both Arabs and Jews for our support of the Bernadotte plan which was probably the best evidence of our impartiality. I told Mr. Shertok I would like to discuss the points which he raised with my associates. I would not, therefore, reply now but would see him again shortly.²

² Secretary Marshall transmitted a paraphrase of this memorandum to the Department in telegram Deiga 284, October 9, 9 p. m. (501.838 Palestine/10-248). The telegram noted that the conversation lasted a half hour.

SOL.MA Palestine/10-148

Draft Position Paper on Relief for Near Eastern Refugees¹

[WASHINGTON,] October 5, 1948.

PROBLEM

The conclusions of Part III of the Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine point out that the temporary alleviation of the Palestine refugees is quite inadequate to meet any continuing need and suggests that responsibility for their relief be assumed by the UN in conjunction with the neighboring Arab states, the provisional government of Israel, the specialized agencies and voluntary organizations of a humanitarian and non-political character. The problem is to determine what kind of action should be taken by the General Assembly in meeting this responsibility.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. It is anticipated that the Mediator will present an overall program of relief assistance for Arab and Jewish refugees for the period January 1 to September 1, 1949, which will take account of the assistance now being rendered or which may be furnished by UNICEF, the specialized agencies, members of UN, the neighboring Arab states, the provisional government of Israel and voluntary organizations. It is recommended that the governments having important interests in the Near East, particularly the United States and the United Kingdom, furnish a large proportion of the assistance required under the program and that the U.S. delegation announce that this government is prepared to present to the Congress, when it reconvenes in January 1949, a request for an appropriation for a contribution to such a relief program. The amount of the proposed U.S. contribution will be formulated after the Acting Mediator has presented such a program.

2. It is recommended in addition that the U.S. delegation initiate or support a resolution including the following points:

(a) Utilize, for a relief program for Arab and Jewish refugees, at least \$1,000,000 of the residual funds of UNRRA allocated to UNICEF by the Central Committee of UNRRA, such expenditures to form part of an integrated program under the coordination of the Acting Mediator;²

(b) Invite the IRO to render the fullest practicable assistance

¹Transmitted by Mr. Tomlinson to ten officers of the Department with a memorandum of October 5, which stated that the recommendation regarding a United States contribution would need to be cleared with Mr. Lovett and Congressional leaders.

²When reference is made to the Acting Mediator, it is intended to include any body which may be designated by the General Assembly to succeed him, such as the Conciliation Commission or the Secretary General. (See section on Organization in the discussion.) [Footnote in the source text.]

within its budgetary and constitutional limitations in line with the resolution adopted by the General Council of IRO on this subject:

(c) Invite the WHO to provide such medical personnel or other services as may be feasible in order to assist in the control of disease and in preventing the outbreak of serious epidemics;

(d) Invite the FAO to furnish such expert assistance on food supply and nutritional problems as may be requested by the Acting Mediator;

(e) Take note of the assistance being rendered by governments and non-governmental organizations and stress the necessity for full co-ordination of all such assistance with the program of the Acting Mediator;

(f) Provide the Acting Mediator immediately with a supplementary credit of not less than \$1,000,000 for obtaining the services of such staff as he may require in coordinating relief assistance other than personnel detailed by specialized agencies or by governments, and for emergency purposes, pending the receipt of aid from other sources.

DISCUSSION

FINANCIAL PROBLEM

The Mediator's Report points up the action already taken to alleviate the desperate condition of the 350,000 Arab and 7,000 Jewish refugees, and of the contributions in supplies and personnel furnished by governments, specialized agencies, UNICEF, and voluntary organizations, for the short term program, September-December 1948. Although reference is made to the need for a long-range program through August-September, 1949, and the hope is expressed that the General Assembly will assume responsibility for it, no concrete program has yet been presented for consideration by the General Assembly. It is believed, however, that such a program will be submitted as soon as the reports of the experts (supply, medical, nutritional) who have been surveying the situation have been completed. Preliminary estimates and suggestions have been forwarded to Paris by Sir Raphael Cilento,² but he has indicated that he would not have the full picture until the above-mentioned reports were submitted to him, which were due about October 1. Consequently the position outlined in the recommendations cannot be finalized until a program is laid before the General Assembly.

