“American Foreign Policy Towards the Arab-Israeli Conflict and Its Regional Context” Kenneth W. Stein, Junior/Senior Colloquium, Undergraduate or Graduate, Emory University, Spring 2014 This class focuses on American foreign policy in the Middle East over…
September 10, 2013 Speaker: Professor William Quandt, Professor Emeritus, University of Virginia, speaks at the “Yom Kippur War — A Launching Pad for U.S. Middle East Policy” conference, held in Tel Aviv by the Institute…
In Jerusalem, Obama affirms the bonds in the U.S.-Israeli relationship, praises Israel’s democracy, and calls for Israelis to support a democratic Palestinian state and Palestinians to recognize Israel as a Jewish state.
Focusing on the Arab Spring and Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, President Obama seeks democratic reform in the region and advocates two states for two peoples based on the 1967 lines with land swaps.
Barack Obama, while seeking to improve America’s image by urging an end to violence and stereotypes, emphasizes the need for a two-state Israeli-Palestinian solution as part of a reset of U.S. relations with the Muslim world. His advocacy of soft power distinguishes his administration from George W. Bush’s use of force. Nine years later, Donald Trump’s secretary of state, also in Cairo, heavily criticizes the Obama soft-power approach.
Delivering the third address by a U.S. president to the Knesset, George W. Bush celebrates Israel’s 60th birthday by emphasizing the enduring U.S.-Israel relationship based on shared values.
Since the June 1967 war, more than two dozen mediators have engaged in Arab‐ Israeli diplomacy seeking to clarify one underlying question: under what conditions and over what period of time would Israel relinquish land attained in the June 1967 War, and what kind of understanding or agreement from an Arab partner would Israel receive in return? The Annapolis Conference in 2007, was again a Transaction but not a Transformation of Outcomes.
Israeli Prime Minister Olmert and Palestinian leader Abbas meet near Washington to kick-start negotiations by implementing previous promises; the U.S. is to judge performance to see if a treaty can result. It does not.
“The Palestine Mandate: 1920-1948” Kenneth W. Stein, Introductory, Upper-Level Seminar, Emory University, Spring 2007 This junior/senior colloquium reviews the 30-year history before the creation of Israel in 1948. We try to answer the question “Why…
“History of Modern Israel” Kenneth W. Stein, Freshman Seminar, Emory University, Spring 2006 This undergraduate freshman seminar reviews the history of modern Israel from the inception of Zionism to the post-1967-war period. The four periods…
As a negotiating plan it seeks an end to the conflict with reciprocal performance objectives. Israel accepts the plan with some reservations; Hamas rejects it out of hand. The plan is not enacted.
President Bush castigates PLO leader Arafat for support of terrorism and condemns Palestinian groups that “seek Israel’s destruction.” He also suggests that Israel economically support a viable Palestinian state.
CIA Director George Tenet proposes a cease-fire to stop vicious Palestinian-Israeli violence that carries on for four more years. The plan seeks to restore Palestinian-Israeli security cooperation, end incitement, arrest militants and establish mechanisms for accountability through the U.S.
In the midst of severe Palestinian-Israeli clashes, a committee led by former U.S. Sen. George Mitchell concludes, as had many previous investigations, that the two communities fear and want to live separately from each other. From the report flows the EU-U.N.-U.S. commitment to a two-state solution suggested in the 2003 Roadmap for Peace.
After failing to have PLO leader Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak reach an understanding at Camp David in mid-2000, President Bill Clinton offers a U.S. view of a final-status agreement near the end of his term.
Perspective provides valuable insights in evaluating contemporary diplomacy. Though neither the Palestinian-Israeli-U.S. summit of July 2000 nor the Egyptian-Israeli-U.S. summit of September 1978 ended discussions between Israel and its Arab adversaries, there were more differences than similarities between the two intense and highly charged meetings.
Kenneth W. Stein, “The Arab-Israeli Peace Process,” Middle East Contemporary Survey, Vol. XXIII, 2000, Bruce Maddy-Weitzman (ed.), Westview Press, pp. 48-76. For some aspects of Arab-Israeli relations and negotiations, the beginning and end of 1999…
This was the fourth Palestinian-Israeli Agreement signed that broadly extended Palestinian self-governing arrangements throughout the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. No Palestinian state was promised, essentially only putting substance on the Palestinian autonomy agreement that Menachem Begin signed with Anwar Sadat in the 1978 Camp David Accords.
A day after the signing of the Jordan-Israel peace treaty and hours before addressing the Knesset, U.S. President Bill Clinton meets with his Syrian counterpart, Hafez al-Assad, in Damascus and expresses optimism that Syria will be part of a comprehensive Middle East peace. Assad continues to insist on the full return of the Golan Heights.
Jordan becomes the second Arab country after Egypt (1979) to sign a peace treaty ending the state of war with Israel. The Treaty addresses boundary demarcations, water sharing, police and security cooperation, environmental issues, border crossings, administration of Muslim holy sites and other issues.
Negotiated through the Norwegians, the Oslo Accords call for limited Palestinian rule in some of the territories but do not call for a Palestinian state or an end to settlements.
Clinton expresses gratitude to those who brought about the possibilities of reconciling Israeli and Palestinian aspirations, and acknowledges past leaders, Menachem Begin, Anwar Sadat, Jimmy Carter, and George Bush for advancing the sides toward this moment of signing the Accords on Interim Palestinian Self-Government. Over the next two decades, funds pour into the West Bank and Gaza Strip and elections for a self governing authority are held, but autocratic rule and financial mismanagement prevail, stymying along with other reasons, successful Palestinian self-rule.
From 1970 to 1984, Khaddam served as Syria’s foreign minister, and later he was Syria’s decision-maker for actions in Lebanon. He recounts Syrian anger toward Egyptian President Sadat’s slow but continual bilateral engagement and recognition of Israel. He recalls how Syrian President Assad, after a four-hour meeting, refused Henry Kissinger’s invitation to attend the 1973 Geneva peace conference, not wanting to sanction the closeness Sadat was establishing with Israel and with Washington. These were the same reasons why Syria refused President Carter’s invitation to attend a similar Middle East peace conference in 1977. Khaddam says, “We were shocked by Sadat’s actions.”
Tamir was a 35-year veteran of the Israeli army, attending all Egyptian-Israeli negotiations as a strategic planner. He stated that he thought the 1973 war could have been averted if Golda Meir had responded to Sadat’s pre-war overtures. He credits Henry Kissinger’s negotiating successes of the post-1973-war period as laying the basis for the successful 1978 and 1979 Egyptian-Israeli agreements.
