U.S. Backs Palestinian “Entity”; Syria Insists on PLO at Any Peace Conference, 1977

September 28, 1977

Memorandum of conversations between President Jimmy Carter and Syrian Foreign Minister Abdel Halim Khaddam and between Khaddam and U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, White House, Washington

Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980. Volume VIII: Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977-August 1978

These two conversations took place less than two months before Egyptian President Anwar Sadat dramatically and unexpectedly flew to Jerusalem to speak to Israelis directly about negotiating a peace agreement. Sadat did so because he sensed that President Jimmy Carter was too entwined in the belief that all Arab states should meet as one delegation if any negotiations were to ensue between Israel and Arab states. Sadat opposed having all Arab states meet together to negotiate with Israel, fearing that Syria especially would veto Egypt’s national interests and prevent Egypt’s securing the return of Sinai from Israel. Sadat would later tell U.S. Ambassador to Egypt Hermann Eilts that “Carter was getting lost in all the papers” in generating plans to conduct a Middle East peace conference that was his most valued process to unfold an Arab-Israeli negotiating process.

Notably in the second U.S.-Syrian meeting of the day, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance stated that U.S. views on the Palestinian issue included the establishment of a “Palestinian entity,” a position unalterably opposed by the Israeli government. Carter in March 1977 became the first U.S. president to endorse the establishment of a “Palestinian homeland.” A major reason for Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin’s growing distance with Carter was their disagreement over Israel building settlements in Judea and Samaria (the West Bank), but another issue was that Carter was a persistent advocate of Palestinian self-determination under PLO direction.

In these conversations, Syrian Foreign Minister Abdel Halim Khaddam emphasized that no negotiations could happen without the presence of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which Arab states viewed as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and which Syria fully understood would not under any circumstances accept Israel as a political reality.

Israeli leaders were unwilling to negotiate with the PLO, with its stated goal of Israel’s elimination. In essence, Syria was dancing with Washington for publicity, knowing that no negotiations were likely. Carter told Khaddam that without the PLO agreeing to recognize Israel, the U.S. would not allow the PLO to attend the conference he intended to convene before the end of 1977.

In the second meeting, Vance went into great detail about how a conference would unfold, how working groups at a conference might function and whether they would be divided according to geography. Khaddam again insisted on PLO representation and noted exactly Sadat’s fear, “that Syria’s interest in [Egyptian] Sinai is no less than its interest in Golan.” Khaddam also insisted that Palestinian refugees not be resettled in Lebanon or Syria, intimating that they should return to Israel proper.

What neither Vance nor Khaddam understood was that Israel and Egypt had made secretly in Morocco and had agreed to consider meeting bilaterally, totally at odds with the core idea of a conference of all Arab representatives meeting collectively with Israel. Despite Carter’s sincere efforts throughout his presidency to hold a Middle East peace conference, none met.

A year after these meetings Carter succeeded in bringing willing Egyptian and Israeli leaders to negotiate the Camp David Accords, then to follow through with a peace treaty six months later. Despite Carter’s efforts to find a way for Syria to negotiate with Israel, no talks materialized, nor would any take place seriously until late in the Clinton administration in 2000. For deeply held ideological reasons, Syria’s leadership under President Hafez al-Assad and his son Bashar was not willing to accept the legitimacy of a Jewish state. The Assad rule lasted from 1970 until December 2024.

— Maya Rezak and Ken Stein, August 13, 2025

---

11. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, September 28, 1977, 11:40 a.m. to 12:25 p.m.

SUBJECT

Summary of the President’s Meeting with Foreign Minister Khaddam of Syria

PARTICIPANTS

The President

The Vice President

Secretary of State Cyrus Vance

Mr. Alfred L. Atherton, Jr.

