Summary: Ripe conditions that prefaced the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Treaty are almost totally absent in 2025 that might presage additional Arab-Israeli agreements. Why? Today, there is a an absence in political will, courage, and foresight of leaders to change the non-war status quo; dysfunctional structural weaknesses are present among all parties to the conflict, especially Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and the PA/PLO; massive political instability exists on all of Israel’s borders for states and insurgencies to prioritize their own existence; none of the sides to the conflict are willing to recognize unequivocally the sovereignty, territorial integrity and legitimacy of the other; the level and frequency of hatred levelled at Israel from many Arab and Moslem leaders has been joined by unprecedented vitriol directed against Israel’s existence in almost daily Arabic, Turkish, and Persian newspapers, on social media, and from the mosque podium. Unlike 1979 there is virtually unlimited resources from petro-dollar wealth to prevent and undo any and all agreements that might be attempted or reached. The irrevocable reality exists. “Outside parties or mediators to a conflict cannot want the conflict resolved more than the parties to the conflict do themselves.”
Sadat: the engine that drove Egyptian-Israeli Negotiations
The Egyptian-Israeli Treaty was the fourth Arab-Israeli agreement signed between the end of the 1973 October War through March 1979, with another not signed until the 1993 Oslo Accords. Egypt’s President Anwar Sadat and Israel’s Prime Minister Begin promoted their respective national interests in signing bilateral agreement, confounding the Carter administrations strongly preferred diplomatic approach of comprehensive peace between Israel and all of her proximate neighbors. Sadat’s relentless pursuit for the full return of Israeli-held Egyptian Sinai, including critically, securing Israel’s commitment to evacuate all of Israeli settlements there were major Egyptian diplomatic successes. Sadat calculated correctly that the PLO leadership remained adamant in its refusal to negotiate and recognize Israel, and that Israel had no intention to see the emergence of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Indeed, Sadat made a separate peace with Israel because no other Arab party was eager or prepared to join Sadat’s bold and unprecedented initiative of recognizing the Jewish state. Sadat proved to be at least a decade ahead of his Arab leadership peers in realizing the expenditure of human lives and national treasure in trying to destroy or dislodge Israel was not possible, especially if the United States was heavily siding with Israel.