This curated and expansive bibliography on Hamas-Israel relations goes back to the late 1980s, with multiple additions found since the eruption of the Hamas-Israel war October 7, 2023, Hezbollah’s joining the war against Israel the next day, the Iranian-Israeli military encounters, hostage negotiations and cease-fires, and ancillary impacts on the domestic politics of Israel and her contiguous neighbors. Multiple events locally, regionally and internationally are covered.
We particularly suggest the six incisive articles written by Dr. Michael Milshtein and cited at the end of this introduction; they are among the best identified. There are many more.
Of note are 18 short videos compiled by CIE interns of remarks made by analysts and scholars who graciously participated in our weekly webinars during the first eight months of the Hamas-Israel war. The videos cover Hezbollah, Hamas, Iranian engagement and the pernicious outpouring of antisemitism.
The bibliography covers the decades-long struggle with the PLO/PA for leadership among Palestinians, the formation and ideology of Hamas as covered in multiple languages, statements by Hamas leaders, and more. We have included reputable surveys of Palestinian public opinion and Israeli opinions from the Israel Democracy Institute and the American Jewish Committee. All entries are logged by date, beginning with the most recent.
CIE-produced materials are included, and CIE’s 35 webinars on the war are listed at the end of the compilation and can be found here; each webinar runs roughly 45 minutes, with both audio and visual versions. Some 80 experts, scholars, writers and analysts were interviewed on the webinars; each provides an insightful assessment about Israel and the war from regional and international perspectives. Learners, researchers, clergy, teachers and others could use the webinars as starting points for discussions, a lecture series or a full course on the war.
We have listed only a small fraction of the excellent analytical prose and digital materials that have appeared, and a major shortcoming of the bibliography is the absence of entries in multiple foreign languages. Before we annotated two or three excellent articles published monthly, we have curated a list of some of the best materials. Going to CIE’s monthly curated contemporary readings and conducting a keyword search for Hamas will call up dozens of articles of merit.
Below the first series of listings of what we consider the best readings, we highlight for each month two articles with in-depth summaries. The bibliography is long, but most of the entries are front of any pay walls. When we posted these items, the links were live; please notify us at info@israeled.org if you find any bad links.
— Ken Stein, June 3, 2025
Ghaith al-Omari, “Hamas Has Fractured the Arab World,” Foreign Affairs, October 13, 2023.
Meir Litvak, “The Islamization of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict: the Case of Hamas,” Middle Eastern Studies, January 1998 (with permission).
Michael Milshtein, “Why Is It So Difficult for Israel to Decipher Hamas?” The Jerusalem Strategic Tribune, December 2023.
Michael Milshtein, “The Nazis Had the SS, Hamas Has the Nukhba: Sinwar’s Diabolical Unit,” Ynet News, April 27, 2024.
Michael Milshtein, “The Four Pillars of Anti-Israel Dehumanization,” Ynet News, August 1, 2024.
Michael Milshtein, “The Occupation Is No Longer Telling the Story,” Ynet News, October 2, 2024.
Michael Milshtein, “The Operation in Gaza Required Immediate Foresight,” Ynet News, January 13, 2025.
Michael Milshtein, “A Nation Without a Compass: The Cost of Israel’s War Without Endgame Strategy,” Ynet News, April 9, 2025.
Asher Susser, “The Rise of Hamas in Palestine and the Crisis of Secularism in the Arab World,” Brandeis, 2006 (79 pp.) (with permission).
Aaron Zelin, “Hamas Diplomacy: From Haniyeh to Sinwar,” PolicyWatch 3921, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, August 28, 2024.
Neomi Neumann, “What If Gaza’s ‘Day After’ Converges With the Day After Abbas?” PolicyWatch 3894, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, July 1, 2024.
Dana Stroul, Dennis Ross, David Schenker and Robert Satloff, “U.S. Policy in the Post-October 7 Middle East: Looking Back, Looking Forward,” video (1:07:27), Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 2, 2024.
“A Short History of Hamas” (Español, Portuguese), Center for Israel Education, October 28, 2023.
“Hamas Charter Totally Rejects Israel and Zionism — 1988” (Español), Center for Israel Education, October 23, 2023.
“Jimmy Carter’s Hamas Decade of Embrace,” Center for Israel Education, October 29, 2023.
“International Voices Urging the Recognition of Hamas as a Legitimate Political Actor,” Center for Israel Education, October 30, 2023.
“Quotations From Hamas Sources Expressing Hatred for Zionism, Israel, and Jews, 1988-Present” (Español, Portuguese), Center for Israel Education, June 4, 2024.
Timeline — Hamas-Israel Relations With Events, Statements and Previous Clashes, 1988-Present, Center for Israel Education, June 2024.
May 2025
An Israeli exposé of British funding for Hamas and Dennis Ross’ appraisal of American-Israeli relations during the first four months of Trump’s second term.
Lahav Harkov, “Report: U.K. One of the Top Three Sources of Funding for Hamas,” Jewish Insider, May 25, 2025.
An investigation by Israel’s Channel 12 found that the United Kingdom is the third-largest source of Hamas’ foreign funding. Although the Palestinian terrorist organization is proscribed in the U.K., the British government has been remiss in enforcing the related ban on contributions to Hamas. As a result, the U.K. is home to 25% of Hamas’ nonstate donors. Nor is nonenforcement of that ban Britain’s only dereliction. The British government also contributes to a UNICEF program whose beneficiaries are handpicked by Hamas’ Ministry of Social Development in Gaza. (A USAID-funded digital platform distributes the funds.) By way of proof, the Channel 12 report produces a 2022 document from the British Foreign Office showing that London was well aware that its aid was going into Hamas’ war chest. The document reads, “The MoSD in Gaza is affiliated with the de facto authorities and thus UK Aid can be linked directly or indirectly with supporting the de facto authority [Hamas] in Gaza which is part of a proscribed group.” The Channel 12 exposé quotes a former counterterrorism finance official in the Shin Bet: “Hamas is strong in Britain because over the years they got used to being able to do almost anything they want there, compared to other countries in Europe.” In response to the report, the British Embassy in Israel decried Channel 12’s “false and irresponsible allegations.”
Dennis Ross, “Will Trump Dump Netanyahu? Here’s When Israel Will Find Out,” Haaretz, May 26, 2025.
In this article, carried by Haaretz and republished by the Washington Institute, Dennis Ross, the venerable Middle East specialist and adviser in four presidential administrations, traces the arc of American-Israeli relations since the start of President Donald Trump’s second term. Ross notes that Israeli rightists have been chastened by a series of presidential measures: negotiating directly with Hamas, parleying with Iran, freezing Israel out of the U.S. cease-fire with the Houthis, securing the release without Israeli input of the last known living American hostage, lifting American sanctions on Syria, and visiting the Middle East but skipping Israel. Ross observes that, whatever the merits of those policies, their common denominator is that they have been pursued without regard for Israeli concerns. What’s more, Israel was blindsided by most of them, learning of them only when the rest of the world did. Despite Trump’s apparent steps away from Israel, Ross convincingly argues that the Trump administration is not so much retreating from Israel as pursuing American interests single-mindedly. Ross says that because, under Trump’s transactional calculus, an ally is only as good as its perceived value to the U.S., “the Israeli government has to show how what Israel is doing will serve U.S. interests. And the fact that it is Israel, not the U.S., that changed the regional balance of power in the region, weakening Iran and its proxies Hezbollah and Hamas and increasing Iran’s need for a deal, serves America’s interests.” Because the Obama 10-year memorandum of understanding on arms sales will lapse during Trump’s tenure, it is all the more important for Jerusalem to impress on Trump its value as an American asset: “A good measure of Donald Trump’s relationship with Israel and with Netanyahu will be how he approaches a new military assistance deal. And that is not a given.”
April 2025
Pitfalls for the Trump administration to avoid in its talks with Tehran, Qatari money and antisemitism on campus.
Frannie Block and Maya Sulkin, “Qatar and China Are Pouring Billions Into Elite American Universities,” The Free Press, April 27, 2025.
Amid President Trump’s push for universities to disclose their foreign funding sources, the role of Qatari money in American higher education has come under renewed scrutiny. In this open-access article for the largely paywall-protected Free Press, two reporters follow the money trail of foreign contributions to American universities, tracing Qatari and Chinese sources in particular. The reporters discover that foreign contributions to American universities have surged in recent years, amounting to nearly $29 billion between 2021 and 2024. Qatar and China are two of the of the main donor countries. Considering that Qatar is the Arab country closest to Hamas, its generosity to the American academy carries far-reaching implications for Israel and American Jews. In fact, no country has donated more to American universities — $6.3 billion — since the federal government started tracking such foreign largesse 40 years ago. Nearly a third of this Qatari money was spent from 2021 to 2024. The reporters note that the main beneficiaries of foreign donations have also been “the universities exploding with anti-Israel protests.” Citing a 2024 study in Frontiers of Social Psychology, they report “a strong correlation between universities that receive foreign funding from authoritarian countries and a rise in antisemitic incidents.”
Matthew Levitt, “Ending Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Program Is Not Enough,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 25, 2025.
In this op-ed for the Boston Globe, Matthew Levitt, the director of the Reinhard Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, argues that the talks between Iran and the Trump administration must not be limited to the nuclear portfolio. Iran’s regional subversion must also be addressed, especially given Iran’s backing for the October 7 attack and for Houthi efforts to disrupt maritime commerce. Levitt observes that, despite Tehran’s eagerness for sanctions relief, Iran’s regional posture has not been conciliatory. To the contrary, he quotes the U.S. intelligence community’s latest annual threat assessment report, stating, “Tehran will continue its efforts to counter Israel and press the United States to leave the region by aiding and arming its loose connection of like-minded terrorist and militant actors.” The United States, Levitt continues, should make every effort to leverage Iranian weakness and demand that Iran cease its support for terrorism and its human rights abuses. Otherwise, the U.S. risks a resurrection of President Obama’s Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which dealt exclusively with the nuclear portfolio. “Unless the president plans to capitulate to Iranian terrorism and unilaterally terminate all Iran sanctions, even without an Iranian commitment to cease sponsoring terrorism or engaging in other malign activities, then the same problem will face these new negotiations.”
March 2025
IDF changes since October 7 and Iran’s nuclear vulnerability.
Yaakov Lappin, “Israel Applying Lessons Learned From October 7,” The Jerusalem Strategic Tribune, March 2025.
Veteran military analyst Yaakov Lappin surveys corrective measures taken by the IDF since October 7, 2023. But first he discusses Hamas’ conception of the October 7 attack, reconstructing it from documents seized in Gaza. He then reviews the Jewish state’s operational and intelligence failures that enabled the attack. Proceeding to the crux of his essay, Lappin details “significant changes in IDF doctrine, particularly regarding rapid response capabilities and preemptive action.” At the practical level, a new air force command structure has been established with a view to real-time coordination between units on the ground and in the air. A “Participation and Borders Air Group” has been set up to undertake aerial surveillance of vulnerable borderlands, a force that works hand in hand with ground troops. Specifically to counter Hamas’ guerrilla tactics (tunnel warfare and urban entrenchment), “special forces units and frontline combat teams have undergone extensive training.” These and other reforms have found useful application as the war has worn on. The change in the IDF’s strategic doctrine has also been observable in recent months. As has been seen in Syria and Lebanon the past four months, the IDF’s post-October 7 commitment to pre-emption (forestalling aggression instead of responding to it) stands in stark contrast to Israel’s prewar passivity.
Majid Rafizadeh, “Iran’s Nuclear Programme and the Possibility of Military Action,” Al Majalla, March 29, 2025.
Iranian-American political scientist Majid Rafizadeh, whose sympathy for Israel and antipathy to the Islamic Republic are no secret, is a columnist for the Saudi-owned English-language magazine al-Majalla. In light of President Donald Trump’s ultimatum to Iran to halt nuclear enrichment and ballistic missile production or face possible military action, Rafizadeh casts an eye toward the future, exploring Tehran’s likely response as well as Israel’s and America’s possible rejoinders. He notes that Trump’s conditions are nonstarters for Tehran. Iran, after all, regards its nuclear capability as the regime’s lifeline: “Full nuclear disarmament is simply not an option for a country whose national security heavily relies on its nuclear capability.” For its part, Iran would prefer a return to an Obama-style nuclear accord. Rafizadeh then looks at America’s and Israel’s possible courses of action. Washington and Jerusalem seem to be in agreement about the urgency of a reckoning with Tehran over its nuclear program, Iran being closer than ever to achieving nuclear breakout capability. Rafizadeh observes, “If Israel were to take military action, it is almost certain that the US would provide logistical and intelligence support and possibly even direct military assistance.” Finally, Rafizadeh points out that in the event of an Israeli attack, Iran’s options for retaliation have narrowed such that Tehran could only attempt a small and face-saving, if operationally meaningless, counterattack.
February 2025
The findings of the IDF’s probes into the failures of October 7 and striking Iran while the iron is hot.
Emanuel Fabian, “Entire Gaza Division Was Overrun for Hours, and IDF Didn’t Know It; 767 Troops Faced 5,000 Terrorists,” The Times of Israel, February 27, 2025.
The Times of Israel military affairs correspondent Emanuel Fabian synthesizes the findings of the IDF’s reports on its failures on October 7, 2023. The recently completed reports are the products of months-long probes by the IDF’s Southern Command, Operations Directorate, Israeli Air Force and Israeli Navy. Fabian summarizes the accounts of the Hamas onslaught itself, noting that the invasion proceeded in three main waves, the first between 6:30 and 7 a.m., the second between 7 and 9 a.m., and the third between 9 a.m. and 4 p.m. All told, as many as 5,600 terrorists crossed into Israel, with the number of infiltrators dropping with each wave. Fabian then turns to the IDF’s costliest failures that day. He observes that the Gaza envelope was so woefully undermanned that dawn on October 7 found just 767 soldiers deployed in the Gaza perimeter. Then Fabian, on the reports’ authority, explains the IDF’s inability to reinforce its thin presence. He notes that the principal problem was the general staff’s lack of situational awareness. With the Gaza Division’s headquarters overrun by terrorists, the Southern Command and Operations Directorate could not gain a clear picture of what was unfolding. This opacity was made all the worse by a breakdown in command and control. Many company and platoon commanders were killed that morning, the Gaza Division’s Southern Brigade commander among them. Access was another obstacle. With roads blocked and terrorists lying in wait alongside them, thoroughfares and service streets became practically impassable. Intervening from the air presented difficulties, including distinguishing between terrorists and civilians. Also, with situational awareness so limited, the IAF faced many of the same problems as the ground forces, target prioritization especially. For instance, the IAF, on the mistaken assumption that tunnels were being used for cross-border infiltration, concentrated on destroying these passageways. Nor was the Israeli Navy prepared for Hamas’ seven speedboats when they attempted an amphibious landing. Naval patrols did take out five of the speedboats, but the terrorists on the two that avoided interdiction made it ashore and killed 17 Israelis on Zikim Beach.
Michael Makovsky and John Hannah, “No More Talk: It’s Time to Destroy Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Program,” Newsweek, February 3, 2025.
