Arab-Israeli Negotiations

From 1898 to 1948, Zionism evolved from an idea to a concrete reality: the actual establishment of the Jewish state, Israel. Slowly, a few immigrating Jews created facts by linking people to the land. For half a century, fortuity and fortitude made the Zionist undertaking a reality. They exhibited pragmatism and gradually constructed a nucleus for a state. Through perseverance Zionists empowered themselves.

British Foreign Ministry promises to set up a Jewish National Home in Palestine with no harm to non-Jewish populations, or to Jews living elsewhere who might want to support a Jewish home.

April 25, 1920 In April 1920, the San Remo Conference in Italy determined the boundaries of the territories captured by the allies during World War I. These included boundaries for the political existence of Syria,...

International legitimacy is granted to establish a Jewish National Home in Palestine. Rules for its establishment clearly give Jews in Palestine distinct advantages over the local Arab population.

After outbreak of communal violence, the British investigatory committee suggests partition of Palestine, seeking to create two states for two peoples.

Pressure from Arab leaders in states surrounding Palestine, growing instability in the eastern Mediterranean, and a firm opposition voiced by the British High Commissioner in Egypt, Miles Lampson, caused the British to withdraw the idea of resolving the Arab-Zionist conflict with a two-state solution. Instead, heavy restrictions were imposed in 1939 on the growth of the Jewish National home. Coincidently this policy statement is issued, two days after Nazi Germany attacks Jewish, homes, businesses and synagogues, in what came to be known as Kristallnacht.

From the beginning of the Palestine Mandate in 1920, Arabs in Palestine opposed Zionism; Arab states and leaders joined the opposition to Zionism in the 1930s. After WWII, Arab states were vehement in their opposition to Zionism, though the merits of their arguments were genuine, Arab leaders were more interested in controlling the land of Palestine than in the Palestinians themselves.

Kenneth W. Stein, “Zionist Land Acquisition: a core element in establishing Israel,” in Michael J. Cohen, (ed.) The British Mandate in Palestine: A Centenary Volume, 1920-2020, Routledge, 2020, pp. 189-204.

Cohen shows regular Palestinian Arab collaboration with Zionists before Israel was established and asserts that local and family loyalties, with identity to villages, and not to a nation, did severe harm to the Palestinian struggle against Jewish nation building. (Presented with permission of the author, June 2024).

The UN recommended establishing Arab and Jewish states in Palestine, with an international regime for Jerusalem. Zionists were jubilant; Arab states and the Palestinians were indignant and rejected two state solution. No Arab state is established, Israel is in 1948

The head of Arab League says Palestine may be lost in a confrontation with the Zionists, but emphatically states that war is the Arab’s only option.

The UN suggested partition of Palestine into Arab and Jewish states with an economic union between them and an internationalization of Jerusalem.

In recognition of the anniversary of the United Nations' passage of Resolution 181 on November 29, 1947, we present our newest three-part whiteboard videos providing context to this historical moment in Jewish history.

The Declaration recounts the Jewish connection to the Land of Israel, the birth of Zionism and U.N. recognition of a Jewish state’s legitimacy. It also promises that the state will be a democracy for all its citizens.

Otherwise known as Israel’s War of Independence, or, “the nakbah” or disaster to the Arab world because a Jewish state was established, the war was fought between the newly established Jewish state of Israel opposed by Palestinian irregulars, and armies from five Arab states. Official beginning of the war is usually given as May 14, 1948, the date Israel declared itself an independent Jewish state, but the war’s first of four phases began in November 1947. Lasting for two years, the war ended with armistice agreements signed in 1949 between Israel and four Arab states.

In this 46-minute video recorded Dec. 25, 2022, two emeritus professors from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem joined President Ken Stein to discuss the key period when the Zionists succeeded in creating and securing a...

The resolution states that refugees “wishing to return to their homes and live at peace (with Israel) should do so or compensation be paid…” Israel opposes the idea because it jeopardizes Israel as a majority Jewish state.

Steady disintegration of Palestinian Arab society from 1945-1949 is detailed by five Arab and non-Arab historians citing local social cleavages, economic impoverishment, fear, indebtedness, and political dysfunction.

One of four agreements Israel signed in 1949 with Arab neighbors, it does not end “state of war,” between Israel and Arab states. No treaty is signed until 1979.

