Secret Remarks by David Ben-Gurion, “Arab Perception of Zionism 1937”
Palestine Royal (Peel) Commission, Forty-Ninth Meeting – Secret
Notes of evidence taken on Thursday, 7 January 1937
Source: Palestine Royal (Peel) Commission, Forty-Ninth Meeting – Private
Central Zionist Archives, Political Department files S25/4642, Jerusalem, Israel
As the chairman of the Jewish Agency Executive, David Ben-Gurion had publicly appeared before the Palestine Royal Commission in late 1936, but he returned for closed-door testimony before the panel in early January 1937. Appointed to investigate the causes of the Arab revolt that began in spring 1936, the panel heard from Ben-Gurion about Arab feelings toward Jews and Zionism.
Candidly, he noted “that there is opposition among the Arabs to Zionism; there is no doubt about that, … due to many causes. It is a national feeling. It is the belief of their leaders that this is an Arab country and should not be changed. It is a dislike of foreigners. He said, “the violence in Palestine was a product of self-interested Arab leaders opposed to the Jewish national home for reasons of personal ambition, not a reflection of the feelings of the vast majority of Arab residents. Ben-Gurion said most Jews and Arabs coexisted comfortably, especially economically, but Mufti Haj Amin al Husseini and others like him cared only about political power and did nothing for their people.
Further, he noted, “It had never occurred to the Arab leaders [in Palestine] that they should do anything to better the conditions of the people, either the fellaheen or the workers, or the small shopkeepers and others, either culturally or economically. He also said Arab leaders in the neighboring areas of Syria and Iraq wanted the same kind of economic development Zionists had brought to Palestine. He recounted a conversation with one Palestinian nationalist, Auni Bey Abdul Hadi, during which Ben-Gurion offered to exchange Zionist know-how for Arab political support: “Do what we are doing, creative work, economically and culturally raising the level of the people, improving agricultural conditions, education, and so on; this is the real thing to do. We can help you in that if you will help us.”
Ben-Gurion also surprised the commissioners by predicting a day when 4 million Jews and 2 million Arabs would live in the area controlled by the British Mandate of Palestine.
The 4 million person estimate was the same estimate that Herbert Samuel provided in his April 1920 assessment. In 1967, the Jewish and Arab population in all the land west of the Jordan River was about 4 plus million.
Ken Stein, August 5, 2024
Secret Remarks by Ben-Gurion, “Arab Perception of Zionism 1937”
Notes of evidence taken on Thursday, 7 January 1937
PRESENT: The Rt. Hon. Earl Peel, G.C.S.I., G.B.E. (Chairman)
The Rt. Hon. Sir Horace George Montagu Rumbold,
G.C.B., G.C.M.G., M.V.C. (Vice-Chairman)
Sir Egbert Laurie Lucas Hammond, K.C.S.I., C.B.E.
Sir William Morris Carter, C.B.E.
Sir Harold Morris, M.B.E., K.C.
Professor Reginald Coupland, C.I.E.
Mr. J.M. Martin (Secretary)
IN ATTENDANCE: Mr. P.G. Heathcoat-Amory
WITNESS: Mr. D. Ben-Gurion
Chairman of the Executive of the Jewish Agency
EVIDENCE OF MR. BEN-GURION
CHAIRMAN: Mr. Ben-Gurion, I think you wanted to discuss the attitude of the Arabs towards Zionism?
A. Yes, and I will start at the end, perhaps.
Q. As connected with the underlying causes?
A. No, I do not mean that. I will start with this, that my last words at the public session were not mere words. Only last week there was an invitation to certain of our leaders to send a representative to Syria, and they met the new Prime Minister, Jamal Bay Mardam, and the Minister of Finance, Shukri Kuwatli. I will tell you what the Prime Minister said to our representative; this was four days ago. “The Syrian Government is now busy in establishing our vital interests in this country, but at the first opportunity we will try to continue the negotiations.” We had had negotiations before the Treaty, about three or four months ago. “Shukri Bey Kuwatli has already told me what he has said to you, and I have nothing to add except to express my hope that the thing will be arranged sooner or later. I am very sorry that there is still not peace in Palestine between these two peoples, but this quarrel is rather a family quarrel. It is not a quarrel of strangers, and therefore I am optimistic with regard to the future. Besides the racial kinship between the Jews and Arabs, there are concrete vital interests which require peaceful relations between Jews and Arabs, and the statesmen of the two peoples must understand this and act accordingly.” We have very reliable information from Iraq that when Auni Bey Abdul Hadi was there (he returned yesterday), he tried to suggest that there was danger in Zionism, and he was told that they did not accept his view. They were rather looking upon the Palestine problem in another way, and they, the Government of Iraq, were talking to him of the benefits which Zionism had conferred on Palestine, and which could be conferred on all the countries around, especially Syria and Iraq, when the Palestine problem would be solved. That is what Auni Bey Abdul Hadi was told in Iraq.