Scholars Michael Makovsky, the president and CEO of the Jewish Institute for National Security of America, and John Hannah, a lawyer and senior fellow at several eminent think thanks, make the case that the time is ripe for Israel to do what it has considered for almost 15 years: strike Iran’s nuclear facilities. Makovsky and Hannah contend that Iran has shown time and again that diplomacy is ineffective and Iranian good faith unthinkable, so military action is the only option to stop Iran from becoming the 10th country with a nuclear arsenal. They stress the urgency of an attack for several reasons. First, Iranian skies are more vulnerable than ever. Israel neutralized Iranian air defenses in its two attacks last year, leaving Iranian nuclear installations exposed, but it’s only a matter of time before Russia helps Iran restore its air defenses. Second, given the erosion of Iranian deterrence and the crippling of its proxies and clients — none more so than Hezbollah — Iran’s longstanding bid for nuclear weapons has gathered momentum. Meanwhile, if Iran’s willingness to obtain nuclear weapons has deepened, its ability to develop them has improved. “In a month, it could have 10-bombs’ worth of highly enriched uranium,” Makovsky and Hannah estimate. Another time-sensitive factor is the expiration October 18 of the provision of the 2015 nuclear deal that empowers Britain and France to institute “snapback” sanctions on Tehran. Makovsky and Hannah further argue that the United States should carry out the attack with Israel, given the greater earth-penetrating capabilities of American bunker-busting bombs. Failing that, Washington could provide Jerusalem with precision-guided weapons and aerial refueling tankers.
January 2025
The reasons for a cease-fire agreement and Trump’s options in response to Iran’s quest for nuclear weapons.
David Makovsky, “What the Israel-Hamas Ceasefire in Gaza Means for the Middle East,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 17, 2025.
David Makovsky, veteran Middle East analyst and the director of the Washington Institute’s Project on the Middle East Peace Process, analyzes the reasons that, after 15 months of fighting, a cease-fire deal was struck. He begins by detailing all the recent blows sustained by Iran’s “Axis of Resistance”: Hamas and Hezbollah have been decimated, the latter having withdrawn from the war in November; the Assad dynasty has fallen in Syria, replaced by a regime hostile to Iran; and Tehran’s air defenses have been neutralized and its ballistic missile production degraded. Makovsky then looks at the impact of Donald Trump’s imminent return to office. Seeing that Trump was intent on a cease-fire, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was determined not to defy the incoming president. Though less important, the same consideration likely influenced the two American allies that brokered the agreement, Egypt and Qatar. For its part, Hamas was not concerned about Trump’s good will, but the terrorist organization fears Trump more than it did President Jow Biden. That fear and the recognition that it would not get a better deal under Trump softened Hamas’ position. As for the Trump presidency itself, Netanyahu probably acceded to the agreement with an eye to the future. The specter of a nuclear Iran looms, and the prospect of a peace agreement with Saudi Arabia beckons, two things for which Netanyahu must be able to count on Trump’s help.
Michael Singh, “Policy Steps to Prevent a Nuclear Iran,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Notes 154, January 28, 2025.
In this study on Iran at the outset of the second Trump presidency, Washington Institute scholar Michael Singh combines analytical insights and policy prescriptions. As his point of departure, Singh calls attention to a striking paradox: While Iran has never been weaker, it also has never been closer to nuclear weaponization. The two premises of this paradox, though seemingly contradictory, are complementary because Iran’s weakness is accelerating its nuclear pursuit. Iran’s nuclear “breakout time” is now a week or less, down from the 3.5 months four years ago. Meanwhile, as Iran has made strides toward the militarization of its nuclear program, its cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency has dropped off. So has the regime’s messaging about the legitimacy of nuclear weapons. After years of declaring nuclear weapons contrary to Islam, the regime now says that acquiring such munitions would be a natural response to the threat Iran faces. Singh looks at Iran’s revised calculus as regards nuclear weapons. By obtaining these munitions, Iran would not only restore the potency it lost in 2024, but also heighten it: “The possession of nuclear weapons would dramatically enhance Iran’s deterrence. Any country confronting Iran directly would be risking not just regional war, but a nuclear exchange.” Amid Tehran’s march to becoming the 10th country to possess nuclear weapons, the Trump administration, Singh observes, would “be remiss not to consider, and indeed prepare seriously for, military strikes against Iran’s nuclear program.” Singh observes that preventing a nuclear Iran by diplomacy would be “less costly,” but the pitfalls of such a course, given the nature of the Iranian regime, would be considerable. That said, Singh writes that where Iran is concerned, diplomacy and coercion are not mutually exclusive, but synergistic.
December 2024
Assad’s fall is an unprecedented setback for Iran’s regional ambitions; one devout Egyptian Arab nationalist, Abdel Moneim Said, bemoans the state of the Arab state and acknowledges that for too long Arabs have blamed others for their own failure.
Majid Rafizadeh, “Biggest Blow to Iranian Power Since 1979: The Fall of al-Assad and Loss of Strategic Ally,” al-Arabiya, December 12, 2024.
Writing in al-Arabiya, Iranian-born Middle East scholar Majid Rafizadeh analyzes the implications for Iran of the fall of the Assad regime. Assad’s ouster is indeed a crushing blow to Iran, Syria having been Iran’s oldest and closest Arab ally as well as the central node in its “Axis of Resistance.” By way of Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, Iran boasted a continuous arc of territory between the Caspian and Mediterranean seas. For decades this land bridge was a crucial highway for the transit of Iranian weapons and personnel throughout the Fertile Crescent. It was through this corridor, moreover, that Iran pressed its 45-year offensive, through its proxies, Hezbollah most especially, against the Jewish state. The loss of Syria, in effect, severs this land bridge, depriving Iran of its resupply route to Hezbollah, its positions in Syria not far from the Israeli border, and its Syrian munitions factories and military installations. Besides its operational, logistical and military consequences, the end of the Assad dynasty spells a strategic defeat for Iran, representing as it does “the unraveling of Iran’s regional strategy.” Although the factions that ousted Assad are no friends of the Jewish state, the chief benefit of Assad’s ouster, as far as Israel is concerned, is that Iran has ceased to be — as al-Julani, post-Assad Syria’s foremost figure, put it — “a “playground for Iranian ambitions.” Rafizadeh doesn’t exaggerate when he proclaims the fall of Assad “the most significant blow to Iranian power in the region since the 1979 revolution.”
Abdel Moneim Said, “The Syrian Tragedy,” Al-Ahram, December 10, 2024.
“Syria is not alone in experiencing the recurring cycle of misery. We see it in other Arab countries whose national experiments failed to establish a cohesive state based on a common national identity, national culture, and geopolitical and economic interests. Arab intellectuals and thinkers still typically argue that all this disunity and fragmentation is the product of colonial era arrangements and territorial partitions, such as the Sykes-Picot Agreement. It is as though more than a century is not enough for that argument to have lost its efficacy. To some extent, the tendency to fall back on colonial machinations and the implantation of Israel in the region stems from the inclination to deny responsibility for the failure to build a nation state able to sustain the cohesion of the polity and flourish. For some time, the preferred alternative to that effort was to leap into the unknown by expanding the political realm to establish a single pan-Arab state or, for some, to resurrect the Islamic caliphate after the Turks renounced it. Perhaps people’s vision was too blurred to see a successful, sustainable, and undivided Arab national state with citizens who were not constantly at each other’s throats and without being overrun by jihadist groups or rapid support forces. The tragedy experienced by Syria and other Arab countries is, sadly, all too familiar. What we see unfolding today in our geographic proximity is heartrending, all the more so in the light of its historical precedents and the failure to remedy its underlying causes. There is always a scapegoat on which to lay the blame, whether Western colonialism in the past or Zionist settler colonialism in the present, so as to avoid facing up to responsibility for the root cause that has left Arab countries open to such constant attrition. This root cause is the absence of a modern nation state due to the inability to develop a shared national identity and a bedrock of common economic and strategic interests.”
November 2024
Reforming UNRWA’s and UNIFIL’s mandates and an infographic with commentary on Iran’s uranium stockpiling and enrichment.
Seth J. Frantzman, “If We Want Peace, UNRWA and UNIFIL Must Both Be Completely Reformed,” The Jewish Chronicle, November 27, 2024.
Since October 7, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) have increasingly come under fire for their complicity or, worse, their participation in attacks against Israel. Criticism of the two U.N. apparatuses is nothing new, but the flagrancy over their hostile acts against Israel since October 7 has raised a louder-than-ever outcry against them. In this piece for Britain’s flagship Jewish newspaper, Israeli-American analyst Seth Frantzman considers measures that could be taken to overhaul UNRWA and UNIFIL. Frantzman argues that serious reform must begin with changing the organizations’ mandates. UNRWA “needs to be mandated to report on Hamas’ criminal activities,” while UNIFIL “needs to fulfil its mandate and stop having its 10,000 soldiers sit behind walls and pretend Hezbollah doesn’t exist.” Frantzman notes that, far from reporting candidly on Hamas’ interdiction of humanitarian aid, UNRWA has repeatedly covered for the terrorist group. In its reports, it signally fails to identify the “unnamed looters” from Hamas who requisition aid. Not to be outdone, UNIFIL runs interference for Hezbollah by referring to Hezbollah terrorists who impede their work as “non-state actors.” This practice of anonymizing Hamas and Hezbollah terrorists must end, Frantzman insists, and their organizational affiliations must be recorded in official reports. Frantzman concludes, “It’s time for the international community to ensure the UN mandates in Gaza and Lebanon change. The UN needs to focus on preventing Hamas and Hezbollah rule. Only then can civilians live in peace in Israel, Gaza and Lebanon.”
“Will Iran Eventually Have a Nuclear Weapon?” Al Majalla, November 26, 2024.
The English-language, Saudi-owned weekly Al Majalla presents an annotated infographic charting the increase of Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium from 2015 to the present. The infographic tracks two increases in particular: the quantity of Iran’s total stockpile of enriched uranium and the grade of its enrichment. (For reference, 25 kilograms, or about 55 pounds, of uranium enriched to 90% purity is needed for one nuclear weapon.) The infographic shows that while Iran was a party to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action — the accord that President Barack Obama considered his foremost foreign policy achievement — its known stockpile of enriched uranium was not refined beyond 3.67%, the threshold stipulated under the agreement. Even after President Trump withdrew from the agreement in 2018, Iran enriched its stockpile only modestly. It wasn’t until President Biden took office that things changed. At the end of Trump’s first term, Iranian enrichment of its uranium stockpile stood at 4.5%. By the end of Biden’s first year in office, it had soared to 60%.
October 2024
A native Gazan describes Hamas’ efforts to prevent the evacuation of civilians, new revelations about UNRWA, and Israel’s first direct attack against Iran.
Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib, “An Uncomfortable Fact That Many Don’t Want to Acknowledge,” X, October 23, 2024.
Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, is no ordinary analyst. If being a native Gazan who comments in English on Palestinian affairs makes him unusual, being one who champions nonviolence and a two-state solution makes him extremely rare. In this 700-word op-ed posted on the former Twitter, he details the attempt by Hamas, from the beginning of the war, to hinder Palestinian civilians from fleeing northern Gaza. Not only were Gazans barred access to the tunnels into which Hamas fighters disappeared, but also their evacuation out of harm’s way was foiled. He quotes a Hamas spokesman who, early in the war, declared, “We cannot tolerate civilians leaving us alone to the Israelis.” Although it is well known that Hamas’ strategy is “to delegitimize Israel and high casualties which generate high pressure on the Israeli government to ultimately stop the war,” testimony to this effect from an insider like Alkhatib is no common occurrence. He further describes how Hamas “wanted to hide behind the civilian population, which was told not to leave and to ‘hold the land.’”
Benny Morris, “The Shifting Sands of War,” Quillette, October 28, 2024.
In this essay on Jerusalem’s first direct attack against Iran, Israel’s best-known living historian analyzes the operation and its consequences. Benny Morris opens with a detailed description of the aerial assault. The strike was executed by a 140-strong armada of F-15s, F-16s and F-35s. In three sorties spanning two hours, the Israeli aircraft struck 20 sites from the Persian Gulf in the south to Tehran in the north. The targets were of three main types: air defense batteries, military-industrial plants, and the Revolutionary Guard’s missile bases and depots. Seeing that the targets were all military, it would seem that Prime Minister Netanyahu acceded to President Biden’s pressure that Israel spare Iran’s oil infrastructure and nuclear installations. Morris then surveys the war, since October 2023, on the northern front. When Hezbollah began rocketing Israel on October 8, 2023, it began what Morris calls the Third Lebanon War. He notes that until September 2024, both sides showed restraint. Hezbollah didn’t lob rockets at Haifa or Gush Dan (the Tel Aviv metropolitan area), and Israel restricted its strikes to the southernmost of Hezbollah’s three main concentrations. Lebanon was a sideshow to the war in the main theater of conflict, Gaza. But the situation changed the past two months. Morris devotes the second half of this long-form piece to contextualizing the war in Israeli history.
Asaf Romirowsky, “History Shows Congress Made the Correct Choice in Cutting Off UNRWA Funding,” The Hill, October 23, 2024.
In this op-ed, Israeli scholar Asaf Romirowsky, a leading authority on UNRWA, considers recent developments in the scandal about the relief organization. Controversial since its founding in 1949, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency ostensibly sees after the welfare of Palestinian refugees throughout the Middle East. The organization has long been faulted for doing much to aggravate the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and never more so than since October 7. Since January, when it emerged that many UNRWA employees, most notably Hamas’ finance minister, participated in the October 7 massacre and abductions, the organization has been rocked by scandal. Romirowsky presents an update on UNRWA’s woes days after an UNRWA employee’s passport was found on Yahya Sinwar. Romirowsky observes that Israeli documents recently made public identify at least 440 UNRWA employees in Gaza as Hamas fighters and 2,000 more as registered members of the organization. More than half of UNRWA’s 13,000 employees in Gaza have immediate family members in Hamas. Romirowsky then looks at the American government’s inconsistent response to the exposure of UNRWA’s dubious deeds. While Congress passed an “unprecedented appropriations bill earlier this year that bans all funding for UNRWA,” the Biden administration has been less firm. President Biden not only supports restoring funding for UNRWA, but when the relatives of Israelis slain on October 7 sued UNRWA in federal court in New York for its complicity, the Department of Justice intervened on UNRWA’s behalf and filed a brief stating, “The United Nations is absolutely immune from suit and legal process absent an express waiver of immunity.”
September 2024
The intelligence behind Israel’s many recent successes in its campaign against Hezbollah; American support for Israel that’s qualified and conditional.
Mehul Srivastava, James Shotter, Charles Clover and Raya Jalabi, “How Israeli Spies Penetrated Hizbollah,” Financial Times, September 29, 2024.
This detailed article was published in the immediate aftermath of Hassan Nasrallah’s assassination. Written by four authors with insider knowledge and access to well-placed sources, the article traces the improvement of Israel’s intelligence-gathering related to Hezbollah. The article makes plain that Israel’s highly effective campaign of targeted assassinations against Hezbollah brass didn’t begin in July, when it took out Fuad Shukr, a senior commander; it was years in the making. It began after the 2006 Second Lebanon War, in which Israel fell far short of its declared objective to destroy Hezbollah. Israeli intelligence then underwent a conceptual change vis-a-vis Hezbollah. No longer would Jerusalem look upon Hezbollah as merely a band of well-armed guerrilla fighters; it would view the organization holistically, as a political party with, in many respects, a conventional army. But for Hezbollah as an organization and for Hezbollah watchers in Israeli intelligence, it was the terrorist group’s entry into the Syrian civil war on the side of the government that proved to be the crucial turning point. When Hezbollah deployed to Syria in 2012, it exposed itself to infiltration by Israel and afforded Israel a more complete picture of the organization’s operations: “who was in charge of Hezbollah’s operations, who was getting promoted, who was corrupt, and who had just returned from an unexplained trip.” Amid its participation in the Syrian conflict, Hezbollah needed more manpower, so it accelerated recruitment and brought into the organization recruits who would otherwise not have passed muster. At the same time, Hezbollah’s coordination with the Syrian army, long penetrated by Israel, meant that Israel’s intelligence pipeline to the Syrian military now extended to Hezbollah. Together with this human intelligence, Israel reaped a harvest of publicly available data because of Hezbollah’s participation in the Syrian civil war. Of particular value were “martyr posters” and social media posts reporting biographical details of dead terrorists and surveillance of mourners at fighters’ funerals. Technology was also enlisted by Israeli intelligence: “spy satellites, sophisticated drones and cyber-hacking capabilities that turn mobile phones into listening devices.” With all these facilities, Israel could zero in on Hezbollah members and create the vast target bank that allowed Israel to kill eight of the organization’s nine most senior military commanders.