In the aftermath of the 1948 War of Independence, Israel signed armistice agreements with Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. These armistice lines lasted until the immediate aftermath of the June 1967 War. Israel has 1068 kilometers in land borders. Egypt 208 km, Gaza Strip 59 km, Jordan 307 km, Lebanon 81 km, Syria 83 km, and the West Bank 330 km; its Mediterranean coastline 273 km. CIA The World Factbook – Israel

The Palestinian Arab elite chose to boycott in virtually all British and U.N. overtures to them from 1920 to 1948, with egregious consequences. The Palestinian Arab elite shunned British officials who were staunch supporters of...

Palestine Liberation Organization seeks Israel’s destruction through armed struggle. It retains this stated policy until December 1988.

Arab states declare “no peace, no negotiation, no recognition” with Israel after their collective defeat in the June 1967 War.

The Resolution calls for unspecified Israel withdrawal from territories in return for right of all states to live in peace. It does not call for full withdrawal. It is the basis of Egyptian (1979) and Jordanian (1994) Treaties with Israel, and PLO (1993) recognition of Israel.

October 6, 2023, was the 50th anniversary of the outbreak of the October 1973 war. Six months prior, Egyptian President Sadat sent his national security adviser to meet with Secretary of State Kissinger to determine whether the U.S. would engage Egypt and Israel in serious mediation for a Sinai agreement, or a series of them, all focused on Israeli withdrawal and gradual acceptance of Israel. Kissinger did not take Sadat’s overtures seriously. Would American action then have avoided the October 1973 war? All informed analyses say no.

Sadat tells the Israeli people and world that he seeks a just and durable peace, which is not a separate peace, between Israel and Egypt. He equates statehood for the Palestinians as their right to return.

In this animated white board video, we explore Jimmy Carter’s efforts at achieving peace in the Middle East.

Our second animated white board video covers in detail what took place during the thirteen days of negotiations at Camp David in September 2018. The video begins with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s priority on getting back the Sinai Peninsula which Egypt lost to Israel in the June 1967 War and the origins of direct negotiations between Israel and Egypt following Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem in November 1977.

With President Carter mediating, Sadat and Begin agree to two outlines: a framework for a treaty between them and to define Palestinian “autonomy,” not self-determination or a state for them.

Signed sixteen months after Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem, it calls for establishment of diplomatic relations, staged Israeli withdrawal from Sinai, and American security arrangements to support the bilateral treaty.

Since its inception in 1988, Hamas has been crystal clear about its total opposition to Zionism and Israel. It opposes any kind of negotiations or agreements that recognize Israel as a reality, and its more extreme spokesmen regularly incite or celebrate the killing of Jews.

Four days before signing the Oslo Accords, the PLO and Israel recognize each other. Israel’s Rabin worries about the growth of Hamas influence, thus elevates the PLO through international recognition.

Negotiated through the Norwegians, the Accords call for limited Palestinian rule in some of the territories; it did not call for a Palestinian state or an end to settlements.

Jordan becomes the second Arab country after Egypt (1979) to sign a peace treaty ending the state of war with Israel. The Treaty addresses boundary demarcations, water sharing, police and security cooperation, environmental issues, border crossings, administration of Muslim holy sites and other issues.

Jan. 31, 2023 In this 48-minute webinar recorded Jan. 31, 2023, two experts on Jordan, the Washington Institute’s Ghaith al-Omari and Tel Aviv University’s Asher Susser, help CIE President Ken Stein explore more than a...

Twenty-five years after the signing of the Jordan-Israel peace treaty, the bilateral relationship is in a challenging phase, but nothing should obscure the crucial benefits strategic and security cooperation affords to both sides, and the centrality of the relations to each side’s national security.

Perspective provides valuable insights in evaluating contemporary diplomacy. Though neither the Palestinian-Israeli-U.S. summit of July 2000 nor the Egyptian-Israeli-U.S. summit of September 1978 ended discussions between Israel and its Arab adversaries, there were more differences than similarities between the two intense and highly charged meetings.

Israeli Prime Minister Olmert and Palestinian leader Abbas meet in Washington to ‘kick start’ negotiations by implementing previous promises; the US is to judge performance to see if a treaty can result. It does not.

Quietly pursued in the past, long-standing strategic ties between Israel and Gulf states have become public. Building on the historic Joint Agreement signed between Israel and the UAE in August 2020, the Abraham Accords serve as a framework for normalizing diplomatic relations between Israel, the UAE and Bahrain.

October 4, 2024 Source: https://english.khamenei.ir/news/11146/Palestinian-and-Lebanese-Resistance-pushed-back-Zionist-regime Iranian leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s speech is a synopsis of Iran’s hatred of Israel and the United States and the need to rid the region of foreigners. Khamenei provides deep insights into...