Now I will give you briefly our relations with the Arab leaders here. I admit that there is opposition among the Arabs to Zionism; there is no doubt about that. It is due to many causes. It is a national feeling. It is the belief of their leaders that this is an Arab country and should not be changed. It is a dislike of foreigners. It is intolerance, which is inherent perhaps in them. I do not say in their religion, but in their education and their upbringing. It is fanaticism. It is different levels of culture. It is also the great ambition of the leaders, because when there is trouble, some leaders are more influential, and the fact that our work benefited the country did not do away with this opposition, for the simple reason, first of all, that not all the Arabs of Palestine benefit.
There are about 800,000 or 900,000 Arabs in Palestine, and it does not benefit all of them, either directly or indirectly, but even those who benefit did not know it, and even those who know it must not be grateful. There is no such thing as gratitude, especially among such a people, and perhaps there is another reason, the nature of the Arab National Movement. They do not care to improve the conditions of their people. I have been in Palestine for more than thirty years; I studied the question before the war; I have Arab friends.
When I first came to Palestine, I was a worker; I came to work on the land. I was an agricultural worker, and I worked together with Arabs. I know Arabs in all walks of life. It had never occurred to the Arab leaders that they should do anything to better the conditions of the people, either the fellaheen or the workers, or the small shopkeepers and others, either culturally or economically. There is no such thing. I know of nothing that has been done for the last thirty years by their leaders, and, after all, there are some very rich in this country, perhaps more than you know, but they have never tried to do anything for their people. They do not care about it. It is a purely political movement. I quite understand it. Haj Amin al Husseini thinks: “Why should there be a British High Commissioner? If there were not, I should be Prime Minister.”
I really do not blame them; it is natural, but there is nothing constructive about it; it is purely political. Then the expression of it is, first, opposition to England, secondly, opposition to Jews. But, I think, it is a mistake to judge the extent and intensity of this opposition from the last disturbances; I am afraid you will make a mistake if you do that. It is not the whole of the Arabs who are opposed to it; it is a minority; it is an active minority, I agree.
The others are practically not heard, and they are perhaps eighty percent of the Arab people. They have no means of self-expression; they are not given the chance of being heard; they are uneducated; they are unorganized; they are oppressed; they have been oppressed for centuries by these people who are their leaders. They have no chosen leaders as it is with us; we have chosen leaders. They have no chosen leaders; they have masters. It is only the minority which is politically active which is heard, and the great majority of the people are indifferent to the Jews. I do not say they are the friends of the Jews; why should they be? We have very few friends in the world. There is no reason they should be our friends, but they’re not afraid of us; they have nothing to be afraid of. If there is a festival in Tel-Aviv, thousands of Arabs come there; there are thousands of them working in our colonies, and never will an Arab be afraid to be among Jews; an Arab child or an Arab woman could be alone in the streets of Tel-Aviv at night. There is also among the intelligent section of the Arabs a section which is, I would not say very friendly to Zionism, I do not see any reason why they should be friendly to Zionism, but they are not against it, and they want co-operation with the Jews. I will give you a few instances. I have met Arab leaders who recognize, first of all, that we are right. It is unpleasant for them, but they tell me we are right, and then there are the Jews to reckon with as a fact; it is an accomplished fact, they believe; the Jews are here, and they come here; there is such a tremendous urge among Jews to come back to Palestine that they cannot stop it even if they would like to stop it; it is a fact, and they, as a realistic people, recognize facts, and then there is a third reason, they believe that there may be some political and economic advantages from an understanding with the Jews.
PROFESSOR COUPLAND: Political advantage?
A. Yes, I will come to that. Economic co-operation is much easier, and it exists, although of course it has not existed in the last six months, but there is economic co-operation between Jewish and Arab villages. There are friendly relations in the villages in the Emek; they visit each other, and their children come to our festivals and our children go to their festivals, and they are co-operating when they are in trouble; for instance, rats, and other agricultural problems in Palestine. There is co-operation among Jewish and Arab workers. There is co-operation between Jewish and Arab grove-owners.
