Israel-Egypt Separation of Forces Agreement, 1974
The US mediates an agreement separating forces in Sinai after the 1973 War; Egyptian and Israeli
generals will negotiate additional details.
In Damascus in December 1973, Kissinger Rebuffed by Assad: “Mr. Secretary, Is It My Turn to Speak?”
Henry Kissinger and and Hafez al-Assad meet in Damascus in December 1973 (credit: Agence France-Presse stringer, released by Getty in January 1974). By Ken Stein Sandwiched between the end of the 1973 October Middle East…
Memorandum of Conversation Between Syrian President Hafez al-Assad and U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, December 1973
U.S. Secretary of State Kissinger failed to persuade Syrian President Assad to attend the December 1973 Geneva Middle East Peace Conference. Assad saw the proposed conference, which it was, a ruse to cover up a “pre-cooked” Israeli-Egyptian arrangement. Assad wanted no part of implicitly supporting any agreement where Israel’s legitimacy might be enhanced.
President Nixon and the Role of Intelligence in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War
Proceedings of a conference concluded that while pre-war intelligence was plentiful and accurate, there was a massive U.S. intelligence failure. Misinterpretation layered on top of preconceived notions of Arab military ineptitude and faith in diplomacy formed the core of the failures.
Sterner: Ken Stein Interviews with Ambassador Michael Sterner, Washington, D.C.
In the 1970s, US State Department Ambassador Michael Sterner was privy to Sadat’s preference for step-by-step diplomacy PRIOR to the 1973 October War. He is critical of the Carter administration for being too satisfied with only a bilateral Egyptian-Israeli Agreement.
Sirry: Ken Stein Interview With Omar Sirry, Cairo, Egypt
Omar Sirry provides intimate details of the diplomatic aftermath of the October 1973 War, the Kilometer 101 talks, Kissinger’s choreography of the December 1973 Middle East peace conference, and admiration for Sadat as the “modern Egyptian Pharaoh” who was not ever politically passive but took repeated initiatives for Egypt’s benefit.
Ghorbal: Ken Stein Interview With Ashraf Ghorbal, Cairo, Egypt
Ashraf Ghorbal represented Egypt to the US for four years from 1968 to 1972 until Egypt restored diplomatic relations with the US in the wake of the October War. Ghorbal was Sadat’s Ambassador in Washington for 11 years until 1984. He credits Sadat with foresight in setting out and fulfilling his diplomatic objectives; breaking from the USSR, aligning Cairo with the US, harnessing US diplomacy under Kissinger and Carter to secure Sinai’s return to Egyptian sovereignty, and even if that meant signing agreements and recognizing Israel.
Rodman: Ken Stein Interview with Peter Rodman, Washington, D.C.
June 10, 1992 (Permission to publish this interview granted by Peter Rodman, June 1992) Peter Rodman, member of United States National Security Council Staff and Special Assistant to Henry Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft, August 1969…
Bashir: Ken Stein Interviews with Tahsin Bashir, Cairo, Egypt
Tahsin Bashir served as spokesman for Egypt and for the Arab League in many capacities from 1963 to 1978. He knew Anwar Sadat intimately, revealing that Sadat kept his own counsel while using others to test political and diplomatic options. His long-term goal was to reorient Egypt away from Moscow and obtain Sinai’s return. Sadat cleverly managed others, including Kissinger, Carter and his own advisers.
U.N. Security Council Resolution 338 on a Cease-Fire and Direct Negotiations After October 1973 War
The October 1973 war broke the logjam over whether diplomacy could unfold to kick off Arab-Israeli negotiations. Sadat used the 1973 war as an engine to harness American horsepower. In that he succeeded because U.S. Secretary of State Kissinger saw Sadat’s leaning to Washington not only as a chance to begin useful negotiations, but also of great significance to weaning the Egyptian president away from Moscow.
The October 1973 War and Its Aftermath — Quotable Quotes and Key Conversations
In carrying out research in the 1990s for Heroic Diplomacy: Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace, Routledge, 1999, I undertook 84 interviews with individuals who participated in the diplomacy.