Mr. David Aaron

Ambassador Richard Murphy

Mr. William B. Quandt

Mr. Hamilton Jordan

Mr. Jody Powell

Mr. Robert Lipshutz

Mr. Stuart Eizenstat

Mr. Isa Sabbagh

His Excellency Abd al-Halim Khaddam, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Syrian Arab Republic

HIs Excellency Sabah Qabbani, Ambassador of Syrian Arab Republic

Mr. Abdassalam Aqil, Private Secretary to Deputy Prime Minister

Mr. Samih Abu Fares, Interpreter

President: I am very pleased to welcome the Foreign Minister and his colleagues and I apologize for the delay in beginning the full meeting. We had a thorough discussion about the arrangements for convening the Geneva Conference[2] and I would like to outline our position at this time. I’ll give my version of our discussion and will welcome any corrections that the Foreign Minister might make. I pointed out that our public and private commitments to the Arab governments and Israel have not changed. I am completely dedicated to getting a peaceful solution to the Middle East problem and our approach is based on the principles that we have explained and which we support very strongly. I pointed out that we are carrying out several simultaneous negotiations: the United States and Israel; the United States with each of the Arab countries; the United States with the Soviet Union; and we are trying to bring about agreement not only between the Arabs and Israel, but among the Arabs themselves. Without flexibility, there is obviously no hope for progress. I think that the Foreign Minister would agree that Syria is not famous for flexibility (Laughter), and neither are the Israelis. But President Assad has taken a very constructive view in calling for a unified Arab delegation and by saying that Palestinian rights matter more than who represents the Palestinians at Geneva. Al – though we do not yet have Israel’s agreement, the proposal that we make has in our view the best chance of succeeding and I would like to outline our views.

Geneva should be convened this year with a unified Arab delegation, which will include Palestinian representatives, and will include PLO members. The only caveat is that the PLO representatives should not be well known or famous persons.

I know that Foreign Minister Khaddam prefers to have three committees at Geneva, to deal with peace, withdrawal, and the Palestinian question, and that these will each be made up of members of the unified Arab delegation. He feels that this is an important principle. I replied that in our view there should be an arrangement whereby the subcommittees would be formed as follows: Egypt and Israel to discuss Sinai; Syria and Israel to discuss the Golan Heights; Jordan and Israel on specific topics of a bilateral nature; and in discussions on the West Bank, the Palestinian entity, and the rights of the Palestinians, this would be between Israel, Jordan and the Palestinians, including members of the PLO. If desirable, there could be a separate group on the refugee problem, including Palestinians from several countries, such as Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Kuwait, and even Iraq, but for the refugee question, there might be a separate discussion. This is not necessary but might be a possibility. In order to accommodate the Syrian position on the three committees, the Arab nations and the Palestinians could consult constantly with one another and could approve agreements with Israel only if they are satisfied with the agreements on all of the other fronts. No one would need to sign an agreement with Israel unless he were satisfied with the other agreements as well.

My guess is that a detailed discussion on the Sinai, including the question of outposts, security forces, drawing of maps, would be done by technicians and subcommittees, but the final agreement would be made by heads of state. My belief is that unless this proposal proves to be acceptable, the chances for a Geneva Conference will be damaged very badly. We have committed ourselves to consistent involvements and we are trying to treat all of the parties fairly, including the Palestinians. I described to the Foreign Minister the text of an invitation that we would issue with the Soviets that is now in its final stages of preparation. The Secretary of State has pointed out that the text is not yet final, but the principles for reconvening a conference are in their final stages of preparation. In my opinion, once the principles have been agreed upon, then then the invitation can be issues without much further difficulty. The Foreign Minister expressed a keen interest in how the parties would be addressed when the invitation is actually extended.

Secretary Vance: We are not yet there.

President [to Secretary Vance]: You and Foreign Minister Khaddam can work on this.

Secretary Vance: We haven’t yet discussed this with the Soviets. We are not that far.

President: The other question covered was P LO acceptance of Resolution 242 and the right of Israel to exist. We have a signed agreement committing our nation’s word of honor that we will not meet directly with the PLO until this is done. I expressed my doubt that Syria had fully agreed with our proposal, and I stated our hope that Syria and President Assad would help to get the PLO to accept Resolution 242.

Foreign Minister Khaddam: It would be unfortunate if the United States remained committed forever to Henry Kissinger’s promises!

President: I have reconfirmed this commitment in my own words. We would like to begin discussion with the PLO directly and this would help us to understand their special needs and to arrange for their representation at the Geneva discussions.

