July 2024
Source:For the original please see https://dayan.org/he/content/6302
This proposal for the “morning after in Gaza” was produced at Tel Aviv University’s Moshe Dayan Center, in July 2024 – Key to future governance for both the Gaza Strip and southern Lebanon is how quickly human services and semblance of a reconstituted administrative order will evolve before a political vacuum is filled by reconstituted armed militias. Opponents of Israel who might be wearing different external clothing, but whose purposes will remain to threaten Israel for the purpose of rebuilding their military might. For some this proposal contains an over abundance of optimistic outcomes. All credit for this proposal belongs to the authors.
Ken Stein, October 15, 2024
1. Total defeat is a prerequisite for successful transformation and rehabilitation. Historical experience shows that without total defeat—meaning the cessation of fighting, dismantling of military capabilities, and the removal of murderous governance—there is no point in attempting deradicalization, system rehabilitation, and building new governance infrastructures. Rehabilitation under fire is doomed to fail. In the case of Hamas, total defeat means dismantling its terror army, as well as its governing capabilities, to a non-threatening level of functionality. The extent of this should be determined by the security apparatus in accordance with developments on the ground and could include, among other things, the elimination or neutralization of a critical mass or an overwhelming majority of military forces (casualties and incapacitated), destruction of production infrastructure and weapon stockpiles, underground infrastructure, and Hamas’s governing abilities. It is crucial that the Palestinian public also perceives a broad defeat of Hamas. However, “first aid” can be provided in areas cleansed of Hamas, even if the organization is still present in other areas. Meanwhile, it should be assumed that isolated Hamas cells will remain in the area and will seek to carry out limited, targeted actions throughout the entire process.
2. The window of opportunity for transformation and rehabilitation is short, and swift action is required. Germany and Japan experienced direct occupation for only a few years. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the consensus is that the first years were the window of opportunity for change, and when this window was missed due to operational and infrastructural mistakes, transformation efforts were doomed. From this, it follows that reforms to transform Gaza must begin immediately, without losing precious time. Gaza’s rehabilitation and transformation require civilian management, and the urgency of time demands that an effective and agreed-upon mechanism for institutional management be planned and established immediately.
3. Successful transformation requires presenting a positive future for the defeated nation, contingent upon meeting measurable conditions. Historical experience shows that offering a positive future of renewed independence and acceptance into the family of nations is essential for the success of the process, both to engage the population and the new leadership, and to secure the international cooperation needed for financing and carrying out reforms. Therefore, the long-term horizon of the transformation and rehabilitation process should aim at establishing an autonomous Palestinian entity. However, the independence of this entity must be conditional upon strict criteria, primarily education for peace, renunciation of violence and terrorism, and security and administrative effectiveness. Historical experience shows that the process of achieving these conditions begins with an initial phase of external, non-Palestinian management and supervision. This can be carried out by an international force, including Arab forces, with Israel involved either directly or indirectly, or solely by Israel. In many respects, it is preferable that Israel does not lead the rebuilding body. However, even if Israel does not wish to govern Gaza and prefers another civilian government in the Strip, the option of Israeli military rule must be clearly present in the background, and the transfer of any form of governance should be contingent upon reforms in government, education, finances, and the outlawing of terrorist organizations. If Israel makes it clear from the outset that it will leave Gaza no matter what, there will be no incentive for regional and local elements to create an alternative to Hamas, as the prevailing perception will be that its return is only a matter of time.
4. Progress should depend on meeting objectives, not on a rigid timeline. Once the population understands that there is a commitment to withdrawal by a certain arbitrary date, regardless of progress in the transformation process, the expected outcome is a collapse similar to what the Americans experienced in Afghanistan. A withdrawal without eradicating Hamas’s rule and building an alternative governance and educational infrastructure will nullify any achievement.
5. Spiritual development must accompany material aid. Transformation and rehabilitation cannot rely solely on the provision of material resources—such as infrastructure, food, medicine, etc. These resources are necessary but not sufficient. Eradicating jihadist aspirations will only be possible through addressing the educational, religious, and media systems, including their content, but in a continuous, non-confrontational manner that respects the basic cultural characteristics of the Gaza Strip.