Whatever the size of the program, it is clear from rough preliminary estimates that it will cost not less than about \$24 million, and that ways and means must be found for financing it. It is equally clear that the principal burden will have to be carried by those governments which have a strong, direct interest in the Near East, namely the United States and the United Kingdom, in addition to the Arab states themselves. The remainder would be raised on a humanitarian or welfare basis from UNICEF, certain specialized agencies, some

² Director of Disaster Relief for the United Nations.

governments, and voluntary organizations. An operation of such proportions cannot be financed under the UN scale of contributions, and therefore UN financial responsibility must be limited to a relatively small amount such as that suggested in recommendation 2(f). The position of the United Kingdom as outlined in Delga 158, September 29,² is silent on the costs of expanding the present disaster relief operations, but indicates that the whole financial burden would be borne by the UN as its responsibility. This position is considered unrealistic because it would result in nearly doubling the contributions of all Members, without regard to their degree of interest or ability to contribute. (There are other financial implications in the Mediator's report which will place a heavy burden on some, if not all UN Members, e.g., the Jerusalem police force, tentatively estimated by the Department to cost about \$30 million.) If the UN scale is not practical, neither is any other scale applicable to all UN Members (such as the IRO) which carries with it a specific obligation. The only alternative, therefore, is for those governments having a strong interest in the problem to proffer voluntary contributions. Because of the important strategic and political interests of the United States in the Near East, it is considered that these interests would be advanced by announcing the intention of this government to seek an appropriation from Congress for the assistance of these refugees. The amount to be proposed will need to be determined after the relief program has been submitted, but it is tentatively suggested that about \$10 million would be appropriate. If the United Kingdom were to contribute half that amount, the two contributions, together with \$6 million from UNICEF would total \$21,000,000. Contributions from all other sources would make up for the difference. In making any announcement of the intention of the U.S. to make a voluntary contribution, stress should of course be given to the humanitarian aspects of this problem rather than to the interests of the U.S. The statement should at the same time express the hope that other governments would likewise contribute.

It is hoped that the Acting Mediator will not submit a plan for financing the program. Sir Raphael Cilento in a letter to M. Laugier³ September 21, made several suggestions on this subject which the Department considers unrealistic. For example, he anticipated that about \$9,000,000 could be raised through voluntary organizations. Insofar as the U.S. is concerned, the response from the voluntary organizations and the oil companies to the Mediator's appeal of August 16 is disappointing. The potentially large donors, including the oil companies, have indicated a reluctance to make contributions for purely

² Not printed.

³ Henri Laugier, Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations in charge of Social Affairs.

relief purposes, especially food and have indicated a much greater interest in longer-range social development. The agencies which control CROP (Church World Service, National Catholic Relief Service, Lutheran World Relief) have not proven as cooperative as had been hoped in providing a contribution in wheat. Moreover, they are planning at this stage to launch a publicity campaign themselves to broaden the program of collections to include appeals for refugees from the Holy Land. The Department therefore considers that any program which relies so heavily upon contributions from voluntary sources from the U.S. is likely to fail, and that measures along the line recommended above are required. Similarly, contributions from private sources cannot take the place of a U.S. government contribution which is required to demonstrate U.S. interest. This position is a reversal of the earlier position set forth in the Memorandum of August 31 on "Plan of Action on Arab Refugee Problem".²

[Here follow sections on possible UNICEF and IRO assistance.]