Foreign Minister Khaddam: If you permit, I would like to make a comment. As for Palestinian representation, our view is that we prefer that the PLO be present on all matters of interest to the Palestinians. This is the case whether the questions are touching on the West Bank or Gaza, or on those questions outside that area. There is a simple reason. No one can claim to represent the Palestinians except the PLO. If I may repeat the imagery I used with the President, when you talk about normalizing relations with Cuba, it makes no sense for you to talk with the Cuban refugees in Florida. Likewise, there is no point in dealing with Palestinians who are not part of the PLO. This would be like Secretary Vance discussing SALT with the White Russian emigrants in Europe. It is also true that no Palestinian would claim the right to speak for the Palestinians other than the PLO.

On Resolution 242, we sent a text to Secretary Vance.[3] It is the maximum that we have managed to get from the Palestinians. Resolution 242 addresses itself only to the refugee problem and the issues of the 1967 war, and it is not up to date. I frankly think that the United States role should transcend the commitments of Henry Kissinger. The PLO is now an observer at the United Nations. There are twice as many states that recognize the PLO as recognize Israel. The United States in the past did vote for UN Resolution 181 in 1947,[4] which proposed the creation of two states, one Jewish and one Arab. This was a historic commitment. The United States at the UN has voted for all the Resolutions calling for the right of return of all the Palestinian refugees. That also is a historic commitment.

As for the Palestinians, Resolution 242 does not address their problems. We could talk with Secretary Vance and come up with a draft which would help the Palestinians to attend Geneva and to participate. We would approach this with an open mind, the drafting of a new resolution. As to the President’s reference that we did not try to influence the Palestinians, I would like to point out that we have tried to. But our concern is that we be able to deal with a Palestinian leadership capable of adhering to resolutions. Any leadership which represents nothing would have no importance. There are also certain detailed points which I will discuss with Secretary Vance later.

I would also like to repeat our opinion on the formation of committees. I will also convey to President Assad the proposals that you have made. Of course, we see in the US proposal for a unified Arab delegation a positive step in a contribution to peace.

President: The Foreign Minister asked earlier if I foresaw separate agreements and I said “Yes.” But Syria need not sign any agreement unless it is satisfied with all of the other agreements as well.

Foreign Minister Khaddam: We need to look at things clearly. Among the Arab nations, there is a mutual defense agreement. Assume that we reach a separate accord with Israel and that we sign, but that Egypt does not. If war then broke out between Egypt and Israel, we would be involved and our agreement with Israel would mean nothing. That is why I suggest a unified Arab delegation and a single treaty, since this would help keep the peace in the future. I refer to this because we want an agreement to be based on solid ground. This is especially important since we live in a world of such uncertainty. So if the foundations are not solid, the results will not last. Israel’s attitudes also make us look at basic factors. Prime Minister Begin has said that Palestine is only a part of Israel and that Israel considers her boundaries to include some of Lebanon, Syria, and elsewhere. Today I saw a translation of an article from TimeMagazine on US aid to Israel, and it included remarks by Senator Stone attacking the American Administration in the presence of the Israeli Foreign Minister.

Secretary Vance: Foreign Minister Dayan called after that and apologized. He was deeply upset.

Foreign Minister Khaddam: I would have locked up both Dayan and Stone!

President: I understand the problem you describe, but the example you use of Cuba is not exactly the same. There is no Palestinian nation; there is a Cuban nation.

Foreign Minister Khaddam: But there is a Palestinian people.

President: That’s right. We are trying to include the Palestinian people and PLO representatives. We are working to include the PLO representatives in Geneva, but this remains the most difficult issue for us to get agreement on. We need to have a Geneva conference, so that we can induce Israel to participate.

Foreign Minister Khaddam: If we let ourselves follow this to its logical conclusion, Israel in the end would be telling Jordan, Syria, and others who they should name as their representatives as well.

President: There is nothing I have outlined which is unfair to Syria or to the Palestinians or to any Arab country. I would like your government to endorse and approve the proposals that we have described to you. I would like to ask Secretary Vance to put this in writing so that there will be no mistake. If you could approve, and if we could get Egypt, Jordan, and the Soviets to agree, then I think we can get Israel to agree and go to Geneva, where we can meet the needs of the Palestinians, the need for peace, and the need for withdrawal. Only then can we make progress. We need to be supportive and not be an obstacle to progress.