October 1991 Kenneth W. Stein and Samuel W. Lewis, Making Peace Among Arabs and Israelis: Lessons From Fifty Years of Negotiating Experience, United States Institute of Peace, Washington, October 1991, second printing 1992, 69 pages.

For more than 100 years, Arabs and Muslims have expressed multiple attitudes toward Jews, Zionism and Israel. The remarks stretch along a spectrum from hatred, including the absolute, uncompromising need to prevent a Jewish state...

The Sharif of Mecca and Sir Henry McMahon, a British official in Cairo, speaking for the Foreign Office exchanged letters about the current war effort against the Turks, and the future political status of specific Arab lands in the Ottoman Empire. McMahon said then and he repeated the statement again in 1937, that the area of Palestine was definitely excluded from any area to be provided to an Arab leader after WWI. The British allowed the area of Palestine to develop as a "national home for the Jewish people."

Britain and France secretly divide the Arab provinces of the former Ottoman Empire to meet their own geopolitical interests; no concern offered to political aspirations of indigenous populations.

The European agreement that identified the states of the Middle East, 1920.

Palestine's High Commissioner Chancellor seeks to halt the Jewish National Home in favor of the Arabs. He fails to overcome the Zionist drive and Arab unwillingness to cooperate with his intentions.

These Palestinian Arab newspaper materials and other quotations about Arab land sales to the Zionists during the British Mandate were first read and collected at the National Library at the Hebrew University on the Givat...

A map shows the partition of Palestine proposed by the Peel Commission in 1937.

Zionist leaders—David Ben-Gurion, Chaim Weizmann and Eliezer Kaplan—learning of the British intent to limit severely the Jewish national home’s growth. Increasingly, they are also aware of the German government’s hostilities towards European Jewry.

Despite an officially anti-Zionist stance, the Soviet Union, hoping to adopt Israel as a Soviet proxy, takes a pragmatic stance and supports the U.N. partition plan of Palestine into separate Arab and Jewish states.

Apart from the Zionist movement and the Jewish community in Palestine, the role of President Truman, however, was the most important factor enabling the establishment of the Jewish state.

In “The Arabs and the Approaching War with Israel, 1945-1948,” Yaacov Shimoni reviews in detail the period from the early 1940s to May 1948, examining decisions made by Arab leaders toward Palestine and Zionism. He concludes that disunity among Arab states, jealousies, and disorganization plagued Arab preparations for the expected coming war with the Zionists.

With crisp analysis, Haganah Commander Yigal Allon, later a Prime Minister of Israel attributes Israel's successes to multiple factors including the absence of a centralized Arab command, limited Arab military training, underestimating the potential fighting capabilities of local Arabs, and Israel's success in integrating its citizens into the war effort.

Further reinforcing the Truman Doctrine, the US President promises military or economic aid to any Middle Eastern country resisting Communist aggression.

A detailed outline is presented of events that led to the June 1967 War.

Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser declares in a speech to Arab trade unionists that Egypt, Syria and other Arab states intend to destroy Israel.

With tensions on its borders, Eshkol tries to reassure Israeli public. Instead he gives a “painfully faltering” speech. Popular and party disgruntlement follow, opening the way for Eshkol to turn over the Defense Ministry two days later to General Moshe Dayan.

Following the conclusion of the June 1967 War, the Israeli government sent word to Egypt and Syria seeking peace plan that was intended to jumpstart a peace process with Israel’s belligerent neighbors, Egypt and Syria. The messages were sent through the US, but no response was apparently received.

Without any consultation with Jerusalem, Israel rejects US proposal for full withdrawal.

Egyptian President Sadat colluded with Syrian President Assad to attack Israel on October 6, 1973. Sadat's objective was not to seek Israel's destruction but to gain a limited success by crossing the canal. He also sought to engage American diplomacy to generate talks with Israel that would see Israeli withdrawal from Egyptian land Israel secured in the June 1967 War. Sadat took a large gamble by attacking Israel yet he unfolded a negotiating process with Israel that lasted through 1979. He achieved his overarching long-term priority of having Egyptian Sinai returned to Egyptian sovereignty.

In carrying out research in the 1990s for Heroic Diplomacy: Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace, Routledge, 1999, I undertook 84 interviews with individuals who participated in the diplomacy.