Michael Oren, “Israel Must Battle the ‘But,’” Clarity With Michael Oren, September 23, 2024.
Michael Oren, the eminent historian and former Israeli ambassador to America, probes a newish trend in American discourse about Israel: the tendency of many on the left side of the political spectrum to qualify declarations of support for Israel. Oren observes that this support for Israel is not merely conditional; it’s impossibly conditional: “In many sectors of America — indeed, throughout the West — recognition of Israel’s right to self-defense and sovereignty is now subject to a number of conditions. Few, if any, can be met.” The irony here is that the American officials who stipulate these conditions will, often in the same breath, refer to the very obstacles that make fulfilling these conditions impossible. For instance, the Biden administration made clear its resolute opposition to an Israel offensive in Rafah while at the same time declaring American support for the eradication of Hamas. The snag, of course, was that these two things are irreconcilable. Similarly, the Biden administration has upheld Israel’s right to defend itself while deploring all the casualties inflicted in the process. How exactly Israel is to defend itself without collateral damage is, of course, not specified. Oren closes this brief op-ed with an appeal: “Israel must strive to eliminate those conditions and remove the asterisks above our rights to national liberty and life. While battling both Hamas and Hezbollah, Israel must wage war against the ‘but.’”
August 2024
Hamas’ diplomacy since October 7 and the importance of the Philadelphi Corridor.
Yossi Kuperwasser, “Israeli Presence on the Philadelphi Corridor Is Vital,” Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, August 22, 2024.
Throughout the 17 years of Hamas supremacy over Gaza, the Philadelphi Corridor, a narrow tract of borderland between Gaza and Egypt, had been the terrorist group’s lifeline. After each of the wars Hamas provoked with Israel between 2008 and 2021, Hamas needed to be resupplied; the dozens of cross-border tunnels traversing the corridor were its supply lines. On May 7, Israel seized this narrow belt of borderland, and the Israeli government, it would seem, has no intention of relinquishing it. In this astute analysis, Yossi Kuperwasser, former head of the Research Division of IDF Military Intelligence, stresses the strategic imperative of retaining control of the Philadelphi Corridor. In his judgment, not only ought Israel to field a detachment to secure the corridor, but it also ought to erect a barrier “similar to the one it built along the Gaza-Israel border. The IDF will have to be deployed along the corridor to ensure that the underground barrier, the aboveground wall, the monitoring of the Rafah crossing, and the other elements of the systems designed to prevent smuggling are functioning so that any infiltration attempt will be thwarted immediately.” Israel must learn from its past mistakes and not withdraw from the corridor, trust a third party to secure the border, and build an ineffective barrier. This means, more than anything else, using Israel manpower to secure the corridor and prevent smuggling. As Kuperwasser notes, there is “no substitute for a physical Israeli presence” in the corridor.
Aaron Zeilin, “Hamas Diplomacy: From Haniyeh to Sinwar,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Watch 3921 August 28, 2024.
In this rigorous analysis, Aaron Zeilin, a scholar of Islamism and a fellow at the Washington Institute, looks at the war Hamas has waged on another front since the October 7 massacre: the diplomatic front. Zeilin notes that in the past 11 months Hamas leaders have participated, online or in person, in 128 meetings with “foreign officials, political parties, local NGOs” and others. The representatives of 23 countries have met with Hamas since October 7. Talks with these and other interlocutors represent a significant increase in the terrorist organization’s diplomatic engagements since it committed the world’s deadliest terrorist attack since 9/11. While Hamas usually publicizes its diplomacy, it has, on occasion, kept certain parleys quiet so as not to cause political problems for its interlocutors. Such was the case, Zeilin notes, when Hamas opened a political office in Iraq in June. Iran, naturally, has been Hamas’ most frequent interlocutor since October 7. Next in line are two other Islamist regimes, those of Qatar and Turkey. Nor have Hamas’ diplomatic engagements been limited to Muslim countries. Zeilin notes that Hamas has been feted in South Africa — by no less a personage than Nelson Mandela’s grandson, a Muslim convert. Part of Hamas’ rationale for its diplomatic outreach is “to situate itself as the sole voice on Palestine.” Zeilin notes that, with the assassination of Haniyeh and Sinwar’s succession as politburo chairman, Hamas’ diplomatic efforts will slacken, given Sinwar’s confinement in Gaza and his preoccupation with the war.
July 2024
The Washington Post’s journalistic malpractice in its Israel coverage, preparing for long wars and reducing military dependence on the United States, and looking past Mahmoud Abbas.
Robert Satloff, “Anonymous Sources in Gaza War Reporting: The Washington Post vs. Its Peers,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Notes 151, July 29, 2024.
Media bias is an old and familiar problem in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but the coverage of the conflict since October 7 has thrown this bias into sharper relief. Yet, of all the papers of record in the United States, none has been as slanted and even mendacious as The Washington Post. The crimes against journalism on the part of the Post, a newspaper whose global opinions editor endorsed the October 7 pogrom, have been numerous: denying Hamas’ use of Gaza’s al-Shifa Hospital, criticizing the family of a hostage for not condemning the death toll among Gazans, reproducing Hamas’ casualty figures uncritically, falsely claiming Israel has a policy of separating families. The list goes on. In this study, Robert Satloff of the Washington Institute establishes that The Washington Post’s reportage has relied inordinately on anonymous sources. The Washington Institute assembled a database of 436 stories about the war in different outlets, and of these, “the Washington Post was responsible for 72 percent of all the citations of Gaza-related unofficial anonymous sources — more than five times as many as both the New York Times (8) and all the other major U.S. media platforms combined (8).” This is a major breach of journalistic ethics, which hold that anonymous sourcing is to be used only when there is no alternative for reporting essential information. Satloff finds that the Post compounded the problem of undue reliance on these sources by presenting their informants’ testimonies in a biased manner: “A detailed review of the Post’s Gaza coverage shows that more than 80 percent of the total were secondary subjects often providing a confirming quotation or color to complement observations from named sources.”
Yaakov Lapin, “A New Era of Long Wars,” Jerusalem Strategic Tribune, July 2024.
Veteran military analyst Yaakov Lappin considers the effects of Operation Swords of Iron on Israeli strategy and military doctrine. The era of lightning assaults on conventional armies is long over, and Israeli warfare needs to be revised accordingly. The solution, writes Lappin, is “balancing operational resilience and resource management while maintaining strategic agility.” In the matter of weaponry, Israel must enlarge its stockpile of munitions, boost domestic production and diversify its sources of ammunition imports. The Israeli Defense Ministry has taken a step in this direction, formulating a plan called “Independence,” under which Israel has increased its production of air-to-ground munitions and shells. Lappin opines that “domestic production will not be able to keep up with the rate of wartime usage. The key is to ensure that Israel can amass a substantial stockpile swiftly before the next lengthy war begins.” Lappin further observes that “the scenario of a drawn-out conflict with Hezbollah means Israel must also stockpile food, medicine, and fuel, and ensure that every sector of the economy can function, meaning that government planners must look beyond military affairs.”
Neomi Neumann, “What If Gaza’s ‘Day After’ Converges With the Day After Abbas?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Watch 3894, July 1, 2024.
Neomi Neumann, a former head of the Shin Bet’s research unit, considers the effects of October 7 and the ensuing war on the Palestinian Authority. She observes that Hamas’ successes have reinvigorated a flagging commitment to the “resistance agenda” among some Palestinians. The triumph of the PA’s rival has forced it to acknowledge that, if it wants to remain relevant, it will have to “continue taking confrontational steps toward Israel.” This is not to say that PA President Mahmoud Abbas will call for a third intifada. Rather, he will pursue other “potential avenues for provocation, including diplomatic moves abroad (e.g., promoting international recognition of a Palestinian state) and internal actions (e.g., reconciling with Hamas, calling for elections, and raising the possibility of integrating more Palestinian factions into the institutions of the Palestine Liberation Organization).” Since Hamas has shown that “resistance pays,” Abbas or his successor will have to reconcile with Hamas and reach a modus vivendi of some kind. Meanwhile, the aggression of Palestinians in the West Bank, the PA’s fiefdom, is mounting, the violence in the territory reaching its highest level since 2002.
June 2024
Interpreting Iran’s supreme leader.
Ben-Dror Yemeni, “Khamenei Is Leading Israel Like a Lamb to Geopolitical Slaughter,” Ynet, June 4, 2024.
Ben-Dror Yemeni, one of Israel’s most esteemed journalists, analyzes a recent speech by Iranian supreme leader Ali Khamenei. Yemeni laments Israel’s historical tendency to discount the hawkish declarations of its enemies. Instead of taking a sober look at this bellicosity, Israelis tend to dismiss it as saber-rattling bluster. He reminds his readers of Yasser Arafat’s notorious remark, at the height of the Oslo peace process, that the agreement was no more than a tactical cease-fire, not a peace treaty. He then adduces the more recent — not to mention more relevant — example of Yahya Sinwar’s 2018 vow to “rip the hearts of Israelis out of their bodies.” “It’s high time we truly listen,” advises Yemeni, and in that spirit, he unpacks Khamenei’s warmongering speech. Khamenei declared that al-Aqsa Flood (Hamas’ name for the October 7 onslaught) “came at the right moment to halt the regional power shift.” The supreme leader means, in Yemeni’s interpretation, that the massacre arrested Israel’s regional normalization, undermined Jerusalem’s relations with its Arab partners and “invigorated” Iran’s “Axis of Resistance.” Khamenei further declared that Iran seeks the “perpetual harassment” of Israel, the gradual erosion of Israel’s defenses, its morale and its international standing. Yemeni concludes by affirming that “Khamenei’s recent words underscore his intent to thwart this [Israel-Sunni Arab] alliance, isolate Israel, and fortify the resistance axis bombarding Israel from every direction. He meant every word.”
May 2024
Israel’s conceptual and operational mistakes leading up to October 7, the evolution of American Jewry’s response to the Hamas massacre and the war, and the folly of expecting Hezbollah to agree to disarm.
Amir Oren, “Gaza-lighting: How Israel’s Weakest Foe Became Its Worst Enemy,” The Jerusalem Strategic Tribune, May 2024.
This essay by Amir Oren, a celebrated Israeli journalist who writes on security and intelligence affairs, is an extended response to a question he asks at the outset: “How could it happen that Israel’s weakest enemy turned out to be its most lethal?” His short answer: “a grave failure of imagination.” Oren details what he calls Israeli “self-deception,” the complacent view that Hamas was a mere “nuisance” and a deterred one at that. This miscalculation relaxed Israeli vigilance, leaving the Gaza envelope poorly defended. With Israel’s underbelly exposed, Hamas was able to succeed “beyond Sinwar’s wildest dreams” by going all out. Moving from a conceptual to an operational analysis, Oren observes that once the era of conventional warfare between states ended, Israel allowed itself to go from being the formidable “air-and-armor lightning military machine of 1967” to a glorified police force — “a constabulary, an occupying force fighting terror and guarding settlements and roads.” A military focused on guard duty and counterinsurgency is not prepared for confrontations like the Second Lebanon War, let alone Swords of Iron.
David Schenker, “An Israel-Lebanon Agreement May Not Be Worth the Costs,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Watch 3868, May 14, 2024.
Veteran Middle East watcher and former Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs David Schenker turns our attention to the war’s northern front as he examines the prospects and the wisdom of an Israel-Lebanon agreement. Such an agreement, which the Biden administration has pressed for, would theoretically end the hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah. Whether such an agreement is possible, however, is another matter. Schenker, for his part, elaborates his view that an Israel-Hezbollah agreement is neither possible nor desirable, as Hezbollah would not accept nonbelligerency with Israel. The agreement under discussion is based on U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701, which ended the 2006 Second Lebanon War but did not end the Israel-Hezbollah conflict. Intended to correct the defects of Resolution 1701, the proposed agreement would “redeploy Hezbollah’s Radwan special forces seven to ten kilometers north of the border, close to but not necessarily beyond the Litani River,” and station “15,000 troops from the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) along the frontier.” The proposed agreement has several other provisions, but the foregoing are, arguably, its two most ambitious clauses. As expected, the draft agreement did not find a favorable reception on the Lebanese side. The obvious reason that Hezbollah is averse to such an agreement is that it contradicts its “articulated raison d’etre [of] fighting the Israeli ‘occupation’ of Lebanon.” Schenker speculates that Hezbollah will try to take advantage of the American push for an agreement by extracting concessions, most notably the installation of a Hezbollah ally as Lebanon’s next president. Thus, Hezbollah will win concessions without making any itself: “Hezbollah will not adhere to any deal Beirut reaches with Washington and Paris. The lesson from 2008 is that the group will pocket whichever provisions benefit its position at home and the interests of its sponsors in Iran while ultimately disregarding the rest.”
Steven Windmueller, “In the Wake of October 7: Reflections on the American Jewish Community,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, May 20, 2024.
Steven Windmueller, an expert on “Jewish communal studies,” analyzes the response of American Jews to October 7 and the war Hamas launched. He begins by asserting that history will remember October 7 as a turning point in Jewish-American experience, “a new moment in time for Jews in this country.” The Hamas massacre, he explains, has brought about “seismic shifts” in the world’s second-largest Jewish community, shifts that have transformed American Jews’ relationship to Israel, their political alliances, and “their way of being Jewish in a world that feels scarier, lonelier, and, in some surprising ways, more Jewish than ever.” He then offers a periodization of American Jewry’s response, discerning four distinct phases, each defined by an emotional state or a collective action: (1) trauma and shock (the first several weeks after October 7); (2) mobilization and unity (culminating with the demonstration in Washington on November 14, 2023); (3) questions and challenges (since the November 23-30 cease-fire); and (4) uncertainty and concern (some of the glue of unity is coming undone as the possibility of a wider war is on the horizon). While Windmueller identifies many challenges facing American Jewry (e.g., the surge of antisemitism, campus protests, demonization of Jews), he also sees opportunities for American Jews to strengthen their community. He notes that October 7 has prompted “significant numbers of non-affiliated and disaffected Jews [to] seek to reconnect with the Jewish people.” He asks, “Are we prepared to embrace these individuals?”
April 2024
Deterring Iran, the false equivalence between today’s campus protests and those in 1968, and Israeli public opinion on whether officials responsible for failures related to October 7 should resign.
Michael Eisenstadt, “Denial or Punishment? The U.S.-Israel Debate About How Best to Deter Iran,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Watch 3863, April 26, 2024.
Eminent military analyst Michael Eisenstadt considers the best means of deterring Iran. He proposes a combination of “denial” and “punishment,” defining the two concepts as follows: “Denial works by convincing the adversary that it will be thwarted, punishment by convincing the adversary that it will incur unacceptable costs.” Marshaling precedents dating as far back as 1987, Eisenstadt shows that Iranian aggression is halted only when it meets with forceful retaliation or a credible threat thereof. He observes that “U.S. attempts to deter by denial have often yielded to deterrence by punishment, as restraint frequently emboldened Tehran; by practicing both denial and punishment, Washington might more effectively deter and contain Iran.” He further notes — again citing history — that American concerns of escalation are misplaced: “The United States and Israel have sparred with Iran for decades without sparking an ‘all-out regional war.’” The dual deterrent strategy he advocates should be jointly pursued by the United States, Israel and the coalition of Iran’s Arab adversaries: “U.S. policymakers will need to overcome their debilitating caution and avoid disclosing Israeli activities that the latter has not acknowledged; Arab policymakers should be strongly encouraged to stay the course regarding their participation in the regional air and missile defense architecture created by CENTCOM; and Israeli policymakers will need to act with greater prudence to avoid provocative moves that could stoke U.S. fears of escalation and undermine its support for a more risk-acceptant deterrence strategy.”