UN BUDGETARY PROVISION

The proposed UN allocation of \$1,000,000 is to provide an adequate staff for the Director of Relief Operations for the entire period and to furnish him with a reserve for emergency purposes pending the receipt of aid from other sources. It would be desirable to vote a part, if not all, of this sum as a supplementary credit for the current fiscal year in order to enable Cilento to move in on the problem in a more effective way as soon as possible. Shortly before his death Count Bernadotte stated that he needed \$100,000 immediately to provide staff for Cilento and informally inquired whether the U.S. could contribute that sum.³ As indicated in Gadel 31, September 21,⁴ the Department considered that such staff should be provided by the UN to the extent that personnel has not been detailed by specialized agencies, governments, or voluntary agencies.

[Here follows further discussion of UN budgetary provision.]

ORGANIZATION

No recommendation has been submitted herewith with regard to the organization which should take the place of the Mediator insofar as the direction or control of relief operations are concerned. This matter is receiving further consideration in the Department and a separate paper will be forthcoming.

The foregoing recommendations assume that responsibility for relief operations will continue to be under the Director of Relief Operations. The British have suggested, as reported in Delga 134,

² *Ibid.*, p. 1364.

³ As reported by Mr. McClintock in telegram 1127, September 19, 7 p. m., from Cairo, not printed.

⁴ Not printed.

September 28,^a that while the disaster relief operations should presumably work under the Conciliation Commission initially, it could be placed directly under the Secretary General as its responsibilities were expanded to include resettlement. Until further progress has been made concerning the role of the Conciliation Commission, the Department is not prepared to commit itself on the possible assignment of disaster relief operations to this body. In the second place it is conceivable that the governments or bodies (such as UNICEF) making substantial contributions for relief may wish to have some control over relief policies in spite of the relatively short time the program will be in operation. Similarly the Director of Relief Operations might wish to be responsible to such a group rather than to the Conciliation Commission whose functions as outlined in the Bernadotte report do not include supervision of relief activities. The principal objection to making the Director of Relief Operations responsible solely to the Secretary General is that the relatively small number of contributing governments would have little opportunity except at the next session of the General Assembly to see how their money had been spent or to exercise any supervision over the operations during the course of the year. It is also conceivable that Congress may wish in making an appropriation for this program to be assured that U.S. interests are adequately protected. A further paper on this subject will be forwarded as soon as possible.

REPATRIATION AND RESETTLEMENT

No recommendations are set forth in this paper concerning repatriation and resettlement which the Department considers should be distinguished from relief operations. The Department is giving consideration to the repatriation and resettlement problems which will form the basis of a separate paper. To the extent that the matter has been discussed, there seems to be no reason why the relief operations should be expanded to include resettlement in view of the distinctly different nature of the problem. In the second place the financing of resettlement is closely linked with the problem of compensation for the property of those who choose not to return. Furthermore, there is considerable doubt as to whether the UN should assume any direct responsibility for financing resettlement. In this connection it should be borne in mind that the IRO resettlement program does not involve the expenditure of funds for resettlement projects in the countries of reception and that its expenditures for resettlement are almost entirely devoted to providing overseas transportation and a small amount of pocket money. The UN, however, might undertake to provide experts in an advisory capacity to assist the Arab countries in the development of resettlement projects. These preliminary observa-

^a Not printed.

tions are tentatively put forward for discussions with the UK delegation pending the completion of the paper on this subject.

FILE Palestine/10-448

Memorandum by Mr. Robert M. McClintock to the Acting Secretary of State (Lovett)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] October 6, 1948.

[Subject:] Secretary's return to Washington: Palestine

Undoubtedly the Secretary in his weekend consultation with the President will be asked to deal with the stated US position on Palestine as embodied in his support of the Bernadotte Plan along the lines of his statement in Paris on September 21. The President may mention the considerations which formed the topic of your railroad conversation with Mr. Clark Clifford a week ago today.

The President will also have received Mr. McDonald's Ninth telegram 161, of October 4, from Tel Aviv, the effect of which is to urge that we agree to the demand of the Provisional Government of Israel that it retain most of the Negeb despite Count Bernadotte's recommendation to the contrary.