Tahsin Bashir served as spokesman for Egypt and for the Arab League in many capacities from 1963 to 1978. He knew Anwar Sadat intimately, revealing that Sadat kept his own counsel while using others to test political and diplomatic options. His long-term goal was to reorient Egypt away from Moscow and obtain Sinai's return. Sadat cleverly managed others, including Kissinger, Carter and his own advisers.

Ashraf Ghorbal represented Egypt to the US for four years from 1968 to 1972 until Egypt restored diplomatic relations with the US in the wake of the October War. Ghorbal was Sadat's Ambassador in Washington for 11 years until 1984. He credits Sadat with foresight in setting out and fulfilling his diplomatic objectives; breaking from the USSR, aligning Cairo with the US, harnessing US diplomacy under Kissinger and Carter to secure Sinai's return to Egyptian sovereignty, and even if that meant signing agreements and recognizing Israel.

June 10, 1992 (Permission to publish this interview granted by Peter Rodman, June 1992) Peter Rodman, member of United States National Security Council Staff and Special Assistant to Henry Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft, August 1969...

Omar Sirry provides intimate details of the diplomatic aftermath of the October 1973 War, the Kilometer 101 talks, Kissinger’s choreography of the December 1973 Middle East peace conference, and admiration for Sadat as the “modern Egyptian Pharaoh” who was not ever politically passive but took repeated initiatives for Egypt’s benefit.

In the 1970s, US State Department Ambassador Michael Sterner was privy to Sadat's preference for step-by-step diplomacy PRIOR to the 1973 October War. He is critical of the Carter administration for being too satisfied with only a bilateral Egyptian-Israeli Agreement.

Proceedings of a conference concluded that while pre-war intelligence was plentiful and accurate, there was a massive U.S. intelligence failure. Misinterpretation layered on top of preconceived notions of Arab military ineptitude and faith in diplomacy formed the core of the failures.

The US mediates an agreement separating forces in Sinai after the 1973 War; Egyptian and Israeli generals will negotiate additional details.

The US promises to implement an Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement and have the Suez Canal cleared. Israel sees eventual repopulation of Suez Canal cities as a sign that Egypt will not go to war again soon.

On Golan Heights, Israel agrees to limited withdrawal; UN places forces between Syrian and Israeli armies. With few exceptions this border remains almost totally quiet for more than forty years.

President Ford promises that the US will give “weight” to any future Israeli peace agreement with Syria that Israel should remain in the Golan Heights.

Cairo and Jerusalem agree to additional Sinai withdrawals, demilitarized zones, limited force zones and, importantly, placement of US civilians in Sinai to monitor observance of agreement.

The US promises coordination with Israel on resumed negotiations, not to negotiate or recognize the PLO until it recognizes Israel’s right to exist, and accepts UNSC Resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973).

For the first time a US State Department official states the “legitimate interests of the Palestinian Arabs must be taken into account in the negotiating of an Arab-Israeli peace.”

Outlining an Arab-Israeli settlement, it calls for Israeli withdrawal to “almost the pre-June War borders” and “extensive Palestinian autonomy.” The Carter Administration embraces the report for its policy.

Carefully stated, Carter says that there should be a homeland for the Palestinian refugees. He is the first US president to assert the need for a place for the Palestinians and for Israel’s right to exist in peace.

In their first meeting, Anwar Sadat and Jimmy Carter have a vividly detailed exchange about negotiations between Israel and Arab parties, particularly Egypt.

This meeting between President Carter and Syrian President Assad was the only one they had during the Carter presidency. Carter wanted to learn what Assad’s requirements were for an agreement with Israel: borders, security, nature of peace and willingness of other Arabs join. Assad doubted that the Saudis would join this process. When the conversation was finished, Assad made it clear that he was not rushing into an agreement with Israel, even if asked by the United States. Carter acknowledged to Assad that he knew little about the Palestinian refugee issue. Carter did tell Assad that the U.S. was committed to the security of Israel. Assad did not say that the Soviet Union’s participation at a conference was necessary; in fact, Assad noted how difficult his relations were with Moscow in the immediate past. Assad did tell Carter that it was Secretary of State Vance who first raised the possibility of Moscow attending such a peace conference. From American diplomatic sources we learn that Assad was pleased to have been squired by Carter. For their part, the Israelis were deeply anxious about Carter’s positive statements about Assad after this meeting.

Following his surprise electoral victory in May, Prime Minister Menachem Begin traveled to Washington in an effort to establish a positive rapport with President Carter. While this initial meeting was cordial, each met the others’ stubbornness, a characteristic that would keep their relationship respectful but acrid for years to come.

