September 6, 1978, 6 p.m.
Source: Israel State Archives/Box/A4314/1
Notes taken by Elyakim Rubinstein in the Israeli delegation’s discussion about a meeting Prime Minister Menachem Begin had with President Jimmy Carter and President Anwar Sadat on the second day of the Camp David summit.
Begin: The meeting of the three of us was set for 3 PM. I arrived five minutes earlier and Carter said that Sadat is about to arrive, and according to all signs, ‘he will bring a proposal that you will not be able to accept.’ We shall carry on a conversation. You may say that some things are acceptable and some are not, and I want to have a discussion. While he was talking to me, Sadat appeared dressed like an elegant prince.
There was a beautiful, welcoming atmosphere; affable and all. Carter invited him to open the conversation and Sadat said: ‘Maybe Prime Minister Begin wishes to say something.’ I responded in a pleasant fashion: Let us open a new page. There were matters that stood between us. Do you remember Jerusalem and Ismailia? But we are about to negotiate and we should look to the future. Ample time is needed to conduct the negotiations patiently. There are security problems, such as in the Sinai, and I propose that we should agree on that.
Sadat said, ‘I agree with everything that Begin said and there is a need for time, maybe three months. We will not be able to sign a peace treaty here, there are many details and we personally don’t have to deal with; it can be done by our advisors. But it is imperative that the three of us should decide on a framework. (Begin: He used this term all the time.)
‘As the Prime Minister said, it is necessary to turn a new page.’ He repeated it few times and said: ‘My initiative moves on. I made a decision about my fate. Syria cannot decide on the future of the Arab Nation. Neither can Hussein. I can deal with the problems myself.
When he finished, Carter asked him: ‘Are you prepared to have a separate negotiation on the Sinai, the West Bank and Gaza and sign an agreement on the Sinai, prior to an agreement on the West Bank? Sadat responded: ‘Both. The negotiations can be conducted simultaneously. I prefer to sign on the West Bank before Sinai, but not the other way around. Together, I agree to have simultaneous negotiations. (Carter in his conversation with me asked that we bring our wives for a stroll and said that he never saw Sadat so nervous)
Sadat wanted to read us his document, but Carter did not allow him. Rather, he asked him to talk. Sadat asked, how long can we talk in circles? He held a folder that contained documents and wanted to read them aloud, and he did. Carter asked: Do you want Prime Minister Begin to reply now? And he said no, Begin may need to study the documents and consult with his friends. I jumped at the opportunity (Sadat read the whole document by himself — 11 pages — with an accent and with lingual errors) I replied: I need to consult. Sadat too was eager to comply, seemed like he was eager to leave. Carter invited him for a stroll and Sadat replied that he had already taken a walk today.
As for the impending agenda, we decided with Carter that tomorrow at 8:30 AM three representatives from each party will convene. From our side — Dayan, Weizman and I, and the Americans will be represented by Carter, Vance and Brzezinski. While we walked, Carter told me that such an extreme document was never presented before. And added: ‘I have the impression that this is an opening document, maybe to be published among the Arabs.’ I have no doubt that this was the intention. My impression was that Carter did not agree with that document. He will consult tonight with Vance and Brzezinski and will hear some feedback in the morning’s meeting. At 10:30 AM I will be in a meeting with Sadat and Carter, so that I can respond.
I will now read you the document. I told Ezer that whoever presented this document on Egypt’s behalf may be shrewd, smart, but not wise — the introduction is an entire thesis on ‘to live in peace’ etc.
Clause 1 (the Prime Minister reads and emphasizes the clauses. With regards to N.P.T. (Non Proliferation Treaty) Ezer mentioned it before to Gamasy. On the term entity, I’ll be very naive not to assume that it does not mean Palestinian State. As for Jerusalem, Sadat read that Jerusalem will not be divided (Begin reads it, though, in good spirit).
Dayan: (With irony) Word by word as Tamir described it this morning.
Begin: Tamir was more optimistic this morning. The analysis of the document is not required. This is the most extreme document that the Egyptians have ever written, most definitely since last November; more extreme than in Leeds. It contains the issues of nuclear weapons, even putting a limit on our arsenal; the division of Jerusalem; handing out Judea, Samaria and Gaza to Egyptian and Jordanian rule within 24 hours; and a commitment to a total withdrawal in the Golan Heights and so forth.
Barak: And actually a Palestinian State.
Begin: Yes, and linking it to Jordan and the dismantling of settlements.
