Strait of Hormuz: A Struggle to Determine Iran’s Strength Tomorrow
Iran’s move to assert sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz has short- and long-term implications for the Islamic regime and the world economy.
Iran’s move to assert sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz has short- and long-term implications for the Islamic regime and the world economy.
Washington Institute Senior Fellow Michael Eisenstadt speaks about the regional effects of the 2023-2025 Hamas-Israel war and the ongoing U.S.-Israel-Iran war in March 2026.
While too much is unknown after a week of fighting to make definitive statements about the war, certain possible outcomes can be explored.
CIE President Ken Stein addresses what is and what is not known about why Hamas attacked October 7, 2023, why Israel was caught off guard, and what happens after the war across the region.
January 2, 2026 A week of unrest in Iran does not guarantee a revolution even if 85-plus million Iranians are angry at the country’s autocratic, theological rulers. Iran is a security-clerical oligarchy where kleptocracy, cronyism…
Hamas’ genocide against Israelis unleashed the long-blistering hatred that Hamas possesses for Israel and Jews. Entries include severe Arab criticism of Hamas, its detriment to Palestinian nationalism, statements by its leaders, and the war’s unfolding.
May 18, 2025 Contradiction has been a theme in Iran’s relationship with the Jewish people, for nowhere else in the Muslim world have Jews both suffered so grievously and flourished so thoroughly. Nor is the…
January 9, 2025 By Dr. Kenneth Stein, Emeritus Professor, Emory University As the 39th president of the United States, James Earl Carter held office from 1977 to 1981. Carter was the longest-surviving former United States president…
December 11, 2024 Professor Meir Litvak, Tel Aviv University, for the Center for Israel Education In this extraordinary review, Professor Meir Litvak unfolds the ideological origins and development of the Iranian regime’s stark hatred of…
September 2024 By Kenneth Stein Kenneth Stein is Emeritus Professor of Contemporary Middle Eastern History, Political Science and Israel Studies at Emory University and President of the Atlanta-based Center for Israel Education. He is the author…
Iranian presidential elections often produce surprising results, so a victory by Massoud Pezeshkian, the one reformist candidate, could not be ruled out. Three of Iran’s last four presidents were not expected to be elected when…
On Jan. 29, 2019, U.S. Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats told the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence: “We do not believe Iran is currently undertaking the key activities we judge necessary to produce a nuclear device.” However, experience helps us realize that the American intelligence community has a very problematic track record in revealing, on time, nuclear weaponization efforts of many countries (e.g., North Korea, India, Pakistan, Syria, and Iraq) including Iran itself, so one has to be very humble about this kind of assessment.
The clash of great powers to control the Middle East, particularly between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., neither began after World War II nor ended with the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991. Today, China, the U.S., Russia and Middle Eastern regional powers vie to influence everyday politics and resources.
There is much discussion around the world about how to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. But few, if any, international bodies deal with the question of how to prepare for the day Iran achieves such capabilities, if that day has not already arrived.
Israel’s government must nurture a spirit of unity and national purpose by building a policy consensus as broad as possible. This is necessary both in preparation for likely combat operations against Iran and its proxies, and in order to respond wisely to the American peace plan and to intelligently manage conflict with the Palestinians.
After a year in which Iran opted for “strategic patience,” in the hope that European nations would compensate for the United States sanctions, it now seeks to present a price tag for the US measures against it, and has thus embarked on a response comprising action in three realms: nuclear, military, and oil exports from the Gulf. In the current circumstances, Iran and the United States are demanding conditions that would make a resumption of negotiations difficult, although both sides apparently understand that dialogue may ultimately be the less dangerous option for them.
In a bold move, the Trump administration has designated the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). This is historical justice, since the IRGC has sponsored various terrorist militias and organizations, Shiite and Sunni alike, which have committed many attacks against Western, Israeli and Sunni targets.
In the coming years, Syria will focus on tending to its war wounds while continuing to serve as a springboard for strategic threats posed by Iran and its proxies against Israel. It is in Israel’s interest that Syria rebuild its infrastructure, experience economic recovery, and benefit from a stable central government. However, there is inherent tension in Israel’s position.
The US can and should develop a coherent region-wide strategy, involving US allies including Israel, to impede Iran’s ability to continue developing in ways detrimental to the region’s security. However, Iran is proficient in the practice of using proxies and paramilitary methods, as well as in the combination of paramilitary and political struggle. Its response to a US-led strategy to contain and roll back their influence is likely to focus on these areas.
Israel’s opposition to Iranian entrenchment in Syria and Lebanon is twofold: To prevent Iran from building a beachhead against Israel through its proxies on Israel’s borders, and to impede development of Iran’s nuclear and long-range missile capabilities. Israel is absolutely determined and prepared to act forcefully against Iran, which could lead to a full-scale war. Israel must win this struggle against Iran, one way or another.
In the interest of securing any deal rather than the right deal – politics over principle – the president and the diplomats he sent to negotiate seem to have forgotten or perhaps never learned why Iran must not get a nuclear weapon.
“When we analyze foreign policy, the first question should be what interest or objective is served by a particular policy. A good policy should clearly advance U.S. interests and should complement rather than clash with our larger strategy, unless the policy in question heralds an entirely new strategy that can be clearly articulated and implemented.”
On July 14, 2015, Iran and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany (P5+1) concluded a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) concerning the future of Iran’s nuclear program.
Congressional rejection of the nuclear deal wouldn’t be pretty, but a messy domestic political battle is a far cry from the president’s warnings of potential war with Iran.