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Esta primera reunión Carter-Rabin fue, en el mejor de los casos, desagradable. Rabin no entregaría las prerrogativas de negociación de Israel a Estados Unidos; Carter dijo públicamente a Israel que tal vez tuviera que regresar a las fronteras de junio de 1967. Carter dijo que Rabin era como un “pez muerto”. Rabin dijo que se sentía “arrinconado por Carter”. Su administración estaba interesada en crear Cisjordania para la expresión política palestina incluso antes de que la OLP estuviera dispuesta a aceptar la legitimidad israelí. Israel no estaba dispuesto a retirarse de Cisjordania, un cargo que también ocupa Menachem Begin.

Hamas’s genocide against Israelis, unleashes the long blistering hatred that Hamas possesses for Israel and Jews. Entries include severe Arab criticism of Hamas, its detriment to Palestinian nationalism, statements by its leaders, and the war’s unfolding.

In presenting four obstacles in the way of ending the Hamas-Israel War, Schumer omits six basic obstacles that remain in the negotiating pathway to end the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

Chaim Weizmann feverishly advocates for Great Britain to be Palestine’s post WWI administrator, seeking inclusion of specific territories for its boundaries; six months before the Balfour Declaration is issued.

In an effort to eradicate the PLO as a terror threat to Israel, Israel invaded Lebanon in June 1982. Within three months Israel was on the outskirts of Beirut where Christian Phalangists massacred hundreds of Palestinians in refugee camps. Israel was accused of complicity. The Kahan Commission said that Israel had no direct responsibility for the massacres, yet it forced Defense Minister Sharon’s resignation and others too. In May 2000, Israel fully withdrew from Lebanon, which saw Hezbollah, an Iranian affiliate, take control over the Lebanese south. Prime Minister Begin did not resign as a consequence of the war. US President Reagan severely criticized the Israeli government for the summer 1982 events.

The European Union’s foreign policy chief decried “another massacre of civilians” and called for an end to the Gaza “bloodbath” on June 8 after Israel rescued four of the more than 120 hostages remaining from Oct. 7, when Hamas led the slaughter of 1,200 Israelis and others. The EU previously threatened to sanction Israel. European […]

Kenneth Stein, “A General Historiographic and Bibliographic Review of Literature on Palestine and the Palestinian Arabs, Orient,” Vol 1, 1981, 100-112.  Introduction Historically, the area which later became geographic Palestine under the Mandate fell under the domination of various outside forces.  Since the Islamic expansion alone portions of Palestine were controlled by numerous successive regimes […]

In September 2023, thirty years after the historic signing of the Oslo Accords, there is occasion to review Prime Minister Rabin’s understanding of them. I assembled this collection years ago from Daily Reports- Near East and South Asia, 1993-1995. Two short items about Rabin’s views are also found or linked here. Rabin provided a summary of his views of the Accords in a Knesset speech in October 5, 1995. Some of Rabin’s reasons for signing the Accords are also provided in Yehuda Avner’s The Prime Ministers.

Passed on December 30, 1968, Israeli state commissions of inquiry are panels appointed to investigate matters of public concern and state interest. These independent bodies are among Israeli democracy’s most trusted institutions. However, there is no requirement on the part of any sitting government to appoint a commission of inquiry.

Musa Alami, “The Lesson of Palestine,” Middle East Journal, October 1949, reprinted with permission Volume 3, No. 4, October 1949, pp. 373-405 Reprinted with permission of The Middle East Institute, October 2021 In this 1949 article published in Middle East Journal, Musa Alami, a noted and highly respected Palestinian Arab leader during the first half […]

Cohen shows regular Palestinian Arab collaboration with Zionists before Israel was established and asserts that local and family loyalties, with identity to villages, and not to a nation, did severe harm to the Palestinian struggle against Jewish nation building. (Presented with permission of the author, June 2024).

(11 de agosto de 2006) Fuente:: https://unsco.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/s_res_17012006.pdf La frontera libanesa israelí y el río Litani Fuente: CIA El 12 de julio de 2006, la organización terrorista libanesa Hezbollah realizó una incursión transfronteriza en Israel, secuestrando a dos patrulleros israelíes antes de retirarse. Así comenzó lo que los israelíes llaman la Segunda Guerra del Líbano. La […]

Following the conclusion of the June 1967 War, the Israeli government sent word to Egypt and Syria seeking peace plan that was intended to jumpstart a peace process with Israel’s belligerent neighbors, Egypt and Syria. The messages were sent through the US, but no response was apparently received.

The Resolution calls for unspecified Israel withdrawal from territories in return for right of all states to live in peace. It does not call for full withdrawal. It is the basis of Egyptian (1979) and Jordanian (1994) Treaties with Israel, and PLO (1993) recognition of Israel.

