Washington Institute Senior Fellow Michael Eisenstadt speaks about the regional effects of the 2023-2025 Hamas-Israel war and the ongoing U.S.-Israel-Iran war in March 2026.
While too much is unknown after a week of fighting to make definitive statements about the war, certain possible outcomes can be explored.
CIE President Ken Stein addresses what is and what is not known about why Hamas attacked October 7, 2023, why Israel was caught off guard, and what happens after the war across the region.
Before Israel’s establishment, Zionists in Palestine had contacts with Lebanese and Syrian officials, seeking information about anti-Zionist attitudes and understanding of these Arab states’ military capabilities against Israel’s establishment and survival. Since 1949 and the…
February 2024 Washington Institute for Near East Policy Since the Hamas-led attacks against Israel on October 7, 2023, Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah has made five public appearances to address the group’s own confrontation with Israel…
The clash of great powers to control the Middle East, particularly between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., neither began after World War II nor ended with the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991. Today, China, the U.S., Russia and Middle Eastern regional powers vie to influence everyday politics and resources.
The waves of protests in Lebanon in recent weeks and the country’s political instability stem primarily from fundamental problems in the local economy, including the absence of reforms and the rampant corruption among the ruling elite and all government institutions. These developments are highly problematic for the country’s decision makers, including Hezbollah. Israel, for its part, is monitoring the developments, which inter alia could lead to a strengthening of Hezbollah.
July 12, 2019 will mark the thirteenth anniversary of the outbreak of the Second Lebanon War; August 14 will mark the anniversary of its end under Security Council Resolution 1701; and discussions will be held at the United Nations headquarters regarding a renewal of UNIFIL’s mandate for another year. The bottom line: another war between Israel and Lebanon did not erupt, mainly due to both sides’ desire to avoid it and, to some extent, also due to UNIFIL’s help in preventing escalation resulting from tactical incidents.
On March 25th 2019, President Trump signed an order for the United States’ official recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights. This article surveys Israeli public opinion regarding this issue, and its reactions to this announcement. Surveys have shown a consistently high level of support among Jewish Israelis for keeping the Golan Heights, and while there is some disagreement – Jews across the political spectrum support President Trump’s decision.
In the coming years, Syria will focus on tending to its war wounds while continuing to serve as a springboard for strategic threats posed by Iran and its proxies against Israel. It is in Israel’s interest that Syria rebuild its infrastructure, experience economic recovery, and benefit from a stable central government. However, there is inherent tension in Israel’s position.
Israel’s opposition to Iranian entrenchment in Syria and Lebanon is twofold: To prevent Iran from building a beachhead against Israel through its proxies on Israel’s borders, and to impede development of Iran’s nuclear and long-range missile capabilities. Israel is absolutely determined and prepared to act forcefully against Iran, which could lead to a full-scale war. Israel must win this struggle against Iran, one way or another.
October 1991 Kenneth W. Stein and Samuel W. Lewis, Making Peace Among Arabs and Israelis: Lessons From Fifty Years of Negotiating Experience, United States Institute of Peace, Washington, October 1991, second printing 1992, 69 pages.
Conclusions suggest that Israel has no direct responsibility for the massacre of
Palestinians in refugee camps in Beirut; Defense Minister Sharon resigns for ignoring the danger of potential
bloodshed.
Henry Kissinger and and Hafez al-Assad meet in Damascus in December 1973 (credit: Agence France-Presse stringer, released by Getty in January 1974). By Ken Stein Sandwiched between the end of the 1973 October Middle East…
Egyptian President Sadat colluded with Syrian President Assad to attack Israel on October 6, 1973. Sadat’s objective was not to seek Israel’s destruction but to gain a limited success by crossing the canal. He also sought to engage American diplomacy to generate talks with Israel that would see Israeli withdrawal from Egyptian land Israel secured in the June 1967 War. Sadat took a large gamble by attacking Israel yet he unfolded a negotiating process with Israel that lasted through 1979. He achieved his overarching long-term priority of having Egyptian Sinai returned to Egyptian sovereignty.