The Romanian president told Menachem Begin that Egyptian President Sadat was interested in negotiations with the Israelis. This secret visit took place three weeks before Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan met secretly with Egyptian Vice President Hasan Tuhami in Morocco.

Begin welcomes Sadat’s bold initiative, seeking an end to the conflict with other Arab states through negotiated treaties. Begin invites other Arab leaders to negotiate as Sadat was doing.

Five weeks after Egyptian President Anwar Sadat flew to Jerusalem in November 1977, to accelerate Egyptian – Israeli negotiations, Begin brought to President Jimmy Carter, Israel’s response to Sadat’s peace initiative: political autonomy for the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. No Palestinian state was considered.

As part of a joint statement, President Carter makes promises regarding US’ role in coming Political-Military Committee Talks in Cairo and Jerusalem. Likewise presenting a four-point formula for resolving the conflict, these statements contribute to US-Israeli tensions.

The documents reveal the very advanced state of Washington's success in finding compromise language, of terms, and principles for achieving Egyptian and Israeli agreement on bi-lateral matters and about Palestinian West Bank self-rule (Begin's ideas). Enormous compatible detail found with significant gaps remaining before the early September Camp Summit started. The US went to Camp David with outlines of possible agreements already drafted.

Begin agrees to halt settlements construction only for the duration of the peace treaty negotiations, not until Palestinian autonomy is applied. Carter erroneously believes that Begin made a promise to halt settlements.

In this meeting, the contents of which have not been released by the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) but are available from the Israel State Archives (ISA), Begin clearly committed that “perhaps one military settlement” in the Jordan Valley would be established during the three months of the treaty negotiations. The extraordinarily contentious public dispute on the settlements would mar the diplomatic success of the Camp David Accords and add tension to the already fraught Carter-Begin relationship.

The vast gulf in US and Israeli positions about Palestinian self-determination, the degree of withdrawal from the West Bank, and future borders is precisely stated. A year later at the end of the Camp David negotiations, Israeli and US views had not changed at all.

The United States abstains on a Security Council resolution declaring Israel's Basic Law on Jerusalem to be in violation of international law.

It calls for building a mutual security relationship and for enhancing strategic cooperation to deter Soviet threats to the region. Establishment of a consultation framework is a key to the agreement.

US endorses application of UN Resolution 242 to the West Bank and Gaza, and seeks Palestinian control over land and resources, and for the territories to be affiliated with Jordan.

In Aprili 1987, the Jordanian King and Israeli Labor Party leaders secretly outlined a plan to convene an international conference to move Israeli-Palestinian talks forward through a conference format, but Likud opposition leaders in Israel squashed the idea.

Nabil Shaath was a close adviser to Arafat particularly in the tumultuous 1998-1993 period when the PLO was buffeted by events and bad choices. Shaath praised Secretary Baker, President Bush and Yitzhak Rabin, and was pleased that Palestinians were participating in the Madrid Conference. He hoped for an end to the conflict with Israel in 1992, based on land for peace but held out for the right of Palestinian return for that to happen. In 2023 he is a foreign policy adviser to Mahmoud Abbas.

US Secretary of State James Baker warns that in a post-Cold War world the US would not let Saddam Hussein’s August 1990 invasion and erasure of Kuwait stand. Baker said that intimidation and force would not be tolerated. In January 1991, the US and its coalition partners ejected Iraq from Kuwait and restored its rulers.

After the 1991 Gulf War, the US orchestrates a conference with Israel, multiple Arab states, and Palestinians participating; the conference leads to bilateral and multilateral negotiations.

November 1, 1995 Three days before he was assassinated Nov. 4, 1995, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin told his speechwriter Yehuda Avner why he recognized the PLO and Yasser Arafat. That recognition came in the exchange...

With Israeli-Palestinian talks in a hapless state, President Clinton rejuvenates them. In the Arafat-Netanyahu agreement Israel shares Hebron, with the CIA playing a role in West Bank security.

From an Arab summit, the initiative is revised several times since; it calls for normalization of relations with Israel, Israel’s withdrawal to the 1967 lines, but states an imprecise resolution of the refugee issue.

He castigates PLO leader Arafat for support of terrorism and condemns Palestinian groups that “seek Israel’s destruction.” Bush suggests to Israel to support economically a viable Palestinian state.

As a negotiating plan it seeks an end to the conflict with reciprocal performance objectives. Israel accepts the plan with some reservations; Hamas rejects it out of hand. The plan is not enacted.