In this morning’s meeting with the Americans, we should state very adamantly, that this paper is entirely unacceptable. Even the Communists in Israel who might agree with the content of this document would not dare to suggest it, and there is no force in the world that can make us do it. Sadat includes the Americans in a few clauses.
Rosenne: The Russians as well.
Begin: Via Geneva and the Security Council. When I meet exclusively with the two Presidents, I’ll be polite, but I’ll state my case in a very decisive tone. I’ll start with the unacceptability of the sentence ‘non acquisition of territory by war’. I’ll speak with Sadat, politely but firmly, regarding this sentence: If we accept this axiom, then on what basis are the Egyptians demanding to rule Gaza again? How did you enter Gaza if not by a war, launched by the corrupt government of King Farouk, that you mentioned? The same is true with regards to Judea and Samaria. And then comes the rest of the issues — no one in the Knesset will agree to them. Therefore we shall not accept it.
There must be a penetrating discussion with the presence of Carter. I shall not fight with him; I don’t like to fight. But there will be rough exchanges and I will emphasize that this is a formula for the destruction of Israel and you shall never be able to achieve it.
I’ll demand that he takes back the document because we cannot accept it. I have an idea, however, and I wonder how we can execute it? I propose not to just say no, but prepare a paper of our own for publicity purposes. People will say — what new things do you bring to the table? Well, Sadat made some new ones, but for the worse.
We have to present a positive counter-document. We do have the documents and Barak, Rosenne and Tamir will prepare the principles of this document — we don’t necessarily have to submit them, but there must be a message that comes out of Camp David. The truth is that they will not gain support amongst U.S. public opinion with their document.
A document written by us is required. It will tell the stories of the attacks on Israel that resulted in wars and in which Israel had to defend itself according to its inherit rights — the story of the Six Day War (Weizman: We can start at 1948) of course, but today’s conflict has been continuing for 11 years. We have to include all the positive things that we have done and mostly, that we are proposing peace and security. We have to recount the story of the Sinai, especially with regards to the Palestinian Arabs and not leave a vacuum. This will be our document — wholly positive.
Weizman: I have not organized my thoughts yet. The Egyptian document is totally out of the question. The question is where we go from here. Once we work on it, we may insert some words of wisdom.
In my conversation with Vance, I reiterated how we arrived at the Sinai and to Jordan and that it is impossible to start now, as if nothing has happened in the past 30 years. But if we do, then it should be stated that the West Bank was conquered by the Jordanians. …
The question is if it is possible to emerge from the current situation and state what the things are that we accept and what are those that we reject. We are not willing to accept a foreign sovereignty in the West Bank, let alone a Palestinian State. We must arrive at a situation whereby the IDF remains in the West Bank and Gaza, and our settlements remain intact. When I read the Egyptian document I told Tamir, here is the first bombshell. We have to digest what we should write tonight.
Dayan: In my opinion there are three questions:
- Publicity has its merit, but it is a subject in itself.
- The plan.
- The discussions in Camp David and what we wish to happen.
I refer now to the first two. Publicity/dissemination of information and the plan; these two should not be integrated. If we have to explain to the American public, then it is a fact that the Arabs took over the Jewish Quarter, or captured the Etzion Bloc and imprisoned the settlers there. But now it has become ‘a sacred land’. Chutzpah is an understatement. We paid with good Jewish money for “Hadassah” and in ’48 it remained on the Arab side. Now we have to submit it to a foreign sovereignty because of the ‘unacceptability of acquiring territory in war.’ In Gaza we may say that the people there invited the Egyptians and it was not taken by force. But Jordan, from a publicity perspective, has many things that are entirely obvious. If we say that they acquired Gaza by force — it will not be comfortable for us. They did not conquer Gaza against the will of the people there. Such is not the case in the Jewish Quarter in Jerusalem.
There was a war in which we went out of the boundaries of the 1947 Partition Plan. Let us assume that the inhabitants of Gaza do not demand to be annexed now to Egypt, but prefer a transitional period. And to us they say — you wish to alter the borders permanently? I therefore make a distinction between information and a plan. In the dissemination of information it is possible to find highly contentious points — because they wish us to return everything.
As for the plan, I suggest that we do not present different points from those that we have already submitted. We should reiterate that we have presented plans with regard to the West Bank and the Sinai, and that they are not ultimate, but can serve as a base for negotiations. If they wish to conduct negotiations without a basic plan, our reaction should be that it is totally unacceptable.
