Originally posted March 8, 2026; updated April 12, 2026
By Ken Stein, CIE President and Emory Emeritus Professor
The collapse of the Ottoman Empire after World War I ended centuries of imperial rule across the Middle East. By 1920, Britain, France, Russia and Italy had rearranged the Middle East into trusteeships or mandates, with the Ottoman Empire’s former Arab provinces gaining partial or full independence: Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan and Palestine. The Turkish-led empire that had stretched across the Middle East before the war was reduced to one-tenth its area on the Anatolian plateau but significantly still controlled access between the Black and Mediterranean seas.
In place of the empire, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk established the Republic of Turkey in 1923 and anchored it in secular governance, nationalism and alignment with the West. Atatürk dismantled the Ottoman caliphate, reoriented legal and educational systems, and pursued modernization to secure Turkey’s sovereignty and independence. By the late 1940s, Turkey’s strategic outlook emphasized integration into Western political and security structures, setting the stage for its early recognition of Israel in 1949.
Jewish communities in the Ottoman Empire enjoyed significant autonomy and protections, though they were technically second-class subjects rather than equal citizens until late in the empire’s history. In the new republic, Turkish Jews received full voting rights, though they faced socio-political pressures. While systemic, state-sponsored antisemitism was low during the interwar years, anti-Zionism and localized antisemitic incidents did occur, particularly during the Cold War.
Turkish-Israeli relations oscillated from deep friendship to deep hostility. The relationship moved through cycles of strategic alignment, ideological rupture and reconciliation. Periods of quiet intelligence coordination and episodes of sharp disagreement were included, with changes most often originating from Ankara toward Jerusalem.
In March 1949, Turkey became the first Muslim country to recognize Israel. By the end of the Hamas-Israel war in October 2025, Turkey and its leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, viewed Israel as one of three competing regional powers, alongside Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Turkish leaders more openly expressed hostile attitudes toward Israel as a Jewish state as the radical Iranian Islamic Republic rose, but Ankara did not become a center for Islamic antisemitism as Tehran did.
Key moments across seven decades included recognition in 1949, strategic alignment with the United States in the mid-1950s against Soviet penetration into the Middle East during the Cold War, and the 1996 Turkish-Israeli military agreements, which addressed defense and intelligence and reflected deep concern about Syrian and Iranian regional ambitions. Low points in the relationship revolved around the Palestinians, particularly in connection to Gaza: in 2010, when Israeli commandos intercepted the Turkish vessel Mavi Marmara, part of a flotilla attempting to break Israel’s Gaza blockade, and killed nine Turkish citizens; in 2018, when violence on the Gaza border caused political rupture without full economic disengagement; and during and after the 2023-2025 Hamas-Israel war, when Turkish anger toward Israel surged.
In 1949, Turkey’s decision under President İsmet İnönü to accept Israel was grounded less in ideological affinity than in strategic orientation. Turkey was being integrated into the Western alliance system, culminating in NATO membership in 1952. Recognition of Israel signaled a pro-Western foreign policy and independence from Arab bloc pressure. Turkey and Israel established legation-level diplomatic relations, which, while not warm, were stable.
During the 1950s and 1960s, relations remained correct but cautious. Turkey balanced ties with Israel against its desire to maintain workable relations with Arab states. A visible tilt toward Arab positions followed the 1967 Six-Day War and especially the 1973 Yom Kippur War, reflecting regional dynamics and energy dependencies. Diplomatic representation was downgraded in the 1980s, particularly after Israel’s 1980 Basic Law declaring Jerusalem its capital and the 1982 First Lebanon War. Relations were never severed, however, and intelligence contacts persisted.
The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union reduced the East-West framework that had defined Turkish security policy. Simultaneously, instability in Syria and Iraq heightened shared Turkish and Israeli concerns about regional threats, including Syrian support for militant groups and the rise of nonstate actors.