In his speech at the annual Herziliya Conference, PM Sharon articulates his view that the Quartet’s 2003 Road Map for Peace “is the only political plan accepted by Israel, the Palestinians, the Americans and a majority of the international community. We are willing to proceed toward its implementation: two states Israel and a Palestinian State living side by side in tranquility, security and peace.”

President Bush outlines view of Palestinian-Israeli settlement with Israeli Prime Minister: two state solution, borders to take into account changes in territories since 1967 War, and refugee resettlement in a future Palestinian state.

Prime Minister Sharon unilaterally withdrew Israeli military and civilian forces from the Gaza Strip in August 2005. Sharon sought to ensure Israel’s Jewish and democratic essence by getting out of the lives of the Palestinians. Instead Hamas used the territory to kill Jews and degrade Israel morally. Two decades later what would Sharon have said about trusting your neighbor unilaterally?

Thirteen years ago, then Prime Minister Netanyahu endorsed the evolution of a Palestinian state, stipulating that it had to be demilitarized, and he would not rule out a complete halt to settlement activity, noting that Palestinian refugees would not be resettled inside Israel's borders.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu gives five prerequisites for a peace with the Palestinians in call with the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations: mutual recognition, refugee resolution outside of Israel, end of conflict commitment, demilitarized Palestinian state, and guaranteed treaty or arrangement by the international community.

As part of the US negotiating team, Indyk enumerates why talks faltered after nine months. He asserts Israeli settlement activity undermined Palestinian trust for Israel. He also blames Palestinian indecision.

With exasperating passion, Kerry lashes out at Israel for its settlements construction as the major barrier to a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

President Trump’s proclamation to “officially recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel” breaks precedent. In doing so, he incurs bipartisan support in the US congress, but a flurry of criticism from analysts, diplomats and foreign leaders. In his remarks, Trump rebukes claims that he disqualified the US as a “reliable mediator” in future Palestinian-Israeli negotiations.

U.S. President Donald Trump recognizes Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights more than 37 years after Israel annexed the mountains.

The plan builds on previous proposals for a two-state solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict and contains a US-Israeli agreement that sets forth final borders for two states. The plan contains multiple prerequisites for Palestinian behavior before either the US or Israel might agree to Palestinian statehood as well as a proposed $50 economic development package to be allotted over a decade.

This map shows the State of Palestine as proposed by the Trump plan with features and selected locations from the Washington Institute Settlements and Solutions website.

The newly released U.S. peace plan marks a very significant shift in favor of the current Israeli government’s view, especially when compared to three past U.S. initiatives: (1) the Clinton Parameters of December 2000, (2) Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s “Annapolis Process” of 2007-2008, and (3) Secretary of State John Kerry’s 2013-2014 initiative. The message is clear: the Trump administration will no longer keep sweetening the deal with every Palestinian refusal, a criticism some have aimed at previous U.S. efforts. Yet the new plan raises worrisome questions of its own.

US Ambassador to Israel, David Friedman provides the most detailed Trump administration analyses of the prescribed two-state solution for terminating the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict.

CIE Founding President, Professor Ken Stein and Visiting Israeli Scholar, Dr. Nachman Shai, who served in the Israeli Parliament for 10 years, explain the context and implications of the Abraham Accords for Israel and the Middle East.

President Trump announces the diplomatic breakthrough, in which Israel halts its plans to annex parts of the West Bank, and in return, the UAE agrees to full diplomatic relations with Israel. This took place without any Israeli commitments to withdrawal from lands it won in the June 1967 war.

On President Joe Biden’s trip to Israel, he and Prime Minister Yair Lapid affirmed the long-term U.S.-Israel strategic relationship.

Addressing Israel's fear of Iran's access to nuclear weapons, the same point made by his predecessor Yair Lapid stressed in 2022 at the UN, Netanyahu like Lapid praised the Abraham Accords, noting in a quite unrestrained fashion that Israel was on the 'cusp of a historic peace with Saudi Arabia." The Prime Minister did mention support for a two-state solution with the Palestinians as Lapid had done previously.

Israeli Prime minister provides minimal detail for the Gaza Strip's post war civilian restructuring, focusing entirely on immediate and long term Israeli security needs with no imposed Palestinian state nor international negotiating intervention acceptable.

The essence of Netanyahu’s speech was to eliminate Hezbollah as a fighting force in Lebanon. He intoned, “Don’t let Nasrallah drag Lebanon into the abyss. We’re not at war with you. We’re at war with Hezbollah, which has hijacked your country and threatens to..."