Released in two parts, the Agranat Commission investigates the reasons for Israel’s shortcomings in the October 1973 War. One major cause identified is Israel’s intelligence community’s commitment to a ‘concept’ about the improbability of war– it had information about Arab intentions that is not assessed correctly, and deployment of responding forces is needlessly delayed. The Commission refrains from assigning ministerial responsibility. The first part of the report is released in early 1974, resulting in the resignation of Prime Minister Golda Meir and Defense Minister Moshe Dayan. Some Israeli generals are admonished and forced to retire.(source)
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