Hamas-Israel January 2025 Cease-Fire — Commentary and Implications
Romi Gonen is reunited with her family at Sheba Medical Center at Tel HaShomer on January 19, 2025, after 471 days in Hamas captivity in Gaza. (credit: Ma’ayan Tuaf, Israeli Government Press Office, CC BY-SA 3.0)

January 15, 2025, effective January 19, 2025

“Negotiations that take place not to reach a conclusion, but are undertaken to gain political credit, sustain positions in office, and obtain lots of cash are equivalent to giving gas in neutral.” — Ken Stein, January 19, 2025

On January 19, 2025, a Hamas-Israel war cease-fire agreement came into effect after a 15-month war that began October 7, 2023. The agreement is based on an Israeli proposal negotiated with Egypt, Qatar and Hamas, first publicly outlined by U.S. President Joe Biden on May 31, 2024, and voted on positively in U.N. Security Council Resolution 2375 on June 10, 2024. The text of UNSC 2375 follows this introduction, as well as a synopsis of the agreement, a list of questions that remain unanswered, and suggested materials to consult, providing multiple interpretations of the short and long implications of the agreement.

On January 17, 2025, Israel’s Cabinet approved the agreement by a 24-8 vote (general text published January 16, 2025, by The Times of Israel). The agreement was finalized through the cooperation of representatives of the outgoing Biden administration and incoming Trump administration in the period just before Donald Trump’s inauguration for his second term on January 20, 2025. 

UNSC Resolution 2375 contains proposed hostage-for-prisoner release timetables, with specific numbers, and cease-fire arrangements, including Israeli redeployment from specific areas in and around the Gaza Strip. The agreement includes the entry of 600 aid trucks per day and the return of displaced Palestinians to northern Gaza, with provisions made for temporary housing. An estimated 98 hostages remain under Hamas control; 251 were kidnapped by Hamas and other Palestinian militants in the terrorist attack on Israel on October 7, 2023. It is estimated that one-third of the remaining hostages are dead.

Hamas is required to release female hostages first over the first month, with three to be released first on January 19. In return, Israel is to release 50 Palestinian prisoners for every Israeli female hostage freed. The first-phase exchange of 33 Israeli hostages for Palestinian prisoners is scheduled to take place over 42 days, or until until March 3. Negotiations on details of the second six-week phase are due to begin on Day 16, or February 5. 

Suggested analyses through interviews and written presentations about the cease-fire agreement and speculation about Gaza’s future in the broader Middle East:

What is not known or remains unanswered:

  • Can the three phases of the cease fire actually be implemented?
  • Will Hamas give up all of its remaining Israeli hostages, or must it keep an unknown number as collateral for future negotiating purposes to sustain itself as the key voice in the Palestinian Arab national movement?
  • How and when will a postwar Gaza administration commence? Who will staff it and in what relationship with external donors and international organizations?
  • Can the debilitated, corrupt, and administratively inept PA be rehabilitated to play a viable and lasting role in a post war Gaza administration? 
  • Will Israel’s objective of destroying Hamas as a fighting force be realized? 
  • Will Hamas cede its autocratic rule in Gaza to another administration, retaining into the future its fiercely anti-Israeli and anti-Jewish outlooks?
  • To what degree were Egypt, Qatar, Hamas, Israel and others in the negotiating mix prompted to begin implementation of the first cease-fire phase just prior to the Trump administration’s arrival in office?
  • What influence did Israel’s decapitation of Hezbollah, decimation of Hamas as a fighting force, and the fall of the Asad regime in Syria, and destruction of Iran’s air defense systems,  prompt Israel to consider that its strategic deterrence was sufficiently restored to enter into the cease-fire agreement?
  • Can the Netanyahu government keep its parliamentary majority if Phases 2 and 3 evolve into a permanent end of the war? What impact will the agreement and the coalition’s maintenance have on pieces Israel’s agenda (judicial tinkering, draft laws, economic rejuvenation, and managing the Iran file?
  • How will adherence or non-compliance to the cease-fire agreement, if sustained into Phases 2 and 3, blend into broader Trump administration policies or initiatives in the Middle East vis-a-vis Iran, Syria, the PLO/PA, Israel, Saudi Arabia (including Saudi-Israeli relations) and beyond? 
  • Hamas entered a conflict with Israel four times previously. Each time a cease fire ended the fighting and portions of the Gaza Strip were refurbished, Hamas built more tunnels, rearmed itself in Gaza, continued to promote its genocidal outlooks toward Israel, engaged Iran and others in supporting its future. What part of this pattern or precedent will repeat itself in the months and years ahead?
  • After a brutal 15 month war, hostage taking,  and decades previously of Israelis and Palestinians not accepting the long term legitimacy of the other, the 1993 Oslo Accords notwithstanding, is it not deeply naïve to continue to believe that a hoped for but mythical two-state solution can be unfolded? For that to occur, let alone be implemented massive ideological and fundamental shifts must first take place with leaders and populations who truly want the conflict to end. Merely wanting a two-state solution to evolve, motivated by external drivers, will not make a hope a reality. Negotiations that take place not to reach a conclusion but are done to access political credit and lots of cash are equivalent to giving gas in neutral.

January 19, 2025, Hamas-Israel War Cease-Fire Agreement

Practical procedures and mechanisms to implement the agreement for the exchange of Israeli hostages and Palestinian prisoners and the return to a sustainable calm which would achieve a permanent cease-fire between the two sides.

