Israeli-Egyptian General Armistice Agreement, Excerpts, 1949
One of four agreements Israel signed in 1949 with Arab neighbors, it does not end “state of war,” between Israel and Arab states. No treaty is signed until 1979.
Assembled here are key sources that have shaped the modern Middle East, Zionism and Israel. We have included items that give texture, perspective and opinion to historical context. Many of these sources are mentioned in the Era summaries and contain explanatory introductions.
Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett to the Knesset, 1949
Sharett gives an overview of Israeli foreign policy, key issues, and relationships with UN and Arab states.
1951 U.N. Report, “The Situation of Jews in Moslem Countries”
This report submitted to the United Nations at the end of 1951 notes that “some one million Jews have become the victims of accelerated antiSemitism” since 1948 in the Muslim countries of the Arab League and North Africa, “communities which have existed for thousands of years.” The report analyzes the situation for Jews overall and explains restrictions and oppressive measures country by country.
Yigal Allon, Lessons From the War of Independence, 1952
With crisp analysis, Haganah Commander Yigal Allon, later a Prime Minister of Israel attributes Israel’s successes to multiple factors including the absence of a centralized Arab command, limited Arab military training, underestimating the potential fighting capabilities of local Arabs, and Israel’s success in integrating its citizens into the war effort.
Eisenhower Doctrine, 1957
Further reinforcing the Truman Doctrine, the US President promises military or economic aid to any Middle Eastern country resisting Communist aggression.
Prime Minister Levi Eshkol’s Radio Address to the Nation, May 1967
With tensions on its borders, Eshkol tries to reassure Israeli public. Instead he gives a “painfully faltering” speech. Popular and party disgruntlement follow, opening the way for Eshkol to turn over the Defense Ministry two days later to General Moshe Dayan.
President Nasser Speech to the Egyptian National Assembly, 1967
Nasser asserts that the conflict with Israel is not over access to the Gulf of Aqaba but the very existence of Israel; Egypt’s foes are Britain and the US that support Israel.
Ambassador Gideon Rafael to the U.N. Security Council, 1967
A detailed outline is presented of events that led to the June 1967 War.
Abba Eban Speech at U.N. Special Assembly, June 1967
Following the conclusion of the June 1967 War, the Israeli government sent word to Egypt and Syria seeking peace plan that was intended to jumpstart a peace process with Israel’s belligerent neighbors, Egypt and Syria. The messages were sent through the US, but no response was apparently received.
Israeli Government-Designed Peace Plan After June 1967 War
Following the conclusion of the June 1967 War, the Israeli government sent word to Egypt and Syria seeking peace plan that was intended to jumpstart a peace process with Israel’s belligerent neighbors, Egypt and Syria. The messages were sent through the US, but no response was apparently received.
The Allon Plan, 1967
July 26, 1967: The Alon Plan reflects a response to Israel’s pre-1967 war border vulnerability seeking a future west bank arrangement that is not a strategic/geographic threat to Israel and its coastal plain population centers.
Arab League Summit Resolutions, 1967
Arab states declare “no peace, no negotiation, no recognition” with Israel after their collective defeat in the June 1967 War.
U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, 1967
The Resolution calls for unspecified Israel withdrawal from territories in return for right of all states to live in peace. It does not call for full withdrawal. It is the basis of Egyptian (1979) and Jordanian (1994) Treaties with Israel, and PLO (1993) recognition of Israel.
U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers’ Plan for an Arab-Israeli Settlement, 1969
Without any consultation with Jerusalem, Israel rejects US proposal for full withdrawal.
Natan Alterman, “Victory as a Scapegoat,” Maariv, 1969
One of Israel’s greatest writers, Natan Alterman, reminded Israel’s accusers in 1969 that well into the 20th century the Palestinians did not even understand themselves as a separate people with a distinctive national identity marking them off from other Arabs. His argument, if framed as a question, might be formulated along these lines: If no one else, not least the Palestinians’ ancestors, saw their distinctive nation in Ottoman Palestine, how can the Zionists be blamed for not seeing one either? Thus, to fault the Zionists for failing to see what was not yet visible to anyone else, including the Palestinians, is to fault them not for suffering from blindness, but for lacking clairvoyance.
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976: “Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973”
Foreign Relations of the United States 1969-1976, Vol. 25: Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973, published in 2011 and running more than 1,200 pages in covering all of 1973 and the first two weeks of 1974….
Transcript of Secret Talks Between Egyptian National Security Adviser Hafez Ismail and U.S. National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger, 1973
October 6, 2023, was the 50th anniversary of the outbreak of the October 1973 war. Six months prior, Egyptian President Sadat sent his national security adviser to meet with Secretary of State Kissinger to determine whether the U.S. would engage Egypt and Israel in serious mediation for a Sinai agreement, or a series of them, all focused on Israeli withdrawal and gradual acceptance of Israel. Kissinger did not take Sadat’s overtures seriously. Would American action then have avoided the October 1973 war? All informed analyses say no.
The October 1973 War and Its Aftermath — Quotable Quotes and Key Conversations
In carrying out research in the 1990s for Heroic Diplomacy: Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace, Routledge, 1999, I undertook 84 interviews with individuals who participated in the diplomacy.
U.N. Security Council Resolution 338 on a Cease-Fire and Direct Negotiations After October 1973 War
The October 1973 war broke the logjam over whether diplomacy could unfold to kick off Arab-Israeli negotiations. Sadat used the 1973 war as an engine to harness American horsepower. In that he succeeded because U.S. Secretary of State Kissinger saw Sadat’s leaning to Washington not only as a chance to begin useful negotiations, but also of great significance to weaning the Egyptian president away from Moscow.
Memorandum of Conversation Between Syrian President Hafez al-Assad and U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, December 1973
U.S. Secretary of State Kissinger failed to persuade Syrian President Assad to attend the December 1973 Geneva Middle East Peace Conference. Assad saw the proposed conference, which it was, a ruse to cover up a “pre-cooked” Israeli-Egyptian arrangement. Assad wanted no part of implicitly supporting any agreement where Israel’s legitimacy might be enhanced.
Israel-Egypt Separation of Forces Agreement, 1974
The US mediates an agreement separating forces in Sinai after the 1973 War; Egyptian and Israeli
generals will negotiate additional details.
U.S.-Israel Memorandum of Understanding, 1974
The US promises to implement an Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement and have the Suez Canal cleared. Israel sees eventual repopulation of Suez Canal cities as a sign that Egypt will not go to war again soon.
U.N. Disengagement of Forces Agreement, 1974
On Golan Heights, Israel agrees to limited withdrawal; UN places forces between Syrian and Israeli armies. With few exceptions this border remains almost totally quiet for more than forty years.
President Ford’s Promises About the Golan Heights, 1975
President Ford promises that the US will give “weight” to any future Israeli peace agreement with Syria that Israel should remain in the Golan Heights.
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