June 3, 1977
U.S. National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski writes a memorandum redefining the U.S. position on resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict. The memo follows President Jimmy Carter’s meeting with President Hafez al-Assad of Syria in May 1977 and reflects Carter’s desire to move Arab-Israeli negotiations forward.
Brzezinski is specific about how the administration interprets U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, whose protracted passage in November 1967 yielded a deliberately vague text. After Israel’s capture of East Jerusalem and the West Bank from Jordan, Sinai from Egypt, and the Golan Heights from Syria in the June 1967 war, Resolution 242 calls for “withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict.” But it does not say “the territories” or “all territories,” allowing room for negotiation over what land Israel should surrender for peace with its neighbors. The resolution also seeks “a just settlement of the refugee problem” without indicating what such a settlement entails.
As cited in the 1977-78 volume of Foreign Relations of the United States, Brzezinski’s memo aims to remove any uncertainty, and not in a favorable way for Israel.
The memo states: “We favor a comprehensive approach to peace based on full normalization of relations, withdrawal and security arrangements, and a homeland for the Palestinians. … Our policy is consistent with the framework provided by those UN Resolutions, but where those resolutions are imprecise on peace, withdrawal and the Palestinians, we have tried to be more specific. Although the UN Resolutions say nothing about open borders, trade, and diplomatic recognition, I believe that we have added a useful dimension to the diplomatic process by identifying these as necessary elements of peace. In the same fashion, by referring to a Palestinian homeland and compensation, we have elaborated upon Resolution 242 which merely calls for a ‘just settlement of the refugee problem.’ But we should be careful not to imply that those countries that have supported Resolutions 242 and 338 have also endorsed the more specific ideas that we have been exploring in the past several months.”
After the memo, Carter and Brzezinski continue to advocate for a “Palestinian homeland,” whose support Carter revealed in March. Carter’s team focused on Palestinian self-determination and refugee compensation.
Carter’s position irritates Menachem Begin, whose Likud was the leading party in the May Knesset election and who formally becomes prime minister June 20. Begin believes that the West Bank is part of the Land of Israel and is not open to Israeli withdrawal or foreign sovereignty. The Carter administration, which had not anticipated Begin’s election, did not understand his ideological commitment to the territories captured in 1967, particularly the West Bank.
Differences remain between Begin and Carter during Begin’s visit to Washington in July 1977, and despite the Camp David peace process and the U.S.-brokered Egyptian-Israeli treaty of 1979, Carter remains Begin’s adversary, straining the U.S.-Israeli relationship, until Ronald Reagan takes office in 1981.