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“Camp David Negotiations,” in Jimmy Carter: Foreign Policy and Post-Presidential Years, Herbert D. Rosenbaum and Alexej Ugrinsky (eds.) Hofstra University Conference, Greenwood Press, 1994, pp. 149–187. Scroll to the end for detailed biographies of the five speakers. Discussants Hermann F. Eilts, Samuel W. Lewis, William B. Quandt, Harold H. Saunders, Daniel C. Kurtzer and Kenneth […]

In the days before the June 1967 war, President Lyndon Johnson warned Israel against war, saying, “If you go it alone, you will be alone.” President Joe Biden issued a similar warning in March against Israel launching an offensive in Rafah, part of the Israeli campaign to destroy Hamas’ control of Gaza after the Oct. […]

No document better reveals the hostility which most Arab leaders and Arab states had in 1947 for Zionism and for a possible Jewish state. The Saudi King notes “that US support for Zionists in Palestine is an unfriendly act directed against the Arabs.” The King’s views were totally supported by US State Department officials including Loy Henderson and George Kennan who advocated strongly against Truman’s support of a Jewish state.

This episode focuses on the first Arab-Israeli peace breakthrough, the Camp David Accords of 1978. Camp David resulted from Egyptian president Anwar Sadat’s electrifying visit to Jerusalem. Host David Makovsky discusses this major decision point with Dr. Ken Stein, who has been a professor of contemporary Middle Eastern history, political science, and Israel studies at Emory University for forty-three years.

As a Democratic Party operative, Mark Siegel astutely helped Jimmy Carter win the 1976 election. He assisted in delegate selection, on the platform committee, and kept Eugene MaCarthy’s name off the New York state ballot. In the White House, as the administration’s liaison to the Jewish community, he abruptly resigned for being lied to by the administration. He explains Brzezinski/Carter disappointment with Sadat’s historic 1977 trip to Jerusalem because it channeled Arab-Israeli negotiations into a bi-lateral pathway. With that, the Brzezinski/Carter fear was realized. Any hope of Palestinian self-determination and Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank/Gaza Strip would be endlessly postponed in favor of Egyptian-Israeli national interests. He is frank in his descriptions and epititude of those who worked in the Carter White House.

On the last day of negotiations at Camp David, President Carter asked Israel to accept the US position that Jerusalem was occupied territory; Dayan shot back in vigorous opposition, “if we had known that you would declare your position on Jerusalem, we would not have come here. This is the first time that we are confronted with an American position and specifically on the most sensitive issue. All your positions with regards to settlements are insignificant compared to our confrontation on the issue of Jerusalem.”

Following his surprise electoral victory in May, Prime Minister Menachem Begin traveled to Washington in an effort to establish a positive rapport with President Carter. While this initial meeting was cordial, each met the others’ stubbornness, a characteristic that would keep their relationship respectful but acrid for years to come.

Common to both the Labor Party and to Begin’s government was a fear that the US would pressure Israel into unwanted concessions and deny Israel its right to sovereign decision-making. It was a concern that Dayan expressed in this October 1977 meeting, and one that he would articulate on several occasions during the Camp David negotiations.

Prime Minister Menachem Begin argues for the return of Rafah to Egypt; the greater purpose is implementation of the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty, which also meant Israel”s withdrawal from settlements in Sinai near Rafah. Egypt in treaty negotiations with Israel, did not want to have the Gaza Strip again under their administration as they had between 1949 until after the June 1967 War

Prime Minister-elect Begin rebukes President Carter’s assertion that Israel will need to withdraw from almost all the lands Israel secured in the June 1967 war, especially Jerusalem and the West Bank. Begin is adamant opposed to dealing with the PLO. Begin refuses to relinquish Israeli decision-making to US preferences or dictates. These fundamental policy disagreements will remain unresolved between Begin and Carter for the duration of Carter’s presidency, and years after.

It is now apparent that distances between the Carter administration and Israel did not begin in earnest after Begin’s May 1977 election or over the settlements. Newly available materials show that from its outset, the Carter administration prioritized curbing Israeli influence in Washington.

Assembled by Scott Abramson and Ken Stein, Center for Israel Education (May 23, 2024) Khaled Abu Toameh, “Does the Palestinian Authority Really Want to Return to Gaza?” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, May 21, 2024 https://jcpa.org/does-the-palestinian-authority-really-want-to-return-to-gaza/ Alan Baker, “The UN’s World of the Absurd,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, May 12, 2024, https://jcpa.org/the-uns-world-of-the-absurd/ Chietigj Bajpaee, […]

From 1970 to 1984, Khaddam served as Syria’s Foreign Minister, and later Syria’s decision-maker for its actions in Lebanon. He recounts Syrian anger toward Egyptian President Sadat’s slow but continuous bilateral engagement and recognition of Israel. He recalls how Syria’s President Assad, after a four hour meeting, refused Henry Kissinger’s invitation to attend the 1973 Geneva Conference, not wanting to sanction the closeness Sadat was establishing with Israel and with Washington. These were the same reasons why Syria refused President Carter’s invitation to attend a similar Middle East peace Conference in 1977. Khaddam said, “We were shocked by Sadat’s actions.”