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Documents and Sources
1977-1981: Camp David and the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty

Memorandum of Conversation Between U.S. President Carter and Israeli Prime Minister Begin and Their Delegations, March 1978

After a year in office, the Carter administration’s initiative to achieve a comprehensive Middle East peace between Israel and her Arab neighbors had stalled. At this White House meeting, Dayan reviewed Israel’s concerns about the West Bank and Brzezinski criticized Begin’s autonomy plan for the Palestinians. Begin and Carter’s mutual dislike over policy decisions continued to rise.

Documents and Sources|March 21, 1978

Six July 1978 U.S. Documents on Egyptian-Israeli Narrowing of Differences

The documents reveal the very advanced state of Washington’s success in finding compromise language, of terms, and principles for achieving Egyptian and Israeli agreement on bi-lateral matters and about Palestinian West Bank self-rule (Begin’s ideas). Enormous compatible detail found with significant gaps remaining before the early September Camp Summit started. The US went to Camp David with outlines of possible agreements already drafted.

Documents and Sources|July 1978

Memorandum of Conversation of Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan and Defense Minister Ezer Weizman With U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and Secretary of Defense Harold Brown at Camp David, September 7, 1978

September 7, 1978 Source: Israel State Archives/Box/A4314/1. Notes taken by Elyakim Rubinstein. By the time the American, Egyptian and Israeli delegations convened at Camp David, dozens of direct meetings had occurred between Israeli and Egyptian…

Documents and Sources|September 7, 1978

Secretary of State Cyrus Vance Meets With Israeli Delegation at Camp David, September 14, 1978

This meeting between Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and the Israeli delegation exemplified the injection of US interests and the application of concerted diplomatic pressure on Israel. The Israeli delegation at Camp David repeatedly refused the Carter administration’s vigorous efforts to introduce new formulations that might ultimately result in a Palestinian state.

Documents and Sources|September 14, 1978

Memorandum of Conversation Among President Carter, Secretary of State Vance, Prime Minister Begin and Foreign Minister Dayan at Camp David, September 16, 1978

In this meeting, the contents of which have not been released by the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) but are available from the Israel State Archives (ISA), Begin clearly committed that “perhaps one military settlement” in the Jordan Valley would be established during the three months of the treaty negotiations. The extraordinarily contentious public dispute on the settlements would mar the diplomatic success of the Camp David Accords and add tension to the already fraught Carter-Begin relationship.

Documents and Sources|September 16, 1978
President Sadat and PM Begin greet each other and President Carter at Camp David. Photo: US National Archives

Camp David Accords, 1978

With President Carter mediating, Sadat and Begin agree to two outlines: a framework for a treaty between them and to define Palestinian “autonomy,” not self-determination or a state for them.

Documents and Sources|September 17, 1978

Camp David Conversation Between President Carter and Foreign Minister Dayan on Jerusalem, September 17, 1978

On the last day of negotiations at Camp David, President Carter asked Israel to accept the US position that Jerusalem was occupied territory; Dayan shot back in vigorous opposition, “if we had known that you would declare your position on Jerusalem, we would not have come here. This is the first time that we are confronted with an American position and specifically on the most sensitive issue. All your positions with regards to settlements are insignificant compared to our confrontation on the issue of Jerusalem.”

Documents and Sources|September 17, 1978

Protocol of Conversation Among President Carter, Prime Minister Begin, Secretary of State Vance, Foreign Minister Dayan and Israeli Attorney General Barak, September 1978

This document is the only known official written transcript of the Begin-Carter discussion held at the end of the 1978 Camp David negotiations about any moratorium on Israel’s future settlement building. This record shows that Begin made no mention of a moratorium on settlement building for longer than three months. However, President Carter publicly, and Secretary of State Vance, in his memoirs, Hard Choices disagreed, believing the time mentioned was five years. For the remainder of Carter’s presidency, and for the rest of his post-presidency, the ‘building of Israeli settlements’ became a key point of contention in shaping his relationship with Israel.

Documents and Sources|September 20, 1978

Moshe Dayan’s Remarks to the Knesset About the 1978 Camp David Accords

Dayan made the case to the knesset that it should vote in favor of the Camp David Accords stipulating why doing so would be in Israel’s long term interest. He stated specifically that there was no promise for a Palestinian state, IDF forces would remain in the West Bank, negotiations for a peace treaty would continue, and these agreements were signed by the President of Egypt and the President of the US.

Documents and Sources|September 29, 1978

Memorandum of Conversation Between U.S. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski and Saudi Prince Fahd on Camp David Accords and Other Regional Issues, March 1979

Nine days before the March 26, 1979 signing of the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty, US National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski and Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud carried out an extraordinarily frank conversation. It included discussions about their bilateral relations, common fears of regional turbulence, and Sadat’s building estrangement from Arab leaders.

Documents and Sources|March 17, 1979

U.N. Security Council Resolution 446: Territories Occupied by Israel, 1979

Carefully sandwiched between Carter’s high-risk presidential visit to Egypt and Israel on March 10, 1979—to solve contentious disagreements between Sadat and Begin—and the Peace Treaty signing on March 26, 1979, his administration gladly votes at the UN to deplore Israeli settlement building; including demographic changes in Jerusalem. After the Peace Treaty signing, until it leaves office in 1981, the Carter administration will continue to barrage Israel with condemnation for settlement building.

Documents and Sources|March 22, 1979

U.N. Security Council Resolution 465 on Jerusalem, Settlements and Territories, 1980

Showing its public opposition to Israeli actions in the lands taken in the June 1967 war, an area that the Carter Administration
wanted reserved for Palestinian self-rule, it ‘strongly deplores’ Israel’s settlement policies. Passage of the resolution three weeks
prior to the New York and Connecticut presidential primaries, cause many Jewish voters to vote in favor of Ted Kennedy
and not for Carter, helping to splinter the Democratic Party.

Documents and Sources|March 1, 1980

Summary of President Jimmy Carter’s Meetings With King Hussein, 1980

After the September 1978 Camp David Accords ended, the Carter administration diligently tried but failed to persuade Jordan’s King Hussein to be part of the follow-on negotiations over Palestinian autonomy. Carter felt Hussein was obstructionist; Hussein did not believe in 1978 that the US could halt Israeli settlement building as promised then. Hussein was correct. He also believed that Palestinian Autonomy might have a negative impact on many Palestinians living in his kingdom. Hussein was skeptical of the US capacity to negotiate for his national interests. At the same time, privately, Egypt’s Sadat was not displeased that the Jordanians remained out of favor with the US, and away from any negotiations that would detract from implementation of Israel’s promised full withdrawal from Sinai, per their 1979 Treaty. In 1988, Hussein stepped away from the West Bank’s future; in 1994, Jordan signed a peace treaty with Israel.

Documents and Sources|June 16 and 17, 1980

The Problem of Rafah: Prime Minister Menachem Begin’s Letter to Shlomo Goren, 1981

Prime Minister Menachem Begin argues for the return of Rafah to Egypt; the greater purpose is implementation of the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty, which also meant Israel”s withdrawal from settlements in Sinai near Rafah. Egypt in treaty negotiations with Israel, did not want to have the Gaza Strip again under their administration as they had between 1949 until after the June 1967 War

Documents and Sources|August 17, 1981
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