6. Change relies on continuity. At first glance, this seems paradoxical, but all attempts at rehabilitation and transformation, especially the successful ones, invested significant efforts in creating a continuous narrative for the defeated nation, a narrative that allows it to rely on certain elements of its identity while shifting that identity towards a constructive, non-violent direction. This applies to governance (preserving elements of the old regime), to education and culture (building a continuous identity narrative), and to the political aspect (creating a positive future for the defeated nation and reintegrating it into regional and global orders). In this case, it is necessary to rely on the tradition of Sunni Islam and Arab culture to create continuous change, giving prominence to moderate versions in education and culture, and providing the Palestinians with a concrete, positive vision to hold onto: a demilitarized Palestinian self-rule as part of a moderate regional order, to be realized only if the transformation and rehabilitation process succeeds.
7. Successful transformation requires pragmatic decision-making, including regarding members of the old regime. It is impossible to start from scratch, and Gaza can only be managed through people who are part of its fabric. Successes in Germany and Japan stemmed from restraining the urge for a broad purge of the previous regime’s members, while failures in Afghanistan, and especially in Iraq, resulted from overly extensive purges that collapsed governance institutions and created chaos and unrest that became a fertile breeding ground for violence and terrorism. To avoid a similar fate in Gaza, the leadership and top management layers of Hamas, and those with blood on their hands, must be removed from power, but flexibility must be shown in integrating the lower, “technocratic” layers, alongside tens of thousands of Palestinian Authority officials who operated in the Strip until the war broke out. Those willing to accept the responsibilities of the new government will not be harmed and will even be rewarded, while those who continue the path of terrorism will be severely punished.
8. The transformation and rehabilitation process are expensive and complex, and there is no guarantee of success. There is a need to develop mental and practical readiness for the possibility of failure—and to formulate alternative plans.
We propose implementing these principles through concrete steps drawn from the successes and failures we have studied.
Important considerations kws
Therefore, the technocratic Palestinian government that will be established will essentially be a cover for Hamas rule. The restoration of the Strip under this government will pour many billions into Gaza (next to them, the 360 million that Qatar transferred under the auspices of Israel will be seen as a joke) and Hamas will of course use a significant part of these billions to restore the tunnels and develop missiles. As Hamas is already using the humanitarian aid first of all for its own needs and only the rest for the rest of the population. There will be no external mechanism opposed to Hamas that will really oversee it. And even if there is a mechanism, there is reason to assume that decisions on the demilitarization of the Gaza Strip will end up in the same trash can that the 1701 decision in South Lebanon ended up in. Peace-seeking international forces never show determination against a determined and established local power. The mechanism that will exist, in light of the past experience on the demilitarization of the Gaza Strip from heavy weapons, will unfortunately turn out to be ineffective at all and under this technocratic government Hamas, riding on the wings of the defeat it inflicted on Israel, will return to being the main governing force. Just like Hezbollah in Lebanon in the last twenty years and just like what happened in the Gaza Strip in 2007. You have to remember, the very deal will give them a huge windfall.
As Hamas spokesmen promised, the seventh of October will repeat itself. And Israel will again be forced to fight in Gaza (who believed before October 7th that we would be forced to? I don’t and I guess very few thought so – kws). Since dealing in hostages has proven to be Hamas’s insurance policy, Hamas will make every effort to kidnap bodies of soldiers and the like (which it did not do this time, because it already had masses of hostages in its hands). When those bodies are kidnapped and Hamas demands an end to the war, who can tell the families – not this time. This time we don’t give up at the last minute. This time we fight to the end. After all, the families will rightly say
“The survey conducted by Harel indicates that the continuation of the war until the destruction of Hamas as a ruling force is not a whim of Netanyahu’s but a position that is widely supported by the Israeli public. Netanyahu can be blamed for all the problems in the world. I have no problem with that. But if this is a position that receives broad public support, then it is at least worth a substantive discussion and it is not enough to blame Netanyahu.” Avi Picard Commentary (academic/researcher in Israel)