If Sadat wishes to negotiate with us based on our plan — that’s fine. But if he wants to negotiate without a basic plan, to relate to issues based on their merits — whether they are of a security nature, such as free navigation, demilitarization, settlements and air fields — then let us discuss a peace treaty between us and the Egyptians and how to solve questions that will guarantee the vital interests of both parties.
With regards to withdrawing to the international border demarcations, it should be on the record that we told Carter that we are not retreating, unless it is conditioned on limited sovereignty and not to the international borderlines. Period. And then we have demands of our own. We are ready to retreat from Sharem and Eitam airfield, on the condition that Israeli forces will execute it. If the settlements remain — the IDF goes out. … It is possible that the Americans will submit their own paper.
First, it should be said that the Egyptian’s proposal is unacceptable with regards to the Sinai and Judea and Samaria, and therefore it is rejected. If they wish to negotiate on the basis of our proposals — that’s good. We can discuss issues on their merits, without a plan. We can discuss the elements that are essential for arriving at an agreement on the Sinai, respond to them and at the same time, see what can be applied to Judea and Samaria.
As for a declaration of principles, I laughed from day one when there were those who said that Sadat will be satisfied with a non-committal declaration with regards to Judea, Samaria and the Golan Heights, and will sign a peace agreement on the Sinai. If such will be the case, he will have to issue an extreme declaration and tell Hussein ‘I received everything on your behalf — now go and negotiate the details.’ If Sadat does not wish to have peace in the Sinai and other fronts, he will have to say that he accepts the general signing and not the Vienna document etc.
This morning, when it was said that he will suffice in declaring the principles on Judea and Samaria and will sign a peace treaty on the Sinai, I said that he will have extreme demands for Judea and Samaria so that he will be able to tell Hussein: ‘You have got the maximum, including the right of the refugees to return,’ and all that at the expense of a small Israel.
For many months I’ve been trying, and until now the Americans did not object, to talk about what will happen on the ground and not just about this declaration of principles. It is in those matters that don’t touch the Egyptians specifically, that they are using extreme expression aimed at the consumption of the entire Arab world. And when today’s Sadat paper will become public knowledge — even if Carter will say that this is a preliminary paper — what will the Arabs say if Sadat reduces his demands? Sadat will enter into a predicament that he will not be able to retreat from. He will be harshly judged by the Arab world — if he retreats from his positions; they will say that he surrendered to Israel.
Therefore a huge effort must be undertaken not to deal with a declaration of principles and the furthest area of contention, it is becoming more extreme. Now it includes the Golan Heights, nuclear weapons, refugees and compensation, hence, from their perspective it is not Sadat, but Begin who has to relent and make concessions. It is futile to deal with declarations and we have to concentrate on the core of the issues in the Sinai; not in Judea and Samaria.
And last: I assume that the Americans pushed and later initiated those papers. Initially, Sadat refused to have one. In one of my visits to the U.S., I had some information coming that the Americans are exerting pressure on Sadat to present a paper that will include extreme demands so that they (the Americans) could say — what the Israeli propose, you reject and vice versa.
Therefore I do not believe that they did not read the paper prior to its presentation. The Americans use the tactic that the Egyptians should present a paper that is not accepted by the Israelis and an Israeli paper that is not accepted by Sadat, and this will present them with the opportunity to propose a paper of their own, as Eli Rubinstein suggested. We may hear about it tomorrow, and this only reinforces my suggestion to reject the Egyptian paper. Let us not have a counter paper yet, because there might be an American paper that we will have to deal with as well. For the moment the Americans do not reject the Autonomy Plan as a basis for negotiations. … We should wait for two-three days and see what the Americans will do when it becomes clear that we do not accept the Egyptian paper. In my opinion, there is a need to a have a practical discussion, because declarations of principles usually are “pushing” towards extreme positions.
Weizman: We have just started Camp David. So far there were smiles. It is imperative that we agree among ourselves. It is interesting to note that Tamir and I never dealt with principles, only in business matters, such as buffer zones, limited regions and so forth. We have been doing it for nine months. I don’t give up on Sadat’s documents. In one stage or another, I can see the possibility that Sadat goes forward by his own initiative. This may be implied from the document. I also laughed for nine months watching how difficult it is to write declarations of intentions and simultaneously search for proposals. That is why I’m happy for the observations that were expressed by Dayan. After nine months, we need to talk business.