I have had constant awareness of your special concern, and these proposals do not violate any of your principles. But I need you to be accommodating. On the details of the arrangements and these may have to be different from those that you prefer. Of course, others will also have to be accommodating.

Foreign Minister Khaddam: I will convey to President Assad exactly what President Carter says.

President: If we could get an early favorable reply, we and the Soviets would be ready to prepare an invitation to consult with you and to get to Geneva before the end of the year. We will be careful not to surprise or embarrass you as we prepare for Geneva. I am just as committed to protecting the legitimate interests of the Palestinians and the refugees as I am to protecting Israel. The crucial thing for me is that I be able to earn and maintain your trust and the confidence of the others as well. If I betray that, the prospects for peace will perhaps be lost. So I want to ask you to be flexible on details, as long as we do not violate your principles.

Foreign Minister Khaddam: I would like to underscore for President Carter the great and deep appreciation that President Assad had for his integrity and his hard work and efforts, as well as those of Secretary Vance. We will spend every effort to get to the goal of a just and lasting peace. President Carter is the first American President who has so consistently followed the path of peace in the Middle East in earnest. Even if we disagree on some things, even profoundly, I must say this. As far as we are concerned, we want to continue and increase the cooperation between our two countries. I will convey to President Assad the substance of the US proposal. I will convey to you his reply. We will conduct some inter-Arab consultations as well. I believe that for the Arabs to agree on certain aspects will be better than for them to disagree.

President: Yes.

Foreign Minister Khaddam: I want to repeat that I appreciate President Carter’s receiving me. When are you coming to Damascus? We have heard of your upcoming trip.

President: I don’t want you to get tired of me.

Foreign Minister Khaddam: On the contrary, we would like to see you and we will let you see the Golan Heights after Israel’s withdrawal. You have seen perhaps the city of Quneitra, and you can see how the Israelis left it.

President: When a peace treaty is signed, perhaps then I will visit.

Foreign Minister Khaddam: We really wish that you would come the day that peace if established, but Israel’s behavior, and the American generosity in aid to Israel, are not encouraging.

President: I know that you will do everything possible to help bring about my visit. I will make a permanent commitment to do all that I can while I am President to bring peace in the Middle East.

Foreign Minister Khaddam: Thank you.

President: Give my best regards to President Assad.

12. Memorandum of Conversation[5]

Washington, September 28, 1977, 1 p.m.

SUBJECT

Secretary’s Luncheon with Foreign Minister Khaddam of Syria

PARTICIPANTS

Syria

Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Abd al-Halim Khaddam

Syrian Ambassador to the United States Sabah Kabbani

Mr. Abou Fares, Interpreter

United States

Secretary of State Cyrus Vance

Deputy Secretary Warren Christoper

Under Secretary for Political Affairs Philip Habib

Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Alfred L. Atherton Jr.

Ambassador Richard Murphy

Mr. William Quandt, National Security Council

Mr. David Korn, Policy Planning Staff

Mr. Isa Sabbagh, Interpreter

The Secretary said that the President had noted that it was a little unclear how the working group subcommittees would report the results of their activity. The President’s suggestion was that the working groups report to the Plenary. Khaddam said that in his view the subcommittees should be based on topics. If a topical committee agreed on something, it would be reported to the Plenary. The Secretary replied that there is a difference of view between Syria and the U.S. on how the working groups should be set up and on who they should report to. The Secretary said that why he brought the matter up, was to make sure that there was no misunderstanding.

Khaddam said there were two points he wanted to make. The first was that committees based on topics would make things easier. The second was that if the committees were subdivided on the basis of geography, what would be the advantage of having a unified Arab delegation — it would only be a matter of protocol. The Secretary said he did not agree. Some matters should be handled on a bilateral basis and others on a multilateral basis. As the President said, questions related to Gaza, the Palestinians and the West Bank would require more than bilateral discussion. Khaddam said if something concerning Egypt has to be bilateral, why should the Palestinian issue not be bilateral, between the Palestinians and Israel? Because there is more than one party involved, the Secretary replied. No, Khaddam said, there are only the Palestinians. That is why we say the Palestinians have to be included in the discussions of the Palestinian issue, the Secretary said.