The 1973 October War — A Short History
Egyptian President Sadat colluded with Syrian President Assad to attack Israel on October 6, 1973. Sadat’s objective was not to seek Israel’s destruction but to gain a limited success by crossing the canal. He also sought to engage American diplomacy to generate talks with Israel that would see Israeli withdrawal from Egyptian land Israel secured in the June 1967 War. Sadat took a large gamble by attacking Israel yet he unfolded a negotiating process with Israel that lasted through 1979. He achieved his overarching long-term priority of having Egyptian Sinai returned to Egyptian sovereignty.
Transcript of Secret Talks Between Egyptian National Security Adviser Hafez Ismail and U.S. National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger, 1973
October 6, 2023, was the 50th anniversary of the outbreak of the October 1973 war. Six months prior, Egyptian President Sadat sent his national security adviser to meet with Secretary of State Kissinger to determine whether the U.S. would engage Egypt and Israel in serious mediation for a Sinai agreement, or a series of them, all focused on Israeli withdrawal and gradual acceptance of Israel. Kissinger did not take Sadat’s overtures seriously. Would American action then have avoided the October 1973 war? All informed analyses say no.
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976: “Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973”
Foreign Relations of the United States 1969-1976, Vol. 25: Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973, published in 2011 and running more than 1,200 pages in covering all of 1973 and the first two weeks of 1974….
Natan Alterman, “Victory as a Scapegoat,” Maariv, 1969
One of Israel’s greatest writers, Natan Alterman, reminded Israel’s accusers in 1969 that well into the 20th century the Palestinians did not even understand themselves as a separate people with a distinctive national identity marking them off from other Arabs. His argument, if framed as a question, might be formulated along these lines: If no one else, not least the Palestinians’ ancestors, saw their distinctive nation in Ottoman Palestine, how can the Zionists be blamed for not seeing one either? Thus, to fault the Zionists for failing to see what was not yet visible to anyone else, including the Palestinians, is to fault them not for suffering from blindness, but for lacking clairvoyance.
U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers’ Plan for an Arab-Israeli Settlement, 1969
Without any consultation with Jerusalem, Israel rejects US proposal for full withdrawal.
U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, 1967
The Resolution calls for unspecified Israel withdrawal from territories in return for right of all states to live in peace. It does not call for full withdrawal. It is the basis of Egyptian (1979) and Jordanian (1994) Treaties with Israel, and PLO (1993) recognition of Israel.
Arab League Summit Resolutions, 1967
Arab states declare “no peace, no negotiation, no recognition” with Israel after their collective defeat in the June 1967 War.
The Allon Plan, 1967
July 26, 1967: The Alon Plan reflects a response to Israel’s pre-1967 war border vulnerability seeking a future west bank arrangement that is not a strategic/geographic threat to Israel and its coastal plain population centers.
Allon Plan Map, 1967
Drafted by Minister of Labor Yigal Allon after the June 1967 war, the plan envisages Israeli retention of a series of settlements and military installations along the Jordan Valley as buffers to a potential Arab land attack from the east.
Israeli Government-Designed Peace Plan After June 1967 War
Following the conclusion of the June 1967 War, the Israeli government sent word to Egypt and Syria seeking peace plan that was intended to jumpstart a peace process with Israel’s belligerent neighbors, Egypt and Syria. The messages were sent through the US, but no response was apparently received.
Abba Eban Speech at U.N. Special Assembly, June 1967
Following the conclusion of the June 1967 War, the Israeli government sent word to Egypt and Syria seeking peace plan that was intended to jumpstart a peace process with Israel’s belligerent neighbors, Egypt and Syria. The messages were sent through the US, but no response was apparently received.
Ambassador Gideon Rafael to the U.N. Security Council, 1967
A detailed outline is presented of events that led to the June 1967 War.
President Nasser Speech to the Egyptian National Assembly, 1967
Nasser asserts that the conflict with Israel is not over access to the Gulf of Aqaba but the very existence of Israel; Egypt’s foes are Britain and the US that support Israel.
