November 28, 1947
Source: “The Consequences of the Partition in Palestine,” Central Intelligence Agency estimate, November 28, 1947, Washington, D.C.
The CIA estimate of contemporary and coming issues was half-right and half wrong. It was issued the day before the U.N. General Assembly vote on the partition of Palestine into two states with an economic union between them and the internationalization of Jerusalem. In the strongest possible terms, the CIA estimate supported and confirmed the September 1947 view of Loy Henderson, the director of Near Eastern affairs at the U.S. State Department, that U.S. support of a Jewish state in Palestine would alienate Arab countries and, as reiterated by George Kennan, the director of policy planning at the State Department, in February 1948, that American Middle Eastern interests would be irrevocably jeopardized if a Jewish state came into being. The CIA warned of the deep negative reaction among Arab populations across Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Palestine, Transjordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia because they are “inflamed by nationalism and religious fervor and are prepared to fight against the Jewish state’s establishment.” The estimate overstated the presence of religious fervor!
It said, “The US, by backing partition, faces a loss of prestige throughout the Arab world. Arab hostility could jeopardize US strategic interests, including oil pipelines, concessions, air agreements, and broader economic initiatives vital for regional stability. Rising poverty and instability could foster the spread of Soviet influence, with Communist agents already infiltrating the region disguised as Jewish displaced persons. Should the UN enforce partition, it may further strain US-Arab relations and inflame US-Soviet tensions. Arab nationalism, religious zealotry, and tribal militarism pose significant challenges, and Arab states are united in rejecting partition. Although reluctant to completely sever ties with the UN, the Arab world’s growing animosity toward the US could have profound and lasting consequences.”
The estimate did not go as far as the State Department prediction that a dramatic, rapid Jewish loss would force the United States to send troops to Palestine to save the Jews. Instead, the CIA estimated that “although Arab governments may not officially declare war, they are unlikely to restrain their citizens and may clandestinely support them. Arab forces, composed of guerrilla fighters and tribal groups, could field between 100,000 and 200,000 combatants. The Jewish community, committed to establishing a state, plans to mobilize around 200,000 fighters, well-trained and well-armed, and initially will likely dominate due to better organization.”
The CIA estimated that Jewish supply lines and economic sustainability would be critically strained by persistent Arab guerrilla attacks. Without significant foreign aid, Jewish forces were projected to hold out no more than two years.
As it turned out, the Zionists and Israelis acquired weapons in 1948 and 1949 from multiple Eastern European markets, and the CIA overestimated Arab military capacities in concluding that the Arabs possessed advantages in guerrilla tactics and terrain familiarity that would enable them to sabotage the Jewish economy. The estimate praised the Arab intelligence network, bolstered by telecommunications and aerial reconnaissance, and said the significant Arab population within the proposed Jewish state posed an internal threat.
While the Palestinian population could have created massive problems for the young Israeli forces, many fled for numerous reasons, including fear and instructions by their leaders to vacate lands so that Arab armies would have an easier time preventing the Zionists from controlling additional areas.
The CIA estimate joined the State Department views in demonstrating a genuine fear of losing access to Middle Eastern oil as a result of Palestine’s partition and the establishment of a Jewish state. Well into the 1970s, a few State Department officials maintained a staunch view that any policy leaning toward Israel would jeopardize present and future relations with Arab states. Indeed, the five-month Arab oil embargo against the United States for providing massive military supply to Israel during the October 1973 war did cause considerable harm to the American economy.
The fear of Arab states walking away from positive U.S. relationships because of Washington’s strong support for Israel’s sovereignty and defense dissipated during the 1979-2000 period where six Arab states recognized Israel. Whereas the State Department and CIA feared massive negative consequences from U.S. support for Zionism in 1947-1948, now the strong Israel-U.S. relationship appeals to many Arab states, which see joining that alliance as vital for the preservation of their respective national interests.
— Ken Stein, April 29, 2025