For the entire nine months I tried to avoid the issue of principles. Therefore it is for the best to stay away from declarations. I sat with Sadat and talked about joint issues of police, lands, and settlements and not about declarations (Barak was present). We spoke business, who will “buy” what? Yes to Joint administration; no to joint administration. I’m happy that we arrived at the conclusion that these are the issues that we have to discuss.
Tamir: The problem is that we should not compromise the principles of our plan. But we do have to assess if we can reach an agreement here. I’ll recount few points of the peace plan that we have warned against.
As for the Sinai — our team reemphasized the following points: Sinai will be demilitarized; the Egyptians do not cross the Passages; dividing the Sinai into regions; not to evacuate the settlements near Raffah, where a solution must be found for the other settlements as well, so that they will not be dismantled; the necessity for flexibility; Sinai is where the complete solution can be devised together with the Egyptians; one airfield should remain under Israeli control and we shall give up the rest; the issues of space and time with regard to the withdrawal; and that we should make initial steps and discuss the essential issues in longer period of negotiations. With regards to Judea and Samaria — the solution should be that there will be no foreign sovereignty.
We do not accept joint administration, as was suggested in the Sadat-Gamasy formula, because it lays the foundation for sovereignty and no negotiations on security measures in Judea and Samaria should be conducted without Israel’s vital considerations. We said that after five years, other issues could be discussed. Hence, I’m at peace because I know that it is impossible to “nibble” in the foundations of Israel’s peace plans. That is not why the Prime Ministers and the Ministers came here.
With regards to Egypt, there are two possible venues: First, the one that was mentioned by Dayan — the Kissinger method; give me two options, let me know what your preferred fallback is and I’ll deal with that one. The opening line is that the Passages and the oil fields will remain in our hands. The Egyptians began with axis of Al-Arish — Ras Muhammad and we have arrived at no final understanding. It’s possible that it was coordinated with the Americans who know where the fallback is. We assessed that they will start with an extreme measure.
I think that they may start with the Leeds’ paper. The paper must be Leeds plus, otherwise it’s incomprehensible to assume that they came here without an intention to reach an agreement. If that’s the paper and the tendency is to present it now and deal with the rough issues later on, then this paper is the best to reach unity and explain to the people of Israel that we have no partner for peace. But I do not think that they came here to stick to that paper, if that is not the case, then the Egyptians made deceived us. In my opinion, there are flexible points and they conveyed these to Weizman. Even the following points are hard to accept — the retreat to the 1967 lines; self-rule in Judea, Samaria and Gaza with security remaining in our hands. But this is “black and white” compared to the content of this paper. So I assume that this paper can be regarded as a starting point, though I’m weary about their flexibility if it remains within the boundaries of Leeds and Cairo. The gap on the issues of Judea, Samaria and Gaza is so wide that the only thing that may emerge from it is an agreement on the Sinai. If the Americans will render their support to us, this will be fine, if not, we will have a political struggle with them. A freezing situation is not good from their stand point. We never suggested that principles are only a written proposition. Agreements in the Sinai and a declaration of principles have their significance in the territories.
As for the paper: Your (Weizman) approach was right; we presented a peace proposal and it’s open in its entirety for discussion. They presented an extreme proposal and we have to counter it. It occurred to me that we may present something that is not right from a political perspective — namely, to demand sovereignty. The direction that we shall define in our paper has great significance if we reach a stalemate. If the American knew in advance about the Egyptian paper, then I’m right. If the Egyptians did it independently, then every compromise, if there will be one, will benefit the Egyptians, not us. Therefore, from a historical perspective, it is important to present a counter-paper.
Dinitz: The danger is not in the document that is not accepted from A to Z. The danger is that this paper is so bad, that Sadat can eliminate few items and appear to have complied with the Americans. In my view the danger is that the Americans will publish a paper that will be more extreme than that of the Egyptian’s. Sadat went so far, so the Americans will have something to compare it with and get even further. That’s the danger.
Sadat knows that we will not retreat to the ’67 lines; that is why he modified the theory of ‘non-acquisition of territory. Therefore, when we attack the subject and explain our position, we have to indicate what the Egyptian thesis is based on. We should not forget that Sadat told Begin that he will not accept a separate agreement just on the Sinai.
Begin: I’m ready to discuss both, but first Judea and Samaria.
Dinitz: … My proposal with regards to tactics is that we should not present a counter-paper, because a paper that will reiterate our positions will allow the Americans to maneuver between our flexible stands while we are making overtures to Sadat who is going backwards — the middle of the road can be even worse.