Khaddam said that Syria’s interest in the Sinai is no less than its interest in Golan. “We consider the whole thing an Arab problem.” Khaddam said Syria would have no objection to having one delegation represent the Arab side for all issues, because what we are talking about is the Arab cause. If the discussions were based on a national concept, then there would be no point in having a united Arab delegation.

The Secretary said that the President thought he was meeting Syria’s suggestion when he suggested that the working groups should report back to the Plenary. He thought that solved the problem. The Secretary asked if it made sense to have five parties discussing security arrangements on Golan. It seems to us that Golan is Syria’s business. We can see why at the end it would go back to the Plenary, but we cannot see why others would want to tell Syria what kind of security arrangements to make on Golan. Otherwise someone would be telling Syria to put its forces here instead of there. The Secretary repeated that that does not make sense. Khaddam replied that the point is that Syria and Israel will not be negotiating regarding Golan. Syria will be negotiating Israeli withdrawal from Golan. Then negotiations will take place regarding arrangements for security, but security arrangements must be all encompassing for they affect all the Arab states. Khaddam added, however, that he had no doubt that what the President had suggested, that the results of the deliberations should be submitted to the Plenary, is constructive.

The Secretary pointed out that the Syrians had said that they would have an interest in the arrangements for Egypt, and that others would have an interest in the arrangements between Syria and Israel, but, the Secretary said, then you took a leap and said let’s talk about security arrangements and said security arrangements interested everyone. In the abstract that is correct. But when you get down to a question of how big a DMZ there would be in Syria and how big a DMZ there would be in Egypt, where the terrain is different, then why have all these people waiting around discussing these detailed problems. Khaddam replied that he had mentioned security arrangements only as an illustration of Syria’s view that negotiations should be on a multilateral basis rather than on a geographic basis. Khaddam said Syria would be ready to have any Arab country do the negotiations for it on security arrangements, even Iraq or Libya.

The Secretary said he wanted to make sure he understood what Syria’s views are regarding Palestinians in a united Arab delegation. He would start by asking a question: Does Syria have any objection to having among the Palestinians in the united Arab delegation both PLO and non-PLO Palestinians? Khaddam replied yes, Syria does object. The Secretary asked what the objection is and what is the reason. Khaddam replied that first of all there is only one Palestinian people and one Palestinian cause. This requires one type of representation. Secondly, the PLO is the one body recognized internationally and by the Arabs as the sole representative of the Palestinians. Khaddam said that there is not one Palestinian outside the PLO who can claim to represent the Palestinians. For instance, Khaddam said if we were to agree as Israel suggests that Palestinian representation in Geneva should include West Bank mayors, the mayors would not come. They would say the PLO is the representative of the Palestinians. In any event, Khaddam said, the mayors are administrators, not political leaders. Would it be possible, for instance, for Mayor Beame to come and negotiate foreign affairs with me, Khaddam asked?[6] Any such suggestion would be refused by the PLO. The Security Council considers the PLO as representing the Palestinian people and the PLO has representatives attending Security Council deliberations. The UNGA has passed a resolution accepting the PLO as an observer delegation.[7] In view of all of this, Khaddam said, we consider that the PLO alone should represent the Palestinians. However, we want to be helpful and will present another idea, Khaddam said. This would be an Arab League delegation. In an Arab League delegation there would be no problem about who would be Syrian or Palestinian. Everybody would represent only one party, the Arab League. The delegation would go to Geneva in the name of all the Arab states. The Secretary asked whether other Arab states would agree to this; Khaddam said he believed they would. The Secretary replied that he believed they might not all agree. Khaddam said objections would only come from troublemakers. It would not be difficult to get a resolution in the Arab League for this. Khaddam added that Syria wants to move things ahead, but the results must be serious and solid. He said even King Hussein, who claims the West Bank once belonged to him, now recognizes the PLO as the representatives of the Palestinians.

