(1 September 1967)
Arab League Summit Resolutions – 1967
The Khartoum Arab Summit Conference -August 30 – September 1, 1967
The 1967 Arab Summit conference was convened to demonstrate Arab solidarity after the dreadful defeat of Arab states at the hands of Israel in the June 1967 War. It was an opportunity for Arab oil producing states to commit funds to Jordan and Egypt whose militaries and economies were severely hurt by the war. The summit passed its famous resolution that there would be “no negotiations, no recognition, and no peace with Israel,” a commitment to the full rights of the Palestinian people, and agreement on annual financial support for Egypt and Jordan.” A decade later, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat dismissed the Khartoum ‘3 Nos,’ by meeting the Israelis at their parliament in November 1977.
In broader context, like the first Arab Israeli war in 1947-1949, the June 1967 War outcome did not evolve into a negotiating process aimed at ending the Arab Israeli Conflict. Twenty years earlier, Arab states chose war instead an accommodation with a Jewish political presence in Palestine, sanctioned by the UN’s suggested establishment of Arab and Jewish states with an economic union to be set up between them. As a result of the 1947-49 War and a result of the 1967 War, Arab territories were lost to Israel and additional large numbers of Palestinian Arab refugees fled the area of what was the original Palestine Mandate. Whereas the Arab loss of 1947-1949, came to be known in Arab historiography as the ‘nakbah’ or disaster, the Arab loss in the 1967 war came to categorized as the ‘naksah’ or set back. Whereas the end of the 1947-1949 War, the UN negotiated Armistice Agreements between Israel and Arab states (Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt), no similar negotiations evolved immediately after this war. After the 1947-1949 War, Arab states were devastated by Israel’s creation and the of Palestine; this loss to Israel was more devastating because the territorial losses to Israel were so vast. It was more devastating because Arab states were further away from ever from eradicating Israel. Twelve years after the Khartoum resolution of ‘3 no’s’ Egypt and Israel signed a peace treaty in March 1979. Immediately after that treaty was signed, Arab states met in desperation to offer Sadat the chance to take funds from Arab states if he would abrogate the treaty he just signed with Israel.
The attempted effort to ply Egypt with vast sums of money did not work. Sadat was committed to have Israel return Egyptian held Sinai to Cairo’s sovereignty, indicating that Egyptian land and Egyptian national interests could not be bartered for financial subventions. Well into the 1980s and beyond, the United States provided Egypt with much needed economic assistance, and Sinai was returned to Egyptian control.
The 1967 summit conference was a landmark in inter-Arab cooperation. The conference agreed to extend 135 million pounds sterling of annual economic aid to Egypt and Jordan, of which 95 million pounds would go to Egypt to make up for losses due to the closure of the Suez Canal and the loss of the Sinai oil fields. Jordan was to be given 40 million pounds to meet various commitments. Nothing was earmarked for Syria because it did not attend the conference. Saudi Arabia committed itself to contributing 50 million, Kuwait 55 million, and Libya 30 million pounds of the total sum. On the political side, Egypt’s President Nasir clarified his position as follows:
We must take two basic points into account when we deal with the subject of political action to remove the consequences of the aggression, namely military preparation, and economic resistance. There is no doubt that the decision made during the previous session on economic support will be of great help. We must also keep in mind that there is an agreement betweeen the United States and the Soviet Union to solve the problem along the lines of the draft text presented to the General Assembly. This is based on two major goals: an end to the state of war, and Israel’s withdrawal from the occupied Arab lands.
I hope it is clear to all of us that when we speak of political action this does not mean that we will take without giving in return. We should look into what we will give or, in other words, what we can offer.
The international situation is totally different from what it was in 1956. At that time, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to oppose the Tripartite Aggression. But now, in 1967, the Untied states and the Soviet Union have agreed on Israel’s right to exist. They have also agreed on ending the state of war.