I’m for preparing a paper with long-term ramifications that will explain our political positions. This should be presented to Carter tomorrow, so that the American paper will not be based on compromise and that Israel will be the one who says no. We should enumerate what we would like to include in a plan for peace. Israel says what she is ready to do. This is preferable than a paper that could be interpreted as a compromise. But as for our substantive arguments, we should tell Sadat tomorrow that we reject the Egyptian paper.
Barak: I agree that the Egyptian paper is extreme, and as far as they are concerned it is not very clever. It is important to emphasize to the U.S. that this paper is not only a retreat from what they have talked to us about, but also of what they discussed with the Americans, such as military presence after five years. Also, with regards to a Palestinian State — the issue here is that they will have the right to self-determination. It is not only unacceptable by us, but also by the U.S. (and the Americans request that they should withdraw this proposal.)
I would like to remind you that in the conversation that Dayan had with Vance in Washington — when the idea came about to leave the declaration of principles and enter into detailed discussions — Vance commented: ‘Excellent, as long as there will be positive answers to two questions: Is there going to be a decision after five years, and what will be its mechanism?’ I am quite indecisive about the idea of preparing an Israeli paper on framework. They took a long time to prepare theirs, and I am not sure that we can do it in such short notice. Naturally, we will be redundant and we have no time to come up with new ideas. … I would hesitate to present a framework as a formal document. … I would make an effort to switch the discussion on frameworks to a thorough discussion of every single issue that was previously accepted.
Rosenne: I am certain that if Israel were to present an extreme document in the fashion of the Egyptians’, Sadat would have stood-up and left this place. Maybe we can convey the message to the Americans that the Egyptians left out Jerusalem and rejected Um-Hashiba. This also insults the U.S. — asking everyone to cease doing everything, and then present them with such a paper. The purpose of it is to destroy 242, which poses obstacles in Geneva and dictates to the U.S. what its obligations to us should be.
In addition, the declaration of principles was an Egyptian idea that was originated on the eve of Ismailia, and we had to deal with it from December to September. It was not an Israeli proposal, so no one can argue that we are not open to proposals. In 242 there are no Palestinians and they are no partners to the negotiations. However, from a legal standpoint, they would sign an agreement. There is no issue of Palestinians here and we refuse to deal with it. However, we know that changes have occurred, after all, 11 years have passed. …
The Egyptian paper is critical because of the issues that it evaded, such as diplomatic relations, arriving at a settlement of conflicts in accordance with Clause 33 in the United Nations Charter. They try to “sell,” for the second time, the issue of non-use of force that already exists in the previous agreement. To come now and demand compensation for war damages is the ultimate impudence. All the previous wars started by the Egyptians and the U.S. had sided with the issue of granting compensations to Jews who were forced to leave the Arab countries. I will not show any interest or give attention to the subject of a Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Begin: We should ignore this clause.
Rosenne: My concrete proposal is to tell the President of the U.S., the declaration of principle is Resolution 242. We should stop dealing with it. We relented on many things; we agreed to discuss sovereignty, to involve them in determining their future and to end military administrations, But enough with dealing with declarations of principles. The question is, do they really wish to reach an agreement or force upon us issues that are not realistic? From a standpoint of publicity, I do not know if the document will be revealed.
Weizman: I think that they wished to not achieve an agreement; the Egyptians have done the maximum to reach that goal. But if they wish to negotiate, let them leak the content of their document.
Rosenne: Before departing Cairo, Sadat committed himself to the decisions that were made by his Council for National Security. If they submitted the document to us, they have considered the option that we will leak the information.
Begin: Who leaked the Leeds document?
Rosenne: They did.
Begin: I think that the Egyptians wanted the document to be leaked. That’s its purpose. They intend to prove to all those who attack Sadat and tell them — I have done everything to achieve all without a war; the things that you were not able to achieve up to now with wars. As for a paper of our own, it is not that essential in my view if we do not react officially. What is necessary to do in the next few days — here and later as well — is to compose “positive proposals that can be compared favorably to the utter negativism of the Egyptian proposal.” We need it for publicity and to make our case to the Americans.
The analysis should start with the drastic change to 242 by adding the word “the” to “withdrawal from occupied territories.” If they try again, as they did in Ismailia, to relate to each element specifically — the Golan, Sinai, the West Bank and Gaza, and to discuss our retreat to either the ’67 borders, or the ’49 demarcations, it’s clear that we are not obligated to comply. If they come again with such proposals, they hurt the Americans as well.
