Assembled here are key sources that have shaped the modern Middle East, Zionism and Israel. We have included items that give texture, perspective and opinion to historical context. Many of these sources are mentioned in the Era summaries and contain explanatory introductions.

Moshe Shertok, “Palestine — A Jewish Commonwealth”

A key figure in the Jewish Agency’s Political Department, Shertok, later Moshe Sharett argues for a Jewish commonwealth/state in Palestine. Pragmatically he realizes Arabs in Palestine oppose Jewish presence, yet he fully rejects a potential binational Arab-Jewish state, suggesting that the end of WWII will be a turning point in favor of a Jewish state.

Volume XXIII, Series A (August 1947-June 1952)

The last of 23 volumes of Chaim Weizmann’s Letters summarized wonderfully by Aaron Klieman, recalls the Israeli first president’s views of those fateful years for Zionism and Israel from 1947-1952. Chaim Weizmann died at his home in Rehovot on 9 November 1952, shortly before his 78th birthday. All of the letters read together, provide ring side seat to Zionism as an idea to the reality of the Jewish state.

Documents and Sources|August 1, 1947
Rabin and Allon

Yigal Allon, Lessons From the War of Independence, 1952

With crisp analysis, Haganah Commander Yigal Allon, later a Prime Minister of Israel attributes Israel’s successes to multiple factors including the absence of a centralized Arab command, limited Arab military training, underestimating the potential fighting capabilities of local Arabs, and Israel’s success in integrating its citizens into the war effort.

David Ben-Gurion, “Jewish Survival,” 1953

Israel’s first prime minister was a prolific writer. In this excerpt of a 50-page document, he notes that the Jewish nation’s DNA included relentless challenges marked by dispersal, ostracism and hatred by many people. Despite these adversities, Israel’s establishment symbolizes a remarkable victory against all odds — a culmination of the Jewish people’s tenacity and unyielding spirit. The state and Zionism were not remotely close to being finished, nor having succeeded in the quest for the Jewish people’s normalization.

Documents and Sources|November 1, 1953

Prime Minister Eshkol Statement to Knesset at Conclusion of June 1967 War

Two days after the conclusion of the June 1967 War, Eshkol, recounts the series of events that led to war, the war itself and the immediate aftermath. He reaches out to Arab states for peace seeking a path to peace with her belligerent neighbors. A week later, Israel will quietly messages Cairo and Damascus through the US, hat Israel seeks an end to the conflict. No answers are received.

Documents and Sources|June 12, 1967

The Allon Plan, 1967

July 26, 1967: The Alon Plan reflects a response to Israel’s pre-1967 war border vulnerability seeking a future west bank arrangement that is not a strategic/geographic threat to Israel and its coastal plain population centers.

Israel’s State Commissions of Inquiry Law

Passed on December 30, 1968, Israeli state commissions of inquiry are panels appointed to investigate matters of public concern and state interest. These independent bodies are among Israeli democracy’s most trusted institutions. However, there is no requirement on the part of any sitting government to appoint a commission of inquiry.

Documents and Sources|December 30, 1968|Spanish

Memorandum of Conversation: U.S. Secretary of State Vance in Israel With Israeli Foreign Minister Yigal Allon, 1977

With candor, Israeli Foreign Minister Allon tells Secretary of State Vance that the Israeli Labor government would under no circumstances negotiate with the PLO until it gave up terrorism, recognized UNSC 242, and unequivocally accepted Israel’s right to exist. Only in 1993, did the PLO accept these premises, Sixteen years had then passed while Israel built settlements virtually without restraint in the territories.

Documents and Sources|February 16, 1977

Memorandum of Conversation Between President Carter and Prime Minister Rabin, March 1977

This first Carter-Rabin meeting was unpleasant at best. Rabin would not turn over Israel’s negotiating prerogatives to the US; Carter publicly told Israel that it might have to return to the June 1967 borders. Carter said Rabin was like a “dead fish.” and Rabin said that he felt ‘cornered by Carter.” His administration was interested in carving out the West Bank for Palestinian political expression even before the PLO was prepared to accept Israeli legitimacy. And Israel was not prepared to withdraw from the West Bank, a position also held by Menachem Begin.

Documents and Sources|March 8, 1977

Interview With Israeli Prime Minister-Elect Menachem Begin, ABC News’ “Issues and Answers,” May 1977

Prime Minister-elect Begin rebukes President Carter’s assertion that Israel will need to withdraw from almost all the lands Israel secured in the June 1967 war, especially Jerusalem and the West Bank. Begin is adamant opposed to dealing with the PLO. Begin refuses to relinquish Israeli decision-making to US preferences or dictates. These fundamental policy disagreements will remain unresolved between Begin and Carter for the duration of Carter’s presidency, and years after.