Michael Oren, “A Page From the 1968 Playbook?” Clarity With Michael Oren, April 28, 2024.
Michael Oren, the celebrated Middle East historian and former Israeli ambassador to the United States, tests the accuracy of the oft-heard comparison of today’s campus protests with their antecedents in 1968. Oren contends that the comparison is facile, observing, “In multiple ways, the current unrest differs fundamentally from that of the 1960s. In fact, they could not be more different.” In the first place, the demonstrators in 1968 were anti-war, opposed to the tragic American misadventure in Vietnam, whereas the demonstrators of today are bloodthirsty militarists, as their sloganeering makes clear: “Globalize the intifada” and “Burn Tel Aviv to the ground.” The 1968 and 2023-24 demonstrators’ orientation toward racism is another salient difference. If the 1968 demonstrations were “about tolerance and love, today’s demonstrations are about racism and hatred.” The taunts directed at Jews by today’s demonstrators — “Go back to Poland,” for instance — cannot be understood other than as racist. Moving from the message to the messengers, Oren observes that in 1968 a great many of the demonstrators, not least the leaders themselves, were Jewish. In today’s demonstrations, in contrast, Jews are notably few. Oren does discern one signal similarity between the demonstrations of these two different eras: “The primary objective of both was, and remains, the radical alteration of American policy. Fifty-six years ago, they largely succeeded.” Whether today’s demonstrators will also succeed remains to be determined.
Tamar Hermann, Lior Yohanani and Yaron Kaplan, “Israelis Say the Time Has Come for Those Responsible for October 7 to Step Down,” Israel Democracy Institute, April 21, 2024.
In a recent survey, the Israel Democracy Institute probed Israeli public opinion on government responsibility for the failure to avert the October 7 massacre. The telephonic survey sounded out 514 respondents and found that a majority of Israelis believe that “those responsible for the failure of October 7” should resign without further delay: 58% of Jews and 81% of Arabs. Not nearly as many Israelis, however, regard holding early elections as a matter of similar urgency. Fifty-one percent of Israelis “agree that elections should be held before the end of 2024”: 68% of Arabs, 47% of Jews. Unsurprisingly, the Israeli right is not nearly as impatient for early elections as the political center and left.
March 2024
Hamas falsifies casualty figures, Israel sets a new standard in urban warfare, and Hezbollah uses increasingly advanced weaponry, suggesting an uptick toward a larger Israel-Hezbollah conflict.
Gabriel Epstein, “Gaza Fatality Data Has Become Completely Unreliable,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Watch 3851, March 26, 2024.
Gabriel Epstein, an analyst at the Washington Institute, astutely unpacks the methodology behind Hamas’ unreliable tally of war dead. He notes that in the first month of the war, Hamas relied on its usual collection system for casualty figures, aggregating the fatalities from hospitals, morgues and Red Crescent ambulances. But in early November, the exigencies of war forced Hamas to consult another and much less authoritative source: local news reports. The change came after the Israeli ground invasion, when hospitals in northern Gaza ceased to operate. The Hamas-run Gaza Ministry of Health announced its new methodology November 10; since then, most of the fatalities have been tallied according to gleanings from news reports. The shortcomings of this approach are many. The numerical total is less reliable when so calculated, and the demographic breakdown (e.g., men, women, children, combatant, noncombatant) is similarly flawed: “The repeated claim that 72% of the dead are women and children is very likely incorrect.” It is more than probable, Epstein observes, that the “media reports methodology significantly understates the number of men killed and may overstate the number of children killed.”
John Spencer, “Israel Has Created a New Standard for Urban Warfare. Why Will No One Admit It?” Newsweek, March 25, 2024.
John Spencer, urban warfare expert and co-director of West Point’s Urban Warfare Project, lauds Israel for setting “a remarkable, historic new standard” in balancing military objectives with humanitarian considerations in urban combat. Spencer singles out Israel for doing more than “any military in history — above and beyond what international law requires and more than the U.S. did in its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.” In fact, so attentive is the IDF to civilian welfare that its humanitarian precautions have often come at the expense of operational success. One such precaution is the IDF’s practice of announcing attacks in advance. While the IDF’s warnings allow civilians to move out of harm’s way, they also deny their attacks the crucial element of surprise. What is more, the warnings enable Hamas commanders, in preparation for an IDF assault, either to reposition themselves or to disappear into the tunnels beneath Gaza. These operational warnings only add to Israel’s inherent disadvantage of fighting an enemy that embeds itself among the civilian population, both in its fighting positions and its civilian mode of dress. Israeli appeals to civilians to evacuate combat zones have been variously transmitted —70,000 direct phone calls, 13 million text messages, 15 million pre-recorded voice messages, and drones outfitted with loudspeakers and parachute-borne amplifiers. A few weeks after Swords of Iron began, the IDF also instituted a complex map system, accessible by cellphone, which directs evacuees to safe zones.
Abraham Wyner, “How the Gaza Ministry of Health Fakes Casualty Numbers,” Tablet, March 6, 2024.
News outlets the world over have generally accepted without question the casualty figures of the Hamas-directed Gaza Ministry of Health. Sometimes references to the death toll are caveated with the explanation that the Gaza Ministry of Health is a part of the Hamas government, but the figures themselves are mostly accepted at face value. The eminent statistician Abraham Wyner casts doubt on the veracity of Hamas’ data, concluding that “the casualties are not overwhelmingly women and children, and the majority may be Hamas fighters.” Wyner observes several irregularities in the data. First, from October 26 until November 10, 2023, the death toll increased “with almost metronomical linearity.” The gradual, almost perfect cresting of the tally from this period shows “strikingly little variation. There should be days with twice the average or more and others with half or less.” Similarly suspect is the constancy with which the number of women and children dead rises during this period. What is more, woman and child casualties should correlate, showing similar spikes and dips, but they don’t: “Consequently, on the days with many women casualties there should be large numbers of children casualties, and on the days when just a few women are reported to have been killed, just a few children should be reported.” How, then, have casualties been reckoned? “Most likely, the Hamas ministry settled on a daily total arbitrarily. We know this because the daily totals increase too consistently to be real. Then they assigned about 70% of the total to be women and children, splitting that amount randomly from day to day. Then they in-filled the number of men as set by the predetermined total. This explains all the data observed.”
“Five Months of Hostilities on the Israel-Lebanon Border,” Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, March 17, 2024.
Analysts at the Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, a think tank close to Israel’s defense establishment, note a gradual escalation in the lethality and range of the armaments used by Hezbollah. In the war’s first three weeks, Hezbollah’s barrages consisted of “sniper fire, artillery and mortar shell fire, anti-tank guided missiles and rockets.” In November, Hezbollah began fielding drones, short-range ballistic missiles and double-barreled launchers to fire anti-tank guided missiles. January brought another escalation, and since then Hezbollah has deployed an array of advanced weapons. Hezbollah’s belligerent rhetoric and the reach of its salvos have increased correspondingly. Hezbollah has so far “carried out 959 attacks on Israel, using anti-tank guided missiles (266 attacks), Burkan heavy rockets (73), Falaq rockets (40), suicide drones (31) and surface-to-air missiles (6).” Despite these tactical and operational changes, the analysts maintain that Hezbollah’s strategy has been constant, and its “objective is to exhaust the IDF and force it to divert resources from the Gaza Strip to the northern border, part of Hezbollah’s aid to Hamas and showing its commitment to the ‘resistance axis,’ the ‘unity of the arenas’ and to preserve the organization’s balance of deterrence vis-à-vis Israel.” The analysts also give their assessment of the prospects that Hezbollah will withdraw to north of the Litani River, as required by U.N. Resolution 1701: “Hezbollah has no intention of giving up its control of the border when the war ends.” As for whether the ongoing exchange of fire could escalate into full-scale war, the analysts argue that Hezbollah is prepared to risk war with Israel even though Lebanese opinion opposes it. Accordingly, Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah has belabored “the claim that they do not want a war with Israel, but they are prepared for one, and if Israel starts a war, Hezbollah will retaliate without reservation.”
February 2024
Observations from a delegation’s recent tour of the Middle East, the essentials of reforming the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian co-opting of social justice advocacy in the United States.
Cory Gardner, Howard Berman, Dana Stroul, Ghaith al-Omari and Michael Singh, “From War to Peace? Trip Report From a Middle East Study Tour,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, PolicyWatch 3839, February 27, 2024.
This rapporteur’s summary (minutes of a meeting taken by a recording secretary) recaps the remarks of three scholars and two former members of Congress in the Washington Institute’s virtual Policy Forum on February 22. The five participants, fresh off a tour of the Middle East “to assess the prospects for security and peace in the current environment,” are former U.S. Sen. Cory Gardner (R-CO), former U.S. Rep. Howard Berman (D-CA), and Washington Institute senior fellows Ghaith al-Omari, Michael Singh and Dana Stroul. Gardner and Berman agree that, for now, Israel has no further care than to achieve its war aims. The two-state solution or diplomacy in pursuit of this objective is, as Berman notes, “out of sight for now.” Israelis, Berman further observes, “have no appetite to even consider the idea of Palestinian statehood.” The Israelis are similarly blasé about the idea of a reformed Palestinian Authority, al-Omari remarks, and “there is no appetite for the idea now.” Stroul, until recently the most senior civilian Middle East hand in the Department of Defense, analyzes the Biden administration’s response to the 180 attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria by Iranian proxies. She describes the administration’s strategy of retaliating with “strikes against Iran-linked facilities in Iraq and Syria, followed by operations targeting Iraqi militia leaders.” The results, she suggests, are zero-sum: a success in preventing full-scale regional war but a failure by not deterring Iran. The discussants do not detect much willingness on the part of the Arab states to make meaningful contributions to stabilize the region. Al-Omari notes that “no Arab state appeared willing to put in the hard work necessary for real PA reform,” while Gardner says that “although the Saudis are eager for the U.S. security umbrella that a treaty would provide, we heard very little about what they will provide in return.” Nevertheless, Singh notes that the Saudis “still view normalization with Israel as the price they must pay to reach a deal with Washington.”
Ghaith al-Omari, “Real PA Reform Requires More Than Just a New Prime Minister,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 27, 2024.
In the wake of the recent resignation of the Palestinian Authority’s prime minister and Cabinet, Ghaith al-Omari, a former PA adviser and a fellow at the Washington Institute, considers the prospects for reforming the authority. Since October 7, the United States, European Union and Arab states have all called for the ineffective, corrupt and unpopular PA to be reformed so that “Ramallah [can] play a role in humanitarian, reconstruction, and governance efforts in postwar Gaza and, ultimately, reassume control over the Strip.” Such reform is necessary not just for the administrative health of the Palestinian territories, but also because a better-functioning PA will recover some of the legitimacy it has lost and restore the willingness of donors to contribute to the regeneration of postwar Gaza. “International actors will be reluctant to get involved in transitional arrangements,” al-Omari says, “unless they are sure the PA is serious about building the necessary security capabilities.” To gauge PA reform’s prospects for success, al-Omari presents two allied questions to be asked during the reform: “First, will the new prime minister be empowered to undertake the necessary reforms?” For the answer to be affirmative, al-Omari argues that the new prime minister must command enough independence of action so that reforms can be undertaken without being sabotaged by those invested in the old, corrupt order. The true test of the prime minister’s independence will be answered by al-Omari’s second question: “Who will control the cabinet formation process?” If President Mahmoud Abbas and the Fatah Central Committee continue to exercise veto power over the prime minister’s appointments, then true reform will remain elusive. Al-Omari also wonders if the next government will be technocratic (i.e., manned by competent technical experts) or a “national consensus government” in which the appointees are chosen by different factions, Hamas among them. If Hamas is included, reform will be impossible, and if the next Cabinet is uniformly elderly, made up of veteran Fatah hands instead of the young guard, reform will be improbable.
Gil Troy, “How Palestine Hijacked the U.S. Civil Rights Movement,” Tablet, January 31, 2024.
Harnessing the insight that has made him one of Israel’s ablest historians of our era, Gil Troy analyzes the success of the Palestinian movement’s “gain[ing] a seat in the progressive sectarian tent by piggybacking off the historical experience of American Blacks.” Troy traces the origins of the Palestinian cause’s appeal to the American left and Black activists to the Soviet Union’s campaign in the 1960s to internationalize the Palestinian cause. The Soviets, Troy observes, sought to weaponize the Palestinian cause, deploying it in their propaganda campaign to hurt the West and court the Third World. The Palestinians are finishing what the Soviets started, in other words. Since, in the United States, no cause commands as much sympathy as that of Black Americans, “other identity groups keep trying to graft their victimhood onto the story of the Black civil rights movement to cement their legitimacy.” But only the Palestinians have succeeded to this end because “the Palestinian cause gets a free pass other movements somehow don’t merit.” Troy notes that “when the Black Lives Matter movement emerged, its activists policed any attempts to broaden their slogan to include other identity groups. Yet pro-Palestinian activists were allowed to appropriate the slogan ‘Palestinian Lives Matter’ and to embed themselves in an internationalized framework against ‘oppression’ that extends ‘from Ferguson to Gaza.’” Troy further notes that the vogue of the “grievance-based politics” in today’s America draws its roots from the “rise of identity politics in the 1960s and 1970s,” around the same time the Soviets’ anti-Zionist campaign began. Support for the Palestinian cause has become one of the orthodoxies in the creed of the progressive left, he maintains: “Since 2010 or so, when progressive Third World sectarianism became quasi-official ideology among all right-thinking people, the Palestinian cause has become increasingly central in left doctrine, bounding to the top of the American left’s ‘anti-racist’ agenda.”
January 2024
A prescient analysis of UNRWA’s institutional flaws, different scenarios for the postwar administration of Gaza, recommendations for preventing Hamas from regenerating after the war, and a sober look at Hamas’ priorities.
Alexander H. Joffe and Asaf Romirowsky, “Stop Giving Money to the U.N.’s Relief Agency for Palestinians,” The New Republic, August 18, 2014.
Reading this 10-year-old analysis in light of recent revelations about UNRWA, one cannot fail to be impressed by the foresight of the authors’ analysis of UNRWA’s defects and the wisdom of their suggestions for its reform. Joffe and Romirowsky begin by exposing Hamas’ connections to UNRWA laid bare in the 2014 Israel-Hamas war — namely, the repurposing of UNRWA schools into weapons depots and rocket-launching sites. They go on to say that, although the war brought the UNRWA-Hamas connection into sharper relief, the organization itself is fundamentally compromised, so much so that “UNRWA is effectively a branch of Hamas.” Indeed, most of UNRWA’s staffers in Gaza are members of the Hamas-linked trade union, and some are even fighters in Hamas’ ranks. Moreover, UNRWA schools are accessible to and used by Hamas, and their curriculum is shaped by Hamas. These and other abuses, Joffe and Romirowsky maintain, call for the top-down institutional form of UNRWA. First, UNRWA should be denied any role in the postwar arrangement for Gaza’s reconstruction. Second, because the U.N. General Assembly wouldn’t support the overhaul, much less the dismantlement, of UNRWA, Western donor countries ought to use their leverage to better advantage. Western diplomatic and financial pressure could “reprogram their funds, first by demanding that the PA take over UNRWA’s employees and responsibilities.” Although this would bolster the more pragmatic PA and weaken Hamas, Joffe and Romirowsky acknowledge that this plan is not without its flaws, foremost among which is that “the PA is monumentally corrupt.”
