Though written in May 2017, Paul Rivlin, a Moshe Dayan Center researcher analyzes a rich trove of data to analyze the Gaza Strip’s troubling economic character. Five major reasons are enumerated for its dilemmas: absence of investment, extraordinary high unemployment, a very young population, inability of goods and services to go in and out of the strip, and Hamas’s stranglehold on taxation and spending.
During the 1967 Six-Day War, the State of Israel conquered territory that tripled its size. Though Israel later ceded the clear majority of that territory in the context of a peace agreement with Egypt, the war changed the contours of Israeli politics and opened an ideological rift that has been at its core ever since.
The Israel Democracy Institute and Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) held a two day forum at the end of May 2017, on possible scenarios for the future of Israel.
Placing Jewish destiny into Jewish hands was why Zionism emerged at the end of the 19th century. Acquiring political power to promote Jewish security is how a Jewish state was created.
Coming up, fifty years after the June 1967 War. How many times have I taught the causes and effects, or written about the War? Hundreds of times in forty years.
America’s new president has the potential to thoroughly shake up international relations. Volker Perthes lays out five theses that researchers and policymakers will need to address.
The October 1973 War was 43 years ago this month. What follows is the US Intelligence Estimate when the war started on October 6
Israelis are divided on the impact and future of the territories gained in the June 1967 war, according to the June 2016 Israel Democracy Institute Peace Index.
Jeffrey and Eisenstadt in their analyses, US Military Engagement in the Broader Middle East, focus on the inheritance of the Obama administration’s general military disengagement from the region and the downward spiral of stability there.
Hamas has long sought to stymie Egyptian control over the peninsula and keep its weapons smuggling routes open, but its latest opportunistic gamble on local jihadists carries wider dangers that should be nipped in the bud by sponsors Turkey and Qatar.
In the interest of securing any deal rather than the right deal – politics over principle – the president and the diplomats he sent to negotiate seem to have forgotten or perhaps never learned why Iran must not get a nuclear weapon.
On July 14, 2015, Iran and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany (P5+1) concluded a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) concerning the future of Iran’s nuclear program.
Congressional rejection of the nuclear deal wouldn’t be pretty, but a messy domestic political battle is a far cry from the president’s warnings of potential war with Iran.
The agreement will not prevent Iran from having a nuclear weapons capability. It will not require the dismantling of Iran’s nuclear enrichment infrastructure. It will however reduce that infrastructure for the next 10 to 15 years.
The lifting of sanctions on Iran will allow Teheran to increase its support for terrorist groups across the region, and bolster Iran’s political and military power.
Yossi Kuperwasser, “The Struggle over the Iranian Nuclear Programme, ” Fathom, Winter/2015
There is a major, and unfounded, underlying assumption behinds calls for Israel to accept Hamas’s conditions: that Hamas is genuinely motivated by its responsibility for the welfare of Gazans.
Many recollections remain from the Egyptian-Syrian surprise attack on Israel on Yom Kippur in 1973. The war set in motion a diplomatic process that eventually culminated in the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty.
Lessons from the overthrow of the Morsi government in Egypt, the restart of Palestinian-Israeli talks, and the civil war in Syria remind us how difficult it is to judge whether American engagement is good or bad in the long run.
Should the United States become centrally or peripherally involved in monitoring a cease-fire and the movement of a cease-fire into a new status-quo for Gaza, the contents of this MOU could constitute a workable outline for helping enforce calm in Gaza and on its borders.
“The Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace: Israel’s Disengagement from the Gaza Strip: Precedents, Motivations and Outcomes” Zionism Fulfilled.- Israel’s preemptive physical disengagement from the Gaza Strip in August 2005 was the result of a national consensus;…
The findings of the Or Commission on the October 2000 clashes between Arab and Jewish Israelis provide context to the response of Arab citizens to the May 2021 Israeli-Palestinian fighting.
By Kenneth W. Stein “The Link Between War and Diplomacy: The Kilometer 101 Talks After the October 1973 War,” in Richard B. Parker (ed.), The October War: A Retrospective, University Press of Florida, 2001, pp….
The rise of Hamas marks a shift in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from a struggle between national movements or states to a battle between religions, making a resolution all the more difficult to achieve.
