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Southern Lebanon: The Land of Three Armies

Southern Lebanon: The Land of Three ArmiesCIE+

July 12, 2019 will mark the thirteenth anniversary of the outbreak of the Second Lebanon War; August 14 will mark the anniversary of its end under Security Council Resolution 1701; and discussions will be held at the United Nations headquarters regarding a renewal of UNIFIL’s mandate for another year. The bottom line: another war between Israel and Lebanon did not erupt, mainly due to both sides’ desire to avoid it and, to some extent, also due to UNIFIL’s help in preventing escalation resulting from tactical incidents.

Issues and Analyses|July 3, 2019
What Do Israelis Think About the Golan Heights?

What Do Israelis Think About the Golan Heights?CIE+

On March 25th 2019, President Trump signed an order for the United States’ official recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights. This article surveys Israeli public opinion regarding this issue, and its reactions to this announcement. Surveys have shown a consistently high level of support among Jewish Israelis for keeping the Golan Heights, and while there is some disagreement – Jews across the political spectrum support President Trump’s decision.

Issues and Analyses|March 31, 2019
Israel’s Dilemma Over Syrian Reconstruction

Israel’s Dilemma Over Syrian ReconstructionCIE+

In the coming years, Syria will focus on tending to its war wounds while continuing to serve as a springboard for strategic threats posed by Iran and its proxies against Israel. It is in Israel’s interest that Syria rebuild its infrastructure, experience economic recovery, and benefit from a stable central government. However, there is inherent tension in Israel’s position.

Issues and Analyses|January 27, 2019
The Logic of Israel’s Actions to Contain Iran in Syria and Lebanon

The Logic of Israel’s Actions to Contain Iran in Syria and LebanonCIE+

Israel’s opposition to Iranian entrenchment in Syria and Lebanon is twofold: To prevent Iran from building a beachhead against Israel through its proxies on Israel’s borders, and to impede development of Iran’s nuclear and long-range missile capabilities. Israel is absolutely determined and prepared to act forcefully against Iran, which could lead to a full-scale war. Israel must win this struggle against Iran, one way or another.

Issues and Analyses|September 16, 2018
President Barack Obama’s Speech at Cairo University, 2009

President Barack Obama’s Speech at Cairo University, 2009CIE+

Barack Obama, while seeking to improve America’s image by urging an end to violence and stereotypes, emphasizes the need for a two-state Israeli-Palestinian solution as part of a reset of U.S. relations with the Muslim world. His advocacy of soft power distinguishes his administration from George W. Bush’s use of force. Nine years later, Donald Trump’s secretary of state, also in Cairo, heavily criticizes the Obama soft-power approach.

Documents and Sources|June 4, 2009
Map of Lebanon, 2006

Map of Lebanon, 2006CIE+

The map includes the Israeli border and the Litani River, which is about 18 miles north of the Israeli-Lebanese border and runs roughly parallel to it. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701 from 2006 calls for…

Maps of Israel|2006
Presidents Clinton and Assad Meet in Damascus, 1994

Presidents Clinton and Assad Meet in Damascus, 1994CIE+

A day after the signing of the Jordan-Israel peace treaty and hours before addressing the Knesset, U.S. President Bill Clinton meets with his Syrian counterpart, Hafez al-Assad, in Damascus and expresses optimism that Syria will be part of a comprehensive Middle East peace. Assad continues to insist on the full return of the Golan Heights.

Documents and Sources|October 27, 1994
Khaddam: Ken Stein Interview With Syrian Vice President Abdel Halim Khaddam

Khaddam: Ken Stein Interview With Syrian Vice President Abdel Halim KhaddamCIE+

From 1970 to 1984, Khaddam served as Syria’s foreign minister, and later he was Syria’s decision-maker for actions in Lebanon. He recounts Syrian anger toward Egyptian President Sadat’s slow but continual bilateral engagement and recognition of Israel. He recalls how Syrian President Assad, after a four-hour meeting, refused Henry Kissinger’s invitation to attend the 1973 Geneva peace conference, not wanting to sanction the closeness Sadat was establishing with Israel and with Washington. These were the same reasons why Syria refused President Carter’s invitation to attend a similar Middle East peace conference in 1977. Khaddam says, “We were shocked by Sadat’s actions.”

Interviews|July 18, 1993
Prime Minister Begin’s Report on Treaties With Arab States and His Visit to Romania, 1977

Prime Minister Begin’s Report on Treaties With Arab States and His Visit to Romania, 1977CIE+

Unknown to the Carter administration and one month before it issued the US-Soviet Declaration to convene an international Middle East Peace Conference, Prime Minister Begin tells the cabinet that he learned from the Rumanian president that Sadat wishes to have Israeli and Egyptian representatives meet in secret talks. That bi-lateral Dayan -Tuhami meeting takes place on September 16. Begin refers to advanced drafts of proposed treaties between Israel and each Arab state; he presents details about Rumanian Jewish immigration to Israel.

Documents and Sources|September 4, 1977
Memorandum of Conversation Between President Carter and President Assad, 1977

Memorandum of Conversation Between President Carter and President Assad, 1977CIE+

This meeting was the only one between U.S. President Carter and Syrian President Assad during the Carter administration. Carter wanted to learn Assad’s requirements for an agreement with Israel. Assad doubted that the Saudis would join this process. In the end, Assad made it clear that he was not rushing into an agreement with Israel, even if asked by the United States. Carter acknowledged knowing little about the Palestinian refugee issue and said the U.S. was committed to the security of Israel.

Documents and Sources|May 9, 1977
Memorandum of Conversation Between Syrian President Hafez al-Assad and U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, December 1973

Memorandum of Conversation Between Syrian President Hafez al-Assad and U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, December 1973CIE+

U.S. Secretary of State Kissinger failed to persuade Syrian President Assad to attend the December 1973 Geneva Middle East Peace Conference. Assad saw the proposed conference, which it was, a ruse to cover up a “pre-cooked” Israeli-Egyptian arrangement. Assad wanted no part of implicitly supporting any agreement where Israel’s legitimacy might be enhanced.

Documents and Sources|December 15, 1973
Explainer: 1973 October War — A Short History

Explainer: 1973 October War — A Short History

Egyptian President Sadat colluded with Syrian President Assad to attack Israel on October 6, 1973. Sadat’s objective was not to seek Israel’s destruction but to gain a limited success by crossing the canal. He also sought to engage American diplomacy to generate talks with Israel that would see Israeli withdrawal from Egyptian land Israel secured in the June 1967 War. Sadat took a large gamble by attacking Israel yet he unfolded a negotiating process with Israel that lasted through 1979. He achieved his overarching long-term priority of having Egyptian Sinai returned to Egyptian sovereignty.

Explainer Articles, Ken's Blog|October 1973|Spanish
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