Latest

Agronsky’s clear assessment of 1936-1939 disturbances provides a graphic description of the devastation caused to Palestine’s rural economy and to the majority Arab population.

El vicepresidente Joe Biden le dice enfáticamente a un grupo rabínico en Atlanta: “sin ambigüedades, si fuera israelí, si fuera judío, no contrataría mi seguridad con nadie, ni siquiera con un amigo leal, leal como Estados Unidos.”

La clara evaluación de Agronsky de los disturbios de 1936-1939 proporciona una descripción gráfica de la devastación
causada a la economía rural de Palestina y a la mayoría de la población árabe.

Vice President Joe Biden emphatically tells a rabbinic group in Atlanta, “unambiguously, were I an Israeli, were I a Jew, I would not contract out my security to anybody, even to a loyal, loyal friend like the United States.”

British Foreign Ministry promises to set up a Jewish National Home in Palestine with no harm to non-Jewish populations, or to Jews living elsewhere who might want to support a Jewish home.

With 20 maps and prose, trace the progression of Jewish physical and demographic growth toward state building from 1882 to 1948 (25,000 to 600,000), with two-thirds in place by 1940.

July 26, 1967: The Alon Plan reflects a response to Israel’s pre-1967 war border vulnerability seeking a future west bank arrangement that is not a strategic/geographic threat to Israel and its coastal plain population centers.

Eventual head of the World Zionist Organization, Theodor Herzl says anti-Semitism requires a Jewish state.

Notwithstanding the signing of the Abraham Accords (1920) and the growing prominence of the cooperation between Israel and the Arab Gulf states, including on security matters, the road toward its establishment increasingly rests with American involvement or leadership. Will this be a Biden priority when he visits the region over the summer?

On the last day of negotiations at Camp David, President Carter asked Israel to accept the US position that Jerusalem was occupied territory; Dayan shot back in vigorous opposition, “if we had known that you would declare your position on Jerusalem, we would not have come here. This is the first time that we are confronted with an American position and specifically on the most sensitive issue. All your positions with regards to settlements are insignificant compared to our confrontation on the issue of Jerusalem.”

As a Democratic Party operative, Mark Siegel astutely helped Jimmy Carter win the 1976 election. He assisted in delegate selection, on the platform committee, and kept Eugene MaCarthy’s name off the New York state ballot. In the White House, as the administration’s liaison to the Jewish community, he abruptly resigned for being lied to by the administration. He explains Brzezinski/Carter disappointment with Sadat’s historic 1977 trip to Jerusalem because it channeled Arab-Israeli negotiations into a bi-lateral pathway. With that, the Brzezinski/Carter fear was realized. Any hope of Palestinian self-determination and Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank/Gaza Strip would be endlessly postponed in favor of Egyptian-Israeli national interests. He is frank in his descriptions and epititude of those who worked in the Carter White House.

Peter Bass’s Princeton University Senior thesis is the most comprehensive work on a critical topic that befuddled and dominated Carter’s entire presidency.
Historical context evolves from tepid Jewish support for Carter in the 1976 campaign through ever widening gaps between his administration, Israel and the Jewish community. Carter wanted Middle East policy his way as shaped by Brzezinski. All Israeli leaders chafed at being told what to do, and frequently in public about territorial compromises “they had to make.” American Jews who voted reluctantly for him in 1976, did not do so in the 1980. Carter carried that sting with him for the rest of his life. Bass’s work is superb; thanks are given to him for giving us permission to provide his thesis here.