A U.S. House Intelligence subcommittee issued a scathing report on the failures of the intelligence community and policymakers as the Shah's regime was collapsing in Iran.
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[1] As early as January 14, 1978, the Morning Summary noted growing restiveness in Iran over the past several months, and attributed it to the system’s failure to provide an outlet for complaints about dislocations caused by Iran’s efforts to modernize. On January 29 it reported that the Shah’s Islamic opponents were in their strongest position since 1963, and described the policy dilemma the Shah faced. With steady coverage throughout the spring, the Morning Summary warned that continued unrest would precipitate a crackdown, that confrontations would become more violent, and that SAVAK officials feared these would present a growing threat to the government. Although less consistent in its coverage, by May 11 the NID was also warning that there appeared to be little room for compromise between the Shah and his opponents. Both publications reflected that the Shah appeared to be losing his grip, and that the social fabric of Iran was unraveling; NID coverage, somewhat less gloomy, noted the seriousness with which the Shah viewed continued unrest. In September both publications reported on the imposition of martial law, and said that the Shah appeared to have recovered his self-confidence. The NID reported indications of morale problems in the military, but generally stressed the capacity of the Shah and of the Iranian army to handle the situation. Morning Summary reporting during September underlined the deeply ingrained economic problems, reported on contacts with oppositionists, and stated that the critical question was whether the Shah’s government could convince opponents that it was serious about political freedom and social justice.
[2] Warning: An Assessment of Intelligence Community Performance and Capability, Subcommittee on Evaluation, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
[3] These procedures were developed under the “National Intelligence Officer for Warning,” a position established by the DCI largely in response to criticisms by the Committee of warning intelligence management. While the mere creation of this position falls short of responding to the full range of Committee concern, the newly instituted procedures hold promise for improving intelligence analysis.
