PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat issues a declaration with five American Jewish leaders in an effort to meet U.S. conditions for dialogue and thus strengthen his position as the leader of the Palestinian national movement.
In the waning days of the Reagan administration, Secretary of State George Shultz pushes for U.S.-mediated peace negotiations, including Palestinians, and offers the outlines for a resolution to the conflict.
The agreement affirms the close relationship between the U.S. and Israel based on common goals, celebrates the 3-year-old U.S.-Israel Free Trade Agreement, and institutes multiple regular meetings between Israeli and U.S. officials.
Jimmy Carter, “The U.S.-Iran Relationship, the Shah’s Downfall, Khomeyni’s Rise to Power, and the Hostage Crisis,” an Emory class presentation, Atlanta, March 24, 1985, recorded and transcribed with permission.
Areas of bilateral political and military cooperation are noted to fend off Soviet involvement in the Middle East, to assist Israel in building the Lavi aircraft, to support an independent Lebanon and to promote Arab-Israeli negotiations.
Israel and Lebanon agreed to a treaty in 1983 through U.S. mediation, only for Syria’s dominance and Lebanon’s dysfunction to block ratification.
The United States endorses the application of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 to the West Bank and Gaza, seeks Palestinian control over land and resources, and wants the territories to be affiliated with Jordan.
It calls for building a mutual security relationship and for enhancing strategic cooperation to
deter Soviet threats to the region. Establishment of a consultation framework is a key to the agreement.
Kenneth Stein, “A General Historiographic and Bibliographic Review of Literature on Palestine and the Palestinian Arabs,” Orient, Vol. 1, 1981, 100-112. Introduction Historically, the area that became geographic Palestine under the Mandate fell under the…
After the September 1978 Camp David Accords ended, the Carter administration diligently tried but failed to persuade Jordan’s King Hussein to be part of the follow-on negotiations over Palestinian autonomy. Carter felt Hussein was obstructionist; Hussein did not believe in 1978 that the US could halt Israeli settlement building as promised then. Hussein was correct. He also believed that Palestinian Autonomy might have a negative impact on many Palestinians living in his kingdom. Hussein was skeptical of the US capacity to negotiate for his national interests. At the same time, privately, Egypt’s Sadat was not displeased that the Jordanians remained out of favor with the US, and away from any negotiations that would detract from implementation of Israel’s promised full withdrawal from Sinai, per their 1979 Treaty. In 1988, Hussein stepped away from the West Bank’s future; in 1994, Jordan signed a peace treaty with Israel.
It calls for “recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, a just solution to the
Palestinian problem, the right to self-determination, [and] for PLO association to the negotiations.”
The CIA report details Iran’s aggressive foreign policy of promoting Islam as a radical platform for governance, noting also the new regime’s vigorous anti-U.S. outlook. Viewing Iran exclusively as an asset in the Cold War and not comprehending the potential power of political Islam developing with Iran proved to be one of the greatest oversights in U.S. Middle East foreign policy in the last 100 years.
Showing its public opposition to Israeli actions in the lands taken in the June 1967 war, an area that the Carter Administration
wanted reserved for Palestinian self-rule, it ‘strongly deplores’ Israel’s settlement policies. Passage of the resolution three weeks
prior to the New York and Connecticut presidential primaries, cause many Jewish voters to vote in favor of Ted Kennedy
and not for Carter, helping to splinter the Democratic Party.
This was the second UNSC Resolution within four months supported by the Carter administration condemning Israel’s settlement building in the territories. It too greatly angered the Israeli government and American supporters of Israel.
Signed sixteen months after Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem, it calls for establishment of diplomatic relations, staged Israeli withdrawal from Sinai, and American security arrangements to support the bilateral treaty.
If Egypt breaches the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty, the US will enhance its presence in the area, provide military and economic supplies to Israel, and vote against any UN resolution contrary to the treaty.
Nine days before the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli treaty, U.S. National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski and Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud carry out an extraordinarily frank conversation. It includes bilateral relations, common fears of regional turbulence and Anwar Sadat’s estrangement from other Arab leaders.
In an unprecedented presidential political gamble, President Carter meets Prime Minister Begin and then President Sadat to tie up loose ends for an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, signed two weeks later. During the trip, he delivers the first Knesset address by a U.S. president.
Embedded in the September 17, 1978 Camp David Accords were broad outlines for an Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty and a Framework for Palestinian autonomy. The details of both remained to be negotiated. Yet, obstacles to implementation of the Accords appeared almost immediately.
Dayan made the case to the knesset that it should vote in favor of the Camp David Accords stipulating why doing so would be in Israel’s long term interest. He stated specifically that there was no promise for a Palestinian state, IDF forces would remain in the West Bank, negotiations for a peace treaty would continue, and these agreements were signed by the President of Egypt and the President of the US.
Begin summarizes in great detail the contents and the political implications of the recently signed Camp David Accords. He reiterated Israel’s continued presence in Jerusalem, per its June 1967 Law, and clarified the terms used in the agreements.
This document is the only known official written transcript of the Begin-Carter discussion held at the end of the 1978 Camp David negotiations about any moratorium on Israel’s future settlement building. This record shows that Begin made no mention of a moratorium on settlement building for longer than three months. However, President Carter publicly, and Secretary of State Vance, in his memoirs, Hard Choices disagreed, believing the time mentioned was five years. For the remainder of Carter’s presidency, and for the rest of his post-presidency, the ‘building of Israeli settlements’ became a key point of contention in shaping his relationship with Israel.
Begin agrees to halt settlements construction only for the duration of the peace treaty negotiations, not until Palestinian autonomy is applied. Carter erroneously believes that Begin made a promise to halt settlements.
With President Carter mediating, Sadat and Begin agree to two outlines: a framework for a treaty between them and to define Palestinian “autonomy,” not self-determination or a state for them.