I believe the Secretary could usefully urge on the President a compromise which would preserve the essence of the position he adopted in Paris on September 21. Official statements of Israeli leaders and press reports from Tel Aviv indicate that the Provisional Government of Israel has laid special stress on retaining some twenty-two "embattled" Jewish settlements in the Negeb. According to our information, most, if not all, of these settlements lie in an area north of Beerseba. It would therefore seem possible for us to agree that Israel retain a salient into the northern Negeb as far south as the Beerseba-Gaza Road, giving to Israel the bulk of the twenty-two Jewish settlements but retaining for the Arabs the bulk of the Negeb as recommended by the slain UN Mediator. Such a settlement would be in precise accord with the territorial settlements embodied in the Department's telegram to Tel Aviv #72 of September 1, which the President approved in his own handwriting and of which you have the text. Before proposing a compromise of this nature to the UNGA, we have at least a moral obligation to endeavor to obtain British agreement.

It is of the utmost importance, if there is to be any chance of success in securing UN adoption of the Bernadotte Plan and thereby a material advance toward a solution of the Palestine problem, that this government undertake immediate and urgent representations with the Arab governments and the Provisional Government of Israel urging their acquiescence in the Bernadotte Plan. Draft telegrams providing arguments to our various chiefs of mission for this purpose have been

prepared now for some time and await top-side approval.¹ I enclose three such telegrams² in the accompanying folder. It would be most helpful if the Secretary could approve the despatch of these instructions. The British have taken a more forthright line at least with the Arab States and, quite naturally, look to us to do our share in securing acquiescence not only on the part of the Arabs but on the part of Israel.

¹ See pp. 1433, 1434.

² The offices have been unable to identify the third such telegram.

501.33 Palestine/15-448: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Delegation,
at Paris*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 6, 1948—4 p. m.

Gadal 134. Dept has given careful consideration recommendation Para. 4(g) Bernadotte conclusions for placing Jerusalem under effective UN control. This study has necessarily involved consideration problem policing Jerusalem area.

Colonel Bagley¹ Sept 15 at Rhodes and subsequently Paris strongly expressed opinion that minimum force for international police Jerusalem area under UN control would be six thousand men. Bagley suggested that these men form bulk SYG's UN guard² and be at once sent Jerusalem.

Independent estimates made by Dept in consultation UN Naval Observers returned this week from Jerusalem and Haifa indicate minimum number international police force for Jerusalem may be fixed at four thousand. We believe this force should be separate from proposed UN guard because difference in function.

Although administratively it would be more simple for govt members Palestine Truce Commission to assign troops to this special Jerusalem police service we feel on balance that nature of duties and responsibilities UN administration in Jerusalem suggest that Jerusalem international police force should be clearly UN responsibility and that force should be recruited by SYG. However, this govt would have strong objections to establishment of UN international police force for Jerusalem if there were any material representation in that force of Soviet or satellite nationals.

Our preliminary rough estimate cost to UN of international police force totaling four thousand men is that first year outlay would be twenty million dol. It is our hope that this initial expenditure could be materially reduced in subsequent years through (a) increasing em-

¹ Frank Bagley, Chief Security Officer of the United Nations Secretariat.

² For documentation on the attitude of the United States towards the proposal by the Secretary-General of the United Nations for the establishment of a United Nations Security Guard, see vol. 1, Part 1, pp. 29 ff.

ployment Arab and Jewish policemen and (b) fact that initial expenses for outfitting will not recur subsequent years.

We are fully aware difficulty recruiting effective, disciplined, international police force and placing such a force promptly in No-Man's Land of Jerusalem. Recruitment should in fact be in progress now. However we are unwilling to separate elements of Bernadotte Plan and accordingly at this juncture request you sound out other delegations and SYG their thinking this respect. For your info any commitments this govt to defray expenses international police for Jerusalem will have to be carefully checked with Congressional leaders and accordingly our views at this time are purely tentative.

