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On Oct. 6, 1973, Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack against Israel on the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur. Backed by arms from the Soviet Union, Egypt and Syria made significant territorial gains in the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights. By the war’s end three weeks later, aided by military supplies from the United States, Israeli counterattacks proved successful. A U.N.-applied cease-fire took effect, and a brief Middle East peace conference was held in Geneva in December. Despite mistrust, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir used the war to usher in a period of American-led diplomacy. Israelis critically investigated their failures in preparing for the war; their inquiries resulted in both the resignation of high-ranking officials and the revision of military readiness procedures. No treaties were signed at the end of the war, only military disengagement agreements. The diplomatic aftermath of the war evolved into more detailed, secret and direct Egyptian-Israeli negotiations that resulted in the 1979 Israel-Egyptian peace treaty.

The Key Curated Essentials of the 1973 War

The 1973 October War — A Short History

Egyptian President Sadat colluded with Syrian President Assad to attack Israel on October 6, 1973. Sadat’s objective was not to seek Israel’s destruction but to gain a limited success by crossing the canal. He also sought to engage American diplomacy to generate talks with Israel that would see Israeli withdrawal from Egyptian land Israel secured in the June 1967 War. Sadat took a large gamble by attacking Israel yet he unfolded a negotiating process with Israel that lasted through 1979. He achieved his overarching long-term priority of having Egyptian Sinai returned to Egyptian sovereignty.

U.N. Security Council Resolution 338 on a Cease-Fire and Direct Negotiations After October 1973 War

The October 1973 war broke the logjam over whether diplomacy could unfold to kick off Arab-Israeli negotiations. Sadat used the 1973 war as an engine to harness American horsepower. In that he succeeded because U.S. Secretary of State Kissinger saw Sadat’s leaning to Washington not only as a chance to begin useful negotiations, but also of great significance to weaning the Egyptian president away from Moscow.

Documents and Sources|October 22, 1973

El-Gamasy: Ken Stein Interview with General Mohamed Abdel Ghani el-Gamasy, Cairo, Egypt

General Ghani el-Gamasy served as Egypt’s chief of staff during the October 1973 war, executed Egypt’s limited success across the Suez Canal, and negotiated with an Israeli counterpart, General Aharon Yariv, the details of the Kissinger-choreographed Kilometer 101 talks, which led to the January 1974 Egyptian-Israeli Disengagement Agreement. Gamasy was surprised when Sadat told him at Aswan then, “Egypt was making peace with the United States and not with Israel.” Gamasy to Yariv, “We (the Egyptians) are finished with the Palestinians.”

Interviews|November 10, 1992

Yariv: Ken Stein Interview With Major General Aharon Yariv, Tel Aviv University

As the October 1973 war came to an end, Israeli and Egyptian leaders decided that respective generals from both sides should disentangle the war’s realities. Israel was keen to have her POWs returned, and Egypt did not want to see Israel clobber the Third Army, which Israel had surrounded in the second week of the war. General Yariv, who had been head of military intelligence in earlier years, recalls in detail his cordial meetings with the Egyptian chief of staff, General Mohamad al-Gamasy. Yariv’s recollections pair almost identically to the ones given by others who participated in the talks or were on the Kissinger negotiating team at the time. These negotiations came to be known as the Kilometer 101 talks; they were the first direct Israeli-Egyptian public negotiations since the late 1940s. The talks were collusively halted by U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, as agreed upon with Golda Meir and Anwar Sadat. What followed was the December 1973 Geneva Middle East peace conference. It was a public display and intentionally a truncated meeting with no substance discussed. Kissinger sidelined the U.S.S.R., though they were co-chairs of the conference, as the U.S. choreographed the postwar diplomacy extending over the next six years into the Carter administration. The Yariv-al-Gamasy negotiations became the basis for the January 1974 Israel-Egyptian Disengagement Agreement.

Interviews|March 26, 1992

Bibliography — 1973 War

CIE has compiled the following list of books, articles and interviews, including many available on our website, to guide understanding of the unfolding of the October 1973 Middle East war and its consequences. Books Adan, Avraham. On…

Bibliographies|March 25, 2025