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Jordanian Prime Minister Zaid Rifai lucidly explains Jordan’s role (inclusion and exclusion) in regional politics from before the 1973 October war to the late 1980s. His insights into Kissinger’s diplomacy and Arafat’s unfounded fear of being absorbed by Jordan are as worthy as they are insightful.
Serving as director general of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1976-1977, Avineri recounts Romanian overtures to Rabin for a visit to gauge interest in another agreement with Egypt. He estimates that Rabin and Begin both took strategic considerations in hand in negotiating; he is highly critical of Carter’s political naivete.
For years, Naftali Lau-Lavie worked closely with Moshe Dayan. His remarks here focus on Dayan as Menachem Begin’s foreign minister (1977-1979). He provides sumptuous detail on Dayan’s thinking and interactions with the Carter administration as it tried to force a Palestinian/PLO state on Israel in seeking a comprehensive Middle East peace.
Mustafa Khalil served as the primary Egyptian negotiator in tying up the Egyptian-Israeli treaty with Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan between September 1978 and March 1979. Though most of the talks took place in Washington, the final excruciating details were negotiated in difficult exchanges in Jerusalem between Jimmy Carter and Menachem Begin in the week before the March 26, 1979, treaty signing.
From 1970 to 1984, Khaddam served as Syria’s foreign minister, and later he was Syria’s decision-maker for actions in Lebanon. He recounts Syrian anger toward Egyptian President Sadat’s slow but continual bilateral engagement and recognition of Israel. He recalls how Syrian President Assad, after a four-hour meeting, refused Henry Kissinger’s invitation to attend the 1973 Geneva peace conference, not wanting to sanction the closeness Sadat was establishing with Israel and with Washington. These were the same reasons why Syria refused President Carter’s invitation to attend a similar Middle East peace conference in 1977. Khaddam says, “We were shocked by Sadat’s actions.”
With a keen memory to detail, Nicholas Veliotes engaged an array of American and Middle Eastern political leaders. This interview is laced with charming and enthusiastic candor as he served in American diplomatic positions from 1973 to 1986 in Tel Aviv, Washington, Amman and Cairo. He was present when sensitive U.S. policies were debated and operationalized. His assessments of Kissinger, Sadat, Meir, Nixon, King Hussein, Brzezinski, Carter, Vance and a whole panoply of Israeli officials bubble with content; the vignettes he shares about Nixon and Brzezinski are priceless. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Veliotes, along with Morris Draper, Hermann Eilts, American consuls general in Jerusalem and other U.S. officials failed in repeated attempts to secure PLO leader Yasser Arafat’s participation in the diplomatic process.
Hafez Ismail was a close adviser to Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. Ismail carried out secret negotiations with Henry Kissinger before the 1973 war to see if the U.S. would quietly start talks with the Israelis. Kissinger said no. Ismail provides notable insights into Sadat’s sophisticated decision-making.
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