Q. There is not much, is there?
A. Not very much, but there is some co-operation. It was interrupted during the disturbances, as is natural, but generally there is co-operation. Political co-operation is much more difficult. We have tried many times to come to terms even in the political field. I will give you only a few instances. In the last three years, since I and my friend Shertok have been in charge of the political affairs of the Agency here, I have met Auni Bey Abdul Hadi. He was at that time without any influence whatsoever. Now he is very influential. He is the head of the Istiqlal party, but at that time his party had very little political influence. I went to him because I knew that he was not a man with political ambitions, at least at that time. He was a man who cannot be bought; he has no office, and he is an important Arab Nationalist. I thought that if I could come to terms with him, it would be worthwhile to get a man who was not biased, and who could not be bought, and who really cared for the future of the Arab people. It is only if such people come to terms that it is lasting. I said to him: “We are here; we will come here whether you like it or not. You do not like it, and I can understand why you do not like it, but here we are; it is a fact; you will not prevent us from coming; why should we fight each other, perhaps we can help each other.” He said: “How can you help us?” I said: “You have large countries, Syria and Iraq, that want to be developed; otherwise, no political change, where it us under a Mandate or an Independent State, will affect the destiny of your people, but it will always be the same until you do what we are doing, creative work, economically and culturally raising the level of the people, improving agricultural conditions, education, and so on; this is the real thing to do. We can help you in that if you will help us.” Then he said: “Well, you will be here, but we will still be under England and France.” I said to him: “As I am being frank with you about our aim, I am telling you that we do not mean to have a spiritual center in Palestine; we want to have millions in Palestine; we do not want to be here at your mercy; we want to be a free people.” He asked me: “How many do you think you can have here?” I said: “In this part of the world, at least four million.”
SIR HORACE RUMBOLD: Four million in Palestine?
A. Yes.
SIR LAURIE HAMMOND: Total population is that?
A. No, I mean Jews. I am telling you what I said to him. This is my conviction, that in this part of the country, Palestine, we can bring in at least four million.
CHAIRMAN: How many Arabs are there in the country?
A. At that time there will be about two million Arabs.
Q. A total population of six million?
A. Yes. I believe in time, with modern methods of industry, Haifa will be a town of one million Jews. It may sound ridiculous to you; perhaps it is ridiculous, but we are an optimistic people. I remember that when I came to Palestine, what is now Tel-Aviv was sand. Probably an economic expert would have said, “To build a city here, it is mad.” But we were mad, and we were ridiculed, but we had to do it, and we did it; we have to do it. I saw what people could endure during the war. Before the war nobody would have believed that people could endure what they endured for four years of war, because there was a necessity, and for us Palestine is a question of life and death. It can be done. I was telling you about my conversations with Auni Bey Abdul Hadi. I said to him: “We are attached to England; we will do nothing without the knowledge and without the consent of the British, not only because of gratitude, we are grateful, but only because of gratitude; we are coming here as Europeans; we know we are facing the desert on the north, the east and south; it is not only essential for us to bring in many Jews, but also to bring to Palestine European culture and to maintain that standard and not to sink down to the level of the country, and it is for us a live necessity to be connected with the greatest civilized Power in the world.” Then he said: “Then I see no basis. I reported this to the High Commissioner because I did not want to proceed without having authority, and I was glad that the High Commissioner encouraged me.” He said: “All right, go on.” Then I met some of the other leaders. I did not continue to negotiate with Auni Bey Abdul Hadi. At that time, Auni Bey had no influence; he was almost the single member of his own party, the Istiqlal Party. We met some other people from Syria and from Egypt, and specially the Palestinian leaders, and for months there were negotiations. I will give you an outline of what was the basis of those negotiations. I am sorry I cannot give you the name because I bound myself to this gentleman that as long as nothing practical came out of it, it should be a private affair. But he was a Muslim, a very distinguished Arab. In order not to create a wrong impression, I will say it was not the Mufti, although he knew all about it. I will make the story very short. I will give you very briefly what were the lines of the agreement; that we should together, it be accepted by the Government, and I gave the High Commissioner an outline of the basis upon which I wanted to negotiate with the Arabs, we the Jews and the Arabs with the consent of Government should work out a plan of agricultural development, not for the whole country at once, which would be too big a job, but we would take a district and say: “By intensification we can raise the standard of the fellaheen; we can better their conditions; and we can make a place for new settlers. We will work it out together, and we will see to it that not a single Arab cultivator is displaced, but he should not only remain, but his conditions should be improved, and, by intensification, new room should be created for new Jewish settlers. We should work out together a plan to develop industry with Jewish and Arab capital and Jewish and Arab labour.” I made it clear that we wanted economic co-operation, Jewish capital and Arab labour, because labour does not regard itself as being benefited by the employer, but, on the contrary, as being exploited by the employer, and if they belong to the same race, it does not matter; if they belong to different races, it may become a very dangerous thing. That was the economic basis. Then political co-operation for the transition period, and I will call the transition period the period when the Jewish national home will not be fully established, when it is not yet rooted and able to stand on its own feet; during this transitional period Jews and Arabs will, on a basis of equality, participate in the actual government, not in a Legislative Council.