The Secretary said everybody agreed that there is need for a just and lasting peace, but to achieve that we have to reconvene Geneva and get all the parties there. If you can’t get them all to Geneva, you won’t be able to have negotiations. So what we are trying to do is find a way to get all the necessary parties to the table so that they can deal with the issues. The issues have to be defined so that it will be clear that they include all those matters needed for a comprehensive settlement. The Secretary said he was worried that we are getting so hung up on procedure that we will lose sight of substance and we will not get a solution. What the President is trying to do in making his suggestion is cut through procedure and get all the parties to the table so that we can get down to the serious work of negotiations. Khaddam replied that President Assad had told the Secretary and the President that the moment the Arabs have a clear idea of U.S. views on what constituted Palestinian rights, then the procedural questions would disappear. The Secretary said he would like to make clear what our views are on the Palestinian issue. They are:

1. There should be a Palestinian entity.
2. Who governs it and its relations with its neighbors are to be determined by the people of the entity themselves. Nothing should be imposed upon them from outside. Khaddam said this is fine, but where will the entity be? The Secretary said the entity should be on the West Bank and include Gaza; the Secretary emphasized that while this is our view, we of course cannot guarantee any outcome, there will have to be negotiations.

Khaddam asked about the refugees. The Secretary said the refugee question has to be dealt with as well. The refugee question comprises two sets of issues: one, resettlement, and, two, compensation. Khaddam asked hotly where the refugees would be resettled. Not, he said, in Syria: “We would refuse that; not in Lebanon either, you know Lebanon’s views on the problem.” The Secretary replied that resettlement is a subject that will have to be dealt with. Khaddam said Syria’s view is that the best way to handle the refugee problem is to have the UN resolutions applied. The Secretary said the resolutions are not that clear. Khaddam said Syria would accept all the UN resolutions concerning refugees to which the USG is a party; we would agree to the refugee resolutions agreed to by the U.S. from the beginning up to now. Khaddam remarked that there is a 1947 UN resolution, which was supported by the U.S., which calls for the establishment of a Palestinian state, and there are resolutions calling for the return of the refugees. So, Khaddam said, in the name of the Palestinians, I will permit myself to say that they will agree to all these resolutions. The Secretary noted that Khaddam was now speaking for the Palestinians. Khaddam replied he was doing so because “we are the same people.”

The Secretary said he would like to ask why all this should not be discussed and decided at Geneva. Khaddam said he agreed, but “don’t you think we should have the Palestinians at Geneva?” The Secretary replied that we have said the Palestinians must be represented at Geneva. Khaddam said that by Palestinians he means PLO. The Secretary pointed out that as the President had said in the conversation this morning there should be PLO among the Palestinians at Geneva. Khaddam replied: “There is a difference between an organization that represents the Palestinians and Palestinian representation that represents only part of the Palestinians.” The Secretary said that he had to point out that if Syria maintains that only the PLO can represent the Palestinians at Geneva, then Syria may be creating a situation in which it would be impossible to reconvene Geneva. Khaddam reiterated his view that “nobody is capable of representing the Palestinians except the PLO.” Khaddam added that all the West Bank mayors had declared their loyalty to the PLO. Khaddam said that he doubted even that Egypt and Jordan would accept any Palestinian representation except the PLO.

The Secretary said he understood Syria’s position on this. However, the President has asked Khaddam to convey his views to President Assad. The President’s view is that the most realistic way to accomplish our basic objective is to have Palestinians who are not exclusively PLO, but who include PLO, in the united Arab delegation at Geneva. Khaddam said he would convey the President’s views and in any case there will be inter-Arab consultations on this matter. The Secretary emphasized that this is a critical point. We would hate to see Geneva driven onto the rocks, the Secretary said, by the parties being too rigid on the definition of Palestinian. Khaddam replied that “the rocks” are Israel not the Arabs. The question is, is it reasonable to expect to discuss Palestinian issues in the absence of the real representatives of the Palestinians? The Secretary replied that there will be representatives of the Palestinians at Geneva. Khaddam asked whether in a Syrian delegation there should be people who are not Syrian Government officials, who do not represent the Syrian Government. Khaddam said the PLO should nominate the people who will represent it.