We are studying general problem financing UN Govt Jerusalem. Believe eventual cost should be borne by local revenues far as possible but recognize this not practical immediate future. For interim period choices are:

1. Contributions by members UN on regular budget scale.
2. Contributions by members UN on special scale with Big Five bearing major share.
3. Contributions only by Big Five.
4. Loan to working capital fund of entire amount by fifteen largest contributors to UN budget with repayment scheduled over twenty-year period by all members on regular contribution basis and by govt of Jerusalem to extent possible.

Foregoing alternatives may be used as basis for discussion with other debs. but without any commitment. For your info only we now inclined favor No. 2 on basis principle universal participation, with US prepared bear up to 53 percent of total and with only token contributions from smaller countries.¹

LOVETT

¹ This telegram represented "the Department's preliminary thinking on the problem of how to supply the United Nations administration of Jerusalem with an effective international police force" (memorandum of October 4 by Mr. McClintock to Mr. Lovett, SOI:HS Palestine/10-448). Mr. McClintock noted that he did think "we can deal with any estimates which do not squarely face the need for having an adequate body of police in Jerusalem: something far more disciplined and tough than a mere token guard. Such a force, of course, needs money."

"From a congressional point of view it would seem helpful if the Department's preliminary ideas with regard to the Jerusalem international police were checked early with leaders in both the House and the Senate."

184.81/9-1040: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, October 6, 1948—7 p. m.

1882. Position which Dept has consistently maintained (urtels 1433 Oct 2, 1435 Sept 30, and 1490 Sept 29¹) is that Amor vessels are free

¹ None printed.

to trade with ports of all nations and US has refrained from recommending that Amer vessels accede to pressure or sanctions imposed by Arabs upon vessels trading with other nations. At same time Dept has kept shipping companies informed of Arab and Israeli actions affecting their interests and has informed them that decision re continuance of operating schedules must be made by them and at their own risk.

Egypt, in order not to be accused of being aggressor nation, has maintained position that its intervention in Palestine was solely to restore peace and order. This Govt has never recognized that Egypt has belligerent status and insists that interference US shipping inconsistent with peacetime practices. Therefore, Emb should continue to impress upon authorities that US considers interference US shipping as contrary to international practice and as injurious to international trade and particularly that between US and Egypt.

For your info re subject US retaliation raised by AmExp reps (see memo conversation Sept 22nd), there is of course possibility that activities of Egypt Govt might lead Amer shipping companies to request President or Congress to take retaliatory measures against Egypt shipping interests.¹

Lowry

¹ Memorandum by Mr. Satterthwaite of conversation with representatives of the American Export Lines, not printed (194.91/9-2245).

² Minister Pinkerton, on October 24, reported information from the Lebanese Foreign Office that the Marine Corp, an American Export Lines vessel, would not be permitted entry into Beirut. He concluded that "Experience . . . shows that insuperable difficulties may be expected if attempt is made to serve both Israeli and Arab ports with same vessels." (Telegram 547, October 24, from Beirut) As a result, the Department, the next day, recommended to the United States Maritime Commission "that the outbound itinerary of the S.S. Marine Corp, which is scheduled to sail from New York on November 2, be restricted to Piraeus and Haifa." Both messages are filed under 194.91/10-2448.

Truman Papers, President's Secretary's File

*Memorandum by the Secretary of Defense (Forrestal)
to President Truman*

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, 7 October 1948.

This is to advise you that upon the urgent request of the Acting Secretary of State, I have directed the Secretary of the Navy to increase the number of Marine guards stationed at the Consulate in Jerusalem from 18 to 40. This action had been recommended by the Consul General as necessary to provide what he considered minimum protection under existing circumstances—six guards on duty at all times. The request for this added complement of men was reported as well justified by General Riley, the Senior United States Military Observer in Palestine, in response to a request for his opinion. The

Secretary of the Navy recommended against the action on the ground that the additional personnel would not provide effective protection and would increase the possibility of incidents. I felt, however, in view of the strong representations of the Department of State and personnel in the field, that the request should be complied with.

JAMES FORESTAL

SECRET/18-748

Memorandum by Mr. Dean Rusk to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

[PARIS,] October 7, 1948.