Jeremy Sharp and Jim Zanotti, “Israel and Hamas Conflict in Brief: Overview, U.S. Policy, and Options for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, January 11, 2024 (updated October 4, 2024).
This report by two scholars in the Congressional Research Service considers the Israel-Hamas war from the American perspective. After a summary review of the war up to the date of publication, the report looks at American involvement from a number of angles, including expedited arms deliveries to Israel, humanitarian assistance to the Palestinians, supplemental appropriations legislation, the oversight of American security assistance and the American response to the aggression of Iranian proxies. Of particular interest is the report’s commentary on different scenarios for Gaza’s postwar governance and security. It relates that if the differences among the United States, Israel and the PA can be resolved, a plan such as Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant proposed in early January could be carried into effect. This plan for civil administration in Gaza rests on three pillars: maintaining “Palestinian administrative mechanisms, with officials and local clans unaffiliated with Hamas”; affording “Israel broad responsibility to prevent security threats against Israel, including via coordination with Egypt at its border with Gaza”; and forming a multinational task force (with the U.S. and some European and Arab states) to regulate Gaza’s civil affairs and economic recovery. Gallant’s proposal could be carried out in tandem with a plan discussed by the U.S. and the PA under which the PA and the U.S. security coordinator for Israel could retrain 1,000 of the PA’s former Gaza security officers. To assist this initial tranche of security personnel reinstated in Gaza, 3,000 to 5,000 PA security forces could be redeployed from the West Bank to Gaza. Meanwhile, on the diplomatic front, negotiations between Israel and the PA could be renewed so as to smooth the obstacles to regional Arab participation.
Matthew Levitt, “How to Keep Hamas From Bouncing Back,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 9, 2024.
In a crushing blow to the terrorist organization, Israel assassinated Hamas’ most senior official based in Lebanon, Saleh al-Arouri, on January 2. Al-Arouri was the deputy chairman of Hamas’ Politburo, but his responsibilities were hardly limited to political affairs. He was also Hamas’ principal liaison with its foremost foreign sponsor, Iran, and with Iran’s Lebanese surrogate, Hezbollah. What’s more, al-Arouri, a co-founder of Hamas’ armed wing, was in charge of Hamas’ operational activity in the West Bank, in which capacity he helped orchestrate the casus belli of the 2014 Israel-Hamas war: the abduction and murder of three Israeli teenagers. In this analysis, Levitt, with characteristic acuity, considers the impact of the assassination on Hamas and the means by which Hamas can be kept from “bouncing back” from this and from the decimation of its forces in Gaza. Levitt draws on lessons from history to explain “the key to preventing Hamas from fully bouncing back after the loss of Arouri: namely, concerted action against the group’s support networks abroad.” He points out that it was this external support that allowed Hamas to recover from Israel’s 1989 arrest of 200 Hamas and Islamic Jihad operatives and its 1992 deportation of 415 members of the two groups. Yet, whereas “in 1992, Hamas had just a few core supporters within the Palestinian diaspora, today it enjoys various degrees of support from Iran, Qatar, and Turkey, as well as diaspora donors around the world, including in the West.” This is all the more reason for “the international community to work collectively to disrupt Hamas’ external channels of support.” Levitt cites several encouraging examples of American and Western attempts to crack down on foreign support for Hamas since October 7. For instance, the FBI has opened investigations into Hamas-affiliated individuals in the U.S. suspected of “raising funds or providing other material support to this designated foreign terrorist organization.” The Virginia Attorney General’s Office has initiated an inquest into American Muslims for Palestine, an NGO that may have violated the law by soliciting charitable contributions for Hamas. Another effort since October 7 that promises to hobble Hamas abroad is the formation of the Counter Terrorist Financing Taskforce-Israel, a collaborative body of European and Australian financial intelligence units aimed at disrupting “the flow of funds to Hamas and other terrorist groups.” These actions are “already yielding dividends,” Levitt observes.
Matthew Levitt, “For All That Changed, Hamas Is Still Hamas,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 22, 2024.
Levitt persuasively shows that in the 18 years since he published his landmark study of Hamas, the group has consistently defied expectations that it would moderate; nothing has dramatized the falsity of this idea more vividly than the October 7 massacre. Levitt observes that since his book was published, “Hamas experienced two transformational events”: its landslide victory in the Palestinian national elections of 2006 and its assault on Israel on October 7. These two events form the bookends of the moderation delusion, from its emergence in January 2006 to its discrediting in October 2023. After its 2006 electoral victory, Hamas, “faced with the choice of focusing on governance or militancy, … chose the latter.” But this was a choice Hamas made discreetly, not avowedly, so as to encourage the impression that it was open to an accommodation of some kind with Israel. Thanks to its deception campaign, “Hamas duped Israeli and Western officials into thinking it would not put its governance project at risk and therefore could be deterred.” But October 7 made nonsense of this idea, and, “in fact, October 7 was the war Hamas always wanted.” As was belatedly realized, an Islamist terrorist organization will not renounce its raison d’etre for the sake of better governance. In other words, the leopard, as the Book of Jeremiah advises, doesn’t change its spots.
December 2023
The surge of attacks against Jews in Europe, the miscalculations behind Israel’s pre-October 7 assessment failure, the reasons for quiet in the West Bank, and Hamas’s cynical use of civilian infrastructure in its war against Israel, support for a two-state solution plummets.
Matthew Levitt, “Addressing the Scourge of Anti-Semitism in Europe,” testimony to the House Foreign Affairs subcommittee on Europe, December 12, 2023.
Setting the contemporary context of European antisemitism, Levitt summarizes the number of antisemitic incidents in Europe since the October 7 slaughter of 1,200 Jews and others in southern Israel. He includes incidents across Europe and acts of Islamophobia. He recounts the rise in hate speech, use of symbols, threats, intimidation and violence. He cites right-wing extremist posts and calls for violence. He notes that Islamist groups “are by far not the only terrorist organizations to take advantage of October 7 to advocate for violence, hatred and racism. Far-right neo-Nazi groups began creating antisemitic propaganda within hours of Hamas’s incursion into Israel, drawing positive comparisons between Hamas and the Nazis and even creating a hybrid Palestinian-Nazi flag.” The spike in antisemitism in Europe has been dramatic, requiring vigilance and excellent intelligence gathering. European officials, Levitt says, acknowledge the intersection of antisemitism and terrorism in Europe, with more incidents anticipated to come.
Michael Milshtein, “Why Is It So Difficult for Israel to Decipher Hamas?” The Jerusalem Strategic Tribune, December 2023.
In one of the best, clearly stated and insightful summaries of the Hamas attack and Israel’s dramatic failures to understand Hamas’ intentions and ideology, Milshtein delves into the inability of Israeli and other analysts to understand Hamas ideological fervor. Milshtein suggests that Israelis grossly erred in wanting to believe that Hamas was and could be tamed. He cites the increasing willingness of analysts to subscribe to groupthink, as well as fewer specialists who read Arabic and are familiar with Middle Eastern political and religious cultures. This is an article that should be read and its suggestions ingested if mistakes like October 7 are to be avoided in the future.
Neomi Neumann, “Why a West Bank Front Has Not Opened So Far,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, December 13, 2023.
Neomi Neumann, a visiting fellow at the Washington Institute, probes the reasons that West Bank Palestinians have not opened a second Palestinian front despite Hamas’ repeated calls for them to join the fray. Citing statistics from Israel’s internal security service, Shin Bet, Neumann notes that Palestinians in the West Bank have committed some 150 terrorist attacks (“acts of violence that result in Israeli casualties”) since October 7. Yet, although the West Bank is seething with discontent, it has not blazed into rebellion, and, as Neumann argues, there is little prospect that it will. These attacks, far from increasing, have declined significantly since early November, a drop that Neumann attributes to “the killing of senior terrorists, the seizure of arms caches, the introduction of new combat patterns (e.g., aerial fire).” Moreover, some 2,150 Palestinians in the West Bank have been arrested, more than at any time since the Second Intifada. Israelis, however, are not the only ones maintaining order; the PA security forces, Neumann goes on to say, have prevented large-scale protests, justifying these interventions “by telling the public that it is protecting them from ‘trigger-happy’ Israel.” Neumann also mentions a restraining force that is not military or coercive but psychological; the “relative quiet” in the West Bank has been enforced by the memory of Israel’s suppression of the Second Intifada and of the high casualties it inflicted.
“Hamas Exploitation of Hospitals for Military-Terrorist Purposes: Shifa Hospital as a Test Case,” Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, December 12, 2023.
The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, a think tank close to Israel’s defense establishment, is well known for its exposure of Hamas’ and Hezbollah’s cynical use of human shields and civilian infrastructure in combat. This study draws on this expertise to analyze Hamas’ conversion of Gaza’s largest hospital, al-Shifa in Gaza City, into a command-and-control center. It details the specific ways in which al-Shifa, a government hospital administered by Hamas’ Ministry of Health, serves the Hamas war effort. Complete with photographs and satellite imagery, the exposé documents weapons stockpiles and ammunition depots in al-Shifa’s MRI suite. It also describes the tunnel network and shafts that enabled Hamas to circulate underground between buildings, escaping the notice of prying eyes. These tunnels, the center notes, were maintained with fuel and electricity diverted from the medical facility. The article broadens its focus beyond al-Shifa and the ongoing war, citing other hospitals in which Hamas is operating and other wars in which it has used the same modus operandi.
“Popularity for a Two-State Solution at All-Time Low,” Public Opinion Poll No. 90, Palestine Center for Policy and Survey Research, December 13, 2023.
The poll finds wide Palestinian public support for Hamas’ offensive on October 7, but the vast majority denies that Hamas has committed atrocities against Israeli civilians. The war increases Hamas’ popularity and greatly weakens the standing of the PA and its leadership; nonetheless, the majority of Palestinians remain unsupportive of Hamas. Support for armed struggle rises, particularly in the West Bank and in response to settler violence. The overwhelming majority condemns the positions taken by the United States and the main European powers during the war and expresses the belief that they have lost their moral compass. Support for a two-state solution among Palestinians and Israelis declines to just one-third on each side.
November 2023
Hamas’ long-term ambitions and anti-Israel indoctrination in academia.
Devorah Margolin and Matthew Levitt, “The Road to October 7: Hamas’ Long Game, Clarified,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, October/November 2023.
When Hamas took over the Gaza Strip by force of arms in 2007, it faced an ideological crisis. It could focus on governing Gaza and addressing the needs of the Palestinian people, or it could use the Gaza Strip as a springboard from which to attack Israel. Even then, Hamas understood these two goals were mutually exclusive. And while some anticipated Hamas would moderate, or at least be co-opted by the demands of governing, it did not. Instead, Hamas invested in efforts to radicalize society and build the militant infrastructure necessary to someday launch the kind of attack that in its view could contribute to the destruction of Israel. This article explores the road from Hamas’ 2007 takeover of Gaza to the October 2023 massacre.
Kenneth Stein, “Anti-Israel Activism in American Universities, Parts I and II,” Center for Israel Education (originally appeared in The Jerusalem Strategic Tribune), November 29, 2023.
The two-part essay identifies multiple reasons for the growth of anti-Israel sentiment on American campuses. It asserts that (1) both the Hamas massacres and the anti-Israel demonstrations reflect delegitimizing of Jews as a people, undercutting the legitimacy of Jews to constitute a state. Embedded in modern Arab and Muslim attitudes toward Zionism and Israel are 100-plus years of denigration, boycott and belittlement interrupted with significant yet transactional Arab acceptances of the Jewish state. (2) The public and scholarly realms have become increasingly abusive of Israel, acerbic toward her policies and vengeful toward her political leaders. (3) Campus teaching of the Middle East and Israel in the United States since 1967 has disfavored students’ broad learning about Israel except for studying Hebrew. (4) College professors and campus organizations have increasingly preached anti-Israel views to unsophisticated, apathetic and unknowing students. (5) Pre-collegiate learning about Zionism and Israel, for Jewish and non-Jewish students alike, is sporadic, often lacking in content and concept, and self-limited to less than half of American Jewish students between the ages of 5 and 18. The major takeaway is that the Jewish students going to American campuses today have minimal Zionist and Israeli education when they arrive as freshmen and have few opportunities to learn about Israel in the classroom where bias and prejudice do not dominate the discourse.
October 2023
The background to and progression of the Israel-Hamas war.
Jim Zanotti, Luisa Blanchfield, Jeremy Sharp, Cory Gill, Christopher Blanchard, John Rollins, Clayton Thomas, Rebecca Nelson, Matthew Weed, Liana Rosen and Rhoda Margesson, “Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs),” Congressional Research Service, October 20, 2023.
Describing reaction to Hamas’ October 7 attack on Israel, the report notes that analysts have described the PA as “wanting to see Hamas fail but unable to openly cheer for Israel.” A number of factors could affect how the conflict proceeds, including “Hamas’s motivation and timing,” Hezbollah’s role, and “Israeli leadership and domestic concerns.” An unnamed senior official addresses the first factor, “Hamas’s intention is to get Israel to retaliate massively and have the conflict escalate: a West Bank uprising, Hezbollah attacks, a revolt in Jerusalem.” This report’s sections focus on questions, such as “What is Hamas and who supports it?” and “Did Iran play a role in planning, directing, or otherwise enabling Hamas attacks?” Its scope covers not only Hamas and thoughts about Israel’s possible steps, but also the possibility of regional actors attacking, the scope of international responses and the factors Congress ought to consider.
More Readings, October 2023
Scott Abramson, “Maps of the Middle East and the Gaza Strip,” Center for Israel Education, October 14, 2023.
Gwen Ackerman and Marissa Newman, “Israel Taps Blacklisted Pegasus Maker to Track Hostages in Gaza,” Bloomberg, October 26, 2023.
Nidal Al-Mughrabi, “Israel Drops Leaflets in Gaza Offering Reward for Hostage Information,” Reuters, October 24, 2023.
Hadeel Al Sayegh, John O’Donnell and Elizabeth Howcroft, “Analysis — Hamas’ Cash-to-Crypto Global Finance Maze in Israel’s Sights,” Reuters via AOL, October 13, 2023.
Rafiah Al Talei, Nathan J. Brown, Yasmine Farouk, Mohanad Hage Ali, Amr Hamzawy, Zaha Hassan, Marwan Muasher, Sinan Ülgen, Maha Yahya and Sarah Yerkes, “Arab Perspectives on the Middle East Crisis,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 13, 2023.
Jon Alterman, “Hamas and Israel: The Current Situation and Looking Ahead,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 11, 2023.
Yara Asi, Imad Harb, Khalil Jahshan, Tamara Kharroub, Laurie King, Jonathan Kuttab and Yousef Munayyer, “The Hamas Attack on Israel: Context, Analysis, and Potential Repercussions,” Arab Center Washington DC, October 10, 2023.
Yaron Ayalon, Jonathan Rynhold and Kenneth Stein, “Israel’s 9/11: The October 2023 Hamas Attack on Israel,” webinar (52:29), Center for Israel Education, October 11, 2023.
Avner Barnea, “Analysis: How Israeli Intelligence Failed to Anticipate the Hamas Attack,” IntelNews, October 16, 2023.
Gil Bashe, “In the Face of Horror, Hope Is a Vital Mental Health Resource,” Medika Life, October 8, 2023.
