U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers’ Plan for an Arab-Israeli Settlement, 1969
Without any consultation with Jerusalem, Israel rejects US proposal for full withdrawal.
U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, 1967
The Resolution calls for unspecified Israel withdrawal from territories in return for right of all states to live in peace. It does not call for full withdrawal. It is the basis of Egyptian (1979) and Jordanian (1994) Treaties with Israel, and PLO (1993) recognition of Israel.
Eisenhower Doctrine, 1957
Further reinforcing the Truman Doctrine, the US President promises military or economic aid to any Middle Eastern country resisting Communist aggression.
Explainer: The Arab-Israel War of 1948 — A Short History
Otherwise known as Israel’s War of Independence, or, “the nakbah” or disaster to the Arab world because a Jewish state was established, the war was fought between the newly established Jewish state of Israel opposed by Palestinian irregulars, and armies from five Arab states. Official beginning of the war is usually given as May 14, 1948, the date Israel declared itself an independent Jewish state, but the war’s first of four phases began in November 1947. Lasting for two years, the war ended with armistice agreements signed in 1949 between Israel and four Arab states.
Great Britain — Palestine: Termination of the Mandate
This 10-page report, written by the British Colonial and Foreign Office, along with the 1937 Peel (Royal) Commission Report, is one of the two best summaries of the British presence in Palestine. Both are substantial in terms of content, detail and analyses; both were written from Britain’s perspective. Read these along with 1931 Census for Palestine to have a fuller grasp of the politics and the populations that shaped Britain’s Palestine’s administration from 1918-1948
Avraham Sela, “The Arabs, Truman, and the Birth of the State of Israel,” 1945-1948
Apart from the Zionist movement and the Jewish community in Palestine, the role of President Truman, however, was the most important factor enabling the establishment of the Jewish state.
Saudi King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud to President Truman, 1947
No document better reveals the hostility which most Arab leaders and Arab states had in 1947 for Zionism and for a possible Jewish state. The Saudi King notes “that US support for Zionists in Palestine is an unfriendly act directed against the Arabs.” The King’s views were totally supported by US State Department officials including Loy Henderson and George Kennan who advocated strongly against Truman’s support of a Jewish state.
Loy Henderson, State Department Director of Near Eastern and African Affairs, Vehemently Opposes Jewish State in Memo to Secretary of State George Marshall, 1947
Loy Henderson, Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, U.S. State Department, to U.S. Secretary of State George Marshall
Writing two months before the U.S. voted at the United Nations in favor of Palestine’s partition into Arab and Jewish states, Henderson voices profound dislike for Zionism and a Jewish state. He advocates for cultivating positive relations with Muslim and Arab states. He is one of many at the State Department at the time who saw Zionism as contrary to American national interests.
Report of the U.N. Special Committee on Palestine, 1947
Earlier in 1947, Great Britain turned the future of the Palestine Mandate over to the newly established United Nations. Then in August 1947, the UN suggested that establishing an Arab and Jewish state with a federal union would be the best solution for the communal unrest there.
Memorandum on the Administration of Palestine, June 1947
Published by the British Administration of Palestine, this summary emphasizes attempts at impartiality in governing the Mandate. It notes that in 1922, the Jewish community already possessed ‘national’ characteristics, while the Arab community’s composition was sociologically and economically divided and to a large degree impoverished by the war.
Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko’s Remarks to the U.N. Special Committee on Palestine, 1947
Despite an officially anti-Zionist stance, the Soviet Union, hoping to adopt Israel as a Soviet proxy, takes a pragmatic stance and supports the U.N. partition plan of Palestine into separate Arab and Jewish states.
1947 Truman Doctrine
Fearing Communist penetration of the Eastern Mediterranean, Truman at the beginning of the Cold War defines the region as a sphere of US national interest.
Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine, 1946
April 20, 1946 Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, Report to the United States Government and His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom, meeting in Lausanne, Switzerland, 1946. Unsure how to manage Palestine’s future, the British and…
Pro-Zionist Remarks by Winston Churchill, 1939
Over four decades, Winston Churchill’s views on Zionism and Jews varied greatly. Without knowing his long held personal beliefs or the policies he adopted while the Jewish state developed, and only reading this speech, one would not know that he was a political opportunist and certainly not a “Gentile Zionist.”
HMG White Paper: Statement of Policy, 1939
Zionist leaders—David Ben-Gurion, Chaim Weizmann and Eliezer Kaplan—learning of the British intent to limit severely the Jewish national home’s growth. Increasingly, they are also aware of the German government’s hostilities towards European Jewry.
Britain in 1939 Reaffirms Area of Palestine Was Not Promised to Sharif of Mecca During World War I
March 16, 1939 Was the area of Palestine excluded from British promises made to Sharif Hussein of Mecca during World War I? A British investigation in 1939 said it was not part of a British…
Mufti Rejects Majority-Palestinian State, 1939
Mufti opposes Arab majority state in ten years contrary to wishes of a dozen key other Palestinian leaders. Mufti wants no Jewish political presence in Palestine whatsoever.
British Government: Policy Statement/Advice Against Partition
Pressure from Arab leaders in states surrounding Palestine, growing instability in the eastern Mediterranean, and a firm opposition voiced by the British High Commissioner in Egypt, Miles Lampson, caused the British to withdraw the idea of resolving the Arab-Zionist conflict with a two-state solution. Instead, heavy restrictions were imposed in 1939 on the growth of the Jewish National home. Coincidently this policy statement is issued, two days after Nazi Germany attacks Jewish, homes, businesses and synagogues, in what came to be known as Kristallnacht.
Political Statements on a Two-State Solution to Resolve the Arab (Palestinian)-Israeli Conflict, 1937–Present
Speculation again abounds whether a two state solution might be a seriously considered outcome to Palestinian-Israeli differences. A long history of its mention but not its implementation persists. Advocacy by external voices persists, but no one seems ready to make the critical political trade-offs required.
Map of Peel (Partition) Report for Arab and Jewish States, 1937
A map shows the partition of Palestine proposed by the Peel Commission in 1937.
Palestine High Commissioner Sir John Chancellor Seeks to Stop Jewish National Home in Dispatch to Colonial Secretary, 1930
Palestine’s High Commissioner Chancellor seeks to halt the Jewish National Home in favor of the Arabs. He fails to overcome the Zionist drive and Arab unwillingness to cooperate with his intentions.
Vladimir Jabotinsky, “The Iron Wall,” 1923
April 11, 1923 Vladimir “Ze’ev” Jabotinsky (October 17, 1880-August 3, 1940) was a Russian-Jewish intellectual, writer, soldier and political activist who founded the Revisionist Zionist movement. A charismatic orator and prolific author, Jabotinsky broke with…
American Officials on Zionism, Israel, the U.S.-Israeli Relationship and Resolving the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1922-2022
For more than seventy years the US government developed and revised its attitude toward Zionism and Israel. Using published archives, press conferences, speeches and numerous interviews, this compilation of 50 quotations traces how American views of Zionism and Israel changed.
1922 White Paper on Palestine
With intentioned ambiguity, Britain asserted that its goal in Palestine was not to make it wholly Jewish or subordinate the Arab population. Self-determination was not promised. Britain wanted to remain ‘umpire’ between the communities. Naively it thought it could control communal expectations and keep the peace.