In the 1990s, relations entered what many describe as a golden age. Military cooperation agreements in 1996 enabled joint training exercises, intelligence sharing and defense industrial collaboration. Israeli companies upgraded Turkish aircraft and tanks. Turkish pilots trained in Israeli airspace. Navies conducted joint maneuvers in the eastern Mediterranean. Mutual benefit defined the partnership: Turkey gained advanced military technology and leverage against Syria, while Israel secured a rare Muslim-majority strategic partner. The 1993 Oslo Accords, with the prospect of a resolution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, improved Israel’s relations with states, like Turkey, that supported the Palestinians. Turkey thus greatly increased its trade with Israel, as did the likes of India, Japan and South Korea.
The late 1990s and early 2000s saw relative calm between Turkey’s secular government and pragmatic Israeli leadership. Domestic political changes in Turkey, however, began to alter the relationship’s tone. A gradual shift in Turkish foreign policy followed the rise of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) under Erdoğan after 2002. Erdoğan’s government emphasized regional engagement, support for Palestinian political actors and a more assertive diplomacy. Economic ties expanded, and bilateral trade grew steadily throughout the 2000s, yet political rhetoric between the countries sharpened.
After Israel’s 2008-2009 Gaza operation, Erdoğan publicly criticized Israeli policies, and relations plunged to their lowest point since 1949 after the Mavi Marmara incident in May 2010. Ankara recalled its ambassador, expelled Israel’s ambassador, suspended military cooperation, and demanded an apology for the nine Turkish deaths, along with compensation and the lifting of the Gaza blockade.
In 2013, under U.S. mediation, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu formally apologized to Erdoğan for operational errors leading to the loss of life. A reconciliation agreement in 2016 restored full diplomatic ties and compensated victims’ families. Strategic cooperation did not return to the intensity of the 1990s, however. Trust had eroded, and both governments were navigating complex domestic constituencies and regional rivalries. In the early 2000s, Turkey began to host Hamas leaders, adding tension between Jerusalem and Ankara.
Natural gas discoveries in the eastern Mediterranean added another layer of competition. Israel deepened cooperation with Turkish rivals Greece and Cyprus through energy and security frameworks that Turkey viewed warily. Maritime boundary agreements and an assertive Turkish naval posture heightened tensions. Trade between Turkey and Israel continued to grow, however, illustrating a paradox: Economic interdependence coexisted with political disputes.
The U.S. recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital in 2017 and move of its embassy to the city five months later triggered another diplomatic row. Turkey expelled Israel’s ambassador and recalled its own, protesting Israeli actions in Gaza during 2018 border demonstrations. Diplomatic representation was again downgraded, though commercial ties persisted.
By the early 2020s, regional realignment encouraged renewed pragmatism. Ankara warmed relations with Jerusalem after Israel normalized ties with several Arab states under the Abraham Accords. Domestic economic challenges and a desire to reduce regional isolation shaped Turkey’s approach. Quiet intelligence contacts intensified, particularly concerning Iranian activities and shared concerns over instability in Syria.
In 2022, full diplomatic relations were restored once more, and Israel and Turkey reappointed ambassadors. High-level visits followed, including meetings between Israeli and Turkish leaders. Both sides showed interest in expanding energy cooperation, potentially involving Israeli natural gas exports through Turkey to European markets. These projects remained complex and politically sensitive but reflected renewed recognition of mutual interests. Erdoğan and Netanyahu met in September 2023, just before Hamas’ October 7 attacks on Israel.
Turkey then sharply and continually criticized Israeli military operations in Gaza while expressing support for Palestinian claims to the West Bank and Gaza. Diplomatic rhetoric escalated, and trade sometimes was restricted. But channels of communication did not close. A regular pattern reappeared: political confrontation layered over enduring economic and security calculations. Over seven decades, Turkish exports to Israel have increased despite sometimes-angry bilateral relationships. Trade has continued through third-party transit points and the repackaging of goods. After the two-year Gaza war, Turkey and Israel were frequently brought together by U.S. mediation seeking working diplomatic relationships despite hostility. Into 2026, Erdoğan and Netanyahu ratcheted up their vitriol toward each other as the United States and Israel fought Iran and Israel battled Hezbollah in Lebanon.