Justin Bassi, “Israeli’s Intelligence Failure Could Be Worse Than in 1973,” The National Interest, October 13, 2023.
Stephen Battaglio, “Horrific Images From Israel-Hamas War Pose Challenges for TV News,” Los Angeles Times, October 12, 2023.
BBC Video Formats team, “Land, Air and Sea: Video Analysis Shows How Hamas Coordinated Huge Attack,” BBC, October 12, 2023.
Peter Beaumont, “Israel Attack Is Hamas Imposing Itself on Wider Middle East Diplomacy,” The Guardian, October 8, 2023.
Jordyn Beazley, “‘Israel Declares War’: What the Papers Say About the Surprise Hamas Attack and Its Aftermath,” The Guardian, October 7, 2023.
Ronen Bergman, Mark Mazzetti and Maria Abi-Habib, “How Years of Israeli Failures on Hamas Led to a Devastating Attack,” The New York Times, October 29, 2023.
Ari Blaff, “UNWRA Deletes Social-Media Post Accusing Hamas of Stealing Humanitarian Supplies,” National Review, October 16, 2023.
Yonah Jeremy Bob, “Ups and Downs of Northern Gaza Security Zone Strategy — Analysis,” The Jerusalem Post, October 24, 2023.
Anna Borshchevskaya, “Russian Policy and Hamas’ Assault: Putin Benefits From Chaos,” The Jerusalem Strategic Tribune, October 2023.
Elliot Cosgrove, Bret Stephens and Rachel Fish, “American Jewry and the War in Israel: What Do We Do Now?” video (1:23:45), Sapir Journal and Park Avenue Synagogue, October 20, 2023.
Ben Caspit, Daoud Kuttab and Andrew Parasiliti, “Israeli, Palestinian Journalists Preview Gaza War,” webinar (47:43), Al-Monitor, October 14, 2023.
Center for Preventive Action staff, “Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” Global Conflict Tracker, October 8, 2023 (updated March 31, 2025).
Andrew Chuter, “Britain Sends Spy Planes, Ships to Mediterranean Amid Israel-Hamas War,” DefenseNews, October 13, 2023.
Amichai Cohen, “The Case for a Lean, Unified Wartime Cabinet,” Israel Democracy Institute, October 11, 2023.
Amichai Cohen, “The Hamas Abductions and International Law,” Israel Democracy Institute, October 24, 2023.
Amichai Cohen, Eran Shamir-Borer and Mirit Lavi, “Operation Swords of Iron: The Decision to Go to War, in Theory and Practice in Israel,” Israel Democracy Institute, October 11, 2023.
Roger Cohen, “A Shaken Israel Is Forced Back to Its Eternal Dilemma,” The New York Times, October 8, 2023.
Stephen Collinson, “Israel’s War With Hamas Will Cause Deep and Wide Political Shockwaves,” CNN, October 10, 2023.
Tara Copp, “Here’s a Look at the Military Firepower the US Is Providing to Israel,” The Associated Press via DefenseNews, October 12, 2023.
Isabel Debre, “What You Need to Know About Hamas Air, Land and Sea Attack on Israel,” The Associated Press via DefenseNews, October 7, 2023.
Ami Tojkes Dombe, “If Hamas Was Indeed Aided by Iran — the Mossad Had No Clue: Analysis,” Israel Defense, October 10, 2023.
Holly Ellyatt, “Bloodshed, Destruction and a Far-Off Peace? There Are Several Possible Outcomes of the Israel-Hamas War,” CNBC, October 12, 2023.
Steven Erlanger, “Attack Ends Israel’s Hope That Hamas Might Come to Embrace Stability,” The New York Times, October 9, 2023.
Farnaz Fassihi and Ronen Bergman, “Hamas Attack on Israel Brings New Scrutiny of Group’s Ties to Iran,” The New York Times, October 13, 2023.
Jeffrey Feltman, Sharan Grewal, Patricia M. Kim, Tanvi Madan, Suzanne Maloney, Amy J. Nelson, Michael E. O’Hanlon, Bruce Riedel, Natan Sachs, Natalie Sambhi, Jaganath Sankaran, Caitlin Talmadge and Andrew Yeo, “The Israel-Gaza Crisis,” Brookings Institution, October 13, 2023.
Foreign Affairs staff, “Why Hamas Attacked — and Why Israel Was Taken by Surprise: A Conversation With Martin Indyk,” Foreign Affairs, October 7, 2023.
Seth Frantzman, “Israel’s Russia and China Policy in Spotlight After Hamas Attack — Analysis,” The Jerusalem Post, October 14, 2023.
Manisha Ganguly and Hibaq Farah, “How Israel-Hamas War Disinformation Is Being Spread Online,” The Guardian, October 11, 2023.
Judah Grunstein, “Hamas’ Most Damaging Blow Was to Israel’s Psyche,” World Politics Review, October 9, 2023.
Haviv Rettig Gur, “A Wounded, Weakened Israel Is a Fiercer One,” The Times of Israel, October 8, 2023.
Bruce Hoffman, “Israel’s War on Hamas: What to Know,” Council on Foreign Relations, October 9, 2023.
Bill Hutchinson, “Israel-Hamas War: Timeline and Key Developments,” ABC News, October 12, 2023 (updated November 22, 2023).
Philip Ingram, “Analysis: Is Hamas a More Sophisticated Force Than Israel Imagined?” Al Jazeera, October 10, 2023.
INSS Data Analytics Center, “Swords of Iron: An Overview,” Institute for National Security Studies, October 8, 2023 (updated April 9, 2025).
Michael Jacobs, Ken Stein and Scott Abramson, “Hamas-Israel Relations With Events, Statements and Previous Clashes, 1988-Present,” Center for Israel Education, October 14, 2023 (updated February 15, 2025).
Stanly Johny, “What Is Hamas, the Palestinian Militant Group?” The Hindu, October 10, 2023.
Stanly Johny, “What Are Israel’s Options After the Hamas Attack? Analysis,” The Hindu, October 12, 2023.
Yossi Klein Halevi, “The Reckoning,” The Atlantic, also free on Facebook, October 10, 2023.
Michael Knights, “Gaza’s Urban Warfare Challenge: Lessons From Mosul and Raqqa,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 13, 2023.
Zoran Kusovac, “Analysis: Why Did It Take Israel Three Days to Return to Gaza’s Boundary?” Al-Jazeera, October 11, 2023.
Zachary Laub and Kali Robinson, “What Is Hamas?” Council on Foreign Relations, October 9, 2023.
Tovah Lazaroff, “Is This Israel’s Moment to Re-Occupy Gaza? — Analysis,” The Jerusalem Post, October 10, 2023.
Brad Lendon, “How Does Hamas Get Its Weapons? A Mix of Improvisation, Resourcefulness and a Key Overseas Benefactor,” CNN, October 12, 2023.
Matthew Levitt, “The War Hamas Always Wanted,” Foreign Affairs, October 11, 2023.
Natasha Li and Jean-Luc Mounier, “From 1947 to 2023: Retracing the Complex, Tragic Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” France 24, October 11, 2023.
Joe Macaron, “Analysis: Why Did Hamas Attack Now and What Is Next?” Al-Jazeera, October 11, 2023.
Aaron Maclean, “Israel’s Outside-the-Box Options,” Mosaic, October 13, 2023.
David Makovsky, “The Trust Biden Built With Israelis Doesn’t Come With a Blank Check,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 13, 2023.
Kenneth Marcus, Alyza Lewin, Denise Katz-Prober and Mark Goldfeder, “The Hamas Atrocities and the American Campus,” webinar (57:45), Louis D. Brandeis Center for Human Rights Under Law, October 12, 2023.
Chris McGreal, “What Are the Roots of the Israel-Palestine Conflict?” The Guardian, October 13, 2023.
Bryan Mena, “Israel-Hamas War Risks Further Deglobalization and Inflation,” CNN Business, October 15, 2023.
Middle East Media Research Institute staff, “Special Announcement — The Hamas Atrocities Documentation Center (HADC),” Middle East Media Research Institute, October 15, 2023 (updated November 17, 2023).
Yasmine Mohammed, “Opinion: Many Palestinians in Gaza Hate Hamas. My Father Certainly Did,” CNN, October 19, 2023.
Katie Nadworny, “How Businesses Are Affected in Israel,” SHRM, October 23, 2023.
Moscow Times staff, “Israel-Hamas War Pulls Russians’ Attention Away From Ukraine — Analysis,” The Moscow Times, October 10, 2023.
Samia Nakhoul, Nidal Al-Mughrabi, Matt Spetalnick and Laila Bassam, “Analysis: In Striking Israel, Hamas Also Took Aim at Middle East Security Realignment,” Reuters, October 8, 2023.
Ed Nawotka and Nicholas Clee, “Frankfurt, Sharjah Book Fairs Impacted by Israel-Hamas War,” Publishers Weekly, October 15, 2023.
Nimrod Novik, “Nimrod Novik on the False Premises and Failure of Vision That Led to the Hamas Attacks,” The Economist, October 12, 2023.
David Patrikarakos, “Analysis: Hamas Cannot Defeat Israel. Israel Cannot Lose to Hamas. So Why All the Blood?” Jewish News, October 16, 2023.
Kali Robinson, “What Is Hamas? What to Know About Its Origins, Leaders and Funding,” Council on Foreign Relations via PBS, October 10, 2023.
Paul Pillar, “The Hamas Attack and the Failure to Understand ‘Intelligence Failures,’” The National Interest, October 12, 2023.
Kenneth Pollack, “A Big War That Won’t Inevitably Get Bigger,” Foreign Affairs, October 12, 2023.
John Raine, Emile Hokayem, Rym Monmtaz, Hazan AlHasan and Tom Beckett, “The Geopolitics of the Hamas-Israel War,” webinar (1:00:46), International Institute for Strategic Studies, October 13, 2023.
Barak Ravid, “Scoop: Israel Says It Found Hamas Files With Instructions for Making Cyanide-Based Weapon,” Axios, October 21, 2023.
Dennis Ross, “What Israel Must Do,” Foreign Affairs, October 11, 2023.
Grant Rumley, “U.S. Wartime Support to Israel: First Steps and Future Considerations,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 12, 2023.
Robert Satloff, Dennis Ross, Michael Singh and Patrick Clawson, “Hamas Attacks: A Turning Point for U.S. Policy — A Statement of Washington Institute Experts,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 13, 2023.
Robert Satloff, Ehud Yaari, Matthew Levitt, Neomi Neumann and Ghaith al-Omari, “The New Middle East: Hamas Attack, Israel at War, and U.S. Policy,” webinar (1:19:37), Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 13, 2023.
Robert Satloff, Dennis Ross and David Makovsky, “Israel’s War Aims and the Principles of a Post-Hamas Administration in Gaza,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 17, 2023.
Jonathan Schanzer, “The War After the War Between the Wars,” Commentary, October 12, 2023.
Assaf Shapira, “Emergency Governments in Israel: A Survey of Unity Governments,” Israel Democracy Institute, October 10, 2023.
Aditya Sinha, “The Mirage of Stability: How Hamas Attack Has Changed Middle East Geopolitics,” Firstpost, October 10, 2023.
Matt Spetalnick, Humeyra Pamuk and Simon Lewis, “Israel-Hamas War Upends Biden’s Two-Pronged Mideast Strategy,” Reuters, October 10, 2023.
Kenneth Stein, “Hamas Charter Totally Rejects Israel and Zionism” (español), Center for Israel Education, October 23, 2023.
Kenneth Stein, “International Voices Urging the Recognition of Hamas as a Legitimate Political Actor,” Center for Israel Education, October 30, 2023 (updated November 11, 2023).
Kenneth Stein, “Jimmy Carter’s Hamas Decade of Embrace,” Center for Israel Education, October 29, 2023.
Kenneth Stein, “Quotations From Hamas Sources Expressing Hatred for Zionism, Israel and Jews, 1988-2021” (español, Portuguese), Center for Israel Education, October 24, 2023 (updated May 6, 2024).
Kenneth Stein, “A Short History of Hamas” (español, Portuguese), Center for Israel Education, October 28, 2023.
Bret Stephens, “‘We Are Alone’: Reflections on the Jewish-American Response to October 7,” Sapir Journal, October 16, 2023.
Laura Strickler, “‘It’s Like Being Underwater’: What Israeli Soldiers Will Face Inside the Labyrinth of Hamas Tunnels,” NBC News, October 23, 2023.
Zhiyuan Sun, “Binance Freezes Hamas-Linked Accounts After Israeli Request,” Cointelegraph, October 10, 2023.
Fatma Tanis, “Why Hamas and Israel Reached This moment Now — and What Comes Next,” NPR, October 11, 2023.
Daniel Thomas, Jim Pickard and Heba Saleh, “Six BBC Reporters Taken off Air as Probe Launched Over Pro-Palestine Tweets,” Financial Times, October 16, 2023.
Times of Israel staff, “A 2016 Warning Drafted by Then-Defense Minister Liberman Predicted Hamas Onslaught,” The Times of Israel, October 30, 2023.
Times of Israel staff, “Ministry Proposes Moving Gaza’s Civilians to North Sinai, a Likely Non-Starter,” The Times of Israel, October 30, 2023.
Times of Israel staff and Jacob Magid, “US Said Concerned That Israel Lacks Achievable Goals for Gaza Op and IDF Isn’t Ready,” The Times of Israel, October 24, 2023.
Karl Vick, “A Former Israeli Intelligence Chief on Atrocities, the Coming Invasion of Gaza, and the Fate of Hostages,” Time, October 13, 2023.
Pierre Vimont, “Europe’s Moment of Powerlessness in the Middle East,” Carnegie Europe, October 10, 2023.
Cleary Waldo, Gabriel Epstein and Sydney Hilbush, “International Reactions to the Hamas Attack on Israel,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 11, 2023.
Selina Wang, “Israel-Hamas Conflict Tests Biden’s Foreign Policy Message Ahead of 2024: Analysis,” ABC News, October 9, 2023.
Robin Wright, “Israel May Decimate Hamas, but Can It ‘Win’ This War?” The New Yorker, October 9, 2023.
Michael Young, “Will Gaza Set the Middle East Alight?” Diwan, Carnegie Middle East Center, October 13, 2023.
Amy Zegart, “Israel’s Intelligence Disaster,” Foreign Affairs, October 11, 2023.
Neri Zilber, Shira Efron, Nimrod Novik and Michael Koplow, “Israel Under Attack,” emergency briefing (57:02), Israel Policy Forum, October 9, 2023.
CIE-Curated Hamas Reading List of Articles, 1987-August 2023
This 1987-2023 compilation covers important English-language articles, analyses and videos, providing valuable context and recent history of the Hamas-Israel conflicts.
We recommend these authors: Mathew Levitt, Meir Litvak, Devorah Margolin, Michael Milshtein, Ghaith al-Omari, Jonathan Schanzer, Rob Satloff, Kenneth Stein, Khalil Shikaki and Jim Zanotti.
2023
Gianluca Pacchiani, “Protests Against Hamas Reemerge in the Streets of Gaza, but Will They Persist?” The Times of Israel, August 8, 2023.
TOI staff, “Iranian, Hamas Officials Discuss Response to Upheaval in Israel — Report,” The Times of Israel, July 26, 2023.
Michael Oren, “When Israel Gave Hamas Something Worth Not Fighting For,” The Times of Israel, May 15, 2023.
Nidal Al-Mughrabi, “Analysis: Hamas Sees West Bank as Battleground With New Israel Gov’t,” Reuters, January 18, 2023.
Center for Peace Communications and TOI staff, “What’s Life Like Under Hamas? ‘Whispered in Gaza’ Offers Unique, Courageous Testimony,” The Times of Israel, January 16, 2023.