Immediately upon his return Mr. Dulles called me in to discuss further the bipartisan aspect of the Palestine question.

He said he had discussed the matter at some length with Mr. Dewey and that Mr. Dewey had "a very strong intention" not to stir up the Palestine issue during the remainder of the campaign. Although Mr. Dewey is under enormous pressure, his present plan is to leave the matter alone. Mr. Dulles emphasized that he was not authorized to make any flat commitment and also stated that Mr. Dewey's conduct would be conditioned somewhat on the President's. I had the impression that when Mr. Dulles used the words "very strong intention" he was seeking words which were as strong as possible short of an absolute commitment.

I told Mr. Dulles that I certainly was not in a position to make or seek a commitment from the other side but that I felt the Secretary would be encouraged in his own efforts to know that Mr. Dewey would probably co-operate in keeping the matter out of the campaign.¹

¹ The text of this memorandum was transmitted to the Department in telegram Deiga 332, October 8, 6 p. m. (504.88 Palestine/18-748)

504.88 Palestine/18-748: Telegram

The Charge in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, October 7, 1948—7 p. m.

4421. Following obtained October 6 and 7 from Wright, Burrows and Bealey regarding Palestine.

1. Maneuvers of PGI in Paris to amend Bernadotte Plan are understood by Foreign Office officials to be forceful and widespread. PGI representatives have been very active with delegations and are taking line that decision regarding Negub is most important point requiring modification. Israeli strategy appears to be that once principle has been established that Bernadotte Plan can be amended regarding

Negeb it will be possible for them to bring about other amendments.

2. By contrast, only Arab intervention in Paris has been working for delay in Committee I and this has been harmful to Arab cause. Arabs do not seem to be doing much lobbying.

3. Foregoing activities FGI regarding emphasizing in the minds of Foreign Office officials crucial importance of US-UK standing firmly together against any amendments to Bernadotte Plan. Wright said that if difficult task of obtaining acquiescence from both sides is to be accomplished, US and UK must both turn deaf ears to appeals for amendments involving Negeb or anything else. Strength of Bernadotte Plan rests largely on US and UK solidarity in accepting plan in its entirety. On this basis French Government, although it has been subjected to strong Zionist pressure, is prepared to support plan in its entirety, and there are other governments in roughly same position. However, if UK should be induced to back some pro-Arab amendment, US would probably back a pro-Israeli amendment and from this divergence (perhaps at first on some very minor matter) there would develop a flood of inspired amendments from smaller states which would very shortly put situation back to pre-Bernadotte Plan days.

4. Wright emphasized that so far British Government has firmly resisted various Arab offers of collaboration with UK if only latter will abandon its support for Bernadotte Plan (Embassy's 4308, September 29 reference talk with Gallad Bey; Embassy's 4361, October 4 reference Berin's talk with head Iraqi delegation Paris; and Embassy's 4350 October 1 reference talk British Chargé with Syrian Foreign Minister).¹ HMG can only hold this line if US likewise maintains its support for entire Bernadotte Plan.

5. Foreign Office officials believe that in the interval between its publication and present a good deal of the emotional appeal and drive behind Bernadotte Plan has been dissipated. Consequently they feel some steps will have to be taken to refocus attention of world on uneasy character of truce in Palestine and vital need for the fair and equitable settlement offered by Bernadotte Plan. UK delegation Paris will discuss with USGAdel in near future desirability of holding, shortly before Committee I takes up Bernadotte Plan, an SC meeting to consider latest report of truce commission and Banche's report that authority of UN is being undermined by both sides. Banche has asked for a new SC resolution and "has almost drafted it."

6. Eastern Department has been considering also attitude which UK should adopt toward UNGA hearing of representatives of Transjordan and Provisional Arab Government (PAG). Present thinking is that Transjordan representative should be heard but there is divergence views re PAG representative. In case of latter there could be

¹ None printed.

no question of referring to him by title but some Foreign Office officers think that he might be allowed as spokesman for Arab population Palestine to occupy seat vacated by Arab Higher Committee. This school of thought believes that if Transjordan representative is seated and PAG representative is refused seat this will direct undesirable spotlight on Transjordan.

