January 18, 1974

https://www.gov.il/en/pages/23-separation-of-forces-agreement-government-statement-18-january-1974

Read the Agreement in a Printable PDF

After the October 1973 war, Egypt and Israel negotiated this Separation of Forces Agreement, known as Sinai I. Though it was signed after the Geneva Middle East peace conference in December 1973, much of the agreement was negotiated previously by Egyptian and Israeli generals immediately after the war. American Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat wanted a public conference from which would flow an Israeli-Egyptian agreement. Kissinger wanted to demonstrate American dominance in Arab-Israeli negotiations, leaving the Soviet Union on the sideline; Sadat wanted a public conference to show the Arab world that he was not undertaking a unilateral policy of negotiating separate Egyptian interests with the Israelis. Syria stayed away from the conference because it believed it to be nothing but a show for Egypt’s interests; Jordan attended, hoping to negotiate a disengagement agreement for the West Bank.

The Geneva conference provided the fig leaf Sadat required. From the conference flowed military and political committee talks, but they too were only symbolic diplomatic mechanisms. Kissinger carried out the real negotiations in conjunction with Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir. The Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement was signed January 18, 1974. It included limited force zones for Egyptian and Israeli men and materiel and a U.N. buffer zone.

The 10-point memorandum of understanding that accompanied the disengagement agreement was meant to assure Israel of American monitoring. For Arab-Israeli negotiations, this MOU set a precedent because it made the United States witness to the agreement and assured Israel that Washington would see to the implementation of the provisions, especially the Israeli right of passage through international waterways. When the second Egyptian-Israeli Disengagement Agreement was signed in September 1975, the United States again provided Israel a memorandum of understanding, reaffirming America’s policing role in implementing that agreement.

— Ken Stein, May 7, 2025

A. Egypt and Israel will scrupulously observe the cease-fire on land, sea, and air called for by the UN Security Council and will refrain from the time of the signing of this document from all military or para-military actions against each other.

The 1974 Israeli-Egyptian Separation of Forces Agreement references this map. (credit: “A History of Israel: From the Rise of Zionism to Our Time,” by Howard Sachar, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1976)

B. The military forces of Egypt and Israel will be separated in accordance with the following principles:

  1. All Egyptian forces on the east side of the Canal will be deployed west of the line designated as Line A on the attached map. All Israeli forces, including those west of the Suez Canal and the Bitter Lakes, will be deployed east of the line designated as Line B on the attached map.
  2. The area between the Egyptian and Israeli lines will be a zone of disengagement in which the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) will be stationed. The UNEF will continue to consist of units from countries that are not permanent members of the Security Council.
  3. The area between the Egyptian line and the Suez Canal will be limited in armament and forces.
  4. The area between the Israeli line (Line B on the attached map) and the line designated as Line C on the attached map, which runs along the western base of the mountains where the Gidi and Mitla Passes are located, will be limited in armament and forces.
  5. The limitations referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4 will be inspected by UNEF. Existing procedures of the UNEF, including the attaching of Egyptian and Israeli liaison officers to UNEF, will be continued.
  6. Air forces of the two sides will be permitted to operate up to their respective lines without interference from the other side.

C. The detailed implementation of the disengagement of forces will be worked out by military representatives of Egypt and Israel, who will agree on the stages of this process. These representatives will meet no later than 48 hours after the signature of this agreement at Kilometre 101 under the aegis of the United Nations for this purpose. They will complete this task within five days. Disengagement will begin within 48 hours after the completion of the work of the military representatives and in no event later than seven days after the signature of this agreement. The process of disengagement will be completed not later than 40 days after it begins.

D. This agreement is not regarded by Egypt and Israel as a final peace agreement. It constitutes a first step toward a final, just and durable peace according to the provisions of Security Council Resolution 338 and within the framework of the Geneva Conference.

 

For Egypt:

General Abdel Gani el-Gamasy

For Israel:

David Elazar, Lt. Gen., Chief of Staff of IDF