2022
Syrian Observer staff, “Syrian Islamic Council: Mufti’s Meeting With Haniyeh to Discourage Hamas From Normalizing With Regime,” The Syrian Observer, July 6, 2022.
Ido Zelkovitz, “Game of Thrones: The Struggle Between Fatah and Hamas for Political Hegemony in the Palestinian Authority, 2011-2022,” Institute for National Security Studies, July 2022.
Khaled Abu Toameh, “Hamas Wins Birzeit University Student Council Elections,” The Jerusalem Post, May 19, 2022.
Ramy Aziz, “Egypt, Israel, and Hamas: Opportunities for Progress in Gaza,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 19, 2022.
Yaakov Katz, “Hamas Doesn’t Need Sheikh Jarrah or Jerusalem to Start a War — Opinion,” The Jerusalem Post, February 17, 2022.
Khaled Abu Toameh, “Palestinian Online Campaign Blames Hamas for Gaza Misery,” The Jerusalem Post, January 29, 2022.
2021
Khaled Abu Toameh, “Hamas, PA Responsible for Crises, Say Gazans — Poll,” The Jerusalem Post, December 24, 2021.
Hillel Frisch, “Hamas Takeover of Gaza Killed the Two-State Solution,” Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security, December 23, 2021.
Kobi Michael, “Israel’s Moment of Truth in Dealing With Hamas?” Institute for National Security Studies, December 23, 2021.
Makram Rabah, “The Palestinian Refugee Camp Explosion Shows That Hamas Is in the Pocket of Iran,” Al-Arabiya, December 19, 2021.
Khaled Abu Toameh, “PA Steps Up Crackdown on Hamas, Islamic Jihad Members,” The Jerusalem Post, November 27, 2021.
Jonathan Schanzer, “The May 2021 Israel-Hamas War Was a Stress Test for Normalization,” Al-Arabiya,November 12, 2021.
Udi Dekel, “Hamas Has Its Own Logic. What Is Israel’s Logic?” Institute for National Security Studies, September 4, 2021.
Khaled Abu Toameh, “Fatah-Hamas Rift Deepens as Abbas Moves Closer to US, Israel,” The Jerusalem Post, August 31, 2021.
David Wurmser, “The Hamas War Against Israel,” Jewish Policy Center, Summer 2021.
Ambassador Alan Baker, “The Legal War: Hamas’ War Crimes and Israel’s Right to Self-Defense,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, June 3, 2021.
Alex Grinberg, “The Axis of Resistance After the Last Bout of Fighting — Hamas After the Latest Round: A Total Failure or an Advantageous Opportunity?” Reut Group, June 17, 2021.
Ido Levy, “How Iran Fuels Hamas Terrorism,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, June 1, 2021.
Grant Rumley and Neri Zilber, “A Military Assessment of the Israel-Hamas Conflict,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 25, 2021.
Sarah Feuer, “The Real Impact of the War Between Hamas and Israel,” The National Interest, May 22, 2021.
Dore Gold, “Hamas Is Acting as an Arm of Iranian Power,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, May 20, 2021.
David May and Jonathan Schanzer, “The Truth About Hamas,” The Washington Examiner, May 20, 2021.
Yohanan Plesner, “Israel Must Differentiate Between Hamas, Arab Riots — Opinion,” The Jerusalem Post, May 20, 2021.
Shoshana Solomon, “Israel’s Political Stalemate Impacts Economy More Than Hamas Rockets — Moody’s,” The Times of Israel, May 20, 2021.
Ghaith al-Omari, “Israel-Gaza Violence Means Biden Must Avoid Emboldening Hamas in Any Cease-Fire Deal,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 18, 2021.
Ben-Dror Yemini, “The Truth About the Hamas Terrorist Organization,” Ynet News, May 18, 2021.
Haviv Rettig Gur, “In Rocket War ‘for Al-Aqsa,’ Hamas Has Already Won the Palestinian Leadership,” The Times of Israel, May 13, 2021.
Katherine Bauer and Matthew Levitt, “Hamas Fields a Militant Electoral List: Implications for U.S.-Palestinian Ties,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 21, 2021.
Oded Eran and Yohanon Tzoreff, “Possible Rapprochement Between Fatah and Hamas: Is Israel Ready?” Institute for National Security Studies, April 5, 2021.
Ghaith Al-Omari, “If Palestinian Elections Proceed, Hamas May Have the Upper Hand,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 25, 2021.
2020
Gadi Eisenkot, “Israel’s Greatest Threat Is Not Hamas or Iran, but Political Infighting,” Ynet News, December 31, 2020.
Yohana Tzoreff and Kobi Michael, “A Discussion at INSS on Hamas-Fatah Reconciliation Efforts,” Institute for National Security Studies, October 15, 2020.
Jehab Harb, “Phased Policy Alternatives Between Reunification and Separation” for Hamas and the PA, Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, July 2020.
2019
Adnan Abu Amer, “How to Read Hamas’ Visit to Iran,” Al-Monitor, July 26, 2019.
Hillel Frisch, “Ahead of the Bahrain Conference, Hamas Casts Its Lot With Iran,” BESA Center, June 18, 2019.
Ehud Yairi, “Israel’s Armistice With Hamas, Growing Tensions With Abbas,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 24, 2019.
Yaakov Lappin, “Hamas Is Willing to Risk War to Avoid Economic Collapse,” BESA Center, March 10, 2019.
Yaakov Lapid, “Can Israel Defeat Hamas Without Toppling It?” BESA Center, February 21, 2019.
Michael Barak, “Civil War? The Rift Between Fatah and Hamas, as Seen on Social Media,” Moshe Dayan Center, Beehive Middle East Social Media, February 7, 2019.
2018
Seth J. Frantzman, “How Hamas Brought Israel to the Brink of Election Chaos,” The National Interest, November 16, 2018.
David Pollock, “New Polls Show Most Gazans Want Israeli Jobs, Not Hamas Mobs,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 29, 2018.
Hillel Frisch, “What Is the Right Strategy With Hamas: Make Concessions or Fight?” BESA Center, September 27, 2018.
Maj. Gen. (res.) Gershon Hacohen, “The Israel-Hamas Deal: Escape From Oslo,” BESA Center, August 28, 2018.
Giora Eiland, “What Do the Three Players Stand to Gain From the Gaza Ceasefire Deal?” Ynet News, August 19, 2018.
Yaakov Lappin, “A Failure at State-Building, Hamas Sticks to Military Buildup in Gaza,” BESA Center, July 23, 2018.
Maj. Gen. (res.) Gershon Hacohen, “Hamas’s Kite Terrorism: A Threat That Requires a Decisive Response,” BESA Center, June 20, 2018.
Amos Yadlin, “Hamas Incites Violence to Hide Its Own Shortcomings,” Ynet News, May 14, 2018.
Haim Ramon, “It’s Time to End Policy of Coexistence With Hamas,” Ynet News, April 13, 2018.
Daniel L. Byman, “Why Israel Is Stuck With Hamas,” Brookings Institute, March 19, 2018.
2017
Maj. Gen. (res.) Gershon Hacohen, “Fatah-Hamas Reconciliation: Resistance as an Expression of Faith,” BESA Center, December 5, 2017.
Muriel Asseburg, “The Fatah-Hamas Reconciliation Agreement of October 2017,” Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik Berlin, November 2017.
Yaron Schneider, “The Limits of Restraint: Hamas in Gaza and a Confrontation With Israel,” Institute for National Security Studies, October 30, 2017.
Ami Ayalon, Gilad Sher and Orni Petruschka, “Fatah-Hamas Reconciliation: Both a Challenge and an Opportunity,” Ynet, October 19, 2017.
Raphael S. Cohen, David E. Johnson, David E. Thaler, Brenna Allen, Elizabeth M. Bartels, James Cahill and Shira Efron, “Lessons From Israel’s Wars in Gaza,” RAND Corp., October 18, 2017.
Yoni Ben Menachem, “A Fatah-Hamas Reconciliation. Has Anything Changed?” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, October 3, 2017.
Avi Issacharoff, “Sick of Running Gaza, Hamas May Be Aiming to Switch to a Hezbollah-Style Role,” The Times of Israel, October 1, 2017.
Michael Segall, “Iran and Hamas Reconnect,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, September 25, 2017.
Kobi Michael, Liran Ofek and Gilead Sher, “Hamas: Toward Palestinian Reconciliation, or Abdication of Government Responsibility?” Institute for National Security Studies, September 24, 2017.
David Pollock, “The Palestinian Public’s Tough Choices: On Violence, Instability, Hamas, ‘Jewish State,’” Washington Institute for Near East Studies, June 27, 2017.
Raz Zimmer, “No More Palestinian Than the Palestinians: Iranians React to the Hamas Revised Charter,” Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Beehive Middle East Social Media, June 7, 2017.
Rasha Abou Jalal, “What’s Behind Abbas’ Recent Threats to Hamas?” Al-Monitor, May 15, 2017.
Udi Dekel, “Hamas’s New Statement of Principles: A Political Opportunity for Israel?” Institute for National Security Studies, May 14, 2017.
Shlomo Brom and Ofir Winter, “Israel and the New Leaf in Egypt-Hamas Relations,” Institute for National Security Studies, February 16, 2017.
2016
Khaled Abu Toameh, “Hamas, Palestinian Authority Target Journalists Ahead of Election,” Gatestone Institute, August 23, 2016.
Shlomi Eldar, “The Morning After: What Happens to Gaza if Hamas Is Toppled?” Al-Monitor, August 2016.
Grant Rumley, “Hamas Vows to Join Municipal Elections, but Obstacles Remain,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, July 19, 2016.
Efraim Inbar, “No One-Shot Solution to the Hamas Challenge,” BESA Center, June 30, 2016.
Nadav Pollak, “Hamas Is Testing Israel Once Again,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 22, 2016.
Hani Al-Masri, “Hamas Faces Bitter Options,” Middle East Monitor, March 29, 2016.
Amos Yadlin, “Past Lessons and Future Objectives: A Preemptive Strike on Hamas Tunnels,” INSS Insight, February 15, 2016.
2015
Ehud Yaari, “Hamas and the Islamic State: Growing Cooperation in the Sinai,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, December 15, 2015.
Uri Savir, “Israel, Hamas Negotiate, but Truce Still Far Off,” Al-Monitor, June 30, 2015.
Benedetta Berti, “Hamas’s Islamic State Woes,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 28, 2015.
Gabi Siboni and A.G., “Military Lessons for Hamas From Operation Protective Edge,” INSS Insight, May 21, 2015.
Yoram Schweitzer, “Hamas and the Islamic State Organization: Toward a Head-On Collision in the Gaza Strip?” INSS Insight, May 17, 2015.
Grant Rumley, “Hamas Triumphs in Election at Flagship West Bank University,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, April 23, 2015.
Avi Issacharoff, “Hamas Digs New Terror Tunnels up to, but not Across, Border,” The Times of Israel, March 25, 2015.
Ahmed Melhelm, “The Deepening Rift Between Fatah and Hamas,” Al-Monitor, March 20, 2015.
Orit Perlov, “Israel, Hamas and Hizbollah on a Collision Course: Undesirable yet Inevitable,” Institute for National Security Studies, March 16, 2015.
Khalil Shikaki, “Can Hamas Moderate? Insights From Palestinian Politics During 2005-2011,” Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, January 2015.
2014
Pinhas Inbari, “Hamas and Muslim Brotherhood Have Their Sights on the West Bank and Jordan,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, December 23, 2014.
Lt. Col. (ret.) Jonathan D. Halevi, “Hamas Embraces the Path of the Islamic State (ISIS),” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, November 30, 2014.
Grant Rumley, “Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood Seeks Help From Hamas,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, October 21, 2014.
Burak Bekdil, “Turkey’s Love Affair With Hamas,” Middle East Forum, October 19, 2014.
Lt. Col. (ret.) Jonathan D. Halevi, “Hamas Policy After Operation ‘Protective Edge,’” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, September 28, 2014.
Rami G. Khoury, “Shameful Hamas-Fateh Behavior Must Stop,” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, September 20, 2014.
Yaacov Amidror, “We Have to Be Prepared,” BESA Center, September 15, 2014.
Robert Satloff and Ehud Yaari, “Gaza and Beyond: The Arab-Israeli Arena in the Wake of the Hamas War,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 11, 2014.
Amos Yadlin, “Dealing With Hamas’ Military Force Reconstruction,” INSS Insight, September 11, 2014.
Ofra Bengio, “Meet the Kurds, a Historically Oppressed People Who Will Get Their Own State: While Hamas Fires Rockets, and ISIS Beheads Unbelievers, the Kurds Build the Second Non-Arab State in the Middle East,” Tablet, August 14, 2014.
Udi Dekel, “Is Israel Facing a War of Attrition Against Hamas?” INSS Insight, August 13, 2014.
Abdel Moneim Said, “Let’s Be Frank About Hamas and Gaza,” Al-Ahram Weekly, August 7, 2014.
Yoram Schweitzer, “After Operation Protective Edge: Hamas’ Sense of What It Achieved,” INSS Insight, August 7, 2014.
Ken Stein, “Hamas Doctrine: Detest Israel — Part III: Hamas — Principles for the Liberation of Palestine and Jihad Against Zionism,” The Times of Israel, August 6, 2014.
Ken Stein, “Hamas Doctrine: Detest Israel — Part II: On Israel and Israel’s Illegitimacy,” The Times of Israel, August 4, 2014.
Ken Stein, “Hamas Doctrine: Detest Israel — Part I: Hamas on Opposing Agreements, Negotiations, or Recognition of Israel,” The Times of Israel, August 3, 2014.
Eyal Zisser, “Hamas Lost Big,” Israel Hayom, August 3, 2014.
Jeffrey Herf, “Why They Fight: Hamas’ Too-Little-Known Fascist Charter,” The American Interest, August 1, 2014.
David D. Patrick, “Arab Leaders Viewing Hamas as Worse Than Israel, Stay Silent,” The New York Times, July 30, 2014.
Lt. (ret.) Dr. Jacque Neriah, “Egypt, Israel and Hamas — the Impossible Equation,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, July 27, 2014.
Michael Oren, “Israel Must Be Permitted to Crush Hamas,” The Washington Post, July 24, 2014.
Maj. Gen. (res.) Yaacov Amidor, “The War With Hamas: Decision Time Approaching,” BESA Center, July 24, 2014.
Irwin J. Mansdorf, “Unseen Scars of War: Psychological Consequences of the Hamas Attacks on the Israeli Civilian Population,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, July 20, 2014.
Udi Dekel, “Israel-Hamas: Conditions for a Stable Ceasefire,” INSS Insight, July 17, 2014.
David Pollock, “Gaza Public Rejects Hamas, Wants Ceasefire,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, July 15, 2014.
Shai Feldman, “Five Early Lessons From the Israel-Hamas War,” Crown Center for Middle East Studies, Brandeis University, July 14, 2014.
Jeffrey Goldberg, “What, Exactly, Is Hamas Trying to Prove?” The Atlantic, July 13, 2014.
Harel Chorev, “Hamas: Charting a New Strategic Course of Action,” Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, July 10, 2014.
Elliott Abrams, “Why Did Hamas Provoke a War?” Center for Foreign Relations, July 9, 2014.
Professor Hillel Frisch, “Hit Hamas Hard to Create a Different Strategic Balance Against Islamic Terrorism,” BESA Center, July 9, 2014.
Aaron David Miller, “Stay Home and Stay out of This Fight,” Foreign Policy, July 8, 2014.