7. When possibility Soviet reversal re Palestine was mentioned to Bealey (Embassy's 4340, October 4*) he said UK delegation knows that Soviet delegation has been in touch with Lebanese Prime Minister Paris although details of meeting are not known. Bealey said there has been no indication of line of Soviet thought beyond rather vague reference to effect Western Powers are sabotaging November 29 resolution.

Sent Department 4421, repeated Paris for Gadel 720.

HOLMES

* Not printed; but see footnote 1, p. 1422.

201,22 Palestine/10-2948: Telegram

Mr. Wells Stabler to the Secretary of State

SECRET

AMMAN, October 10, 1948—5 p. m.

78. Conditions Palestine Arab refugees in Transjordan and Arab Legion occupied areas, severely deteriorating daily with increase death rate in various camps and sites. Transjordan Government now responsible for about 200,000 refugees and though it continues extend meagre assistance, its administrative and material resources are too meager to provide prompt action needed relief—food, medicine and shelter. Despite presence one UN relief official Amman, no relief supplies, except for small amount powdered milk for children and pregnant women, have as yet been forthcoming from UN relief organization. Understand reason is that UN relief headquarters insists Transjordan Government organize group to take responsibility for distribution supplies and that no such group has been formed. Meanwhile, winter approaches and plight refugees grows worse not better. If aid does not come soonest and in liberal quantities, nature will solve problem which man apparently cannot.

While realizing Transjordan Government should theoretically take major responsibility for distribution relief supplies, submit that well known lack of organization and initiative in Arab Governments should prove *a priori* that major burden must be borne by UN relief organization, if in fact any relief work is to be done. Immediate relief is not only of importance from humanitarian standpoint, but also as essen-

tial factor in arriving at satisfactory solution Palestine problem based on Bernadotte's conclusions. This running sore of refugees will make Arab acquiescence therein more difficult and odious as it will remain evidence of UN inability cope with complicated yet urgent problem.

Appreciate fact USA is only one of many participants in relief program. However, further delay can only result in appalling number deaths and prompt action is so vital that strongly urge Department, in continuance its deep interest in matter, take urgent steps stimulate immediate action by UN relief headquarters at Beirut in providing necessary supplies. Believe that once supplies come in, distribution can be satisfactorily worked out by UN officials in collaboration with Transjordan Government.

Department pass Jerusalem 54, and Arab capitals.

STANLEY

FOILER Palestine/16-1948

*Draft Statement Prepared in the Department of State*¹

[WASHINGTON, undated.]

From the statements made by the Arab leaders and by spokesmen for the State of Israel, it is clear that the Mediator's plan for a settlement of the Palestine problem will cause debate in the United Nations. The Arabs still refuse to admit the existence of the State of Israel and take other less important exceptions to some of Bernadotte's proposals. The Israelis strongly object to the Mediator's proposal under which the Negev, which was allotted to the Jewish State under the November 29th Resolution of the General Assembly, was to be turned over to the Arabs. Under the Mediator's plan Western Galilee, previously allotted to the Arabs, was to go to the Israelis.

The two parties are, therefore, far apart in their respective views and must be brought together if there is to be a settlement of the Palestine issue.

In our opinion, the Bernadotte plan provides a sound basis for the adjustment of their differences before the United Nations. It should not be too difficult to reach an agreement given a real desire on the part of the two peoples.²

¹ A marginal notation by Mr. McClintock states that this paper was prepared on October 10 for Mr. Lovett's press conference of October 11. Another copy of the proposed statement, filed with Mr. Clifford's telegram of October 11, *infra*, bears a marginal notation stating that President Truman approved the paper at 12:50 p. m., October 10.

² A marginal notation by Mr. McClintock on October 11 reported information from Mr. Lovett that the statement approved by the President had been disapproved by White House political advisers "who preferred to say nothing at all than to give this statement."