The Secretary said that as the President pointed out, what we have here is the difference between a sovereign state and an organization. But the main question is how to get Geneva convened so that we can deal with the substantive issues. Khaddam said the reply to this is easy. The USG has suggested a united Arab delegation. This united Arab delegation could have subcommittees. The Secretary asked Khaddam precisely what he was suggesting. Khaddam replied that, for instance, let us assume that the Arabs and Israel are discussing a specific subject. The Arab delegation would nominate the people it feels should represent it at that meeting. Another possibility, Khaddam said, would be for the Arab League to represent all the Arabs in the negotiations, irrespective of the subject. Khaddam said both suggestions should be considered. The Secretary said let’s take the first suggestion: of whom would the Arab League delegation be composed? Khaddam replied that the Arab League itself would name the people on its delegation as it did for its negotiations with the European Economic Community. Of course, it would name appropriate people from countries interested in the problems to be dealt with. In the Arab League delegation there would be subcommittees, some with Syrians on them and some with Egyptians on them. Khaddam said he thought an Arab League delegation could solve the problem of Palestinian representation and the organization of the conference. But he added that Syria would approach with an open mind any formula that would not cause difficulties.

The Secretary asked how the question of PLO in an Arab League delegation would be handled. Khaddam replied that it would be handled as if the PLO were an Arab state. Mr. Habib said we should resolve these procedural problems and agree on Geneva. Khaddam said fine, but Geneva is a means and not a goal. For instance, if the Arabs were to come to agreement with Israel, the agreement could be signed at Paris, the UN or anywhere. What is important is to have negotiations under the supervision of the UN. Khaddam said he would be meeting with the other Arabs as soon as they get back home from New York to discuss the problems of Palestinian representation and the organization of the conference. Mr. Habib asked if this had to wait until the Arabs leave New York; couldn’t it be discussed in New York. Khaddam said there will be talks about this in New York, but the issues are so important that they will have to be decided by the highest authorities. The foreign ministers cannot make the decisions on these things.

Khaddam asked how Egypt reacted to the formula suggested by President Carter. The Secretary said that Fahmy had promised to report to Sadat the President’s suggestion and to get back in touch with us. The same was true of the Jordanians. But, the Secretary emphasized, we expect to hear back from them not in the indefinite future, but in a week or so. Khaddam said he too would try to get a response to the Secretary soon. The Secretary said he would like to get a clear understanding of how the Palestinians are represented in Khaddam’s concept of a united Arab delegation and how they would be represented in an Arab League delegation. Khaddam replied that the united Arab delegation would consist of four or five elements, five if Lebanon were included. But, Khaddam added, leave Lebanon out, it does not come into the picture. The Secretary asked if Lebanon could be included. Khaddam said yes, but Syria, Egypt, the PLO and Jordan would meet to decide on the composition of the delegation. The decision on composition would be conveyed to the UN Secretary General by the heads of the four governments’ parties to Geneva. The Secretary asked if the elements of the delegation would come as separate groups or as individuals. Khaddam replied to the members will be a part of one unified delegation with one head. The Secretary said that that still did not answer his question. Are they separate elements representing their countries or are they individuals? The latter, Khaddam replied. A Syrian would not represent only Syria; he would represent all the Arab states. The delegation in its totality would represent all Arab interests.

The Secretary asked if we could now go on to the Arab League delegation concept, and he asked how that works. Khaddam replied that the Arab League Council would meet and issue a resolution nominating so-and-so to be members of the delegation. The Arab League delegation would represent all the Arab states at Geneva. The Secretary said he did not know how the Arab League works internally. Would there be a meeting of the Arab League in which the members of the delegation would be nominated? Yes, Khaddam replied. The Secretary said he assumed then that when that delegation goes to Geneva it would decide which of its members would work on which problems. Was that correct, the Secretary asked? Yes, Khaddam said. The Secretary asked if Khaddam had discussed this idea with his Arab colleagues. Khaddam said no, the idea had been discussed only in Syrian Government Councils. President Assad, in his desire to move the negotiations forward, came up with the idea. The Secretary asked if the Syrians had any other suggestions. Khaddam indicated that they did not.