Pew Research Global Attitudes Project, “Concerns About Islamic Extremism on the Rise in the Middle East — Negative Opinions of Al-Qaeda, Hamas and Hezbollah,” Pew Global, July 1, 2014.
Pnina Sharvit Baruch, “The Fight Against Hamas: The Legal Angle,” INSS Insight, June 27, 2014.
Neri Zilber, “Hamas on the Ropes,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, June 26, 2014.
Daniel Mandel, “Obama’s Outrageous Decision to Fund Hamas-Aligned Palestinian Regime,” The Algemeiner, June 8, 2014.
Ehud Yaari, “Hamas Opts for the Hezbollah Model,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, June 3, 2014.
Jonathan Schanzer, “Hamas Participation in Palestinian Government Likely Won’t Trigger Cut-Off,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, June 1, 2014.
Lt. Col. (ret.) Jonathan D. Halevi, “Palestinian Reconciliation and the Rising Power of Hamas and Islamic Jihad: An Iranian Windfall,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, May 14, 2014.
Adnan Abu Amer, “Hamas’ Abu Marzouk Says Recognizing Israel a ‘Red Line,’” Al-Monitor, May 13, 2014.
Shoshana Bryen, “Hamas Tells Israel, ‘No Hope,’” American Thinker, May 8, 2014.
Benedetta Berti and Shlomo Brom, “The Erosion of the Israel-Hamas Ceasefire in Gaza,” INSS Insight, April 6, 2014.
Adan Abu Amer, “Hamas, Jordan Probe Possibility of Better Ties,” Al-Monitor, March 31, 2014.
Ehud Yaari, “The New Triangle of Egypt, Israel, and Hamas,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, PolicyWatch 2193, January 17, 2014.
2013
Ehud Yaari, “The Call for Rebellion Against Hamas in Gaza,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, November 8, 2013.
Hanin Ghaddar, “The Marriage and Divorce of Hamas and Hezbollah,” Wilson Center, August 26, 2013.
Jonathan Schanzer, “How Hamas Lost the Arab Spring: After Drifting Away From Syria and Iran, the Movement Faces an Uncertain Future,” The Atlantic, June 21, 2013.
Julio de la Guardia, “The Emergence of Hamas as a Regional Political Actor,” El Cano Royal Institute, February 27, 2013.
2012
Whitney Eulich, “With Hamas’s Confidence Waxing, Khaled Meshaal Arrives in Gaza,” Christian Science Monitor, December 7, 2012.
Assaf David, “How Well Do We Know Hamas,” Molad, December 11, 2012.
Naomi Westland and Lia Tarachansky, “Israeli Army, Hamas Military Tap Power of Social Media,” USA Today, November 21, 2012.
Ulrike Putz, “Hamas Can Replenish Arsenal — If Egypt Lets It,” Spiegel International, November 20, 2012.
Nidal al-Mughrabi, “Analysis: Hamas Finds Cause to Smile Under Israeli Assault,” Reuters, November 18, 2012.
2011
Lucy Kurtzer-Ellenbogen, “Palestinian Reconciliation,” United States Institute of Peace, May 3, 2011.
Katherine Faley and Gisue Mehdi, “Iran-Hamas Relationship Tracker 2011,” Critical Threats, January 13, 2011.
2010
“Hamas: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, December 2, 2010.
Are Hovdenak, “Hamas in Gaza: Preparing for Long-Term Control?” Peace Research Institute Oslo, November 2010.
Mahmoud Jaraba, “Hamas and the Peace Process: Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 10, 2010.
Dag Tuastad, “The Hudna: Hamas’s Concept of a Long-Term Ceasefire,” Peace Research Institute Oslo, September 2010.
Daniel Byman, “How to Handle Hamas,” Brookings Institute (originally in Foreign Affairs), August 25, 2010.
Kerry Harris, Michael Adkins, Cody Curran, Katherine Faley, Laura Fish, James Gallagher, Patrick Knapp, Michal Toiba and Katherine Zimmerman, “Iran-Hamas Relationship Tracker 2010,” Critical Threat, June 16, 2010.
Are Hovdenak (ed.), “The Public Services Under Hamas in Gaza: Islamic Revolution or Crisis Management?” Peace Research Institute Oslo, March 2010.
“Mixed Views of Hamas and Hezbollah in Largely Muslim Nations,” Pew Research Center, February 4, 2010.
2009
“What About Hamas? Question Snarls Peace Bid,” NBC News, October 7, 2009.
Carl Brown, “Book Review of ‘Kill Khalid: The Failed Mossad Assassination of Khalid Mishal and the Rise of Hamas,’” Foreign Affairs, September 1, 2009.
Paul Scham and Osama Abu-Irshaid, “Hamas: Ideological Rigidity and Political Flexibility,” United States Institute of Peace, June 2009.
Kristen Chick, “Briefing: The Motives and Aims of Hamas,” Christian Science Monitor, May 13, 2009.
Charlie Szrom, “Iran-Hamas Relationship in 2008,” Critical Threats, February 18, 2009.
Jonathan Fighel, “Hamas, Al-Qaeda and the Islamisation of the Palestinian Cause,” Elcano Royal Institute, January 30, 2009.
Andrew Tabler and Simon Henderson, “Tough Choices on Hamas Prompt Arab Disarray,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 27, 2009.
“The Hamas War Against Israel: Statements by Israeli Leaders,” Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 18, 2009 (updated August 8, 2021).
Robert Ehrenfeld, “Where Hamas Gets Its Money,” Forbes, January 16, 2009.
Bernard Gwertzman, “Iran Supports Hamas, but Hamas Is No Iranian ‘Puppet,’” Council on Foreign Relations, January 7, 2009.
Alex Altman, “Hamas Leader Khaled Mashaal,” Time, January 4, 2009.
Floor Janssen, “Hamas and Its Positions Towards Israel,” Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael (academic paper), January 2009.
2008
Matthew Levitt, “Holding Hamas Accountable,” The Forward, December 31, 2008.
Anav Silverman, “Hamas’s Winning Media Strategy,” Sderot Media Center, December 30, 2008.
Jeffrey White, “Operation Cast Lead: Israel’s Assault on Hamas,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, December 29, 2008.
Jeffrey White, “West Bank Hardball: Fatah’s Offensive Against Hamas,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, December 9, 2008.
Mohammad Yaghi, “Reconciling With Hamas? Abbas’s Hedge Against a Failed Peace Process,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy (originally in the Los Angeles Times), June 18, 2008.
The Associated Press, “Hamas Offers Truce in Return for 1967 Borders,” NBC News, April 21, 2008.
Robert Satloff, “The False Hope of Embracing Hamas,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy (originally in the Los Angeles Times), April 21, 2008.
Matthew Levitt, “Carter’s Role in Legitimizing Hamas,” CBS News/Weekly Standard, April 16, 2008.
Robert Satloff, “The Hamas Dilemma: A Debate on Alternative Strategies,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 26, 2008.
Nidal al-Mughrabi, “Inspired by God, Hamas Fighters Battle On,” Reuters, March 4, 2008.
Matthew Levitt, “Hamas in the Spotlight,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 28, 2008.
2007
Haim Malka, “Hamas: Resistance and the Transformation of Palestinian Society” (book chapter), Center for Strategic & International Studies, December 28, 2007.
Mohammad Yaghi, “Hamas’s Authoritarian Regime in Gaza,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 13, 2007.
Nick Francona, “Hamas’s Military Capabilities After the Gaza Takeover,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy (originally in the Los Angeles Times), August 27, 2007.
Matthew Levitt, “Undercutting a Culture of Militancy: Designating Hamas Charities,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy (originally in the Los Angeles Times), August 8, 2007.
Matthew Levitt, “Hamas’s Hidden Economy,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy (originally in the Los Angeles Times), July 3, 2007.
The Associated Press, “Abbas Vows to Protect West Bank From Hamas,” NBC News, June 20, 2007.
Mohammad Yaghi and Ben Fishman, “Hamas’s Coup and the Challenges Ahead for Fatah,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, June 19, 2007.
Robert Satloff, “Hamas and the Second Six Day War: Implications, Challenges, and Opportunities,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, June 18, 2007.
Dennis Ross, “The Specter of ‘Hamastan’: More Must Be Done to Counter Islamist Gains in Gaza,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, June 4, 2007.
Khalil Shikaki, “With Hamas in Power: Impact of Palestinian Domestic Developments on Options for the Peace Process,” working paper, Brandeis University, February 2007.
Mohammad Yaghi, “Hamas’s Victory: From Gaza to Mecca,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 16, 2007.
Matthew Levitt, “Teaching Terror: How Hamas Radicalizes Palestinian Society,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 12, 2007.
Mohammad Yaghi, “Palestinian Public Opinion a Year after Hamas’s Victory,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 30, 2007.
Ghaith al-Omari, Mohammad Yaghi and Dennis Ross, “Hamas vs. Fatah: Is Confrontation Inevitable?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 22, 2007.
2006
Adam Davidson, “Hamas: Government or Terrorist Organization?” NPR, December 6, 2006.
Shimon Peres, “Israel’s War Against Hizballah and Its Battle Against Hamas,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, August 2, 2006.
Moshe Yaalon, David Makovsky and Dennis Ross, “Hamas and Israel: From Isolation to Confrontation,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, July 20, 2006.
David Schenker, “Syria, Hamas, and the Gaza Crisis,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, July 10, 2006.
David Makovsky, “How to Deal With the Challenge From Hamas,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 12, 2006.
Ben Fishman, “Funding Alternatives to Hamas,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 2, 2006.
Robert Satloff, “Hobbling Hamas: Moving Beyond the U.S. Policy of Three No’s,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 3, 2006.
Matthew Levitt, “Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 1, 2006.
Martin Kramer, “Power Will Not Moderate Hamas,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 27, 2006.
Michael Herzog, “Target Aid to Help Hamas Fail,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 8, 2006.
Patrick Clawson and David Makovsky, “Responding to Hamas’s Triumph,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 3, 2006.
Michael Herzog, “Can Hamas Be Tamed?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 1, 2006.
Robert Satloff, “Hamas Triumphant: Implications for Security, Politics, Economy, and Strategy,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 17, 2006.
Moshe Yaalon, “The Security Implications of a Hamas-Led Palestinian Authority,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 16, 2006.
Dennis Ross, “United States Must Focus on Getting Hamas to ‘Transform Itself’ and Accept Israel’s Right to Exist,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 15, 2006.
Alexandra Silver, “Hamas’ Leaders,” Council on Foreign Relations, February 8, 2006.
Paul Owen and agencies, “Hamas Sets Out Conditions for Peace,” The Guardian, February 8, 2006.
Dennis Ross, “Give Hamas Nothing for Free,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 5, 2006.
David Makovsky, “Keep Up the Pressure on Hamas,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 3, 2006.
Christopher Hitchens, “Suicide Voters: How Hamas Dooms Palestine,” Slate, January 30, 2006.
“Hamas: The New Political Force,” Al-Jazeera, January 26, 2006.
Robert Satloff, “Hamas’s Rise and Israel’s Choice,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 26, 2006.
David Makovsky, “Don’t Make Exceptions for Hamas,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 24, 2006.
2005
Meir Litvak, “The Anti-Semitism of Hamas,” Palestine-Israel Journal of Politics, Economics and Culture, December 2005.
Jamie Chosak and Julie Sawyer, “Hamas’s Tactics: Lessons From Recent Attacks,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 19, 2005.
Matthew Levitt, “A Hamas Headquarters in Saudi Arabia?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 28, 2005.
Michael Herzog, “A Wind in Hamas’s Sails: Palestinian Militants Gather Post-Disengagement Momentum,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 13, 2005.
David Makovsky, “Toward a Quartet Position on Hamas: European Rules on Banning Political Parties,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 12, 2005.
Matthew Levitt, “Undermining Hamas and Empowering Moderates by Filling the Humanitarian Void,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 7, 2005.
Ben Fishman and Mohammad Yaghi, “To Stay in the Game, Hamas Has to Play by the Rules,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, August 10, 2005.
Michael Herzog, “Encouraging a Tougher PA Response to the Hamas Challenge,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, July 28, 2005.
Matthew Levitt, “Palestinian Authority Minister of Economy Tied to Hamas?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 4, 2005.
David Makovsky, “A Multi-Pronged Strategy to Defeat Hamas,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 1, 2005.
Matthew Levitt, “Hamas and Islamic Jihad Clash Over ‘Media Jihad,’” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 1, 2005.
2004
Matthew Levitt, “Terror on the UN Payroll?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 13, 2004.
Matthew Levitt, “Indicting Hamas: By Disrupting Its Operations, Does the West Become a Target?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, August 26, 2004.
Matthew Levitt, “Shaykh Yassin and Hamas Terror,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 23, 2004.
Jeff Cary, “Hamas Ceasefire Proposal: Peace or Pause?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 16, 2004.
Matthew Levitt, “Shut Down Hamas,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 22, 2004.
Zohar Palti, “Advancing Palestinian Society by Weakening Hamas,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 21, 2004.
Matthew Levitt, “Hamas’s Political Wing: Terror by Other Means,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 6, 2004.
Matthew Levitt, “Hamas From Cradle to Grave,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 1, 2004.
2003
Matthew Levitt, “Turning a Blind Eye to Hamas in London,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy (originally in The Wall Street Journal, European edition), October 20, 2003.
Max Abrahms, “Terrorism Casts Pall on ‘Road Map,’” Washington Institute for Near East Policy (originally in the Los Angeles Times), August 14, 2003.
Shoshanah Haberman, “Between Hudna and Crackdown: Assessing the Record of Hamas Ceasefires,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, June 2, 2003.
Matthew Levitt, “Hamas Blood Money: Mixing Good Works and Terror Is No Formula for Peace,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 5, 2003.
Jonathan Schanzer, “The Challenge of Hamas to Fatah,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 1, 2003.
2002
Jonathan Schanzer, “Fatah-Hamas Relations: Rapprochement or Ready to Rumble?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, December 19, 2002.
Richard Sale, “Analysis: Hamas History Tied to Israel,” UPI, June 18, 2002.
Matthew Levitt, “Hamas: Toward a Lebanese-Style War of Attrition?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 26, 2002.
Seth Wikas, “The Hamas Ceasefire: Historical Background, Future Foretold?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 3, 2002.
2001
David Schenker, “Jordan and the Islamists [Hamas]: Unfinished Business,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, July 27, 2001.
Jacqueline Kaufman, “Islamic Palestine or Liberated Palestine? The Relationship Between the Palestinian Authority and Hamas,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, July 19, 2001.
2000
Reuven Paz, “Hamas’s Lessons From Lebanon,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 25, 2000.
Reuven Paz, “Palestinian Holocaust Denial,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 21, 2000.
1999
Nicole Brackman, “Clampdown on Hamas: King Abdullah Strikes Out on His Own,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 6, 1999.
Meir Litvak, “The Islamization of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict: The Case of Hamas,” Middle Eastern Studies, January 1998, with permission of the author.
1997
Rachel Ingber and Jonathan Lincoln, “A ‘Kinder, Gentler’ Hamas? Hamas Leaders on the Record,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 27, 1997.
Robert Satloff, “From Hebron to Har Homa to Hamas: The Chimera of ‘Reciprocity,’” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 4, 1997.
Jonathan Torop, “The Arafat-Hamas Rapprochement,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 21, 1997.
1993
Congressional Research Service, “Hamas: The Organizations, Goals and Tactics of a Militant Palestinian Organization,” Federation of American Scientists, October 14, 1993.
1992
Clinton Bailey, “Policy Focus: Hamas: The Fundamentalist Challenge to the PLO,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 1992.
1989
Lisa Taraki, “The Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) in the Palestinian Uprising,” Middle East Research and Information Project, January-February 1989.
