Wars and Defense

A seminar at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) on political and security implications of the corona crisis underscored the prevalent uncertainty regarding the situation, but also highlighted several instructive points. The biggest threat to the global (and Israeli) economy derives from the slowdown or negative growth in the United States, and at the current stage, the American ability to meet the crisis effectively is not clear. As for Israel, the risks of escalation in the northern arena and the Gaza Strip have decreased in the short term, but toughening the restrictions on the border crossings with the Palestinian Authority could lead to its economic collapse.

At the core of the strategic assessment for 2020 stands the tension between Israel’s evident strength and its success in various fields, and the possibility that this positive state of affairs will prove temporary and fragile. This tension stems from a series of factors that in the coming year could lead to a large-scale conflict and even to war, and involves Israel’s approach to a series of substantive national security challenges. The strategic assessment is comprised of seven chapters along with an introduction and conclusion.

Anti-Israel mobilization and rhetoric have always been a prominent feature of official Arab discourse, regardless of political orientation. Islamist, nationalist, and secular parties have all seen vocal hatred of Israel as a cornerstone for rallying support and a vehicle to spread unrelated political messages to achieve related objectives, with unrelated acts being framed as forms of ‘resistance’ against Israel. However, the Syrian civil war has slowly shifted the dynamic of who is considered ‘enemy’ in the Arab world.

There is much discussion around the world about how to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. But few, if any, international bodies deal with the question of how to prepare for the day Iran achieves such capabilities, if that day has not already arrived.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is awarded high grades for improving Israel’s international standing (60%), enhancing the country’s military strength (56%), and successfully contending with the Iranian threat (50.5%) but poor grades for failing to increase solidarity between Israel’s different segments of society (51%) and on the question of personal integrity (49%).

July 12, 2019 will mark the thirteenth anniversary of the outbreak of the Second Lebanon War; August 14 will mark the anniversary of its end under Security Council Resolution 1701; and discussions will be held at the United Nations headquarters regarding a renewal of UNIFIL’s mandate for another year. The bottom line: another war between Israel and Lebanon did not erupt, mainly due to both sides’ desire to avoid it and, to some extent, also due to UNIFIL’s help in preventing escalation resulting from tactical incidents.

In early June 1967, Following three weeks of building tension with Egypt—particularly Cairo’s dispatch of 200,000 troops into Sinai, the removal UN peace keeping troops from there, the blockade of Israeli shipping access to its port at Eilat, and blistering verbal barrages from Arab leaders threatening Israel’s destruction—Israel preemptively struck Egypt on June 5. In six days Israel defeated three Arab armies and increased its size three-fold, without pre-determined plans to take either the Golan Heights or the West Bank. Its victory included the reunification of Jerusalem, divided in the 1948-1949 Arab-Israeli War.

Conversion is a central theme of the upcoming holiday of Shavuot when the biblical story of Ruth the Moabite – widely considered the first convert to Judaism – is traditionally read. In the spirit of the holiday, we decided to examine what types of relationships Jewish Israelis are ready to have with non-Jews. We also looked into what Jewish Israeli think about the topic of conversions in general and the conversion process in Israel in particular.