I can tell Carter that at one time he said that Sadat does not want a Palestinian State, and now he wants it. You said that Sadat agreed to have a decision made after five years, and now he does not want to have the presence of an Israeli soldier even after one year.
Dinitz: According to the peace proposal — three months after the signing of the framework.
Dayan: That is if we say that the timetable for retreat should end once the peace treaty is concluded.
Begin: All is according to Clause 6 — three months.
Dayan: We have to work on a timetable for withdrawal. If it will be in 10 years, does that mean that it has to be done within the time limit and end with the signing of a peace treaty?
Barak: There is no time frame as to when the withdrawal is completed. It needs to be a part of the agreement. The timetable can also take ten years.
Begin: That is what we should argue in our conversations with the Americans, and with Sadat in the presence of the Americans. Therefore it is not necessary to have a framework, but rather positive proposals by Israel in response to the latest negative Egyptian proposals. As for the Sinai, the interpretation of our preparedness to retreat our forces to the international borders is not simply a retreat. It means that we took upon us to retrieve our forces in two stages, and under such and such conditions — demilitarization, airfields, and keeping the settlements. Sadat does not mention any of these. …
We have the material and I suggest that I will be authorized to say in the meeting of the three of us: ‘This document, Mr. President (Sadat), is totally unacceptable by Israel and as we do want to have an agreement, we suggest respectfully the withdrawal this document.’
We shall then start from scratch and discuss concrete matters. Carter was taken by surprise by Sadat saying that he is not ready to sign on the Sinai, as long as there is no agreement in Judea and Samaria. To conduct two sets of negotiations simultaneously, but sign on Judea and Samaria first. The order of the signing is Sinai not before the West Bank, and if before, than it is preferable to sign on the West Bank. Carter asked Sadat specifically if he would sign on an agreement in Hussein’s absence, and Sadat responded that the Palestinian question has the highest priority. Thus, he will not be accused of betraying the Arab strategy.
As for the U.S. proposal, I see no danger in presenting a paper of our own, since the Americans can present a proposal based on the Egyptian’s and our plan is known to them, so this argument should not discourage us from presenting our own…
Dayan: I suggest that during the continuation of the negotiations we will propose that Egyptians take back their proposals since it is not acceptable to us as a basis for further negotiations. We should not suggest that the condition for the continuation of negotiations is dependent on taking back their paper.
Begin: I only meant it as a good bit of advice, but we should not conduct our negotiations on this basis.
Dayan: Absolutely. I make a distinction between having our own arguments, while condemning their documents. We should emphasize the previous decisions in which we stretched our limits while accepting the U.S. positions. But there is one thing that I have my reservations about — to lay out a paper on the table and surprise the Americans. It is possible to do it verbally, as long as you do have a paper while making your arguments.
Begin: Good. So be it.
Dayan: We have plenty of material and we can indicate how far we accommodated them. I will not hesitate to remind them that when Vance first came to Israel (in December), after he met with Sadat, he was already familiar with our plan. I asked Vance if he talked about it with Sadat and if he accepted our plan as a basis for negotiations? Vance responded that he believes so. This was on December 10. Afterwards the Government inserted only a small change with regards to the Eitam airfield. I assume that they will publicize it. If they want a pullback, they will not change the paper, but will say: The Americans presented a paper and we accept the American proposal.
They might also say – let our proposal remain as is for the Arab world to see it as their proposal. I wonder if we should ask the Egyptians if they plan to publicize their proposal and if their paper is classified as a secret document.
Begin: This will be in the next stage.
Dayan: I don’t regard it as a confrontation with the Egyptians. However, when Shalom Achshav organizes a favorable demonstration for Sadat on the eve of our departure for Camp David, it motivates Sadat to become more extreme. His document should be placed in the Knesset. And Peres should stop declaring that it is possible to accept Kreisky’s declaration.
Begin: I have here a letter from Ford to Rabin that includes a clause on the Golan Heights, in which Ford promises that the American will support our staying in the Golan. This, of course, is not a decisive commitment.
Dinitz: In my view, the main issue is to keep the U.S. favorable to our position, because otherwise it can shatter our plan. The U.S. is an important ally. I suggest that we do not surprise the U.S. and that you should tell Carter that this document is unacceptable and that you plan to ask Sadat to take it back. Maybe even, as suggested, to ask Carter to agree to it.
Begin: I suspect that they may ask to proceed in the Chinese method — to get the positions closer.