Egyptian President Nasser added:
The political situation for us in Egypt has also greatly changed after today’s decision to support the confrontation states economically. The Americans thought we would surrender after six months, but this support will enable us to stand fast. Our situation in Egypt is very different from that of King Husayn in Jordan because Egypt can stand fast for a year or two or even more. We in Egypt can wait until we complete our military preparations, then we can take the only kind of action Israel understands, which is to liberate our land by force.
Therefore, I am not worried as far as the situation in Egypt is concerned, but frankly I am worried about the situation on the West Bank. At this point we should ask ourselves: Will the element of time in the case of the West Bank be in our favor or not? I personally believe that it will not be in our favor. We have to move quickly to recover Jerusalem and the West Bank with whatever means available to us at present, because even if we are a little slow, neither Jerusalem nor the West Bank will return.
Here we have to ask ourselves another question: Is it possible to recover the occupied land by military means? I think the answer is clear. This approach is not possible at present. Hence, we have only one alternative now, which is political action for the West Bank and Jerusalem.
The Khartoum Conference ended with the unanimous resolution for “no negotiations, no recognition, and no peace with Israel,” a commitment to the full rights of the Palestinian people, and agreement on annual financial support for Egypt and Jordan.
Ken Stein, August 29, 2022
Arab League Summit Resolutions, Khartoum
(1 September 1967)
League of Arab States. “Khartoum Resolution.” Resolution created at the Arab Summit Conference in Khartoum, Aug. 29- Sept 1, 1967, and it
was presented on Sept. 1, 1967.
The Conference has affirmed the unity of Arab ranks, the unity of joint action and the need for coordination and for the elimination of all differences. The Kings, Presidents and representatives of the other Arab Heads of State at the Conference have affirmed their countries’ stand by and implementation of the Arab Solidarity Charter which was signed at the Third Arab Summit Conference in Casablanca.
The Conference has agreed on the need to consolidate all efforts to eliminate the effects of the aggression on the basis that the occupied lands are Arab lands and that the burden of regaining these lands falls on all the Arab States.
The Arab Heads of State have agreed to unite their political efforts at the international and diplomatic level to eliminate the effects of the aggression and to ensure the withdrawal of the aggressive Israeli forces from the Arab lands which have been occupied since the aggression of June 5.
This will be done within the framework of the main principles by which the Arab States abide, namely, no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with it, and insistence on the rights of the Palestinian people in their own country.
The Conference of Arab Ministers of Finance, Economy and Oil recommended that suspension of oil pumping be used as a weapon in the battle. However, after thoroughly studying the matter, the Summit Conference has come to the conclusion that the oil pumping can itself be used as a positive weapon, since oil is an Arab resource which can be used to strengthen the economy of the Arab States directly affected by the aggression, so that these States will be able to stand firm in the battle. The Conference has, therefore, decided to resume the pumping of oil, since oil is a positive Arab resource that can be used in the service of Arab goals. It can contribute to the efforts to enable those Arab States which were exposed to the aggression and thereby lost economic resources to stand firm and eliminate the effects of the aggression. The oil-producing States have, in fact, participated in the efforts to enable the States affected by the aggression to stand firm in the face of any economic pressure.
The Participants in the Conference have approved the plan proposed by Kuwait to set up an Arab Economic and Social Development Fund based on the recommendation of the Baghdad Conference of Arab Ministers of Finance, Economy and Oil.
The Participants have agreed on the need to adopt the necessary measures to strengthen military preparation to face all eventualities.
The Conference has decided to expedite the elimination of foreign bases in the Arab States.
1. In June 2007, forty years after the war, the Egyptian Al-Ahram Weekly On-Line, (June 7-13, 2007) published half a dozen articles probing into the reasons for the losses from the War, what happened, who was responsible, and were there issued beyond military incompetence that were detailed thoroughly in the first 100 pages of Egyptian Field Marshall Mohamed Abdel Ghani El-Gamasy’s The October War Memoirs, Cairo, American University of Cairo Press, 1989; See also, Mira Tzoreff, “Remembering the June 1967 War After Fifty Years: The Egyptian Version,” MDC, Tel Aviv University. July 2017.