1. Stage 2 preparations:

• The parties and the mediators’ objective are to achieve a final consensus to implement the May 27, 2024, agreement on the exchange of hostages and prisoners and return to a sustainable calm which would achieve a permanent cease-fire between the parties.

• All procedures in the first stage will continue in Stage 2 so long as the negotiations of the conditions of implementing Stage 2 are ongoing and the guarantors of this agreement shall work to ensure that negotiations continue until an agreement is reached.

2. Israeli forces withdrawal:

• Withdrawal of Israeli forces eastwards from densely populated areas along the borders of the Gaza Strip, including Wadi Gaza (Netzarim axis and Kuwait roundabout).

• The Israeli forces will be deployed in a perimeter 700 meters with an exception at 5 localized points to be increased no more than 400 additional meters that the Israeli side will determine, south and west of the border, and based on the maps agreed upon by both sides which accompany the agreement.

3. Prisoner exchange:

• The 9 ill and wounded from the list of 33 will be released in exchange for the release of 110 Palestinian prisoners with life sentences.

• Israel will release 1,000 Gazan detainees from 8 October 2023 that were not involved on 7 October 2023.

• The elderly (men over 50) from the list of 33 will be released in exchange for an exchange key of 1:3 life sentences + 1:27 other sentences.

• Avera Mengistu and Hisham al-Sayed will be released according to an exchange key of 1:30, as well as 47 Shalit prisoners.

• A number of Palestinian prisoners will be released abroad or in Gaza based on lists agreed upon between both sides.

4. Philadelphi Corridor:

• The Israeli side will gradually reduce the forces in the corridor area during Stage 1 based on the accompanying maps and the agreement between both sides.

• After the last hostage release of Stage 1, on Day 42, the Israeli forces will begin their withdrawal and complete it no later than Day 50.

5. Rafah border crossing:

• The Rafah crossing will be ready for the transfer of civilians and for the wounded after the release of all women (civilian and soldiers). Israel will work toward the readiness of the crossing as soon as the agreement is signed.

• Israeli forces will redeploy around the Rafah crossing according to the attached maps.

• 50 wounded military individuals will be allowed to cross daily accompanied by 3 individuals. Each individual crossing will require Israeli and Egyptian approval.

• The crossing will be operated based on the August 2024 discussions with Egypt.

6. Exit of ill and wounded civilians:

• All ill and wounded Palestinian civilians will be allowed to cross via Rafah border crossing, according to Section 12 in the 27 May 2024 agreement.

7. Return of unarmed internally displaced (Netzarim Corridor):

• The return is agreed based on the 27 May 2024 agreement, Section 3-a and 3-b.

• On Day 7, the internally displaced inhabitants will be allowed to return north, without carrying arms and without inspection .

• On Day 7, vehicles and any non-pedestrian traffic will be allowed to return north of Netzarim corridor after vehicle inspection, which will be performed by a private company which will be determined by the mediators in sync with the Israeli side, based on an agreed upon mechanism.

8. Humanitarian aid protocol:

• Humanitarian aid procedures under the agreement will be done subject to the humanitarian protocol agreed upon under the supervision of the mediators.

UNSC Resolution 2735

June 10, 2024

Adopted on a 14-0 vote with one abstention (Russia).

https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4051310?v=pdf&ln=en

The Security Council,

Reaffirming the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Recalling all its relevant resolutions on the situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question,

Underscoring the importance of the ongoing diplomatic efforts by Egypt, Qatar, and the United States aimed at reaching a comprehensive ceasefire deal, consisting of three phases,

1. Welcomes the new ceasefire proposal announced on May 31, which Israel accepted, calls upon Hamas to also accept it, and urges both parties to fully implement its terms without delay and without condition;

2. Notes that the implementation of this proposal would enable the following outcomes to spread over three phases:

(a) Phase 1: an immediate, full, and complete ceasefire with the release of hostages including women, the elderly and the wounded, the return of the remains of some hostages who have been killed, the exchange of Palestinian prisoners, withdrawal of Israeli forces from the populated areas in Gaza, the return of Palestinian civilians to their homes and neighborhoods in all areas of Gaza, including in the north, as well as the safe and effective distribution of humanitarian assistance at scale throughout the Gaza Strip to all Palestinian civilians who need it, including housing units delivered by the international community;

(b) Phase 2: upon agreement of the parties, a permanent end to hostilities, in exchange for the release of all other hostages still in Gaza, and a full withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza; and

(c) Phase 3: the start of a major multi-year reconstruction plan for Gaza and the return of the remains of any deceased hostages still in Gaza to their families;

3. Underlines that the proposal says if the negotiations take longer than six weeks for phase one, the ceasefire will still continue as long as negotiations continue, and welcomes the readiness of the United States, Egypt, and Qatar to work to ensure negotiations keep going until all the agreements are reached and phase two is able to begin;

4. Stresses the importance of the parties adhering to the terms of this proposal once agreed and calls upon all Member States and the United Nations to support its implementation;

5. Rejects any attempt at demographic or territorial change in the Gaza Strip, including any actions that reduce the territory of Gaza;

6. Reiterates its unwavering commitment to the vision of the two-State solution where two democratic States, Israel and Palestine, live side by side in peace within secure and recognized borders, consistent with international law and relevant UN resolutions, and in this regard stresses the importance of unifying the Gaza Strip with the West Bank under the Palestinian Authority;

7. Decides to remain seized of the matter.