Mr. Habib remarked that if Israel has had problems in agreeing with the united Arab delegation scheme, just imagine what problems they would have with an Arab League delegation. Mr. Habib pointed out that, by virtue of the Secretary’s leadership and hard work, we had now gotten to the point where the Israelis have accepted the idea of a united Arab delegation. Now the Syrians are bringing up this new idea which will create more difficulties. Khaddam said Mr. Habib had misunderstood. Syria adheres to the idea of a united Arab delegation. It is not saying that it is suggesting something else, but it was asked to put forth alternatives and it is doing so. We are dealing with a sick person, Khaddam said, and we were asked what to prescribe. Syria still gives first preference to a united Arab delegation, but it sees that Israel is refusing everything, and it wants to be helpful. Mr. Habib pointed out that Israel is not refusing everything, it has accepted a united Arab delegation with Palestinians. Khaddam objected that the Israeli acceptance carried with it stipulations that amount to a refusal. Habib said forget about the Israeli stipulations for the moment. The Secretary said if we can reach agreement with the Arabs on something that makes sense, we will do everything in our power to get the Israelis to agree to it. We got them to accept the united Arab delegation idea after they had said they would never do it. Now they are posing certain other conditions, the Secretary said. We will have to work on this.

The Secretary said there are two problems: How do you define the Palestinians, and how do you organize the conference? We have to work on these problems together. We are agreed on one thing: the united Arab delegation. The question now is how do you compose the Palestinian element of that delegation. The President has suggested that the Palestinian element of that delegation would include PLO as long as they are not well known. The Israelis have not agreed to that, but we are willing to push them to try to get them to agree. Khaddam reiterated that the Arabs would choose the Palestinians in the united Arab delegation. Mr. Habib pointed out that we would have to have an understanding with the Arabs on what the composition of the delegation would be, so that we can get Israeli agreement. Khaddam retorted that the Arabs do not want to interfere in the choice of the Israeli delegation. Thus, it would not be right for Israel to interfere in the composition of the Arab delegation since this would be a unified delegation. The Secretary said that Mr. Habib had made a very important point. Even accepting for the sake of argument that there would be agreement that the Arabs should choose the Palestinians who go to Geneva, we would have to know who they would be. Khaddam said Egypt, Jordan, Syria and the PLO would meet and decide on this. Khaddam added that he could assure us that the formation of the delegation would not create obstacles in the path of the negotiations.

The Secretary said he would have to leave in a moment to go to the White House for the President’s meeting with the Jordanians, but first he would like to turn briefly again to the question of organization of the conference. The Secretary said that the President has made suggestions that he would like Khaddam to convey to President Assad. He himself would give Khaddam a paper tomorrow with the precise wording of this suggestion,[8] but to summarize, the suggestion is that there should be specific groups to deal with specific issues. Some would be bilateral and some multilateral. Regarding the problem that Khaddam has raised about the united Arab delegation being able to act as a whole, the President suggested that the individual working groups report to the Plenary. The Secretary said that as he understood Syria’s present position, it does not agree with this kind of working group structure. The Secretary said he hoped the Syrians would change their stand on this, and he hoped Khaddam would report to President Assad President Carter’s conviction that this is a wise and appropriate way of organizing Geneva.

The Secretary said he wanted to give Khaddam a copy of the draft done by Israel of a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt.[9] (The Secretary handed Khaddam a copy of the Israeli draft.) The Secretary said that the Israelis have told us they would be prepared later to present drafts of similar treaties for other countries. The treaty has lots of detail, the Secretary remarked, much more than necessary. He pointed out that we have differences of opinion regarding a number of substantive points in the treaty. We don’t endorse it in any way. The Secretary said that he would like to fill Khaddam in, during their next meeting, on his conversations with Dayan and on Dayan’s views on substantive issues.

The Secretary said that before he left he would like to say a word on the situation in South Lebanon. The Secretary said that he was pleased that there was now a cease fire in South Lebanon and wanted to express his appreciation to Khaddam and President Assad for their efforts to help in resolving the difficulties that we have faced in recent weeks. The Secretary said we believe it essential that the Shtaura Agreement go into effect, and we will do everything we can to make sure it stays in effect. We also think the Lebanese handled themselves well in this matter, but it is absolutely essential that they get their troops into the south quickly. The Secretary said he was sure that Khaddam shared our views on this. Absolutely, Khaddam replied. Syria has for some time been asking the Lebanese to do this. The Secretary noted that when General Khoury, the Commander of the Lebanese Army, was here, we signed an agreement with him for $25 million in equipment which we hope will help General Khoury move quickly.[10]

The Secretary again apologized for having to leave and said he would look forward to seeing Khaddam soon in New York.

---