2013 Kenneth W. Stein, “Evolving a Diplomatic Legacy From the October War: The US, Egyptian, and Israeli Triangle,” in Asaf Siniver (ed.), The October 1973 War: Politics, Diplomacy, and Legacy, London: Hurst and Co., 2013,…
Introduction With an extraordinary legaI mind and life of civil service to the state of Israel, Elyakim Rubinstein served as an estimable Supreme Court Judge, as legal adviser during the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations, worked closely with…
The Jordanian, Israeli, Palestinian Triangle Ken Stein January 27, 2023 From the June 1967 War, when Israel captured lands on the West Bank of the Jordan River, portions of Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip and the…
Udi Dekel and Noa Shusterman, with permission of INSS
On a stormy evening on Sept. 17, 1978, with President Jimmy Carter as their witness, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin stepped to a table at the White House and signed the Camp David Accords, consisting of two framework agreements: an outline for the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty and a scaffold for planning self-rule for the Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, held by Israel since the June 1967 war. Six months later, on March 26, 1979, the three men gathered again at the White House to sign the peace treaty. But their path to the ceremony 40 years ago was hardly smooth.
Despite ongoing efforts to improve relations between Fatah and Hamas, there is no serious hope of reconciliation between them in the foreseeable future. Noteworthy against this background are the attempts by Hamas and other opposition organizations to challenge both the PLO’s standing as the sole representative of the Palestinian people, and the senior standing of Fatah within the PLO. The Palestinian public, which saw the PLO as its sole representative, understands that it can no longer ignore the dominance of Hamas, which has competed with Fatah for their hearts and minds since 1987.
Notwithstanding the signing of the Abraham Accords (1920) and the growing prominence of the cooperation between Israel and the Arab Gulf states, including on security matters, the road toward its establishment increasingly rests with American involvement or leadership. Will this be a Biden priority when he visits the region over the summer?
Eight years after a series of uprisings erupted across the Middle East, there is a debate whether a relatively stable order (old or new) has taken hold in the Middle East, or whether the region remains unstable and, therefore, will continue to produce waves of unrest.
March 26, 2025 By Ken Stein The ripe conditions that prefaced the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli treaty and might presage additional Arab-Israeli agreements are almost totally absent in 2025. Why? Today, there is an absence of political…
In 13 days in September 1978, Egypt and Israel made a two part agreement: an outline for an Egyptian – Israeli Treaty ending their state of war and an agreement on where and how the Palestinians would engage in self-rule. With great clarity and insight, Hermann Eilts, Sam Lewis, Hal Saunders, and Bill Quandt recall the ups and downs of those negotiations.
In August 2021, the U.S. withdrew its military from Afghanistan, ending America’s longest war. Correctly, we needed to prevent another 9/11 on our doorsteps. We still have that imperative. Our departure does not diminish America’s need for stable allies, like Israel and Arab states. The US should build an effective alliance system among them. We should have a small, substantive and selective US footprint in the region for support of friends and deterrence of foes, not for nation-building.
Since the 1920s the Sacred Esplanade of Jerusalem came to symbolise the bone of contention in the conflict over Palestine. The maintenance and even definition of the lines of division between the communities was a clear aim of the British authorities from 1920-1948. The communal/religious conflicts intensified after 1967 with the Israeli capture of East Jerusalem and other Arab-populated territory, which left neither side fully content.
Nine pre-conditions that enabled Arab-Israeli negotiations to unfold successfully in the 1970s and 1990s are not present today. Egyptian-Israeli and Jordanian-Israeli agreements occurred because the respective sides wanted them and needed them.
November 25, 2020 By Ken Stein Leadership is about knowing your objectives and adjusting and implementing the tactics to accomplish them. Leadership is also about choices and consequences. It is about making political trade-offs. November…
Constructive ambiguity is a concept sometimes utilized in international negotiations to overcome remaining, unresolved issues. In such cases, parties agree to adopt a word or an expression that is so ambiguous they can both accept it—typically allowing them to reach an agreement without departing from their original, contradictory positions on certain contentious issues. This article describes instances in Arab-Israeli relations in which fundamental disagreements between the parties have been resolved—in fact, papered over—through constructive ambiguity.
Six weeks before the UAE and Israel announced their mutual recognition in August 2020, Tel Aviv University Professor Eyal Zisser published a comprehensive perspective defining the compatible national interests for Arab state and Israeli mutual cooperation. Then resolving the Palestinian issue was still considered the key blockage to entrenching those ties publically. That obstacle was removed with the signing of the September 15, 2020 Bahrain-Israel-UAE Agreement.
On August 13, 2020, when the United Arab Emirates agreed to pursue full normal relations with Israel, without any Israeli withdrawal from lands it won in the June 1967 war, the sacred negotiating formula, “Land for Peace” that had dominated Arab-Israeli talks for half a century abruptly ended.
Israeli prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu has repeatedly declared that he will be putting forward his proposal for West Bank annexation as early as July 1. Yet uncertainties about his plans still abound, indicating that this timetable may not be met despite his assertions to the contrary.
In January, President Donald Trump published his long-awaited plan for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: “Peace to Prosperity: A Vision to Improve the Lives of the Palestinian and Israeli People.” The president’s vision calls for Israel to annex roughly 30% of the West Bank – half of Area C – with Areas A, B and the balance of Area C allocated to the future State of Palestine (which is also slated to receive additional land, currently a sovereign part of Israel, of roughly equal size to lands to be annexed by Israel).
With permission, read full article at Washington Institute for Near East Policy. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/wrestling-with-annexation-the-elusive-search-for-a-policy-rationale As soon as next month, Israel’s new government could approve plans to annex a substantial portion of the West Bank. The trigger…
A Palestinian public opinion poll conducted during this latest Israeli election campaign, January 23-February 11, showed a mere 8% of West Bankers, along with 22% of Gazans, reporting that the vote would probably turn out “better for the Palestinians.” Many more expected Israel’s election to make things worse for them: a third of West Bankers, and nearly half (46%) of Gazans. The remainder—half in the West Bank, and a quarter in Gaza—anticipated that it would “probably make very little difference either way.”
“The Deal of the Century,” formulated by the Trump administration, is presented as a new paradigm for a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that also shapes the architecture of a new Middle East. In order to keep the State of Israel Jewish, democratic, secure, and moral, it is necessary to adopt the components of the plan that both enhance security and at the same time can jumpstart the process of separation from the Palestinians, thus creating a better strategic reality for Israel.
Three different Palestinian polls show that the West Bank and Gaza publics roundly reject the U.S. Administration’s peace plan, by margins of around 90 percent. But the latest poll, conducted by the Palestinian Center for Public Opinion (PCPO) also shows that most Palestinians now also reject an armed confrontation or intifadah against Israel—opting instead for a focus on pragmatic improvements on the ground, or even on renewed peace talks.
